IN THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO2008

STATE OF OHIO,

-vs-

Plaintiff-Appellee,

JEROME PETERSON,

Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 2008-1467

On Appeal from theFranklin County Courtof Appeals, TenthAppellate District

Court of AppealsCase No. 07AP-303

MEMORANDUM OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE OPPOSING JURISDICTION

RON O'BRIEN 0017245Franklin County Prosecuting AttorneySETH L. GILBERT 0072929Assistant Prosecuting Attorney(Counsel of Record)373 South High Street-13th Fl.Columbus, Ohio 43215Phone: 614-462-3555Fax: 614-462-6012Email: slgilber@franklincountyohio.gov

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE

WILLIAM S. LAZAROW 0014625(Counsel of Record)Attorney at Law400 South Fifth Street, Suite 301Columbus, Ohio 43215614-228-9058

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

LSUPREMl: COURT OF OHIO I

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXPLANATION OF.WHY THIS COURT SHOULD DECLINE JURISDICTION.1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS ................:................................................1

ARGUMENT ...........................:.........................................................................................7

Response to First Proposition of Law: The test forprosecutorial misconduct is whether remarks wereimproper and, if so, whether they prejudicially affectedsubstantial rights of the accused . .................................................................7

Response to Second Proposition of Law: The admissionof expert testimony is subject to an abuse-of-discretionstandard of review . ...................................................................................... 9

Response to Third Proposition of Law: To proveineffective assistance, a defendant must show deficientperformance and prejudice . .......................................................................11

Response to Fourth Proposition of Law: Evidence issufficient to sustain a conviction if, construing the evidencein a light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of factcould have found the defendant guilty. Reversal onmanifest-weight grounds is appropriate only in theexceptional case where the jury clearly closes its way andcreates a manifest miscarriage of justice . ..................................................14

CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................15

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ......................................................................unnumbered

i

EXPLANATION OF WHY THIS COURT SHOULD DECLINE JURISDICTION

Defendant's four propositions of law raise the routine, fact-specific issues of (1)

prosecutorial misconduct, (2) admissibility of expert testimony, (3) ineffective assistance

of counsel, and (4) sufficiency and manifest weight of the evidence. Defendant does not

seek to overrule, modify, or extend any principle of law, but rather simply claims that the

Tenth District improperly applied well-settled law to the narrow facts of this case. Thus,

any ruling from this Court would have minimal statewide importance.

Because the presents no questions of such constitutional substance or of such

great public interest as would warrant further review by this Court, and because the Tenth

District correctly affirmed defendant's convictions, the State respectfully submits that

jurisdiction should be declined.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS

Defendant was indicted for murder, aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery,

having a weapon while under disability (WUD), and participating in a criminal gang. All

but the WUD and the participating-in-a-criminal-gang counts carried frrearm and gang

specifications. The case proceeded to trial, where the following evidence was adduced.

On November 4, 2004, Derrick Goins contacted Tyrone Payne to tell him that he

(Goins) had just received a shipment of cocaine and marijuana. Payne relayed this

information to Detective Annie Durbin of the Franklin County Sheriffs Department, for

whom Payne worked as a confidential informant. Payne then called Goins back, and

Goins offered to sell Payne some of the cocaine (unbeknownst to Goins, Durbin was

listening in on the conversation). Goins also offered to give Payne some of the marijuana

as payment of an old debt.

1

Wanting to look like a "big guy," Payne next contacted defendant Jerome

Peterson and offered to sell to him the marijuana he was going to receive from Goins (the

marijuana was high-end marijuana called "hydro"). Payne also wanted to introduce

defendant to Goins to set up a drug deal between the two.

Later that night, defendant met Payne at Payne's house; with defendant were two

individuals whom Payne did not know. Payne later identified these two individuals as

Reginald Perry and Justin King. During the meeting, Perry commented that Goins is

"spoon fed"-meaning that Goins received his drugs from another source-and asked

defendant whether they could rob him. Payne responded that there was no need to rob

Goins, as Goins typically "fronted" drugs to Payne, meaning that he gave Payne drugs

and expected payment only after the drugs were later sold. Payne, however, told

defendant and Perry that what they did after he introduced them to Goins was up to them.

Perry, King, defendant, and Payne eventually went to Goins' apartment. Payne

then went into the apartment as the others waited outside. The plan was for Payne to get

a sample of the drugs and bring it outside so defendant could inspect it. When Payne

entered the apartment, Goins first gave Payne the marijuana to pay off the old debt.

Next, Payne told Goins that defendant was outside and wanted to inspect a sample of the

drugs. Goins allowed Payne to take a sample from about five or six ounces of cocaine on

the counter.

As Payne headed outside to show defendant the sample, defendant and Perry

"[b]urst in" the apartment. Defendant came in first, and Perry-who had a gun-

followed behind. After entering, defendant grabbed a baseball bat from somewhere

inside the apartment. Perry yelled "Shut the fuck up" as he waived the gun around.

2

Defendant was "poking" the baseball bat at Goins, who was sitting on a couch near the

front door.

Goins got up off the couch and tried to "charge" Perry, but Perry stepped back

and pointed the gun at him. At this point, Goins said, "Don't shoot me, don't kill me.

The drugs are on the counter." Meanwhile, Payne was screaming at defendant, saying

that he "didn't have to do this." As Payne and defendant were arguing, Perry pointed the

gun at Payne and instructed him to lie face-down on the floor. Payne complied.

As Perry headed toward the kitchen to get the drugs, Goins got up from the couch

and ran to front door. Defendant tried to block Goins from the door, but Goins managed

to get through. Defendant and Perry both chased Goins outside, with defendant leading

the way. Shortly thereafter, Payne, who was still inside the apartment, heard a single

gunshot. Payne remained inside the apartment for a few minutes; when he heard a car

drive away, he went outside and saw Goins lying on the ground near the front porch.

Goins was still breathing but was bleeding.

Payne went back inside the apartment to find his cell phone, but it was gone.

Payne then drove to a friend's apartment a few minutes away, where he called Detective

Durbin and told her that he thought someone had been shot. Because he was scared,

Payne did not tell Durbin everything he knew. Durbin instructed Payne to return to the

scene to see what happened. Payne then drove back to Goins' apartment, saw that Goins

was still lying on the ground, then returned to his friend's apartment and again called

Durbin. Still afraid, Payne told Durbin that everything was okay. Payne then called

another friend and instructed him to ca11911.

3

When the police arrived at the scene, Goins was deceased. The cause of Goins'

death was a single gunshot to the head.

Later the night of the shooting, Payne called his cell phone and defendant

answered. Defendant asked Payne if he had spoken to the police. Although he had

already spoken to Durbin by this point, Payne was afraid, so he answered, "No." The two

then arranged to meet at Aquarium Club. At the club, defendant offered to give Payne

three of the six ounces of cocaine that he and Perry stole from Goins' apartment. Payne

declined the offer then went home.

The next day, defendant went to Payne's house and offered him $10,000 not to

talk to the police. Payne declined this offer as well and told defendant that he would not

contact the police.

Payne contacted Durbin later that day, and Durbin arranged for him to speak to

homicide detectives. To minimize his involvement in the incident, Payne told the

detectives that he was in his car when the shot was fired and that he did not know any of

the perpetrators. Eventually, however, Payne told the police everything he knew. In all,

Payne spoke to the police several times-each time, Payne initiated the contact, and with

each contact he revealed more infonnation about the shooting.

King also testified about the events at Goins' apartment. King stated that he and

defendant drove to Goins' apartment in King's car, while Payne and Perry went in a

separate car. King testified that when he arrived at the apartment, Payne and Perry were

already inside. After he and defendant waited in the car for a few minutes, defendant got

out of the car and started walking up the driveway. Defendant was standing near Goins'

porch when King heard something slam against the security door.

According to King, he then got out of the car and was walking toward the

apartment when a man ran out of the apartment. Perry followed the man out of the

apartment and shot him: Perry, King, and defendant then ran to the car and drove away;

in Perry's hands were a gun and a brown bag. Defendant later told King that Perry gave

him (defendant) half of the drugs for defendant to give to Payne. King, however, did not

know whether defendant actually gave the drugs to Payne. King also testified that he

heard Perry bragging about the shooting, and that King and defendant both were

concerned about Perry's bragging. King testified that he was unaware of any plans to rob

Goins that night, although he had a "gut feeling" that a robbery was to take place.

King's trial testimony was inconsistent with a "proffer" statement he prior to the

trial. Greg Peterson-a former assistant prosecutor who at the time of trial was a

conunon pleas judge-testified that in January 2005 he was involved in accepting King's

"proffer." Contrary to King's trial testimony, King told Peterson during the proffer that,

from the very beginning, the purpose of going to Goins' apartment was to rob Goins.

According to Peterson, "[fJrom the beginning of the proffer it was clear Justin admitted

right out of the gate that their entire intention of this whole situation was for a robbery to

occur." Peterson also testified that there was "no question" that King said during the

proffer that defendant was inside Goins' apartment when Goins ran outside and was shot

by Perry.

Detective Patrick Brooks of the Columbus Police Department's Strategic

Response Bureau testified that he interacts with criminal gangs on a daily basis and had

done so for ten years. Brooks has attended over ten conferences on gang activity and has

received regular ongoing training on the topic.

5

One criminal gang in the Columbus area is the "Deuce-Deuce Bloods," also

known as the "22°d Street Bloods." The Deuce-Deuce Bloods engage in "every crime

you can imagine," including kidnapping and drug and weapon trafficking. Brooks

explained that, even when just two or three gang members commit a crime, the entire

gang can benefit. For example, criminal activity generates funds that can be used to pay

attorney fees, to assist family members of incarcerated gang members, or to purchase

narcotics. Individual crimes also enhance the gang's overall reputation.

According to Brooks, there are five criteria to determine whether an individual is

in a criminal gang: (1) whether the individual has any identifying gang tattoos, (2) the

type and color of the individual's clothing, (3) information from confidential informants,

(4) with whom the individual associates, and (5) self admission.

Perry, King, and defendant are all members of Deuce-Deuce Bloods. With

respect to defendant, each of the above five criteria apply. For example, Brooks testified

that defendant has a "614 Boys" tattoo, a reference to Columbus' area code, which gang

members use to identify where they are from. Defendant has also been seen wearing

clothing red in color-the color associated with the Bloods-and depicting gang-related

phrases.

Moreover, in July 2001, a confidential informant saw defendant at a Deuce-Deuce

Bloods meeting held at King's house. The purpose of the meeting was to "rally the gang

around those who were incarcerated, intimidate witnesses, to get money together to help

out family and to help for attorneys." Another purpose of the meeting was to discuss

retaliating against witnesses who were going to testify against Dartangnan Hill, a known

Deuce-Deuce Bloods member.

6

Additionally, Brooks has seen defendant "[m]any times" with other members of

Deuce-Deuce Bloods. Defendant went to various nightclubs with fellow gang members,

went to Grant Hospital when two fellow gang members had been shot, and attended the

funerals of two fellow gang members.

In July 2004, Brooks heard defendant say, "You ain't shit if you ain't a Blood."

And according to Greg Peterson, in January 2002, defendant admitted in open court that

he participated in a gang.

Defendant was convicted on all counts and specifications and was sentenced

accordingly. The Tenth District affirmed defendant's convictions. State v. Peterson, 10a

Dist. No. 07AP-303, 2008-Ohio-2838. Defendant now seeks discretionary review.

ARGUMENT

Response to First Proposition of Law: The test forprosecutorial misconduct is whether remarks wereimproper and, if so, whether they prejudicially affectedsubstantial rights of the accused.

Defendant's first proposition of law claims that the prosecutors engaged in

misconduct. Specifically, defendant complains that the prosecutors (1) presented Payne's

testimony regarding the events surrounding the shooting, (2) presented Greg Peterson's

testimony to impeach King, and (3) presented Brooks' testimony regarding gang activity.

"The test for prosecutorial misconduct is whether [the] remarks were improper

and, if so, whether they prejudicially affected substantial rights of the accused." State v.

Smith (2000), 87 Ohio St.3d 424, 442, citing State v. Smith (1984), 14 Ohio St.3d 13, 14.

The touchstone of analysis "is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the

prosecutor." Smith v. Phillips (1982), 455 U.S. 209, 219.

7

At the outset, defendant's arguments contain a fundamental flaw: he criticizes the

State's evidence, but then goes on to argue that the prosecutors invited the jury to convict

him "not upon the evidence." What defendant really seems to be arguing is that certain

components of the State's evidence either lacked credibility and/or were inadmissible.

For example, defendant argues that Payne's testimony is "unreliable and circumspect,"

that Greg Peterson's testimony was "unsupported," and that Brooks' testimony was

"improper, incorrect, and highly prejudicial." (Memorandum, 7)

But none of these arguments belongs in a proposition of law alleging .

prosecutorial misconduct. Absent a prosecutor knowingly presenting false testimony,

Mooney v. Holohan (1935), 294 U.S. 103, 112, or some other evidence of bad faith, it is

not misconduct for a prosecutor to present evidence to prove a defendant's guilt. A

prosecutorial-misconduct claim-by defrnition-examines the conduct of the prosecutor,

not the credibility or admissibility of the State's evidence.

Thus, to the extent defendant argues that the State's evidence lacked credibility,

those arguments are more appropriately addressed in defendant's fourth proposition of

law, which alleges that his convictions are against the manifest weight of the evidence.

And to the extent defendant alleges that Brooks' testimony was inadmissible, that

argument is more appropriately addressed in defendant's second proposition of law,

which alleges that the trial court erred in admitting Brooks' testimony.

Even if defendant's arguments were cognizable as prosecutorial-misconduct

claims, he would still be entitled to no relief. To start, defendant raised no prosecutorial-

misconduct objections during the trial. Thus, defendant's prosecutorial-misconduct

8

arguments are subject to plain-error review. Crim.R. 52(B); State v. Slagle (1992), 65

Ohio St.3d 597, 604.

Defendant fails to show any error, let alone plain error. The evidence that

defendant criticizes was all relevant and admissible, so the State's reliance on this

evidence did not deprive defendant of a fair trial. Payne's testimony was relevant and

admissible in that he described the events surrounding the shooting. Peterson's testimony

regarding King's prior inconsistent statements was relevant and admissible to impeach

King. And Brooks was properly qualified as an expert on gang activity; and his

testimony was admissible to prove the gang specifications and the participating-in-a-

criminal gang count. Brooks' testimony was also admissible to show motive.

For the foregoing reasons, defendant's first proposition of law deserves no further

review.

Response to Second Proposition of Law: The admissionof expert testimony is subject to an abuse-of-discretionstandard of review.

Defendant's second proposition of law claims that the trial court improperly

admitted Brooks' gang-related expert testimony. Specifically, defendant cites Daubert v.

Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals (1993), 509 U.S. 579, and argues that Brooks was not

properly qualified as an expert.

"[T]he admission of evidence lies within the broad discretion of the trial court,

and a reviewing court should not disturb evidentiary decisions in the absence of an abuse

of discretion that has created material prejudice." State v. Conway, 109 Ohio St.3d 412,

2006-Ohio-2815, ¶62, citing State v. Issa (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 49, 64. This discretion

9

extends to the admission of expert testimony under Evid.R. 702, State v. Adams, 103

Ohio St.3d 508, 2004-Ohio-5845, ¶88, and to determinations of admissibility under

Evid.R. 403(A), State v. Bethel, 110 Ohio St.3d 416, 2006-Ohio-4853, ¶171. "The term

`abuse of discretion' * * * implies that the court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or

unconscionable." State v. Adams (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157.

As this Court has held, a police officer may be qualified as an expert on gang-

related matters if he has gained knowledge and experience about gangs through

investigating gang activities and if his testimony shows that he possesses specialized

knowledge about gang symbols, cultures, and traditions beyond that of the trier of fact.

State v. Drummond, 111 Ohio St.3d 14, 2006-Ohio-5084, ¶116; see, also State v.

Jefferson (2001), 9°i Dist. No. 20156 (police officer properly qualified as an expert on

gang activity when he had years of experience in the police gang unit and had received

specialized training); State v. Jones (2000), 10'' Dist. No. 99AP-704 (same).

Defendant fails to show any abuse of discretion. Brooks testified that he interacts

with gangs on a daily basis and has done so for ten years. Brooks also stated that he has

attended over ten conferences on gang activity and has received ongoing training on the

topic. Contrary to defendant's contention, the fact that Brooks' qualifications related to

his work as a police officer makes him no less an expert on gang activity and gang

identification.

Moreover, defendant's reliance on Daubert is misplaced. In Drummond, this

Court specifically held that the so-called Daubert factors (peer review, publication,

potential error rate, etc.) do not apply to expert testimony on gangs. Drummond, at ¶119.

"[U]nlike scientific testimony, expert testimony about gangs depends heavily on the

10

expert's knowledge and experience rather than on the expert's methodology and theory."

Id., citing United States v. Hankey (C.A. 9, 2000), 203 F.3d 1160, 1169.

For the foregoing reasons, defendant's second proposition of law deserves no

further review.

Response to Third Proposition of Law: To proveineffective assistance, a defendant must show deficientperformance and prejudice.

Defendant's third proposition of law claims that his trial counsel was ineffective.

Specifically, defendant claims that his trial counsel was deficient in (1) not filing a jury

waiver with respect to the gang specifications and the participating-in-a-criminal-gang

count, (2) not seeking severance of the gang specifications and the participating-in-a-

criminal-gang count, (3) not filing a pre-trial motion in limine or motion to suppress to

exclude Brooks' testimony, and (4) not raising prosecutorial-misconduct objections

throughout the trial.

To prevail on an ineffective-assistance claim, a defendant must show (1) that his

trial counsel's performance fell below an objective level of reasonable representation, and

(2) that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the

result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466

U.S. 668, 687, 697. "Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance is to be highly

deferential, and reviewing courts must refrain from second-guessing the strategic

decisions of trial counsel." State v. Carter (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 545, 558. Ineffective-

assistance claims are generally unreviewable on direct appeal because of inadequacies of

the appellate record. Massaro v. United States (2003), 538 U.S. 500, 504-05. Although

11

there are "rare instances" in which claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness can be

legitimately argued on appeal, id. at 507, the present case is not one of them.

Defendant first argues that, rather than cross-examining Brooks on his gang-

related testimony, trial counsel should have waived jury on the gang specifications and

the participating-in-a-criminal-gang count. But with respect to the gang specifications,

defendant's argument is a non-starter. R.C. 2941.142 says nothing of whether jury may

be waived on a gang specification. Compare, State v. Nagel (1999), 84 Ohio St.3d 280,

285 (discussing prior-conviction specifications under former R.C. 2941.142 and R.C.

2941.143, both of which stated that "the defendant may request that the trial judge, in a

case tried by a jury, determine the existence of the specification at the sentencing

hearing"). Moreover, in Nagel, this Court held that the phrase "criminal cases" in R.C.

2945.05 does not encompass specifications. Id. at 286. Thus, a defendant may waive

jury on a specification while demanding ajury trial on the underlying count.

Even if defendant could have waived jury on the gang specifications, defendant

still fails to show any ineffective assistance. The ultimate authority to determine whether

to waive jury belonged not to trial counsel but to defendant himself Jones v. Barnes

(1983), 463 U.S. 745, 751. The record, however, does not disclose what advice trial

counsel gave to defendant regarding whether to waive jury on the gang specifications and

the participating-in-a-criminal-gang count. For aught that appears in the record, it may

well have been that trial counsel advised defendant to waive jury, and defendant refused.

Defendant next argues that his trial counsel should have sought to sever the gang

specifications and the participating-in-a-criminal-gang count. With respect to the gang

specifications, defendant's argument is again a non-starter. Crim.R. 14 provides for

12

severance of counts, not specifications. "[A] specification is, by its very nature, ancillary

to, and completely dependent upon, the existence of the underlying criminal charge or

charges to which the specification is attached." Nagel, 84 Ohio St.3d at 286. Thus,

specifications must be tried along with their underlying counts and cannot be severed.

Besides, any motion to sever would have been overruled. The law favors the

joinder of multiple offenses in a single trial. State v. Brinkley, 105 Ohio St.3d 231, 2005-

Ohio-1507, ¶28. Thus, to obtain severance, the burden would have been on the defense

to prove prejudice. Id., at ¶29, citing State v. Torres (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 340, syllabus.

The State, however, could have rebutted any such prejudice by showing that the evidence

of the severed offenses would be admissible under Evid.R. 404(B) in a trial on the other

offenses. Brinkley, at ¶30, citing State v. Lott (1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 160, 163.

Here, the State would have rebutted any such claimed prejudice, because, even in

a severed trial, Brooks' testimony would have been admissible. Brooks' testimony

regarding the relationship between defendant, Perry, and King as fellow members of

Deuce-Deuce Bloods was admissible to show defendant's complicity in the crimes.

Bethel, at ¶170. And Brooks' testimony providing background information about Deuce-

Deuce Bloods was admissible to put the crimes in context and to show defendant's

motive. Drummond, at ¶76.

Defendant next argues that his trial counsel should have filed a pre-trial motion in

limine or motion to suppress to exclude Brooks' gang-related testimony. But any such

motion would have been overruled. As explained above, Brooks' training and experience

qualified him to give expert testimony regarding gang activity and gang identification.

13

Nor was trial counsel ineffective in choosing not to raise prosecutorial-

misconduct objections. As explained more fully in the State's response to defendant's

first assignment of error, defendant's criticisms of the credibility and admissibility of the

State's evidence are not properly raised as prosecutorial-misconduct claims. In any

event, the evidence defendant criticizes was all relevant and admissible. Thus, any

prosecutorial-misconduct objections would have been overruled.

For the foregoing reasons, defendant's third proposition of law deserves no

further review.

Response to Fourth Proposition of Law: Evidence issufficient to sustain a conviction if, construing the evidencein a light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of factcould have found the defendant guilty. Reversal onmanifest-weight grounds is appropriate only in theexceptional case where the jury clearly closes its way andcreates a manifest miscarriage of justice.

Defendant's fourth proposition of law claims that his convictions are supported by

insufficient evidence and are against the manifest weight of the evidence. In judging the

sufficiency of the evidence, the following test applies:

An appellate court's function when reviewing thesufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction isto examine the evidence admitted at trial to determinewhether such evidence, if believed, would convince theaverage mind of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonabledoubt. The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing theevidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, anyrational trier of fact could have found the essential elementsof the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259, paragraph two of the syllabus.

14

Under a manifest weight review, a court of appeals sits as a "thirteenth juror" and,

after "reviewing the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences,

considers the credibility of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the

evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice

that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered." State v. Thompkins ( 1997),

78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, quoting State v. Martin ( 1983), 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175.

Here, construing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, a rational trier

of fact could have found defendant guilty of murder, aggravated burglary, aggravated

robbery, WUD, participating in a criminal gang, as well as the attached firearm and gang

specifications. Nor did the jury (or the trial court on the WUD count) clearly lose its way

in finding defendant guilty.

For the foregoing reasons, defendant's fourth proposition of law deserves no

further review.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully submits that jurisdiction should

be declined.

Respectfully submitted,

RON O'BRIEN 0017245PKosecutlypg Attorney

GILBERT 0072929'sistWProsecuting Attorney

Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellee

15

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to qertify that a copy of the foregoing was sent by regular U.S. Mail, this

nelday, August 1,

'Cl-2008, to WILLIAM S. LAZAROW, 400 South Fifth Street, Suite 301,

Columbus, Ohio 43215; Counsel for Defendant-Appellant.

sis*t Vrosecuting Attorney

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