Maclean, Norman Young Men and Fire

• History-Theory-Doctrine• Theory provides framework or basis from which to critically

think.• Confirmation bias- It's hard to admit you're wrong.• There are indicators something is wrong before a crisis.• This is an example of critical inquiry leading to a discovery

of the causes and consequences of systems failure.

1

Reynolds, Paul Davidson A Primer on Theory Construction

Scientific knowledge must provide: • A method of organizing & categorizing things (typology), • “Predictions” of future events, • Explanations of past events, • Sense of understanding about causal relationships, • Potential for control (indep. Variables)

Desirable characteristics of scientific knowledge:• Abstractness (independent of space and time)• Intersubjectivity (Agreement about meaning among relevant

scientists)• Empirical relevance (can be compared to “known” evidence) 2

Gaddis, John The Landscape of History

• The title is a metaphor as history is like cartography- They both create a representation of reality.

• Historians cannot know truth. Tension between particularization and abstraction (rarely claim applicability beyond context but do acknowledge tendencies and patterns)

• Historians believe in contingent causation – ID sensitive dependence on initial conditions (Cleopatra's Nose)

• Causes always have context – dependence of sufficient (exceptional) causes on necessary(general) causes; context does not directly cause what happens, but determines consequences

• Point of no return (moment when equilibrium ceases to exist(phase transistion) as a result of whatever trying to explain); this is the exceptional cause; the principle of diminishing relevance allows emphasis of this over other general causes

• History is not guide to future, but can guide and inform the future• Time and Space is defined by selectivity, simultaiouaity, scale, Continuities,

Contingencies, and Dependence." 3

Kuhn, Thomas - Structure of Scientific Revolutions

• Paradigm Shift• paradigm is a commonly accepted scientific principle – “A

theory in practice”• new paradigms start with rejection of current beliefs• cannot hold two paradigms, changes the way one views

evidence• normal science is research based upon past scientific

achievement• SAMS so what: be open to new paradigms

4

Schneider, "Vulcan's Anvil"Growth of Operational Art through study of American Civil War• Distributed Ops • Distributed Campaign • Continuous Logistics• Instantaneous C2 • Operationally Durable• Operational Vision• Distributed Enemy• Distributed Deployment

IssersonEvolution of Operational Art

• Deep operations• Simultaneous containment and suppression of enemy's

depth.• Consecutive Operations

– Depth, Mass, Mobility, Organization, C2

Shimon Naveh, In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory

Characteristics of Operational Art: • Reflect the cognitive tension • Based upon industrious maneuver • Action should be synergetic• Aim towards disruption of Opponent's system • Reflect a contemplative attitude towrds the factor of

randomness• Non-Linear in Nature • Interaction between maneuver and attrition• Independent Entity • Related to a broad and universal theory

Calhoun, Mark - "Clausewitz and Jomini: Contrasting Intellectual Frameworks in Military Theory"

• Calhoun believes "these works instead represent very different forms of military thought, based on fundamentally opposed intellectual foundations.“

• Background– Clausewitz: war first hand at 12 years old– Jomini: first hand after theory published

• Intellectual Traditions– Clausewitz: Counter-enlightenment– Jomini: Enlightenment

• Purpose– Clausewitz: framework for inquiry– Jomini: Simply war and reveal key to victory

• Ideas– Clausewitz: COG, policy and war, friction– Jomini: LOOs, Decisive Points

• Clausewitz meets Reynold's standards better than Jomini

Echevarria, Antulio. Clausewitz and Contemporary War

• Clausewitz’s understanding of objective knowledge derived from Kiesewetter’s Outline of General Logic, an arrangement of lectures on the Kantian system of logic delivered at the Institute for Young Officers.

• Clausewitz worked with pairs of ideas, dualisms, which the term dialectics tends to obscure. Thus, readers would do well to consider his method more along the lines of a contrasting of opposites in order to penetrate appearances and explore the substance of concepts more closely

• Importance of COG Analysis

Lynn, John A. Battle

• Understanding the cultural context through a cultural approach to warfare allows you to see the changes in institutions over time, promotes critical thinking, and reduces over-generalizing (there are no Universal Soldiers).

• Role of discourse in a society to discuss the reality of war vs. the perception of an ideal form of war.

• Argues against technological determinism (differences in styles of warfare due to weaponry only) because it is the culture and society that determine how a weapon is used (ie. German vs. French use of the tank).

• Argues against Hanson's enduring Western way of war from the Greeks/Romans due to lack of continuity in link because of the Dark Ages.

• Discussion of the tournament (idealized) and Chevauchée (reality) forms of warfare

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Porter, Patrick. - Military Orientalism: Eastern War through Western Eyes

• A cultural approach allows you to understand how war impact the society.• War is not just culture, necessary for limited understanding

• A cultural approach allows you to understand how war impacts the society.• Culture is not a static thing and changes during warfare due to the relationship

between war, politics, and the society. Belief that culture is an ambiguous repertoire of competing ideas that can be selected and manipulated vs. a clear script for action.

• Concept that the West defines itself in contrast to the "Other.” • Value of the cultural approach is:

– information requires interpretation of meaning and that requires cultural understanding– allows strategy to optimally organize resources to accomplish goals – allows development of achievable vs. utopian goals, and – culture shapes choices and ideational factors (ideals and norms), which are more

important than objective interests

Griffith, Samuel B., ed. and trans. (Hart Intro)Sun Tzu: The Art of War

• Hart is clearly enamored with Sun Tzu. He argues that only Clausewitz is comparable and Sun Tzu is even more relevant than him.

• Sun Tzu is the first known attempt to formulate a rational basis for the planning and conduct of military operations.

• Sun Tzu’s purpose “was to develop a systematic treatise to guide rulers and generals in the intelligent prosecution of successful war.”

• Sun Tzu understood the importance of moral, intellectual, and circumstantial elements in war and considered them to be more important than physical. Cautioned kings and commanders to not rely solely on military power.

• Sun Tzu understood the decisive influence of supply.• Sun Tzu discusses the moral, emotional and intellectual qualities of

the good general.

Ames, Roger T., ed. and trans. Sun Tzu: The Art of Warfare

• Leadership is critical. Must select the right commander, and that commander needs specific traits. Parts of Sun Tzu are really leadership lessons.

• Importance of study. Each battle/war is unique, and requires study. It is the many lists of attributes and types that support this study – much like METT-TC, ASCOPE, PMESII-PT, etc today.

• War is expensive and destructive. Should be avoided when possible. If not possible, only commit resources (men) when victory is assured.

• Does recognize the enemy will attempt to do the same things he is suggesting. Need to know about enemy commander.

• The only way to understand is to have very good intelligence. For Sun Tzu, this meant HUMINT as that was the only type available to him.

Linn, Brian McAllister. The Echo of Battle: The Army’s Way of War

Three distinct intellectual traditions affect how the Army uses lessons from previous wars to determine how to prepare for next war.• Guardians: The "Guardians," view war as "an engineering

problem," requiring the proper application of art and science to resolve, and have generally been conservative in foreign affairs, such as Colin Powell.

• Heroes - such as George S. Patton, were adaptable and flexible, holding that "wars are fought by men."

• Managers - such as George C. Marshall or Dwight D. Eisenhower, viewed war as a matter of proper mobilization and organization of resources.

Echevarria, Antulio J. II. “American Operational Art, 1917-2008.”

• Operational Art in the 20th Century has seen progression toward prefection of first grammar. US operational planning and execution focused too much on war’s first grammar, which is why the classic definition of operational art is also problematic. It is not enough merely to ‘design’ and ‘link’ operations, as the classic definition holds, with only one grammar in mind. Contemporary operational art requires mastering two grammars.

• First Grammar is conventional war, which the US Army has nearly perfected

• Second Grammar is unconventional war, which has suffered from focus on first grammar.

Bousquet, Antoine. The Scientific Way of Warfare.

"Its central claim is that throughout the modern era the dominant corpus of scientific ideas has been reflected in the contemporary theories and practices of warfare in the Western world“ Synthesis of technology, scientific thought, and society results in the way of war. • Clock = mechanism

– synch movements, discipline, orders, ballistics and fortifications• Engine = thermodynamics

– motorized, improved weapons, industrial power

• Computer = cybernetics– Science of C2 will control chaos

• Network = chaoplexity– Decentralization and autonomy to counter chaos

Osinga, Frans. - Science, Strategy, and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd

• Tempo and Variety, not speed– Strategic level is slower for effects to occur– doctrine– Tactical level is speed relative to enemy

• Interaction and Isolation• Attack enemy's mental, moral, and physical• Themes:

– pervasive uncertainty as prime characteristic of life, – the essence of combining analysis with synthesis, marrying induction

and deduction, – the importance of novelty, mismatches and creativity, – and the requirement to combine multiple perspectives to form

adequate orientation patterns

Daase, Christopher. “Clausewitz and Small Wars.”

Despite the emergence of small wars and terrorism, but because of the changing forms of war, Clausewitz and his thinking is relevant today• Provides the means for a superior

conceptualization of political violence that allows describing historical and recent changes of war, including the emergence of guerrilla warfare and terrorism.

• Offers theoretical insights into the dynamics of defence and offence which help to explain why certain actors apply certain strategies and tactics.

• Allows reflecting on the effects of war on both actors and structures and helps to explain why big states often loose small wars

Heuser, Beatrice. “Small Wars in the Age of Clausewitz.

• Historical context is crucial in order to truly understand what the writer is trying to convey.

• Clausewitz stands at the watershed of 2 forms of 'Small War‘

• There was a shift in meanings of the terms – Small War – Partisan War– People's War

• People's War was independent of political ideology

Schmitt, Carl. Theory of the Partisan

• Generally speaking, civil war is military conflict between two or more approximately equal political governments for sovereignty over people and territory native to both, whereas revolution is a change, not necessarily by force or violence, whereby one system of legality is terminated and another is constituted within the same country

• Criteria for a partisan: – irregularity – increased mobility of active combat– increased intensity of political engagement– telluric

• the idea is that a partisan, and especially a revolutionary, are willingly operating outside the law. The revolutionary is outside the law because they oppose a government, which considers them criminals. The result is that both sides it is a battle to destroy the other side – for there is no way to deal with illegal actors on the other side.

Kalyvas, Stathis. The Logic of Violence in Civil War

Kalyvas proposes a theory that selective violence in civil wars is the result of a rational decision making process by the actors involved to exert control during civil wars. In the section we read, the primary focus is on developing the linkage between support, control, and the role of violence (particularly selective violence). • Civil War: armed conflict between two parties within the geographical limits of what was

previously one sovereign power. This widens the definition to include foreign occupation.• Civil wars are inherently brutal, violence is a result of the nature of the war• Political parties seek to establish support from the population. However, most people do not

have an ideological link to either party, they simply want to survive.• To gain support, the party must exert control. With control, the instinct of survival will provide the

collaboration required (intelligence on identify individuals) to win.• Military forces can provide control, but requires significantly more numbers to control the entire

country than most are able to generate. Incumbents typically control urban areas and insurgents rural areas because urban areas are easier to control (not ideologically linked)

• Because military cannot control entire area, they use coercion to gain control. This is best done through selective violence.

• Selective violence: requires the ability to identify collaborators with enemy, which can only happen if locals have incentive to cooperate. Thus some level of control is first required.

• Biases: Partisan, political, selection, overaggrigation,

Herbst, Jeffrey. States and Power in Africa.

• The fundamental assumption undergirding this study is that states are only viable if they are able to control the territory defined by their borders. Control is assured by developing an infrastructure to broadcast power and by gaining the loyalty of citizens.

• The fundamental problem facing state-builders in Africa has been to project authority over inhospitable territories that contain relatively low densities of people.

• Herbst argues that Europeans are territory based view of control while Africa is population based view of control

• Herbst argues that leaders confront three sets of issues when building their states: – Costs

• Leaders face cost when trying to expand their authority.• Nature of costs that leaders face depends on how far power is being broadcast.• Definition of “territorial control” defines extent of consolidation of rule/power

– Boundaries• Boundary Politics- broadly defined as attempts by states to mediate pressures from the international system through

the use of buffer mechanisms to maximize their authority over territory.• States can and do lower the costs of controlling a territory by developing a set of boundary institutions that insulate

them from possible economic and political threats.– State Systems

• Focus on the state systems that successive African leaders constructed in order to further their own efforts at state consolidation.

Mintzberg, Henry. The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning

• Strategy is a plan, a pattern, position, and perspective• Strategy = intended, deliberate, unrealized, emergent, and realized• Umbrella Strategy = Operational Approach• Design School of Strategy Formation• Emergent Strategy is refined by feedback mechanisms to achieve

intended results

p. 7. Formal definitions of planning (per Mintzberg)1) Planning is future thinking (p. 7)2) Planning is controlling the future (p. 7-8) Planning is the design of a desired future3) Planning is decision making (p. 9.)4) Planning is integrated decision making (p. 11) Plan(ning) refers to an integrative hierarchically organized action in which various kinds of decisions are functionally ordered.5) Planning is a formalized procedure to produce an articulated result, in the form of an integrated systems of decisions. (p. 12) “a formalized, integrated process”

p. 24. Based on Forms of strategy discussion (and diagram), there are:Intended strategiesDeliberate strategiesUnrealized strategiesEmergent strategies Realized (actual) strategies

p. 27. One person’s strategy is another’s tactics- that what is strategic depend on where you sit (a business, not DoD definition)

p. 29. “Our conclusion is that ”strategic planning” cannot be synonymous with strategy formation…the implication…is that planning may have less to do with strategy making than is often claimed…”

Mintzberg, Rise and fall of Strategic Planning

Intended Deliberate Realized

Emergent

Dolman, Everett Carl. Pure Strategy

• The outcome of battles and campaigns are ever-present variables within the strategist’s plan, but victory is a concept that has no meaning there. The pure strategist accepts that war is but one aspect of social and political competition, an ongoing interaction that has no finality. Strategy therefore connects the conduct of war with the intent of politics. It shapes and guides military means in anticipation of a panoply of possible coming events. In the process, strategy changes the context within which events will happen.

• definition of strategy, a plan for continuing advantage• purpose of military strategy is to link military means to the political aim. The

purpose of operational strategy is to contest or gain command of the medium of battle (land, sea, air, space, or information), which allows the tactical and political aims to remain at odds logically but to converge practically Military power is but one of the means by which the political object is pursued. Land, sea, air and space, and information power are sub-domains of military power.

• The ability to describe a system by breaking it down into its constitutive parts. And vice versa, is linear reductionism. Where the whole is less or greater than the sum of its parts, we find nonlinear systems.

Walter McDougall, “The Constitutional History of U.S. Foreign Policy: 222 Years of Tension in the Twilight Zone”

• Old Testament: Four great traditions shaped US foreign relations during the 19th century: Exceptionalism, Unilaterialism, an American System, and Expansion.– Exceptionalism- Founders were realists who understood human nature required

power to be checked. Naïve, reckless, or arrogant behavior put America at risk. Exceptional because of liberty, unity and independence at home, thus foreign policy was to prevent corrupting influence of abroad, not isolationist

– Unilateralism- Warning against gratuitous meddling in European affairs lest Americans harm their own interests, surrender their freedom of action, invite attacks from abroad, and forfeit the geographic advantages that a beneficial God had bestowed.

– American System- Invocation of an American System of republics. Monroe Doctrine

– Expansion- Manifest Destiny, North America was off-limits to new foreign colonial claims. Liberty and opportunity that distinguished America could not be passed to future generations without territorial growth.

p. 3. Book goal: “it is to decide which American traditions we ought to reaffirm and apply to diplomacy today, and which traditions we would do well to discard as irrelevant or even repugnant.

Old Testament dominated the rhetoric and, for the most part, the practice of US diplomacy from 1776-1890s, preaching Liberty (exceptionalism) at home, Unilateralism abroad, and American System of states, and Expansion New Testament in foreign affairs has dominated the rhetoric and, for the most part the practice of US diplomacy in the 20th Century, and preached the doctrines of Progressive Imperialism, Wilsonianism, Containment, and Global Meliorism or the belief that America has a responsibility to nurture democracy and economic growth around the world.

Old Testament:1) Liberty, or Exceptionalism (Unity, aloofness from Europe)2) Unilateralism, or Isolationism (independent of the toils of European ambition)3) The American System, or Monroe Doctrine (America’s off limits to new colonization)4) Expansionism, or Manifest Destiny (ideology of expansionism to the western areas)

New Testament:5) Progressive Imperialism (Spanish American War; capitalistic drive for new markets)6) Wilsonianism, or Liberal Internationalsim (Global peace; idea of America is to serve humanity)7) Containment (Cold War)8) Global Meliorism (Export American Ideas to make the world better)

McDougall, Promised Land, Crusader State

George Herring,From Colony to Superpower

US has taken a distinctive approach toward foreign policy. Assumed ideas and shared values determined ways Americans viewed themselves and others and how they dealt with other peoples and responded to and sought o shape events abroad.• Exceptionalism• Power is not guaranteed security• Unilateralism is not isolationism- we engage the world but we don't become beholden to

other powers.• US has had a successful foreign policy.Fall of the Soviet Union brought many changes within the American Political and Military Strategy. The US struggle against the USSR had become the norm and the rapid collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the USSR placed the US as the hyperpower within an unstable and fragmented globalized world. Following the collapse the US half heartedly embraced its position as the head nation in the 1990s with mixed results. Following the attacks of 9/11 this policy radically changed from balancing and stability efforts to pre-emption and preventive conflict under the younger Bush administration. The demonstrated willingness for the US to act unilaterally has had a negtative impact on the US reputation and soft power influence throughout the world and the US has lost some of its prestige as a result.

Edward Mead Earle, “Adam Smith, Alexander Hamilton, Friedrich List: The Economic Foundations of Military Power,”

• War is inherent in the Mercantilism system• The predominant purpose of mercantilist regulations was to develop the military or war potential.• Military power and national security are fundamental to all problems in government.• Adam Smith

– Ability of a nation to wage war is best measured in terms of its productive capacity.– Accepted mercantilist fundamental of the necessity of state intervention in economic matters insofar as it

might be essential to the military power of the nation.– Economic power of the nation should be cultivated and used as an instrument of statecraft.

• Alexander Hamilton– Agreed with Smith on the necessity of a professional army, as well as on certain questions of economic

policy related to national defense.– Nationalist: believed in using economic power as an instrument of both national unification and national

power.– Support strong navy to protect external commerce.– A country with a diversified economy (agriculture, manufactures, and commerce) will be more unified at

home and stronger with its relations with other powers.– Only if strong can a nation choose peace or war. Government must maintain adequate forces in time of

peace.– In time of war, the power of the executive must be adequate for direction of common defense.

• Friedrich List- You can have wealthy individuals but if you don't have the power to protect those individuals then you run the risk of losing everything.

Stephen M. Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,”

• States form alliances to balance against threats rather than bandwagon with them. Threats, in turn, are the product of several different sources. Second, ideology is a weaker cause of alliance formation, and ideological movements that strive for tight central authority are more likely to lead to conflict than cooperation. Third, the instruments of "bribery" and penetration are by themselves weak determinants of alignment; they make existing alliances more effective, but rarely create them in the absence of common interest

• Balancing vs bandwagoning. Alliances are most commonly viewed as a response to threats, yet there is sharp disagreement as to what that response will do. When entering an alliance, states may either balance (ally in opposition to the principal source of danger) or bandwagon (ally with the state that poses the major threat).

• Decision on which method is based up analysis of threat: aggregate power; Proximity, offensive capability, or offensive intentions.

• security considerations take precedence over ideological preferences, and ideologically based alliances are unlikely to survive when more pragmatic interests intrude

• Foreign aid can make an existing alliance more effective, but it rarely creates one in the absence of shared political interests.

G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars

• The debate about international control is not about realists vs institutionalists...debate is how states develop institutions to restrain power and establish binding commitments

• United States transformed the international system by employing institutions as a way to establish political control and order– “…[I]nstitutions are…critical at the beginning of hegemony – or ‘after victory’ – in

establishing order and securing cooperation between unequal states”– Institutions develop because of the asymmetries of power between weak and

strong states in the international system. While neoliberal insitutionalism usually speaks of institutions as resolving ‘collective action’ or ‘information’ problems, Ikenberry sees institutions as crucial for resolving these power “asymmetries”.

– institutions create a “constitutional order”; a political order that exists because of agreed upon rules, that allocate rights and restrain power

– Institutions create order in three ways. One, institutions have shared, or mutual agreements, over the rules of the game. Two, these rules set limits on the ability to exercise power. Lastly, once these rules are in place, they are not easily changed

Colin S. Gray, War, Peace and International Relations,

• The destruction Hiroshima/Nagasaki brought about a revolution in military affairs (RMA) through nuclear weaponry. Afterwards, a nuclear strategy developed, not before the fact (bombing of Hirosh/Nagasaki). How the bomb shaped strategy.

• Two main and opposing views of strategic history.– Idealistic - We are making progress towards a warless world. – Realistic - we are creatures of habit and our strategic future will

resemble our strategic past. A peaceful world order cannot be created by institutional engineering. It has to be the product of some shared cultural values and of common understanding through historical experience.

Colin S. Gray, Hard Power and Soft Power: The Utility of Military Force as an Instrument of Policy in the 21st Century

The focus has been upon how to think about the relevance of military power as an instrument of policy—most especially in relation to soft power—as a substitute or complement.• Military force is not an anachronism; it is and will long remain an essential

instrument of policy.• Military force is not under threat of obsolescence because of the

availability of “smart” soft power alternatives, but its utility to liberal Western societies is menaced by the imprudent measure of their imprudent enthusiasm for placing constraints upon their use of it.

• Strategic competency is key to the utility of military force for policy, but is less relevant to soft power.

• There is strategic advantage in moral advantage, which translates as a requirement for the use of military force to be plainly legitimate.

• Soft power tends to co-opt the readily co-optable, while hard military power is necessary for more demanding missions.

Steven Metz, Eisenhower as Strategist: The Coherent Use of Military Power in War and Peace

• How do you extend order through DIME over space and time. (milenia - generation to generation)

• We should see strategy as a consistent and long-term method of problem-solving. The phrase "a strategic approach to planning" reflects a deeper understanding than does "the national security strategy." It shows a grasp of the fluidity of strategy, of its relativity, and, most of all, it indicates that strategy is a deliberately patterned way of approaching problems rather than the output of the process.

• strategy can be defined as order extended in time, space, and milieus. It attempts to impose order in a disorderly environment of thinking, reacting, competing, and conflicting entities. Strategy is the organized and deliberate use of power resources to attain, protect, or promote goals with a minimum of waste and a maximum chance of success.

• Strategy making entails defining objectives, priorities, methods, concepts and techniques; planning the mobilization and sustainment of power resources; shaping attitudes, beliefs, perceptions, values, and morale; and crafting an organization to flesh out the strategic framework and oversee its implementation.

John Sloan Brown, Kevlar Legions: The Transformation of the U.S. Army, 1989-2005

• Army leaders recognized the imminence of a paradigm shift, even though its direction and ultimate dimensions remained unclear. They solidified a framework for change, initiated relevant planning, and undertook some changes that had immediate effects.

• The Army of 89 was very focused, at end of Vietnam it experienced a renaissance in training, doctrine, increase in defense budgets; led to the development of the "Big 5"; Bradley, M1A1tanks, AH-64, UH-60, and Patriot missile.

• In an era of diminishing resources by embracing technology; rapid force projection; not threat based; tailorable force (Haiti/Balkans)

Hew Strachan, “The Lost Meaning of Strategy,”

• Strategy initially meant application of military power to achieve policy. Meaning has been skewed to include other activities.

• Strategy is designed to make war useable by the state, so that it can, if need be, use force to fulfill its political objectives.

• It is not policy; it is not politics; it is not diplomacy.• It exists in relation to all three, but it does not replace them.• the democratic head of state sets out his or her policy, and

armed forces coordinate the means to enable its achievement. The reality is that this process – a process called strategy – is iterative, a dialogue where ends also reflect means, and where the result – also called strategy – is a compromise between the ends of policy and the military means available to implement it.

Hew Strachan, “Strategy and the Limitation of War,”• Strategy, as opposed to strategic theory, has two principal tasks. The first

is to identify the nature of the war at hand. The second task, once the nature of a war has been plumbed, is to manage the war and direct it.

• Strategy uses theoretical insights to question real events in a bid to shape them according to the needs of policy, but as soon as strategy allows the expectations of theory to lessen its grasp of what is really happening it has allowed theory to be its master rather than its tool.

• By failing to fulfil its function of imposing rationality on war, government is not only behaving illogically, it is also ensuring that the three components of Clausewitz’s secondary trinity are diverging, not converging. When Colin Powell, returning from the Vietnam War, read and was impressed by Clausewitz, he likened the secondary trinity to a three-legged stool.24 At the moment the stool is wobbly: each of the three legs is becoming detached, and as a result strategy, the seat itself, lacks bottom.

Gregor, William. “Military Planning Systems and Stability Operations”

In their strident opposition to EBO, ONA, and SoSA, the American military in general and the U.S. Army in particular chose to ignore the assessment of strategies and the need to capture a record of action and response in a complex environment. The military has instead decided to pursue a planning process that avoids the serious study of complex contingencies and substitutes a dialogue with the commander, leaving him to use his experience and intuition to define or discover the right strategy.• The drive for design and the argument against scientific measures have ensured

that the military offers the President only one option, the selection of an agent• One purpose of a military planning system is to enable a commander to present

his recommended course of action based upon evidence, not simply his warrant.• The relationship between cause and effect, action and response, in stability

operations is not inscrutable. However, the methods and data needed for dealing with complex contingencies differ greatly from those of conventional military operations.

• Greater attention must be paid to the political, social, economic, and cultural context of the operation because those conditions have a serious impact on how military actions work and how those actions are perceived.

Swain, Richard. “Commander’s Business: Learning to Practice Operational Design.

• Design is a heuristic or abductive practice that utilizes learning and rigorous dialectic to derive sound appreciation of the problem and the best options available for managing and treating the underlying causes of complex...social-cultural-political systems that have slipped beyond the bounds of tolerance.

• Commanders engage with and employ staff design to aid with mutual understanding about a situation -- a derivative of the complex human systems. Reframing to formulate new understanding and development of new solution. Collaborative learning is the bedrock for the theory of operational design. Design is the "preamble for the practice of operational art."

Schoen, Donald A. Educating the Reflective Practitioner.

• Design and professional education derives from reflective practicum

• Knowing-in-action: the sorts of know-how we reveal in our intelligent action—publicly observable. Physical performances like riding a bicycle and private operations like instant analysis of a balance sheet

• Reflection-in-action has a critical function, questioning the assumptional structure of knowing-in-action. We think critically about the thinking that got us into this fix or this opportunity; and we may, in the process, restructure strategies of action, understandings of phenomena, or ways of framing problems

• Reflection-in-reflection.

Lawson, Bryan. How Designers Think.

• 'Design' is both a noun (product) & a verb (process), but from Lawson's perspective it is a process, which helps professionals learn to understand problems that other people may find hard to describe and create good solutions for complex, unfamiliar dilemmas.

• the process of design problems is a 3-dementional model – x-axis = designer, client, user, legislator; – y-axis = internal and external constraints; and – z-axis = radical, practical, formal, and symbolic constraints.

• 3 types of drawings: presentation, production, and the design drawing

• 5 steps of the creative process, 1st insight, 2nd preparation, 3rd incubation, 4th illumination, 5th verification. Talks about design traps (category, puzzle, number, icon, & image)

Lawson, Bryan. How Designers Think.

Design Traps• Category Trap = Whilst schools undoubtedly share much in common, they are also all different.

Thus to transfer solutions previously y, seen at other schools to a new one may be quite inappropriate. ^ What is worse, is that the designer working in this way may not O even notice the difference or be aware of the parts of the problem which have not been addressed.

• Puzzle Trap = design problems are not puzzles. There are no correct or, even, optimal answers to design problems…Designers treating a part of a design problem as a pseudopuzzle can be trapped into thinking that the elements and rules of this pseudo-puzzle are as inviolate as a normal puzzle.

• Number Trap = If a problem or any aspect of a problem can judgment in design’. If a problem or any aspect of a problem can be expressed numerically then all the power of mathematics can be brought to bear on it. Any powerful tool is dangerous, and mathematics is no exception. The incorrect use of mathematical techniques on the wrong sort of numerical systems was thoroughly discussed in Chapter 5. However, even if all the rules have been obeyed, one even more tricky aspect of the number trap still remains. The assumption that larger numbers represent things which are bigger, better or more desirable!

• Icon Trap = It is all too easy for the designer gradually to become more interested in what the drawing looks like in its own right, rather than what it represents.

• Image Trap = The designer invariably has an image of the final design held in his or her mind. However, there can often be a mismatch between intention and realization in design.

Kotter, John, P. Power and Influence.

- Most of us work in socially intricate organizations where we need the help not only of subordinates but of colleagues, superiors, and outsiders to accomplish our goals. This often leaves us in a "power gap" because we must depend on people over whom we have little or no explicit control.• One must manage all relevant relationships – subordinates, peers, bosses,

those outside one’s chain of command, employees in interdependent departments.

• ---- Effective leadership in a job that includes a complicated set of lateral relationships requires, first, a keen sense of where those relationships are.

• ----managing the relationship with the boss is a necessary and legitimate part of a job in a modern organization, especially in a difficult leadership job

• “Power and influence beyond formal authority” Interdependence- a state in which two or more parties have power over each other, because they are to some degree dependent on each other”

Stone, Deborah. “Causal Stories and the Formation of Policy Agendas.”

• Casual stories can challenge or protect an existing social order, assign responsibility to political actors in order to stop an activity, do it differently, compensate its victims. Legitimate actors as fixers of the problem.

• How a narrative is written will affect the perception of cause. ID causal stories within a narrative will allow you to understand their root motivation

Paret, Peter. The Cognitive Challenge of War, Prussia 1906

This book provides a narrative on how Prussian Army transformed from autocratic militaristic to Scharnhorst's reforms. Concepts were not adopted until there was a crisis because resistance because existing social system • Ability to adapt and learn• Inability to identify the changing nature of war• Importance of narrative

Abbot, Porter. The Cambridge Introduction to Narrative,

• "To help readers understand narrative, because we are all narrators" All humans communicate through narrative, the composition of narrative depends on the speakers background, perspective, motivation or medium. The more detailed the narrative the more complex it becomes.

• Narrative "The representation of events or a series of events "is relating events in organized time in order to make it intelligible, by adding detail to a narrative it can provide more understanding of a complex event. It is interactive. The audience of the narrative also interprets the meaning, whether it was the narrator's intention or not.

Schama, Simon. Dead Certainties

• By using the narratives behind the many deaths of General Wolfe, Schama describes how history is created.

• Any historical certainty can be put in question, and that the student of history must consider how a historical perspective was created if they are seeking historical accuracy.

Hatch, Mary Jo. Organization Theory,

Introduction to the study of organizations and organizing processes. Several perspectives are considered• Modernists use the organization as an organism model• Symbolic-interpretive use organizations as a culture and

interaction as based on shared beliefs • Postmodernists use the collage metaphor bits of knowledge and

understanding brought together to form a new perspective that has reference to the past organizations have or are cultures

(shared understanding is an illusion)

Keegan, John. Intelligence in War.

• V1&V2 Rockets , understand competing narratives, creative tension, cooperation and competition

• understanding the OE, Problem Framing, and avoiding the intelligence trap

Dörner, Dietrich. The Logic of Failure, Recognizing and Avoiding Error in Complex Situations.

• Failure is mapped with multiple decisions and not 1 point of failure. Used games to map decisions.

• The modern world is made up of innumerable interrelated subsystems, and we need to think in terms of these interrelations

• Complexity, interdependency, analogies, unintended consequences and observations. The effectiveness of a measure depends on the context for which it is pursued.

• In very complex and quickly changing situations the most reasonable strategy is to plan only in rough outline and to delegate as many decisions as possible to subordinates. These subordinates will need considerable independence and a thorough understanding of the overall plan. Such strategies require a “redundancy of potential command,” that is, many individuals who are all capable of carrying out leadership tasks within the context of the general directives

Senge, Peter, M.The Fifth Discipline

• Disciplines are Personal Mastery, Mental models, building shared vision, team learning and systems thinking

• Systems thinking is the integration of the other four disciplines• two distinct types of feedback processes:

– Reinforcing (or amplifying) feedback processes are the engines of growth. ..Reinforcing feedback can also generate accelerating decline—a pattern decline where small drops amplify themselves into larger and larger drops, such as the decline in bank assets when there is a financial panic.

– Balancing (or stabilizing) feedback operates whenever there is a goal-oriented behavior. If the goal is to be not moving, then balancing feedback will act the way the brakes in a car do. If the goal is to be moving at sixty miles per hour, then balancing feedback will cause you to accelerate to sixty but no faster

– In addition, many feedback processes contain “delays,’’ interruptions in the flow of influence which make the consequences of actions occur gradually.

Andreas, Peter. Blue Helmets and Black Markets

• Path to failure is paved with Good intentions• Historical example of Serbian siege. Manifestation of the

urban bias to depict the criminalization, troops, media that led to the extension of the siege for which everyone was supposed to help.

Cohen, Elliot and John Gooch. Military Misfortunes The Anatomy of Failure in War.

• Disputes traditional rational for failure: “man in the dock,” “The Man on the Couch,” Collective Incompetence, Institutional Failure, or culture failure

• 3 types of failures: – failure to learn – failure to predict– failure to adapt

• Model for determining the causation of military failure: five steps – Identify failure– Identify critical tasks not performed– analyze all layers strategic operational and tactical– Identify analytical matrix– determine pathway

Gharajedaghi, Jamshid. Systems Thinking: Managing Chaos and Complexity: A Platform for Designing Business Architecture.

• They don't understand how to function as a group. five system principles– openness – purposefulness (reaction response and action) – multidimensionality – emergent property – counter intuitiveness.

Strange, Joe and Richard Irons. “Center of Gravity What Clausewitz Really Meant”

• Clausewitz understood that there were more than a single COG. Multiple translations have led interpretations that he is only referring to a single COG (hub of all power). Strange believes there are two categories for COGs Moral and Physical (may be COGs at different levels and different times). COGs are mostly apparent when interaction occurs (Clausewitz).

• By appealing to the original concept of centers of gravity, one can determine that they are dynamic, positive, active agents (people in formations and groups or individuals), obvious (more for physical than moral centers, depending on the quality of intelligence gathered on an enemy), and powerful and strike effective blows. Physical centers of gravity can be visualized more easily as armies or units, those things that resist an enemy. By contrast, moral centers of gravity are less obvious. Yet it is essential to understand them since they are likely to be more important on the strategic level.

• Clausewitzian centers of gravity are not characteristics, capabilities, or locations. They are dynamic and powerful physical and moral agents of action or influence with certain qualities and capabilities that derive their benefit from a given location or terrain.

Bar-Yam, Y. Making Things Work: Solving Complex Problems in a Complex World

• approach to understanding complex systems based on a few fundamental ideas:– The mechanisms of collective behavior (patterns). – A multiscale perspective (the way different observers describe a system). – the evolutionary process that creates complex systems, and – the nature of purposive or goal-directed behavior

• Emergence refers to the relationship between the details of a system and the larger view.

• Problems that are difficult to solve using traditional approaches are often hard because the causes and effects are not obviously related. Pushing on a complex system “here” often has effects “over there” related. Pushing on a complex system “here” often has effects “over there” because the parts are interdependent

• Sometimes in nature, patterns form without anyone putting each part in a particular place. The pattern seems to develop all by itself: it self-organizes.

• Being complex is the only way to succeed in a complex environment

Schneider, James, J. and Lawrence L. Izzo. “Clausewitz’s Elusive Center of Gravity”.

• Authors mention that Clausewitz had a mechanistic view of warfare

• War is a duel between two opponents that each has a mass with a COG.

• Clause then IDs that the army may have several centers of gravity and then also applies it into the psychological realm of personalities and public opinion

• Schneider defines COG as the greatest concentration of combat force – The size of the COG will vary with the level of war that you are dealing

with. At the Operational level, it may be a maneuver group• The Decisive Point is a physical object for which we are willing

to expend combat power, either in defense or in attack

Vego, M. N., “Systems versus Classical Approach to Warfare”

• A system of systems analysis (SoSA) is used as the bedrock for EBO planning. It is divided into six major systems: political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information (PMESII)

• In fact, the reality depicted by EBO proponents does not exist—nor can it be created.22 In short, human activity is so complex that it operates outside the physical domain.

• In contrast to EBO advocates, SOD advocates acknowledge that uncertainty is an attribute of complex adaptive systems, such as war. They addressed that problem by employing what they call continuous systems reframing—an awkward term—which traditionalists simply call the “running estimate of the situation.”

• Experience has shown that reductive analysis is the most successful explanatory technique ever used in science. Systems thinking approaches a system in a holistic manner. The system is understood by examining the linkages and interactions between the elements that compose the entirety of the system. Systems thinking attempts to illustrate that events are separated by distance and time and that small catalytic events can cause large changes in complex systems.

Cronin How Terrorism Ends• Characteristics of terrorism:  fundamentally of political

nature, symbolic use of violence, purposeful targeting of non-combatants, carried out by non-state actors.

• Ways terrorism ends:  – Decapitation: capture or killing of group's leader – Negotiation: entry of the group into a legitimate political process – Success: achievement of the group's aims – Failure: implosion or loss of the group's public support – Repression: defeat and elimination by brute force – Reorientation: transition from terrorism into other forms of

violence.

IR Theory

Principles of Joint Operations (ADRP 3-0, figure 4-1)

61

Elements of Operational DesignADRP 3-0, Figure 4-3

62

Elements of Operational ArtADRP 3-0, Figure 4-4

Elements of Combat PowerADRP 3-0, Page 3-1

63

Commanders’ ActionsADRP 5-0, Page 1-2

64

DIME• Instruments of National Power — All of the means

available to the government in its pursuit of national objectives. They are expressed as diplomatic, economic, informational and military. (JP 1) (JP 1-02, pg 154)

“Decisive”• decisive action – (Army) The continuous, simultaneous combinations of offensive, defensive,

and stability or defense support of civil authorities tasks. (ADRP 3-0)

• decisive engagement – An engagement in which a unit is considered fully committed and cannot maneuver or extricate itself. In the absence of outside assistance, the action must be fought to a conclusion and either won or lost with the forces at hand. (ADRP 3-90)

• decisive operation – The operation that directly accomplishes the mission. (ADRP 3-0) See also battle; engagement; major operation; shaping operation.

• decisive point – (DOD) A geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or contribute materially to achieving success. See ADRP 3-0 and ADRP 5-0.

• decisive terrain – Decisive terrain, when, present, is key terrain whose seizure and retention is mandatory for successful mission accomplishment. (FM 3-90) See also key terrain.

Reconnaissance Operations (ADP 3-90, pg 5-2)

• Route Recon: Route reconnaissance is a form of reconnaissance that focuses along a specific line of communication, such as a road, railway, or cross-country mobility corridor. (pg 5-2)

• Zone Recon: Zone reconnaissance is a form of reconnaissance that involves a directed effort to obtain detailed information on all routes, obstacles, terrain, and enemy forces within a zone defined by boundaries. (pg 5-2)

• Area Recon: Area reconnaissance is a form of reconnaissance that focuses on obtaining detailed information about the terrain or enemy activity within a prescribed area. (pg 5-2)

• Reconnaissance in force: A reconnaissance in force is a deliberate combat operation designed to discover or test the enemy’s strength, dispositions, and reactions or to obtain other information. (pg 5-2)

• Special Reconnaissance: Special reconnaissance includes reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to collect or verify information of strategic or operational significance, employing military capabilities not normally found in conventional forces (JP 3-05). (pg 5-3)

Scenario NameFRAGMENTATION

COHERENCE

INDI

VIDU

ALCO

MM

UNITY

Scenario 1: Scenario 4:

Scenario 2: Scenario 3:

Elements of Operational Art ADRP 3-0, short hand definitions from Chapter 4

1. (Everyone) End state and conditions – Desired Future2. (Can) Center of Gravity- Source of all Power3. (Drive) Decisive Points – Geographic Place, Key Event, or factor that allows the

commander a marked advantage4. (Lamborghinis) Lines of Operation/ Effort – Link objectives to end state5. (or) Operational Reach- distance and duration to employ military capabilities *can be a

political limitation

6. (bring) Basing – permanent or non-permanent7. (their) Tempo –Relative Speed and Rhythm of Military operations over time w/ respect

to enemy8. (Porsche) Phasing –planning tool to divide an operation9. (Race) Risk – Probability and Severity of Loss linked to hazards (ADRP 1-0.2)10.(Car) Culmination - represents a crucial shift in relative combat power.

Operational art. For Army forces, operational art is the pursuit of strategic objectives, in whole or in part, through the arrangement of tactical actions in time, space, and purpose

Joint Elements of Operational Design JP 3-0, Definitions from JP 1_02 (updated 2013)1. (the) Termination The specified standards approved by the President and/or the Secretary of Defense that must be met

before a joint operation can be concluded.2. (men) Military end state- The set of required conditions that defines achievement of the commander’s objectives.3. (of) Objective- 1. The clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal toward which every operation is directed. 2. The specific

target of the action taken which is essential to the commander’s plan. See also target.4. (Echo) Effects – no definition5. (Can) Center of gravity The source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act. 6. (Drive) Decisive point - geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, allows

commanders to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or contribute materially to achieving success. 7. (Lamborghinis) line of operation — A line that defines the interior or exterior orientation of the force in relation to the enemy

or that connects actions on nodes and/or decisive points related intime and space to an objective(s). line of effort — In the context of joint operation planning, using the purpose (cause and effect) to focus efforts toward establishing operational and strategic conditions by linking multiple tasks and missions.

8. (Directly) Direct and indirect approach- no definition9. (Aboard) Anticipation-no definition10. (Or) Operational reach- The distance and duration across which a joint force can successfully employ military capabilities.11. (camp) Culmination –no definition (referenced as enemy closer to culmination JP 3-0)12. (around) Arranging operations- no definition “By arranging operations and activities into phases, the JFC can better integrate

and synchronize subordinate operations in time, space, and purpose.” JP 3-0 under phasing13. (Flames) Force and functions 1. An aggregation of military personnel, weapon systems, equipment, and necessary support, or

combination thereof. 2. A major subdivision of a fleet.operational art. The cognitive approach by commanders and staffs—supported by theirskill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment—to develop strategies,campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends,ways, and means. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)