mackenzie reconstructing the self revised 2

8/19/2019 MacKenzie Reconstructing the Self Revised 2

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(Re-) Constructing the Self

Matthew MacKenzieAssociate Professor of Philosophy

Colorado State University

DRAFT-Please do not quote

(See published version in Journal of Consciousness Studies 23/1-2, 2016)

Introduction

Diversity and disagreement about the very idea of ‘the self’ is a persistent feature

of contemporary discussions of self and self-consciousness in philosophy, psychology,and neuroscience. Is the self merely a metaphysical or theoretical posit? Or is it a

manifest feature of human consciousness? Perhaps it is a social construct or a convenient

fiction. Or maybe it is the content of a subconscious self-representation. Drawing on

contemplative discourses and practices, while undoubtedly enriching our understanding,further complicates matters. Some contemplative and philosophical traditions of India,

for instance, would agree with A. H. Almaas that, “the ordinary self, [i.e.] seeing oneself

as an entity with independent existence, agency and ownership, is the primary obstacle tospiritual enlightenment, and is the repository of human suffering, misery and ignorance”(Almaas, this volume, p. 2). And yet, Hindu thinkers, while rejecting the ‘ordinary self’

( j ! va), vigorously defended the existence of the self (" tman) as an enduring locus of

consciousness. In contrast, Buddhist thinkers argue that there is no self (an" tman) in

either the ordinary or the metaphysical sense.1 Given this diversity and disagreement, proper study of self and self-consciousness

must be interdisciplinary and multi-perspectival. It must be interdisciplinary in the

traditional sense of drawing on multiple academic fields and modes of inquiry. It must bemulti-perspectival in that the study of the self must draw on disciplined modes of third-,

second-, and first-person inquiry. I take these perspectives to be distinct and irreducible,

though hopefully complementary, modes of inquiry. In my view, both contemplativetraditions and philosophical phenomenology offer valuable modes of first-person (andsecond-person) inquiry. Yet, in the case of the contemplative traditions, first-person

inquiry takes place with a larger context of self-transformation. Hence, contemplative

traditions take attention, awareness, emotion regulation, and so on, to be trainable aspects

of mind (Thompson, 2006) and take human self-experience to be multivalent, variable,and transformable. Indeed, the investigation, transformation, and transcendence of

ordinary forms of self-experience2 is a central theme of Indian contemplative traditions.

In what follows I will take up the complex dialectic between self and selflessness

as raised in the target papers of this issue and in classical Buddhist thought. I will discussthe classical Buddhist view that the recognition that the self is constructed can lead, in the

right theoretical and practical context, to (i) the deconstruction of fixed views of self, (ii)the decentering of self-experience within a larger horizon of awareness, and (iii) the

reconstruction of a more fluid (sense of) self as a skillful means to cultivating andembodying wisdom and compassion.

Self and Selflessness

1 I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for helpful comments on this article.2 By ‘self-experience’ here I mean both the various forms of self-consciousness and the sense of self.


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Whether or not they affirm, in the final analysis, the existence of a self, the

authors of the target papers recognize that the relationships between experiences of selfand selflessness are complex and multivalent. Human modes of self-experience are

intertwined with the whole range of basic psychological processes, including bodily

experience, affect, emotion, perception, memory, motivation, and cognition. Further,

evidence from psychopathology, as well as from contemplative experience, shows thatseveral key aspects of self-experience (such as a ownership, agency, and sense of reality)

are dissociable (Parnas and Gallagher (in press), Lutz, Dunn, and Davidson, 2007). So, in

so far as contemplative training modifies or even radically transforms normal self-

experience, it is important to keep track of which aspects of self-experience are beingtransformed and what the implications of the transformation might be for our more

general understanding of self and self-consciousness. The ‘selflesness’ of a flow state, for

instance, may involve a diminishment of certain forms of reflective self-consciousness

combined with a heightened sense of agency. In contrast, the discovery of the ‘true self’in an experience of pure consciousness may involve the radical modification of

ownership, agency, and reflective self-consciousness (Shear and Jevning 1999). And

finally, the ‘selflessness’ of a Buddha, one hopes, is quite different from that of a personsuffering from a depersonalization disorder such as Cotard’s syndrome. What counts asan experience of self or of selflessness, then, will depend on both one’s background

account of the self and on what aspects of the experience are modified.

As for the background account of the self that I’ll be working with here, I take

my lead both from the classical Buddhist tradition and from some contemporaryphilosophical accounts. Galen Strawson provides a clear and plausible characterization of

our normal notion of a self. He writes,

I propose that the mental self is ordinarily conceived or experienced as:(1) a thing, in some robust sense

(2) a mental thing, in some sense

(3,4) a single thing that is single both synchronically consideredand diachronically considered(5) ontically distinct from all other things

(6) a subject of experience, a conscious feeler and thinker

(7) an agent

(8) a thing that has a certain character or personality. (Strawson,1999, p. 3)

This view of the self fits well with the classical Buddhist account. As Miri Albahari puts

it:A self is defined as a bounded, happiness-seeking/dukkha [suffering]-

avoiding (witnessing) subject that is a personal owner and controllingagent, and which is unified and unconstructed, with unbroken and

invariable presence from one moment to the next, as well as with longer-term endurance and invariability. (Albahari, 2006, p. 73)

It is also similar to Almaas’ characterization of the ordinary self as involving a sense of

independent existence, ownership, and agency. In addition, the self in the above sensewould also serve to individuate the person or sentient being synchronically and


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diachronically, in what I take to be Roberts’ (this volume) notion of individuation. It is

distinct, however, from Adyashanti’s notion of self as witness. The view of the self a purewitness (s" k #in) distinct from the body, changing mental contents, and even the

personality has its roots in the contemplative traditions of classical Yoga and Advaita

Ved!nta.

Classical Buddhist thinkers, of course, were proponents of an" tmav" da, ‘the viewof no-self’. That is, they denied (and vigorously argued against) the existence of the self

in the above sense. While there are complex psychophysical systems with a sense of self,

there is not—and never has been—any such entity as a self.3 There are three paradigmatic

features of Buddhist anti-realism about the self. First is the rejection the existence of theself as a substance or enduring entity. There are causally and functionally integrated

psychological processes, but there is no self at the center. Second is the denial that the

sense of self is a necessary and invariant feature of experience. The sense of self is rather

a variable construct. Third is the view that the sense of self, no matter how natural itseems, necessarily involves some kind of error, illusion, or distortion. That is, the sense

of self leads to mistaking the ontologically selfless flow of experience for the existence of

a self. Hence, the anti-realist about the self must develop an ontology andphenomenology of experience—including self-experience—that does not rely on theexistence of the self. Below I will discuss one such Buddhist model, drawn from the

Yog!c!ra school.

Deconstructing the self

While Buddhist philosophers argue deftly against the existence of the self on

ontological and epistemological grounds, the fundamental motivation for anti-realism

about the self is deeper. On the Buddhist analysis, our innate tendencies toward affectiveand conative distortions such as craving and attachment drive a vicious cycle of

frustration, suffering, and alienation (sa$s" ra). The root cause of these distortions is the

innate tendency to reify self (" tmad %#& i) and world. This deep-seated self-grasping(" tmagraha) seems to be what Adyashanti (this volume) is referring to as egoicconsciousness. The eighth century Buddhist philosopher, "!ntideva, gives a striking andmemorable characterization of the sa$s" ric predicament of sentient beings: “Hoping to

escape suffering, it is to suffering that they run. In the desire for happiness, out of

delusion, they destroy their own happiness, like an enemy” ("!ntideva, 1996, p. 7).Sa$s" ra here is a kind of existential catch-22, a mode of psychological functioning

wherein our attempts to attain happiness and avoid suffering are self-defeating. The three

poisons of craving, aversion, and delusion are dysfunctional forms of our basic impulses

of attraction, aversion, and indifference, on the basis of which we respond to changingcircumstances, seeking happiness and avoiding suffering. Because these basic forms of

reaction are distorted or dysfunctional, as long as we are bound to them, our attempts tosecure the lasting happiness we desire are doomed to fail.

On the Buddhist account, then, the most fundamental form of cognitive distortionis the sense that one is a fixed, enduring self and the self-centeredness and self-cherishing

3 Indeed, one source of conceptual and terminological confusion about the existence of the self is that many

in the contemporary discussion hold a thin conception of self, whereby the existence of a self just consists

in the existence of a relatively stable sense of self. The Buddhists, of course, don’t deny this. What they

deny is that there is any stable, enduring entity that is ‘the self’.


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that go along with this sense. The path to liberation must involve deconstructing and

overcoming the view of the self that is the lynchpin of sa$s" ra. The deconstruction ofthe reified sense of self involves first-, second-, and third-person methods. Third-person

methods include contemplating and internalizing philosophical arguments against the

existence of the self, recognition of the impermanent and conditioned nature of

phenomena, and the analysis of the sentient being into the five complexes (skandhas) ofbodily form, affect, perception, mental formations, and consciousness. On my

interpretation, the function of these third-person methods is to gain insight into the nature

of phenomena. One comes to see sentient beings, not as enduring mental subjects, owners,

and agents, but as complex conditioned networks of mental and physical processes.Second person methods of deconstructing the self include displacing reactive

attitudes such as blame and the attendant afflictive emotions such as anger, as well as

cultivating interpersonal empathy and compassion. For instance, in discussing the

cultivation of patience (k #" nti), "!ntideva states, “Whatever transgressions and evil deedsof various kinds there are, all arise through the power of conditioning factors [sa$sk " ras],

while there is nothing that arises independently. . . Therefore, even if one sees a friend or

an enemy behaving badly, one can reflect that there are specific conditioning factors thatdetermine this, and thereby remain happy” ("!ntideva, 1996, p. 53). By shifting awayfrom the default interpersonal perspective of praise and blame one is able to see that the

other, just like oneself, is conditioned by craving, aversion, and delusion. Indeed, in this

same section, he deploys rather technical Buddhist arguments against the existence of the

self in order to further undermine the idea that the harmful action of another originatedfrom such a reified self. Thus, by adopting the impersonal, selfless causal-psychological

view on another, one may defuse the afflictive emotion of anger in oneself, allowing one

to respond instead from the skillful or wholesome (ku'ala) traits of patience andcompassion.

On the more positive side, second-person methods of deconstructing the self focus

on the basic moral equality of oneself and others. As "!ntideva forcefully states, “Whenhappiness is liked by me and others equally, what is so special about me that I strive afterhappiness only for myself? When fear and suffering are disliked by me and others equally,

what is so special about me that I protect myself and not the other?” (1996, p. 96). This

meditation on the equality of self and other has as its explicit goal overcoming the narrow

egoism of self-cherishing—that is, the deep-seated sense that one’s own happiness andsuffering are the only things that are really important—and the extension of altruistic

concern for others. Those who fully realize the equality of self and other, are ones “to

whom the suffering of others is as important as the things they themselves hold dear”

(1996, p. 97).Finally, the Buddhist tradition offers a rich variety of first-person methods for

overcoming self-grasping. Notably the contemplative methods associated with classicalmindfulness are central to deconstructing the sense of self. On the classical Abhidharma

view, the cultivation of mindfulness is closely linked with attention regulation ormindfulness (sm%ti-samprajanya), ethical vigilance (apram" da), and insight (vipa' yana)

(Dunne, 2014). The basis of the first-person method of mindfulness is the development of

attention regulation through the cultivation of sm%ti (focus or attentional stability) and

samprajanya (meta-awareness or introspective vigilance). Sm%ti is the capacity to holdone’s attention on an object, such as the breath or bodily sensations. Samprajanya is the


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capacity to monitor the quality of one’s focus on the object of attention. Thus, noticing

that one’s attention has wandered from the object, or that one’s attention is dull ratherthan clear are instances of samprajanya. In cultivating the joint operation of sm%ti and

samprajanya, the practitioner is supposed to develop a calm, focused mind and the

increased level of attention to her mental life is supposed to bring a clearer

comprehension of her own mental processes. This leads to the cultivation of apram" da (ethical vigilance or heedfulness). Here the increased awareness of one’s intentions and

positive and negative mental states allows one better to keep her actions of body, speech,

and mind in accord with her ethical commitments and spiritual goals. Lastly, one

develops penetrating insight (vipa' yana) into the impermanent, unsatisfactory, andselfless nature of the phenomena constituting one’s mind-body complex (n" ma-r( pa).

That is, one realizes directly that the mental and bodily events that constitute this very

stream of experience are i) constantly changing; ii) that grasping after them cannot lead to

true happiness and satisfaction; and iii) that the phenomena are not related to a fixed,enduring self. Thus, according to the classical Abhidharma, the cultivation of

mindfulness and the related qualities of heedfulness and insight, yield a profound

transformation in self-experience, from a sense of being a fixed self to a selfless flow ofexperience.

Decentering Subject and Object

So far, the discussion of deconstructing the self in classical Buddhism is

commensurate with Almaas’ notion of seeing through the reified self and Adyashanti’snotion of overcoming egoic consciousness. Yet for both thinkers a further stage of

contemplative insight involves the recognition of a kind of witness-consciousness that is

seen as more fundamental, closer to our true nature, than the reified egoic self. Asmentioned above, this appeal to a higher form of witness-consciousness or pure

subjectivity is most closely associated with the Advaita Ved!nta tradition, but a version

of the idea can also be found in the non-dual strands of Buddhist contemplative theoryand practice. What the Advaita and Buddhist non-dualist (broadly Yog!c!ra) views havein common is that both take consciousness to be a self-luminous (svaprak "'a)

background awareness to which or within which both ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’

phenomena are presented.

The metaphor of consciousness as light ( prak "'a) or luminosity ( prak "'at " ) is atthe heart of Indian thinking about the nature of the mind going back as far as the

Upani#ads. Like a light, consciousness has (or is) the capacity to shine forth andilluminate its object. Indeed, just as, without illumination, no objects could be visible, so

without the light of consciousness, no object could be experienced. Thus luminositycomes to denote the capacity to disclose, present, or make manifest. The luminosity of

consciousness, then, is that original capacity to make experientially present somephenomena. To hold that consciousness is self -luminous is to hold that it is reflexive or

self-presenting. Consciousness presents itself in the process of presenting its object.Moreover, just as light does not need a second light in order to be revealed, so

consciousness does not need a distinct state to present itself—it is self-intimating.

The Advaita Ved!nta school takes self-luminosity or reflexivity to be the veryessence of consciousness. Consciousness (cit ) in its fundamental nature is pure reflexivesubjectivity—a radical openness to what is presented. What we normally think of as the


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object-directed intentionality of consciousness itself actually arises from the association

of pure non-intentional consciousness with certain mental states (v%tti).4 This puresubjectivity is the witness (s" k #in) and is identified with the true self (" tman) in contrast

to the person ( j ! va) or the ego (aha$k " ra). Moreover, it is important to note that, for the

Advaitin, the " tman is not an individuated, enduring entity. It is the witnessing

subjectivity that can never be objectified. The " tman, as pure consciousness, is the self-luminous source of illumination for any phenomenon whatsoever, ‘internal’ or ‘external’,

and cannot itself become an object of cognition. As the condition of the possibility of any

presentation of an object, consciousness is not one object among others, yet it is

indubitably present. Further, any object or content of consciousness, including those withwhich the ego identifies as ‘I’ or ‘mine’, is necessarily not the self. Experiential

recognition of the distinction between the pure (i.e., unobjectifiable) subjectivity of the

true self and the ever-changing contents of consciousness is key to the psychological

freedom of liberation (mok #a).Buddhist philosophers such as Dign!ga, Dharmak $ rti, and "!ntarak#ita also hold

that the luminosity of consciousness consists in its being reflexive or self-presenting.

Here the term ‘svasa$vedana’ (self-awareness) denotes this self-luminosity or pre-reflective self-awareness that is an invariant aspect of conscious experience. On this view,individual conscious states simultaneously disclose both the object of consciousness and

(aspects of) the conscious state itself. This type of self-awareness, then, consists in

awareness being acquainted with itself , not the self. Thus, when a subject is aware of an

object, she is also (pre-reflectively) aware of her own experiencing (MacKenzie, 2007,2008).

According to Dign!ga, “Every cognition is produced with a twofold appearance,namely that of itself (sv" bh" sa) and that of the object (vi#ay" bh" sa)” (Dign!ga, 1968, p.28). The object-appearance or object-aspect is the presentation of the intentional object in

cognition. Yet a cognition is not exhausted by its presentation of an intentional object. It

also presents a subject-aspect (sv" bh" sa), which for Dign!ga means the way thecognition presents itself. When I have an experience as of a tree, on this view, theexperience presents both the tree (the object-aspect) and the experiencing of the tree (the

subject-aspect). And since I grasp both the object-appearance and the self-appearance of

the cognition in which the object is presented, the dual-aspect structure of cognition

implies pre-reflective self-awareness (svasa$vedana). Importantly, the vi#ay" bh" sa, sv" bh" sa, and svasa$vedana are features of a single episode.5 Hence, a typical episode

of consciousness manifests a subject-object structure.

Finally, it is important to note that this subject-object structure in consciousness is

ultimately considered a deep form of cognitive distortion. The subject-appearance andobject-appearance are automatically reified into the experience as of an enduring self and

an enduring mind-independent object, neither of which are truly real, according to these4 The notion of intentionality here is transitive object-directed intentionality. In the phenomenological

tradition, this form of intentionality is distinguished from the more fundamental form of intentionality a

sheer openness to phenomena. In that sense, it seems, even witness-consciousness would be intentional.

5 Note that the relation between sv" bh" sa and svasa$vedana is controversial. On some interpretations of

Dign!ga, self-awareness just is the subject-aspect’s apprehension of the object-aspect. On my view, self-awareness is the apprehension of both faces. Yet, insofar as the subject-aspect is the presentation of the

cognition as that very cognition itself, there will be an intimate connection between the sv" bh" sa and

svasa$vedana.


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thinkers. What we are immediately aware of in conscious experience are not observer-

independent features of the external world, but mental images (" k " ra) caused by theinteraction between the world and our cognitive system. We are usually unaware of the

constructive activity of the mind in producing these images and we are unaware that they

are images, rather than external objects. The mind constructs a virtual world-model that

is transparent to us. More radically, like the observed objects, the observing self is also avirtual construct of a cognitive system. The sense of self arises from the way the

cognitive system models itself and draws the self-other distinction. Indeed, the

Yog!c!rins hold that there is a deep interdependence between grasping an objectiveworld and grasping oneself as a persisting subject of experience. It’s just that, on thisview, this goes to show that both are mental constructs. What we take to be the self is like

an avatar in the virtual world created by the mind (Metzinger, 2003). Yet, Dign!ga andhis fellow Yog!c!rins think it is possible to come to see both the experiential world andthe experiential self as cognition-only (vijñ" ptim" tra)—that is, as the contents of a virtualworld created by the cognitive system and not reality as it is in itself. The result is said to

be a radical transcendence of the subject-object framework of understanding experience.

As John Dunne (2011) has argued, this Yog!c!ra view provides the necessarytheoretical framework for non-dual styles of contemplative practice such as mah" mudr" and dzogchen. For instance, the Indo-Tibetan Buddhist contemplative practice of ‘Open

Presence’ (rigpa chog-zhag), begins with the observation that intentional objects are only

given in and through experience and, further, that objects are not given apart from the

(non-objectified) givenness of the subject. Thus, rather than forming a dichotomy orduality, subject and object are co-given in experience and are correlative and mutually

specifying. As Lutz, et al write:

Chag-zog practitioners are thus aiming to understand the nature ofexperience - that which is essential to any instance of experience,

regardless of the accidental and changing features of the objects or

subjectivities involved. To do so, they employ a set of techniques that areintended to make the practitioner aware of the invariable feature of allexperiences. They speak of this invariable feature using various

descriptions, including Rigpa, “Awareness,” or, using the metaphor of

light, Selwa (gsal ba), “Luminosity” or “Clarity.” But whether called

Awareness, Clarity, or some other synonym, the point is that the invariantelement in experience is that which, from a phenomenal standpoint, makes

it possible for the subject-object relation to be presented in experience.

(2007, pp. 513-514)

On this view, subject and object are co-given and correlative, but also variable across

different experiences. Moreover, in so far as subject and object are variable contents ofexperience one may ask what makes it possible for these contents to be given. In this

tradition, the answer is luminosity, the reflexive awareness that constitutes the open spaceor phenomenal field within which the subject-object correlation is presented.

The practice itself follows four stages. First, one must develop concentration or

stable attention on an object of meditation. Second, one de-emphasizes the object-pole of

experience and begins to attend to the subject-pole. That is, without shutting out theobject one becomes mindful of the subject-aspect (sv" k " ra, sv" bh" sa) of experience. One


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is then led to recognize that, while initially seeming quite independent of awareness,

experiential objects are constituted in and through experience and are not given apartfrom subjectivity. One recognizes that ‘appearances are not other than mind’. Third, one

begins to de-emphasize subjectivity and in particular the sense of diachronic subjectivity,

the sense of an ‘I’ that extends beyond the living present or experiential now. This leads

to a state in which, “The experience's content does not appear as an object over against asubject, and the experience also does not involve a sense of subjectivity that is articulated

by conceptual or linguistic structures, even if those structures are only implicit” (Lutz, et

al, 2007, p. 517). Finally, in the fourth stage:

[D]e-emphasis of both object and subject moves, at least theoretically, to a

point where no elements of objectivity or subjectivity - whether in the

form of conceptual structures, categories of time and space, or some other

feature -remain in the experience. At this point, the invariant feature ofcognition is said to be realized fully by the meditator, and this is the full-

blown state of Open Presence. . . [The] stability [of this state] consists of

one's ability to continue to experience phenomena without objectifyingthem and, ideally, without having a sense of an agentive or narrativesubjectivity. The state thus seems to cultivate a type of ipseity or bare

awareness. (p. 517)

The point of this practice is not to shut out experiential content, but rather progressivelyto undo the implicit and habitual reification of subject and object. Thus subject and object

are no longer seen as fixed realities, but rather come to be experienced as dynamically co-

emergent and correlative appearances (" bh" sa) within a pre-objective, pre-egoic field ofexperience. This field is then identified as luminosity, a non-egological reflexive

awareness that is the space, the ‘arena of presence’ within which subjective and objective

phenomena appear. In these types of non-dual practices, and the experiences they arepurported to evoke, we find prima facie evidence that even the minimal or thin self is notan invariant structure of experience, both in the sense that it can drop away and in the

more subtle sense that one can potentially, through a kind gestalt shift, come to

experience it as an constructed phenomenon within a larger horizon of awareness.

At this point, one might wonder whether it is really accurate to claim that ‘noelements of objectivity or subjectivity . . . remain in experience’.6 Granted that

reifications of subject and object have ceased, some form of subject-object structure may

remain even in these open presence experiences. In particular, if the larger horizon of

awareness is reflexive or self-presenting—indeed, Lutz, et al characterize it as ipseity—then it seems that the minimal subjectivity of pre-reflective self-awareness remains. And

if anything is presented or given in the experience (even the experience itself) there mustbe something it is presented or given to—as the phenomenologists say, if there is a

genitive of manifestation, there must be a dative of manifestation. Moreover, a numberof phenomenologists have identified reflexive awareness, the first-person perspective,

and the minimal self (Zahavi 2008). On this view, the experiences still have a minimal

subject-object structure and are not even selfless.

6 I thank an anonymous reviewer for pressing this point.


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In response, the first thing to note is that, in the Buddhist philosophical and

contemplative context, terms like ‘subject’ and ‘object’ are often used to denote reifiedphenomena. Hence, some of the disagreement will be simply terminological. More

substantively, I think we should deploy Wolfgang Fasching’s distinction between two

types of self-consciousness (including pre-reflective forms). The first type is “the self-

identification with certain configurations of what one experiences.” The second type is“the self-presence of experience itself” (Fasching 2008, p. 464). In normal experience,

these two types of self-awareness are more or less seamlessly integrated. Indeed, a central

claim of a number of Indian contemplative traditions is that type-1 self-awareness may

occlude or make difficult to notice type-2 self-awareness. Yet, in some cases, whetherpathological or contemplative, these two types of self-awareness may become dissociated

(MacKenzie 2015). Indeed, we may understand non-dual styles of meditation such as

open presence or Zen ‘just sitting’ (shikantaza) as disclosing the self-presence of

experience itself as distinct from self-identification, including the implicit self-identification of bodily and affective forms of self-awareness.

With regard to non-dual awareness or consciousness itself, Fasching writes:

So, by consciousness, we mean here the event of phenomenal presence ofwhatever is present. The distinction between “real” objects and those thatonly exist “in our mind” is a subsequent one in comparison. So in a way

there are “subjective” and “objective” phenomena, but consciousness is

not a subjective phenomenon, it is not an “inner world”: It is the being-

there of whatever kind of phenomena—whether “subjective” or“objective”. Consequently, consciousness is not a phenomenon among

phenomena but the taking place of the phenomenality of phenomena. The

fact of consciousness is not something in addition to what is otherwisepresent, it is simply its being present. (Fasching 2008, p. 467)

So if non-dual awareness is the ‘taking place of presence’ (i.e., luminosity as phenomenalpresence), then it is both the condition of the possibility of any appearance and it isinseparable from what appears. Further, distinctions between ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ or

‘subject’ and ‘object’ are constituted within the horizon (or as Buddhists would say, the

‘space’ or ‘expanse’) of non-dual awareness. To realize non-dual awareness, then, is to

come to experience the dynamic arising and passing away of the subjective,intersubjective, and objective phenomena constituting the phenomenal field as the ‘play’

or ‘expression’ (rtsal) of awareness itself.7

Now, According to the Advaitins (and, it seems, Adyashanti) the self-luminous

horizon of awareness is the self. So, while the Buddhists hold that episodes of experienceare impermanent occurrences within an ever-changing stream of consciousness

(cittasant " na), the Advaitins maintain that self-luminous consciousness is changeless andpermanent. As the changeless background of all changing experience, this witness-

consciousness is taken to account for the diachronic unity of experience. According toAdvaita, the Buddhist view of experience as made up of causally connected moments of

experience—self-luminous or not—cannot account for either the diachronic cognition of

objects or of the stream of consciousness itself.

7 This phenomenological point has been given both strongly metaphysically idealist and more deflationary

phenomenological readings within the Buddhist tradition.


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The standard Buddhist response to this objection is to appeal to the causal and

functional connections between mental events within a single stream of consciousness.Of course, the mere fact that one event causes another (even when those events are

mental) does not entail that the two events are experientially continuous. In order for the

Buddhist response to be plausible, the causal-functional connections must ground

phenomenal continuity. Phenomenally continuous mental events must not only becausally connected, they must both be part of the same phenomenal point of view. In the

Advaita account this point of view is provided by witness-consciousness as an enduring

subject of experience over and above the various mental events (v%ttis) that constitute the

stream of experience. On the other hand, Buddhist philosophers will appeal to acontinuous, but not enduringly self-identical, point of view as a feature of the connection

mental events. For Buddhist reflexivists like Dign!ga, reflexive awareness(svasa$vedana) can be pressed into service here. First, reflexive awareness constitutes

the synchronic phenomenal point of view in that it is that feature of awareness to whichthe subject-aspect and object-aspect are present. Second, as Dign!ga argues, reflexiveawareness plays a central role in the diachronic relations of access-consciousness in

memory. That is, svasa$vedana allows for the apprehension of both aspects ofexperience by a later experience and this later apprehension is from the inside (Ganeri,2012). Hence, on this view, it is the recurrent self-luminosity of consciousness that

constitutes the synchronic and diachronic phenomenal point of view, not an enduring

subject.8 The Advaitin’s mistake, it might be said, is to slide from a continuous point of

view within a stream to an enduring subject above or behind the stream (MacKenzie2012).

Re-constructing the self?

The Buddhist contemplative practices discussed above seem to be able both to

evoke experiences of selflessness and to cultivate selfless modes of psychological

functioning. An altered state of consciousness, such as one induced through specificmeditative practices, may dramatically alter self-experience either transiently or morepermanently and yield (purported) insight into the fundamentally selfless nature of all

mental and physical phenomena. Other practices may cultivate a shift from a self-

centered mode of psychological functioning characterized by an exaggerated sense of

one’s own importance, to a selfless mode of functioning characterized by a sense of theequality of self and other ("!ntideva, 1996, Dambrun and Ricard, 2011). As we have seen,on the classical Buddhist view, there is thought to be a fundamental link between these

two kinds of selflessness. That is, the structure and content of one’s sense of self is linked

to one’s style of psychological functioning. Hence, given the right theoretical andpractical context (i.e., the Buddhist path), transformation in one’s sense of self can yield a

transformation in one’s mode of psychological function. Dambrun and Ricard havepostulated that a sense of self as independent and permanent (stably enduring) is

8 Note here that for these Buddhist reflexivist, the phenomenal point of view is parasitic on the moments of

consciousness that form the causal continuum, rather than belonging to an enduring subject—like a series

of beads arranged so that the hole in each bead is aligned with others to form an opening through the whole

series. How compatible this view is with idea of non-dual awareness as developed in later contemplative

traditions is open to dispute. I have argued elsewhere (MacKenzie 2012) that the distinct tath" gatagharba

(Buddha nature) tradition is also central to the non-dual contemplative tradition.


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correlated with a self-centered mode of functioning, whereas a sense of self as

interdependent and impermanent is correlated with a weak sense of distinction betweenself and others and the environment. They also hypothesize that an interdependent sense

of self is correlated with strong feelings of connection to others and pro-social attitudes

and behaviors (2011, p. 141). Further, following classical Buddhist thought, they

postulate that the experience of both the interdependence and the impermanence of thebody-mind continuum can yield as sense of self as “a dynamic network of evanescent

relations that have causal coherence (i.e., the self as an interdependent and impermanent

dynamic network)” (2011, p. 143). Here the sense of self as any kind of entity (even an

interdependent one) is absent and ‘self’ is understood to be a convenient designation foran impermanent and interdependent dynamic process. Corresponding to this radical

transformation of the sense of self (or no-self!) is a more radically altruistic mode of

psychological functioning.

It is important to see that the transformation from self-centeredness to selflessnessinvolves both the deconstruction and the reconstruction of self-experience or, in

Dambrun’s and Ricard’s terms, the sense of self. To see this more clearly we can

distinguish between the notions of self-experience and the sense of self. ‘Self-experience’is the more general term that refers to the various ways a sentient being experiences itselfas itself, such as experiencing its own movements, hedonic states, or episodic memories.

Thus, one could experience oneself as a dynamic network of impermanent events, with

no enduring ontological self—a selfless form of self-experience. A sense of self, then,

involves the sense of being a self , a stable, enduring locus of ownership, agency, etc. Onthe Buddhist view being considered here, we are selfless persons ( pudgalanair" tmya).

But a person is a sentient being that is typically capable of several rather sophisticated

forms of self-experience, including autobiographical memory and anticipation, self-referential thinking, rational self-understanding, and so on. So being a selfless person will

still involve self-experience, even if it involves abandoning a thicker sense of self. The

Buddha may have perfectly realized the experiential truth of no-self, but there is noindication that he would have failed the mirror self-recognition task or was incapable ofepisodic memory. Rather, on my interpretation, his self-experience was free from all

experiential reification of even sophisticated, self-referential processes and capacities.

Yet, while a fully awakened Buddha might be, on the classical view, free of any

sense of self, even highly advanced practitioners are thought to maintain some sense ofself. In fact, in the famous eighth chapter of "!ntideva’s Bodhicary" vat " ra, we find aninteresting example of the deconstruction and reconstruction of a sense of self. In a

section of the chapter dedicated to undermining egocentrism and cultivating the impartial

compassion of bodhicitta (the awakening mind), he first evokes the basic moral equalityof self and other: “All equally experience suffering and happiness. I should look after

them as I do myself . . . When happiness is liked by me and others equally, what is sospecial about me that I strive after happiness only for myself? When fear and suffering

are disliked by me and others equally, what is so special about me that I protect myselfand not the other?” (1996, p. 95). The obvious rejoinder here (and one given voice in the

text) is that my suffering and happiness are mine and I therefore have reason to be

concerned with them in a way that I don’t with regard to suffering and happiness that are

not mine. It is at this point that "!ntideva appeals to the idea of no-self.


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8. 101 The continuum of consciousness, like a queue, and the combination

of constituents, like an army, are not real. The person who experiencessuffering does not exist. To whom will that suffering belong?

8.102 Without exception, no sufferings belong to anyone. They should be

warded off simply because they are suffering. Why is any limitation puton this?

8.103 If one asks why suffering should be prevented, no one disputes that!

If it must be prevented, then all of it must be. If not, then this goes foroneself as for everyone. (1996, p. 96)

Yet, in the above passages, "!ntideva does not simply deny the reified substantialself, but goes further to say that the person who suffers does not exist and that sufferingbelongs to no one. That is, he moves from the cultivation of an impartial perspective to

an impersonal perspective that affirms suffering but denies the sufferer. The proper

interpretation of these passages in the larger context of "!ntideva’s thought is the subjectof a lively and on-going debate, to which I cannot enter here. In my view, "!ntideva’sdeployment of the no-self doctrine to undermine egocentrism is part of a larger

movement to first deconstruct our default sense of self and then reconstruct a sense of

self that is consistent with the altruistic ethics of the bodhisattva. After deconstructing

both the reified notion of a substantial self and even the more moderate conventionalnotion of persons as distinct and persisting, "!ntideva writes:

8. 110 Therefore, just as I protect myself to the last against criticism, letme develop in this way an attitude of protectiveness and of generosity

towards others as well.

8.111 Through habituation there is the understanding of ‘I’ regarding thedrops of sperm and blood of two other people, even though there is in fact

no such thing.

8.112 Why can I not also accept another’s body as my self in the sameway, since the otherness of my own body has been settled and is not hard

to accept?

8.114 In the same way that the hands and other limbs are loved becausethey form part of the body, why are embodied creatures not likewise loved

because they form part of the universe?

8.115 In he same way that, with practice, the idea of a self arose towardthis, one’s own body, though it is without self, with practice will not the

same idea of a self develop towards others too? (1996, p. 98)

Notice here that "!ntideva has returned from the impersonal perspective ofreductionism to the interpersonal perspective of self and others. But now, having fully


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realized that it is a habitual construction based on type-1 self-consciousness, the self is

not abandoned in favor of seeing the moral landscape as simply an impersonaldistribution of suffering and happiness. Instead, the self, as an empty (i.e., insubstantial),

malleable construct is reconstructed non-egocentrically. Through practice, one comes to

extend one’s sense of identity, and therefore one’s moral concern, to all other sentient

beings as parts of an interdependent reality. Note also, that this reconstruction does notsimply erase the distinction between self and other, but rather situates the distinction

within the deeper insight into the impermanence and interdependence of selves and others.

Moreover, within this new perspective of thoroughgoing interdependence, the egocentric

view of self looks both alienating and absurd.But why not simply abandon any notion of self, no matter how impermanent or

interdependent it is taken to be? In one sense, the reconstruction of a post-egological

sense of self is merely a skillful means (up" ya)—other sentient beings are still trapped in

the delusion of self and the bodhisattva maintains a sense of self in order to benefit them.On the other hand, it may be that a sense of self is not simply an optional tool for the

practitioner of the bodhisattva path. If the moral domain is constitutively interpersonal, if

it is the domain of empathy and empathic perception, then to abandon a sense of self (andother) may be to abandon the moral domain itself. Some of the rhetoric of enlightenmentsuggests this kind of transcendence of the moral. Be that as it may, for one struggling to

cultivate a wise and active altruism, abandoning self and other entirely does not seem to

be a viable option and it is not an option "!ntideva suggests here. Rather, recognition ofthe utter non-existence of the substantial self and the emptiness of the conventional selfopens up the possibility of a reconstruction of self on the basis of universal compassion,

as opposed to the afflictions of delusion, craving, and aversion.

Conclusion

As mentioned in the introduction, I believe proper study of self and self-

consciousness should be interdisciplinary and multi-perspectival. To gain better anddeeper understanding of these central phenomena of human experience, we must draw onphilosophy and other humanities, as well as the natural and social-behavioral sciences.

Moreover, we should draw from and try to integrate first-, second-, and third-person

perspectives on the phenomena. Finally, we ought to draw on a wide array of types of

experience and functioning. This includes, but is not limited to, pathologies of self-experience, altered states, and contemplative transformations of self-experience. The

target articles offer rich resources and perspectives from contemplative traditions for this

on-going study and exploration. My aim here has been to contribute to the dialogue by

discussing the sophisticated approach to questions of self and selflessness in classicalBuddhist philosophy. Indeed, while I am partial to Buddhist thought, on my view

classical Indian philosophy in general offers a number of very powerful insights andmodels of the mind that are ripe for contemporary exploration and engagement (Ganeri

2012, Siderits, Thompson, and Zahavi 2011, Thompson 2015). In the end, what isneeded to understand self and self-consciousness is a cosmopolitan, interdisciplinary, and

contemplative approach to studying the mind.


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