Major power intervention in Major power intervention in international crises, 1918-1988international crises, 1918-1988

Paul K. HuthPaul K. Huth

Military intervention of major powers can have decisive impact Military intervention of major powers can have decisive impact on the outcome of international crises: deter outbreak of the on the outcome of international crises: deter outbreak of the war, lead to military defeat of aggressors when policies of war, lead to military defeat of aggressors when policies of deterrence faildeterrence failChallengers to status quo want to avoid military escalation Challengers to status quo want to avoid military escalation when major powers are expected to intervenewhen major powers are expected to intervene whilewhile de defending fending statesstates seek outside support to counter threats to their securityseek outside support to counter threats to their security

Main questions: Main questions: • when leaders of major powers decide to intervene with the when leaders of major powers decide to intervene with the

threat or use of military force in international crises to defend threat or use of military force in international crises to defend states threatened with attack?states threatened with attack?

• What set of domestic anWhat set of domestic andd international conditions produce international conditions produce acceptable military and political risks of intervention and acceptable military and political risks of intervention and thus thus convince leaders that military involvement will lead to favorable convince leaders that military involvement will lead to favorable domestic and foreign policy outcomesdomestic and foreign policy outcomes??

Author tests a set of hypothesis about the Author tests a set of hypothesis about the conditions under which major powers intervene conditions under which major powers intervene with military support for states that are with military support for states that are threatened in a crisisthreatened in a crisisHe analyzes major power interventions in 272 He analyzes major power interventions in 272 international crisinternational crisees from 1918-1988s from 1918-1988HHe emphasizes on importance of domestic e emphasizes on importance of domestic political determinants of foreign policypolitical determinants of foreign policy, role o, role of f domestic politics in foreign policy decisionsdomestic politics in foreign policy decisionsRational choice approach to studying foreign Rational choice approach to studying foreign policy choices that integrates realist and policy choices that integrates realist and domestic politics modelsdomestic politics models

ArgumentsArguments

Realist approach to analyzing international Realist approach to analyzing international politics can be strengthened by theorizing about politics can be strengthened by theorizing about how domestic political concerns of state leaders how domestic political concerns of state leaders may have systematic and consequential effects may have systematic and consequential effects on on their their foreign policy decisionsforeign policy decisions

AA decision regarding intervention depends on decision regarding intervention depends on foreign policy leadersforeign policy leaders’’ ability to sell this policy to ability to sell this policy to important domestic political constituencimportant domestic political constituenciesies

Connections between domestic politics and Connections between domestic politics and security policysecurity policy

1- 1- State leaders need to balance the pursuit of State leaders need to balance the pursuit of security interests abroad with domestic politics security interests abroad with domestic politics of building a coalition ofof building a coalition of political support behind political support behind a decision to intervenea decision to intervene( hypothesis 1,2,3,6)( hypothesis 1,2,3,6)::

• pragmatic intervenors: defer to leader the pragmatic intervenors: defer to leader the initiative of intervention but they will hold leader initiative of intervention but they will hold leader accountable for outcomes and punish leader for accountable for outcomes and punish leader for failed interventionsfailed interventions

• Isolationist critics: less willing to deter initiative Isolationist critics: less willing to deter initiative to leader and contest government’s rationale to leader and contest government’s rationale demanding for clear justification for interventiondemanding for clear justification for intervention

2- A2- A leader’s desire to hold onto power can leader’s desire to hold onto power can create incentives to pursue foreign policies that create incentives to pursue foreign policies that can enhance his-her domestic political positioncan enhance his-her domestic political position (7,8)(7,8)

3- 3- potential trade-off between resources potential trade-off between resources ((like like financial, manpower, timefinancial, manpower, time) ) available to available to governments to supportgovernments to support both domestic andboth domestic and international goalsinternational goals ( 5) ( 5)

so there are two main factors for state leader's so there are two main factors for state leader's calculations: military and political costs and calculations: military and political costs and risks of intervention, domestic and international risks of intervention, domestic and international security benefits of supporting a threatened security benefits of supporting a threatened countrycountry

HypothesisHypothesis1.1. The probability of military intervention by a major The probability of military intervention by a major

power will decrease as the capacity of a threatened power will decrease as the capacity of a threatened state to defend itself militarily increasesstate to defend itself militarily increases

2.2. The probability of military intervention by a major The probability of military intervention by a major power will increase as the severity of the threat of power will increase as the severity of the threat of military attack against a target state increasesmilitary attack against a target state increases

3.3. The probability of military intervention by a major The probability of military intervention by a major power will increase as thepower will increase as the relative military strength of relative military strength of the coalition supporting the threatened state the coalition supporting the threatened state increasesincreases

4.4. The probability of military intervention by a major The probability of military intervention by a major power will decreasepower will decrease if leaders of the major power are if leaders of the major power are about to or have already committed large-scale about to or have already committed large-scale military forces to another international disputemilitary forces to another international dispute

5.5. The probability of military intervention by a major The probability of military intervention by a major power will decreasepower will decrease if leaders of the major power are if leaders of the major power are about to or have already committed large-scale about to or have already committed large-scale military forces tomilitary forces to the suppression of domestic the suppression of domestic political oppositionpolitical opposition

6.6. The probability of intervention by a major power will The probability of intervention by a major power will increaseincrease if the threatened state is of military-strategic if the threatened state is of military-strategic value to the major powervalue to the major power

7.7. The probability of intervention by a major power will The probability of intervention by a major power will increaseincrease if the major power and threatened state if the major power and threatened state share the same type of political system that differs share the same type of political system that differs from the regime of the challenger statefrom the regime of the challenger state

8.8. The probability of intervention by a major power willThe probability of intervention by a major power will decrease if the incumbent regime’s chances of decrease if the incumbent regime’s chances of victory in upcoming elections are quite favorablevictory in upcoming elections are quite favorable

Major powers: might intervene in an international crisis for Major powers: might intervene in an international crisis for two reasons: they have political and military capacity to two reasons: they have political and military capacity to project military forces beyond their borders, they have project military forces beyond their borders, they have security interests and military ties with states beyond their security interests and military ties with states beyond their bordersborders. . But even major powers do not intervene militarily But even major powers do not intervene militarily in most cases of international militarized disputesin most cases of international militarized disputesequation: dependent variable is the level of support that equation: dependent variable is the level of support that major power provides and independent variables are: major power provides and independent variables are: military balance of target versus attacker, level of security military balance of target versus attacker, level of security threat for target or threat, military balance of major power threat for target or threat, military balance of major power and target versus attacker, major power armed conflict and target versus attacker, major power armed conflict with other states, armed conflict within major power, with other states, armed conflict within major power, military ties between major power and target of threat, military ties between major power and target of threat, common adversary between major power and target of common adversary between major power and target of threat, strategic location of target, similarity of regime threat, strategic location of target, similarity of regime between major power and target or threat, prospects for between major power and target or threat, prospects for victory in upcoming electionsvictory in upcoming elections

ResultsResults intervention with diplomatic action=27intervention with diplomatic action=27, , military force support= military force support=

7272, n, no major power intervention= 173o major power intervention= 173 The more capable the target state was of defending itself, the The more capable the target state was of defending itself, the

less likely the major power was to interveneless likely the major power was to intervene (hypothesis(hypothesis 1) 1) major major powers powers were not likely to intervene unless military were not likely to intervene unless military

disadvantage could be overcome by addition of the major disadvantage could be overcome by addition of the major power’s forces and those of supporting alliespower’s forces and those of supporting allies. . Relative parity Relative parity or a military advantage for the target coalition is a necessary or a military advantage for the target coalition is a necessary condition for major power military interventioncondition for major power military intervention ( (hypothesishypothesis 3) 3)

Major power intervention is more likely when target faced a Major power intervention is more likely when target faced a severe security threat and also if the target is of military and severe security threat and also if the target is of military and security value to major power (hypothesis 2 and security value to major power (hypothesis 2 and 66))

More likely to intervene if they share same type of political More likely to intervene if they share same type of political regime, whereas attacker’s regime differed (hypothesis 7)regime, whereas attacker’s regime differed (hypothesis 7)

Prospects of victory in upcoming elections counterbalance the Prospects of victory in upcoming elections counterbalance the incentive to intervene in support of political allies (hypothesis incentive to intervene in support of political allies (hypothesis 88))

If leaders of major powers committed armed forces to the If leaders of major powers committed armed forces to the suppression of domestic political opposition, likelihood of suppression of domestic political opposition, likelihood of military intervention decreases (hypothesis 5)military intervention decreases (hypothesis 5)

7.7. Hypothesis 4 = major power involvement in armed Hypothesis 4 = major power involvement in armed conflicts with other states had no discernable impact. conflicts with other states had no discernable impact. Although involvement in armed conflict was Although involvement in armed conflict was associated with a low rate of intervention in crises associated with a low rate of intervention in crises ( 27%), the rate of intervention was the same even ( 27%), the rate of intervention was the same even when major power was not involved in any armed when major power was not involved in any armed conflicts (26%)conflicts (26%)

CONCLUSIONS:CONCLUSIONS: Seven of eight hypothesis are supported by the Seven of eight hypothesis are supported by the

results of analysis on major power interventions in results of analysis on major power interventions in 272 international crises 272 international crises

Role of domestic politics are thereforeRole of domestic politics are therefore important to important to study in understanding international politicsstudy in understanding international politics