THIRD DIVISION 

 

ZENAIDA ACOSTA, EDUARDO ACOSTA, ARNOLD ACOSTA, DELIA ACOSTA, SPS. TEODULO MACHADO AND AURORA ORENZA, SPS.ROLDAN PALARCA AND PACITA PANGILINAN, SPS. FROMENCIO JONATAS AND LUCENA M. MARIANO, SPS. MARCIAL IGLESIA AND VIRGINIA LAPURGA, ATTY.-IN-FACT FELINO MACARAEG, SPS. MANUEL MANGROBANG AND VALERIANA SOTIO, SPS. VIRGINIA DELA ROSA AND ROMEO DELA ROSA, SPS. PACIFICO SOTIO AND LOLITA SORIANO, JUAN DALINOC (DECEASED), REPRESENTED BY DAUGHTER CONSUELO DALINOC, SPS. MARIANO TORIO AND MAXIMA MACARAEG, REPRESENTED BY LEGAL HEIRS TORIBIA TORIO AND MAYUMI MACARAEG, TEOFILO MOLINA AND AVELINO DIZON,

Petitioners,

- versus -

TRINIDAD SALAZAR AND ANICETA SALAZAR,Respondents.

G.R. No. 161034

Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,Chairperson,CHICO-NAZARIO,VELASCO, JR.,NACHURA, andPERALTA, JJ.

Promulgated:

June 30, 2009

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 DECISION

 NACHURA, J.:  This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the July 25, 2003 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) as well as its November 25, 2003 Resolution [2] in CA-G.R. CV No. 70161, which reversed and set aside the December 20, 2000 Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 64, Tarlac City in Civil Case No. 7256. Said RTC decision dismissed the complaint for quieting of title filed by herein respondents Trinidad Salazar and Aniceta Salazar against petitioners. Below are the facts. On November 19, 1985, respondents Trinidad and Aniceta Salazar (hereinafter, Salazars), filed a petition for the cancellation of the entries annotated at the back of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 40287 registered in the names of spouses Juan Soriano and Vicenta Macaraeg, who died without issue. [4] The Salazars claim that two of the entries Entry Nos. 19756 and 20102 annotated at the back of the aforesaid title are void since no consolidation of rights appear in the Registry of Deeds (RD) of Tarlac to support the entries; and that Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 9297, which supposedly cancelled OCT No. 40287, is non-existent according to a certification issued by the RD.[5]On October 21, 1986, RTC Branch 63 of Tarlac resolved to grant the petition and ordered the cancellation of Entry No. 20102.[6] No respondent was impleaded in the said petition.Subsequently, the Salazars filed an urgent motion praying for the issuance of an order to direct the RD of Tarlac to recall all titles issued under Entry Nos. 19756 and 20102 and to cancel all the tax declarations issued based thereon. The motion was granted in an Order issued on November 7, 1986.[7]

 On November 20, 1986, the Salazars filed a second urgent motion praying that the owners of the affected property be ordered to appear before the court to show cause why their titles should not be cancelled.[8]

 

On October 20, 1987, the Salazars filed a new motion praying that the RD of Tarlac be ordered to comply with the courts order issued on November 7, 1986. The RD, however, explained that to comply with the said court order would remove the basis for the issuance of TCT No. 9297 which title had, in turn, been cancelled by many other transfer certificates of title and would indubitably result in the deprivation of the right to due process of the registered owners thereof.[9] On this basis, the RTC denied the motion and advised the Salazars to elevate the matter en consulta to the Land Registration Commission (now Land Registration Authority or LRA). After the Salazars moved for reconsideration, the RTC directed the RD of Tarlac to comply with the October 21, 1986 and November 7, 1986 orders. Threatened with contempt, the RD elevated the matter en consulta to the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration, which, in turn, issued a resolution directing the RD to comply with the RTCs orders. [10] On March 7, 1989, OCT No. 40287 was reconstituted and TCT No. 219121 was issued in the names of the Salazars, sans Entry Nos. 19756 and 20102. It was at this stage of the proceedings that herein petitioners together with other subsequent purchasers for value of the disputed property twenty-seven (27) titleholders in all[11]filed their formal written comment dated April 17, 1989.[12] In their comment, the oppositors contended, among others, that they had acquired their titles in good faith and for value, and that the lower court, acting as a land registration court, had no jurisdiction over issues of ownership.[13]

 On September 14, 1989, the said court, apparently realizing its mistake, issued an Order, stating thus:

Upon motion of Atty. Alcantara and without objection on the part of Atty. Molina and Atty. Lamorena, all the incidents in this case are hereby withdrawn without prejudice to the filing of an appropriate action in a proper forum.SO ORDERED.[14]

 This prompted the Salazars to file a complaint for quieting of title impleading herein petitioners as well as other individuals who claim to have purchased the said property from the heirs of Juan Soriano. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 7256 before Branch 64 of the RTC of Tarlac.[15] The complaint alleged that TCT No. 219121 was issued in the names of the Salazars without Entry Nos. 19756 and

20102 at the back of said title, but the previous TCTs issued by the RD of Tarlac as well as the tax declarations existing in the Assessors Office have not been cancelled and revoked by the said government agencies to the detriment and prejudice of the complainants (herein respondents). They also alleged that Pcs-395, from which Lot Nos. 702-A to 702-V were taken, is non-existent and, thus, the court should cause the cancellation and revocation of spurious and null and void titles and tax declarations.[16]

Defendants filed three separate answers. Defendants Raymundo Macaraeg, Martha Estacio (both deceased), Adelaida Macaraeg, Lucio Macaraeg, represented by Eufracia Macaraeg Baluyot as attorney-in-fact, Gregorio Baluyut and Eligia Obcena (hereinafter, Macaraegs) maintained that the November 7, 1986 order of the RTC is null and void because the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case. They also argued that TCT No. 219121 issued in the name of the Salazars is void and that the case for quieting of title is not a direct, but a collateral, attack against a property covered by a Torrens certificate.[17]

 Defendants, now herein petitioners, for their part, maintained that the Plan of Consolidation Subdivision Survey Pcs-396 had been an existing consolidation-subdivision survey plan annotated on OCT No. 40287 under Entry No. 20102 dated February 17, 1950 from which TCT No. 9297 was issued covering Lot Nos. 702-A to 702-V, inclusive, in the names of the heirs of Juan Soriano. They argued that TCT No. 219121 issued in the name of the Salazars is spurious and null and void from the beginning since it was acquired pursuant to an illegal order issued by the court.[18] By way of special and affirmative defenses, they also alleged, among others, (1) that the Salazars were not among the heirs of the late Juan Soriano, not within the fifth civil degree of consanguinity, and hence, they have no right to inherit; (2) that TCT No. 219121 constitutes a cloud upon the Torrens title of herein petitioners, and should therefore be cancelled and revoked; (3) that assuming, without admitting, that the Salazars have any right over the lots in question their right to enforce such action had already prescribed by laches or had been barred by prescription since more than forty (40) years had lapsed since the heirs of Juan Soriano had registered the lots in question under TCT No. 9297 on February 17, 1950; and (4) that petitioners and/or their predecessors-in-interest acquired the lots in question in good faith and for value from the registered owners thereof.[19]

 

Defendant spouses Francisco Jonatas and Lucena M. Mariano and spouses Manuel Mangrobang and Valeriana Sotio filed their answers practically raising the same defenses.[20]

 Meanwhile, on July 29, 1991, petitioners, together with the Macaraegs and Jonatas, et al., filed before the CA a petition for annulment of judgment[21] rendered by RTC Branch 63 of Tarlac, Tarlac. The case, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 25643, was, however, dismissed on the ground of litis pendencia.[22]

 On December 20, 2000, Branch 64 of the RTC of Tarlac dismissed the complaint for quieting of title. The trial court faulted the Salazars for failure to present proof that they are heirs of the late Juan Soriano.[23] It also declared TCT No. 219121 issued in the name of the Salazars as null and void, and affirmed TCT No. 9297 as well as all certificates of title derived therefrom.[24]

 Unsatisfied, the Salazars appealed to the CA,[25] which ruled in their favor. According to the CA, it was erroneous for Branch 64 of the RTC of Tarlac to reverse and declare as null and void the decision of Branch 63, which is a court of equal rank. Such issue should have been properly ventilated in an action for annulment of final judgment. Consequently, the orders issued by RTC Branch 63, had become final and executory, hence, covered by res judicata.[26]

 The CA also struck down the arguments raised by the appellees that the orders of RTC Branch 63 are null and void for lack of proper notice. It ratiocinated that the proceeding is a land registration proceeding, which is an action in rem. This being so, personal notice to the owners or claimants of the land sought to be registered is not necessary in order to vest the court with jurisdiction over the res and over the parties.[27]

 A motion for reconsideration[28] was filed, but the same was denied.[29] Hence, this petition. Pivotal to the resolution of this case is the determination of the validity of the action taken by the Salazars in Branch 63 of the RTC of Tarlac. 

We rule for petitioners. It is true that the registration of land under the Torrens system is a proceeding in rem and not in personam. Such a proceeding in rem, dealing with a tangible res, may be instituted and carried to judgment without personal service upon the claimants within the state or notice by mail to those outside of it. Jurisdiction is acquired by virtue of the power of the court over the res. Such a proceeding would be impossible were this not so, for it would hardly do to make a distinction between constitutional rights of claimants who were known and those who were not known to the plaintiff, when the proceeding is to bar all.[30]

Interestingly, however, the proceedings instituted by the Salazars both in Branch 63 of the RTC of Tarlac for the cancellation of entries in OCT No. 40287 and later in Branch 64 of the RTC of Tarlac for quieting of title can hardly be classified as actions in rem. The petition for cancellation of entries annotated at the back of OCT No. 40287 ought to have been directed against specific persons: namely, the heirs of Juan Soriano as appearing in Entry No. 20102 and, indubitably, against their successors-in-interest who have acquired different portions of the property over the years because it is in the nature of an action quasi in rem. Accordingly, the Salazars should have impleaded as party defendants the heirs of Juan Soriano and/or Vicenta Macaraeg as well as those claiming ownership over the property under their names because they are indispensable parties. This was not done in this case.[31] Since no indispensable party was ever impleaded by the Salazars in their petition for cancellation of entry filed before Branch 63 of the RTC of Tarlac, herein petitioners are not bound by the dispositions of the said court.[32] Consequently, the judgment or order of the said court never even acquired finality. Apparently realizing their mistake, the Salazars later on filed an action for quieting of title, also an action quasi in rem, albeit this time before Branch 64 of the RTC of Tarlac. Because the Salazars miserably failed to prove the basis for their claim, the RTC dismissed the complaint.[33] In fact, the RTC was bold enough to have pronounced thus: 

Who are the heirs of Juan Soriano who caused the consolidation and in whose favor TCT No. 9297 was issued? Certainly, they are not the plaintiffs. If the plaintiffs claim that they are the only heirs, they

should file a case against those who executed the consolidation in whose favor [E]ntry [N]o. 20102 was made.

x x x In its order dated February 24, 2000, this Court ruled that it is necessary that plaintiffs should prove that they are the heirs of Juan Soriano, the registered owners as indicated in OCT No. 40287 of (sic) Vicenta Macaraeg, the late spouse. Despite the cue, the plaintiffs opted not to present evidence on how they became the heirs of Juan Soriano or Vicenta Macaraeg. There being [no] evidence presented to prove that plaintiffs are the heirs of the late Juan Soriano and Vicenta Macaraeg, they had no right and cause of action to prosecute this case.[34]

 Needless to say, the failure of the Salazars to implead indispensable party defendants in the petition for cancellation of entries in OCT No. 40287 should have been a ground for the RTC to dismiss, or at least suspend, the proceedings of the case.[35] Yet, although the action proceeded, any judgment or order issued by the court thereon is still null and void for want of authority on the part of the court to act with respect to the parties never impleaded in the action.[36] Thus, the orders issued by said court dated October 21, 1986 and November 7, 1986 never acquired finality.[37] Quod ab initio non valet, in tractu temporis non convalescit.[38]

 Paraphrasing by analogy this Courts ruling in Metropolitan Waterworks &

Sewerage System v. Sison,[39] a void order is not entitled to the respect accorded to a valid order. It may be entirely disregarded or declared inoperative by any tribunal in which effect is sought to be given to it. It has no legal or binding effect or efficacy for any purpose or at any place and thus cannot affect, impair or create rights. It is not entitled to enforcement and is, ordinarily, no protection to those who seek to enforce the same. Accordingly, all proceedings founded on the void court order are themselves regarded as invalid, and the situation is the same as it would be if there was no order issued by the court. It leaves the party litigants in the same position they were in before the trial.[40] A void order, like any void judgment, may be said to be a lawless thing which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight.[41]

 More crucial is the fact that both parties in this case are dealing with property registered under the Torrens system. To allow any individual, such as the Salazars in this case, to impugn the validity of a Torrens certificate of title by the simple expediency of filing an ex parte petition for cancellation of entries would

inevitably erode the very reason why the Torrens system was adopted in this country, which is to quiet title to land and to put a stop forever to any question on the legality of the title, except claims that were noted, at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto.[42] Once a title is registered under the Torrens system, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the courts or sitting in the mirador su casa to avoid the possibility of losing his land.[43] Rarely will the court allow another person to attack the validity and indefeasibility of a Torrens certificate, unless there is compelling reason to do so and only upon a direct action filed in court proceeded in accordance with law.[44]

 Finally, this Court also takes note of the fact that for more than 30 years from the time Entry No. 20102 was annotated at the back of OCT No. 40287 on February 17, 1950 until the time of the filing of the ex parte petition for cancellation of entries on the said certificate of title on November 19, 1985 the Salazars remained deafeningly quiet and never made any move to question the issue of ownership over the said land before the proper forum. They also failed to ventilate their claim during the intestate proceeding filed by the heirs of Juan Soriano sometime in 1939. Likewise, they miserably failed to stop the transfer of portions of the property to petitioners who, for themselves, were able to secure TCTs in their own names. All of these would lead to the inevitable conclusion that if there is any validity to the claim of the Salazars over the said property although such issue is not the subject of the present case the same had already prescribed [45] or, at the very least, had become stale due to laches.WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed July 25, 2003 Decision of the Court of Appeals including its November 25, 2003 Resolution are hereby SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the December 20, 2000 Decision rendered by Branch 64 of the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City, Tarlac is REINSTATED. Costs against respondents. SO ORDERED.

September 10, 1913

G.R. No. 8692GODOFREDO B. HERRERA, as municipal president of Caloocan, petitioner,vs.ALBERTO BARRETTO, judge of first instance of Rizal, and CONSTANCIO JOAQUIN, respondents.Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey for petitioner.R. Diokno, and Gibbs, McDonough and Blanco for respondents.MORELAND, J.:This is an application for a writ of certiorari to the Court of First Instance of the Province of Rizal.It appears that on or about the 1st of March, 1913, Constancio Joaquin, believing himself entitled to a license to open and exploit a cockpit in the municipality of Caloocan, and the authorities thereof refusing to issue it to him, began an action against Godofredo B. Herrera as municipal president of said municipality, the officer whose duty he claimed it was to issue cockpit licenses, to obtain a mandamus compelling said official to issue such license.On the presentation of the verified complaint and upon the facts stated therein and the exhibits annexed thereto, the plaintiff asked that the court issue a mandatory injunction directed to the defendant requiring him to issue a provisional license under which the plaintiff might conduct his cockpit during the pendency of the action. The court, in pursuance of such request and upon the facts stated in the complaint and exhibits annexed thereto, issued such order ex parte without notice of the defendant.Thereupon the defendant in that action began a proceeding in this court against the judge of the Court of First Instance who had issued the mandatory injunction relative to the provisional license referred to, Honorable Alberto Barretto, and Constancio Joaquin, plaintiff

therein, for a writ of certiorari, alleging that the court below and had acted without jurisdiction in the following particulars:1. That the said Honorable Alberto Barretto exceeded his jurisdiction in issuing a mandatory injunction, because, according to paragraph ( j), section 40, of the Municipal Code and article 4 of municipal ordinance No. 8 of Caloocan (Exhibit 1 a), the issuance of cockpit licenses in Loma and Maypajo does not pertain to the municipal president of Caloocan but to the municipal council thereof.2. That the said Honorable Alberto Barretto exceeded his jurisdiction in issuing the mandatory injunction ex parte without giving the municipal president opportunity to show cause why such injunction should not be issued as required by section 202 of theCode of Civil Procedure .

3. That the said Alberto Barretto exceeded his jurisdiction in issuing such mandatory

injunction for the reason that the cockpit license which the president of Caloocan had

erroneously issued in favor of Constancio Joaquin, on the day of __________, 1913,

has been annulled and cancelled by virtue of ordinance No. _____ of the municipal

council of Caloocan, which ordinance has been duly approved by the provincial board

of Rizal.

4. That there being another action pending between the same parties, founded upon

the same facts and reasons, the Court of First Instance of Rizal had no jurisdiction to

issue the mandatory injunction of the 1st of March, 1913 (Exhibit 4), for the reason

that such injunction tends to render inefficacious and null the final decision which this

honorable court will render in civil case No. 8673.

The action referred to in this paragraph is one begun by Antonio Bertol and

Tranquilina T., windows of Angeles, against Godofredo B. Herrera and others relating

to the validity of a certain ordinance.

5. That there being pending civil case No. 986 mentioned in the previous paragraphs,

the Court of First Instance of Rizal lacked jurisdiction to issue the mandatory

injunction which he issued on the 1st of March, 1913, for the reason that it tends to

render inefficacious and null the decision which the Honorable Richard Campbell will

render in civil cause No. 986.

This objection is based upon an action previously begun by Antonio Bertol and

Tranquilina T., windows of Angeles, against the municipality or the officials thereof

for the purpose of having declared null and void municipal ordinance No. 8 of

Caloocan, which is the same ordinance upon which was based the complaint of

Constancio Joaquin and in which the mandatory injunction was issued.

6. That the said Constancio Joaquin at the present time does not possess a license to

maintain and run the said cockpits of Loma and Maypajo, nor does he have the right

to exploit the same.

It has been repeatedly held by this court that a writ of certiorari will not be issued unless it clearly appears that the court to which it is to be directed acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. It will be not be issued to cure errors in the proceedings or to correct erroneous conclusions of law or of fact. If the court has jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the person, decisions upon all questions pertaining to the cause are decision within its jurisdiction and, however irregular or erroneous they may be, cannot be corrected by certiorari. The Code of Civil Procedure giving Court of First Instance general jurisdiction in actions for mandamus, it goes without saying that the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction in the present case to resolve every question arising in such an action and to decide every question presented to it which pertained to the cause. It had already been held by this court that, while it is a power to be exercised only in extreme cases, a Court of First Instance has power to issue a mandatory injunction to stand until the final determination of the action in which it is issued. While the issuance of the mandatory injunction in this particular case may have been irregular and erroneous, a question concerning which we express no opinion, nevertheless its issuance was within the jurisdiction of the

court and its action is not reviewable on certiorari. It is not sufficient to say that it was issued wrongfully and without sufficient grounds and in the absence of the other party. The question is, did the court act with jurisdiction?It has been urged that the court exceeded its jurisdiction in requiring the municipal president to issue the license, for the reason that he was not the proper person to issue it and that, if he was the proper person, he had the right to exercise a discretion as to whom the license should be issued. We do not believe that either of these question goes to the jurisdiction of the court to act. One of the fundamental questions in a mandamus against a public officer is whether or not that officer has the right to exercise discretion in the performance of the act which the plaintiff asks him to perform. It is one of the essential determination of the cause. To claim that the resolution of that question may deprive the court of jurisdiction is to assert a novel proposition. It is equivalent to the contention that a court has jurisdiction if he decides right but no jurisdiction if he decides wrong. It may be stated generally that it is never necessary to decide the fundamental questions of a cause to determine whether the court has jurisdiction. The question of jurisdiction is preliminary and never touches the merits of the case. The determination of the fundamental questions of a cause are merely the exercise of a jurisdiction already conceded. In the case at bar no one denies the power, authority, or jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance to take cognizance of an action for mandamus and to decide every question which arises in that cause and pertains thereto. The contention that the decision of one of those questions, if wrong, destroys jurisdiction involves an evident contradiction.

Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a cause —the right to act in a case.

Since it is the power to hear and determine, it does not depend either upon the

regularity of the exercise of that power or upon the rightfulness of the decisions made.

Jurisdiction should therefore be distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction. The

authority to decide a cause at all, and not the decision rendered therein, is what makes

up jurisdiction. Where there is jurisdiction of the person and subject matter, as we

have said before, the decision of all other questions arising in the case is but an

exercise of that jurisdiction.

In the case of Chase vs. Christianson (41 Cal., 253), the court said: "Here, then, was jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the person and these conditions conceded, the decision of all other question arising in the case is but the exercise of that jurisdiction and an erroneous decision of any of these other questions could not impair the validity and binding force of the judgment when brought in question collaterally.

It is not the particular decision given which makes up jurisdiction, but it is the

authority to decide the question at all. Otherwise all distinction between erroneous

exercise of jurisdiction upon the hand, and a total want of it upon the other, must be

obliterated.

In the case of Freeman vs. Thompson (53 Mo., 183), the following is quoted with approval from Paine vs. Mooreland (15 Ohio, 435): "The court once having, by its process, acquired the power to adjudicate upon a person of thing, it has what is called jurisdiction. . . . The distinction is between a lack of power or want of jurisdiction in the court, and a wrongful or defective execution of the power. In the first instance, all acts of a court, not having jurisdiction or power, are void; in the latter, voidable only. A court, then may act, first without power or jurisdiction; second, having power or jurisdiction, may exercise it wrongfully; or third, irregularly. In the first instance the act or judgment of the court is wholly void, and is as though it as though it had not been done; the second is wrong and must be reversed upon error; the third is irregular and must be corrected by motion."In Hardin vs. Lee (51 Mo., 241), the court said: "The judgment though grossly erroneous was not void, the court having acquired

jurisdiction of the subject matter. . . . In a word, error and nullity are not legal equivalent or synonymous."In Hagerman vs. Sutton (91 Mo., 519), the court said: "The power to decide correctly and to enforce a decision when correctly made necessarily implies the same power to decide incorrectly and to enforce a decision when incorrectly made. (Devis vs. Packard, 10 Wend., 71.)"In Paine vs. Mooreland (15 Ohio, 435), the court said: "The distinction is between a lack of power or want of jurisdiction in the court, and a wrongful or defective execution of the power. In the first instance all acts of the court, now having jurisdiction or power, are void; in the latter voidable only."In the case of Colton vs. Beardsly (38 Barb., 51), the court said: "The test of jurisdiction is, whether the court has power to enter on the inquiry, and not whether its decision is right or wrong."In Wertheimer vs. Boonville (29 Mo., 25 4), the court said: "It is hard to conceive how the question of jurisdiction can be made to depend on the fact whether the judgment was right or wrong. The mayor unquestionably has authority to decide whether the ordinance had been violated, and after he has determined it, how can it be said he had no jurisdiction?"In O'Rielly vs. Nicholson (45 Mo., 160), the court said: "A judgment, though informal, even to the extent of granting a relief not contemplated in the petition, when the parties are before the court and the relief is within its jurisdiction, is not a void proceeding. The doctrine laid down in Fithian vs. Monks (43 Mo., 502), 'in that it fails to make the readily observable distinction between jurisdiction to act in a given cause, and erroneous exercise of such jurisdiction, . . . should no longer be followed . . . Jurisdiction being acquired error could not oust it, although that error consisted in granting relief not warranted by law.'"In the case of Gray vs. Bowles (74 Mo., 419), the court said: "When a court has jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action and the

parties to it, a judgment rendered by it, although it may be an erroneous, irregular, or wrong judgment, cannot be said to be void, but remains valid and binding until reversed or set aside on the ground of such error or irregularity."In States vs. Second Judicial District (24 Mont., 238), the court said: "A judgment was rendered against Baker, who appealed but could not furnish the necessary bonds or security on appeal. The purpose of this application is to set aside the judgment, the relator asserting that the district court was without jurisdiction. The right to hear and determine necessarily carries with it the power to decide wrong as well as right. It did not exceed its jurisdiction although the court may have erred, yet it regularly pursued its authority. Certiorari may not be used to correct errors committed within the jurisdiction of the court."In Central Pac. vs. Board (43 Cal., 365) the court said: "Mere irregularly intervening in the exercise of an admitted jurisdiction — mere mistakes of law committed in conducting the proceedings in an inquiry which the Board had authority to entertain, . . . are not to be considered here upon certiorari, otherwise that writ would be turned into a writ of error . . . Jurisdiction over a question presented being conceded, carries with it necessarily the authority — the mere power — to decide the question either way."In Lewis vs. Larson (45 Wis., 353), the court said: "The judgment of a justice of the peace will not be reversed on a common-law certiorari, if the justice had jurisdiction to render it, no matter how irregular or erroneous it may be."In the case of Utah Association vs. Budge (16 Idaho, 751), the court said: "If the court had jurisdiction of the person and the subject matter, then it is clear that whatever mistakes has been made has been only an error committed on the part of the trial court in exercising his judgment and applying the law to the case, rather than an excess of jurisdiction in acting in a matter wherein he had not acquired jurisdiction to act or wherein his court has no

jurisdiction of the subject in litigation. . . . The court had the jurisdiction, power, and authority to hear and determine that question. It accordingly did so. If the court committed an error in deciding the question thus presented, we answer that the court had jurisdiction to commit the error."Although certiorari may be considered a direct attack upon a judgment as distinguished from a collateral attack, nevertheless, under the laws of these Islands the only ground for the issuance ofcertiorari being the failure of jurisdiction of the inferior tribunal, the basis of the direct attack upon the judgment becomes in this jurisdiction the same as for collateral attack, inasmuch as, generally speaking, a collateral attack against a judgment is sustainable only when the judgment is void for lack of jurisdiction in the court to pronounce it. Therefore the authorities relative to the ground necessary for a successful collateral attack upon a judgment are authorities in a large sense, pertinent to a discussion as to when a court may be held to have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.In the case of Cooper vs. Reynolds (10 Wall., 308), the court said: "It is of no avail, therefore, to show that there are errors in the record, unless they be such as prove that the court had no jurisdiction of the case, or that the judgment rendered was beyond its power. This principle has been often held by this court and by all courts, and it takes rank as an axiom of the law."In the case of Cornett vs. Williams (30 Wall., 226), it was declared that "the settled rule of law is, that jurisdiction having attached in the original case, everything done within the power of that jurisdiction, when collaterally questioned, is to be held conclusive of the rights of the parties, unless impeached for fraud."These two cases were cited and approved in the case of Manson vs. Duncanson (166 U. S., 533), wherein the court said: "When a court has jurisdiction it has right to decide every question that may arise in the cause; and whether its decisions be correct or not, its judgment, until reversed, is regarded as binding in every other

court. These principles apply in all respects and with special force in this case. It was for the court whose decree is attempted to be impeached, not only to decide on the facts before it, but upon the construction and legal effect of all deeds and muniments of title upon which the proceeding was based. The court having general jurisdiction over the subject matter of decreeing the sale of real estate of a deceased debtor and for the payment of debts, it had the right and was required to determine the question as to the liability of the property for the debts, and whether the case was within its jurisdiction; and though its decision may have been erroneous, it could only be reversed upon a direct appeal."See Shepard vs. Adams, 168 U. S., 618; Gunn vs. Plant, 94 U. S., 664; Parker vs. Kane, 22 Howard, 1; Huff vs. Hutchinson, 14 Howard, 586; Thompson vs. Tolmie, 2 Pet., 157; Hatcher vs. Hendrie, 68 C. C. A., 19.

See also, the long list of authorities cited as sustaining this doctrine in 23 Cyc., 1090,

where the rule is stated as follows: "Where a court has jurisdiction of the parties and

the subject matter, its judgment, although irregular in form, or erroneous or mistaken

in law, is conclusive, as long as it remains unreversed and in force, and cannot be

impeached collaterally."

In the case of Miller vs. Rowan (251 Ill., 344), the court said: "A judgment or decree is not binding upon anyone unless the court rendering the same had jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter of the cause. The court did have jurisdiction of the parties, and the appellant, who is disputing the binding effect of the decree, was one of the complainants. Jurisdiction of the subject matter is the power to adjudge concerning the general question involved, and if a bill states a case belonging to a general class over which the authority of the court extends, the jurisdiction attaches and no error committed by the court can render the judgment void. It the court has jurisdiction, it is altogether immaterial, when the judgment is collaterally called in question, how grossly irregular or manifestly

erroneous its proceedings may have been. The judgment cannot be regarded as a nullity, and cannot, therefore, be collaterally impeached. Such a judgment is binding on the parties and on every other court unless reversed or annulled in a direct proceeding and is not open to collateral attack. If there is a total want of jurisdiction in a court its proceedings are an absolute nullity and confer no right and afford no protection but will be pronounced void when collaterally drawn in question. (Buckmaster vs. Carling, 3 Scam., 104; Swiggart vs. Harber, 1 id., 364; People vs. Seelye, 146 Ill., 189; Clark vs. People, 146 id., 348; O'Brien vs. People, 216 id., 354; People vs. Talmadge, 194 id., 67.)"Trombly vs. Klersy (146 Mich., 648); Chapman vs. Taliaferro (1 Ga. App., 235); Smith vs. Schlink (44 Colo., 200), where the court said: "That the court had jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter cannot be questioned. This being true, and it not appearing that the judgment was not within the issues presented by the pleadings, however, erroneous it may be, the judgment cannot be held to be void, so as to bring this case within the rule that disobedience of a void decree does not constitute contempt of court."Baldwin vs. Foster (157 Cal., 643), where the court said:

Throughout this consideration the fact is to be borne in mind that we are not reviewing this judgment under attack made on direct appeal where errors prejudicial to those appealing would call for a reversal, but we are considering it upon collateral attack, where every intendment is in favor of the judgment and where mere errors and irregularities will not be considered. Upon collateral attack the judgment will be set aside, generally speaking, for but one of three reasons: Lack of jurisdiction of the person, lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action, or an absolute lack of jurisdiction to render such a judgment as the one given. (Moore vs. Martin, 38 Cal., 428; Mayo vs. Foley, 40 Cal., 281; In re James, 99 Cal., 374; 37 Am. St. Rep., 60; 33 Pac., 1122; Wood vs. Jordan, 125 Cal., 261; 57 Pac., 997.)

Goodman vs. City (164 Fed., 970); Sawyer vs. Kelly (148 Iowa., 644); Lucy vs. Deas (59 Fla., 552).That certiorari will lie only in case of failure of jurisdiction has been consistently held by this court. The following are substantially all of the cases decided by this court referring to certiorari or prohibition. We include those referring to prohibition for the reason that the ground of its issuance is the same as that in certiorari, viz, lack or excess of jurisdiction:In the case of In re Prautch (1 Phil. Rep., 1 32), the court said: "Under the provisions of the code in certiorari proceedings, it is necessary that it would appear both that the inferior court has exceeded its jurisdiction and that there is no appeal from such court."In his concurring opinion Judge Willard says: "Considering the existence of facts which may confer jurisdiction, the question of whether those facts are presented in such a manner in the affidavit as to invoke the exercise of this jurisdiction is one which the court has the same right to determine as it would have in the decision of any other questions which might arise in a matter within its recognizance. In the exercise of this power it may issue an erroneous order, but such an order is not absolutely void; unless it is remedied during the same action by means of an appeal or otherwise, it will have the effect of a valid order. The Court of First Instance should not give a judgment upon a complaint on a promissory note which does not state a cause of action, but if it does so its judgment is valid unless it is reversed by means of appeal. We cannot defer to any decision of the supreme court of California which sustains a contrary doctrine. Article 528, already cited, establishes the law of these Islands, and we must submit to that. To accept the other rule would be to convert the writ of habeas corpus into a writ of error, a thing which is in no wise permissible. It would make it possible for any defendant by means of such writ to interpose an appeal to this court in all those cases in which an order

of arrest should be issued and would oblige us to review the errors of law which are alleged to have been committed by the court in investigating the sufficiency of the affidavit, and this is, in our opinion the very practice which article 528 seeks to avoid."In the of Reyes vs. Roxas (1 Phil. Rep., 625), the court held that the refusal to hear witnesses offered by the defense in a criminal action might constitute error, but was not an excess of jurisdiction to be remedied by certiorari, the court saying: "The complaint in this case does not allege that the court which convicted the petitioner had no jurisdiction to try the case. Neither does it allege that in the prosecution of the case there has been any affirmative action by the judge outside of his jurisdiction. It simply alleges that he has failed to take action; that he has refused to hear the witnesses for the defendant. This, if true, would constitute error, but it would be error committed by the judge in the exercise of a jurisdiction which he possessed. The remedy by certiorari does not apply to this case."In the case of Dy Chuan Leng vs. Amber (1 Phil. Rep., 535), the court said: "We cannot grant an injunction under this section unless there is a compliance with article 164 and 166. It must appear from the complaint that the plaintiff is entitled to recover in the action. If the complaint states no cause of action no preliminary injunction can be issued. The complaint filed in this court is defective in this respect. It shows upon its face that the petitioner are not entitled to an order of prohibition against the court below. That court had jurisdiction of the action to dissolve the partnership. In that action it had the power to grant a preliminary injunction (art. 164), and to appoint a receiver (art. 174). Having those powers, if in the exercise of them any errors were committed, they could be corrected only on appeal from the final judgment. The facts as alleged, that the complaint was ambiguous; that the judge believed that the plaintiff below was a partner when the defendants denied it; that he fixed the bonds at $1,000 instead of $30,000, as requested by the defendants; that no mention of the bond was made in the writ of injunction; that he

refused to hear the defendants' witnesses; that he refused to dissolve the injunction upon a bond which the defendants offered to give, all of these do not show that the court was acting outside of its jurisdiction. They simply show, if they are true, that the court has committed certain errors in exercising its jurisdiction, errors which must be corrected by appeal."In the case of Ivancich vs. Odlin (1 Phil. Rep., 284), the court said at page 287: "The ground upon which the second prohibition is sought is that the attachment ordered by the court is not such an attachment as is authorized by articles 424 et seq. of the Code of Civil Procedure of the Philippine Islands , but on the contrary is an attachment under a procedure not in force here, although it is in force in the United States of America in maritime cases, and that the attachment, moreover, was levied without affidavit, bond, or any of the securities established by law whereby the owners of the steamer can obtain reparation for any damages which may be occasioned them by the unlawful detention of the said steamer; and that the procedure of the court below is devoid of all the formal requisites established by law for the levying of such attachments.

xxx           xxx           xxx

The judge, did not, therefore, act without jurisdiction when directing the attachment of the vessel in question, and has not exceeded his jurisdiction. If the excess of jurisdiction upon which the argument was based consists in his having levied the attachment without the fulfillment of the necessary conditions and without following the form prescribed by some law of procedure applicable to the case, it is our opinion that this error is not such an excess of jurisdiction as can be secured by prohibition, and the petitioner has other means whereby this error or procedure may be corrected or remedied. Upon these grounds we decide that the petition for a writ of prohibition must be denied, with the costs to petitioner, and it is so ordered.

In the case of Araneta vs. The Heirs of Tranquilino Gustilo (2 Phil. Rep., 60), this court said: "This is a petition for a writ of certiorari to review the action of the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros in requiring a supersedeas bond under section 144 of theCode of Civil Procedure. It does not appear from the petition what the amount involved in the litigation is, nor on what sum that bond was fixed by the court, but it is alleged that the bond is excessive. The court below had jurisdiction to require the bond as a condition of a stay of execution, and to fix its amount. Assuming that the bond was excessive, yet nothing is alleged in the petition which shows that the court exceeded its jurisdiction in the premises or committed any irregularity in its proceedings in exercise thereof. The writ must therefore be denied."In the case of Springer vs. Odlin (3 Phil. Rep., 344), the court said: "The court, on the 30th of May, after hearing both parties, made an order by which it was adjudged that the claim of Co-Banco had a preference over the claim of Springer and ordered the money in the custody of the clerk to be believed to Co-Blanco, but requiring him to execute a bond for the sum of P400 with sureties for the protection of Springer in case he appealed to the Supreme Court to annul the order.The plaintiff, Springer, alleges in his application for certiorari that the Court of First Instance acted without jurisdiction in making this order of the 30th day of May, 1903; that not being a party in the cause of the United States vs. Catalino Mortes, he has no right to appeal nor has he any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy from the order; and further alleging that Co-Banco had no lien upon the P259.50 in dispute, either by attachment or by execution; nor did the said Co-Blanco on the date of the making of the order in his favor have any right of any other character upon said money.If the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction to render the judgment of the 13th day of May, 1903, in favor of Co-Banco in the case of the United States vs. Catalino Mortes, and in the proceeding in which

Springer intervened resulting in the order of May 30, or if the plaintiff, Springer, had any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy by a bill of exceptions, appeal, or otherwise from the order of the 30th day of May, 1903, by which the money in question was directed to be paid to Co-Banco, then the proceeding in certiorari will not lie.In the case of Felizardo vs. Justice of the Peace of Imus (3 Phil. Rep., 635), the court said: "Attorneys Pineda and Escueta, on behalf of Flaviano Felizardo and Francisca Felizardo, upon the facts stated by their complaint, dated April 4, 1904, and upon the ground that there was no other speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, pray for an order dissolving the attachment levied upon the property of the petitioners, and that a writ issue to the justice of the peace of Imus, requiring him to absolutely refrain from all further proceedings until a final decision is rendered upon the complaint.

By intervening in the suit result in which the attachment was levied, the parties may

avail themselves of all the legal remedies provided for the defense of their lawful

rights, but cannot avail themselves of the writ of prohibition for the purpose of

obtaining a discharge of attachment complained of. The case is one which pertains

exclusively to the jurisdiction of the judge who is trying it, and there is no authority of

law for interference with the proceedings.

In the case of Rubert & Guanis vs. Sweeney (4 Phil. Rep., 473), the court said: "The court below had jurisdiction of the subject matter of that suit and of the parties thereto. It had power by law to grant an injunction in the case and power to dissolve it or modify it. There can be no doubt of the correctness of these propositions, but it is claimed by the plaintiff in this suit that the stipulation made between the parties to the suit below to the effect that the sheriff should hold the money until the final judgment in that case, deprived the court of jurisdiction to make the order modifying the injunction and requiring to sheriff to pay the money to the defendant Lo Shui upon his furnishing a proper bond.

When section 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure speaks of a tribunal exercising functions which are without or in excess of its jurisdiction, it covers those cases only in which such tribunal acts without or in excess of the jurisdiction conferred upon it by law. It has no reference to cases where it is claimed that such tribunal acts in excess of jurisdiction which the parties may have attempted by stipulation to confer upon it, or in excess of a jurisdiction to which the parties may by stipulation have attempted to limit the court. The fact that the judge may have committed an error in disregarding the stipulation of the parties has nothing to do with the question of the jurisdiction which by law the judge was authorized to excess. If there was such error in the action of the court below, it was an error that must be corrected by appeal. An action of prohibition cannot be maintained in such cases. (Citing cases.) There is nothing in the case of Yangco vs. Rohde(1 Phil. Rep., 404), relied upon by the plaintiff, in conflict with this rule. As was stated in the case of Dy Chuan Leng vs. Amber above cited, the writ of prohibition was there granted upon the ground that in no case where the fact of marriage was denied did the Court of First Instance have any jurisdiction to grant temporary alimony.In the case of Castaño vs. Lobinger (7 Phil. Rep., 91), the court said: "The concrete questions raised by the parties to these proceedings are (1) whether or not the judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte had power to issue an injunction against the justice of the peace of Manila in an action pending in his court, and (2) whether the judge of the said Court of First Instance of Leyte could entertain a petition for a writ of certiorari against the said justice of the peace of the city of Manila.

xxx           xxx           xxx

The judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte had no jurisdiction over the judge of

the peace of the city of Manila, and were a judge of the Court of First Instance

permitted to grant such extraordinary remedies against a justice of the peace in a

district or province other than his own, it would be a serious interference with the

proper administration of justice, and a procedure relating to appeals from and other

remedies against the judgments of inferior courts would be subverted. It should be

borne in mind that the enforcement of the laws jurisdiction of the various courts,

concerns the interests of the community at large.

The judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte had no power to take cognizance, on

appeal, of a case originally tried in the justice court of the city of Manila, nor has he

the power to take cognizance of cases that should ordinarily be tried in the Court of

First Instance of Manila, unless by virtue of a special commission. Nor has he the

power to issue writs of injunction in connection wit other special and extraordinary

remedies sought from the decisions of said justice of the peace.

In the case of Herman vs. Crossfield (7 Phil. Rep., 259), the court said: "After the term at which judgment was rendered, a Court of First Instance made an order opening the case for the introduction of additional evidence, the motion therefore having been made and argued during said term. Held, That such order was not void because made after the close of said term and that it could not be reviewed on certiorari."

The court at page 261 said: "Whether the order made on the 14th of April was right or

wrong is not before us for decision. The court had jurisdiction to decide the motion,

even if it were a motion for a new trial, a point which we do not determine. If it

decided it incorrectly, the plaintiff who was the defendant in that case, had the right to

except to the order and, although he could not bring the case here at once for decision

because that order was not a final judgment, yet he could do so after final judgment

had been entered and could then have the order in question reviewed."

In the case of Somes vs. Crossfield (8 Phil. Rep., 284), the action was one of certiorari. The court said: "The plaintiff, in an action brought by himself in the Court of First Instance of Manila, made a motion for a preliminary injunction restraining the defendants from selling certain property upon execution. After a hearing upon the

motion, the court after saying that the plaintiff was not entitled to the preliminary injunction, made the following order:

"According, the petition for a preliminary writ of prohibition is denied,

and it is hereby further ordered that the proceeds of the sales under the

executions already issued, and pending, either in this court or in the

hands of the sheriff of the Province of Albay, be deposited in this court,

subject to the further orders thereof, upon a bond of P10,000 being filed

by the plaintiff to answer for any loss resulting from the failure to apply

said proceeds as ordered in the execution issued."

The plaintiff thereupon commenced this original action of certiorari in this court, claiming that the court below, in making the order in question, exceeded its jurisdiction. The defendants have demurred to the complaint, and the case is now before us for decision upon such demurrer.

xxx           xxx           xxx

That the court below did not exceed its jurisdiction in making that order is free from doubt. (Rubert & Guamis vs. Sweeney, 4 Phil. Rep., 473.)In the case of Artacho vs. Jenkins (11 Phil. Rep., 47), the court said at page 48: "It is alleged in the complaint that, in ordering the issue of a second execution, the defendant judge exceeded his jurisdiction and that such order was absolutely void. This contention cannot be sustained. The court of Pangasinan had jurisdiction of the case of Tan Chu Chay against the plaintiff Artacho, jurisdiction both of the parties and of the subject matter, and the mere fact that some creditor of Tan Chu Chay had attached the debt due from Artacho to the former did not oust that court from its jurisdiction to proceed with the case. (See among other cases decided by this court: Rubert & Guamis vs. Sweeney, 4 Phil. Rep., 473; Somes vs. Crossfield, 8 Phil. Rep., 284; and Yambert vs. McMicking, 10 Phil. Rep., 95.)"

In the case of Lagahit vs. Nengasca and Wislizenus (12 Phil. Rep., 423), the action was one of certiorari. The action in the court below was one over a contested election. The court, speaking through Mr. Chief Justice Arellano, said: "Whether or not the below acted rightly in considering the other candidate as the 'adverse party' and the party defeated in the proceedings is not a matter on which action may be taken by this court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. It is evident that it was a matter within the jurisdiction of the court below to tax the 'adverse party' with the costs. The remedy of certiorari is, therefore, not available, as the purpose thereof is to prevent and remedy extra limitations of jurisdiction and authority, not to correct errors in decisions or mistakes of law, which are proper subjects for appeal and cassation.

The first finding is perfectly in accordance with the provision of the law. The court

below in deciding upon the protest against the contested election for president of

Aloguisan said: 'The court believes that the majority of the electors at the present

election voted in favor of the petitioner, Simeon Nengasca.' Whether or not this

opinion of the court below is proper cannot be the subject or review by this court. It is

a decision which is within the jurisdiction of the lower court as conferred by law.

As a result of this opinion of the court below, and in compliance with the provision of the law, the judgment should have been: "Let a writ of mandamus be issued against the board of canvassers requiring the board to correct its canvass in accordance with the facts as found."

For the reason above set forth we decide that the order of the Court of First Instance

of Cebu recognizing Nengasca as president-elect at the elections in the municipality of

Aloguisan, in said province, should be, and is hereby annulled for the reason that it is

not within the jurisdiction of the said court to recognize or proclaim a president in a

contested election.

The action of Ocampo vs. Jenkins (14 Phil. Rep., 681), was one of prohibition. It was held there: "The fact that an appeal is pending in

the Supreme Court in a criminal case for libel, under Act No. 277 of the Philippine Commission, does not prevent the prosecution of a civil action for damages under the same Act, which clearly recognizes two distinct actions upon the theory that there are two separate and distinct injuries received from the crime, one by the State and the other by the individual damaged by the libel. In such a case, therefore, a petition for a writ of prohibition enjoining the prosecution of the civil suit while the criminal appeal is pending will be denied."There are certain cases like Lagahit vs. Nengasca and Wislizenus above cited wherein the court has held that certiorari would lie. In the case of Encarnacion vs. Ambler (3 Phil. Rep., 623), the court said at page 624: "In the case of Eugenio Bonaplata vs. Byron S. Ambler et al. (2 Phil. Rep., 392), which involved the validity of the appointment of Antonio Torres as receiver of the estate of Tan-Tonco in the said cause of Sergia Reyes vs. Fulgencio Tan-Tonco, it was held by this court that section 174 of the Code of Civil Procedure, under which the appointment of the receiver was made, did not authorize the appointment; that no property belonging to Fulgencio Tan-Tanco was the subject of litigation in the case of Sergia Reyes vs. Tan-Tonco; nor did the case fall within either of the other subdivisions of section 174; that the placing of the property of the defendant in said cause in the hands of the receiver for the purpose, after praying fees and expense of distributing the property among the creditors, was practically a bankruptcy proceeding; that there are no bankruptcy laws in force in these Islands; that bankruptcy proceedings have been expressly forbidden by section 524 of the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions until a law shall be enacted; and that consequently the Court of First Instance acted in excess of its jurisdiction in appointing Antonio Torres receiver in said action.We adhere to the views expressed in the decision of this court in the said case of Eugenio Bonaplata vs. Byron S. Amber et al."

In the case of United States vs. Siatong (5 Phil. Rep., 463), the court said: "Without its being our purpose to decide if the remedy or certiorari invoked by the provincial fiscal is proper in this case or not, we cannot admits his petition on account of its not being made in due form. The remedy of certiorari should be petitioned for by formal complaint having all of the requirements prescribed by the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions, and the petition formulated by the fiscal in the form of a brief in a criminal cause does not come up to these requirements, for which reason it is set aside in accordance with law."In the case of Rocha & Co. vs. Crossfield (6 Phil. Rep., 355), the court, on page 358, after quoting the section of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to cases in which a receiver may be appointed, said: "The case at bar does not fall within any of the provisions of this section. There is no allegation in the complaint, as has been before stated, that the plaintiff is the owner of any of the property of Rocha & Co., nor is there any allegation that he has any lien thereon, nor are there any facts alleged in the complaint from which it could be inferred that he was the owner of such property of had any lien thereon. On the contrary, from the facts that are alleged in the complaint it would seem that his separation from the partnership of Carman & Co. left that partnership as a going concern and did not dissolve it. The effect of the provisions of the articles of partnership which are referred to in the complaint is that after the withdrawal of any partner the remaining partners became the owner of all the assets of the partnership and he became a general creditor of the partnership.

xxx           xxx           xxx

The case not being one in which a receiver could be appointed, the order making such appointment was void and was beyond the jurisdiction of the court, although that court had jurisdiction of the main action has been settled adversely to the defendants in this suit

by the case of Bonaplata vs. Amber (2 Phil. Rep., 392; see also Encarnacion vs. Amber, 3 Phil. Rep., 623; Findlay & Co. vs. Amber, 3 Phil. Rep., 690).That certiorari is the proper remedy in such cases was decided in the case of Blanco vs. Amber (3 Phil. Rep., 358, 735).In the argument in this court it was claimed that this extraordinary remedy would not, lie because the plaintiff, Rocha & Co., had a right to appeal from the order appointment a receiver, although that appeal could not be taken until a final judgment had been entered in the case. That argument is answered by what is said in the case of Yangco vs. Rohde (1 Phil. Rep., 404)."In the case of Bañes vs. Cordero (13 Phil. Rep., 466), the court said: "And, if the jurisdiction has not been exceeded, there is not nor could there be any legal ground for the issuance of the writ of certiorari, because these proceedings can only exclusively be granted to remedy abuses committed in the exercise of a power or jurisdiction. Sections 217 and 514 of the Code of Civil Procedure providing for such relief unequivocally and specifically refer to the act of exceeding or going beyond the jurisdiction; and this court has repeatedly held that, in order that certiorari may issue, it is absolutely necessary to show that the respondent has exceeded his power or jurisdiction. (In re Prautch, 1 Phil. Rep., 132; De los Reyes vs. Roxas, 1 Phil. Rep., 625; Springer vs. Odlin, 3 Phil. Rep., 344.)"In the case of Arzadon vs. Chanco (14 Phil. Rep., 710); the court decided as follows: "Certiorari is the proper remedy whenever an inferior tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions has exceeded its or his jurisdiction, and no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to correct such excess or extra limitation. (Secs. 217 and 514, Code of Civil Procedure). The jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance to hear and decide election contests is exclusive and final (sec. 27 of the Election Law); consequently, decisions rendered by them in the exercise of said

jurisdiction cannot be reviewed by means of an appeal. As they are not appealable and as against them no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy exists, it is evident that they constitute a proper subject for the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. Therefore, if the court below has exceeded his jurisdiction in rendering the above-cited decision it is proper to annul and the same by virtue of said proceedings."

In that case the Court of First Instance made the following order: "By the foregoing,

Silvestre Arzadon appears to have violated the provisions of the Election Law which

prohibit every action, influence, and promise of any kind, for the purpose of obtaining

votes. These should indicate the free will of the voters, and for such infractions his

election for the office of municipal president of the town of Badoc must be considered

illegal.

Therefore, it is declared by the court that the election of Silvestre Arzadon for the

office of president, held on the 15th day of November last in the municipality of

Badoc, Ilocos Norte, was not legal, and another special election for the said office

must be held at the expense of the said Arzadon who shall not then be eligible, and

any vote entered in his favor shall not count; the costs and expenses of these

proceedings shall also be charged to him.

In respect to that order the Supreme Court said: "It is our opinion that he has so

exceeded his jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance hear election

protests is conferred upon them by the aforesaid section 27 of the Election Law, and

neither the said section, nor any other legal provision, authorizes the court, in deciding

such protests, to declare ineligible in future elections the person against whom the

protests was presented, nor to sentence him to pay the expenses of the new election to

be held. Hence, the court below had no power to enter such rulings in the case as gave

rise to these proceedings, and in consequence there of said rulings must be entirely

annulled."

See also Topacio vs. Paredes (23 Phil. Rep., 238).

The case of Yangco vs. Rohde (1 Phil. Rep., 404) was one relating to the allowance of alimony pending the trial of an action for a divorce. The court below allowed alimony although the answer denied the marriage. Prohibition was brought in this court, and after hearing, the lower court was enjoyed from levying and collecting alimony. The court said at page 414: "The court below had jurisdiction to try the divorce suit, but he was without jurisdiction to grant alimony when the right to claim alimony had not accrued in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code. This code only grants the right to alimony to a wife. This status not appearing by a final judgment, the court is without jurisdiction to make any order in the matter."See also U. S. vs. Crossfield (24 Phil. Rep., 321); Young Wampo vs. Collector of Customs (id., 431).The reasons given in these cases last cited for the allowance of the writ of prohibition are applicable only to the class of cases with which the decisions deal and do not in any way militate against the general proposition herein asserted. Those which relate to election contests are based upon the principle that those proceedings are special in their nature and must be strictly followed, a material departure from the statute resulting in a loss, or in an excess, of jurisdiction. The cases relating to receivers are based, in a measure, upon the same principle, the appointment of a receiver being governed by the statute; and in part upon the theory that the appointment of a receiver in an improper case is in substance a bankruptcy proceeding, the taking of which is expressly prohibited by law. The case relative to the allowance of alimony pendente lite when the answer denies the marriage is more difficult to distinguish. The reasons in support of the doctrine laid down in that case are given in the opinion in full and they seem to place the particular case to which they refer in a class by itself.It is not light thing that the lawmakers have abolished writs of error and with them certiorari and prohibition, in so far as they were methods by which the mere errors of an inferior court could be

corrected. As instrument to that end they no longer exist. Their place is now taken by the appeal. So long as the inferior court retains jurisdiction its errors can be corrected only by that method. The office of the writ of certiorari has been reduced to the correction of defects of jurisdiction solely and cannot legally be used for any other purpose. It is truly an extraordinary remedy and, in this jurisdiction, its use is restricted to truly extraordinary cases—cases in which the action of the inferior court is wholly void; where any further steps in the case would result in a waste of time and money and would produce no result whatever; where the parties, or their privies, would be utterly deceived; where a final judgment or decree would be nought but a snare and a delusion, deciding nothing, protecting nobody, a judicial pretension, a recorded falsehood, a standing menace. It is only to avoid such results as these that a writ of certiorari is issuable; and even here an appeal will lie if the aggrieved party prefers to prosecute it.A full and thorough examination of all the decided cases in this court touching the question of certiorari and prohibition fully support the proposition already stated that, where a Court of First Instance has jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the person, its decision of any question pertaining to the cause, however erroneous, cannot be reviewed by certiorari, but must be corrected by appeal.It must be remembered that the people of the Philippine Islands may go to the Court of First Instance to require a public officer to perform his duties; and they have the right to have that court pass upon the whole case and upon every phase thereof and upon every question arising therein. This right is conferred by statute. It would be respected by the courts as well as by others. It would be manifestly illegal, as it would be flagrantly unjust, so long as the court acts within its jurisdiction, to withdraw from the Court of First Instance the consideration of that case under color of any proceeding whatever. As long as the court is considering that case, its right and

the rights of the litigants to continue to final determination are inviolate.

The fact that another action may have been pending involving the same subject matter

and even between the same parties, which was not the fact in this case, does not touch

the jurisdiction of the court to act.

We cannot leave the case without suggesting that the applicant herein, before coming to this court, should, as the better practice, have made the proper application to the Court of First Instance for a dissolution or modification of the mandatory injunction, and thereby given that court an opportunity, after full argument of counsel and citation of authorities, to pass upon the question of his power and jurisdiction and, even, the correctness and propriety of his action, should power and jurisdiction be found by the court to exist. Questions which Courts of First Instance are required by law to decide should not be summarily taken from them and presented to this court without first giving them an opportunity of deliberately passing on such questions themselves. The most natural and proper thing to do, when such court, in the judgment of one of the parties, has issued an injunction erroneously, is immediately to call the attention of that court to its supposed error and ask for its correction. The strongest reasons of policy and courtesy if not actual legal rights itself, require such procedure; and we discourage all attempts to come to this court upon questions which a court below is entitled to decide without first invoking its judgment thereon. There are special reasons for following this course in cases where the court has acted ex parte.

The writ is denied and the proceeding is dismissed. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-54287 September 28, 1988

REPUBLIC PLANTERS BANK petitioner, vs.HON. CONRADO M. MOLINA, as Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XX, SARMIENTO EXPORT CORPORATION, SARMIENTO SECURITIES CORPORATION and FELICIANO SARMIENTO, JR., respondents.

Paco, Gutierrez, Dorado, Asia & Associates for petitioner.

Benjamin M. Reyes for respondents.

 

GANCAYCO, J.:

The principal issue raised in this case is whether the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion when it ordered Civil Case No. 129829 dismissed on the ground of resjudicata it appearing that Civil Case No. 116028 was dismissed on May 21, 1979, for failure of petitioner to prosecute within a reasonable length of time, although in the said case, the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the persons of private respondents.

It is not disputed that both complaints in Civil Case No. 116028 (Branch XXXVI, Manila, Judge Alfredo C. Florendo) and in Civil Case No. 129829 (Branch XX, Manila, Judge Conrado M. Molina) were filed by petitioner Republic Planters Bank against private respondent, for the collection of a sum of money based on a promissory note dated January 26, 1970, in the amount of P100,000.00.

On May 21, 1979, Judge Alfredo C. Florendo dismissed Civil Case No. 116028 for failure of the petitioner "to prosecute its case within a reasonable length of time. 1 A motion for reconsideration of that order was denied on January 15, 1979. 2

When Civil Case No. 129829 was filed by petitioner, a motion to dismiss was submitted by private respondents on the ground that the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment (res judicata) in Civil Case No. 116028. Private respondents opined that said order was an adjudication upon the merits. Petitioner opposed the motion to dismiss, claiming that res judicata does not apply because the summons and complaint in Civil Case No. 116028 were never served upon private respondents and, as such, the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over private respondents and, consequently, over the case. Petitioner maintains that the order of dismissal in Civil Case No. 11 6028 never became final as against private respondents.

The trial court (Branch XX), in its order dated May 8, 1980, dismissed the complaint in Civil Case No. 129829 on the ground that the orders dated May 21, 1979 and June 15, 1979 issued by Judge Alfredo C. Florendo, dismissing Civil Case No. 116028, had become final. The trial court ruled that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 116028 had the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, that the dismissal was with prejudice since the order was unconditional, and that the lack of jurisdiction over defendants (private respondents) in Civil Case No. 116028 was of no moment. 3

In a motion for reconsideration of the order of May 8, 1980, petitioner reiterated its allegation that in Civil Case No. 116028, the court did not acquire jurisdiction over private respondents and that at the time the court ordered its dismissal, a motion for an alias writ of summons was pending resolution inasmuch as the sheriff had not acted on the same. 4 The motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court on June 26, 1980 in Civil Case No. 129829. 5

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals both questioned orders of respondent court in Civil Case No. 129829.6 But then, petitioner sought a more speedy remedy in questioning said orders by filing this petition for certiorari before this Court.

Under the foregoing undisputed facts, the Court finds this petition to be impressed with merit.

The questioned orders of the trial court in Civil Case No. 129829 supporting private respondent's motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata are without cogent basis. We sustain petitioner's claim that respondent trial judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction when he issued said orders because he thereby traversed the constitutional precept that "no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law" and that jurisdiction is vitally essential for any order or adjudication to be binding. Justice cannot be sacrificed for technicality. Originally, the action for collection of the loan, evidenced by a promissory note, was only for P100,000.00 but petitioner claims that as of March 5, 1981, the obligation was already P429,219.74. It is a cardinal rule that no one must be allowed to enrich himself at the expense of another without just cause.

In the very order of dismissal of Civil Case No. 116028, the trial court admitted that it did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of private respondents and yet, it held that it was of no moment as to the dismissal of the case. We disagree. For the court to have authority to dispose of the case on the merits, it must acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. If it did not acquire jurisdiction over the private respondents as parties to Civil Case No. 116028, it cannot render any binding decision, favorable or adverse to them, or dismiss the case with prejudice which, in effect, is an adjudication on the merits. 7 The controverted orders in Civil Case No. 116028 disregarded the fundamental principles of remedial law and the meaning and the effect of jurisdiction. A judgment, to be considered res judicata, must be binding, and must be rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction. Otherwise, the judgment is a nullity.

The order of dismissal in Civil Case No. 116028 does not have the effect of an adjudication on the merits of the case because the court that rendered the same did not have the requisite jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants therein.

This being so, it cannot be the basis of res judicata and it cannot be a bar to a lawful claim. If at all, such a dismissal may be considered as one without prejudice. 8

Trial courts have the duty to dispose of controversies after trial on the merits whenever possible. In this case, there are no indications that petitioner intentionally failed to prosecute the case. The delay could not be attributed to its fault. Petitioner pursued the case with diligence, but jurisdiction could not be acquired over defendants-private respondents. The sheriff had not yet submitted his return of the alias summons when the action was precipitately dismissed by the trial court. These are proven

circumstances that negate the action of respondent judge that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 116028 has the effect of an adjudication upon the merits and constitutes a bar to the prosecution of Civil Case No. 129829. The court finds that the two questioned orders of the trial court are irregular, improper, and, were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.

Petitioner correctly states that its appeal to the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 67288 pertaining to the questioned orders of the trial court is not an adequate remedy, because petitioner was not able to present evidence in the trial court. The sole issue involved in this case is one of jurisdiction, which is appropriate for resolution by the instant petition.

WHEREFORE, and by reason of the foregoing, the questioned orders dated May 8, 1980 and June 26, 1980 issued in Civil Case No. 129829 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The records of the case are ordered returned to the trial court for trial and disposition on the merits. No costs. This decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.