m trexler additionality why does it matter 201004

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Additionality Understanding and Assessing Additionality in Project Based Emissions Trading Dr. Mark C. Trexler Director, Carbon Markets and Strategies Det Norske Veritas (DNV)

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An excellent presentation on the issues of additionality in CO2 offset trading by Mark Trexler, Director, Climate Markets and Strategies at Det Norske Veritas.

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Page 1: M Trexler Additionality Why Does It Matter 201004

Additionality

Understanding and Assessing Additionality in Project Based Emissions Trading

Dr. Mark C. TrexlerDirector, Carbon Markets and Strategies Det Norske Veritas (DNV)

Page 2: M Trexler Additionality Why Does It Matter 201004

© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved Slide 225 March 2010

“Additionality: Never has so much been said by so many, over so many years, without agreeing on the meaning of the

term being discussed, and the goals of the conversation.”

Trexler, BCSE Side Event, COP-9

Page 3: M Trexler Additionality Why Does It Matter 201004

© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved Slide 325 March 2010

The Logic of Offset Additionality

Offsets Allow Emitters To Negate GHG Emissions In One Place By Creating GHG Reductions Somewhere Else

In A Capped Trading System, Offsets Allow Emissions From Capped Sources To Be Greater Than They Otherwise Would Be, With The Understanding That These Greater Emissions Are “Offset” By Reductions At An Uncapped Source, Leaving Net Emissions Reduced or Unchanged

To Really Offset Emissions Under the Cap, Reductions From Uncapped Sources Must Be A Response To Offset Markets

Credited Reductions Must Therefore Be Additional To Reductions That Would Have Occurred In The Absence Of The Trading System

If They’re Not, Offsets Allow Global Emissions To Rise Beyond What Was Intended Under a Cap

The “Additionality Logic” Applies Equally to Offsets Under Regulatory and Voluntary Crediting Systems. Additionality is Additionality.

Page 4: M Trexler Additionality Why Does It Matter 201004

© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved Slide 425 March 2010

Why Additionality Matters

© 2003 Cli Mit Supply Tool

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Page 5: M Trexler Additionality Why Does It Matter 201004

© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved Slide 525 March 2010

Why Additionality Matters

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This graphic illustrates the impact of different additionality screens on offset supply curves. The three curves are based on the same underlying data set of mitigation potentials. They vary only in the severity of the additionality screen being applied. It is clear that the additionality screen can have a huge impact on the supply of offsets to the market, the environmental integrity of the trading system, and carbon market prices. That’s why additionality matters.

Page 6: M Trexler Additionality Why Does It Matter 201004

© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved Slide 625 March 2010

So What Does Additionality Mean?

“Additional” GHG Reductions Are Reductions That Are Attributable to the Existence of a Market for GHG Reductions

“Additional” Reductions Go Beyond “Business as Usual” (BAU) Reductions, But BAU is Too Amorphous a Concept to Serve as a Useful Additionality Definition

Page 7: M Trexler Additionality Why Does It Matter 201004

© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved Slide 725 March 2010

Testing for Additionality

The Thought Experiment of “Would the Reduction Have Otherwise Happened” Is Impossible To Answer Definitively

We’re Forced to Seek a Second-Best Solution by Designing Questions That Are Answerable

These Take the Form Of Additionality “Tests”

All Additionality Tests, Regardless of What They Are Called, Are Trying To Answer The Same Question: Would A Reduction Have Occurred Regardless of the Drivers Created by a Market-Based Trading System?

Page 8: M Trexler Additionality Why Does It Matter 201004

© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved Slide 825 March 2010

Additionality Testing – Two Approaches

Project-Specific Assessments (aka the CDM’s Approach)- A project is additional if the developer can demonstrate:

- The project is not required by law- The project faces higher implementation barriers than other options- The project faces lower financial returns than other options- The project can be distinguished from common practice alternatives

Standardized Project Eligibility Criteria - A project is additional if it meets measurable criteria, for example:

- Not required by law- Involves a certain type of technology/practice (e.g. on a “positive list”)- Is not on a “negative list” of common or least-cost technologies- Meets a performance benchmark- Is of a certain size or capacity- Meets other specific characteristics

8

Page 9: M Trexler Additionality Why Does It Matter 201004

© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved Slide 925 March 2010

Explaining Additionality in Pictures

Page 10: M Trexler Additionality Why Does It Matter 201004

© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved Slide 1025 March 2010

The Context for Additionality

If everything displaces coal

If all efficiency gains count

If all behaviors count

If all nuclear counts

If all forestry counts

Theoretical Mitigation “Supply”

Non-AdditionalAdditional

There are MANY activities “reducing” GHG emissions all the time. They’re not “offsets”because they are “business as usual.” Offsets are reductions that go beyond BAU, and that are attributable to a market for the reductions.

Page 11: M Trexler Additionality Why Does It Matter 201004

© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved Slide 1125 March 2010

If We Ignore Additionality . . .

Demand for Reductions

Ignoring Additionality Virtually Guarantees That Zero-Cost Non-Additional Reductions Will Supply That Demand, Undercutting Environmental Integrity

Additional

Non-Additional

Potential Offset Supply

Page 12: M Trexler Additionality Why Does It Matter 201004

© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved Slide 1225 March 2010

If Additionality Screening is Inadequate

Demand for Reductions

With Inadequate Additionality Screening, Zero-Cost Non-Additional Reductions Will Still Supply Most of the Demand for Reductions

Additional

AdditionalNon-Additional

Potential Offset Supply

Page 13: M Trexler Additionality Why Does It Matter 201004

© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved Slide 1325 March 2010

©

Credited Reductions

False Negatives

False Positives

False Positives – Undercutting Targets

False Negatives – Lost Mitigation Opportunities

True Positives

The Real Additionality Challenge

Page 14: M Trexler Additionality Why Does It Matter 201004

© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved Slide 1425 March 2010

©

Credited Reductions

False Negatives

False Positives

False Positives – Undercutting Targets

False Negatives – Lost Mitigation Opportunities

True Positives

The Real Additionality Challenge

There is no such thing as a perfect test for additionality. Any set of additionality rules will result in at least some “false positives”(reductions that are not additional but that are credited) and “false negatives” (reductions that are additionality but are excluding from crediting eligibility. The challenge in establishing additionality rules is to effectively balance these two “errors.”

Page 15: M Trexler Additionality Why Does It Matter 201004

© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved Slide 1525 March 2010

©

False Positives – Targets Are Undercut

Credited Reductions

False Negatives – Lost Mitigation Opportunities

Squeeze False Negatives (Liberal Additionality Rules), Increase False Positives

The Additionality Balancing Act - 1

Page 16: M Trexler Additionality Why Does It Matter 201004

© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved Slide 1625 March 2010

©

False Positives – Targets Are Undercut

Credited Reductions

False Negatives – Lost Mitigation Opportunities

Squeeze False Positives (Strict Additionality Rules), Increase False Negatives

The Additionality Balancing Act - 2

Page 17: M Trexler Additionality Why Does It Matter 201004

© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved Slide 1725 March 2010

What’s the Answer?

Demand for Reductions

Additionality Rules Can Never be Perfect, but They Can Ensure That Policy Objectives Are Advanced

AdditionalAdditional

Additional

Successful Additionality Outcomes Result From Balancing False Positives and False Negatives, and Balancing the Size of Supply and Demand Pools

Constrained Offset Supply

Page 18: M Trexler Additionality Why Does It Matter 201004

© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved Slide 1825 March 2010

Why Additionality Matters

© 2003 Cli Mit Supply Tool

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0 1,125 2,250 3,375 4,500 5,625 6,750 7,875 9,000

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Low Stringency Moderate Stringency Severe Stringency

In addition to illustrating the relevance of additionality testing, this graphic also explains why stringency per se is not the answer to additionality policy. More and more stringent additionality rules will help keep “false positives” out of the offset pool, but will inevitably exclude more and more real reductions (“false negatives”) as well. This can quickly lead to higher offset prices as supply is constrained. The balancing of these two forces is the key to project-based emission trading.

Page 19: M Trexler Additionality Why Does It Matter 201004

© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved Slide 1925 March 2010

The Morals of the Offset Story

There Are Lots of Good Offsets (and Non-Offsets)

There Are No Perfect Offset Criteria

Some Key Offset Design Decisions Are Policy, Not Technical Issues- What’s the acceptable balance of false positives and negatives?- What’s the acceptable cost for offsets?- What objectives (sectors/benefits) do we want to promote?

Decision Rules Cannot be Static (additionality can vary over time)

We’ve Been Talking Past Each Other About Additionality For 20 Years

Unless We Agree on the Nature of the Additionality Problem, and the Nature of the Balancing Act we Face, We’ll Argue About Offsets Forever. This Could Cost Us a Potentially Key Tool for Cost-Effective Compliance With Emission Reduction Mandates

Page 20: M Trexler Additionality Why Does It Matter 201004

© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved Slide 2025 March 2010

Coming at Additionality From a Different Direction

Page 21: M Trexler Additionality Why Does It Matter 201004

© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved Slide 2125 March 2010

Qualifying Reductions

Note: The point here is that any set of

offset rules, additionality and

otherwise, creates a pool of eligible

reductions. That simple fact doesn’t

tell you the composition of the pool. It could be a poor quality pool (too many false

positives) or a high quality pool (and

perhaps too many false negatives).

The Impact of Offset Rules

Page 22: M Trexler Additionality Why Does It Matter 201004

© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved Slide 2225 March 2010

ForestryMethane

Transportation

Industrial Gases

RE/EE

Note: In a perfect world every potential

offset would count (within the pool),

and every potential offset would be

“additional” (green dots).

Wouldn’t a Perfect World Be Great?

Page 23: M Trexler Additionality Why Does It Matter 201004

© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved Slide 2325 March 2010

RE/EE

Forestry

Methane

Transportation

Industrial Gases

Note: In the real world not all offsets are “additional”

(represented here by mix of red and green dots). With lax rules, a lot of

non-additional offsets (red

dots) make it into the offset

pool, potentially unacceptably contaminating

the pool.

What Happens With Lax Rules?

Page 24: M Trexler Additionality Why Does It Matter 201004

© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved Slide 2425 March 2010

RE/EE

Forestry

Methane

Transportation

Industrial Gases

Note: With overly tight rules the

eligible pool may be dominated by

additional reductions, but

only a small fraction of truly

additional reductions make it into the pool.

This can significantly

increase market-clearing prices.

What Happens With Overly Tight Rules?

Page 25: M Trexler Additionality Why Does It Matter 201004

© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved Slide 2525 March 2010

RE/EE

Forestry

Methane

Transportation

Industrial Gases

Note: It’s not realistic to

expect “perfect”rules and a

perfectly high quality pool.

But with careful attention to

these issues, we can

construct rules that limit the

eligibility of low quality offsets, while keeping offset prices reasonable.

What Can We Strive For?

Page 26: M Trexler Additionality Why Does It Matter 201004

© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved Slide 2625 March 2010

RE/EE

ForestryMethane

Transportation

Industrial Gases

Note: One approach is to focus on those sectors where it’s relatively

easy to identify high quality

offsets, while excluding or down-playing

market participation from sectors

where quality is much harder to

judge.

What’s One Approach?

Page 27: M Trexler Additionality Why Does It Matter 201004

© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved Slide 2725 March 2010

Additionality Conclusions Additionality Policy is Key to the Price and Environmental Integrity of any

Project-Based Offset Program

Additionality is Not Rocket Science, But It’s Not Easy Either.

Additionality Testing Can Never be Perfect, and Unless We Understand the Nature of the Problem (Balancing Competing Objectives) We’ll Never Get It Right

To Evaluate Additionality Testing, We Have to Evaluate the Makeup of the Resulting Offset Pool, and Determine If We’re Comfortable With How False Positives and False Negatives Were Balanced.

Because We So Rarely do This Evaluation, It’s Not Surprising That Additionality (and Project-Based Emissions Trading) Has Become So Controversial

We Can Do a Lot Better. The Question is Whether We Really Want To

Page 28: M Trexler Additionality Why Does It Matter 201004

© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved Slide 2825 March 2010

Dr. Mark C. Trexler

Director, Climate Strategies and Markets

DNV Climate Change Services North America

[email protected]