main actions to improve accident management in spain...
TRANSCRIPT
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Vienna August 27, 2013 SPANISH NUCLEAR SAFETY COUNCIL
MAIN ACTIONS TO IMPROVE ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT IN SPAIN AFTER FUKUSHIMA
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Index
1. REGULATORY RESPONSE AFTER FUKUSHIMA
a) Regulatory Commitment with Europe
b) Requirements: ITC 1/3, ITC 2/4, ITC 5
c) Design criteria
d) CSN supervision process
e) CSN organization
2. SPANISH NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS RESPONSE
a) Response to ITC 3 ITC 2/4
b) Procedures
c) Analyses
d) Main modifications in the Spanish NPP
e) Radiation protection issues
f) Periodic information
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NUCLEAR FLEET IN SPAIN
NPPs & FUEL CYCLE FACILITIES: • 7 REACTORS IN OPERATION (5 SITES) - 2 TECHNOLOGIES (PWR & BWR) - 3 SUPPLIERS (W, GE, KWU) • 1 REACTOR SHUTDOWN •1 REACTOR BEING DECOMMISSIONED • 1 REACTOR DISMANTLED • 1 FUEL FABRICATION PLANT
PWR NPP (W) (degraded: same site) PWR NPP (KWU) BWR NPP (GE) BWR NPP SHUTDOWN (GE) NPP (IN DECOM.) NPP DISMANTLED FUEL FACTORY
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01 REGULATORY RESPONSE AFTER FUKUSHIMA
a) COMMITMENT WITH EUROPE
STRESS TEST - NATIONAL REPORT - PEER REVIEW –NATIONAL ACTION PLAN
Under ENSREG-EU (May, 2011 - Dec, 2011 - April, 2012 – Dec, 2012)
WENRA (Western Europe Nuclear Regulators Association)
Reference levels review under Fukushima events light
(May, 2012 - October, 2013)
Current CSN participation in working groups under RHWG:
o I4: Mutual assistance
o T1: Natural hazards
o T2: Containment in severe accidents
o T3: Accident management
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01 REGULATORY RESPONSE AFTER FUKUSHIMA
b) REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS: ITC 1/3, ITC 2/4, ITC 5
Regulatory requirements associated to the NPP operating licence (“Orders”)
Specific for every NPP
Post-Fukushima European stress tests: ITC 1 and ITC 3
Large explosions or fires beyond design bases: ITC 2 and ITC 4
Currently under CSN consideration: ITC5
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01 REGULATORY RESPONSE. b) Regulatory requirements
POST-FUKUSHIMA: ITC 1 AND ITC 3
ITC 1: Stress test (lessons learnt from the Fukushima events)
o May, 2011 to NPP
o June, 2011 to Jose Cabrera and Juzbado
o Closed interaction between CSN and licensees
ITC 3: Specific requirements derived from the Stress tests conclusions
o March, 2012
o Extreme natural hazards, prolonged and total SBO, loss of UHS
o Accident management (reactor/containment and fuel pool storage)
o Two types of requirements:
i) Analysis and subsequently improvements (modifications);
ii) Modifications
o Short (2012), medium (2014) and long (2016) terms requirements
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01 REGULATORY RESPONSE. b) Regulatory requirements
LARGE EXPLOSIONS OR FIRES BEYOND DESIGN BASES: ITC 2 AND ITC 4
ITC 2: “Potential loss of big areas in the NPP”
o July, 2011
o Confidentiality
o NEI 06-12, rev.2 “B.5.b phase 2&3 submittal guideline” as reference
o Requires analysis and modifications depending on the results, covering:
Emergency management
Large fires extinction
Fuel damage mitigation
Mitigation of radioactive releases
ITC 4: “Potential loss of big areas in the NPP”
o July, 2012
o Some additional requirements/clarifications not included previously in ITC 2
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01 REGULATORY RESPONSE. b) Regulatory requirements
ITC 5
In force for CNSMG (July, 2013)*
o Compilation of ITC 2/4 and 3 requirements
o Adaptation of these previous orders to its new operational situation
o Consistency between the two processes
o Relief of confidentiality requirements
o Abolition of ITC 2/4 and 3
Under CSN consideration for the rest of NPP
* CNSMG has been in “permanently ceased operation” since July 6th, 2013
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01 REGULATORY RESPONSE AFTER FUKUSHIMA
c) DESIGN CRITERIA FOR PLANT MODIFICATIONS
CSN is developing criteria as a minimum to fulfil some ITC 2/4 and 3 requirements
NPP collaboration
Applicable to physical design modifications
Double purpose: Design (utility) and acceptance criteria (CSN)
General application criteria:
For new or pre-existing equipment/system, fixed or mobile, considered in the analysis
Assuring robustness against postulated events (extreme natural hazards, prolonged and total SBO, loss of UHS, events with loss of big areas)
Requirements in terms of functionality, availability, “qualification”.....
Specific criteria to design:
On site alternative management centre (CAGE)
Filtered containment venting systems (FCVS)
Passive autocatalytic recombiners (PAR)
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01 REGULATORY RESPONSE AFTER FUKUSHIMA
d) CSN SUPERVISION PROCESS
CSN has developed a detailed guidance to fulfil the supervision process
Inspection and Evaluation specific program
Several annual inspections to every NPP on ITC 2/4 and 3 requirements (different inspection teams depending on the topic)
Evaluation on some ITC 2/4 and 3 requirements
CSN formal acceptance on some design modifications
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01 REGULATORY RESPONSE AFTER FUKUSHIMA
e) CSN ORGANIZATION
No changes in the normal organization of CSN
Different departments affected
Supervision process responsibilities defined in the guide
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Index
1. REGULATORY RESPONSE AFTER FUKUSHIMA
a) Commitment with Europe
b) Regulatory requirements: ITC 1/3, ITC 2/4, ITC 5
c) Design criteria
d) CSN supervision process
e) CSN organization
2. SPANISH NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS RESPONSE
a) Response to ITC 3 ITC 2/4
b) Procedures
c) Analyses
d) Main modifications in the Spanish NPP
e) Radiation protection issues
f) Periodic information
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02 NPP RESPONSE
a) RESPONSE TO ITC 3 ITC 2/4
Specific response from every NPP
Most of the NPP proposed changes fulfil ITC 3 and ITC 2/4 requirements simultaneously
Planning for accident management (organization, human resources, training, facilities)
Procedures (EOPs – SAMG – EDMG)
Physical Design Modifications
Time frame: a few of authorized delays on some specific requirements . Not compromised final dates (2016)
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02 NPP RESPONSE
b) PROCEDURES
W-PWR and GE-BWR: review of their existing EOP-SAMG under OG reference (new revision includes SFP)
KWU-PWR: Developing new symptom based SAMG. Long term
NPP developing EDMG (extensive damage mitigation guides): short/medium term
Different models/structures of EDMG depending on the NPP design
Portable equipment
Fuel damage prevention/mitigation
Fire/explosion/security
Radiological issues
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02 NPP RESPONSE
c) ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS
In response to some CSN requirements (ITC 3 and 2/4)
Short and medium term
Implementation of improvements (modifications) identified in the analysis: medium and long term
Examples of some kind of analyses:
Natural Hazards
o Potential and large internal flooding
o Harmonization between scenarios of dam breaking consider under stress test and considered under the dam emergency plans
o Combination of another potential extreme natural hazards (extreme temperatures, rain, snow, wind,...)
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02 NPP RESPONSE. c) Analysis
Planning for accident management
o Human resources required to reinforce the NPP emergency organizations
o Access routes towards the plant under extreme natural hazards
o Mutual assistance (among Spanish NPP)
o Communication resources (on-site & external)
Severe accidents
o Alternatives to depressurize the RCS under total SBO and earthquake
o Use of seismic FPS (fire protection systems) to inject/spray water in the RPV/containment/SFP
o Hydrogen leaks to neighbour buildings
o Severe accidents in shutdown states
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02 NPP RESPONSE c) Analysis
Severe accidents (cont)
o Critical instrumentation for severe accident management
o Instrumentation in containment under severe accident conditions
o Closure of containment under total SBO (whatever operational mode: normal operation, start-up, hot/cold shutdown and, mainly, refuelling outage)
o Containment integrity under severe accident conditions (leaktighness)
Storage fuel pool
o Reinforcement of the instrumentation (temperature, level and radiation) under severe accident scenario and total SBO
Radiological protection
o Analysis of additional radiological protection resources and equipment
o Analysis of the resources needed to estimate radioactive emissions
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02 NPP RESPONSE
d) MAIN DESIGN MODIFICATIONS IN THE SPANISH NPP
Design criteria for physical design modifications: Developed by CSN with NPP participation
Emergency management: On site alternative emergency centre
Specific design criteria (functionality, availability, “qualification”, radiological aspects)
For potential loss of big areas in the NPP and for extreme natural hazards
Not an alternative emergency control room
Final date: long term (2016)
Prevention/mitigation severe accident scenarios
General and/or specific design criteria (functionality, availability, “qualification”)
Reactor/containment/spent fuel pool
Mobile/fixed, new or adapted, equipment to respond against postulated events (extreme natural hazards, prolonged and total SBO, loss of UHS, loss of big areas)
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02 NPP RESPONSE. d) Main design modifications
Examples of design modifications under developing currently in the Spanish NPP:
New FCVS (or up-graded in CN Cofrentes). 2016 H2 control: PAR inside containment. 2016. Exceptions: CN Trillo (it has PAR currently) New portable equipment and new procedures to inject/spray water into the
RPV/SG/containment/SFP (motor driven pumps/connections/hoses). 2012-2013 Connection of seismic FPS to inject/spray water into the RPV/SG/containment/SFP Minor modifications and new procedures to allow water injection to RPV/SG by using the pre-
existing turbine driven pumps without DC power (manually operated). 2012-2013 Improvements in PWR-W RCP seals. 2014 New or upgraded instrumentation for critical parameters/new portable equipment and or
procedures to alternatively obtain critical values. 2012-2013 Storage for portable equipment
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02 NPP RESPONSE. d) Main design modifications
Examples of design modifications under developing currently in the NPP Spanish plant: Supporting
systems
Reinforced off-site power supplies (new procedures to quickly recover off-site power) New mobile electrical power supply (mobile diesel generators for AC/batteries or
MDG+battery charger for DC/connections) for mobile/fixed equipment, including instrumentation. 2012-2013
New mobile fuel supply (tanker) for mobile/fixed equipment. 2012-2013 New mobile lightening systems for exterior use. 2012-2013 New alternative air supply (portable compressors/accumulators/connections) for pneumatic
equipment. 2012-2013 New connections for alternative water supply (from different pre-existing tanks or water
deposits).2012-2013 20
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02 NPP RESPONSE
e) RADIATION PROTECTION ISSUES
Reinforce the electrical supply to the main control room habitability system. 2012-2013
Reinforce the electrical power supply to essential radiological surveillance equipment 2012-2013
Containment filtered venting
External spray of the containment and another buildings with potential radiological risk
Confinement/treatment of the radioactive liquid waste
Development of radiological guidelines for severe conditions actuations (under SAMG strategies)
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02 NPP RESPONSE
f) PERIODIC INFORMATION
The Spanish NPP are submitting periodically (every six months) a report summarizing the advance state of their activities related to the ITC 2/4 and ITC 3, as required by CSN
