G.R. No. L-7857 March 27, 1913

MANUEL E. CUYUGAN,petitioner, andLIM TUICO, actual owner,appellees,vs.PEDRO SY QUIA,respondent-appellant.

This is a proceeding before the Court of Land Registration for what is alleged to be a correction in a decree of that court made in the year 1907 registering title to certain land described therein.

The original application which resulted in the decree aforesaid was made in the name of Manuel E. Cuyugan y Vergara. Pedro Sy Quia, who owned the land bounding upon the north side the lands sought to be registered, opposed the registration. After a trial in the Court of Land Registration the opposition of Sy Quia was overruled and the property was registered in the name of Manuel E. Cuyugan y Vergara aforesaid. After the registration of the land Manuel y Cuyugan y Vergara sold the same to Lim Tuico in the manner prescribed in Act No. 496.

Until the 19th of December, 1911, no controversy had arisen between Pedro Sy Quia and Manuel E. Cuyugan y Vergara or his grantee, Lim Tuico, in regard to the actual location of the line between their lands as described and defined in the decree of registration entered on the 11th day of July, 1907. On said December 19, 1911, the city of Manila presented to the Court of Land Registration the following writing:

[Expediente No. 3325. Mariano Cuyugan, applicant.]

The city of Manila by its attorney appears and respectfully sets forth to the court:

I. That the plan of the land to which the above proceedings refer contains an error of closure greater than 1/1500;

II. That the city of Manila is interested in the correction of said error for the reason that it must condemn a part of said land for the public street.

Therefore, said city prays the court to order a new measurement of said land described in the plan filed in this proceedings.

Upon this application the Court of Land Registration made an order for a resurvey of said premises, and, upon the coming in of the report of the surveyor and of the plan accompanying the same, an order was entered on the 25th of January, 1912, "fixing a time and place for the hearing of the matter and the approval of said plan, of which order all the interested parties were notified." Upon the hearing thus set there appeared the city of Manila, Lim Tuico, and Pedro Sy Quia. Without any of the parties objecting to or in any way questioning the power or authority of the city of Manila to begin such a proceeding, trial was had, evidence was introduced by the city, by Lim Tuico, and Sy Quia relative to the location of the line between the lands registered and the lands of Sy Quia. Upon the evidence thus adduced the Court of Land Registration entered a decree providing:

(a) That said new plan, being folio No. 68 ofexpedienteNo. 3325, be approved;

(b) That the certificate of title and duplicate thereof, entered and issues as aforesaid in the name of the said Lim Tuico, be canceled by the registrar of deeds of the city of Manila and that a new certificate of title be entered and a new duplicate issued to Lim Tuico, including therein the technical description contained in said new plan, as follows: (New description.)

(c) That, for the purpose indicated, the duplicate certificate of title issued to the said Lim Tuico be delivered up to the said registrar of deeds without delay.

This appeal is from that decree.

A comparison of the plan which was the basis of the original registration with the plan made under the proceedings registration with the plan made under the proceedings initiated by the city of Manila discloses a difference in the size of the parcel of land which the two plans are supposed to describe. There also appears from such comparison a difference in the direction of one or more of the lines which mark the limits of said land. It appears from the record, indeed it is the cause of the controversy now before us, that the new plan takes from Sy Quia a small piece of land which pertained to him under the original plan and decree of the Court of Land Registration. In other words, the result of the proceedings instituted nearly four years after the final decree definitely and finally registered the land therein described, extends the limits of the land thus registered toward the upon the lands of Sy Quia, thereby depriving him a land which was found to belong to him in the proceedings resulting in said decree and which lands, by virtue of such finding, were excluded from registration in the name of Manuel Cuyugan y Vergara. It is thus seen that, under as a result of proceedings begun by the city of Manila, the Court of Land Registration has opened a final decree of the court and changed not only the description but the area of the land registered by that decree.

This proceeding seems to have been conducted by the city of Manila, by Lim Tuico, and by the court upon the theory that its object was the result would be the correction of a decree of the Court of Land Registration. That idea prevails throughout the case. It is manifest in the citation by the court of section 112 of Act No. 496 to support its power to maintain the proceeding, and it is apparent in the evidence and arguments presented by the appellee. We are of the opinion, however, that is error. Whatever the intention of the parties and of the court may have been the result was not the correction of a decree but the making of a new decree upon new evidence. It was not that changing of a decree but the changing of the evidence upon which the decree was based. It is not questioned by any of the parties or contradicted by any portion of the record that the original decree, entered on 11th day of July, 1907, was in its provisions in strict accord with the evidence in the case. The same description appears in the decree that appears in the plan was made by an expert surveyor who testified upon that proceeding to its correctness and to the location of the lines marking the boundaries of the lands registered. If there was a mistake in that description as given by the plan and the testimony given by the surveyor who made it to prove its correctness, it was a mistake of evidence, an error of fact. A decree entered upon facts which are not true is not itself erroneous. It is a perfectly correct decree according to the evidence in the case. No other decree could have been entered. A decree which is at variance with the evidence presented to support that decree is an erroneous decree and, within certain limitations, may be corrected to conform to the evidence; but a decree which is entered in accordance with the evidence is not erroneous decree but a correct one.

From this it is clear that what the Land Court attempted and accomplished was not the correction of a decree but the retrial of the case with the production of new and conflicting evidence and the entering of a new decree thereupon. That the proceeding was a new trial essentially is demonstrated by the fact that Lim Tuico claimed that the northern line was located at one place and introduced evidence to support that contention, while Sy Quia claimed that said line was located at another place and introduced evidence to support his contention, while Sy Quia claimed that said line was located at another place and introduced evidence to support his contention. Different surveyors were presented as witnesses and gave conflicting testimony as to where the line between Lim Tuico and Sy Quia was really located. Upon this conflicting evidence the court found that the line was located differently from what its location was found to be on the trial of case No. 3325 which resulted in the decree of July 11, 1907. It found that, according to the preponderance of the evidence, the line was located as described in the new plan made by the surveyor favorable to Lim Tuico and adjudged that the land registered in 1907 was not correct in amount or description. It, therefore, decreed the registration of the newly described parcel of land.

It is our opinion that the Court of Land Registration exceeded its authority. The original and fundamental purpose of Act No. 496 was to settle finally and for all time the title to land registered. A decree of registration cannot be permanent if the limits of the land therein registered may be changed or the amount of land so registered altered by a subsequent adjudication of said court based upon the new evidence tending to show that the evidence introduced on the former hearing was incorrect. The fact that A, who obtains a judgment against B for P1,000, subsequently discovers that the evidence which he gave on the trial of that case erroneously showed that the sum due him was P1,000 instead of P1,500, the amount really due him, does not permit him to apply to the court four years later to open said judgment, retry the case, introduce evidence establishing a debt of P1,500, and obtain a judgment against B for P1,500 instead of P1,000, under cover of the claim that he had made a mistake in giving his evidence originally.

It is of no importance that the claim in this proceeding is made that the error complained of is one of closure. The naming of the error does not alter its nature nor does it alter the nature of the proceeding based upon it. upon it. The difficulty is that, while the city of Manila alleges that there is an error, Sy Quia, who is injured by its correction if it be an error, denies that such error existed or exists and produces witnesses to sustain his denial. Where an error of evidence is alleged there always results an issue of fact if the existence of the error is denied by the opposing party. Just as in the example given, B comes forward and alleges that there was no error in A's evidence tending to show a debt of P1,000, for the reason that he never owed A more than P1,000, thus producing an issue, so, in the present case, Sy Quia comes forward and says there was no error in the former description, that the line located in the original plan was properly located, and denies, producing witnesses to support that denial, that Lim Tuico has any right of authority in fact or in law to take from him any land by any proceeding whatever, especially under cover of correcting an error.

Moreover, contents arising over the location of division lines are actionsin personamand must be tried in the ordinary courts of law and not in the Court of Land Registration. They are actions involving the title to real estate, damages for illegal detention, for the cutting of timber, or the taking of crops. Sometimes they are for ejectment and sometimes for trespass. After the land has been registered the Court of Land Registration ceases to have jurisdiction over it for any purpose and it returns to the jurisdiction of the ordinary court of law of the Islands for all subsequent purposes. The only authority remaining in the Court of Land Registration after its decree becomes final is that to it by section 112 of Act No. 496. That section does not convey authority to conduct a proceeding like the present or to take cognizance in any way of disputes subsequently arising between adjoining owners and owners of the land registered.

The judgment appealed from is reversed and proceeding dismissed. No costs. So ordered.

SPOUSES FRANCISCO and BERNARDINA RODRIGUEZ,Petitioners,v.HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES CHRISTOPHER and MA. ANGELICA BARRAMEDA, and SPOUSES ANTONIO and MARIDEL CALINGO,Respondents.

This is a Petition for Review of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated September 7, 1999 in CA-G.R. CV No. 48772 and its resolution dated March 31, 2000. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati in Civil Case No. 92-3524.

The facts show that herein respondent Spouses Antonio and Maridel Calingo (respondents Calingo) were the registered owners of a house and lot located at No. 7903 Redwood Street, Marcelo Green Village, Paraaque, Metro Manila. The property was mortgaged to the Development Bank of the Philippines, which mortgage was later absorbed by the Home Mutual Development Fund (HMDF) or Pag-ibig.

On April 27, 1992, respondents Calingo and respondent Spouses Christopher and Ma. Angelica Barrameda (respondents Barrameda) entered into a contract of sale with assumption of mortgage where the former sold to the latter the property in question and the latter assumed to pay the outstanding loan balance to the Development Bank of the Philippines.1Respondents Barrameda issued two checks in the amounts ofP150,000.00 andP528,539.76, for which respondents Calingo issued a receipt dated April 24, 1992.2

In a letter dated April 23, 1992, respondent Antonio S. Calingo informed HMDF/Pag-ibig about the sale of the property with assumption of mortgage. Said letter, however, together with an affidavit by respondents Calingo, was served upon HMDF/Pag-ibig on October 2, 1992.3

On May 29, 1992, respondents Barrameda filed with the Register of Deeds of Paraaque an affidavit of adverse claim on the property. The adverse claim was inscribed at the back of the certificate of title as Entry No. 3439.4

On June 1, 1992, respondent Ma. Angelica Paez-Barrameda wrote HMDF, Mortgage and Loans Division informing the office that they have purchased the subject property from the Calingo spouses and that they filed a notice of adverse claim with the Register of Deeds of Paraaque. They also sought assistance from said office as regards the procedure for the full settlement of the loan arrearages and the transfer of the property in their names.5

Respondents Barrameda moved into the property on June 2, 1992.

On July 13, 1992, a notice of levy with attachment on real property by virtue of a writ of execution was annotated at the back of the certificate of title of the property in question. The writ of execution was issued by Judge Salvador Abad Santos, Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 65 in connection with Civil Case No. 88-2159 involving a claim by herein petitioners, Spouses Francisco and Bernardina Rodriguez, against respondents Calingo. Judge Abad Santos issued the writ in favor of petitioners Rodriguez.6

On July 21, 1992, petitioners' counsel, Atty. Nelson A. Loyola, sent a letter to respondents Barrameda inquiring about the basis of their occupation of the property in question.

On August 21, 1992, respondents Barrameda remitted to respondents Calingo the amount ofP364,992.07 to complete the payment of the agreed purchase price. Respondents Calingo acknowledged receipt of said amount and waived all their rights to the property in favor of the Barrameda spouses. They also guaranteed that the property was clear and free from any liens and encumbrances, except the real estate mortgage assumed by respondents Barrameda.7

On October 7, 1992, respondents Barrameda executed a joint affidavit stating that they are the owners of the property in question by virtue of a deed of sale with assumption of mortgage; that they registered an affidavit of adverse claim with the Register of Deeds of Paraaque; that the Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 65, Makati, Sheriff Manuel C. Dolor, levied said property despite their adverse claim; and that they have acquired the property long before the levy was made, and therefore, said levy was illegal. They served a copy of the affidavit on petitioners' counsel, Atty. Loyola, who made a reply thereto on October 15, 1992.

In his letter to Christopher Barrameda dated October 15, 1992, Atty. Loyola pointed out that the alleged deed of sale with assumption of mortgage was not registered with the Register of Deeds and that the records of the HMDF show that the property is owned by the Calingo spouses. He urged the Barrameda spouses to confer with the petitioners to amicably settle the controversy.8

On November 9, 1992, respondents Barrameda found a Notice of Sheriff's Sale posted on their front gate, announcing the auction sale of their house and lot on December 3, 1992 at 10:00 in the morning.9

On November 20, 1992, pursuant to Rule 39, Section 17 of the Revised Rules of Court, respondents Barrameda served a Notice of Third Party Claim upon Sheriff Manuel C. Dolor, accompanied by their affidavit of title.

On December 2, 1992, respondents Barrameda filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati a petition for quieting of title with prayer for preliminary injunction. The petition prayed, among others, that the execution sale of the property be enjoined, the notice of levy and attachment inscribed on the certificate of title be cancelled, and that respondents Barrameda be declared the lawful and sole owners of the property in question.10

The trial court ruled in favor of herein petitioners and dismissed respondents Barrameda's petition for quieting of title. It ruled that the annotation of respondents Barrameda's adverse claim at the back of the certificate of title was insufficient to establish their claim over the property. It said that respondents Barrameda, as buyers of the property, should have registered the title in their names. Furthermore, respondents Barrameda's adverse claim had lost its efficacy after the lapse of thirty days in accordance with the provisions of the Land Registration Act. The trial court also found that there was collusion between respondents Barrameda and respondents Calingo to transfer the property to defraud third parties who may have a claim against the Calingos.11

The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the decision of the trial court. Citing the ruling inSajonas v. Court of Appeals,12the appellate court held that respondents Barrameda's adverse claim inscribed on the certificate of title was still effective at the time the property was levied on execution. It said:

Therefore, the disputed inscription of adverse claim on TCT No. 83612/57286 was still in effect on July 13, 1992 when the Rodriguezes caused the annotation of the notice of levy on execution thereto. Consequently, they are charged with knowledge that the property sought to be levied upon on execution was encumbered by an interest the same as or better than that of the registered owner thereof. Such notice of levy cannot prevail over the existing adverse claim inscribed on the certificate of title in favor of the Barramedas. xxx

The court held, therefore, that the notice of levy could not prevail over respondents Barrameda's adverse claim.

Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the appellate court's ruling, but the motion was denied.

Hence, this petition. Petitioners essentially argue that the remedy of a petition for quieting of title was not available to respondents Barrameda as they did not have a valid title to the property in question; that the affidavit of adverse claim inscribed by respondents Barrameda at the back of the certificate of title was not sufficient to establish their claim to the property; and there was collusion between respondents Barrameda and respondents Calingo.

The principal issue that needs to be resolved in this case is whether respondents Barrameda's adverse claim on the property should prevail over the levy on execution issued by another court in satisfaction of a judgment against respondents Calingo.

We hold that it cannot.

Respondents Barrameda anchor their claim on the property on the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage executed by them and respondents Calingo on April 27, 1992. The Property Registration Decree13requires that such document be registered with the Register of Deeds in order to be binding on third persons. The law provides:

Sec. 51.Conveyance and other dealings by registered owner.An owner of registered land may convey, mortgage, lease, charge or otherwise deal with the same in accordance with existing laws. He may use such forms of deeds, mortgages, leases or other voluntary instruments as are sufficient in law.But no deed, mortgage, lease, or other voluntary instrument, except a will purporting to convey or affect registered land shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract between the parties and as evidence of authority to the Register of Deeds to make registration.

The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned, and in all cases under this Decree, the registration shall be made in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land lies. (emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary

It is admitted in this case that the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage was not registered, but instead, respondents Barrameda filed an affidavit of adverse claim with the Register of Deeds. The question now is whether the adverse claim is sufficient to bind third parties such as herein petitioners.

InL.P. Leviste and Company, Inc. v. Noblejas,14we explained when an inscription of an adverse claim is sufficient to affect third parties, thus:

The basis of respondent Villanueva's adverse claim was an agreement to sell executed in her favor by Garcia Realty. An agreement to sell is a voluntary instrument as it is a wilful act of the registered owner. As such voluntary instrument, Section 50 of Act No. 496 [now Presidential Decree No. 1529] expressly provides that the act of registration shall be the operative act to convey and affect the land. And Section 55 of the same Act requires the presentation of the owner's duplicate certificate of title for the registration of any deed or voluntary instrument. As the agreement to sell involves an interest less than an estate in fee simple, the same should have been registered by filing it with the Register of Deeds who, in turn, makes a brief memorandum thereof upon the original and owner's duplicate certificate of title. The reason for requiring the production of the owner's duplicate certificate in the registration of a voluntary instrument is that, being a wilful act of the registered owner, it is to be presumed that he is interested in registering the instrument and would willingly surrender, present or produce his duplicate certificate of title to the Register of Deeds in order to accomplish such registration.However, where the owner refuses to surrender the duplicate certificate for the annotation of the voluntary instrument, the grantee may file with the Register of Deeds a statement setting forth his adverse claim, as provided for in Section 110 of Act No. 496.In such a case, the annotation of the instrument upon the entry book is sufficient to affect the real estate to which it relates, although Section 72 of Act No. 496 imposes upon the Register of Deeds the duty to require the production by the [r]egistered owner of his duplicate certificate for the inscription of the adverse claim.The annotation of an adverse claim is a measure designed to protect the interest of a person over a piece of real property where the registration of such interest or right is not otherwise provided for by the Land Registration Act, and serves as a notice and warning to third parties dealing with said property that someone is claiming an interest on the same or a better right than the registered owner thereof. (emphases supplied)cralawlibrary

In the case at bar, the reason given for the non-registration of the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage was that the owner's duplicate copy of the certificate of title was in the possession of HMDF. It was not shown, however, that either respondents Barrameda or respondents Calingo exerted any effort to retrieve the owner's duplicate copy from the HMDF for the purpose of registering the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage. In fact, the parties did not even seek to obtain the consent of, much less inform, the HMDF of the sale of the property. This, despite the provision in the contract of mortgage prohibiting the mortgagor (respondents Calingo) from selling or disposing the property without thewritten consentof the mortgagee.15Respondents Calingo, as party to the contract of mortgage, are charged with the knowledge of such provision and are bound to comply therewith. Apparently, there was haste in disposing the property that respondents Calingo informed HMDF of the sale only on October 2, 1992 when they served a copy of their letter to said office regarding the transfer of the property to respondents Barrameda. There was no reason for the parties' failure to seek the approval of the HMDF to the sale as it appears from the letter of respondent Angelica Paez-Barrameda to HMDF that they were ready to pay in full the balance of the loan plus interest. What is more suspect is that the judgment against respondents Calingo ordering them to pay the petitioners the sum ofP1,159,355.90 was rendered on January 28, 1992, before the sale of the property on April 27, 1992. We also find it unsettling that respondents Barrameda, without any reservation or inquiry, readily remitted to respondents Calingo the full payment for the property on August 21, 1992 despite knowledge of the levy on execution over the property in July of the same year. Any prudent buyer of real property, before parting with his money, is expected to first ensure that the title to the property he is about to purchase is clear and free from any liabilities and that the sellers have the proper authority to deal on the property.

Again, we stress that the annotation of an adverse claim is a measure designed to protect the interest of a person over a piece of propertywhere the registration of such interest or right is not otherwise provided for by the law on registration of real property.Section 70 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 is clear:

Sec. 70.Adverse claim.Whoever claims any part or interest in registered land adverse to the registered owner, arising subsequent to the date of the original registration, may,if no other provision is made in this Decree for registering the same, make a statement in writing setting forth his alleged right or interest, and how or under whom acquired, a reference to the number of the certificate of title of the registered owner, the name of the registered owner, and a description of the land in which the right or interest is claimed. xxx

The deed of sale with assumption of mortgage executed by respondents Calingo and Barrameda is a registrable instrument. In order to bind third parties, it must be registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds. It was not shown in this case that there was justifiable reason why the deed could not be registered. Hence, the remedy of adverse claim cannot substitute for registration.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition isGRANTED. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals areSET ASIDEand the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Makati in Civil Case No. 92-3524 isREINSTATED. No cost.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 185604 June 13, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,Petitioner,vs.EDWARD M. CAMACHO,Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

VILLARAMA, JR.,J.:

Before this Court is a petition1for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, seeking the reversal of the Decision2of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 87390, which affirmed the Decision3of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Villasis, Pangasinan, Branch 50 in Land Registration Case No. V -0016.

The facts follow.

On March 6, 2003, respondent Edward M. Camacho filed a petition4denominated as "Re: Petition for Reconstitution of the Original Title of O.C.T. No. (not legible) and Issuance of Owner's Duplicate Copy" before the RTC.

In support thereof, respondent alleged that the Original Certificate of Title5(OCT) sought to be reconstituted and whose number is no longer legible due to wear and tear, is covered by Decree No. 444263, Case No. 3732, Record No. 221416issued in the name of Spouses Nicasio Lapitan and Ana Doliente (Spouses Lapitan) of Alcala, Pangasinan. Respondent also alleged that the owners duplicate copy of the OCT is in his possession and that he is the owner of the two parcels of land covered by the aforementioned OCT by virtue of a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition with Absolute Sale7(the Deed) executed on December 26, 2002 by the heirs of Spouses Lapitan in his favor. Said OCT covers two parcels of land located in San Juan, Alcala, Pangasinan, (Lot No. 1) and Namulatan,8Bautista, Pangasinan (Lot No. 2) with the following technical descriptions:

A parcel of land (Lot No. 1, plan Psu- 53673), situated in the Barrio of San Juan, Municipality of Alcala. Bounded on the NE. by property of Benito Ferrer; on the S. by an irrigation ditch and property of Marcelo Monegas; and on the W. by Lot No. 2. Beginning at a point marked "1" on plan, being S. 0 deg. 53 W., 3830.91 m. from B. L. L. M. No. 1, Alcala; thence S. 87 deg. 22 W., 44.91 m. to point "2"; thence N. 5 deg. 25 W., 214.83 m. to point "3"; thence S. 17 deg. 06 E., 221.61 m. to the point of beginning; containing an area of four thousand eight hundred and eighteen square meters (4,818), more or less. All points referred to are indicated on the plan and on the ground are marked by old P. L. S. concrete monuments; bearings true; declination 0 deg. 40 E.; date of survey, April 19-21, 1926; and

A parcel of land (Lot No. 2, plan Psu-53673), situated in the Barrio of Namulatan, Municipality of Bautista. Bounded on the N. by properties of Hipolito Sarmiento and Ciriaco Dauz; on the E. by Lot No.1; and on the SW. by property of Nicasio Lapitan vs. Felix Bacolor. Beginning at a point marked "1" on plan, being S. 2 deg. 40 W., 3625.25 m. from B. L. L. M. No. 1, Alcala; thence N. 80 deg. 47 E., 3.50 m. to point "2"; thence N. 86 deg. 53 E., 40.64 m. to point "3"; thence S. 5 deg. 25 E., 214.83 m. to point "4"; thence N. 16 deg. 57 W., 220.69 m. to the point of beginning; containing an area of four thousand seven hundred and fortyfour square meters (4,744), more or less. All points referred to are indicated on the plan and on the ground are marked by old P. L. S. concrete monuments; bearings true; declination 0 deg. 40 E.; date of survey April 19-21, 1926.9

Respondent attached to his petition photocopies of the Deed; the OCT; Tax Declaration No. 485810; a Certification11dated January 13, 2003 issued by the Office of the Register of Deeds of Lingayen, Pangasinan stating that the file copy of the OCT could not be found and is considered lost and beyond recovery; and Decree No. 444263.12

Upon a Show-Cause Order13of the RTC, respondent filed an Amended Petition14dated May 21, 2003, alleging that the subject properties bear no encumbrance; that there are no improvements therein; that there are no other occupants thereof aside from respondent; and that there are no deeds or instruments affecting the same that had been presented for registration. He further alleged that "the land in issue is bounded on the North by the land covered by Plan Psu-53673; on the North by the properties of Hipolito Sarmiento and Cipriano Dauz,15residents of Anulid, Alcala, Pangasinan; on the West by Lot No. 3; and on the Southwest by the properties of Nicasio Lapitan vs. Felix Bacolor who are also residents of Anulid, Alcala, Pangasinan."16Respodent intimated that he desires to have the office/file copy of the OCT reconstituted based on the Technical Description provided by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office and thereafter, to be issued a second owners duplicate copy in lieu of the old one.

On May 30, 2003, the RTC issued an Order17finding the respondents petition sufficient in form and substance and setting the same for hearing on September 29, 2003. The said Order is herein faithfully reproduced as follows:

O R D E R

In a verified petition, petitioner Edward Camacho, as vendee of the parcels of land located in San Juan, Alcala, Pangasinan, and Namulatan, Bautista, Pangasinan, covered by Decree No. 444263, Case No. 3732, G.L.R.O. No. 22141, formerly issued in the names of spouses Nicasio Lapitan and Ana Doliente, of Alcala, Pangasinan, under an Original Certificate of Title the number of which is not legible due to wear and tear, seeks an order directing the proper authorities and the Registrar of Deeds, Lingayen, Pangasinan, to reconstitute the office file copy of said Original Certificate of Title based on the technical description thereof and to issue a second owners duplicate copy of the same in lieu of the old one.

Being sufficient in form and substance, the petition is set for hearing on September 29, 2003, at 8:30 in the morning, before this Court, on which date, time and place, all interested persons are enjoined to appear and show cause why the same should not be granted.

Let this order be published twice in successive issues of the Official Gazette at the expense of the petitioner.

Likewise, let copies of this Order and of the Amended Petition be posted in conspicuous places in the Provincial Capitol and the Registry of Deeds, both in Lingayen, Pangasinan, the Municipal Halls of Alcala and Bautista, Pangasinan, and the Barangay Halls of San Juan, Alcala, Pangasinan and Namulatan, Bautista, Pangasinan, and the Office of the Solicitor General, Manila.

Finally, furnish copies of this Order, by registered mail, at the expense of the petitioner, to the following:

1. Hipolito Sarmiento;

2. Cipriano Dauz;

3. Nicasio Lapitan; and

4. Felix Bacolor.

all of Brgy. Anulid, Alcala, Pangasinan.

SO ORDERED.18

Thereafter, copies of the said order were posted on seven bulletin boards: at the Pangasinan Provincial Capitol Building, at the Alcala and Bautista Municipal Buildings, at the San Juan and Namulatan Barangay Halls, at the office of the Register of Deeds in Lingayen, Pangasinan and at the RTC.19The order was also published twice in the Official Gazette: on August 18, 2003 (Volume 99, Number 33, Page 5206), and on August 25, 2003 (Volume 99, Number 34, Page 5376).20

However, on January 22, 2004, respondent filed his second Amended Petition21averring that "the land in issue is bounded on the North by the land of Ricardo Acosta, a resident of Laoac, Alcala, Pangasinan; on the South by the property of Greg Viray,22a resident of Laoac, Alcala, Pangasinan; on the West by the land of Roque Lanuza,23a resident of Laoac, Alcala, Pangasinan; and on the East by the lot of Juan Cabuan,24a resident of Laoac, Alcala, Pangasinan."25On March 4, 2004, respondent filed a Motion26with Leave of Court to admit his second Amended Petition, which the RTC granted in its Order27dated March 4, 2004, directing therein that the persons mentioned in the second Amended Petition be notified by registered mail.

During the hearing, the following witnesses were presented: (1) respondent28who, among others, presented the original owners duplicate copy of the OCT before the RTC;29(2) the tenant of the adjoining lot (Western portion) Roque Lanuza who testified that he tilled the adjoining lots, that he has personal knowledge that respondent bought said lots from the heirs of the Spouses Lapitan, and that he was present when the lots were surveyed;30(3) adjoining owners Gregorio Viray31and Ricardo Acosta32who testified that they were notified of the proceedings and interposed no objection to the petition; and (4) Arthur David (Mr. David), Records Custodian of the Register of Deeds of Lingayen, Pangasinan who testified that Atty. Rufino Moreno, Jr., Registrar of Deeds had issued the Certification that the OCT subject of the petition can no longer be found in the Office of the Register of Deeds.33In his subsequent testimony, Mr. David reported to the RTC that the name of Nicasio Lapitan cannot be located in the Index Cards of titles as some are missing and destroyed. Upon questioning, Mr. David testified that the number of the OCT sought to be reconstituted may be referred to in the decree issued in the name of Nicasio Lapitan which allegedly could be found in the Land Registration Authority (LRA).34

On May 23, 2005, the LRA rendered a Report35addressed to the RTC which pertinently stated, to wit:

(1) The present amended petition seeks the reconstitution of Original Certificate of Title No. (not legible), allegedly lost or destroyed and supposedly covering Lot Nos. 1 and 2 of plan Psu-53673, situated in the Barrio of San Juan, Municipality of Alcala and Barrio of Namulatan, Municipality of Bautista, respectively, Province of Pangasinan, on the basis of the owners duplicate thereof, a reproduction of which, duly certified by Atty. Stela Marie Q. Gandia-Asuncion, Clerk of Court VI, was submitted to this Authority;

(2) Our records show that Decree No. 444263 was issued on July 18, 1931 covering Lot Nos. 1 and 2 of plan Psu-53673, in Cadastral Case No. 3732, GLRO Record No. 22141 in favor of the Spouses Nicasio Lapitan and Ana Doliente;

(3) The technical descriptions of Lot Nos. 1 and 2 of plan Psu-53673, appearing on the reproduction of Original Certificate of Title No. (not legible) were found correct after examination and due computation and when plotted in the Municipal Index Sheet No. 451/1027, do not appear to overlap previously plotted/decreed properties in the area.

The government prosecutor deputized by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)36participated in the trial of the case but did not present controverting evidence.37

On March 9, 2006, the RTC rendered the assailed Decision,38the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court, finding the documentary as well as the parole (sic) evidence adduced to be adequate and sufficiently persuasive to warrant the reconstitution of the Original Certificate of Title covered by Decree No. 444263, Cadastral Case No. 3732, GLRO Record No. 22141, and pursuant to Section 110, PD No. 1529 and Sections 2 (d) and 15 of RA No. 26, hereby directs the Register of Deeds at Lingayen, Pangasinan, to reconstitute said original certificate of title on the basis of the decree of registration thereof, without prejudice to the annotation of any subsisting rights or interests not duly noted in these proceedings, if any, and the right of the Administrator, Land Registration Authority, as provided for in Sec. 16, Land Registration Commission (now NALTDRA) Circular No. 35, dated June 13, 1983, and to issue a new owner's duplicate copy thereof.

SO ORDERED.39

On April 4, 2006, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, filed a Motion for Reconsideration40which was denied by the RTC in its Resolution41dated May 24, 2006 for lack of merit. The RTC opined that while the number of the OCT is not legible, a close examination of the entries therein reveals that it is an authentic OCT per the LRAs findings. Moreover, the RTC held that respondent complied with Section 2 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 2642considering that the reconstitution in this case is based on the owners duplicate copy of the OCT.

Petitioner appealed to the CA.43By Decision44dated July 31, 2008, the CA affirmed the RTCs findings and ruling, holding that respondents petition is governed by Section 10 of R.A. No. 26 since the reconstitution proceedings is based on the owners duplicate copy of the OCT itself. The CA, invoking this Courts ruling in Puzon v. Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc.,45concluded that notice to the owners of the adjoining lots is not required. Moreover, the CA opined that Decree No. 444263 issued on July 18, 1931 covering Lot Nos. 1 and 2 in the name of Spouses Lapitan exists in the Record Book of the LRA as stated in the LRAs Report. The CA ratiocinated that the LRAs Report on said Decree tallies with the subject OCT leading to no other conclusion than that these documents cover the same subject lots. Petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration46which the CA, however, denied in its Resolution47dated November 20, 2008.

Hence, this petition based on the following grounds, to wit:

1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED THE PETITION FOR RECONSTITUTION EVEN IF THE ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OFTITLE NUMBER IS NOT LEGIBLE; and

2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED THE PRAYER FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A SECOND OWNERS DUPLICATE.48

Petitioner through the OSG avers that respondent does not have any basis for reconstitution because the OCT per se is of doubtful existence, as respondent himself does not know its number. According to the OSG, this fact alone negates the merits of the petition for reconstitution as held by this Court in Tahanan Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, et al.49Moreover, the OSG highlights that the Deed, the tax declaration for the year 2003, and the Register of Deeds Certification all indicated that the number of the OCT is not legible. The OSG also stresses that nowhere in the records did the LRA acknowledge that it has on file the original copy of Decree No. 444263 from which the alleged OCT was issued and that said Decree did not at all establish the existence and previous issuance of the OCT sought to be reconstituted. The OSG notes that the RTC erred, as found in the dispositive portion of its decision, in basing the reconstitution of the OCT under Section 2(d) of R.A. No. 26. Finally, the OSG submits that respondent cannot seek the issuance of the second owners duplicate of the OCT because he himself alleged in his own petition that he is in possession of the same owners duplicate certificate.50

On the other hand, respondent counters that the OSGs reliance in Tahanan and Republic of the Phils. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,51is unavailing. He argues that in Tahanan, the petitioner therein merely relied on documents other than the owners duplicate copy of the certificate of title, while in Republic, this Court ruled that reconstitution cannot be based on statutes which do not confer title over the property. Respondent claims that in these aforementioned cases, petitioners therein do not have other sources to support their respective petitions for reconstitution while in this case the owners duplicate copy of the OCT sought to be reconstituted truly exists albeit its number is not legible. Respondent submits that the documentary as well as the parol evidence he adduced are adequate to warrant the reconstitution of the OCT as it is covered by Decree No. 444263. Respondent also submits that since there is a valid title in this case, there is legal basis for the issuance of the owners duplicate copy of the reconstituted title.52

Notwithstanding the numerous contentions raised by both parties, this Court finds that the fundamental issue to be resolved in this case is whether the RTC properly acquired and was invested with jurisdiction in the first place to hear and decide Land Registration Case No. V-0016 in the light of the strict and mandatory provisions of R.A. No. 26.

We resolve the sole issue in the negative.

Section 11053of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, as amended by R.A. No. 6732,54allows the reconstitution of lost or destroyed original Torrens title either judicially, in accordance with the special procedure laid down in R.A. No. 26, or administratively, in accordance with the provisions of R.A. No. 6732.55

As the case set before this Court is one for judicial reconstitution, we limit the discussion to the pertinent law, which is R.A. No. 26, and the applicable jurisprudence.

The nature of the proceeding for reconstitution of a certificate of title under R.A. No. 26 denotes a restoration of the instrument, which is supposed to have been lost or destroyed, in its original form and condition. The purpose of such a proceeding is merely to have the certificate of title reproduced, after proper proceedings, in the same form it was in when its loss or destruction occurred. The same R.A. No. 26 specifies the requisites to be met for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over a petition for reconstitution of a certificate of title. Failure to comply with any of these jurisdictional requirements for a petition for reconstitution renders the proceedings null and void. Thus, in obtaining a new title in lieu of the lost or destroyed one, R.A. No. 26 laid down procedures which must be strictly followed in view of the danger that reconstitution could be the source of anomalous titles or unscrupulously availed of as an easy substitute for original registration of title proceedings.56

It bears reiterating that respondents quest for judicial reconstitution in this case is anchored on the owners duplicate copy of said OCT a source for reconstitution of title provided under Section 2 (a) of R.A. No. 26, which provides in full as follows:

SEC. 2. Original certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources hereunder enumerated as may be available, in the following order:

a. The owners duplicate of the certificate of title;

b. The co-owners, mortgagees, or lessees duplicate of the certificate of title;

c. A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the register of deeds or by a legal custodian thereof;

d. An authenticated copy of the decree of registration or patent, as the case may be, pursuant to which the original certificate of title was issued;

e. A document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which the property, the description of which is given in said document, is mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an authenticated copy of said document showing that its original had been registered; and

f. Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title. (Emphasis supplied.)

In this aspect, the CA was correct in invoking our ruling in Puzon v. Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc.,57that notices to owners of adjoining lots and actual occupants of the subject property are not mandatory and jurisdictional in a petition for judicial reconstitution of destroyed certificate of title when the source for such reconstitution is the owners duplicate copy thereof since the publication, posting and notice requirements for such a petition are governed by Section 10 in relation to Section 9 of R.A. No. 26. Section 10 provides:

SEC. 10. Nothing hereinbefore provided shall prevent any registered owner or person in interest from filing the petition mentioned in section five of this Act directly with the proper Court of First Instance, based on sources enumerated in sections 2(a), 2(b), 3(a), 3(b), and/or 4(a) of this Act: Provided, however, That the court shall cause a notice of the petition, before hearing and granting the same, to be published in the manner stated in section nine hereof: And, provided, further, That certificates of title reconstituted pursuant to this section shall not be subject to the encumbrance referred to in section seven of this Act. (Emphasis supplied.)

Correlatively, the pertinent provisions of Section 9 on the publication, posting and the contents of the notice of the Petition for Reconstitution clearly mandate:

SEC. 9. x x x Thereupon, the court shall cause a notice of the petition to be published, at the expense of the petitioner, twice in successive issues of the Official Gazette, and to be posted on the main entrance of the provincial building and of the municipal building of the municipality or city in which the land lies, at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing, and after hearing, shall determine the petition and render such judgment as justice and equity may require. The notice shall specify, among other things, the number of the certificate of title, the name of the registered owner, the names of the interested parties appearing in the reconstituted certificate of title, the location of the property, and the date on which all persons having an interest in the property must appear and file such claim as they may have. x x x (Emphasis supplied.)

In sum, Section 10, in relation to Section 9, requires that 30 days before the date of hearing, (1) a notice be published in two successive issues of the Official Gazette at the expense of the petitioner, and that (2) such notice be posted at the main entrances of the provincial building and of the municipal hall where the property is located. The notice shall state the following: (1) the number of the certificate of title, (2) the name of the registered owner, (3) the names of the interested parties appearing in the reconstituted certificate of title, (4) the location of the property, and (5) the date on which all persons having an interest in the property, must appear and file such claims as they may have.58

Verily, while the CA invoked the appropriate provisions of R.A. No. 26, it failed, however, to take note that Section 9 thereof mandatorily requires that the notice shall specify, among other things, the number of the certificate of title and the names of the interested parties appearing in the reconstituted certificate of title. In this case, the RTC failed to indicate these jurisdictional facts in the notice.

First. The Notice of Hearing issued and published does not align with the in rem character of the reconstitution proceedings and the mandatory nature of the requirements under R.A. No. 26.59There is a mortal insufficiency in the publication when the missing title was merely identified as "OCT No. (not legible)" which is non-compliant with Section 9 of R.A. No. 26.

Moreover, while the LRA confirmed the issuance of Decree No. 444263 in its Report, it perplexes this Court that the LRA failed to state that an OCT was actually issued and mention the number of the OCT sought to be reconstituted. In Republic of the Phils. v. El Gobierno De Las Islas Filipinas,60this Court denied the petition for reconstitution of title despite the existence of a decree:

We also find insufficient the index of decree showing that Decree No. 365835 was issued for Lot No. 1499, as a basis for reconstitution. We noticed that the name of the applicant as well as the date of the issuance of such decree was illegible. While Decree No. 365835 existed in the Record Book of Cadastral Lots in the Land Registration Authority as stated in the Report submitted by it, however, the same report did not state the number of the original certificate of title, which is not sufficient evidence in support of the petition for reconstitution. The deed of extrajudicial declaration of heirs with sale executed by Aguinaldo and Restituto Tumulak Perez and respondent on February 12, 1979 did not also mention the number of the original certificate of title but only Tax Declaration No. 00393. As we held in Tahanan Development Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, the absence of any document, private or official, mentioning the number of the certificate of title and the date when the certificate of title was issued, does not warrant the granting of such petition. (Emphasis supplied.)

Second. Respondent and the RTC overlooked that there are two parcels of land in this case. It is glaring that respondent had to amend his petition for reconstitution twice in order to state therein the names of the adjoining owners. Most importantly, the Notice of Hearing issued by the RTC failed to state the names of interested parties appearing in the OCT sought to be reconstituted, particularly the adjoining owners to Lot No. 1, namely, Benito Ferrer and Marcelo Monegas. While it is true that notices need not be sent to the adjoining owners in this case since this is not required under Sections 9 and 10 of R.A. No. 26 as enunciated in our ruling in Puzon, it is imperative, however, that the notice should specify the names of said interested parties so named in the title sought to be reconstituted. No less than Section 9 of R.A. No. 26 mandates it.

Well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. Verba legis non est recedendum. From the words of a statute there should be no departure.61In view of these lapses, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction to proceed with the case since the mandatory manner or mode of obtaining jurisdiction as prescribed by R.A. No. 26 had not been strictly followed, thereby rendering the proceedings utterly null and void.62As such, while petitioner overlooked these jurisdictional infirmities and failed to incorporate them as additional issues in its own petition, this Court has sufficient authority to pass upon and resolve the same since they affect jurisdiction.63

Apropos is our ruling in Castillo v. Republic64where we held that:

We cannot simply dismiss these defects as "technical." Liberal construction of the Rules of Court does not apply to land registration cases. Indeed, to further underscore the mandatory character of these jurisdictional requirements, the Rules of Court do not apply to land registration cases. In all cases where the authority of the courts to proceed is conferred by a statute, and when the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is prescribed by a statute, the mode of proceeding is mandatory, and must be strictly complied with, or the proceeding will be utterly void. When the trial court lacks jurisdiction to take cognizance of a case, it lacks authority over the whole case and all its aspects. All the proceedings before the trial court, including its order granting the petition for reconstitution, are void for lack of jurisdiction.65

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision dated July 31, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 87390 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petition for reconstitution docketed as LRC No. V-0016, RTC, Villasis, Pangasinan, Branch 50, is DISMISSED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.