making minority government work: hung parliaments and the challenges for westminster and whitehall

8/8/2019 Making minority government work: hung parliaments and the challenges for Westminster and Whitehall

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MAKING MINORITYGOVERNMENT WORK:Hung parliaments and the challengesfor Westminster and Whitehall

Robert Hazell and Akash Paun (eds.)with Mark Chalmers, Ben Yong and Catherine Haddon


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Making Minority Government Work 1

Contents

About the Authors 3

Foreword 4

Summary o Key Points 5

Executive Summary 6

Part 1: The Westminster Context 9

1. Introduction 10

1.1 Context: In the shadow o the Westminster model

1.2 A Hung Parliament: What Next?

1.3 Minority and Coalition Administrations: A spectrum o options

1.4 Making Multi-Party Governance Work: Lessons rom elsewhere

1.5 Research methodology

Box 1: Timeline o governments at Westminster

2. A Brie History o the Lib-Lab Pact, 1977-78 20

2.1 Introduction

2.2 The ormation o the Pact

2.3 Making it work

2.4 End o the Pact and Dissolution

2.5 Conclusions

Part 2: Minority Governments Elsewhere 25

3. Canadas Dysunctional Minority Parliament 26

3.1 Context

3.2 Government Formation

3.3 Making it Work

3.4 Dissolution - How do Minority Governments End?

3.5 Conclusions


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2 INSTITUTE FOR GOVERNMENT

4. New Zealands Experience of Multi-Party Governance

4.1 Context


4.3 Making it Work

4.4 Durability and Dissolution

4.5 Conclusions

5. Learning from Scotlands Parliament of Minorities

5.1 Context


5.3 Making it Work

4.4 Dissolution How do Minority Governments End?

5.5 Conclusions

Part 3: Making Minority Government Work

6. Lessons for Whitehall and the Palace

6.1 Lessons for the Prime Minister and Cabinet

6.2 Lessons for the Civil Service

6.3 Lessons for the Crown

6.4 Executive power available to minority governments

6.5 Constitutional Resources

6.6 Administrative Resources

6.7 Political Resources

7. Lessons for Westminster and the people

7.1 Lessons for Parliament

7.2 Lessons for the Political Parties

7.3 Lessons for the media and the public

Appendix A: Extracts from New Zealand Cabinet Manual

Bibliography

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lecturer in the Department o Politics and History at Brunel University.is a Research Fellow at the Institute or Government, and a ormer


About the Authors

Pro Robert Hazell has been Director o the Constitution Unit since its establishment in1995 and is also Proessor o Government and the Constitution in the UCL Department oPolitical Science. He was previously Director o the Nueld Foundation and a senior civilservant in the Home Oce.

Akash Paun is a Senior Researcher at the Institute or Government. He was previously aResearch Associate at the Constitution Unit, where he specialised in the study o parliamentand devolution to Scotland and Wales.

Mark Chalmers is a Researcher at the Constitution Unit, and a specialist in Canadian politics.

He holds degrees rom the London School o Economics and the University o Windsor,Ontario, where he also worked as a lecturer.

Dr Ben Yong is a Researcher at the Constitution Society in London, having previously workedat the Constitution Unit. He completed his PhD at the London School o Economics on NewZealand constitutional history and is rom Wellington, New Zealand.

Dr Catherine Haddon


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Robert Hazell and Akash Paun, December 2009


Foreword

Ten years ago, at the outset o devolution in the UK, the Constitution Unit embarked on atwo year study to learn the lessons rom overseas on how to govern in non-majoritariansystems. The research was led by Ben Seyd, who made study visits to Denmark, Germany,Ireland and New Zealand, and wrote a 150 page report on Coalition Government: Lessonsrom Overseas. His aim was to analyse how coalition governments operate, with a view tolearning lessons or the new coalitions in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. In 2004 heupdated his work in Coalition government in Scotland and Wales,reviewing the experienceo the rst term o devolution, how well the coalition arrangements had worked, and whaturther improvements might be needed.

A decade on, the Constitution Unit decided to revisit this work, working in partnershipwith the new Institute or Government. We ound that in Westminster systems minoritygovernment had been as strong a eature as coalitions, and decided to make minoritygovernment the main ocus o our research. We have looked mainly at the recent experiencein Canada, New Zealand, Scotland and Wales. We were ortunate to recruit a Canadian, MarkChalmers, to lead the work on Canada, and a New Zealander, Ben Yong, to lead the researchon New Zealand. Akash Paun led the work on Scotland, and Catherine Haddon did thehistorical research into past minority governments at Westminster.

We conducted over 60 interviews with ministers, politicians, senior civil servants,parliamentary sta, academic experts and journalists in our three study countries. We areextremely grateul to them or giving up their time to be interviewed, and subsequently or

commenting on drats o the report: we received written comments rom over 35 expertsrom across the countries we covered. We are o course responsible or any errors andomissions, and or the conclusions we have drawn.

Our work is a companion piece to the recent report by the Institute or Government onTransitions: Preparing or Changes o Government, by Peter Riddell and Catherine Haddon.That report is about a change o government rom one party to another. Our report is abouta change rom one orm o government to another: rom majority to minority government.In both cases our principal concern is to ensure, not just a smooth transition, but that thenew government is as eective as possible.

That is why we have called our report Making Minority Government Work. Our ocus is notsimply on the executive branch. It is on all the political actors who are involved in minority

government. This includes Parliament, the institution which makes and breaks governments,passes their laws and holds them to account; the political parties, who compose minoritygovernments, and support and oppose them in Parliament; the Crown, centrally involved ingovernment ormation and dissolution; and the media, whose reporting is critical to howminority government is perceived by the public.

The media may play down our report as something which is not going to happen. Thatis a risk we can live with. The electoral experts say that hung parliaments will becomeincreasingly requent, so minority government will happen one day, possibly quite soon.But the greater risk is that when it happens, the media will denounce minority governmentas something earul, unstable and deeply undesirable. They are themselves part o themajoritarian culture. Our purpose is to show that there is an alternative, already workingin parts o Britain and in other Westminster parliaments, rom which we can learn useul

lessons. Minority government can be made to work; but it requires more subtle skills thanthe simpler and cruder orms o majoritarian politics. That is what our report is about.


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Summary o Key Points

Westminster perceives minority government as weak, unstable, incoherent and short term inits approach to policy.

Recent experience in Canada supports that, with unstable minority governments andpolitical and constitutional crises. But in New Zealand and Scotland minority governmentsand minority parliaments have been much more eective.

This report is about how to make minority government work. It summarises the recentexperience in Canada, New Zealand and Scotland, and the historical experience atWestminster. It then draws out lessons or all the main actors.

Lessons or the Prime Minister and government

Minority government has some advantages over coalition: single party control, greaterpolicy coherence, quicker decision making. But a minority government cannot govern ina majoritarian way. It must accept the likelihood o requent parliamentary deeats, andprepare the media and the public or them, so they are not seen as condence issues. Toavoid being blown o course, it must set out a clear strategy and set o long term goals.

Lessons or the civil service

Be prepared or a caretaker government, and the need to support negotiations betweenpolitical parties during a prolonged period o government ormation. Be prepared or manydierent possible combinations o minority and/or coalition government, including looserorms o partnership that may require relaxation o collective Cabinet responsibility. Thisneed not undermine Cabinet condentiality, but does require a clear set o rules. Serving aminority administration also requires a dierent set o skills, including closer monitoring oparliamentary developments and acilitation o inter-party negotiations.

Lessons or Parliament

Parliament can become stronger under minority government, but cannot make policy ororce the government to do anything against its will. Parliament may take longer to pass bills,and amend them more heavily, but the overall volume o legislation is unlikely to diminishgreatly. Parliamentary reorm to reduce the governments dominance o parliamentarybusiness will not happen without a clear agenda and champion who can make it happen.

Lessons or opposition parties

Prepare beore the election or negotiations immediately aterwards. Consider thealternatives beore entering into coalition: supply and condence agreements may helpa party preserve its distinct identity. It is dicult to co-ordinate the opposition againstthe government, or to bring the government down, but opposition parties can infuencegovernment policy through bilateral deals.

Lessons or the Crown

The mystique about the process o government ormation and dissolution risks drawing theCrown unnecessarily into controversy. There need to be clearer rules which explain that it isnot the monarchs role to orm a government, or to acilitate negotiations. The decision toorm a government must be arrived at by politicians, and the Prime Minister then advises themonarch on who can command the condence o Parliament.


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Executive Summary

Prospects or a hung Parliament

No British general election has returned a hung parliament in over three decades. As thepolitical system gears up or the May 2010 poll there is a widespread assumption thatthe era o single-party majority government will continue. Most opinion polls project acomortable majority victory or the opposition Conservative Party. But it is also predictedthat anything up to a 10% Conservative lead will return a parliament o minorities next

year, due to the growth in support or smaller parties and the current bias in the electoralsystem to Labour. The required swing is more than at all post-war elections save or TonyBlairs 1997 landslide. Six months beore that election, the Labour Party had a lead o around

25% (as opposed to the 10-15% advantage enjoyed by the Conservatives today), whicheventually narrowed to a 12.5% margin at the poll.

This means that a hung parliament is a real possibility, whose implications ought to bethought through in advance. The danger is that the necessary preparations and contingencyplanning in Westminster and Whitehall will not take place, or at least not thoroughlyenough. An inconclusive election result might lead to a period o uncertainty and delay, withnegative consequences or public condence and government eectiveness. This report,which presents the ndings rom a study o recent experience in Canada, New Zealand andScotland, is an attempt to help make these problems less likely.

Forming the new government

The rst challenge to be aced in a parliament o minorities will be the ormation o a new

government. It is almost inevitable that this will take longer than usual, but this should be nocause or alarm. Almost all other Western countries cope without diculty with a short periodo negotiation and uncertainty between election and the swearing in o a ministerial team.

The leader o the largest party would normally be expected to lead the government, butthere are no constitutional reasons why this must be the case. The guiding principle is whocan command the condence o the House o Commons. That is normally subject to anearly test in the debate on the Queens Speech. To enhance public understanding o thegovernment ormation process, one sensible reorm would be to hold an investiture vote inparliament (as in Scotland) at which MPs select the Prime Minister. The person nominatedwould then be appointed by the Queen to lead the new government. Doing the process thisway round would help avoid any risk o the Monarch being drawn into political controversy.

Coalition or minority governmentThere is a range o options or how to structure relations between the lead party ogovernment and smaller parties. At one end o the spectrum is ormal coalition, with morethan one party represented in Cabinet and the government bound by a shared policy agenda,set out in a ormal partnership agreement. A ormal coalition can secure or the governmenta working majority in parliament, but it can limit fexibility, especially i the partnershipagreement is very detailed. Agreement on procedures to consult and resolve disputeswithin the coalition is as important as agreement on policies. For smaller parties, entering acoalition may also lead to dilution o the partys distinctive identity in the eyes o the public.Formal coalitions have rarely been the outcome o hung parliaments at Westminster, andwould in any case not greatly change the relationship between government and parliament.They were also the subject o a previous report on this subject by the Constitution Unit, and

are thereore not the central ocus o this report.


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The other end o the spectrum involves the ormation o a minority government by oneo the large parties, which requires it to strike issue-by-issue deals to pass its business.This option is more unpredictable, as it raises the chances o deeats in parliament or oalternative legislative alliances emerging. But it makes lie simpler within government, asthere is no need or time-consuming coalition management. Clarity o strategic vision isalso easier to achieve. And minority government may have to concede less than would bedemanded by a junior coalition partner, i it can nd dierent parties in parliament to backdierent aspects o its policy agenda.

In between these two options there is a spectrum o more or less ormalised mechanisms,

such as condence and supply agreements, by which governments can ensure they have thesupport o external parties on crucial votes in exchange or policy or other concessions, anarrangement which can help preserve the identity o smaller parties.

Resources available to minority governments

The Westminster system preserves or the executive a range o important resources thatthat help to ensure eective government. These include control o the parliamentary agenda,the budget process, delegated legislation, and prerogative powers including the right to seekan early election. Most o these would remain untouched in a hung parliament, althoughpressures may emerge to cede control o the parliamentary timetable to a cross-partybusiness committee, or to allow the Commons to vote on its own dissolution (as the PrimeMinister proposed in 2007).

A minority government would also control the civil service machine, enabling it to developpolicy and plan the allocation o resources with a ar higher level o expertise than theopposition parties. Simply by virtue o being the government, it also enjoys politicalresources in the ability to set the wider political agenda and tone o public debate.

Government must be more consensual

The lack o a majority in parliament means that the PM will have to be prepared to makegreater concessions on policy, spending and control o the agenda. A key lesson rom othercountries (in particular Canada) is that when minority prime ministers seek to govern as ithey had a majority the result is instability, partisanship, persistent electioneering and likelyailure. By contrast, minority administrations which adopt a more consensual approach,negotiating and making concessions with opponents inside and outside parliament, are more

likely to remain in oce and to make headway with their policy agenda.Where the government does not oer enough in the way o concessions, it risks losing billsaltogether. The civil service also need to become more politically attuned to the concernso opposition and backbench MPs and outside interests. The general lesson is that a hungparliament will lead to multi-party governance, even i single party government continues.

Opposition parties must act responsibly

Opposition parties also ace a challenge o adaptation. Unlike under normal Westminsterconditions, in a parliament o minorities the opposition can block or signicantlyamend government proposals and even introduce alternative policies o their own. Thisunaccustomed power requires opposition leaders to act responsibly, not to oppose oroppositions sake.

The absence o a government majority does not imply the existence o an oppositionmajority. Opposition parties may nd it surprisingly dicult to unite against thegovernment, or bring the government down. They will have policy and other dierences, andthey may themselves be earul o triggering an early election. So they are more likely tostrike bilateral deals.

Parliament can become stronger

Without a majority government in oce, parliament becomes more important and morepowerul. The legislative process becomes more uncertain, but also more inclusive, asopposition and backbench amendments have more chance o being carried. But Parliamentcannot make policy, or orce the government to take executive action against its will. Noris parliamentary reorm any more likely in a minority parliament: it needs champions and a

clear agenda to make it happen.


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Role o the media

The medias instinct will be to portray ministerial concessions or deeats in parliament asailures and signs o ineective government. But such events could alternatively be portrayedas a more consensual and inclusive orm o decision making that holds advantages over theexecutive domination that currently characterises the Westminster system.

Making minority government work

Ultimately whether minority government can be made to work at Westminster will dependon the politicians: in particular the Prime Minister and the governing party. But otheractors have important roles too: the civil service, the opposition parties, the parliamentary

authorities, and the media. All have important parts to play, and all can learn rom experienceelsewhere in helping to ensure that a minority parliament and a minority government workas eectively as possible.


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1. Introduction Akash Paun, Institute or Government

1.1 Context: In the shadow o the Westminster modelWestminster, so-called mother o parliaments, has had to suer the parents ate owitnessing her ospring grow up, reject many o her old-ashioned ways, and strike out indirections she hersel nds too bold and rightening.1 One notable example is the extentto which single party majority government has remained the norm at Westminster, unlikein almost all continental European legislatures and, increasingly, the more closely-relatedCommonwealth parliaments too. As a result o the rst past the post electoral system andthe dominance o a two (or two and a hal2) national party system,3 every election in thepostwar era bar one has returned a majority or either Labour or the Conservatives (8 times

each), with the size o the majority ranging rom 3 to 179 (see gure 1.1).

Figure 1.1: Share o seats won by governing party since 1945

Source: UK Election Statistics: 1918-2004, at: http://tinyurl.com/election-stats

1 It should be noted, however, that the original quotation, by John Bright in 1865, was that England is the mother o parliaments.

2 On the two and a hal party system, see J. Blondel, Party Systems and Patterns o Government in Western Democracies, Canadian Journalo Political Science, (1968) Vol.1, No.2.

3 At least in the 84% o the UK population that England represents. Even in Scotland and Wales where there is a variable actor in theshape o nationalist parties, the SNP and Plaid Cymru have never collectively won more than 14 seats (2%) in a UK general election. OnlyNorthern Ireland, with 18 seats (2.8 % o the current House) and just 13 active MPs, has a truly separate party system.

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one party will win aclear majority andrule the roost. I thatassumption is nolonger valid, a verylarge proportiono the normalconventions ogovernment wouldcome under

challenge.

David Butler, Governing withouta Majority (1986), p.8.


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past about how to ensure that eective governance is not undermined.


The requency o single-party majorities has helped create a political culture whereelections are portrayed as winner-takes-all battles between two great political tribes. Inacademic discourse, the electoral system, as well as constitutional eatures such as weaklocal government and the doctrine o parliamentary sovereignty, has led the UK to becharacterised as a strongly majoritarian system, in contradistinction to the consensualdemocracies to be ound in other parts o Europe.4

The spectre that haunts the Westminster model is an inconclusive election, in which no oneparty wins an overall majority. As noted, no election in nearly our decades has returned aparliament o minorities, although Jim Callaghan in 1976 and John Major in 1996 both

saw their majorities wiped out by by-election deeats and deections. Casting urther backinto history, however, reveals that Westminster does in act have signicant experience ominority and coalition government (see Box 1 at the end o this chapter).

Looking orward to the general election expected in May 2010, is the return o a balancedparliament a genuine possibility? Opinion polls throughout 2009 have pointed to acomortable Conservative lead.5 However, or reasons largely to do with the dierentialconcentration o the parties respective support bases, Labour has a signicant inbuiltadvantage under the current electoral system. In 2005, or instance, the Conservatives wonone seat or every 44,000 votes gained ully 65% above the equivalent gure or Labour.6On the assumption o a uniorm national swing, this means that the Conservatives requirea swing o just under 7% to secure a majority.7 This is higher than the party has managed inany election since the Second World War.8

Furthermore, the growing popularity o minor parties and independent candidates inrecent years (see gure 1.2) leaves a signicant grey area on the swingometer betweenLabour and Conservative majorities. Recent projections indicate that anything between adead heat in terms o vote share and a 10% Conservative lead would be likely to return ahung parliament.9 This no mans land would widen urther should there be a urther drito support away rom the two main parties, or instance as a result o the parliamentaryexpenses scandal, or a higher rate o abstention among their supporters.

The election could also be driven closer in the nal ew months o the campaign, particularlyi economic indicators begin to look more positive. There may also be some repeat o the1992 late swing back to the incumbent government on the basis o the better the devil youknow principle.

The purpose o this report is not to predict the outcome o the next election, nor to play therole o advocate or a hung parliament. Rather, we address the question o what could beexpected to happen in the eventuality that a uture general election ails to deliver a singleparty majority. We discuss the challenges that would be aced in adapting to this unamiliarsituation, and ask what lessons can be drawn rom hung parliaments elsewhere and in the

4 See A. Lijphart, Patterns o Democracy: Government Forms and Perormance in Thirty-Six Countries (New Haven: Yale University Press,1999).

5 For instance, the average o 114 national opinion polls published between 1 January and 25 October 2009 gave the Conservatives a 14%lead. Source: http://ukpollingreport.co.uk/blog/.

6 Authors calculations based on data at: House o Commons Library, General Election 2005, Research Paper 05/33 (2006), at: http://tinyurl.com/yk2kqn8.

7 C. Rallings, R. Johnston and M. Thrasher, Changing the Boundaries but Keeping the Disproportionality: The Electoral Impact o the FithPeriodical Reviews by the Parliamentary Boundary Commissions or England and Wales, The Political Quarterly, Vol. 79, No. 1, p. 84.

8 S. Lightbown, Electoral Swing, House o Commons Library Standard Note: SN/SG/2608, September 2008, at: http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/brieings/snsg-02608.pd, p.3.

9 D. Butler, cited in S. Kalitowski, Hung up over nothing? The impact o a hung parliament on British politics, in Parliamentary Aairs, (2008)Vol.61, No.2, p.398.


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Figure 1.2: The decline o two-party dominance since 1945

Source: UK Election Statistics: 1918-2004, at: http://tinyurl.com/election-stats

1.2 A Hung Parliament: What next?

The immediate challenge aced in a hung parliament scenario would be the selection oa prime minister. Unlike many other jurisdictions, Westminster has no ormal rules orthis process. There is no investiture vote by MPs, nor any legal rules about who should begiven rst option on trying to orm a government. Under Britains uncodied constitution,a prime minister is asked to orm a government by the Monarch, who is guided by thestrict convention to ask the person best placed to secure the condence o the House oCommons (that is, the active or passive support o a plurality o its members). Ater normalWestminster elections, there is little controversy about this matter since the leader o theparty holding a majority o seats in the chamber is the only possible appointment theMonarch can make.

When parliament is under no overall control the process becomes more complicated, andmay well last longer than usual in a system amiliar with removal vans in Downing Street the

day ater the election. Ater 1974s inconclusive election, or instance, the narrowly deeatedincumbent Edward Heath did not tender his resignation until the Monday ater the election,while he considered his options.10 Hal a century earlier, it was a ull six weeks beore StanleyBaldwin whose Conservatives lost their majority in the 1923 election, but remained thelargest party was orced out ater losing a vote on the Kings Speech (by convention therst ormal parliamentary test or all administrations).11

International evidence also conrms the impression that Westminsters constitutionalarrangements, and in particular its electoral system, make or a comparatively switgovernment ormation process. Government ormation elsewhere in Western Europe hasbeen calculated to last an average o 39 days, about ten times longer than in the UK.12

10 See R. Brazier, Constitutional Practice (Oxord: Oxord University Press, 1999), p.35.

11 Ibid., pp.33-35.

12 L. de Winter, The role o parliament in government ormation and resignation, in H. Doring (ed.), Parliaments and Majority Rule in WesternEurope (New York: St. Martins Press, 1995), at: http://www.uni-potsdam.de/u/ls_vergleich/Publikationen/PMR.htm, p. 118. The gure reersto average government ormation between 1945 and 1994 in the EU15 plus Iceland and Norway.

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(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1983), p.102.


On the other hand, the government ormation process has lasted an average o only 10 daysin Scotland, ollowing the three elections to the devolved Parliament in Edinburgh, noneo which have returned a single party majority. There is no reason to believe that the UKpolitical system could not cope with a transition o this length.

At Westminster, it is almost certain that in a hung parliament in the near uture the twolargest parties would continue to be Labour and the Conservatives. But which o the partyleaders would be selected to lead the government? In most cases, the leader o the biggestbloc in the Commons could expect to orm the government. This refects what has beendescribed as the mysticism about pluralities which means that even the narrowest leads are

oten portrayed as unambiguous victories, rather than eective dead heats.13 The Scottishelection o 2007, which the SNP won by a single seat, is a case in point. In New Zealandtoo the largest party has always led the government, despite dramatic ragmentation othe party system since 1996. However, the constitutional position is that the leader o thelargest party has no automatic right to the keys o Number 10 or even to be called uponrst by the monarch. The key question is which party can, through coalition or supportarrangements which other parties, command a majority in the Commons on votes ocondence and supply.

The distinction between incumbent and challenger parties is one relevant actor. I in 2010Labour were to lose their majority, Gordon Brown would remain in oce in the immediateatermath o the election whether Labour or the Conservatives were the largest party, albeitas caretaker Prime Minister with little political power. As noted, this was the scenario orEdward Heath in February 1974. Likewise, there were many in the Scottish Labour Partykeen to ormulate a new ruling coalition in 2007, when the party had been overtaken bythe Scottish National Party. The current administration would enjoy the advantage oincumbency, and the PM would remain the Monarchs chie constitutional adviser. The PMwould be under no obligation to resign unless and until it became clear that a majority othe House were against him.

But there is a countervailing orce to this incumbent advantage. The political reality is thata government that had just lost its majority would be on the back oot, and aced with anopposition with political momentum behind them. It may thereore become possible or theopposition to orm an alternative government even when the incumbent administration hadthe greatest number o seats. This was the case when Baldwin was orced out in early 1924

to be replaced in oce by a Labour Party that had 67 ewer seats. It was also considered inWales in 2007, when a Plaid Cymru led coalition came within a whisker o unseating theruling Labour team.14

A resurgent Conservative party that narrowly ailed to win a majority might thereorebe able to make a persuasive political claim to have earned the right to orm the newgovernment. An additional actor that could potentially strengthen this claim to legitimacy even i the party had ewer seats would be i the party had also won more votes thanLabour. This is a not implausible scenario, given the previously mentioned bias to Labour interms o the translation o votes into seats.

Ultimately, however, the single most decisive actor is likely to be the position taken by theLiberal Democrats and other smaller parties. For at least 15 years the Liberal Democrats

have been seen as closer to Labour than the Conservatives. Indeed in 1997 a Labour-LibDemcoalition was under serious consideration on both sides up until (and even ater 15) Labourslandslide victory. The oundations o such a deal had even been laid via the Joint ConsultativeCommittee established to drive orward the parties shared commitments on constitutionalreorm.16 Although there is some evidence that Liberal Democrat party members would stillrather support a Labour than a Conservative PM,17 the relationship between the currentleaders and senior teams o the two parties is ar less intimate. In a hung parliament in 2010Labour will also, by denition, be in decline, and thereore a less attractive partner thanwould previously have been the case. The most likely strategy or the Liberal Democrats in

13 D. Butler, Governing Without a Majority

14 In the end, the so-called rainbow coalition ell apart ater the Liberal Democrats ailed to endorse the deal. See J. Osmond, Crossing theRubicon: Coalition Politics Welsh Style (Cardi: Institute o Welsh Aairs, 2007), pp. 28 - 31.

15 See BBC News, Blair considered coalition ater 1997, 16 November 1999, at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/522526.stm.

16 See Report o the Joint Consultative Committee on Constitutional Reorm: The Cook-MacLennan Agreement, (1997),at: http://tinyurl.com/cook-maclennan.

17 BBC News, LibDems back Labour pact, 21 September 2009, at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/the_daily_politics/8266336.stm,though note that the methodology and ndings o this poll were challenged on the LibDem Voice blog, at: http://tinyurl.com/ygvwg6u.


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have slightly more realistic hopes in this regard (the partys ambitious target is to win 20

a hung parliament would thereore be to support (whether actively or passively)

leaders o governments at Westminster are used to. Coalitions typically bind the partnersEither o these core options entails a greater degree o compromise and concession than


the right o the largest party to orm an administration, at least i that party hadalso won the most votes. However, this might be swayed by any potential deal beingoered (and particularly whether it included the holy grail o electoral reorm or theHouse o Commons).

As or the minor parties, only the Ulster Unionists and SDLP are natural ideological allieso either o the major parties (Conservatives and Labour respectively) but their small sizemeans their chances o holding the balance o power are tiny. The same goes or Plaid Cymru,or whom a great success would be to double its current representation o 3 MPs. The SNP

seats), but would be unlikely naturally to support either Labour or the Conservatives. Again,their strategy would be infuenced by any deal on oer (in their case, this might includethe devolution o additional powers, support or a reerendum on Scottish independence, oradditional unding or Scottish government priorities18).

1.3 Minority and Coalition Administrations: A spectrum o optionsWhich party leader is selected to lead the country ollowing an inconclusive electionrepresents only part o the government ormation process. The other element is determiningwhat type o government would emerge. The major choice acing a leader trying to orm aworkable government is whether to seek a ormal coalition with one or more other parties(meaning that ministerial portolios are shared with the parties in question), or whether to

go it alone as a minority administration, dependent on ad hoc shiting coalitions o supportto secure majorities in the legislature.

to a joint policy platorm. Compromise and negotiation is up ront, during the governmentormation phase, and then subsequently takes place mainly behind closed doors withinthe executive, with the government presenting a united ace in public and in parliament. Acoalition with a secure majority can then typically get its way to a similar extent as a singleparty majority government. To those used to majority rule, stable coalition government(such as that experienced by Scotland between 1999 and 2007, in Wales since 2007 andin Germany since the Second World War) can thereore eel more amiliar in terms o theexecutive-dominated policy-making process it acilitates, and more traditional oppositional

role that non-government parties tend to adopt.

Single-party minority government (as currently in Scotland and Canada), by contrast, makesit ar more complicated or the government to pass legislation, budgets, and even to survive,since the opposition always has the theoretical ability to overthrow the administration bydeeating it on a matter o condence. However, rom the perspective o the lead party, it iseasier to maintain unity within the government than in a coalition, as no up-ront dilution oparty policy is required. O course, compromise (i not outright deeat) will almost certainlybe a necessity when such policies require parliamentary backing. But an advantage or thegovernment can derive rom the ability to strike deals with dierent parties in dierentpolicy areas, which increases bargaining power and limits the scale o concessions it mustmake. And in political terms, it can be preerable to suer honourable deeat in the ace oinsurmountable opposition, rather than to make an explicit U-turn on maniesto pledgesor dearly-held principles. More importantly, rom a wider public interest perspective,minority government may bring a more open and inclusive decision-making process. To itscritics, however, it might tend towards weak and unstable government, which is unable toadequately tackle key policy challenges acing the country.

The unpredictability and fuidity o minority government would thereore be likely topose greater challenges than a majority coalition to the Westminster system as a whole.Supporting Disraelis maxim that England does not love coalitions, it is also notable thatoutside o times o war and economic crisis, hung parliaments at Westminster have typicallyled to minority rather than multi-party majority administrations. For these reasons, our ocusin this report is predominantly on how government and parliament in the UK would operate

18 The party leader Alex Salmond recently set out a list o additional spending pledges totalling a reported 800m which SNP members wouldseek i they were to hold the balance o power at Westminster. Source: Bolger, A., Salmond sets out terms or hung parliament, FinancialTimes, 17 October 2009.


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in the absence o an executive majority. How coalition government works was covered in thecomprehensive study conducted by our predecessor Ben Seyd.19

An additional lesson we emphasise throughout the report is that coalition and minoritygovernment should not be considered a simple binary choice in the context o a hungparliament. For a start, the two models can be blended in the orm o a minority coalition(as has been the case in New Zealand or much o the past decade). Such governments acethe challenges both o maintaining internal unity and o constructing ad hoc issue-basedmajorities to pass legislation. Counting the Westminster norm o single party majoritiestoo, this makes our ideal types o government along the two axes o minority/majority and

single/multi party status.

But the picture is even more complex than this. Experience rom elsewhere reveals a complexspectrum o potential cooperative arrangements between parties that blur the distinctionbetween the concepts o government and opposition (see gure 1.3). For instance, minoritygovernments in New Zealand have regularly struck condence and supply agreements,according to which one or more opposition parties agree to support the government onmatters o condence, but retain the discretion to decide their own position on otherpolicy matters. Sweden and Denmark have also made extensive use o so-called contractparliamentarism arrangements.20 Scotland in 2007 experimented with a more limitedversion o this, when a Cooperation Agreement committed the small Scottish GreenParty to backing the SNP leader or the position o First Minister principally in return ora committee chair and consultation rights on policy. The 1977 Lib-Lab Pact also alls intothis category, with the minority Labour administration granted the security o being ableto survive condence votes, while the smaller Liberal Party gained limited (and ultimatelyunsatisactory) scope or input into policy discussions.21

In New Zealand, other more innovative variants have included coalition agreements withagree to disagree clauses in place o strict collective responsibility, and the appointment oministers rom minor parties who are bound by collective responsibility only in the policyareas covered by their portolio. This type o arrangement can oten suit the smaller partieswho are guaranteed a degree o infuence and support rom the civil service, but withoutrisking seeing the partys identity subsumed into that o the larger party (which can damageelectoral credibility).

Figure 1.3: A typology o government orms

19 B. Seyd, Coalition Government in Britain: Lessons rom overseas (London: Constitution Unit, 2002).

20 See e.g. T. Bale and T. Bergman, Captives No Longer, but Servants Still? Contract Parliamentarism and the New Minority Governance inSweden and New Zealand, Government and Opposition, (2006)Vol. 41, No. 3.

21 See e.g. A. Michie and S. Hoggart, The Pact: The Inside Story o the Lib-Lab Government, 1977-8 (London: Quartet Books, 1978).

Formal Partnership

Coalition Majority Rule

(eg. Scotland 1999-2007,Wales 2007-2010)

Westminster Model

Single Party Majority Rule

(eg. Westminster 1979-present,Canada 1979-2004)

Best (or Worst) of Both Worlds

Minority Coalition Rule

(eg. New Zealand 1999-2008)

Going it Alone

Single Party Minority Rule

(eg. Canada 2004-present,Scotland 2007-present,New Zealand 2008-present)

Majority

Minority

Grey Area(eg. confidence and supply agreements,

ministers outside Cabinet,contract parliamentarism,

Lib-Lab Pact 1977-78)

Multi-PartySingle-Party


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But, as mentioned, Westminster also holds some lessons o relevance. In particular, the

exception to the rule, but the party system has diverged rom two-party dominance to the

crisis. As a result, a historically bounded negative view o minority government may havea result o government decline, and, in the ormer case, also in the context o economic


1.4 Making Multi-Party Governance Work: Lessonsrom elsewhere

At Westminster, as noted above, there are deep-rooted concerns about the likely impact othe lack o a majority on good government, by which is meant stable, eective, accountableand strategic administration.22 One explanation or these perceptions is that the two mostrecent examples o minority governments (those o Callaghan and Major) occurred as

developed.23However, there may also be intrinsic reasons why minority rule at Westminster isdicult to make work well, which international comparative study should help to highlight.

Part two o this report presents our substantive ndings rom studies o non-majoritariangovernments in Canada, New Zealand, and Scotland, which all have political systems derivedrom the Westminster model, though with important variations. Canada, discussed by MarkChalmers in chapter 3, remains the most similar in terms o its electoral and parliamentarysystem and wider constitutional context, but has ar more recent experience than the UKo minority rule. A strongly majoritarian culture still treats minority administrations as the

extent that minority parliaments may become increasingly common. As a majoritariansystem manqu, Canada thereore oers important lessons to the UK, though given theperceived ailure o the most recent minority administrations, this may be more in the orm

o cautionary tale than exemplar.

New Zealand, up until 1996, was also similar to Westminster in its electoral system andtwo-party dominance. A shit to proportional representation at that point, as explainedby Ben Yong in chapter 4, led to widespread predictions o political instability, ineectivegovernment, scal imprudence, and short-termism. The experience since then, mostlyminority coalitions with support party arrangements, suggests that such predictions wereexaggerated; and underestimated the ability o political actors to adapt to an unamiliarelectoral system and the outcomes it produced.

Our third country case study, Scotland, was given a proportional electoral system romthe outset o devolution in 1999, with the explicit intention that this would oster a moreconsensual power-sharing political culture. The three Scottish Parliament elections to

date have led to the creation o two majority coalitions and one minority government. Asdiscussed by Akash Paun in chapter 5, both these government orms have been reasonablyeective and stable, strongly against expectations in the case o the minority government

ormed in 2007.

To enhance comparability, each o these case study sections adheres to a common template,examining in turn each stage o the lie cycle o non-majoritarian governments. We examinein turn their births, lives and deaths (that is their ormation, operation, and dissolution).We discuss both the marriages o ormal coalitions and the more promiscuous temporaryliaisons that characterise minority administrations, with an emphasis tilted towards thelatter, or reasons set out above.

Lib-Lab Pact, discussed in detail in chapter 2 by Catherine Haddon, oers insight into howthe Westminster system might still react and adapt to a hung parliament scenario. So, to alesser extent, does the more distant experiences o the early twentieth century (see Box 1,below). In addition, Westminster has more recent relevant experience in the shape o theHouse o Lords, which was transormed into a balanced chamber by the removal o 90% othe hereditary peers in 1999. The upper house has deeated the government over 500 timeson legislative votes since then,24 requiring the executive to negotiate and compromise withopposition parties in a similar way to minority governments.

22 See e.g., the chapters by S. Jenkins and P. Norton in A. Brazier and S. Kalitowski (eds.), No Overall Control? The impact o a hung parliamenton British politics (London: Hansard Society, 2008).

23 K. Strom cited in J. Mitchell (2008), in A. Brazier and S. Kalitowski (eds.), Ibid., p. 73.

24 Data collected by Meg Russell at The Constitution Unit, UCL.See:http://www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit/research/parliament/deeats08-09.htm


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From this range o examples, it is not easy to derive a clear and consistent story o whatminority rule entails. The overarching lessons, however, are that there are a range oapproaches open to governments without a majority, and that in the right circumstances,and with sucient willingness o the parties to orm eective working relationships,a government that looks extremely weak on paper can be highly successul (just asgovernments that look powerul in terms o seats held can ail). This is because governmentsstanding in parliament is only one source o their power. An administration with or withouta majority in parliament has a range o constitutional resources that enable it to govern. Inthe UK, these include various prerogative powers (including the right to request dissolutiono parliament), control o the budget process, and dominance o the parliamentary agenda.These are supplemented by the signicant administrative and inormational resourcesprovided by the civil service, to which opposition parties have no access. Finally, there arepolitical resources which have a bearing on the success o a minority government. The partyin power at least when it is popular can make it dicult or opposition parties to blockgovernment proposals by claiming the legitimate right to set the policy agenda. Oppositionparties may also nd it dicult to present a united ront against the government.

How and whether to apply the lessons rom our case studies will be a matter or the nextPM (or potential PM) conronted by a hung parliament, as well as or other relevant actorssuch as opposition leaders, backbench MPs, civil servants, and parliamentary ocials. It is ourhope, however, that this study and the targeted briengs or dierent actors that comprisethe nal two chapters o this report will go some way to smoothing the process o

adaptation i and when the House o Commons is next let without a single party majority.

1.5 Research methodologyThe methods adopted by the research team during this project included reviewing thesecondary literature (see the Bibliography), and analysis o parliamentary proceedings,government documents and media coverage. Complementing this was a series o semi-structured interviews with politicians, advisers, parliamentary ocials, civil servants,and commentators rom the our political systems examined: UK, Canada, New Zealandand Scotland. In total, between February and September 2009 over 60 interviews wereconducted. In addition, the research was inormed by the proceedings at a hal-day seminarheld in Edinburgh in May 2009, eaturing speakers rom Wales, Canada and Scotland,and with some 25 ocials and other experts in attendance. In writing up ndings, theresearchers consulted with a subset o the interviewees, receiving written comments romover 35 experts across the countries covered. Finally, aspects o the research included simplequantitative analysis, such as calculations as to the quantity o legislation passed andparliamentary deeats suered by governments in various periods.


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Box 1: Timeline o governments at Westminster25

During the twentieth century there were a number o periods o minority and coalitiongovernment in Britain. In all there were six minority governments and our periods ocoalition rule. Only ater the Second World War did single party majority governmentbecome the norm.

1900-1945The issue o Irish home rule dominated British politics around the turn o the 20th

Century and had split the Liberal Party ater the conversion o its leader WilliamGladstone to the cause o devolution. From 1895 to 1905 the government was ormedby a Conservative/ Liberal Unionist coalition. In 1906 the Liberal Party won a majoritybut was then reduced to a minority rom 1910 to 1915 and looked or support romIrish Nationalist and Labour MPs.

During the First World War, opposition members were brought into a Liberal-led nationalgovernment, which continued ater the 1918 election despite the Conservatives winninga majority o seats. In 1922 the Conservatives withdrew rom the coalition, governing asa majority or a year beore PM Stanley Baldwin called an early election on the issueo protectionism.

The 1923 election remains the most even three-way split to date, with the

Conservatives winning 258 seats (50 seats short o the 308 required or a majority),while Labour and the Liberals took 191 and 158 seats respectively. As the leader o thelargest party, the Conservative Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin, chose to remain in poweruntil meeting Parliament, six weeks ater the election, at which point a Labour-Liberalalliance deeated him on a condence vote. Labour Leader Ramsay MacDonald insteadormed a minority administration.

This rst Labour government survived or eight months by bringing in no measures thatwould oend the Liberals but ell ater instigating an unnecessary vote o condence.26In the subsequent 1924 election the Conservatives won back their majority, while theLiberals held just 40 seats, ending the three-way split and reducing the Liberals to therole o third party, a position they would remain in or the rest o the century.

Ater ve years o Conservative rule, the 1929 election saw Labour returned as thelargest party or the rst time. The party was twenty seats short o a majority and atera period turned to Liberal support, oering electoral reorm as an inducement.

In the context o economic crisis, the Prime Minister split his own party in 1931 byorming a National Government with Conservative and Liberal members. This lasteduntil 1935, by which time a Conservative majority had reasserted itsel. A nationalcoalition government was again ormed during the Second World War under WinstonChurchill. This broke up ater victory in Europe and a caretaker government was ormedunder Churchill until the July 1945 election brought Labour a large majority.

25 Research conducted by Catherine Haddon and Akash Paun.

26 Butler, Governing Without a Majority, p. 44.

Unionist

National GovernmentLib Dems

Conservative

Labour

1990-991980-891970-791960-691950-591940-491930-391920-291910-191900-091890-99

Majority

Minority

Coalition

2000-09


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Margaret Thatchers Conservatives in May 1979, and ushering in 18 years oeight months beore losing a condence motion. This triggered an election, won by

Labour government to survive until the summer recess despite numerous parliamentary


1945-2009Ater 29 years o single party majority rule, the close February 1974 election let Labour17 seats short o a majority and the incumbent Conservative government 21 seats short.The election had taken place in the context o serious industrial action and the three-dayworking week. Since his party had taken the greatest share o the popular vote, and theLiberals had polled more than 6 million votes, Heath elt that this meant that there wasa large anti-Socialist majority, and that the nation would expect him to attempt theormation o a right-centre coalition beore handing over power to the Labour Party.27

Heath consequently spent a weekend attempting to negotiate a coalition with theLiberal Leader Jeremy Thorpe, oering the smaller party a Cabinet post and a SpeakersConerence on Electoral Reorm. The Liberal Party rejected this oer and Heath resignedas PM. A Labour minority government under Harold Wilson consequently took oce.

The reluctance o the other parties to return immediately to the polls allowed the

deeats. When a second election occurred on 10 October 1974 Labour gained a majorityo just 3. By 1976 this majority had gone, and in March 1977 the Labour governmentunder James Callaghan was orced to look or Liberal support to avoid deeat. Theconsequence o this was the Lib-Lab Pact (discussed in the ollowing chapter), underwhich the Liberal Party oered the government support on condence motions in returnor policy consultation and legislation opportunities.

Following the end o the pact in July 1978, Labour managed to retain power or

Conservative majority rule.

The most recent example o minority government in the UK occurred in the nal ewmonths o John Majors administration, when the PM saw his slim 1992 majority erasedby deections and by-election deeats. The government managed to survive until the endo its term due to tactical alliances with dierent minor parties. Indeed Major had beenorced to seek such alliances even beore ormally losing his majority to compensate orsplits in his party, particularly on the issue o Europe. John Majors deeat in May 1997has been ollowed by over a decade o Labour majority rule.

27 The National Archives (TNA) CAB128/53/33, Cabinet Conclusions, CM(74), 9th Meeting, 1 March 1974.


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Between the evening o Monday 21 and late-night on Tuesday 22 March at least ve


2. A Brie History o the Lib-Lab Pact,1977-78Catherine Haddon, Institute or Government

2.1 IntroductionHaving lost its majority the year beore, in March 1977 Jim Callaghans Labour administrationaced likely deeat on a motion o no condence. To stave o this vote, the PM negotiated adeal with the Liberal Leader David Steel, which came to be known as the Lib-Lab Pact. Thissecured or the PM the parliamentary support o 13 Liberal MPs on House o Commons voteso no condence, in return or infuence over government policy and legislation.

Though in political terms it is oten viewed as a ailure, the Pact did achieve its primaryaim it sustained the Labour Government through nearly a year and a hal o minority

government at a time o great economic and social turmoil. For the Liberal Party, however,the diculties o having genuine infuence over government policy meant that this episodecame to be seen as a cautionary tale and a model to be avoided in uture hung parliaments.

2.2 The ormation o the PactOn 17 March 1977 the Callaghan Government was acing huge opposition, including withinits own party, to public expenditure cuts to help pay or the 1976 IMF loan. The mathematicso the vote meant that even i all 310 Labour MPs voted with their own party, Labour waslikely to lose in the ace o opposition rom 278 Conservatives, 11 Scottish Nationalists,3 Welsh Nationalists, 2 Scottish Labour MPs, 10 Ulster Unionists and 13 Liberal MPs. Thegovernment, as the Whips rapidly became aware o the likely deeat, retreated entirelyand conceded the vote by a count o 293-0. To try to orce the governments resignation,Margaret Thatcher, Leader o the Opposition, tabled a motion o no condence, which wouldtake place the ollowing Wednesday. This let the PM less than a week to negotiate with thesmaller parties, with Callaghan considering seeking support rom the Ulster Unionists as wellas the Liberals.

Steel spent the weekend ollowing the government deeat at his constituency, returningon the Sunday to London to conduct discussions with his own MPs. Steel had also usedthe weekend to carry out a poll o local Liberal chairmen about the likely prospects o theParty in a General Election. On the basis o his survey o regional party chairmen Steelthen advised his colleagues at Westminster that though the prospects o a general electionwere not wholly bad or the Liberals, he elt that they should try or an agreement withLabour.28

drats o the agreement went back and orth between the Labour and Liberal leaderships and

our meetings were held between Steel and Callaghan. Joel Barnett, Chie Secretary to theTreasury, described it as a long and tortuous discussion.29 Steel met with Callaghan or therst time on the Monday evening, with the PM telling sta that the discussions were veryunpromising. All too vague.30 For Steel the meeting was sombre but amicable, providing himwith sucient encouragement to think that such an arrangement could be possible.31 Steeldeveloped a six-point drat o Liberal requirements that went to Callaghan late on the morningo the Tuesday. The PMs initial reaction was to reject the Liberal drat as unacceptable.32 Themain problem was agreeing the wording on proportional representation (PR) or direct

28 D. Steel, A House Divided. The Lib-Lab Pact and the Future o British Politics (London: Weideneld and Nicolson, 1980), p.3629 J. Barnett, Inside the Treasury (London: Andre Deutsch, 1982), p.116.

30 B. Donoughue, entry or 21 March 1977, Downing Street Diary. With James Callaghan in No. 10, (London: Jonathan Cape, 2008), p.168.

31 Steel, A House Divided, p.35

32 Donoughue, entry or 22 March 1977, Downing Street Diary, p.169

The most obviousdeect [o theLib-Lab Pact] wasthe one orecast bythe doubters in our

own ranks, namelythat the ailure andunpopularity o theLabour governmentrubbed o on us.

David Steel, A House Divided (1980),p.153.


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elections to the European Assembly. This was a high priority or the Liberals, but intractableor Callaghan because there was so much opposition in the already ractured Labour Party.Steel was only willing to concede a less clear commitment on this issue because Callaghanhad given him private assurances that when the time came he would back PR himsel.33

Callaghan did not consult his partys National Executive Committee or wider membershipduring the negotiating period, and only called a special Cabinet meeting to discuss Steelsapproach and the way orward on Wednesday 23 March, the morning o the no condencevote, which let his Cabinet colleagues little room or manoeuvre. Having been ratied byCabinet at this meeting, the agreement was announced by Callaghan during the Commons

no condence debate, to Thatchers surprise, and subsequently published.34

The Pact stated that the Liberal Party would work with the Government in the pursuito economic recovery. The Pact was initially agreed to last until the end o the presentparliamentary session at which point both parties would consider whether the experimenthas been o sucient benet to the country to be continued. Although it coveredsome o the most important issues or the Liberal Party, the government made ew rmcommitments. Legislation or direct elections to the European Assembly or 1978 was to bepresented to Parliament in this session but the government merely agreed to consultationon the electoral method and to take ull account o the Liberal Partys commitment toproportional representation. Likewise, on devolution, the agreement called or progress andconsultations on Liberal proposals, but little more, except that there would be ree votes onthe electoral systems or both the devolved assemblies and Europe. It was underlined thatthe Pact would not commit the Government to accepting the views o the Liberal Party, orthe Liberal Party to supporting the Government on any issue. 35

In the end, both sides were under pressure because o the limited time available or thenegotiations. For Callaghan, the no-go areas included a commitment on PR, but he did provewilling to allow or more ormal machinery o cooperation. For Steel, less binding agreementsor legislation and policy were acceptable in return or the apparatus that would bringhimsel, and his party, closer to power. The ailure to secure more detailed commitmentswould later mean that Steel had little power to orce urther concessions, and led to a eelingo underachievement in the rest o the party, but to have pushed too ar would likely haveprevented the Pact in the rst place.

2.3 Making it WorkThere were three levels to the mechanics o the Pact. First, consultations between thetwo parties were to take place through the Labour minister and his opposite number.Second, there would be a joint Consultative Committee to consider any important issues,including parliamentary aspects, which have not been disposed o by consultation betweenthe appropriate Ministers and Liberal Party spokesmen.36 Third, there were to be regularmeetings between the Chancellor and the Liberal Party economic spokesman ... and thePrime Minister and the Leader o the Liberal Party will meet as necessary. 37 The ConsultativeCommittee was to be used to settle disputes that could not be resolved at the rst level,with the Steel-Callaghan relationship to orm a nal court o appeal.38 Rather thanmaking or smooth negotiations at a lower level, however, the Pact instead saw numerousdisagreements whereby the leaders were constantly drawn into discussions.39

There were to be six members in the Consultative Committee, with three rom each side.The Labour members were led by Deputy Leader Michael Foot, and the Liberals by theirTreasury spokesman John Pardoe. Additional individuals attended meetings when particularsubjects were on the agenda. The meetings were to take place every ortnight, preerablyon a Wednesday evening with the agenda agreed between Steels oce and Foots PrivateSecretary. Foots oce would also produce minutes and provide a secretariat to the

33 Steel,A House Divided, p.39.

34 The National Archives (TNA), PREM16/1399,Joint Statement by the Prime Minister and the Leader o the Liberal Party, 23 March 1977.Reproduced at: http://www.liberalhistory.org.uk/item_single.php?item_id=77&item=history , accessed 8 September 2009

35 Source or all extracts rom the Pact: TNA, Joint Statement, op cit.36 TNA, PREM16/1399, The Prime Minister to All Members o the Cabin et, 29 March 1977

37 Alistair Michie and Simon Hoggart, The Pact: Inside Story o the Lib-Lab Government, 1977-78 (London: Quartet Books, 1978), p.100

38 Ibid.

39 Ibid.


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Committee. In one o their rst meetings, on the rst day o the Pacts operation, Steel andFoot agreed that the Committee would be symbolic, providing oversight o how the thing isgoing, not trying to do the work itsel.40 Consultation between the two parties was supposedto take place largely at the level o Minister and the respective Liberal Shadow.

Though it was serviced by Foots oce, the Consultative Committee did not oer the Liberalsaccess to the ull resources o the Civil Service nor to classied government inormation notexpected to be published unpublished privileged inormation was only to be given to Steelon the approval o Callaghan. Access to resources was one o the biggest diculties that theLiberals aced as their nancial and manpower capabilities were dwared by Labours support

rom the Civil Service. The way in which civil servants recorded meetings between the partiesand correspondence regarding the Pact shows that the Civil Service continued to treat theLiberals as an opposition party rather than part o the government.41

The act that the Pact was not a ormal coalition ensured that the Liberals were not boundto support Callaghans administration and could maintain their independence. Unortunately,this also meant that there was conusion to outsiders, jumped on by the Conservatives andthe Press, about the issues on which Liberal support or the government would be expected,and how signicant disagreements between the parties were. From the Labour perspective,an initial hurdle was the objection put orward by Tony Benn, and others, that the Labourleadership should have consulted the partys National Executive Committee, i not thewider party, over the decision to go into any kind o governing agreement with anotherpolitical party even one short o a coalition. Consultation with the wider party would havebeen more time-consuming, probably more public and thereore likely to tie the negotiatinghands o the Labour leadership. Callaghan thereore preerred to push ahead on his owninitiative, even at the risk o dividing his party ater the act. It is noteworthy, however, thatwhen conronted with the option o an early election, in July 1977, Callaghans Cabinetunanimously backed the PMs proposal to renew the Pact or the next parliamentary session. 42

There were disputes rom the outset. One o the most damaging occurred within days o thePact ollowing the Budget announcement. Ater the IMF loan o the previous year the LabourGovernment was under intense pressure to make cuts on public expenditure. Following theBudget, the Liberals inormed the government that they would not be able to support theproposed increase in petrol duties. Treasury minister Joel Barnett was highly critical o thesmaller party, reerring to the naivety o the Liberals, who blithely thought that they could

deeat us on a Budget Ways and Means resolution and yet we could carry on as i nothinghad happened.43

A meeting between the Prime Minister and David Steel was held to resolve the issue. Therecord o this meeting is a good example o the disputes and negotiating styles that wereseen throughout the Pact. In addition to the policy disagreement itsel, both Callaghan andSteel knew how much was at stake. The threat o an election was used by both to bolstertheir respective positions and there is a clear sense o brinkmanship and o each attemptingto call the others blu, while emphasising a wish to resolve the dispute in a positive ashion.Callaghan sought to persuade the Liberals either to support the government over the budgetvote or to abstain, but could not oer a concession as it would destroy the Governmentscredibility.44 Steel argued that though he agreed that the government could not lose aBudget vote and carry on, and he did not wish this to occur, he could not now concede when

the Liberals had publicly declared opposition to the petrol tax increase.45 As when the Pactwas agreed in the rst place, over the issue o PR, the eventual solution was or Callaghan toprivately agree, with Mr Steel himsel and only Mr Steel, that there could be changes at theCommittee Stage.46

40 Steel,A House Divided, p. 44.

41 TNA, CAB197/94, Files o the Chancellor o the Duchy o Lancaster, Liberal Party (Lib/Lab Pact), December 1977-April 1978

42 TNA, PREM16/1227, Chequers Cabinet meeting on 26 June 1977 on government strategy: political and economic prospects and electoral

implications, 27 June 1977.43 Barnett, Inside the Treasury, p.117.

44 TNA, PREM16/1399, Record o a Meeting between the Prime Minister and Mr David Steel, 31 March 1977

45 Ibid.

46 Ibid.


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The 1977 budget demonstrated the major diculty in establishing and maintaining anagreement that was a long way short o a ormal partnership in government. In particular,the problem was not just lack o Liberal access to inormation prior to the budgetannouncement, but more the traditional restriction o key budgetary decisions to theChancellor and the Prime Minister.47 Though members o the Cabinet, not orewarned, maylikely support their own government over the budget vote itsel (though this was ar romguaranteed or Callaghans government); or the Liberals the issue was o embarrassmenti required to support measures that were contrary to stated party policy. In 1978, becausethey had longer to prepare, the Liberals were able to initiate discussions over the budgetmuch sooner, better able to ormulate their approach and priorities or infuence, andrelatively better at anticipating problems. The Liberals also co-opted outside help romacademics and businessmen to develop their strategy.48

Despite the early teething diculties the Pact ensured that the government survived to thesummer o 1977. Callaghans reasoning or continuing the alliance beyond this point wasset out in a June 1977 memorandum to the Cabinet, which argued that as Liberal conditionsor the Pact did not seem excessive, the Cabinet should consider continuing it or a xedlonger period, even up to 1979.49 The act that the Pact could guarantee the survival o thegovernment, and the argument that the electoral prospects or Labour could well reverseitsel i the economic basis or National Recovery were achieved, were enough to convincethe Cabinet to continue the Pact.50 Though there were leaks and major disagreements inthe run-up to the 1978 budget, it was the issue o Liberal by-election results and the ailure

to make headway over devolution and electoral reorm that caused the greatest problemsor maintaining the Pact.51 By May 1978, when Steel acknowledged that it was increasinglydicult to delay a denitive announcement on ending the Pact, it had become a relativelyopen secret that it would not last much longer.52

2.4 End o the Pact and DissolutionThe Lib-Lab Pact came to an end in July 1978, ater the parties agreed, by mutual consent,to part ways. The Pacts disintegration ultimately resulted rom Steels appreciation that thegovernment would be unable to give any urther concessions, particularly on PR, an issuethat had loomed in the background throughout (and on which the Liberals had ailed towin a Commons vote despite some Labour support). The Liberal Partys worsening electoralperormance at by-elections, later described as a long parade o humiliating ailures, sawSteels strategy lose signicant grassroots support, and thereore also helped to hasten thedemise o the Pact.53

Even at its end both Callaghan and Steel presented it as having done its job in maintaining astable government or long enough to allow Labour to make some progress on the economyand on incomes policy. The end o the Lib-Lab Pact did not, however, lead directly to thedissolution o Parliament. It was only on 28 March 1979 several months later that Labourlost a no condence vote, ater the ailure o the Scottish and Welsh devolution reerendums,precipitating the 1979 general election.

2.5 ConclusionsThe history o the Lib-Lab Pact and its survival or well over a year shows that the success ominority government by parliamentary alliance depends upon shared interests andthe ability

o the leaderships o both parties to work together. It was dependent in particular uponCallaghans willingness to compromise and Steels desire to demonstrate the ability o theLiberals to work in a coalition, not least as an argument in avour o PR. This was somewhatat variance with much o his party who wanted tangible results. Steel eectively had topersuade, cajole and threaten many o his MPs into support and there was little consultationwith the wider party membership.

47 I. Marsh, Liberal Priorities, the Lib-Lab Pact and the Requirements or Policy Infuence, Parliamentary Aairs, (1990) Vol. 43, p. 301.

48 Michie and Hoggart, The Pact, p.163

49 TNA, CAB129/196/17, Cabinet Memorandum, CP(77)67, The Governments Strategy, 23 June 197750 Ibid.

51 Steel,A House Divided, p.136.

52 Ibid., p.138.

53 Michie and Hoggart, The Pact, p.174.


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take is simply that aligning the party with an unpopular government, not surprisingly, did not


The main aim o the Pact was to avoid a major government deeat. By this measure, androm Callaghans perspective, it can be seen to have been a success. For Steel, it brought hisparty something closer to an experience o coalition government. This was almost exactlywhat he wanted: a taste o power... and the invaluable experience o being locked into themechanism o government, something denied to Liberals since the end o the last war.54

Perhaps the most dominant actor in subsequent measurements o the success o thePact or the Liberals was in their infuence on government policy, or lack thereo. Ater theconclusion o the Pact the Liberals set out what they considered to be the policy successesthey had achieved under the Pact. Later study o this list concluded that although the

Liberals can be seen to have successully exerted their veto power and to have achievedmodication o government proposals, their ailure to advance their own agenda is clear.55As a result, many in the party took rom the Pact the lesson that in uture hung parliamentsthe party should seek ormal coalition (as eventually achieved in both Scotland and Wales)to avoid being saddled with responsibility without power. However, an alternative lesson to

boost the partys political standing.

The 1976-79 period (as well as the February to October 1974 government) does show themeans by which governments can survive in Westminster in a hung parliament withoutentering into ormal coalition. Both Wilson and Callaghan were able to survive a signicantnumber o government deeats, though this did not make or a government able successullyto pursue a positive policy agenda. However, it is plausible that resistance within the Labourparty would have rendered impossible any attempt to initiate a ormal coalition with theLiberals in any case. The choice or Labour was thereore between the Pact and an earlyelection they were likely to lose. The Pact enabled the government, against expectations, toserve almost a ull term in oce but could not be expected to save the party rom ultimateelectoral deeat, nor to solve the proound economic and social problems acing the countryat the time.

54 Ibid.

55 Marsh, Liberal Priorities, p. 309.


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o learning or the UK. Some o its minority governments are regarded as having been highlythan coalition rule in the absence o single-party majorities, Canada provides a useul sourceAs a result o its similar constitutional structure, and its tendency to opt or minority rather

and these were retained at Conederation in 1867, when Canada gained de acto independence.Canada developed Westminster parliamentary institutions in the mid-nineteenth century,


3. Canadas Dysunctional MinorityParliament

Mark Chalmers, The Constitution Unit, UCL

3.1 Context

They are organised on the principle o responsible government, meaning that the executivemust be able to command the condence o the House o Commons. The Federal Parliamentconsists o the House o Commons, elected on the basis o the rst past the post system, anda wholly-appointed Senate. The Queen is Canadas ormal Head o State; however the powerso the Crown are exercised by the Governor General on the advice o the PM and Cabinet.

Canada has three major national parties represented in the Commons: the ConservativeParty o Canada (Conservatives) and the Liberal Party o Canada (Liberals), which are thetraditional oce seeking parties, and the policy seeking New Democratic Party (NDP).56In addition, the Bloc Qubcois, a separatist party that only runs candidates in Quebec,typically wins around a sixth o seats in Parliament.

Since Conederation, Canada has had a total o 13 minority governments (see gures 3.1 and3.2). These can be divided into three periods: the Mackenzie King government between 1921and 1925 and again rom 1926 to 1930; a second period o on-o minority governmentsled by both main parties between 1957 and 1979; and the period rom 2004 to the presentwith PM Paul Martins Liberal minority government and continuing with two Conservativeminority administrations under Stephen Harper. By contrast, there has only been onecoalition government, and that was created in response to the outbreak o the First World

War, rather than an inconclusive election.57 Canada almost had its second ormal coalitiongovernment in December 2008 when the Liberals and NDP signed an accord which wasbacked by the Bloc Qubcois. Ultimately this did not happen, ollowing the controversialdecision o the Governor General to temporarily prorogue parliament (discussed below).

successul and eective at governing. For example, Lester Pearson led a minority governmentover two consecutive Parliaments in the 1960s, and is credited or enacting the CanadaPension Plan and universal health care. His government is viewed by many as one o themost productive and creative in Canadian history.58 Similarly, John Dieenbakers minoritygovernment in 1957, which introduced a number o important legislative reorms andinitiatives, is generally regarded as a major success. However, the current period o minorityrule is not generally seen as a success.

56 D. Good, Minority Government and the Public Service, Notes or a panel presentation at the Conerence, Minority Report: The Eects oMinority Government in Canada since 2004 , at Wilred Laurier University, 8 February 2008, at:http://publicadmin.uvic.ca/aculty/good/minority_govt.pd.

57 For a good historical overview o minority governments in Canada see Chapter 3 o P. Russell, Two Cheers or Minority Government: TheEvolution o Canadian Parliamentary Democracy(Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publication Limited, 2008). It should be noted that PMBordens government held a 43 seat majority in the House o Commons, and only invited the opposition parties to orm a coalition topresent a united ront on the extremely controversial issue o conscription.

58 P. Russell, Learning to Live with Minority Parliaments, in P. Russell and L. Sossin (eds.) Parliamentary Democracy in Crisis (Toronto:University o Toronto Press, 2009), pp. 144-145.

The art o minoritygovernment isengineering deeaton the mostavourable terms.

James Travers, Toronto Star, 22 March2007.


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Source: Parliament o Canada; Peter Russell (2008).


Recent voting patterns indicate that the prospect o any one party gaining a majority isunlikely, given that each has a strong regional base o support. Thus, barring a dramatic shitin voter preerences or the collapse o one or more parties, minority governments will in allprobability occur more requently in the uture.59

Despite the countrys experience, minority governments are seen by many Canadians asaberrations, and short-term exceptions to the otherwise normal condition o governmentswith secure majorities. This has been reinorced by six consecutive elections between 1980and 2004 which returned governments with sizable majorities. As in the UK at present,Canadians became accustomed to majority governments, and until 2004 a large segment o the

population had no memory o, or experience with, minority government at the ederal level.

Minority governments are also oten portrayed by the media as inecient, unstable, andultimately as less eective than governments with secure majorities.60 It is unclear whetherthis is a refection o attitudes towards the current minority government or o a moregeneralised hostility towards the concept o minority rule. Either way, there does seem to bea airly broad consensus that minority government has not worked well since 2004.61

Figure 3.1: Three Periods o Minority Governments in Canada

Year Governing Party Duration Prime Minister(years)

1921-192562 Liberal 4 William Lyon Mackenzie King

1925-1926 Liberal 1 William Lyon Mackenzie King

1926-192663 Conservative


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Figure 3.2: Share o Seats Held by Canadian Governments (%)

Canadian Electoral Outcomes 1921-2008

3.2 Government FormationThe Canadian government ormation process is highly similar to that o the UK. Following aninconclusive election the incumbent Prime Minister has the option o resigning or meetingthe House o Commons to see whether his or her party has the condence o a majorityo MPs.65 It is not clear how long the PM could wait beore making a decision. The onlyrequirement is that there must be a session o Parliament at least once a year.66

In the event that the incumbent PM resigns, the Governor General will usually ask theleader o the opposition party most likely to enjoy the condence o the House to orma government. Thus, ollowing the 2006 election, incumbent PM Paul Martin advised theGovernor General to invite Conservative Leader Stephen Harper to orm a government as hisparty had the most seats in the House.

However, it is not an automatic rule or convention that the incumbent PM should resign ianother party wins a plurality. The right o an incumbent or newly appointed governmentto govern derives rom its ability to maintain the condence o a majority o MPs in theHouse. This is usually tested shortly ater an election with the vote on the Address in Replyto the Speech rom the Throne which sets out the governments legislative agenda or theorthcoming parliamentary session. Should the opposition parties successully pass a motionwhich conveys a lack o condence in the government and its agenda, then by conventionthe government must resign.67

When a government has been deeated in an election, it remains in oce until a newgovernment can be ormed. In the case o elections that have resulted in new governmentssince 1957, the new government has been sworn in 10 to 14 days ater the election.68

65 E. Forsey, How Canadians Govern Themselves 5th Ed. (2003), at:http://lpintrabp.parl.gc.ca/lopimages2/bibparlcat/3000/Ba373601.pd.66 Section 5, Constitution Act 1982, states, There shall be a sitting o Parliament and o each legislature at least once every twelve months.

67 A. Heard, Constitutional Conventions and Parliament, Canadian Parliamentary Review, (Summer 2005), p. 21.

68 Government and Canadas 39th Parliament: Questions and Answers (Ottawa: Library o Parliament, 2005), p. 18, at: http://www.parl.gc.ca/inormation/library/PRBpubs/prb0543-e.htm.

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Making Minority Government Wo

making minority government work: hung parliaments and the challenges for westminster and whitehall

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