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G.R. No. 144057 January 17, 2005

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CORAZON NAGUIT, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

TINGA, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil

Procedure, seeking to review the Decision1 of the Sixth Division of the Court of

Appeals dated July 12, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 51921. The appellate court affirmed

the decisions of both the Regional Trial Court (RTC),2 Branch 8, of Kalibo, Aklan

dated February 26, 1999, and the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC)3 ofIbajay-Nabas, Aklan dated February 18, 1998, which granted the application for

registration of a parcel of land of Corazon Naguit (Naguit), the respondent herein.

The facts are as follows:

On January 5, 1993, Naguit, a Filipino citizen, of legal age and married to Manolito

S. Naguit, filed with the MCTC of Ibajay-Nabas, Aklan, a petition for registration of

title of a parcel of land situated in Brgy. Union, Nabas, Aklan. The parcel of land is

designated as Lot No. 10049, Cad. 758-D, Nabas Cadastre, AP – 060414-014779,and contains an area of 31,374 square meters. The application seeks judicial

confirmation of respondent’s imperfect title over the aforesaid land.

On February 20, 1995, the court held initial hearing on the application. The public

prosecutor, appearing for the government, and Jose Angeles, representing the

heirs of Rustico Angeles, opposed the petition. On a later date, however, the heirs

of Rustico Angeles filed a formal opposition to the petition. Also on February 20,

1995, the court issued an order of general default against the whole world except

as to the heirs of Rustico Angeles and the government.

The evidence on record reveals that the subject parcel of land was originally

declared for taxation purposes in the name of Ramon Urbano (Urbano) in 1945

under Tax Declaration No. 3888 until 1991.4 On July 9, 1992, Urbano executed a

Deed of Quitclaim in favor of the heirs of Honorato Maming (Maming), wherein

he renounced all his rights to the subject property and confirmed the sale made

The oppositor is always the government through the solicitor

general.

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by his father to Maming sometime in 1955 or 1956.5Subsequently, the heirs of

Maming executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of respondent Naguit who

thereupon started occupying the same. She constituted Manuel Blanco, Jr. as her

attorney-in-fact and administrator. The administrator introduced improvements,

planted trees, such as mahogany, coconut and gemelina trees in addition toexisting coconut trees which were then 50 to 60 years old, and paid the

corresponding taxes due on the subject land. At present, there are parcels of land

surrounding the subject land which have been issued titles by virtue of judicial

decrees. Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest have occupied the land openly

and in the concept of owner without any objection from any private person or

even the government until she filed her application for registration.

After the presentation of evidence for Naguit, the public prosecutor manifested

that the government did not intend to present any evidence while oppositor JoseAngeles, as representative of the heirs of Rustico Angeles, failed to appear during

the trial despite notice. On September 27, 1997, the MCTC rendered a decision

ordering that the subject parcel be brought under the operation of the Property

Registration Decree or Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 and that the title

thereto registered and confirmed in the name of Naguit.6

The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the Office of the Solicitor General

(OSG), filed a motion for reconsideration. The OSG stressed that the land applied

for was declared alienable and disposable only on October 15, 1980, per the

certification from Regional Executive Director Raoul T. Geollegue of the

Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Region VI.7 However, the

court denied the motion for reconsideration in an order dated February 18,

1998.81awphi1.nét

Thereafter, the Republic appealed the decision and the order of the MCTC to the

RTC, Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 8. On February 26, 1999, the RTC rendered its decision,

dismissing the appeal.9

Undaunted, the Republic elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via Rule 42 ofthe 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. On July 12, 2000, the appellate court rendered

a decision dismissing the petition filed by the Republic and affirmed in toto the

assailed decision of the RTC.





















Hence, the present petition for review raising a pure question of law was filed by

the Republic on September 4, 2000.10

The OSG assails the decision of the Court of Appeals contending that the

appellate court gravely erred in holding that there is no need for thegovernment’s prior release of the subject lot from the public domain before it can

be considered alienable or disposable within the meaning of P.D. No. 1529, and

that Naguit had been in possession of Lot No. 10049 in the concept of owner for

the required period.11

Hence, the central question for resolution is whether is necessary under Section

14(1) of the Property Registration Decree that the subject land be first classified

as alienable and disposable before the applicant’s possession under a bona

fide claim of ownership could even start.

The OSG invokes our holding in Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate

Cour t12

in arguing that the property which is in open, continuous and exclusive

possession must first be alienable. Since the subject land was declared alienable

only on October 15, 1980, Naguit could not have maintained a bona fide claim of

ownership since June 12, 1945, as required by Section 14 of the Property

Registration Decree, since prior to 1980, the land was not alienable or disposable,

the OSG argues.

Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, governing original registrationproceedings, bears close examination. It expressly provides:

SECTION 14. Who may apply.— The following persons may file in the proper Court

of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally

or through their duly authorized representatives:

(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have

been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and

occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under abona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription

under the provisions of existing laws.

. . . .

Occupancy should be- before june 12, 1945 or earlier

He can have the right of the registrattion of the land.















There are three obvious requisites for the filing of an application for registration

of title under Section 14(1) – that the property in question is alienable and

disposable land of the public domain; that the applicants by themselves or

through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive

and notorious possession and occupation, and; that such possession is undera bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable character

of the land should have already been established since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

This is not borne out by the plain meaning of Section 14(1). "Since June 12, 1945,"

as used in the provision, qualifies its antecedent phrase "under a bonafide claim

of ownership." Generally speaking, qualifying words restrict or modify only the

words or phrases to which they are immediately associated, and not those

distantly or remotely located.

13

Ad proximum antecedents fiat relation nisiimpediatur sentencia.

Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt petitioner’s

position. Absent a legislative amendment, the rule would be, adopting the OSG’s

view, that all lands of the public domain which were not declared alienable or

disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original registration,

no matter the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such

interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative and even

precludes the government from giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify

public agricultural lands as alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of the

situation would even be aggravated considering that before June 12, 1945, the

Philippines was not yet even considered an independent state.

Instead, the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely

requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable

at the time the application for registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time

the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for

alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still reserving

the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the

State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good faith.

However, if the property has already been classified as alienable and disposable,

as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on the part of the State to

abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.







This reading aligns conformably with our holding in Republic v. Court of

Appeals .14

Therein, the Court noted that "to prove that the land subject of an

application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the existence

of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an

executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau ofLands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute."

15In that case, the subject

land had been certified by the DENR as alienable and disposable in 1980, thus the

Court concluded that the alienable status of the land, compounded by the

established fact that therein respondents had occupied the land even before

1927, sufficed to allow the application for registration of the said property. In the

case at bar, even the petitioner admits that the subject property was released and

certified as within alienable and disposable zone in 1980 by the DENR.16

This case is distinguishable from Bracewell v. Court of Appeals,

17

wherein theCourt noted that while the claimant had been in possession since 1908, it was

only in 1972 that the lands in question were classified as alienable and disposable.

Thus, the bid at registration therein did not succeed. In Bracewell , the claimant

had filed his application in 1963, or nine (9) years before the property was

declared alienable and disposable.1awphi1.nét Thus, in this case, where the

application was made years after the property had been certified as alienable and

disposable, theBracewell ruling does not apply.

A different rule obtains for forest lands,18

such as those which form part of a

reservation for provincial park purposes19

the possession of which cannot ripen

into ownership.20

It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that

forest land cannot be owned by private persons. As held in Palomo v. Court of

Appeals,21

forest land is not registrable and possession thereof, no matter how

lengthy, cannot convert it into private property, unless such lands are reclassified

and considered disposable and alienable.22

In the case at bar, the property in

question was undisputedly classified as disposable and alienable; hence, the

ruling in Palomo is inapplicable, as correctly held by the Court of Appeals.23

It must be noted that the present case was decided by the lower courts on the

basis of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, which pertains to

original registration through ordinary registration proceedings. The right to file

the application for registration derives from a bona fide claim of ownership going

back to June 12, 1945 or earlier, by reason of the claimant’s open, continuous,

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exclusive and notorious possession of alienable and disposable lands of the public

domain.

A similar right is given under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, which reads:

Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the

public domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but those

titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First

Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims

and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act,

to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have beenin open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of

agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of

ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the

application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force

majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the

conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of

title under the provisions of this chapter.

When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the period of possessiondeemed necessary to vest the right to register their title to agricultural lands of

the public domain commenced from July 26, 1894. However, this period was

amended by R.A. No. 1942, which provided that the bona fide claim of ownership

must have been for at least thirty (30) years. Then in 1977, Section 48(b) of the

Public Land Act was again amended, this time by P.D. No. 1073, which pegged the

reckoning date at June 12, 1945. This new starting point is concordant with

Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.

Indeed, there are no material differences between Section 14(1) of the PropertyRegistration Decree and Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended. True,

the Public Land Act does refer to "agricultural lands of the public domain," while

the Property Registration Decree uses the term "alienable and disposable lands of

the public domain." It must be noted though that the Constitution declares that

"alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural



lands."24

Clearly, the subject lands under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and

Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree are of the same type.

Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the amendatory P.D.

No. 1073 preclude the application for registration of alienable lands of the publicdomain, possession over which commenced only after June 12, 1945? It did not,

considering Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, which governs and

authorizes the application of "those who have acquired ownership of private

lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws."

Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil

Code.25

There is a consistent jurisprudential rule that properties classified as

alienable public land may be converted into private property by reason of open,

continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years.26

With such

conversion, such property may now fall within the contemplation of "private

lands" under Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to registration by those who

have acquired ownership through prescription. Thus, even if possession of the

alienable public land commenced on a date later than June 12, 1945, and such

possession being been open, continuous and exclusive, then the possessor may

have the right to register the land by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property

Registration Decree.

The land in question was found to be cocal in nature, it having been planted with

coconut trees now over fifty years old.27 The inherent nature of the land but

confirms its certification in 1980 as alienable, hence agricultural. There is no

impediment to the application of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration

Decree, as correctly accomplished by the lower courts.l^vvphi1.net

The OSG posits that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Naguit had been in

possession in the concept of owner for the required period. The argument begs

the question. It is again hinged on the assertion—shown earlier to be

unfounded—that there could have been no bona fide claim of ownership prior to

1980, when the subject land was declared alienable or disposable.

We find no reason to disturb the conclusion of both the RTC and the Court of

Appeals that Naguit had the right to apply for registration owing to the

continuous possession by her and her predecessors-in-interest of the land since

1945. The basis of such conclusion is primarily factual, and the Court generally


















respects the factual findings made by lower courts. Notably, possession since

1945 was established through proof of the existence of 50 to 60-year old trees at

the time Naguit purchased the property as well as tax declarations executed by

Urbano in 1945. Although tax declarations and realty tax payment of property are

not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of thepossession in the concept of owner for no one in his right mind would be paying

taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession.

They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the

property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes

manifests not only one’s sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property

and announces his adverse claim against the State and all other interested

parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government.

Such an act strengthens one’s bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.28

Considering that the possession of the subject parcel of land by the respondent

can be traced back to that of her predecessors-in-interest which commenced

since 1945 or for almost fifty (50) years, it is indeed beyond any cloud of doubt

that she has acquired title thereto which may be properly brought under the

operation of the Torrens system. That she has been in possession of the land in

the concept of an owner, open, continuous, peaceful and without any opposition

from any private person and the government itself makes her right thereto

undoubtedly settled and deserving of protection under the law.

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the assailed Decision of the Court of

Appeals dated July 12, 2000 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.







G.R. No. 179987 April 29, 2009

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, Petitioner,

vs.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

TINGA, J.:

One main reason why the informal sector has not become formal is that from

Indonesia to Brazil, 90 percent of the informal lands are not titled and registered.

This is a generalized phenomenon in the so-called Third World. And it has many

consequences.

x x x

The question is: How is it that so many governments, from Suharto's in Indonesia

to Fujimori's in Peru, have wanted to title these people and have not been able to

do so effectively? One reason is that none of the state systems in Asia or Latin

America can gather proof of informal titles. In Peru, the informals have means of

proving property ownership to each other which are not the same means

developed by the Spanish legal system. The informals have their own papers,

their own forms of agreements, and their own systems of registration, all of whichare very clearly stated in the maps which they use for their own informal business

transactions.

If you take a walk through the countryside, from Indonesia to Peru, and you walk

by field after field--in each field a different dog is going to bark at you. Even dogs

know what private property is all about. The only one who does not know it is the

government. The issue is that there exists a "common law" and an "informal law"

which the Latin American formal legal system does not know how to recognize.

- Hernando De Soto1

This decision inevitably affects all untitled lands currently in possession of persons

and entities other than the Philippine government. The petition, while

unremarkable as to the facts, was accepted by the Court en banc in order to

provide definitive clarity to the applicability and scope of original registration

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proceedings under Sections 14(1) and 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.

In doing so, the Court confronts not only the relevant provisions of the Public

Land Act and the Civil Code, but also the reality on the ground. The countrywide

phenomenon of untitled lands, as well as the problem of informal settlement it

has spawned, has unfortunately been treated with benign neglect. Yet our currentlaws are hemmed in by their own circumscriptions in addressing the

phenomenon. Still, the duty on our part is primarily to decide cases before us in

accord with the Constitution and the legal principles that have developed our

public land law, though our social obligations dissuade us from casting a blind eye

on the endemic problems.

I.

On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration

covering a parcel of land identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, Silang

Cadastre,2 situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite, and consisting of 71,324

square meters. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from

Eduardo Velazco,3 and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open,

notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more

than thirty (30) years.

The application was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of (RTC) Cavite-Tagaytay

City, Branch 18. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) duly designated the

Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite, Jose Velazco, Jr., to appear on behalf of

the State.4 Apart from presenting documentary evidence, Malabanan himself and

his witness, Aristedes Velazco, testified at the hearing. Velazco testified that the

property was originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his

great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons – Benedicto, Gregorio,

Eduardo and Esteban –the fourth being Aristedes’s grandfather. Upon Lino’s

death, his four sons inherited the property and divided it among themselves. But

by 1966, Esteban’s wife, Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the

properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the death of

Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the

properties, including Lot 9864-A, which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo

Velazco. It was this property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan.5

Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jose Velazco, Jr. did not cross-examine Aristedes

Velazco. He further manifested that he "also [knew] the property and I affirm the



















truth of the testimony given by Mr. Velazco."6 The Republic of the Philippines

likewise did not present any evidence to controvert the application.

Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification

dated 11 June 2001, issued by the Community Environment & Natural ResourcesOffice, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which

stated that the subject property was "verified to be within the Alienable or

Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project

No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982."7

On 3 December 2002, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Malabanan, the

dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration and thus

places under the operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise

known as Property Registration Law, the lands described in Plan Csd-04-0173123-

D, Lot 9864-A and containing an area of Seventy One Thousand Three Hundred

Twenty Four (71,324) Square Meters, as supported by its technical description

now forming part of the record of this case, in addition to other proofs adduced in

the name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is of legal age, Filipino, widower, and with

residence at Munting Ilog, Silang, Cavite.

Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree of

registration shall forthwith issue.

SO ORDERED.

The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that

Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and

disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that

he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the length of

time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title.

On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision8 reversing the

RTC and dismissing the application of Malabanan. The appellate court held that

under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree any period of possession

prior to the classification of the lots as alienable and disposable was

inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of

possession. Thus, the appellate court noted that since the CENRO-DENR













certification had verified that the property was declared alienable and disposable

only on 15 March 1982, the Velazcos’ possession prior to that date could not be

factored in the computation of the period of possession. This interpretation of the

Court of Appeals of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree was based

on the Court’s ruling in Republic v. Herbieto.9

Malabanan died while the case was pending with the Court of Appeals;10

hence, it

was his heirs who appealed the decision of the appellate court. Petitioners,

before this Court, rely on our ruling in Republic v. Naguit,11

which was handed

down just four months prior to Herbieto. Petitioners suggest that the discussion

in Herbieto cited by the Court of Appeals is actually obiter dictum since the

Metropolitan Trial Court therein which had directed the registration of the

property had no jurisdiction in the first place since the requisite notice of hearing

was published only after the hearing had already begun. Naguit, petitionersargue, remains the controlling doctrine, especially when the property in question

is agricultural land. Therefore, with respect to agricultural lands, any possession

prior to the declaration of the alienable property as disposable may be counted in

reckoning the period of possession to perfect title under the Public Land Act and

the Property Registration Decree.

The petition was referred to the Court en banc,12

and on 11 November 2008, the

case was heard on oral arguments. The Court formulated the principal issues for

the oral arguments, to wit:

1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may

be registered under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529,

otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, should the land be

classified as alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it sufficient

that such classification occur at any time prior to the filing of the applicant

for registration provided that it is established that the applicant has been in

open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land under a

bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier?

2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may a

parcel of land classified as alienable and disposable be deemed private land

and therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription in accordance with

the Civil Code?



















3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either

because of its use or because its slope is below that of forest lands be

registrable under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in

relation to the provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription?

4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their

names under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration

Decree or both?13

Based on these issues, the parties formulated their respective positions.

With respect to Section 14(1), petitioners reiterate that the analysis of the Court

in Naguit is the correct interpretation of the provision. The seemingly

contradictory pronouncement in Herbieto, it is submitted, should be considered

obiter dictum, since the land registration proceedings therein was void ab initio

due to lack of publication of the notice of initial hearing. Petitioners further point

out that in Republic v. Bibonia,14

promulgated in June of 2007, the Court applied

Naguit and adopted the same observation that the preferred interpretation by

the OSG of Section 14(1) was patently absurd. For its part, the OSG remains

insistent that for Section 14(1) to apply, the land should have been classified as

alienable and disposable as of 12 June 1945. Apart from Herbieto, the OSG also

cites the subsequent rulings in Buenaventura v. Republic,15

Fieldman Agricultural

Trading v. Republic16

and Republic v. Imperial Credit Corporation,17

as well as the

earlier case of Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals.18

With respect to Section 14(2), petitioners submit that open, continuous, exclusive

and notorious possession of an alienable land of the public domain for more than

30 years ipso jure converts the land into private property, thus placing it under

the coverage of Section 14(2). According to them, it would not matter whether

the land sought to be registered was previously classified as agricultural land of

the public domain so long as, at the time of the application, the property had

already been "converted" into private property through prescription. To bolster

their argument, petitioners cite extensively from our 2008 ruling in Republic v.T.A.N. Properties.

19

The arguments submitted by the OSG with respect to Section 14(2) are more

extensive. The OSG notes that under Article 1113 of the Civil Code, the acquisitive

prescription of properties of the State refers to "patrimonial property," while




























Section 14(2) speaks of "private lands." It observes that the Court has yet to

decide a case that presented Section 14(2) as a ground for application for

registration, and that the 30-year possession period refers to the period of

possession under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, and not the concept of

prescription under the Civil Code. The OSG further submits that, assuming thatthe 30-year prescriptive period can run against public lands, said period should be

reckoned from the time the public land was declared alienable and disposable.

Both sides likewise offer special arguments with respect to the particular factual

circumstances surrounding the subject property and the ownership thereof.

II.

First, we discuss Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. For a full

understanding of the provision, reference has to be made to the Public Land Act.

A.

Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land Act, has, since its

enactment, governed the classification and disposition of lands of the public

domain. The President is authorized, from time to time, to classify the lands of the

public domain into alienable and disposable, timber, or mineral lands.20

Alienable

and disposable lands of the public domain are further classified according to their

uses into (a) agricultural; (b) residential, commercial, industrial, or for similarproductive purposes; (c) educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; or (d)

reservations for town sites and for public and quasi-public uses.21

May a private person validly seek the registration in his/her name of alienable and

disposable lands of the public domain? Section 11 of the Public Land Act

acknowledges that public lands suitable for agricultural purposes may be disposed

of "by confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles" through "judicial

legalization."22

Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073,

supplies the details and unmistakably grants that right, subject to the requisitesstated therein:

Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the

public domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but whose

titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First

Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims















and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act,

to wit:

xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been

in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of

alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of

acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding

the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by

war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all

the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a

certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.

Section 48(b) of Com. Act No. 141 received its present wording in 1977 when the

law was amended by P.D. No. 1073. Two significant amendments were

introduced by P.D. No. 1073. First, the term "agricultural lands" was changed to

"alienable and disposable lands of the public domain." The OSG submits that this

amendment restricted the scope of the lands that may be registered.23

This is not

actually the case. Under Section 9 of the Public Land Act, "agricultural lands" are a

mere subset of "lands of the public domain alienable or open to disposition."

Evidently, alienable and disposable lands of the public domain are a larger class

than only "agricultural lands."

Second, the length of the requisite possession was changed from possession for

"thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the application" to

possession "since June 12, 1945 or earlier." The Court in Naguit explained:

When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the period of possession

deemed necessary to vest the right to register their title to agricultural lands of

the public domain commenced from July 26, 1894. However, this period was

amended by R.A. No. 1942, which provided that the bona fide claim of ownership

must have been for at least thirty (30) years. Then in 1977, Section 48(b) of thePublic Land Act was again amended, this time by P.D. No. 1073, which pegged the

reckoning date at June 12, 1945. xxx

It bears further observation that Section 48(b) of Com. Act No, 141 is virtually the

same as Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Said Decree codified

the various laws relative to the registration of property, including lands of the







public domain. It is Section 14(1) that operationalizes the registration of such

lands of the public domain. The provision reads:

SECTION 14. Who may apply.— The following persons may file in the proper Court

of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personallyor through their duly authorized representatives:

(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been

in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of

alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of

ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

Notwithstanding the passage of the Property Registration Decree and the

inclusion of Section 14(1) therein, the Public Land Act has remained in effect. Both

laws commonly refer to persons or their predecessors-in-interest who "have been


alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of

ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier." That circumstance may have led to the

impression that one or the other is a redundancy, or that Section 48(b) of the

Public Land Act has somehow been repealed or mooted. That is not the case.

The opening clauses of Section 48 of the Public Land Act and Section 14 of the

Property Registration Decree warrant comparison:

Sec. 48 [of the Public Land Act]. The following described citizens of the

Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such

land or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or

completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the

land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of

title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

x x x

Sec. 14 [of the Property Registration Decree]. Who may apply.— The following

persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for

registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized

representatives:

x x x



It is clear that Section 48 of the Public Land Act is more descriptive of the nature

of the right enjoyed by the possessor than Section 14 of the Property Registration

Decree, which seems to presume the pre-existence of the right, rather than

establishing the right itself for the first time. It is proper to assert that it is the

Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073 effective 25 January 1977, that hasprimarily established the right of a Filipino citizen who has been "in open,

continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and

disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of

ownership, since June 12, 1945" to perfect or complete his title by applying with

the proper court for the confirmation of his ownership claim and the issuance of

the corresponding certificate of title.

Section 48 can be viewed in conjunction with the afore-quoted Section 11 of the

Public Land Act, which provides that public lands suitable for agricultural purposesmay be disposed of by confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles, and given

the notion that both provisions declare that it is indeed the Public Land Act that

primarily establishes the substantive ownership of the possessor who has been in

possession of the property since 12 June 1945. In turn, Section 14(a) of the

Property Registration Decree recognizes the substantive right granted under

Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as well provides the corresponding original

registration procedure for the judicial confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete

title.

There is another limitation to the right granted under Section 48(b). Section 47 of

the Public Land Act limits the period within which one may exercise the right to

seek registration under Section 48. The provision has been amended several

times, most recently by Rep. Act No. 9176 in 2002. It currently reads thus:

Section 47. The persons specified in the next following section are hereby granted

time, not to extend beyond December 31, 2020 within which to avail of the

benefits of this Chapter: Provided, That this period shall apply only where the

area applied for does not exceed twelve (12) hectares: Provided, further, That the

several periods of time designated by the President in accordance with Section

Forty-Five of this Act shall apply also to the lands comprised in the provisions of

this Chapter, but this Section shall not be construed as prohibiting any said

persons from acting under this Chapter at any time prior to the period fixed by

the President.24







Accordingly under the current state of the law, the substantive right granted

under Section 48(b) may be availed of only until 31 December 2020.

B.

Despite the clear text of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended and

Section 14(a) of the Property Registration Decree, the OSG has adopted the

position that for one to acquire the right to seek registration of an alienable and

disposable land of the public domain, it is not enough that the applicant and

his/her predecessors-in-interest be in possession under a bona fide claim of

ownership since 12 June 1945; the alienable and disposable character of the

property must have been declared also as of 12 June 1945. Following the OSG’s

approach, all lands certified as alienable and disposable after 12 June 1945 cannot

be registered either under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree or

Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act as amended. The absurdity of such an

implication was discussed in Naguit.

Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable character

of the land should have already been established since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

This is not borne out by the plain meaning of Section 14(1). "Since June 12, 1945,"

as used in the provision, qualifies its antecedent phrase "under a bonafide claim

of ownership." Generally speaking, qualifying words restrict or modify only the

words or phrases to which they are immediately associated, and not those

distantly or remotely located.25 Ad proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi

impediatur sentencia.

Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt petitioner’s

position. Absent a legislative amendment, the rule would be, adopting the OSG’s

view, that all lands of the public domain which were not declared alienable or

disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original registration,

no matter the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such

interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative and even

precludes the government from giving it effect even as it decides to reclassifypublic agricultural lands as alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of the

situation would even be aggravated considering that before June 12, 1945, the

Philippines was not yet even considered an independent state.

Accordingly, the Court in Naguit explained:







[T]he more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires

the property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the

time the application for registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the

application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for

alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still reservingthe right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the

State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good faith.

However, if the property has already been classified as alienable and disposable,

as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on the part of the State to

abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.

The Court declares that the correct interpretation of Section 14(1) is that which

was adopted in Naguit. The contrary pronouncement in Herbieto, as pointed out

in Naguit, absurdly limits the application of the provision to the point of virtualinutility since it would only cover lands actually declared alienable and disposable

prior to 12 June 1945, even if the current possessor is able to establish open,

continuous, exclusive and notorious possession under a bona fide claim of

ownership long before that date.

Moreover, the Naguit interpretation allows more possessors under a bona fide

claim of ownership to avail of judicial confirmation of their imperfect titles than

what would be feasible under Herbieto. This balancing fact is significant,

especially considering our forthcoming discussion on the scope and reach of


Petitioners make the salient observation that the contradictory passages from

Herbieto are obiter dicta since the land registration proceedings therein is void ab

initio in the first place due to lack of the requisite publication of the notice of

initial hearing. There is no need to explicitly overturn Herbieto, as it suffices that

the Court’s acknowledgment that the particular line of argument used therein

concerning Section 14(1) is indeed obiter.

It may be noted that in the subsequent case of Buenaventura,26 the Court, citingHerbieto, again stated that "[a]ny period of possession prior to the date when the

[s]ubject [property was] classified as alienable and disposable is inconsequential

and should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession…" That

statement, in the context of Section 14(1), is certainly erroneous. Nonetheless,

the passage as cited in Buenaventura should again be considered as obiter. The







application therein was ultimately granted, citing Section 14(2). The evidence

submitted by petitioners therein did not establish any mode of possession on

their part prior to 1948, thereby precluding the application of Section 14(1). It is

not even apparent from the decision whether petitioners therein had claimed

entitlement to original registration following Section 14(1), their position beingthat they had been in exclusive possession under a bona fide claim of ownership

for over fifty (50) years, but not before 12 June 1945.

Thus, neither Herbieto nor its principal discipular ruling Buenaventura has any

precedental value with respect to Section 14(1). On the other hand, the ratio of

Naguit is embedded in Section 14(1), since it precisely involved situation wherein

the applicant had been in exclusive possession under a bona fide claim of

ownership prior to 12 June 1945. The Court’s interpretation of Section 14(1)

therein was decisive to the resolution of the case. Any doubt as to which betweenNaguit or Herbieto provides the final word of the Court on Section 14(1) is now

settled in favor of Naguit.

We noted in Naguit that it should be distinguished from Bracewell v. Court of

Appeals27

since in the latter, the application for registration had been filed before

the land was declared alienable or disposable. The dissent though pronounces

Bracewell as the better rule between the two. Yet two years after Bracewell, its

ponente, the esteemed Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, penned the ruling in

Republic v. Ceniza,28

which involved a claim of possession that extended back to

1927 over a public domain land that was declared alienable and disposable only in

1980. Ceniza cited Bracewell, quoted extensively from it, and following the

mindset of the dissent, the attempt at registration in Ceniza should have failed.

Not so.

To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an

applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as

a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action;

investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a

statute.

In this case, private respondents presented a certification dated November 25,

1994, issued by Eduardo M. Inting, the Community Environment and Natural

Resources Officer in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources

Office in Cebu City, stating that the lots involved were "found to be within the











alienable and disposable (sic) Block-I, Land Classification Project No. 32-A, per

map 2962 4-I555 dated December 9, 1980." This is sufficient evidence to show the

real character of the land subject of private respondents’ application. Further, the

certification enjoys a presumption of regularity in the absence of contradictory

evidence, which is true in this case. Worth noting also was the observation of theCourt of Appeals stating that:

[n]o opposition was filed by the Bureaus of Lands and Forestry to contest the

application of appellees on the ground that the property still forms part of the

public domain. Nor is there any showing that the lots in question are forestal

land....

Thus, while the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that mere possession of public

land for the period required by law would entitle its occupant to a confirmation of

imperfect title, it did not err in ruling in favor of private respondents as far as the

first requirement in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is concerned, for they

were able to overcome the burden of proving the alienability of the land subject

of their application.

As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, private respondents were able to

prove their open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject

land even before the year 1927. As a rule, we are bound by the factual findings of

the Court of Appeals. Although there are exceptions, petitioner did not show that

this is one of them.29

Why did the Court in Ceniza, through the same eminent member who authored

Bracewell, sanction the registration under Section 48(b) of public domain lands

declared alienable or disposable thirty-five (35) years and 180 days after 12 June

1945? The telling difference is that in Ceniza, the application for registration was

filed nearly six (6) years after the land had been declared alienable or disposable,

while in Bracewell, the application was filed nine (9) years before the land was

declared alienable or disposable. That crucial difference was also stressed in

Naguit to contradistinguish it from Bracewell, a difference which the dissent seeksto belittle.

III.

We next ascertain the correct framework of analysis with respect to Section 14(2).

The provision reads:







SECTION 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file in the proper

Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether

personally or through their duly authorized representatives:

x x x

(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under

the provisions of existing laws.

The Court in Naguit offered the following discussion concerning Section 14(2),

which we did even then recognize, and still do, to be an obiter dictum, but we

nonetheless refer to it as material for further discussion, thus:

Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the amendatory P.D.

No. 1073 preclude the application for registration of alienable lands of the publicdomain, possession over which commenced only after June 12, 1945? It did not,

considering Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, which governs and

authorizes the application of "those who have acquired ownership of private

lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws."

Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code.[30

]

There is a consistent jurisprudential rule that properties classified as alienable

public land may be converted into private property by reason of open, continuous

and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years.[31

] With such conversion,such property may now fall within the contemplation of "private lands" under

Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to registration by those who have acquired

ownership through prescription. Thus, even if possession of the alienable public

land commenced on a date later than June 12, 1945, and such possession being

been open, continuous and exclusive, then the possessor may have the right to

register the land by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.

Naguit did not involve the application of Section 14(2), unlike in this case where

petitioners have based their registration bid primarily on that provision, andwhere the evidence definitively establishes their claim of possession only as far

back as 1948. It is in this case that we can properly appreciate the nuances of the

provision.

A.











The obiter in Naguit cited the Civil Code provisions on prescription as the possible

basis for application for original registration under Section 14(2). Specifically, it is

Article 1113 which provides legal foundation for the application. It reads:

All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of prescription,unless otherwise provided. Property of the State or any of its subdivisions not

patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription.

It is clear under the Civil Code that where lands of the public domain are

patrimonial in character, they are susceptible to acquisitive prescription. On the

other hand, among the public domain lands that are not susceptible to acquisitive

prescription are timber lands and mineral lands. The Constitution itself proscribes

private ownership of timber or mineral lands.

There are in fact several provisions in the Civil Code concerning the acquisition of

real property through prescription. Ownership of real property may be acquired

by ordinary prescription of ten (10) years,32

or through extraordinary prescription

of thirty (30) years.33

Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in good

faith,34

as well as just title.35

When Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree explicitly provides that

persons "who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under

the provisions of existing laws," it unmistakably refers to the Civil Code as a valid

basis for the registration of lands. The Civil Code is the only existing law thatspecifically allows the acquisition by prescription of private lands, including

patrimonial property belonging to the State. Thus, the critical question that needs

affirmation is whether Section 14(2) does encompass original registration

proceedings over patrimonial property of the State, which a private person has

acquired through prescription.

The Naguit obiter had adverted to a frequently reiterated jurisprudence holding

that properties classified as alienable public land may be converted into private

property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty(30) years.

36 Yet if we ascertain the source of the "thirty-year" period, additional

complexities relating to Section 14(2) and to how exactly it operates would

emerge. For there are in fact two distinct origins of the thirty (30)-year rule.

The first source is Rep. Act No. 1942, enacted in 1957, which amended Section

48(b) of the Public Land Act by granting the right to seek original registration of























alienable public lands through possession in the concept of an owner for at least

thirty years.

The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public

domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titleshave not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of

the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the

issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

x x x x x x x x x

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been


agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of

ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the

application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force

majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the

conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of

title under the provisions of this Chapter. (emphasis supplied)37

This provision was repealed in 1977 with the enactment of P.D. 1073, which made

the date 12 June 1945 the reckoning point for the first time. Nonetheless,

applications for registration filed prior to 1977 could have invoked the 30-year

rule introduced by Rep. Act No. 1942.

The second source is Section 14(2) of P.D. 1529 itself, at least by implication, as it

applies the rules on prescription under the Civil Code, particularly Article 1113 in

relation to Article 1137. Note that there are two kinds of prescription under the

Civil Code –ordinary acquisitive prescription and extraordinary acquisitive

prescription, which, under Article 1137, is completed "through uninterrupted

adverse possession… for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith."

Obviously, the first source of the thirty (30)-year period rule, Rep. Act No. 1942,became unavailable after 1977. At present, the only legal basis for the thirty (30)-

year period is the law on prescription under the Civil Code, as mandated under

Section 14(2). However, there is a material difference between how the thirty

(30)-year rule operated under Rep. Act No. 1942 and how it did under the Civil

Code.







Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942, did not

refer to or call into application the Civil Code provisions on prescription. It merely

set forth a requisite thirty-year possession period immediately preceding the

application for confirmation of title, without any qualification as to whether the

property should be declared alienable at the beginning of, and continue as such,throughout the entire thirty-(30) years. There is neither statutory nor

jurisprudential basis to assert Rep. Act No. 1942 had mandated such a

requirement,38

similar to our earlier finding with respect to the present language

of Section 48(b), which now sets 12 June 1945 as the point of reference.

Then, with the repeal of Rep. Act No. 1942, the thirty-year possession period as

basis for original registration became Section 14(2) of the Property Registration

Decree, which entitled those "who have acquired ownership over private lands by

prescription under the provisions of existing laws" to apply for originalregistration. Again, the thirty-year period is derived from the rule on

extraordinary prescription under Article 1137 of the Civil Code. At the same time,

Section 14(2) puts into operation the entire regime of prescription under the Civil

Code, a fact which does not hold true with respect to Section 14(1).

B.

Unlike Section 14(1), Section 14(2) explicitly refers to the principles on

prescription under existing laws. Accordingly, we are impelled to apply the civil

law concept of prescription, as set forth in the Civil Code, in our interpretation of

Section 14(2). There is no similar demand on our part in the case of Section 14(1).

The critical qualification under Article 1113 of the Civil Code is thus: "[p]roperty of

the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the

object of prescription." The identification what consists of patrimonial property is

provided by Articles 420 and 421, which we quote in full:

Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:

(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents,

ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and

others of similar character;







(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are

intended for some public service or for the development of the national

wealth.

Art. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated inthe preceding article, is patrimonial property

It is clear that property of public dominion, which generally includes property

belonging to the State, cannot be the object of prescription or, indeed, be subject

of the commerce of man.39

Lands of the public domain, whether declared

alienable and disposable or not, are property of public dominion and thus

insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.

Let us now explore the effects under the Civil Code of a declaration by the

President or any duly authorized government officer of alienability and

disposability of lands of the public domain. Would such lands so declared

alienable and disposable be converted, under the Civil Code, from property of the

public dominion into patrimonial property? After all, by connotative definition,

alienable and disposable lands may be the object of the commerce of man; Article

1113 provides that all things within the commerce of man are susceptible to

prescription; and the same provision further provides that patrimonial property of

the State may be acquired by prescription.

Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that "[p]roperty of publicdominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form

part of the patrimonial property of the State." It is this provision that controls

how public dominion property may be converted into patrimonial property

susceptible to acquisition by prescription. After all, Article 420 (2) makes clear

that those property "which belong to the State, without being for public use, and

are intended for some public service or for the development of the national

wealth" are public dominion property. For as long as the property belongs to the

State, although already classified as alienable or disposable, it remains property of

the public dominion if when it is "intended for some public service or for thedevelopment of the national wealth".

Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public

dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development of

the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial.







Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or

disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2),

and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable

and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended

for public service or for the development of the national wealth that the period ofacquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a

law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the

President is duly authorized by law.

It is comprehensible with ease that this reading of Section 14(2) of the Property

Registration Decree limits its scope and reach and thus affects the registrability

even of lands already declared alienable and disposable to the detriment of the

bona fide possessors or occupants claiming title to the lands. Yet this

interpretation is in accord with the Regalian doctrine and its concomitantassumption that all lands owned by the State, although declared alienable or

disposable, remain as such and ought to be used only by the Government.

Recourse does not lie with this Court in the matter. The duty of the Court is to

apply the Constitution and the laws in accordance with their language and intent.

The remedy is to change the law, which is the province of the legislative branch.

Congress can very well be entreated to amend Section 14(2) of the Property

Registration Decree and pertinent provisions of the Civil Code to liberalize the

requirements for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles.

The operation of the foregoing interpretation can be illustrated by an actual

example. Republic Act No. 7227, entitled "An Act Accelerating The Conversion Of

Military Reservations Into Other Productive Uses, etc.," is more commonly known

as the BCDA law. Section 2 of the law authorizes the sale of certain military

reservations and portions of military camps in Metro Manila, including Fort

Bonifacio and Villamor Air Base. For purposes of effecting the sale of the military

camps, the law mandates the President to transfer such military lands to the

Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA)40

which in turn is authorized to

own, hold and/or administer them.41The President is authorized to sell portions of

the military camps, in whole or in part.42

Accordingly, the BCDA law itself declares

that the military lands subject thereof are "alienable and disposable pursuant to

the provisions of existing laws and regulations governing sales of government

properties."43

















From the moment the BCDA law was enacted the subject military lands have

become alienable and disposable. However, said lands did not become

patrimonial, as the BCDA law itself expressly makes the reservation that these

lands are to be sold in order to raise funds for the conversion of the former

American bases at Clark and Subic.44

Such purpose can be tied to either "publicservice" or "the development of national wealth" under Article 420(2). Thus, at

that time, the lands remained property of the public dominion under Article

420(2), notwithstanding their status as alienable and disposable. It is upon their

sale as authorized under the BCDA law to a private person or entity that such

lands become private property and cease to be property of the public dominion.

C.

Should public domain lands become patrimonial because they are declared as

such in a duly enacted law or duly promulgated proclamation that they are no

longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth,

would the period of possession prior to the conversion of such public dominion

into patrimonial be reckoned in counting the prescriptive period in favor of the

possessors? We rule in the negative.

The limitation imposed by Article 1113 dissuades us from ruling that the period of

possession before the public domain land becomes patrimonial may be counted

for the purpose of completing the prescriptive period. Possession of public

dominion property before it becomes patrimonial cannot be the object of

prescription according to the Civil Code. As the application for registration under

Section 14(2) falls wholly within the framework of prescription under the Civil

Code, there is no way that possession during the time that the land was still

classified as public dominion property can be counted to meet the requisites of

acquisitive prescription and justify registration.

Are we being inconsistent in applying divergent rules for Section 14(1) and

Section 14(2)? There is no inconsistency. Section 14(1) mandates registration on

the basis of possession, while Section 14(2) entitles registration on the basisof prescription. Registration under Section 14(1) is extended under the aegis of

theProperty Registration Decree and the Public Land Act while registration under

Section 14(2) is made available both by the Property Registration Decree and the

Civil Code.






In the same manner, we can distinguish between the thirty-year period under

Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1472, and the

thirty-year period available through Section 14(2) of the Property Registration

Decree in relation to Article 1137 of the Civil Code. The period under the former

speaks of a thirty-year period of possession, while the period under the latterconcerns a thirty-year period of extraordinary prescription. Registration under

Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act as amended by Rep. Act No. 1472 is based on

thirty years of possession alone without regard to the Civil Code, while the

registration under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree is founded on

extraordinary prescription under the Civil Code.

It may be asked why the principles of prescription under the Civil Code should not

apply as well to Section 14(1). Notwithstanding the vaunted status of the Civil

Code, it ultimately is just one of numerous statutes, neither superior nor inferiorto other statutes such as the Property Registration Decree. The legislative branch

is not bound to adhere to the framework set forth by the Civil Code when it

enacts subsequent legislation. Section 14(2) manifests a clear intent to interrelate

the registration allowed under that provision with the Civil Code, but no such

intent exists with respect to Section 14(1).

IV.

One of the keys to understanding the framework we set forth today is seeing how

our land registration procedures correlate with our law on prescription, which,

under the Civil Code, is one of the modes for acquiring ownership over property.

The Civil Code makes it clear that patrimonial property of the State may be

acquired by private persons through prescription. This is brought about by Article

1113, which states that "[a]ll things which are within the commerce of man are

susceptible to prescription," and that [p]roperty of the State or any of its

subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription."

There are two modes of prescription through which immovables may be acquiredunder the Civil Code. The first is ordinary acquisitive prescription, which, under

Article 1117, requires possession in good faith and with just title; and, under

Article 1134, is completed through possession of ten (10) years. There is nothing

in the Civil Code that bars a person from acquiring patrimonial property of the

State through ordinary acquisitive prescription, nor is there any apparent reason



to impose such a rule. At the same time, there are indispensable requisites –good

faith and just title. The ascertainment of good faith involves the application of

Articles 526, 527, and 528, as well as Article 1127 of the Civil Code,45

provisions

that more or less speak for themselves.

On the other hand, the concept of just title requires some clarification. Under

Article 1129, there is just title for the purposes of prescription "when the adverse

claimant came into possession of the property through one of the modes

recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the

grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right." Dr. Tolentino

explains:

Just title is an act which has for its purpose the transmission of ownership, and

which would have actually transferred ownership if the grantor had been the

owner. This vice or defect is the one cured by prescription. Examples: sale with

delivery, exchange, donation, succession, and dacion in payment.46

The OSG submits that the requirement of just title necessarily precludes the

applicability of ordinary acquisitive prescription to patrimonial property. The

major premise for the argument is that "the State, as the owner and grantor,

could not transmit ownership to the possessor before the completion of the

required period of possession."47

It is evident that the OSG erred when it assumed

that the grantor referred to in Article 1129 is the State. The grantor is the one

from whom the person invoking ordinary acquisitive prescription derived the title,

whether by sale, exchange, donation, succession or any other mode of the

acquisition of ownership or other real rights.

Earlier, we made it clear that, whether under ordinary prescription or

extraordinary prescription, the period of possession preceding the classification of

public dominion lands as patrimonial cannot be counted for the purpose of

computing prescription. But after the property has been become patrimonial, the

period of prescription begins to run in favor of the possessor. Once the requisite

period has been completed, two legal events ensue: (1) the patrimonial propertyis ipso jure converted into private land; and (2) the person in possession for the

periods prescribed under the Civil Code acquires ownership of the property by

operation of the Civil Code.














It is evident that once the possessor automatically becomes the owner of the

converted patrimonial property, the ideal next step is the registration of the

property under the Torrens system. It should be remembered that registration of

property is not a mode of acquisition of ownership, but merely a mode of

confirmation of ownership.48

Looking back at the registration regime prior to the adoption of the Property

Registration Decree in 1977, it is apparent that the registration system then did

not fully accommodate the acquisition of ownership of patrimonial property

under the Civil Code. What the system accommodated was the confirmation of

imperfect title brought about by the completion of a period of possession

ordained under the Public Land Act (either 30 years following Rep. Act No. 1942,

or since 12 June 1945 following P.D. No. 1073).

The Land Registration Act49 was noticeably silent on the requisites for alienable

public lands acquired through ordinary prescription under the Civil Code, though

it arguably did not preclude such registration.50

Still, the gap was lamentable,

considering that the Civil Code, by itself, establishes ownership over the

patrimonial property of persons who have completed the prescriptive periods

ordained therein. The gap was finally closed with the adoption of the Property

Registration Decree in 1977, with Section 14(2) thereof expressly authorizing

original registration in favor of persons who have acquired ownership over private

lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws, that is, the Civil Code

as of now.

V.

We synthesize the doctrines laid down in this case, as follows:

(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree,

Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that "those

who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in

open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation ofalienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide

claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945" have acquired

ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the length and

quality of their possession.















(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945

and does not require that the lands should have been alienable and

disposable during the entire period of possession, the possessor is

entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as

it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframeimposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.

51

(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public

Land Act is further confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property

Registration Decree.

(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree,

consider that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of

acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands

become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these

are alienable or disposable. There must also be an express government

manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained

for public service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422

of the Civil Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can

the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public

dominion begin to run.

(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The

person acquires ownership of patrimonial property by prescription

under the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under


(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property

may be acquired, one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under

ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquires ownership of a

patrimonial property through possession for at least ten (10) years, in

good faith and with just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive

prescription, a person’s uninterrupted adverse possession of

patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good

faith or just title, ripens into ownership.

B.

We now apply the above-stated doctrines to the case at bar.

U have to present evidence that u are occupying the land since 1945 june

12.

* and that it cannot be acquired through prescription except it became a

patrimonial property







It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that

Malabanan has acquired ownership over the subject property under Section 48(b)

of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive evidence to establish that

Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession

of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners candate back their possession, according to their own evidence—the Tax

Declarations they presented in particular—is to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot

avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration

Decree.

Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration.

While the subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there

is no competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use service or for

the development of the national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of theCivil Code. The classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable

land of the public domain does not change its status as property of the public

dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to

acquisition by prescription.

VI.

A final word. The Court is comfortable with the correctness of the legal doctrines

established in this decision. Nonetheless, discomfiture over the implications of

today’s ruling cannot be discounted. For, every untitled property that is occupied

in the country will be affected by this ruling. The social implications cannot be

dismissed lightly, and the Court would be abdicating its social responsibility to the

Filipino people if we simply levied the law without comment.

The informal settlement of public lands, whether declared alienable or not, is a

phenomenon tied to long-standing habit and cultural acquiescence, and is

common among the so-called "Third World" countries. This paradigm powerfully

evokes the disconnect between a legal system and the reality on the ground. The

law so far has been unable to bridge that gap. Alternative means of acquisition ofthese public domain lands, such as through homestead or free patent, have

proven unattractive due to limitations imposed on the grantee in the

encumbrance or alienation of said properties.52

Judicial confirmation of imperfect

title has emerged as the most viable, if not the most attractive means to







regularize the informal settlement of alienable or disposable lands of the public

domain, yet even that system, as revealed in this decision, has considerable limits.

There are millions upon millions of Filipinos who have individually or exclusively

held residential lands on which they have lived and raised their families. Manymore have tilled and made productive idle lands of the State with their hands.

They have been regarded for generation by their families and their communities

as common law owners. There is much to be said about the virtues of according

them legitimate states. Yet such virtues are not for the Court to translate into

positive law, as the law itself considered such lands as property of the public

dominion. It could only be up to Congress to set forth a new phase of land reform

to sensibly regularize and formalize the settlement of such lands which in legal

theory are lands of the public domain before the problem becomes insoluble. This

could be accomplished, to cite two examples, by liberalizing the standards for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, or amending the Civil Code itself to ease

the requisites for the conversion of public dominion property into patrimonial.

One’s sense of security over land rights infuses into every aspect of well-being not

only of that individual, but also to the person’s family. Once that sense of security

is deprived, life and livelihood are put on stasis. It is for the political branches to

bring welcome closure to the long pestering problem.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated

23 February 2007 and Resolution dated 2 October 2007 are AFFIRMED. No

pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.



G.R. No. L-61647 October 12, 1984

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (DIRECTOR OF LANDS), petitioner,

vs.

THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, BENJAMIN TANCINCO, AZUCENA TANCINCOREYES, MARINA TANCINCO IMPERIAL and MARIO C. TANCINCO, respondents.

The Solicitor General for petitioner.

Martin B. Laurea for respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.

This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the decision of the respondent Court of

Appeals (now Intermediate Appellate Court) affirming the decision of the Court ofFirst Instance of Bulacan, Fifth Judicial District, Branch VIII, which found that Lots

1 and 2 of Plan Psu-131892 are accretion to the land covered by Transfer

Certificate of Title No. 89709 and ordered their registration in the names of the

private respondents.

Respondents Benjamin Tancinco, Azucena Tancinco Reyes, Marina (should be

"Maria") Tancinco Imperial and Mario C. Tancinco are registered owners of a

parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-89709 situated at

Barrio Ubihan, Meycauayan, Bulacan bordering on the Meycauayan and Bocauerivers.

On June 24, 1973, the private respondents filed an application for the registration

of three lots adjacent to their fishpond property and particularly described as

follows: têñ.£îhqwâ£

Lot 1-Psu-131892

(Maria C. Tancinco)

A parcel of land (lot 1 as shown on plan Psu-131892), situated in the

Barrio of Ubihan, Municipality of Meycauayan, Province of Bulacan.

Bounded on the NE., along line 1-2, by Lot 3 of plan Psu-131892; on

the SE., along lines 2-3-4, by Meycauayan River; on the S.W., along

fines 4-5-6-7-8-9, by Bocaue River; on the NE., along line 9-10, by

property of Joaquina Santiago; on the E., NE., and NW., along lines



10-11-12-1, by property of Mariano Tancinco (Lot 2, Psu-111877). ...

containing an area of THIRTY THREE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED

THIRTY SEVEN (33,937) SQUARE METERS. ...

Lot 2-Psu-131892(Maria C. Tancinco)

A parcel of land (Lot 2 as shown on plan Psu-131892), situated in the


Bounded on the E., along line 1-2, by property of Rafael Singson; on

the S., along line 2-3, by Meycauayan River; on the SW., along line 3-

4, by Lot 3 of plan Psu-131892; and on the N., along line 4-1, by

property of Mariano Tancinco (Lot 1, Psu-111877). ... containing an

area of FIVE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY THREE (5,453)

SQUARE METERS. ...

Lot 3-Psu-131892

(Maria C. Tancinco)

A parcel of land (Lot 3 as shown on plan Psu-131892), situated in the


Bounded on the NE., along line 1-2, by property of Mariano Tancinco

(Lot 1, Psu-111877); and along line 2-3, by Lot 2 of plan Psu-131892;

on the S., along line 3-4, by Meycauayan River, on the SW., along line4-5, by Lot 1 of plan Psu-131892; and along line 5-6 by property of

Mariano Tancinco (Lot 2, Psu-111877), and on the NW., along line 6-

1, by property of Joaquina Santiago. ... containing an area of ONE

THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED EIGHTY FIVE (1,985) SQUARE METERS. ...

On April 5, 1974, Assistant Provincial Fiscal Amando C. Vicente, in representation

of the Bureau of Lands filed a written opposition to the application for

registration.

On March 6, 1975, the private respondents filed a partial withdrawal of the

application for registration with respect to Lot 3 of Plan Psu-131892 in line with

the recommendation of the Commissioner appointed by the Court.

On March 7, 1975, Lot 3 was ordered withdrawn from the application and trial

proceeded only with respect to Lots 1 and 2 covered by Plan Psu-131892.



On June 26, 1976, the lower court rendered a decision granting the application on

the finding that the lands in question are accretions to the private respondents'

fishponds covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 89709. The dispositive

portion of the decision reads: têñ.£îhqwâ£

WHEREFORE, it appearing that Lots 1 & 2 of plan Psu-131892 (Exh. H)

are accretions to the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.

89709 of the Register of Deeds of Bulacan, they belong to the owner

of said property. The Court, therefore, orders the registration of lots

1 & 2 situated in the barrio of Ubihan, municipality of Meycauayan,

province of Bulacan, and more particularly described in plan Psu-

131892 (Exh. H) and their accompanying technical descriptions (Exhs.

E, E-1) in favor of Benjamin Tancinco, married to Alma Fernandez and

residing at 3662 Heatherdown, Toledo, Ohio 43614 U.S.A.; AzucenaTancinco Reyes, married to Alex Reyes, Jr., residing at 4th St., New

Manila, Quezon City; Marina Tancinco Imperial, married to Juan

Imperial, residing at Pasay Road, Dasmariñas Village, Makati, Rizal;

and Mario C. Tancinco, married to Leticia Regidor, residing at 1616

Cypress St., Dasmariñas Village, Makati, Rizal, all of legal age, all

Filipino citizens.

On July 30, 1976, the petitioner Republic appealed to the respondent Court of

Appeals.

On August, 19, 1982, the respondent Court rendered a decision affirming in

toto the decision of the lower court. The dispositive portion of the decision

reads: têñ.£îhqwâ£

DAHIL DITO, ang hatol na iniakyat ay sinasangayunan at pinagtitibay

sa kanyang kabuuan nang walang bayad.

The rule that the findings of fact of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are

binding upon this Court admits of certain exceptions. Thus inCarolina IndustriesInc. v. CMS Stock Brokerage, Inc. (97 SCRA 734) we held that this Court retains the

power to review and rectify the findings of fact of said courts when (1) the

conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises and

conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, and

impossible; (3) where there is grave abuse of discretion, (4) when the judgment is



based on a misapprehension of facts; and (5) when the court, in making its

findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same are contrary to the

admissions of both appellant and appellee.

There are facts and circumstances in the record which render untenable thefindings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the lands in question are

accretions to the private respondents' fishponds.

The petitioner submits that there is no accretion to speak of under Article 457 of

the New Civil Code because what actually happened is that the private

respondents simply transferred their dikes further down the river bed of the

Meycauayan River, and thus, if there is any accretion to speak of, it is man-made

and artificial and not the result of the gradual and imperceptible sedimentation

by the waters of the river.

On the other hand, the private respondents rely on the testimony of Mrs. Virginia

Acuña to the effect that: têñ.£îhqwâ£

xxx xxx xxx

... when witness first saw the land, namely, Lots 1 & 2, they were

already dry almost at the level of the Pilapil of the property of Dr.

Tancinco, and that from the boundaries of the lots, for about two (2)

arms length the land was still dry up to the edge of the river; thatsometime in 1951, a new Pilapil was established on the boundaries of

Lots 1 & 2 and soil from the old Pilapil was transferred to the new

Pilapil and this was done sometime in 1951; that the new lots were

then converted into fishpond, and water in this fishpond was two (2)

meters deep on the side of the Pilapil facing the fishpond ... .

The private respondents submit that the foregoing evidence establishes the fact

of accretion without human intervention because the transfer of the dike

occurred after the accretion was complete.

We agree with the petitioner.

Article 457 of the New Civil Code provides: têñ.£îhqwâ£



To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the

accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current

of the waters.

The above-quoted article requires the concurrence of three requisites before anaccretion covered by this particular provision is said to have taken place. They are

(1) that the deposit be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be made through the

effects of the current of the water; and (3) that the land where accretion takes

place is adjacent to the banks of rivers.

The requirement that the deposit should be due to the effect of the current of the

river is indispensable. This excludes from Art. 457 of the New Civil Code all

deposits caused by human intervention. Alluvion must be the exclusive work of

nature. In the instant case, there is no evidence whatsoever to prove that the

addition to the said property was made gradually through the effects of the

current of the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. We agree with the observation of

the Solicitor General that it is preposterous to believe that almost four (4)

hectares of land came into being because of the effects of the Meycauayan and

Bocaue rivers. The lone witness of the private respondents who happens to be

their overseer and whose husband was first cousin of their father noticed the four

hectare accretion to the twelve hectare fishpond only in 1939. The respondents

claim that at this point in time, accretion had already taken place. If so, their

witness was incompetent to testify to a gradual and imperceptible increase to

their land in the years before 1939. However, the witness testified that in that

year , she observed an increase in the area of the original fishpond which is now

the land in question. If she was telling the truth, the accretion was sudden.

However, there is evidence that the alleged alluvial deposits were artificial and

man-made and not the exclusive result of the current of the Meycauayan and

Bocaue rivers. The alleged alluvial deposits came into being not because of the

sole effect of the current of the rivers but as a result of the transfer of the dike

towards the river and encroaching upon it. The land sought to be registered is not

even dry land cast imperceptibly and gradually by the river's current on thefishpond adjoining it. It is under two meters of water. The private respondents'

own evidence shows that the water in the fishpond is two meters deep on the

side of the pilapil facing the fishpond and only one meter deep on the side of the

pilapil facing the river



The reason behind the law giving the riparian owner the right to any land or

alluvion deposited by a river is to compensate him for the danger of loss that he

suffers because of the location of his land. If estates bordering on rivers are

exposed to floods and other evils produced by the destructive force of the waters

and if by virtue of lawful provisions, said estates are subject to incumbrances andvarious kinds of easements, it is proper that the risk or danger which may

prejudice the owners thereof should be compensated by the right of accretion.

(Cortes v. City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567). Hence, the riparian owner does not acquire

the additions to his land caused by special works expressly intended or designed

to bring about accretion. When the private respondents transferred their dikes

towards the river bed, the dikes were meant for reclamation purposes and not to

protect their property from the destructive force of the waters of the river.

We agree with the submission of the Solicitor General that the testimony of theprivate respondents' lone witness to the effect that as early as 1939 there already

existed such alleged alluvial deposits, deserves no merit. It should be noted that

the lots in question were not included in the survey of their adjacent property

conducted on May 10, 1940 and in the Cadastral Survey of the entire Municipality

of Meycauayan conducted between the years 1958 to 1960. The alleged accretion

was declared for taxation purposes only in 1972 or 33 years after it had

supposedly permanently formed. The only valid conclusion therefore is that the

said areas could not have been there in 1939. They existed only after the private

respondents transferred their dikes towards the bed of the Meycauayan river in1951. What private respondents claim as accretion is really an encroachment of a

portion of the Meycauayan river by reclamation.

The lower court cannot validly order the registration of Lots 1 & 2 in the names of

the private respondents. These lots were portions of the bed of the Meycauayan

river and are therefore classified as property of the public domain under Article

420 paragraph 1 and Article 502, paragraph 1 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

They are not open to registration under the Land Registration Act. The

adjudication of the lands in question as private property in the names of theprivate respondents is null and void.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The decision appealed from is

hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The private respondents are ordered to move

back the dikes of their fishponds to their original location and return the disputed

property to the river to which it belongs.



SO ORDERED.1äwphï1.ñët

Teehankee, Actg. C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova and De la Fuente, JJ.,

concur.

Property is considered public domain since it was a man made

accretion,thus he cannot register

All decions/notices of the case should be sent to the

solicitor general. When there is no receive notice on

the OSG, there is really no notice.



G.R. No. L-17652 June 30, 1962

IGNACIO GRANDE, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DOMINGO CALALUNG, and ESTEBANCALALUNG, respondents.

Bartolome Guirao and Antonio M. Orara for petitioners.

Gonzales and Fernandez for respondents.

BARRERA, J.:

This is an appeal taken by petitioners Ignacio, Eulogia, Alfonso, Eulalia, and Sofia

Grande, from the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 25169-R)

reversing that of the Court of First Instance of Isabela (Civil Case No. 1171), and

dismissing petitioners' action against respondents Domingo and Esteban Calalung,

to quiet title to and recover possession of a parcel of land allegedly occupied by

the latter without petitioners' consent.

The facts of the case, which are undisputed, briefly are: Petitioners are the

owners of a parcel of land, with an area of 3.5032 hectares, located at barrio

Ragan, municipality of Magsaysay (formerly Tumauini), province of Isabela, by

inheritance from their deceased mother Patricia Angui (who inherited it from her

parents Isidro Angui and Ana Lopez, in whose name said land appears registered,as shown by Original Certificate of Title No. 2982, issued on June 9, 1934). Said

property is identified as Lot No. 1, Plan PSU-83342. When it was surveyed for

purposes of registration sometime in 1930, its northeastern boundary was the

Cagayan River (the same boundary stated in the title). Since then, and for many

years thereafter, a gradual accretion on the northeastern side took place, by

action of the current of the Cagayan River, so much so, that by 1958, the bank

thereof had receded to a distance of about 105 meters from its original site, and

an alluvial deposit of 19,964 square meters (1.9964 hectares), more or less, had

been added to the registered area (Exh. C-1).

On January 25, 1958, petitioners instituted the present action in the Court of First

Instance of Isabela against respondents, to quiet title to said portion (19,964

square meters) formed by accretion, alleging in their complaint (docketed as Civil

Case No. 1171) that they and their predecessors-in-interest, were formerly in



peaceful and continuous possession thereof, until September, 1948, when

respondents entered upon the land under claim of ownership. Petitioners also

asked for damages corresponding to the value of the fruits of the land as well as

attorney's fees and costs. In their answer (dated February 18, 1958), respondents

claim ownership in themselves, asserting that they have been in continuous,open, and undisturbed possession of said portion, since prior to the year 1933 to

the present.

After trial, the Court of First Instance of Isabela, on May 4, 1959, rendered a

decision adjudging the ownership of the portion in question to petitioners, and

ordering respondents to vacate the premises and deliver possession thereof to

petitioners, and to pay to the latter P250.00 as damages and costs. Said decision,

in part, reads:

It is admitted by the parties that the land involved in this action was formed

by the gradual deposit of alluvium brought about by the action of the

Cagayan River, a navigable river. We are inclined to believe that the

accretion was formed on the northeastern side of the land covered by

Original Certificate of Title No. 2982 after the survey of the registered land

in 1931, because the surveyors found out that the northeastern boundary

of the land surveyed by them was the Cagayan River, and not the land in

question. Which is indicative of the fact that the accretion has not yet

started or begun in 1931. And, as declared by Pedro Laman, defendant

witness and the boundary owner on the northwest of the registered land of

the plaintiffs, the accretion was a little more than one hectare, including

the stony portion, in 1940 or 1941. Therefore, the declarations of the

defendant Domingo Calalung and his witness, Vicente C. Bacani, to the

effect that the land in question was formed by accretion since 1933 do not

only contradict the testimony of defendants' witness Pedro Laman, but

could not overthrow the incontestable fact that the accretion with an area

of 4 hectare more or less, was formed in 1948, reason for which, it was only

declared in that same year for taxation purposes by the defendants underTax Dec. No. 257 (Exh. "2") when they entered upon the land. We could not

give credence to defendants' assertion that Tax Dec. No. 257 (Exh. "2")

cancelled Tax Dee. No. 28226 (Exh. "1"), because Exh. "2" says that "tax

under this declaration begins with the year 1948. But, the fact that

defendants declared the land for taxation purposes since 1948, does not

mean that they become the owner of the land by mere occupancy, for it is



a new provision of the New Civil Code that ownership of a piece of land

cannot be acquired by occupation (Art. 714, New Civil Code). The land in

question being an accretion to the mother or registered land of the

plaintiffs, the accretion belongs to the plaintiffs (Art. 457, New Civil Code;

Art. 366, Old Civil Code). Assuming arguendo, that the accretion has beenoccupied by the defendants since 1948, or earlier, is of no moment,

because the law does not require any act of possession on the part of the

owner of the riparian owner, from the moment the deposit becomes

manifest (Roxas v. Tuason, 9 Phil. 408; Cortez v. City of Manila, 10 Phil.

567). Further, no act of appropriation on the part of the reparian owner is

necessary, in order to acquire ownership of the alluvial formation, as the

law does not require the same (3 Manresa, C.C., pp. 321-326).

This brings us now to the determination of whether the defendants,granting that they have been in possession of the alluvium since 1948,

could have acquired the property by prescription. Assuming that they

occupied the land in September, 1948, but considering that the action was

commenced on January 25, 1958, they have not been in possession of the

land for ten (10) years; hence, they could not have acquired the land by

ordinary prescription (Arts. 1134 and 1138, New Civil Code). Moreover, as

the alluvium is, by law, part and parcel of the registered property, the same

may be considered as registered property, within the meaning of Section 46

of Act No. 496: and, therefore, it could not be acquired by prescription oradverse possession by another person.

Unsatisfied, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, which rendered, on

September 14, 1960, the decision adverted to at the beginning of this opinion,

partly stating:

That the area in controversy has been formed through a gradual process of

alluvium, which started in the early thirties, is a fact conclusively

established by the evidence for both parties. By law, therefore, unless some

superior title has supervened, it should properly belong to the riparian

owners, specifically in accordance with the rule of natural accession in

Article 366 of the old Civil Code (now Article 457), which provides that "to

the owner of lands adjoining the banks of rivers, belongs the accretion

which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters."

The defendants, however, contend that they have acquired ownership



through prescription. This contention poses the real issue in this case. The

Courta quo, has resolved it in favor of the plaintiffs, on two grounds: First,

since by accession, the land in question pertains to the original estate, and

since in this instance the original estate is registered, the accretion,

consequently, falls within the purview of Section 46 of Act No. 496, whichstates that "no title to registered land in derogation to that of the

registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession";

and, second, the adverse possession of the defendant began only in the

month of September, 1948, or less than the 10-year period required for

prescription before the present action was instituted.

As a legal proposition, the first ground relied upon by the trial court, is not

quite correct. An accretion to registered land, while declared by specific

provision of the Civil Code to belong to the owner of the land as a naturalaccession thereof, does not ipso jure become entitled to the protection of

the rule of imprescriptibility of title established by the Land Registration

Act. Such protection does not extend beyond the area given and described

in the certificate. To hold otherwise, would be productive of confusion. It

would virtually deprive the title, and the technical description of the land

given therein, of their character of conclusiveness as to the identity and

area of the land that is registered. Just as the Supreme Court, albeit in a

negative manner, has stated that registration does not protect the riparian

owner against the erosion of the area of his land through gradual changesin the course of the adjoining stream (Payatas Estate Development Co. v.

Tuason, 53 Phil. 55), so registration does not entitle him to all the rights

conferred by Land Registration Act, in so far as the area added by accretion

is concerned. What rights he has, are declared not by said Act, but by the

provisions of the Civil Code on accession: and these provisions do not

preclude acquisition of the addition area by another person through

prescription. This Court has held as much in the case of Galindez, et al. v.

Baguisa, et al ., CA-G.R. No. 19249-R, July 17, 1959.

We now proposed to review the second ground relied upon by the trial

court, regarding the length of time that the defendants have been in

possession. Domingo Calalung testified that he occupied the land in

question for the first time in 1934, not in 1948 as claimed by the plaintiffs.

The area under occupancy gradually increased as the years went by. In

1946, he declared the land for purposes of taxation (Exhibit 1). This tax



declaration was superseded in 1948 by another (Exhibit 2), after the name

of the municipality wherein it is located was changed from Tumauini to

Magsaysay. Calalung's testimony is corroborated by two witnesses, both

owners of properties nearby. Pedro Laman, 72 years of age, who was

Municipal president of Tumauini for three terms, said that the land inquestion adjoins his own on the south, and that since 1940 or 1951, he has

always known it to be in the peaceful possession of the defendants. Vicente

C. Bacani testified to the same effect, although, he said that the

defendants' possession started sometime in 1933 or 1934. The area

thereof, he said, was then less than one hectare.

We find the testimony of the said witnesses entitled to much greater

weight and credence than that of the plaintiff Pedro Grande and his lone

witness, Laureana Rodriguez. The first stated that the defendants occupiedthe land in question only in 1948; that he called the latter's attention to the

fact that the land was his, but the defendants, in turn, claimed that they

were the owners, that the plaintiffs did not file an action until 1958,

because it was only then that they were able to obtain the certificate of

title from the surveyor, Domingo Parlan; and that they never declared the

land in question for taxation purposes or paid the taxes thereon. Pedro

Grande admitted that the defendants had the said land surveyed in April,

1958, and that he tried to stop it, not because he claimed the accretion for

himself and his co-plaintiffs, but because the survey included a portion ofthe property covered by their title. This last fact is conceded by the

defendants who, accordingly, relinquished their possession to the part thus

included, containing an area of some 458 square meters.1äwphï1.ñët

The oral evidence for the defendants concerning the period of their

possession — from 1933 to 1958 — is not only preponderant in itself, but

is, moreover, supported by the fact that it is they and not the plaintiffs who

declared the disputed property for taxation, and by the additional

circumstance that if the plaintiff had really been in prior possession andwere deprived thereof in 1948, they would have immediately taken steps

to recover the same. The excuse they gave for not doing so, namely, that

they did not receive their copy of the certificate of title to their property

until 1958 for lack of funds to pay the fees of the surveyor Domingo Parlan,

is too flimsy to merit any serious consideration. The payment of the

surveyor's fees had nothing to do with their right to obtain a copy of the



certificate. Besides, it was not necessary for them to have it in their hands,

in order to file an action to recover the land which was legally theirs by

accession and of which, as they allege, they had been illegally deprived by

the defendants. We are convinced, upon consideration of the evidence,

that the latter, were really in possession since 1934, immediately after theprocess of alluvion started, and that the plaintiffs woke up to their rights

only when they received their copy of the title in 1958. By then, however,

prescription had already supervened in favor of the defendants.

It is this decision of the Court of Appeals which petitioners seek to be reviewed by

us.

The sole issue for resolution in this case is whether respondents have acquired

the alluvial property in question through prescription.

There can be no dispute that both under Article 457 of the New Civil Code and

Article 366 of the old, petitioners are the lawful owners of said alluvial property,

as they are the registered owners of the land which it adjoins. The question is

whether the accretion becomes automatically registered land just because the lot

which receives it is covered by a Torrens title thereby making the alluvial property

imprescriptible. We agree with the Court of Appeals that it does not, just as an

unregistered land purchased by the registered owner of the adjoining land does

not, by extension, become ipso facto registered land. Ownership of a piece of land

is one thing, and registration under the Torrens system of that ownership is quite

another. Ownership over the accretion received by the land adjoining a river is

governed by the Civil Code. Imprescriptibility of registered land is provided in the

registration law. Registration under the Land Registration and Cadastral Acts does

not vest or give title to the land, but merely confirms and thereafter protects the

title already possessed by the owner, making it imprescriptible by occupation of

third parties. But to obtain this protection, the land must be placed under the

operation of the registration laws wherein certain judicial procedures have been

provided. The fact remain, however, that petitioners never sought registration of

said alluvial property (which was formed sometime after petitioners' property

covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 2982 was registered on June 9, 1934)

up to the time they instituted the present action in the Court of First Instance of

Isabela in 1958. The increment, therefore, never became registered property, and

hence is not entitled or subject to the protection of imprescriptibility enjoyed by

Grande- should have registered the property on the alluvial accretion.

The property adjacent which formed the alluvial accretion does not

automatically titled to them even if the land is titled, they should have

registered it.

If not titled it is open for

prescription. If u are a

riparian owner apply for

declaration.



registered property under the Torrens system. Consequently, it was subject to

acquisition through prescription by third persons.

The next issue is, did respondents acquire said alluvial property through

acquisitive prescription? This is a question which requires determination of facts:physical possession and dates or duration of such possession. The Court of

Appeals, after analyzing the evidence, found that respondents-appellees were in

possession of the alluvial lot since 1933 or 1934, openly, continuously and

adversely, under a claim of ownership up to the filing of the action in 1958. This

finding of the existence of these facts, arrived at by the Court of Appeals after an

examination of the evidence presented by the parties, is conclusive as to them

and can not be reviewed by us.

The law on prescription applicable to the case is that provided in Act 190 and not

the provisions of the Civil Code, since the possession started in 1933 or 1934

when the pertinent articles of the old Civil Code were not in force and before the

effectivity of the new Civil Code in 1950. Hence, the conclusion of the Court of

Appeals that the respondents acquired alluvial lot in question by acquisitive

prescription is in accordance with law.

The decision of the Court of Appeals under review is hereby affirmed, with costs

against the petitioners. So ordered.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.

Reyes, J.B.L., Regala and Makalintal, JJ., took no part.



G.R. No. L-40912 September 30, 1976

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the MINDANAO MEDICAL

CENTER, petioner,

vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ALEJANDRO Y DE JESUS, respondents.

Office of the Solicitor for petitioner.

Ananias C. Ona for private respondent.

MARTIN, J.:têñ.£îhqwâ£

This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Apiwals in its CA-

G.R. No. 39577-R, raising the question of whether or not petitioner MindanaoMedical Center has registerable title over a full 12.8081-hectare land by virtue of

an executive proclamation in 1956 reserving the area for medical center site

purposes.

On January 22, 1921, Eugenio de Jesus, the father of respondent Alejandro de

Jesus, applied with the Bureau of Lands for Sales Patent (Sales Application No.

5436) of a 33-hectare situated in barrio Libaron, Municipality of Davao (now

Davao City).1 The property applied for was a portion of what was then known as

Lot 522 of the Davao Cadastre.

On January 23, 1934, the Bureau of Lands, through its Davao District Land Officer,

accepted sealed bids for the purchase of the subject land. One Irineo Jose bidded

for P20.00 per hectare, while a certain Dr. Josc Ebro submitted a bid of P100.50

per hectare The Director of Lands, however, annulled the auction sale for the

reason that the sales applicant, Eugenio de Jesus, failed to participate in the

bidding for non-service of notice on him of the scheduled bidding.

In lieu of that sale, another bidding was held on October 4, 1934. Sales applicantEugenio de Jesus was the lone bidder. He equalled the bid previously submitted

by Dr. Jose Ebro and made a deposit of P221.00 representing 10% of the price of

the land at P100.50 per hectare.

On November 23, 1934, the Director of Lands issued to Eugenio de Jesus an Order

of Award, the dispositive portion of which reads:2ñé+.£ªwph!1



In view of the foregoing, and it appearing that the proceedings had in

connection with the Sales Application No. 5436 were in accordance

with law and existing regulations, the land covered thereby is

herebyawarded to the said applicant, Eugenio de jesus, at P100.50

per hectare or P2,211.00 for the whole tract.

This application should be entered in the records of this office as

Sales Application No. 3231,covering the tract herein awarded, which

is more particularly described as follows:

Location: Central, Davao,ñé+.£ªwph!1

Davao

Area: 22 hectares

Boundaries:ñé+.£ªwph!1

N—Maria Villa Abrille and Arenio Suazo;

SE—Provincial Road and Mary Gohn;

SW—Public Land;

W—Municipal Road;

Because the area conveyed had not been actually surveyed at the time Eugenio

de Jesus filed his Sales Application, the Bureau of Lands conducted a survey under

Plan Bsd-1514. On July 29, 1936, the plan was approved and the land awarded to

Eugenio de Jesus was designated as Lot Nos. 1176-A, 1176-B-1-A and 1176-B-1-B

with an aggregate area of 20.6400 hectares, Bsd-10153, City of Davao.

On August 28, 1936, the Director of Lands ordered an amendment of the Sales

Application of Eugenio de Jesus stating that "a portion of the land covered bySales Application No. 5436 (E-3231) of Eugenio de Jesus is needed by the

Philippine Army for military camp site purposes, the said application is amended

so as to exclude therefrom portion "A" as shown in the sketch on the back

thereof, and as thus amended, it will continue to be given due course." The area



excluded was Identified as Lot 1176-B-2, the very land in question, consisting of

12.8081 hectares.

On September 7, 1936, President Manuel L. Quezon issued Proclaimation No. 85

withdrawing Lot No. 1176-B-2 from sale and settlement and reserving the samefor military purposes, under the administration of the Chief of Staff, Philippine

Army.

On November 29, 1939, Eugenio de Jesus paid P660.45 covering the 8th and 10th

installment for 20.6400 hectares, the remaining area after his Sales Application

was amended. This payment did not include the military camp site (Lot No. 1176-

B-2) as the same had already been excluded from the Sales Application at the

time the payment was made.3 Thereafter, or on May 15, 1948, then Director of

Lands Jose P. Dans ordered the issuance of patent to Eugenio de Jesus, pursuant

to his Sales Application for "a tract of land having an area of 20.6400 hectares,

situated in the barrio of Poblacion, City of Davao.4 On the same date, then

Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Mariano Garchitorena granted a

Sales Patent to Eugenio de Jesus for "a tract of agricultural public land situated in

the City of Davao, Island of Mindanao, Philippines, containing an area of 20

hectares, 64 ares, and 00 centares.5

On August 11, 1956, President Ramon Magsaysay revoked Proclamation No. 85

and declared the disputed Lot 1176-B-2 open to disposition under the provisions

of the Public land Act for resettlement of the squatters in the Piapi Beach, Davao

City.6 In the following October 9, President Magsaysay revoked this Proclamation

No. 328 and reserved the same Lot No. 1176-B-2 for medical center site purposes

under the administration of the Director of Hospital.7

Whereupon, on December 6, 1969, petitioner Mindanao Medical Center applied

for the Torrens registration of the 12.8081-hectare Lot 1176-B-2 with the Court of

First Instance of Davao. The Medical Center claimed "fee simple" title to the land

on the strength of proclamation No. 350 reserving the area for medical center site

purposes.

Respondent Alejandro de Jesus, the son and successor-in-interest of sale

applicant Eugenio de Jesus, opposed the registration oil the ground that his

father, Eugenio de Jesus, had aquired a vested right on the subject lot by virtue of

the Order of Award issued to him by the Director of Lands.



A certain Arsenio Suazo likewise filed his opposition to the registration on the

claim that the 2-hectare portion on the northeastern part of Lot 1176-B-2 belongs

to him.

After due hearing, the Court of First Instance of Davao rendered judgment onSeptember 2, 1966, directing "the registration of the title to Lot No. 1176-B-2 of

Subdivision Plan Bsd-5134, shown on Plan Ap-6512, situated in the Barrio of

Central, City of Davao, and containing an area of 128,081 square meters in the

name of the Mindanao Medical Center, Bureau of Medical Services, Department

of Health.

The two oppositors, Alejandro de Jesus and Arsenio Suazo, excepted from this

judgment of the trial court and appealed the case to the respondent Court of

Appeals.

On July 2, 1974, the Appellate Court held: ñé+.£ªwph!1

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby modified insofar as it

denies the claim of appellant Arsenio Suazo, the same is hereby

affirmed, in regard the appeal of appellant Alejandro Y. de Jesus,

registration Lot 1176-B-2, situated in Barrio Central, Davao City, and

containing an area of 12.8081 square meters, is hereby decreed in

the name of said appellants, but said appellant is hereby ordered to

relinquish to the appellee that portion of Lot 1176-B-2 which isoccupied by the medical center and nervous disease pavilion and their

reasonable appartenances, no costs.

On July 5, 1974, petitioner Mindanao Medical Center moved for reconsideration,

maintaining ownership over the entire area of 12.8081 hectares, but the

Appellate Court in a Special Division of Five denied the motion on June 17, 1975.8

Forthwith, petitioner Mindanao Medical Center elevated the matter to Us thru

the present appeal.

We find petitioner's appeal to b meritorious.

1. Petitioner Mindanao Medical Center has registerable title over the whole

contested area of 12.8081 hectares, designated Lot No. 1176-B-2, and not only on

a portion thereof occupied by the Medical Center, its nervous disease pavilion



and their reasonable appurtenances. Proclamation No. 350, dated October 9,

1956, of President Magsaysay legally effected a land grant to the Mindanao

Medical Center, Bureau of Medical Services, Department of Health, of the whole

lot, validity sufficient for initial registration under the Land Registration Act. Such

land grant is constitutive of a "fee simple" tile or absolute title in favor ofpetitioner Mindanao Medical Center. Thus, Section 122 of the Act, which governs

the registration of grants or patents involving public lands, provides that

"Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands belonging to the Government of

the Philippines are alienated, granted, or conveyed to persons or to public or

private corporations, the same shall be brought forthwith under the operation of

this Act [Land Registration Act, Act 496] and shall become registered lands."9 It

would be completely absurd to rule that, on the basis of Proclamation No. 350,

the Medical Center has registerable title on the portion occupied by it, its nervous

disease pavilion and the reasonable appurtenances, and not on the full extent ofthe reservation, when the proclamation explicitly reserved the entire Lot 1176-B-

2 of 12.8081 hectares to the Center.

Certainly, proclamation no. 350 is free of any legal infirmity. It proceeds from the

recognized competence of the president to reserve by executive proclamation

alienable lands of the public domain for a specific public use or service.10

section

64 (e) of the Revised Administrative Code empowers the president "(t)o reserve

from sale oe other disposition and for specific public uses for service, any land

belonging to the private domain of the Government of the Philippines, the use ofwhich is not otherwise directed by law. the land reserved "shall be used for the

specific purposes directed by such executive order until otherwise provided by

law." Similarly, Section 83 of the Public Land Act (CA 141) authorizes the President

to "designate by proclamation any tract or tracts of land of the public domain as

reservations for the use ofthe commonwealth of the Philippines or of any of its

branches, or of the inhabitants thereof, ... or for quasi-public uses or purposes

when the public interest requires it, including reservations for ... other

improvements for the public benefit.

2. Respondent Appellate Court erroneously ruled that Alejabdro's father, Eugenio

de jesus, had acquired ownership over the whole 12.8081-hectare Lot 1176-B-2

because the Sales Award issued to him on November 23, 1934 by then Director of

Lands Simeon Ramos covered the 33 hectares applied for, including the 12.8081

hectares. We fail to see any reasonable basis on record for the Appellate Court to

draw such conclusion. On the contrary, the very Sales Award describes the tract



awarded as located in Central, Davao, Davao, with an area of 22 hectares, and

bounded on the north by Maria Villa Abrille and Arsenio Suazo; on the southeast

by a provincial road and Mary Gohn; on the southwest by a public land; and on

the west by a municipal road.11

This area of 22 hectares was even reduced to

20.6400 hectares upon actual survey made by the Bureau of Lands. The samearea was reckoned with by then Lands Director Jose P. Dans when he directed the

issuance of a patent to Eugenio de Jesus on May 15, 1948 for his application filed

on January 22, 1921 covering "a tract of land having an area of 20.6400 hectares,

situated in the barrio of Poblacion, City of Davao."12

In like manner, the Sales

Patent issued to Eugenio de Jesus on the same date, May 15, 1948, by then

Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Mariano Garchitorena indicated

therein the sale to Eugenio de Jesus of "a tract of agricultural public land situated

in the City of Davao, Island of Mindanao, Philippines, containing an area of 20

hectares 64, ares 00 centares." Seen in the light of Patent, and Sales Order forIssuance of Patent, and Sales Patent, invariably bearing the area awarded to sales

applicant Eugenio de Jesusas 20.6400 hectares, it becomes imperative to

conclude that what was really awarded to Eugenio de jesus was only 20.6400

hectares and not 33 hectares as applied for by him.

However, We observe that in the public bidding of october 4, 1934, the succesful

bidder, submitted a bid of 100.50 per hectare and made a cash deposit of only

P221.00, which amount represents 10% of the purchase price of the land.13

At

P100.50 per hectare, the purchase would be P2,221.00 for 22 hectares, 10%deposit of which amounts to P221.00. For 33 hectares, the total purchase price

would be P3,316.50 at P100.50 per hectare and the 10% deposit would be

P331.65, not P221.00, as what was actually deposited by sales applicant Eugenio

de Jesus. Withal, if Eugenio de Jesus was really awarded 33 hectares in that public

bidding, he should have made the required 10% deposit of P331.65. That he

merely deposited P221.00 strongly suggests that what was bidden for and

awarded to him was only 22 hectares and not 33 hectares as applied for. As a

matter of fact, his last payment of P660.45 on November 29, 1939 for the 8th te

10th installment intended only to cover 20.6400 hectares, the remaining areaafter the amendment of the Sales Application on August 28, 1936, excluding "the

military camp site [Lot 1176B-2 of 12.8081 hectares] for the reason that the said

site, at the time of last installment was already excluded from Sale Application SA-

5436 of Eugenio de Jesus, as ordered ... by the Director of Lands."14



But, respondent Appellate Court reasons out that if the area bidden for and

awarded in 1934 ws only 22 hectares and since two years thereafter the Director

of Lands ordered an amendment excluding the military camp site of 12.8081

hectares, then only 10 hectares, then would have been left to applicant Eugenio

de Jesus and not 20.6400 hectares would have been left in the Sales Patent. TheAppellate Court's reasoning is premised on wrong assumption. What was ordered

amended was the Sales Application for 33 hectares and not the Order of 22

hectares or 20.6400 hectares. The Order states: "Order: Amendment of

Application." Necessarily so, because the amendment was already reflected in the

Order of Award, since only an area of 22 hectares was awarded.

3. The phrase "whole tract" in the Sales Award15

cannot be licitly seized upon as

basis for the conclusion that the area awarded to applicant Eugenio de Jesus was

the applied area of 33 hectares. Such general description of "whole tract" cannotprevail over the specific description delineating the area in quantity and in

boundaries. Thus, the Sales Award specifies the area awarded as 22 hectares,

located at Central, Davao, Davao, and bounded on the north by the property of

Maria Villa Abrille and Arsenio Suazo; on the southwest by a provincial road and

the property by Mary Gohn on the southwest by a public land; and on the west by

a municipal road.16

Specific description is ordinarily preferred to general

description, or that which is more certain to what which is less certain.17

More so,

when it is considered that the series of executive proclamations (Proclamation

Nos. 85, 328, 350) continuously maintained the intent of the Government toreserve the subject land for a specific purpose or service.

Besides, patents and land grants are construed favorably to the Governement,

and most strongly against the grantee.18

Any doubt as to the intention or extent

of the grant, or the intention of the Government, is to be resolved in its

favor.19

In general, the quantity of the land granted must be ascertained from the

description in the patent is exclusive evidence of the land conveyed.20

And courts

do not usually go beyond a description of a tract in a patent and determine the

tract and quantity of land apart from the patent itself.

21

4. We cannot share the view of respondent Appellate Court that eugenio de

jesus's alleged occupation, cultivation and improvement of the 33-hectare land

(including the 12-hectare camp site) since 1916 vested in him a right of

preference or pre-empive right in the acquisition of the land, which right was

controverted into "a special propriety right" when the Sales Award was issued to



him in 1934. Not only for the earlier reasons that the Sales Award was only for 22

hectares (later found to be 20,6400 fectares upon actual survey) and not for 33

hectares, the privilege of occupying public lands a view to preemption confers np

contractual or vested right in the lands occupied and the authority of the

President to withdraw suchlands for sale or acquisition by the public, or toreserve them for public use, prior to the divesting by the government of title

threof stands, even though this may defeat the imperfect right of a

settler.22

Lands covered by reservation are not subject to entry, and no lawful

settlement on them can be acquired.23

The claims o0f persons who have settled

on occupied, and improved a parcel of public land which is later included in a

reservation are considered worthy of protection and are usually respected, but

where the President, as authorized by law, issuesa proclamation reserving certain

lands and warning all persons to depart therefrom, this terminates any rights

previously avquired in such lands by a person who was settled thereon in order toobtain a preferential right of purchase.

24 And patents for lands which have been

previously granted, reserved from sale, or appropriate, are void.25

It is true that Proclamation No. 350 states that the same is subject to "privilege

rights, if any there be," but Eugenio de Jesus or his son Alejandro de Jesus failed

to prove any private rights over the property reserved. Wee-settled is the rule

that unless the applicant has shown by clear and convincing evidence that a

certain portion of the public domain was acquired by him or his ancestors either

by composition title from the Spanish Government or by possessory informationtitle, or any other means for the acquisition of public lands, such as grants or

patents, the property must be held to be part of the public domain.26

Nor could

respondent Alejandro de Jesus legetimately claim to have obtained title by

prescription over the disputed 12.8081 hectares, inasmuch as by applying for the

sale thereof (assuming hypothetically that the 12.8081-hectare lot was included in

the original sales application for 33 hectares), his father, Eugenio de Jesus,

necessarily admits that the portions applied for are part of the public domain,

against which no acquisitive prescription may lie27

except as provided in Section

48(b) of C.A. 141, as amended.

5. Respondent Appellate Court mistakenly sustained Eugenio de Jesus's pretense

that the military "camp site" (Lot 176-B-2) had been donated by him to the

Philippine Army, thru Secretary Serafin Marabut of the Department of National

Defense, sometime in 1936 subject to the condition that it would be returned to

him when the Philippine Army would no longer need it. As found by the trial court



in 1936, the Department of National Defense was not yet in existence, so that no

Defense Secretary by the name of Serafin Marabut could have entered into a

deed of donation with Eugenio de Jesus over Lot 1176-B-2 consisting of 12.8081

hectares. The Department of National Defense was only organized in 1939.

Nonetheless, respondent Alejandro de Jesus, would prove by secondary evidencethe existence of such donation thru the testimony of persons who supposedly

saw it. In this regard, the Rules provides that before the terms of a transaction in

realty may be established by secondary evidence, it is n that the due execution

and subsequent loss of the original instrument evidencing the transaction be

proved. For it is the due execution of the document and its subsequent loss that

would constitute the foundation for the introduction of secondary evidence to

prove the contents of such document. And the due of the execution of the

document would be proved through the testimony of (1) the person or persons

who executed it; (2) the person before whom its execution was acknowledged, or(3) any who was present and saw it executed and delivered, or who, after its

execution and delivery, saw it and recognized the signatures, or by a person to

whom the parties to the instrument had previously confessed the execution

thereof.28

None of these modes of proof was ever followed by respondent

Alejandro de Jesus. His predecessor- in-interest, Eugenio de Jesus, merely made a

broad statement that he executed a deed f donation in 1936 with Defense

Secretary Marabut when at hat time the Defense Department was not yet in

existence. The notary public who presumptively acknowledged the donation or

the witnesses to the instrument were never presented. It has been ruled that thefailure of the party to present the notary Public and thore s who must have seen

the signing of the document as witnesses to testify on its execution interdicts the

admission of a secondary evidence of the terms of the deed.29

This is especially

true in realty donations where Art. 748 of the new Civil Code requires the

accomplishment thereof in a public document in order to be valid. The testimony

of Marcelo Belendres that Sesinando de jesus, brother of Eugenio de Jesus

showed him a copy of the "paper" signed by Secretary Marabut and Eugenio de

Jesus; of Jose Tinio, Acting Register of Deeds of Davao, that in May or June 1937,

Col. Simeon de jesus went to his office to register a document" executed byEugenio de Jesus and Secretary Marabut; of former Secretary Brigido Valencia

that Col. Simeon de Jesus showed him a deed of donation signed by Eugenio de

Jesus and Serafin Marabut. hardly suffer to satisfy the requisites of the Rules, as

to which very strict compliance is imposed because of the importance of the

document involved.30

First none of these persons was a witness to the



instrument, nor any of them saw the document after its execution and delivery

ind recognized the signatures of the parties nor to whom the parties to the

instrument had previously confessed the execution; second, the reference to a

"paper" or "document" ambigous as to be synonymous with a "deed of

donation;" and third, the persons who showed the deed, Sesinando de Jesus andCol. Simeon de Jesus were not parties to the instrument. Respondent Alejandro

de Jesus's narration of the existence and loss of the document equally deserves

no credence. As found by the trial court, he testified that the copy of the deed

which his father kept was sent to him in Manila thru his uncle, Sesinando de Jesus

in July 1942, while his father himself, Eugenio de Jesus, declared that his copy of

the deed was burned in Davao during the Japanese occupation. The replies of the

Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Acting Executive

Secretary that the property was "still needed for military purposes" and may not

therefore be released from the reservation cannot substitute the proof sorequired. These replies are not confirmatory of the existence of such donation

much less official admissions thereof.

Even on the gratuitous assumption that a donation of the military "camp site" was

executed between Eugenior de jesus and Serafin Marabut, such donation would

anyway be void, because Eugenior de jesus held no dominical rights over the site

when it was allegedly donated by him in 1936. In that year, proclamation No. 85

of President Quezon already withrew the area from sale or settlement and

reserved it for military purposes. Respondent Appellate Court, however,rationalizes that the subject of the donation was not the land itself but "the

possessory and special proprietary rights" of Eugenio de jesus over it. We

disagree. It is true that the gratiuitous disposal in donation may consist of a thing

or right.31

But the term "right" must be understood in a "propriety" sense, over

which the processor has the jus disponendi.32

This is because, in true donations,

there results a consequent impoverishment of the donor or diminution of his

assets.33

Eugenio de Jesus cannot be said to be possessed of that "proprietary "

right over the whole 33 hectares in 1936 including the disputed 12.8081 hectares

for at that time this 12.8081-hectare lot had already been severed from the massof disposable public lands by Proclamation No. 85 and excluded in the Sales

Award. Impoverishment of Eugenio's assets as a consequence of such donation is

therefore farfetehed. In fact, even if We were to assume in gratia argumenti that

the 12.8081-hectare lot was included in the Sales Award, still the same may not

be the subject of donation. In Sales Award, what is conferred on the applicant is

merely the right "to take possession of the land so that he could comply with the



requirements prescribed by law."34

In other words, the right granted to the sales

awardee is only "possessory right" as distinguished from "proprietary right," for

the fundamental reason that prior to the issuance of the sales patent and

registration thereof, title to the land is retained by the State.35

Admittedly, the

land applied for may be considered "disposed of by the Government" upon theissuance of the Sales Award, but this has the singular effect of withdrawing the

land from the public domian that is "disposable" by the Director of Lands under

the Public Land Act. Moreover, the dsiposition is merely provisional because the

applicant has still to comply with the requirements of the law before any patent is

issued. It is only after compliance with such requirements to the satisfaction of

the Director of Lands, that the patent is issued and the land applied for

considered "permanently disposed of by the Government." This again is a

circumstance that demeans the irrevocable nature donation, because the mere

desistance of the sales applicant to pursue the requirements called for wouldcause the virtual revocation of the donation.

ACCORDINGLY, the appealed judgement of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on

July 2, 1974, and its resolution of Jane 17, 1975, denying petitioner's motion for

reconsiderations, are hereby reversed and set aside. The disputed Lot 1176-B-2,

Plan Bsd-1514 of Davao Cadastre and containing an area of 12.8081 hectares, is

hereby adjudicated in favor of petitioner Mindanao Medical Center. The urgent

motion of the petitioner for leave to construct essential hospitawl buildings,

namely: (a) communicable and contagious diseas pavilion; (b) hospital motorpool;and (c) physician's quarters, is hereby granted. With costs against private

respondent.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Muñoz Palma and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.



G.R. No. L-24066 December 9, 1925

VALENTIN SUSI, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

ANGELA RAZON and THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, defendants. THE DIRECTOR OFLANDS, appellant.

Acting Attorney-General Reyes for appellant.

Monico R. Mercado for appellee.

VILLA-REAL, J.:

This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga by a

complaint filed by Valentin Susi against Angela Razon and the Director of Lands,

praying for judgment: (a) Declaring plaintiff the sole and absolute owner of the

parcel of land described in the second paragraph of the complaint; (b) annulling

the sale made by the Director of Lands in favor of Angela Razon, on the ground

that the land is a private property; (c) ordering the cancellation of the certificate

of title issued to said Angela Razon; and (d) sentencing the latter to pay plaintiff

the sum of P500 as damages, with the costs.

For his answer to the complaint, the Director of Lands denied each and every

allegation contained therein and, as special defense, alleged that the land in

question was a property of the Government of the United States under theadministration and control of the Philippine Islands before its sale to Angela

Razon, which was made in accordance with law.

After trial, whereat evidence was introduced by both parties, the Court of First

Instance of Pampanga rendered judgment declaring the plaintiff entitled to the

possession of the land, annulling the sale made by the Director of Lands in favor

of Angela Razon, and ordering the cancellation of the certificate of title issued to

her, with the costs against Angela Razon. From this judgment the Director of

Lands took this appeal, assigning thereto the following errors, to wit: (1) Theholding that the judgment rendered in a prior case between the plaintiff and

defendant Angela Razon on the parcel of land in question is controlling in this

action; (2) the holding that plaintiff is entitled to recover the possession of said

parcel of land; the annulment of the sale made by the Director of Lands to Angela

Razon; and the ordering that the certificate of title issued by the register of deeds

There is already a registrable title

Ruled in

favor of Su



of the Province of Pampanga to Angela Razon by virtue of said sale be cancelled;

and (3) the denial of the motion for new trial filed by the Director of Lands.

The evidence shows that on December 18, 1880, Nemesio Pinlac sold the land in

question, then a fish pond, tho Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza for the sumof P12, reserving the right to repurchase the same (Exhibit B). After having been

in possession thereof for about eight years, and the fish pond having been

destroyed, Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza, on September 5, 1899, sold it to

Valentin Susi for the sum of P12, reserving the right to repurchase it (Exhibit A).

Before the execution of the deed of sale, Valentin Susi had already paid its price

and sown "bacawan" on said land, availing himself of the firewood gathered

thereon, with the proceeds of the sale of which he had paid the price of the

property. The possession and occupation of the land in question, first, by

Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza, and then by Valentin Susi has been open,continuous, adverse and public, without any interruption, except during the

revolution, or disturbance, except when Angela Razon, on September 13, 1913,

commenced an action in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga to recover the

possession of said land (Exhibit C), wherein after considering the evidence

introduced at the trial, the court rendered judgment in favor of Valentin Susi and

against Angela Razon, dismissing the complaint (Exhibit E). Having failed in her

attempt to obtain possession of the land in question through the court, Angela

Razon applied to the Director of Lands for the purchase thereof on August 15,

1914 (Exhibit C). Having learned of said application, Valentin Susi filed andopposition thereto on December 6, 1915, asserting his possession of the land for

twenty-five years (Exhibit P). After making the proper administrative

investigation, the Director of Lands overruled the opposition of Valentin Susi and

sold the land to Angela Razon. By virtue of said grant the register of deeds of

Pampanga, on August 31, 1921, issued the proper certificate of title to Angela

Razon. Armed with said document, Angela Razon required Valentin Susi to vacate

the land in question, and as he refused to do so, she brought and action for

forcible entry and detainer in the justice of the peace court of Guagua, Pampanga,

which was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, the case being one of title to realproperty (Exhibit F and M). Valentin Susi then brought this action.

With these facts in view, we shall proceed to consider the questions raised by the

appellant in his assignments of error.lawphi1.net



It clearly appears from the evidence that Valentin Susi has been in possession of

the land in question openly, continuously, adversely, and publicly, personally and

through his predecessors, since the year 1880, that is, for about forty-five years.

While the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga against Angela

Razon in the forcible entry case does not affect the Director of Lands, yet it iscontrolling as to Angela Razon and rebuts her claim that she had been in

possession thereof. When on August 15, 1914, Angela Razon applied for the

purchase of said land, Valentin Susi had already been in possession thereof

personally and through his predecessors for thirty-four years. And if it is taken

into account that Nemesio Pinlac had already made said land a fish pond when he

sold it on December 18, 1880, it can hardly be estimated when he began to

possess and occupy it, the period of time being so long that it is beyond the reach

of memory. These being the facts, the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court

of the United States in the case of Cariño vs. Government of the Philippine Islands(212 U. S., 449

1), is applicable here. In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover,

the presumption juris et de jure established in paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act

No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary requirements for a grant

by the Government were complied with, for he has been in actual and physical

possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the

public domain openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1894,

with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII

of said Act. So that when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin

Susi had already acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but agrant of the Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title should be

issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application

therefore is sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a

legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the

State, it had already ceased to be the public domain and had become private

property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the

Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in question to Angela Razon,

the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he had no longer any title or

control, and the sale thus made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon didnot thereby acquire any right.

The Director of Lands contends that the land in question being of the public

domain, the plaintiff-appellee cannot maintain an action to recover possession

thereof.lawphi1.net Justice of peace court- municipal trial court



If, as above stated, the land, the possession of which is in dispute, had already

become, by operation of law, private property of the plaintiff, there lacking only

the judicial sanction of his title, Valentin Susi has the right to bring an action to

recover possession thereof and hold it.

For the foregoing, and no error having been found in the judgment appealed

from, the same is hereby affirmed in all its parts, without special pronouncement

as to costs. So ordered.

Avanceña, C.J., Malcolm, Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ.,

concur.

Johnson, J., took no part.



G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,

vs.

INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ACME PLYWOOD & VENEER CO. INC.,ETC., respondents.

D. Nacion Law Office for private respondent.

NARVASA, J.:

The Director of Lands has brought this appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the

Intermediate Appellate Court affirming a decision of the Court of First Instance of

Isabela, which ordered registration in favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. of

five parcels of land measuring 481, 390 square meters, more or less, acquired byit from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe.

The registration proceedings were for confirmation of title under Section 48 of

Commonwealth Act No. 141 (The Public Land Act). as amended: and the appealed

judgment sums up the findings of the trial court in said proceedings in this wise:

1. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo

Nazario is a corporation duly organized in accordance with the laws of the

Republic of the Philippines and registered with the Securities and ExchangeCommission on December 23, 1959;

2. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo

Nazario can acquire real properties pursuant to the provisions of the

Articles of Incorporation particularly on the provision of its secondary

purposes (paragraph (9), Exhibit 'M-l');

3. That the land subject of the Land Registration proceeding was ancestrally

acquired by Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., on October 29, 1962, from

Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel, both members of the Dumagat tribe and as

such are cultural minorities;

4. That the constitution of the Republic of the Philippines of 1935 is

applicable as the sale took place on October 29, 1962;



5. That the possession of the Infiels over the land relinquished or sold to

Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., dates back before the Philippines was

discovered by Magellan as the ancestors of the Infiels have possessed and

occupied the land from generation to generation until the same came into

the possession of Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel;

6. That the possession of the applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., is

continuous, adverse and public from 1962 to the present and tacking the

possession of the Infiels who were granted from whom the applicant

bought said land on October 29, 1962, hence the possession is already

considered from time immemorial.

7. That the land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to the

provisions of Republic Act No. 3872 granting absolute ownership to

members of the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their

ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or disposable public land or

within the public domain;

8. That applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more

than Forty-Five Million (P45,000,000.00) Pesos worth of improvements,

said improvements were seen by the Court during its ocular investigation of

the land sought to be registered on September 18, 1982;

9. That the ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered bythe applicant was duly recognized by the government when the Municipal

Officials of Maconacon, Isabela, have negotiated for the donation of the

townsite from Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., and this negotiation came

to reality when the Board of Directors of the Acme Plywood & Veneer Co.,

Inc., had donated a part of the land bought by the Company from the Infiels

for the townsite of Maconacon Isabela (Exh. 'N') on November 15, 1979,

and which donation was accepted by the Municipal Government of

Maconacon, Isabela (Exh. 'N-l'), during their special session on November

22, 1979.

The Director of Lands takes no issue with any of these findings except as to the

applicability of the 1935 Constitution to the matter at hand. Concerning this, he

asserts that, the registration proceedings have been commenced only on July 17,

1981, or long after the 1973 Constitution had gone into effect, the latter is the



correctly applicable law; and since section 11 of its Article XIV prohibits private

corporations or associations from holding alienable lands of the public domain,

except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares (a prohibition not found in the 1935

Constitution which was in force in 1962 when Acme purchased the lands in

question from the Infiels), it was reversible error to decree registration in favor ofAcme Section 48, paragraphs (b) and (c), of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as

amended, reads:

SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands

of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest

therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply

to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for

confirmation of their claims, and the issuance of a certificate of title

therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest

have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and

occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide

claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately

preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when

prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed

to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and

shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.

(c) Members of the National Cultural minorities who by themselves or

through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open. continuous,

exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public

domain suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or not, under a bona

fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights

granted in subsection (b) hereof.

The Petition for Review does not dispute-indeed, in view of the quoted findings of

the trial court which were cited and affirmed by the Intermediate Appellate

Court, it can no longer controvert before this Court-the fact that Mariano and

Acer Infiel, from whom Acme purchased the lands in question on October 29,

1962, are members of the national cultural minorities who had, by themselves



and through their progenitors, possessed and occupied those lands since time

immemorial, or for more than the required 30-year period and were, by reason

thereof, entitled to exercise the right granted in Section 48 of the Public Land Act

to have their title judicially confirmed. Nor is there any pretension that Acme, as

the successor-in-interest of the Infiels, is disqualified to acquire and registerownership of said lands under any provisions of the 1973 Constitution other than

Section 11 of its Article XIV already referred to.

Given the foregoing, the question before this Court is whether or not the title that

the Infiels had transferred to Acme in 1962 could be confirmed in favor of the

latter in proceedings instituted by it in 1981 when the 1973 Constitution was

already in effect, having in mind the prohibition therein against private

corporations holding lands of the public domain except in lease not exceeding

1,000 hectares.

The question turns upon a determination of the character of the lands at the time

of institution of the registration proceedings in 1981. If they were then still part of

the public domain, it must be answered in the negative. If, on the other hand,

they were then already private lands, the constitutional prohibition against their

acquisition by private corporations or associations obviously does not apply.

In this regard, attention has been invited to Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-

Bartolome, et al ,1 where a similar set of facts prevailed. In that case, Manila

Electric Company, a domestic corporation more than 60% of the capital stock of

which is Filipino-owned, had purchased in 1947 two lots in Tanay, Rizal from the

Piguing spouses. The lots had been possessed by the vendors and, before them,

by their predecessor-in-interest, Olimpia Ramos, since prior to the outbreak of

the Pacific War in 1941. On December 1, 1976, Meralco applied to the Court of

First Instance of Rizal, Makati Branch, for confirmation of title to said lots. The

court, assuming that the lots were public land, dismissed the application on the

ground that Meralco, a juridical person, was not qualified to apply for registration

under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act which allows only Filipino citizens or

natural persons to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect titles to public land.

Meralco appealed, and a majority of this Court upheld the dismissal. It was held

that:

..., the said land is still public land. It would cease to be public land only

upon the issuance of the certificate of title to any Filipino citizen claiming it



under section 48(b). Because it is still public land and the Meralco, as a

juridical person, is disqualified to apply for its registration under section

48(b), Meralco's application cannot be given due course or has to be

dismissed.

Finally, it may be observed that the constitutional prohibition makes no

distinction between (on the one hand) alienable agricultural public lands as

to which no occupant has an imperfect title and (on the other hand)

alienable lands of the public domain as to which an occupant has on

imperfect title subject to judicial confirmation.

Since section 11 of Article XIV does not distinguish, we should not make any

distinction or qualification. The prohibition applies to alienable public lands

as to which a Torrens title may be secured under section 48(b). The

proceeding under section 48(b) 'presupposes that the land is public'

(Mindanao vs. Director of Lands, L-19535, July 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 641, 644).

The present Chief Justice entered a vigorous dissent, tracing the line of cases

beginning with Carino in 19092thru Susi in 1925

3 down to Herico in 1980,

4 which

developed, affirmed and reaffirmed the doctrine that open, exclusive and

undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed by law

creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite

period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be

public land and becomes private property. That said dissent expressed what is the

better — and, indeed, the correct, view-becomes evident from a consideration of

some of the principal rulings cited therein,

The main theme was given birth, so to speak, in Carino involving the

Decree/Regulations of June 25, 1880 for adjustment of royal lands wrongfully

occupied by private individuals in the Philippine Islands. It was ruled that:

It is true that the language of articles 4 and 55 attributes title to those 'who

may prove' possession for the necessary time and we do not overlook theargument that this means may prove in registration proceedings. It may be

that an English conveyancer would have recommended an application

under the foregoing decree, but certainly it was not calculated to convey to

the mind of an Igorot chief the notion that ancient family possessions were

in danger, if he had read every word of it. The words 'may prove'



(acrediten) as well or better, in view of the other provisions, might be taken

to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation. There are indications

that registration was expected from all but none sufficient to show that, for

want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof,

wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, asalready conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law. ...

That ruling assumed a more doctrinal character because expressed in more

categorical language, in Susi:

.... In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de

jure established in paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending

Act No. 926, that all the necessary requirements for a grant by the

Government were complied with, for he has been in actual and physical

possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land

of the public domain openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly since

July 26, 1984, with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the

provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when Angela Razon applied

for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by operation

of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is

not necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in order that said

grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient ,

under the provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction,

Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it

had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private

property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of

the Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in question of

Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he had

no longer any title or control, and the sale thus made was void and of no

effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right.6

Succeeding cases, of which only some need be mentioned, likeof Lacaste vs.

Director of Lands, 7 Mesina vs. Vda. de Sonza, 8 Manarpac vs.

Cabanatuan,9 Miguel vs. Court of Appeals

10 and Herico vs. Dar , supra, by invoking

and affirming the Susi doctrine have firmly rooted it in jurisprudence.

Herico, in particular, appears to be squarely affirmative:11



.... Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 1942, which the

respondent Court held to be inapplicable to the petitioner's case, with the

latter's proven occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years since

1914, by himself and by his predecessors-in-interest, title over the land has

vested on petitioner so as to segregate the land from the mass of publicland. Thereafter, it is no longer disposable under the Public Land Act as by

free patent. ....

xxx xxx xxx

As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified in the

foregoing provision are complied with, the possessor is deemed to have

acquired, by operation of law , a right to a grant, a government grant,

without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land,

therefore, ceases to be of the public domain and beyond the authority of

the Director of Lands to dispose of. The application for confirmation is mere

formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title

as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon

the strength of said patent .12

Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering

possession of public land which is of the character and duration prescribed by

statute as the equivalent of an express grant from the State than the dictum of

the statute itself 13 that the possessor(s) "... shall be conclusively presumed to

have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be

entitled to a certificate of title .... " No proof being admissible to overcome a

conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more

than a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession

claimed is of the required character and length of time; and registration

thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested. The

proceedings would not originally convert the land from public to private land, but

only confirm such a conversion already affected by operation of law from the

moment the required period of possession became complete. As was so well put

in Carino, "... (T)here are indications that registration was expected from all, but

none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be

lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to

establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law."



If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the

Infiels had a legally sufficient and transferable title on October 29, 1962 when

Acme acquired it from said owners, it must also be conceded that Acme had a

perfect right to make such acquisition, there being nothing in the 1935

Constitution then in force (or, for that matter, in the 1973 Constitution whichcame into effect later) prohibiting corporations from acquiring and owning private

lands.

Even on the proposition that the land remained technically "public" land, despite

immemorial possession of the Infiels and their ancestors, until title in their favor

was actually confirmed in appropriate proceedings under the Public Land Act,

there can be no serious question of Acmes right to acquire the land at the time it

did, there also being nothing in the 1935 Constitution that might be construed to

prohibit corporations from purchasing or acquiring interests in public land towhich the vendor had already acquired that type of so-called "incomplete" or

"imperfect" title. The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not

acquire, hold or lease public agricultural lands in excess of 1,024 hectares. The

purely accidental circumstance that confirmation proceedings were brought

under the aegis of the 1973 Constitution which forbids corporations from owning

lands of the public domain cannot defeat a right already vested before that law

came into effect, or invalidate transactions then perfectly valid and proper. This

Court has already held, in analogous circumstances, that the Constitution cannot

impair vested rights.

We hold that the said constitutional prohibition14

has no retroactive

application to the sales application of Binan Development Co., Inc. because

it had already acquired a vested right to the land applied for at the time the

1973 Constitution took effect.

That vested right has to be respected. It could not be abrogated by the new

Constitution. Section 2, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution allows private

corporations to purchase public agricultural lands not exceeding one

thousand and twenty-four hectares. Petitioner' prohibition action is barred

by the doctrine of vested rights in constitutional law.

xxx xxx xxx



The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights. 'A state

may not impair vested rights by legislative enactment, by the enactment or

by the subsequent repeal of a municipal ordinance, or by a change in the

constitution of the State, except in a legitimate exercise of the police

power'(16 C.J.S. 1177-78).

xxx xxx xxx

In the instant case, it is incontestable that prior to the effectivity of the

1973 Constitution the right of the corporation to purchase the land in

question had become fixed and established and was no longer open to

doubt or controversy.

Its compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Law for the

issuance of a patent had the effect of segregating the said land from the

public domain. The corporation's right to obtain a patent for the land is

protected by law. It cannot be deprived of that right without due process

(Director of Lands vs. CA, 123 Phil. 919).<äre||anº•1àw> 15

The fact, therefore, that the confirmation proceedings were instituted by Acme in

its own name must be regarded as simply another accidental circumstance,

productive of a defect hardly more than procedural and in nowise affecting the

substance and merits of the right of ownership sought to be confirmed in said

proceedings, there being no doubt of Acme's entitlement to the land. As it isunquestionable that in the light of the undisputed facts, the Infiels, under either

the 1935 or the 1973 Constitution, could have had title in themselves confirmed

and registered, only a rigid subservience to the letter of the law would deny the

same benefit to their lawful successor-in-interest by valid conveyance which

violates no constitutional mandate.

The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view, and so holds, that the

majority ruling in Meralco must be reconsidered and no longer deemed to be

binding precedent. The correct rule, as enunciated in the line of cases alreadyreferred to, is that alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or

through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the

prescribed statutory period (30 years under The Public Land Act, as amended) is

converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of said

period, ipso jure. Following that rule and on the basis of the undisputed facts, the



land subject of this appeal was already private property at the time it was

acquired from the Infiels by Acme. Acme thereby acquired a registrable title,

there being at the time no prohibition against said corporation's holding or

owning private land. The objection that, as a juridical person, Acme is not

qualified to apply for judicial confirmation of title under section 48(b) of thePublic Land Act is technical, rather than substantial and, again, finds its answer in

the dissent in Meralco:

6. To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the

technicality that the Public Land Act allows only citizens of the Philippines

who are natural persons to apply for confirmation of their title would be

impractical and would just give rise to multiplicity of court actions.

Assuming that there was a technical error not having filed the application

for registration in the name of the Piguing spouses as the original ownersand vendors, still it is conceded that there is no prohibition against their

sale of the land to the applicant Meralco and neither is there any

prohibition against the application being refiled with retroactive effect in

the name of the original owners and vendors (as such natural persons) with

the end result of their application being granted, because of their

indisputable acquisition of ownership by operation of law and the

conclusive presumption therein provided in their favor. It should not be

necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all such

applications in their names and adding to the overcrowded court docketswhen the Court can after all these years dispose of it here and now. (See

Francisco vs. City of Davao)

The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the

applications for confirmation as amended to conform to the evidence, i.e.

as filed in the names of the original persons who as natural persons are

duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the title that they had

acquired by conclusive presumption and mandate of the Public Land Act

and who thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both admittedlyFilipino corporations duly qualified to hold and own private lands) and

granting the applications for confirmation of title to the private lands so

acquired and sold or exchanged.

There is also nothing to prevent Acme from reconveying the lands to the Infiels

and the latter from themselves applying for confirmation of title and, after



issuance of the certificate/s of title in their names, deeding the lands back to

Acme. But this would be merely indulging in empty charades, whereas the same

result is more efficaciously and speedily obtained, with no prejudice to anyone, by

a liberal application of the rule on amendment to conform to the evidence

suggested in the dissent in Meralco.

While this opinion seemingly reverses an earlier ruling of comparatively recent

vintage, in a real sense, it breaks no precedent, but only reaffirms and re-

established, as it were, doctrines the soundness of which has passed the test of

searching examination and inquiry in many past cases. Indeed, it is worth noting

that the majority opinion, as well as the concurring opinions of Chief Justice

Fernando and Justice Abad Santos, in Meralco rested chiefly on the proposition

that the petitioner therein, a juridical person, was disqualified from applying for

confirmation of an imperfect title to public land under Section 48(b) of the PublicLand Act. Reference to the 1973 Constitution and its Article XIV, Section 11, was

only tangential limited to a brief paragraph in the main opinion, and may, in that

context, be considered as essentially obiter. Meralco, in short, decided no

constitutional question.

WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the appealed judgment of the

Intermediate Appellate Court, the same is hereby affirmed, without costs in this

instance.

SO ORDERED.

Feria, Yap, Fernan, Alampay, Cruz, Paras and Feliciano, JJ., concur

Undert the 1935 consti- corporation can acquire

public domain - 1024 sq km.

1000 hectares..

ACME already acquired vested rights- which cannot

be taken away

Phil corp- 60% should be of a filipino owner ---> can

buy private property as long as it is a filipino corp

Before the ACME case, private property cannot

acquire or own private land.

ACME

Case



G.R. No. L-46729 November 19, 1982

LAUSAN AYOG, BENITO AYOG, DAMASO AYOG, JULIO AYOG, SEGUNDA AYOG,

VICENTE ABAQUETA, BERNARDINO ADORMEO, VIDAL ALBANO, FELICIANO

ARIAS, ANTONIO BALDOS, MAXIMO BALDOS, ROMERO BINGZON, EMILIO

CADAYDAY, FRUCTUOSO CHUA, SR., HERACLEO CHUA, GUILLERMO DAGOY,ABDON DEIMOS, NICASIO DE LEON, JULIANA VDA. DE DIANNA, DEMOCRITO

DEVERO, ALFREDO DIVINAGRACIA, ESTEBAN DIVINAGRACIA, LEODEGARDIO

DIVINAGRACIA, NELLO DIVINAGRACIA, MERQUIADES EMBERADOR, JESUS

EMPERADO, PORFERIO ENOC, SOFRONIO ENOC, RAFAEL GAETOS, NICOLAS

GARLET, TRINIDAD GARLET, FORTUNATA GEONZON, NICOLADA NAQUILA,

TORIBIO NAQUILA, EFREN OKAY, ELPIDIO OKAY, SR., DIEGO ONGRIA, ERNESTO

PANARES, VICENTE PATULOT, IGNACIA RIBAO, JUANO RICO, JESUS ROSALITA,

ARMANDO TANTE and ANSELMO VALMORES, petitioners,

vs.JUDGE VICENTE N. CUSI, JR., Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch I,

PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF DAVAO, and BINAN DEVELOPMENT CO., INC.,

respondents. MINISTER OF NATURAL RESOURCES and DIRECTOR OF

LANDS, intervenors.

AQUINO, J.:

This case is about the application of section 11, Article XIV of the 1973

Constitution (disqualifying a private corporation from purchasing public lands) to

a 1953 sales award made by the Bureau of Lands, for which a sales patent and

Torrens title were issued in 1975, and to the 1964 decision of the trial court,

ejecting some of the petitioners from the land purchased, which decision was

affirmed in 1975 by the Court of Appeals. That legal question arises under the

following facts:

On January 21, 1953, the Director of Lands, after a bidding, awarded to Biñan

Development Co., Inc. on the basis of its 1951 Sales Application No. V-6834

Cadastral Lot No. 281 located at Barrio Tamugan, Guianga (Baguio District), Davao

City with an area of about two hundred fifty hectares. Some occupants of the lot

protested against the sale. The Director of Lands in his decision of August 30,

1957 dismissed the protests and ordered the occupants to vacate the lot and

remove their improvements. No appeal was made from that decision.



The Director found that the protestants (defendants in the 1961 ejectment suit,

some of whom are now petitioners herein) entered the land only after it was

awarded to the corporation and, therefore, they could not be regarded as bona

fide occupants thereof. The Director characterized them as squatters. He found

that some claimants were fictitious persons (p. 30, Rollo of L-43505, Okay vs. CA).He issued a writ of execution but the protestants defied the writ and refused to

vacate the land (p. 28, Rollo of L-43505, Okay vs. CA). **

Because the alleged occupants refused to vacate the land, the corporation filed

against them on February 27, 1961 in the Court of First Instance of Davao, Civil

Case No. 3711, an ejectment suit (accion publiciana). The forty defendants were

Identified as follows:

1. Vicente Abaqueta 21. Eniego Garlic

2. Candido Abella 22. Nicolas Garlic

3. Julio Ayog 23. Rufo Garlic

4. Arcadio Ayong 24. Alfonso Ibales

5. Generoso Bangonan 25. Julian Locacia

6. Lomayong Cabao 26. Filomeno Labantaban

7. Jose Catibring 27. Arcadio Lumantas

8. Teodolfo Chua 28. Santos Militante

9. Guillermo Dagoy 29. Toribio Naquila

10. Anastacia Vda. de Didal 30. Elpidio Okay

11. Alfredo Divinagracia 31. Guillermo Omac

12. Silverio Divinagracia 32. Emilio Padayday

13. Galina Edsa 33. Marcosa Vda. de Rejoy

14. Jesus Emperado 34. Lorenzo Rutsa



15. Porfirio Enoc 35. Ramon Samsa

16. Benito Ente 36. Rebecca Samsa

17. German Flores 37. Alfeao Sante

18. Ciriaco Fuentes 38. Meliton Sante

19. Pulong Gabao 39. Amil Sidaani

20. Constancio Garlic 40. Cosme Villegas

That ejectment suit delayed the issuance of the patent. The trial court found that

the protests of twenty of the abovenamed defendants were among those that

were dismissed by the Director of Lands in his 1957 decision already mentioned.

On July 18, 1961 the purchase price of ten thousand pesos was fully paid by Binan

Development Co., Inc. OnNovember 10, 1961, an official of the Bureau of Lands

submitted a final investigation report wherein it was stated that the corporation

had complied with the cultivation and other requirements under the Public Land

Law and had paid the purchase price of the land (p. 248, Rollo).

It was only more than thirteen years later or on August 14, 1975 when Sales

Patent No. 5681 was issued to the corporation for that lot with a reduced area of

175.3 hectares. The patent was registered. Original Certificate of Title No. P-5176

was issued to the patentee.

The Director of Lands in his memorandum dated June 29, 1974 for the Secretary

of Natural Resources, recommending approval of the sales patent, pointed out

that the purchaser corporation had complied with the said requirements long

before the effectivity of the Constitution, that the land in question was free from

claims and conflicts and that the issuance of the patent was in conformity with

the guidelines prescribed in Opinion No. 64, series of 1973, of Secretary of Justice

Vicente Abad Santos and was an exception to the prohibition in section 11, Article

XIV of the Constitution (p. 258, Rollo).

Secretary of Natural Resources Jose J. Leido, Jr., in approving the patent on

August 14, 1975, noted that the applicant had acquired a nested right to its

issuance (p. 259, Rollo).



Before that patent was issued, there was a trial in the ejectment suit. Fifteen

defendants (out of forty), namely, Julio Ayog, Guillermo Bagoy, Generoso

Bangonan, Jose Catibring, Porfirio Enoc, Jose Emperado, Arcadio Lomanto, Toribio

Naquila, Elpidio Okay, Alfeo Sante, Meliton Sante, Ramon Samsa, Rebecca Samsa,

Arcadio Sarumines and Felix Tahantahan, testified that they entered the disputedland long before 1951 and that they planted it to coconuts, coffee, jackfruit and

other fruit trees. (p. 28, Record on Appeal).

The trial court did not give credence to their testimonies. It believed the report of

an official of the Bureau of Lands that in 1953 the land was free from private

claims and conflicts and it gave much weight to the decision of the Director of

Lands dismissing the protests of the defendants against the sales award (p. 30,

Record on Appeal).

Furthermore, the trial court during its ocular inspection of the land on November

8, 1964 found that the plantings on the land could not be more than ten years

old, meaning that they were not existing in 1953 when the sales award was made.

Hence, the trial court ordered the defendants to vacate the land and to restore

the possession thereof to tile company. The Court of Appeals affirmed that

judgment on December 5, 1975 in its decision in Binan Development Co., Inc. vs,

Sante, CA-G.R. No. 37142- R. The review of the decision was denied by this Court

on May 17, 1976 in Elpidio Okay vs. Court of Appeals, L-43505.

After the record was remanded to the trial court, the corporation filed a motion

for execution. The defendants, some of whom are now petitioners herein,

opposed the motion. They contended that the adoption of the Constitution,

which took effect on January 17, 1973, was a supervening fact which rendered it

legally impossible to execute the lower court's judgment. They invoked the

constitutional prohibition, already mentioned, that "no private corporation or

association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to

exceed one thousand hectares in area."

The lower court suspended action on the motion for execution because of themanifestation of the defendants that they would file a petition for prohibition in

this Court. On August 24, 1977, the instant prohibition action was filed. Some of

the petitioners were not defendants in the ejectment case.



We hold that the said constitutional prohibition has no retroactive application to

the sales application of Biñan Development Co., Inc. because it had already

acquired a vested right to the land applied for at the time the 1973 Constitution

took effect.

That vested right has to be respected. lt could not be abrogated by the new

Constitution. Section 2, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution allows private

corporations to purchase public agricultural lands not exceeding one thousand

and twenty-four hectares. Petitioners' prohibition action is barred by the doctrine

of vested rights in constitutional law.

"A right is vested when the right to enjoyment has become the property of some

particular person or persons as a present interest" (16 C.J.S. 1173). It is "the

privilege to enjoy property legally vested, to enforce contracts, and enjoy the

rights of property conferred by the existing law" (12 C.J. 955, Note 46, No. 6) or

"some right or interest in property which has become fixed and established and is

no longer open to doubt or controversy" (Downs vs. Blount 170 Fed. 15, 20, cited

in Balboa vs. Farrales, 51 Phil. 498, 502).

The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights. "A state may

not impair vested rights by legislative enactment, by the enactment or by the

subsequent repeal of a municipal ordinance, or by a change in the constitution of

the State, except in a legitimate exercise of the police power" (16 C.J.S. 1177-78).

It has been observed that, generally, the term "vested right" expresses the

concept of present fixed interest, which in right reason and natural justice should

be protected against arbitrary State action, or an innately just and imperative

right which an enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable

individual rights, cannot deny (16 C.J.S. 1174, Note 71, No. 5, citing Pennsylvania

Greyhound Lines, Inc. vs. Rosenthal, 192 Atl. 2nd 587).

Secretary of Justice Abad Santos in his 1973 opinion ruled that where the

applicant, before the Constitution took effect, had fully complied with all hisobligations under the Public Land Act in order to entitle him to a sales patent,

there would seem to be no legal or equitable justification for refusing to issue or

release the sales patent (p. 254, Rollo).

In Opinion No. 140, series of 1974, he held that as soon as the applicant had

fulfilled the construction or cultivation requirements and has fully paid the



purchase price, he should be deemed to have acquired by purchase the particular

tract of land and to him the area limitation in the new Constitution would not

apply.

In Opinion No. 185, series of 1976, Secretary Abad Santos held that where thecultivation requirements were fulfilled before the new Constitution took effect

but the full payment of the price was completed after January 17, 1973, the

applicant was, nevertheless, entitled to a sales patent (p. 256, Rollo).

Such a contemporaneous construction of the constitutional prohibition by a high

executive official carries great weight and should be accorded much respect. It is

a correct interpretation of section 11 of Article XIV.

In the instant case, it is incontestable that prior to the effectivity of the 1973

Constitution the right of the corporation to purchase the land in question had

become fixed and established and was no longer open to doubt or controversy.

Its compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Law for the issuance of a

patent had the effect of segregating the said land from the public domain. The

corporation's right to obtain a patent for that land is protected by law. It cannot

be deprived of that right without due process (Director of Lands vs. CA, 123 Phil.

919).

As we cannot review the factual findings of the trial court and the Court ofAppeals, we cannot entertain petitioners' contention that many of them by

themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest have possessed portions of

land even before the war. They should have filed homestead or free patent

applications.

Our jurisdiction is limited to the resolution of the legal issue as to whether the

1973 Constitution is an obstacle to the implementation of the trial court's 1964

final and executory judgment ejecting the petitioners. On that issue, we have no

choice but to sustain its enforceability.

Nevertheless, in the interest of social justice, to avoid agrarian unrest and to

dispel the notion that the law grinds the faces of the poor, the administrative

authorities should find ways and means of accommodating some of the

petitioners if they are landless and are really tillers of the soil who in the words of

President Magsaysay deserve a little more food in their stomachs, a little more



shelter over their heads and a little more clothing on their backs. The State should

endeavor to help the poor who find it difficult to make both ends meet and who

suffer privations in the universal struggle for existence.

A tiller of the soil is entitled to enjoy basic human rights, particularly freedomfrom want. The common man should be assisted in possessing and cultivating a

piece of land for his sustenance, to give him social security and to enable him to

achieve a dignified existence and become an independent, self-reliant and

responsible citizen in our democratic society.

To guarantee him that right is to discourage him from becoming a subversive or

from rebelling against a social order where, as the architect of the French

Revolution observed, the rich are choking with the superfluities of life but the

famished multitude lack the barest necessities.

Indeed, one purpose of the constitutional prohibition against purchases of public

agricultural lands by private corporations is to equitably diffuse land ownership or

to encourage "owner-cultivatorship and the economic family- size farm" and to

prevent a recurrence of cases like the instant case. Huge landholdings by

corporations or private persons had owned social unrest.

Petitioners' counsel claims that Biñan Development Co., Inc. seeks to execute the

judgment in Civil Case No. 3711, the ejectment suit from which this prohibition

case arose, against some of the petitioners who were not defendants in thatsuit (p. 126, Rollo).

Those petitioners are not successors-in-interest of the defendants in the

ejectment suit . Nor do they derive their right of possession from the said

defendants. Those petitioners occupy portions of the disputed land distinct and

separate from the portions occupied by the said defendants.

We hold that judgment cannot be enforced against the said petitioners who were

not defendants in that litigation or who were not summoned and heard in thatcase. Generally, "it is an axiom of the law that no man shall be affected by

proceedings to which he is a stranger" (Ed. A. Keller & Co. vs Ellerman & Bucknall

Steamship Co., 38 Phil. 514, 520).

To enforce the judgment against those who were not parties to the case and who

occupy portions of the disputed land distinct and separate from the portions



occupied by the defendants in the ejectment suit, would be violative of due

process of law, the law which, according to Daniel Webster in his argument in the

Dartmouth College case, is the law of the land, a law which hears before it

condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial.

"The meaning is, that every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property, andimmunities, under the protection of the general rules which govern society."

(Cited in Lopez vs. Director of Lands, 47 Phil. 23, 32. See Gatchalian vs. Arlegui, L-

35615 and Tang Tee vs. Arlegui, L-41360, February 17, 1977, 75 SCRA 234 and

Berses vs. Villanueva, 25 Phil. 473.)

Contempt incident .-During the pendency of this case, or at about four o'clock in

the morning of December 12, 1978, Ciriaco Tebayan, Domingo Nevasca, Rogelio

Duterte and Sofronio Etac, employees of the Crown Fruits and Cannery

Corporation, plowed or bulldozed with their tractors a portion of the disputedland which was occupied by Melquiades Emberador, one of the petitioners

herein. The disputed land was leased by Biñan Development Co., Inc. to the

canning corporation.

The four tractor drivers destroyed the improvements thereon worth about five

thousand pesos consisting of coffee, coconut and banana plants. Emberador was

in the hospital at the time the alleged destruction of the improvements occurred.

However, it should be noted that Emberador was not expressly named as a

defendant in the ejectment suit. Apparently, he is not included in the trial court's

decision although he was joined as a co-petitioner in this prohibition case.

The petitioners in their motion of January 11, 1979 asked that the four tractor

drivers and Honesto Garcia, the manager of Biñan Development Co., Inc., be

declared in contempt of court for having disregarded the restraining order issued

by this Court on August 29, 1977, enjoining specifically Judge Vicente N. Cusi and

the provincial sheriff from enforcing the decision in the ejectment suit, Civil Case

No. 3711 (pp. 46-47, 138- 141, Rollo).

Garcia and the four drivers answered the motion. The incident was assigned forhearing to Judge Antonio M. Martinez of the Court of First Instance of Davao.

Judge Martinez found that the plowing was made at the instance of Garcia who

told the barrio captain, petitioner Lausan Ayog, a Bagobo, that he (Garcia) could

not wait anymore for the termination of this case.



The record shows that on April 30, 1979 or four months after the said incident,

Emberador, in consideration of P3,500, as the value of the improvements on his

land, executed a quitclaim in favor of the Crown Fruits and Cannery Corporation

(Exh. 1, 2 and 3).

We hold that no contempt was committed. The temporary restraining order was

not directed to Biñan Development Co., Inc. its officers, agents or privies.

Emberador was not named specifically in the trial court's judgment as one of the

occupants to be ejected.

For the redress of whatever wrong or delict was committed against Emberador by

reason of the destruction of his improvements, his remedy is not in a contempt

proceeding but in some appropriate civil and criminal actions against the

destroyer of the improvements.

In resume, we find that there is no merit in the instant prohibition action. The

constitutional prohibition relied upon by the petitioners as a ground to stop the

execution of the judgment in the ejectment suit has no retroactive application to

that case and does not divest the trial court of jurisdiction to enforce that

judgment.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit but with the clarification

that the said judgment cannot be enforced against those petitioners herein who

were not defendants in the ejectment case, Civil Case No. 3711, and over whomthe lower court did not acquire jurisdiction. The contempt proceeding is also

dismissed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

Escolin J took no part

ltd full text

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