making un peacekeeping more robust: protecting the ......gaye (left) and abdul hafiz, united nations...

Making UN Peacekeeping MoreRobust: Protecting the Mission,Persuading the Actors

AUGUST 2011Patrice Sartre

I N T E RNAT I ONA L P E AC E I N S T I T U T E

Cover Photo: The envoy of UN

Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon,

Military Adviser General Babacar

Gaye (left) and Abdul Hafiz, United

Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire

(UNOCI) Force Commander General,

visit the troops providing security at

the Hotel Golf in Abidjan, where

President Alassane Ouattara and his

prime minister, Guillaume Soro, were

residing. December 21, 2010,

Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire. © UN Photo.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in

this paper represent those of the

author and not necessarily those of

IPI. IPI welcomes consideration of a

wide range of perspectives in the

pursuit of a well-informed debate on

critical policies and issues in interna-

tional affairs.

IPI Publications

Adam Lupel, Editor and Senior FellowEllie B. Hearne, Publications Officer

Suggested Citation:

Patrice Sartre, “Making UN

Peacekeeping More Robust:

Protecting the Mission, Persuading

the Actors,” New York: International

Peace Institute, July 2011.

© by International Peace Institute,

2011

All Rights Reserved

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

PATRICE SARTRE is a retired French Marine General,

having served in peace operations in Africa and the former-

Yugoslavia. He also served as deputy assistant director

within the Strategic Affairs Directorate of the French

Ministry of Defense; military advisor to the Permanent

Representative of France to the United Nations; defense

advisor to the French Secretary-General for National

Defense; and lastly defense advisor to the Ministry for

Foreign Affairs. He currently lectures on African Security,

UN and EU peacekeeping, and counter-piracy. He may be

contacted at [email protected].

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author would like to thank Alexandra Novosseloff and

the French Strategic Affairs Directorate, which initiated and

supported this study while it was being written.

IPI owes a debt of thanks to its generous donors who

contribute to the Coping with Crisis program. In particular,

IPI would like to thank the government of France for

helping to make this project possible.

CONTENTS

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

FROM THE REJECTION OF WAR TO ROBUST PEACEKEEPING

THE WEAKNESSES OF PEACEKEEPING AT THE START OF THE 21ST CENTURY

BEING MORE ROBUST WITHOUT ABANDONING THE FUNDAMENTALS OF PEACEKEEPING

LEGITIMIZING ROBUSTNESS BY THE DUTY TO PROTECTRATHER THAN THE RIGHT TO SELF-DEFENSE

The Objective of Robustness: Protecting to Persuade. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

PHYSICAL AND LEGAL PROTECTION OF THE PEACEKEEPING OPERATION

PROTECTING ORDINARY PEOPLE

MAINTAINING THE PEACEKEEPING FORCE’S FREEDOM OF ACTION

A Doctrine of Robustness:Neither Coercing Nor Giving Way . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

STRATEGIC ROBUSTNESS THROUGH THEUNITY OF THE ACTORS

MANDATES NEED TO BE SPECIFIC RATHER THAN ROBUST

Cohesive Management at the StrategicLevel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

A ROBUST MEDIA APPROACH

ROBUSTNESS WORKS BY CONTROLLING THE AREA OF CRISIS

TACTICAL ROBUSTNESS AND THE NEED FOR HIGH-QUALITY TROOPS

A ROBUST APPROACH MEANS ACCEPTING RISKS

COHESION PRODUCES ROBUSTNESS

Capabilities and Robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

WHAT KIND OF ORGANIZATION PRODUCES ROBUST COMMAND?

ROBUST ORGANIZATION OF THE FORCES THAT COMPENSATES FOR THEIR STRUCTURAL WEAKNESSES

THE TECHNOLOGIES OF ROBUSTNESS

Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

ROBUST PEACEKEEPING AND COUNTER-INSURGENCY

RECOMMENDATIONS

Patrice Sartre 1

Executive Summary

The debate about robust peacekeeping pits theenthusiasm of “diplomats,” who believe inpeacekeeping but worry that it might not succeed inviolent situations, against the scepticism of the“military,” who see its failures as proof that theproper role of military forces is war fighting.

In the last decade of the twentieth century, theuse of the military in peacekeeping operationsencountered setbacks that destroyed the confidencethat the leaders of the great powers had invested init. Yet, the last of these misfortunes occurred almostten years ago, so we might well ask whether the UNhas not already resolved the problems related to“robustness.”1 It is also true that, since that time, theheaviest lifting in crisis-management situations hasbeen done by coalitions that are both morehomogenous and more powerful, especially NATO,leaving the UN with lower-risk missions.

However, during the same period, the UnitedNations has invested a great deal of effort in thedevelopment of doctrine, from the Brahimi Reportin 20002 to the Capstone Doctrine3 in 2008, andmore recently by the New Horizon discussions, allof which show a concern for robustness. Evenstrong coalitions like NATO have encountereddifficulties, and have been obliged to decidebetween trying to overcome them by adoptingsome approaches drawn from peacekeeping, or bysimply abandoning the mission. This suggests thatthe UN may be called upon to face difficultsituations again in the future, and that it would dowell to prepare itself for that possibility.

It is true that peacekeeping will always be amatter of consent rather than compulsion, ofpolitical processes rather than force, but robustnesswill increase the ability to control the area ofoperations where a crisis is taking place, protecting

those who are working toward peace, the localpopulation, and the peace process. Neitherimposing by force, nor yielding to force, butprotecting and persuading is the objective and thedoctrine of such a policy of robustness.

The pages that follow are not intended as acritique of the doctrinal work carried out in thepast few years; on the contrary, this report is meantto build on past achievements, to review theweaknesses of peacekeeping, and finally to considerways to increase its robustness. These ways will notbe found without calling into question somefundamental taboos of peacekeeping. Thus, I willpropose that self defence should no longer be thecriterion for the use of force, but that it should beaccepted for any action to protect peacekeepingforces, their mission, and the population, includinga policy of protection that permits temporary andlocalized offensive action.

I will attempt to show that the UN shouldcontinue to devote a great deal of effort to doctrinein order to increase the coherence both of theconception and the conduct of its operations, andalso to communicate in a language that is moremeaningful to UN member states and their publicopinions. This doctrine should further enhance theunity of the actors around the Security Council,and, on the ground, increase the military’s ability tocontrol the areas affected by crisis, by increasing themobility of the forces. The UN’s second concernshould be to compensate for the structuralweaknesses of its operations, their extremelydiverse multinational nature, and their excessivedilution. Finally, I will attempt to begin a debateabout the technological innovations thatpeacekeeping could give rise to, and which wouldbe over and above the materiel designed for large-scale symmetrical conflicts.

1 One could cite various difficulties encountered in peacekeeping operations since the start of this century, like the Kivus crisis in 2008, as qualifications to thisstatement. These difficulties should not be ignored, although in the case of the Kivus, we should note that over and above the indisputable problem of robustness, inthis case the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) was not able to avoid becoming involved in combatoperations, even though its capabilities were already inadequate for peacekeeping. As I will explain at greater length, robustness consists above all of the capability tokeep the peace in a context where recourse to force is not ruled out.

2 United Nations, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations [Brahimi Report], UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809, August 21, 2000.3 United Nations Departments of Peace Operations (DPKO) and Field Support (DFS), “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines

[Capstone Doctrine],” New York, January 2008.

2 MAKING UN PEACEKEEPING MORE ROBUST

Introduction

Peacekeeping is the result of the contradictionbetween the rejection of war and the need to keeppeace by force. Still based on the idea of the consentof the parties—a concept that had lost some of itsweight by the end of the twentieth century—peaceoperations use the term robustness to designate aconcern for the safety of their members or the localpopulation. When the safety of these is threatened,peacekeeping is impelled to go beyond anexclusively defensive posture, and allow itselflimited and local offensive actions, with the provisothat they are not diverted toward coercive ends thatremain beyond its remit. This more robust attitudecannot be legitimated by the concept of self-defensealone, on which the (purely defensive) use of forcewas previously based. It now seems necessary tobase it on a duty to protect, a task that the interna-tional community gives to peacekeeping missions.

FROM THE REJECTION OF WAR TOROBUST PEACEKEEPING

The UN Charter, which is based on the idea ofpreventing war, does not envisage peacekeeping.Yet this method of crisis management has of coursebeen built on the fear of a war breaking out, overthe course of fifty years of vicissitudes in theSecurity Council. It is on this basis that DagHammarskjöld and Lester B. Pearson “invented”peacekeeping in 1956.4

In Chapters VI and VII, the UN Charter providesfor political and military procedures for resolvingconflicts. The idea was relatively simple: establish ameans for dialogue (Chapter VI) and, if thesituation becomes a threat to international peace,take military action (Chapter VII). The wording ofthe second option did not exclude the first and viceversa. To deal with the technical aspects of themilitary option, a Military Staff Committee was toassist the Council. This committee never really sawthe light of day,5 as with the other measuresprovided for in Chapter VII.

It is commonly asserted that the Cold Warprevented the development of procedures andmechanisms provided for in Chapter VII, but it ismore accurate to say that it was first and foremost

the fear of war, a fear heightened by the spread ofnuclear weapons, that explains why it wasimpossible to implement Chapter VII provisions inthe spirit anticipated by its authors. Due to the factthat first two, and subsequently all, of thepermanent members of the Council, held the abilityto devastate the world in their hands, any recourseto force involved the risk of an escalation toextremes, thus completely negating the very spiritof the Charter. So, in the same way that nuclearweapons explain why the war between the twopower blocs remained “cold,” they justified the lackof application of Chapter VII as it was originallyintended.The Invention of a Crisis-ManagementMechanism

As it could not apply Chapter VII as intended, theSecurity Council, actively backed by the Secretary-General in search of status, used the powers thatChapter conferred, but in the spirit of Chapter VI:use of force in the service of the negotiation of apolitical solution, which had become not only theobjective, but also the means, of conflict resolution.It is no exaggeration to assert that nuclear weaponsthus forced the “international community” togradually invent a method of dealing with—if notresolving—certain conflicts more effectively thandiplomacy alone, or even the use of force in itself.This method was peacekeeping.

The first steps were timid, involving only militaryobservers. Then it became clear that they had to beprotected and that it would be useful if forces wereinterposed between the parties to a conflict. A firststage in peacekeeping had been reached, whichlasted until the fall of the Berlin Wall. Its successdepended on the assumption that the belligerentswould respect their commitments, compelled asthey would be to do so by their patrons on theCouncil, and that they could more or less controltheir forces, which remained the case as long as theconflicts involved national armies. Very soonhowever, Congo, and then Lebanon, demonstratedthe limits of such an approach.

Such a limited use of force did not require signif-icant military capability, and this justified theMilitary Staff Committee being kept on ice. In theamicable struggle waged by the chancelleries and

4 Lester B. Pearson, “Force for UN,” Foreign Affairs 35:3 (April 1957): 395-404. 5 Alexandra Novosseloff, “Le Chapitre VII, le recours à la force et le maintien de la paix,” Guide du maintien de la paix, Montréal, 2008, pp. 85-102.

military headquarters of all of the great powers, thefirst, masters of both the Council and the GeneralAssembly, kept the second well away from the “glasstower” on First Avenue. The diplomats consideredthat the militaries of the major powers, fresh from apitiless war, were not ready for the more subtle usesof force. They also feared that the military wouldbecome involved in arms control, or, even worse,disarmament, both tasks enshrined in Article 47,but also traditional and fundamental tasks fordiplomats. Finally, and most importantly, theSecurity Council willingly let the Secretary-Generaltake responsibility for, and suffer the adverseconsequences of, implementing the militarydecisions of the member states. And so it was thatthe United Nations Office for Special PoliticalAffairs of the Secretariat took charge of the deploy-ment, direction, and support of the troops deployedon the ground, soon to be assisted by a militaryadviser, carefully kept at a distance from theSecretary-General’s office. The Setbacks of the Post-Berlin Wall Era

From 1990 onward, the disintegration of somestates and their escape from the dominance of thegreat powers undermined an essential condition ofpeacekeeping: the consistency and effectiveness ofthe commitments made by the parties to a conflict.Jean-Marie Guéhenno has described how “in theconfusion of a civil war, the commitment of non-state actors to a peace agreement can never beassumed; consent becomes a relative and evolvingconcept: it can be ambiguous, and it can bewithdrawn.”6

Therefore, the protection of observers andpeacekeeping troops requires the occasionalexercise of force and the provision of assets to directand support that use. These lessons were onlylearned at the cost of deplorable humanitarianfailures that made people doubt the relevance ofUN peacekeeping: Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda inparticular. At first, attempts were made to resolvethe problems with more resources: increasing themanpower in the field, protecting units moreeffectively, strengthening the directing body intothe Department of Peacekeeping Operations(DPKO), whose hesitant formation was marked by

oscillations between civilian management andmilitary dominance. The department thenimproved its procedures, notably by introducingthe notions of planning and rules of engagement.In Search of a Doctrine

But as difficulties persisted, it slowly became clearthat there was a doctrinal gap, which led to theBrahimi Report.7 That report did not seek to set outa doctrine that was not yet mature; rather, it astutelylimited itself to posing a number of questions withthe maximum clarity. It asked questions about therole of the Security Council, particularly about itssupport for the troops deployed on the ground, andfor the Secretary-General, about the robustness ofthe force deployed, about its rules of engagementand about the missions assigned to it.

Through its control of the political process, theCouncil was able to evade these questions andconcentrate the debate on the way in which UNoperations were becoming increasingly multidi-mensional. In practice, under the general rubric ofpeacekeeping, UN operations had graduallybrought together all of the components of interna-tional action likely to contribute to the search forpeace. There was the political element, naturally,but also the humanitarian one and soon the civilianone, in the form of police and justice, then little bylittle all of the key functions that contribute to therebuilding of the state. Needless to say, all of thesefunctions required protection, and this gave rise tothe debate on the robustness of operations. Thisdebate was sharpened by the alternative, warfghtingsolutions that the Western nations, disheartened bythe UN, employed for resolving the problems thataffected them directly: Bosnia, Iraq I and II,Kosovo, and Afghanistan.Peacekeeping or Counterinsurgency?

However, in Iraq and Afghanistan, the limitationsof these warfighting doctrines quickly became clear,and even though NATO did not turn directly to theUN, it did adopt some of its methods. In particular,there was a cautious attempt to gain the consent ofthe parties, a clumsily executed limitation of the useof force, and an attempt to structure the operationaround a peace process. At the same time, conflicts

Patrice Sartre 3

6 Jean-Marie Guéhenno, “Robust Peacekeeping: Building Political Consensus and Strenghtening Command and Control,” in Robust Peacekeeping : the Politics of Force(New York: Center on International Cooperation, November 2009), p. 8.

7 United Nations, Brahimi Report.

less vital for the great powers began or continued,and the UN had to deal with them with the limitedresources and narrow focus that still typifiedpeacekeeping. Finally, a new player, the EuropeanUnion, with large budgets and a political orienta-tion close to that of the United Nations, hesitantlytried its hand at crisis management, borrowing itssubstance from UN peacekeeping and itsprocedures from NATO.

The events of September 11, 2001, did notimmediately portend a threat to peacekeepingforces: only American, or possibly Western, powerwas seen as being threatened. The attack inBaghdad on August 19, 2003, with the death ofSergio Vieira de Mello along with twenty-one otherpersons revealed the extent to which, evenindependently of their relations with the parties inconflict, the agencies of the United Nations couldbe threatened by terrorist actions. Thepeacekeeping operations felt that they were first inthe line of fire.

It was in this situation of convergence betweenthe concerns of the UN, NATO, and the EU that areal doctrine, called the Capstone Doctrine, wasestablished in 2008. This forms the frameworkwithin which the discussions today about “a newhorizon for peacekeeping operations” andespecially about robustness, are taking place. Twoyears earlier, the reinforcement of UNIFIL providedan opening for the difficult return of Europeannations to UN peacekeeping, demonstrating theneed to provide it with a more definite operationaldoctrine.8

THE WEAKNESSES OF PEACEKEEPINGAT THE START OF THE TWENTY-FIRSTCENTURY

Today, peacekeeping has weaknesses at every levelof its implementation: tactical, operational, andstrategic. These weaknesses are threefold: physicalvulnerability for the local population and the actorsin the peace process, legal and moral vulnerabilityfor those involved in operations and, finally, mediaand political weaknesses of the UN Secretariat, themembers of the Security Council, and the troop-contributing countries. These different weaknessestogether comprise a single one: the weakness of the

mere notion of peacekeeping, which risks rejectionby the international community each time it bringsthem more worry than reassurance.

The root cause of all of these weaknesses isphysical vulnerability at the tactical level. It hasbecome worse as states have become weaker andthus less able to guarantee their consent. It hasincreased since terrorism has become global, eventhough this threat has remained more abstract thanreal with regard to peacekeeping. Any failure at thetactical level—a setback such as casualties amongthe local population or the peacekeeping force—filters upward and calls into question the robust-ness and the competence of the operationalcommander and headquarters in New York.Subsequently, the moral or legal responsibility ofthe main players in such a failure may be invoked.

In the face of such criticism, existing problemsmay be aggravated by a sense of discouragement, aswas the case in Kigali in 1994, or, on the contrary,may produce an over-reaction causing casualtiesamong the civilian population. This latter problemhas never actually arisen in UN operations, butother peacekeeping operations have been criticizedfor this reason, some of them when they weresupporting a UN operation.

The last, and in the end most serious, vulnera-bility of UN operations is the possibility that, out ofconcerns about their own weaknesses, they mightabandon the fundamentals of UN peacekeeping,exceed their remit, and cross the threshold intowar-fighting.

BEING MORE ROBUST WITHOUTABANDONING THE FUNDAMENTALSOF PEACEKEEPING

UN peacekeeping is not an unproblematic concept,but it is conceived in the spirit of the UN Charter:only use force as the last resort and, if that happens,do everything possible to prevent an escalation thatmight once more send a region or even the wholeworld into disaster. The touchstone of fidelity to theCharter, is the consent of the parties. This consent,which is inseparable from the renunciation of theexercise of force as the means of achieving theoperation’s aims, however, does not exclude the useof force completely, which, we will see, it should be


8 Alexander Mattelaer, “Europe Rediscovers Peacekeeping? Political and Military Logics in the 2006 UNIFIL Enhancement,” Egmont Paper, Brussels: Royal Institutefor International Relations, October 2009.

possible to extend beyond self-defense withoutunder mining the spirit of the Charter.

For a long time, there has been a questionabledistinction between operations “kept underChapter VI” and those “placed under Chapter VII.”It has been easier to invoke this distinction than totalk in terms of the spirit of the Charter. Now thispurely formal distinction has become increasinglythreadbare, even though it still features in theconventional discourse of certain commentators, itis possible to make progress on the discussion offundamental issues. This is all the more truebecause for some time now operations haveemployed methods and procedures that only haveto be incorporated into doctrine for their legiti-macy to be recognized.Peacekeeping and the Spirit of theCharter

Because the Charter was born out of the paroxysmsof World War II, especially the Holocaust andHiroshima, and the indiscriminate bombing ofGerman cities such as Dresden, its authorsimagined that any use of force would ultimately betaken to extremes. Therefore, the general idea wasthe substitution of law for force.9 But, when itenvisages the use of force to put an end to the mostdangerous situations, Chapter VII seems to implythe resolution of problems by force, and notthrough what was to become peacekeeping.

Therefore, the circumstances of the post-warperiod forced the international community toconceptualize its crisis-management activitieswithin a triangle of “force-law-peace,”10 which led toa major innovation: peacekeeping. It certainlyenvisaged the use of force, but within the spirit ofthe Charter, and therefore with the intention ofbringing peace. Thus, this “hybrid product ofdiplomatic and military conflict resolutiontechniques (…) and principles of internationaldevelopment applied to situations of conflict”11 was

born; an operational mechanism with no explicitlegal basis and that was unable to find a doctrinalformulation in the fifty years before the BrahimiReport.12

Its creation and its development—bothessentially pragmatic—have continually raised legalissues,13 but those involved have borne in mind thefact that they were the inheritors of a prudentstrategy of getting what benefits they could fromthe use of force without the risk of an escalationwhich could lead to disaster. Our task is indeed toimprove the effectiveness of peacekeeping, andcertainly by making it more robust; but we alsohave a duty, above all, not to allow it to turn intowar fighting. The Consent of the Parties Limits theScope of Peacekeeping

In the beginning, seeking the consent of the statesin conflict was a diplomatic device, intended tomake up for the absence of the physical force thatthe Security Council had not agreed to provide. Ifthe parties to the conflict did not accept it theyrisked triggering measures in Chapter VII of theCharter, at a time when that still only meant war,and war against industrial powers with massivestocks of weapons and hardened by five years ofglobal conflict. It is worth noting that the first twooperations (observation missions, in fact), wereconceived in this way. They were known asUNTSO14 and UNMOGIP15 and they are stillongoing, as there has been no solution to theconflicts, and the consent of the parties has alsobeen maintained.16 This consent gave the observersand interposition force troops only a symbolic role,of no real military value.

Nevertheless, the seeking of consent quicklybecame a fundamental element of crisis manage-ment, making the warring states themselvesresponsible for managing their own crisis. Thisconsent not only meant that they accepted the

Patrice Sartre 5

9 Anne Rainaud, “Réflexion sur l’usage de la force, le droit et les opérations de maintien de la paix,” Perspectives, N° 1 (2003), available athttp://revel.unice.fr/pie/document.html?id=41, § 2.

10 Ibid., § 4.11 G. Wirick and R. Miller, cited by Rainaud, “Réflexion sur l’usage de la force,” § 17.12 United Nations, Brahimi Report.13 Pineschi, “L’emploi de la force dans les operations,” p. 1.14 UNTSO is the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, the UN body responsible for monitoring the ceasefire in Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Syria, and the

Palestinian Territories. It was established by Security Council Resolution 50 in May 1948.15 UNMOGIP is the United Nations Military Observers Group in India and Pakistan, set up in Kashmir in March 1951 by Security Council Resolution 91. It replaced

the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan.16 Should we criticize peacekeeping because it has been unable to find a solution, or praise it for its persistence in preventing war in spite of the obstinacy of the

parties?

http://revel.unice.fr/pie/document.html?id=41

peacekeeping force but that they also adhered to theplan for the settlement of their conflict as proposedby the international community, and that theywould cooperate in its implementation. The safetyof the peacekeeping operation thereby guaranteedwas no more than a by-product of this consent.

So the UN’s firm attachment to preserving theconsent of the parties demonstrates not just its owndeterminedly peaceful orientation, but also andmost importantly, an essential part of the organiza-tion’s crisis-management technique. This commit-ment distinguishes peacekeeping from peaceenforcement, because “the coercive nature of anoperation is not determined by the authorisation toexercise force but by the fact of acting whiledisregarding the consent of the host state.”17 It is notdesirable, nor would it be responsible, to encouragethe UN to renounce this indisputable advance inthe international practice of conflict resolution. Onthe contrary, we should hope that it survives thecurrent difficulties.

However, “by definition, consent cannot beimposed.”18 The single word “consent” excludes theexercise of force by the international community tosettle disputes. It limits the scope of peacekeepingsolely to those crises where it can be obtained;19 at aminimum, broad consent is required, which doesnot preclude local and short-lived outbreaks ofviolence, which are dealt with firmly, but withoutoverstepping the limits of consent. For a long time,the Security Council has been looking to blur thedistinction between Chapter VI and Chapter VII ofthe Charter, but had to give it up in 2006, duringdiscussion of the reinforcement of UNIFIL. Chapter VI vs. Chapter VII: The End of aMyth?

In August 2006, in order to get the United States toaccept a compromise on the reinforcement ofUNIFIL,20 the Secretary-General of the UnitedNations had to convince the American delegationto the Security Council that a robust mandate couldbe drawn up without referring to Chapter VII of theCharter. It was a break with more than ten years ofinstrumentalization of the text of the Charter by the

Council that had long prevented peacekeepingoperations from becoming more robust. Manyexperts already believed that placing an “operationunder chapter VI” was a contradiction in terms.Others even doubted that “placing somethingunder” a Chapter had any legal significance.

UN Security Council resolutions are traditionallydivided into preambular and operational sections.The first of these sections frequently citesnormative, prescriptive, or legal documents thathave the effect of legitimizing or interpreting theactions to be taken. In its resolutions, the SecurityCouncil has never failed to “reaffirm” some of itsprevious decisions and to “recall” the duties andpowers conferred on it by the Charter, especially byciting a particular Chapter or Article. Until thebeginning of the 1990s, the Council often citedChapters VI and VII of the Charter as the basis forits decisions to deploy, use, or threaten to use force.But the idea that the Council could decide to makeuse of one Chapter of the Charter, excluding thearrangements of another Chapter, is nowhere to befound in the text.

It is also true that the idea that peacekeepingoperations could not use force, except in exercisingthe right of self-defense, had become established indoctrine. Faced with the difficulties arising fromthis constraint, UN doctrine continually expandedthe definition of the right of self-defense to includeresistance in any form, or even any attempt tooppose by force the mandate of the peacekeepingforce.21 After the disappointments in Somalia andthe Former Yugoslavia, diplomats (rather than legalexperts) tried to convince member states that thislimitation only existed under Chapter VI of theCharter, but that Chapter VII gave permission to gofurther in the use of force. A legally dubiouspractice then came into being—one that alsoproved not very effective on the operational level.Operations that were supposed to be “robust” were“placed under chapter VII,” as opposed to those“left under chapter VI,” which were considered lessrobust. It was as if invoking one of the chapters ofthe Charter made the other disappear—an outcome


17 Pineschi, “L’emploi de la force dans les operations,” p. 10.18 Guéhenno, “Robust Peacekeeping ,” p. 8.19 Pineschi, “L’emploi de la force dans les operations,” p. 10.20 UN Security Council Resolution 1701 (August 11, 2006), UN Doc. S/RES/1701.21 United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 425, UN Doc. S/12611 (March 19, 1978).

nowhere envisaged in the Charter.Although it was intended to address the hesita-

tion of some states on the Council regarding certainUN operations, this distinction had no effect onrobustness on the ground. In practice, invokingChapter VII was a political gesture with noconsequences in terms of material resources andorders—consequences that would havedemonstrated that the Council had assumedresponsibility alongside the Secretary-General andthe troops deployed on the ground.

There is no basis for attempting to place thedistinction between peacekeeping and coercion inthe differences between these two chapters.Furthermore, peacekeeping is not referred to ineither of them. It derives from the spirit of ChapterVI, but it is only in Chapter VII that the tools offorce that it uses are considered. Naturally, theauthors of Chapter VII considered that it thuslegitimized a use of coercion by force, but it wouldbe very difficult to show that they meant to prohibita more moderate use inspired by Chapter VI, aslong as the conditions that they had set fordeploying it had been met.

Thus, the real distinction is the level of the threatto peace at stake. A resolution may or may not citeChapter VI; nevertheless the conceptual and legalfoundation for the resulting operation is foundwithin it. Whether it is cited or not, it is only theexistence of Chapter VII in the Charter that conferslegitimacy on the deployment of a force, even insupport of the objectives of Chapter VI, so long aspeace is threatened. Furthermore, it is noteworthythat the cautious drafting of this Chapter goes so faras to cite demonstrations of force, or blockades, asexamples of the use of force, but takes refugebehind “all necessary measures,” a vague expressionoften used in Council resolutions, to evoke more-determined actions. In fact, the two chapters form awhole that considers two ways of resolving conflictsthat are not alternatives, but complementary,depending on the situation. It is in these twochapters that the legitimacy of any deployment offorce, whatever its robustness, should be found,without any need to cite them explicitly.

The Non-exercise Rather than the Non-use of Force

As we saw, “by definition, consent cannot beimposed,” and force cannot be deployed to obtainit.22 We prefer “non-exercise” to “non-use,” if thissemantic nuance has any meaning. The UN haslong accepted the necessary and legitimate use offorce to ensure the safety of an operation or popula-tion. Conversely, in no case can the exercise of forcebecome the mechanism by which the operationachieves its objectives, notably among them theconsent of the parties. The practice of peacekeepingalready frequently makes use of mechanisms andprocedures that reconcile robustness and the non-exercise of force. They now need to be incorporatedinto doctrine in order to make them more easilyunderstood by public opinion, more legitimate, andmore easily handled by the Security Council. • Force is not the decisive tool in peacekeeping

As we have seen, one consequence of the principleof consent of the parties is that this type of crisismanagement cannot make use of force to achieveits objectives. This principle is fundamentallymisunderstood by international public opinion,some politicians, and almost all military personnel.It could even be argued that it is called intoquestion by the UN itself since the CapstoneDoctrine clumsily asserts: “The ultimate aim of theuse of force is to influence and deter spoilersworking against the peace process or seeking toharm civilians; and not to seek their militarydefeat.”23 Those who make an ideology out of thewritings of Clausewitz would suggest that it isstupid, dangerous, or useless to deploy forceswithout getting the most out of them. Realists makethis distinction in theory, but mostly acknowledgethat it is an impractical one in reality.

A much smaller group considers this an exampleof progress made during the twentieth century—aperiod that can reproach itself with many crimes inthe matter of the use of force—and that it should bepreserved at all cost. Only the latter see any interestin the discussion about robustness, but they alsoask the question: can such a limited use of force leadto robust peacekeeping?

Patrice Sartre 7

22 Guéhenno, “Robust Peacekeeping,” p. 8.23 DPKO and DFS, Capstone Doctrine, p. 35.

• The weakness of peacekeeping without forceThe refusal to exercise force in order to achievetheir objectives gives peacekeeping operations aprofile which does not deter, and which mayeffectively tempt troublemakers. Independently ofthe consequences for the security of the mission, itgives Council mandates an ambiguity that LauraPineschi sees as “not constructive but destructive.”24In practice, deploying force without exercising itmakes the mandate of operations difficult tounderstand if there is no doctrine to inform it.

On the other hand, today’s asymmetric conflicts,in which the West uses a high level of force,demonstrate that the use of force itself can confervulnerability, and even demonstrate that vulnera-bility to adversaries using less force. So, the debateis still in progress between the Secretariat and themajority of the military community: what sort ofuse of force is necessary and acceptable inpeacekeeping operations? • Legitimacy and ambiguity of self-defense

As we have seen, the legitimacy of the use of forcewas recognized quickly in cases of self-defense andits acceptance was gradually extended to the protec-tion of populations, then to the fulfillment of themission itself. In 1978, the Secretary-General’sreport requested by Resolution 425 (1978) andapproved by Resolution 426 (1978) gave this self-defense a wide legitimacy that remains the ruletoday.25 It should be noted that it is precisely thisdefinition of the right to self-defense that astrengthened UNIFIL retained in 2006.26 Is itsufficient to achieve the robustness that is thesubject of debate today? It seems not, and it alsoseems that we can go further without leavingbehind the ethos of peacekeeping.

Even interpreted expansively, self-defense isinadequate to provide the necessary robustness.The extreme overstretch of peacekeeping forces is aconstant of peacekeeping, making any notion ofself-defense inapplicable: the parties to the conflictcan, when and where they want to, overmatch the

isolated units of the peacekeeping force, whichwould be incapable of defending itself. Theirprotection can only be ensured by deployingpowerful intervention forces, held at a distance butable to provide them with help as quickly aspossible, even if not instantly. However the term“self-defense” contains the notion of a local reactionby the aggressed party to an immediate attack. Theintervention of remote assets contains the idea of“retaliation,” often thought to be very different fromself-defense, especially in France where this notionis also complicated by the “légitime defense” of theFrench criminal law.27 More seriously, even whenthe intention of these interventions is the defence ofoutnumbered peacekeeping forces, the way inwhich they are carried out is necessarily an aggres-sive act against those threatening them, and thisaggression is far from the idea of “self-defense” andeven further from the “right to self-defense.” Ifthese interventions are necessary for protecting theforces, then the aggressive acts they involve must beexplicitly authorized.

In Africa, the theater where forces are most thinlyspread, these ideas have already been implementedoperationally in their most muscular form, which isthe use of armed helicopters in Sierra Leone and theDRC. However, these practices are not recognizedin doctrine and not supported by Security Councilresolutions. Very early on, Resolution 836, adoptedby the Council on June 4, 1993, to expand themandate of UNPROFOR (United NationsProtection Force) provided an example of this lackof clarity. The resolution authorized “UNPROFOR(…) in carrying out [its mandate] (…) acting in self-defence, to take the necessary measures, including theuse of force, in reply to bombardments of the safeareas by any of the parties, or to armed incursionsinto them or in the event of any deliberate obstruc-tion in or around those areas to the freedom ofmovement of UNPROFOR or of protected humani-tarian convoys.” (Emphasis my own.) It was aquestion of protecting itself, in the fulfillment of itsmission, in response to an attack. Contrary to


24 Laura Pineschi, “L’emploi de la force dans les opérations de maintien de la paix des Nations unies ‘robustes’: conditions et limites juridiques,” in La sécurité collectiveentre légalité et défi à la légalité, edited by M. Arcari et L. Balmond (Nice: Institut du Droit de la Paix et du Développement, 2008), p. 8.

25 “The force will be provided with weapons of a defensive character. It shall not use force except in self-defense. Self-defense would include resistance to attempts byforceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council.”

26 Resolution 1701 (2006) authorized FINUL to “resist attempts aimed at using force to prevent it from carrying out obligations in the context of the mandateentrusted to it by the Security Council.”

27 Article 122-5 of French criminal law demands, on the one hand, that the right to self-defense is exercised “within the same time period” as the “unjustified attack”that it responds to and, on the other, that it does not use “disproportionate force with regard to the means of defence used and the seriousness of the attack.”

normal usage, the French version took care not totranslate the English “self-defense” by “légitimedéfense.” The French légitime défense is the correcttranslation of the English “right of self-defense.” Totranslate “self-defense,” auto-défense would havebeen used. As it was expressing a more extensiverequirement than simple self-defense, the Frenchversion rightly used “pour se défendre” (“to defenditself ”), opening the way to developments that arenot available with the restrictive connotation of“self-defense” and even more the invalid idea oflégitime défense.

At that moment, the formulation and its transla-tion were necessitated by the demand for consensusamong the members of the Security Council whosaw the need for a thorough-going protection of theforce, and those members who worried about aslide into war. This “masterpiece of diplomaticdrafting” then seemed, in the doctrine of the time,like a “confusing, contradictory and unimple-mentable” mandate.28 When studying this resolu-tion, and unaware of the nuance in the Frenchtranslation, Laura Pineschi was vexed by thecontradiction between “all of the measuresnecessary” and the limitation of their use to “self-defence.”29 Yet the resolution was responding to theawareness that if force must not be the means ofmanaging a crisis, (it can only be used in self-defense) it must be the basic way of ensuring thesafety of the mission.

LEGITIMIZING ROBUSTNESS BY THEDUTY TO PROTECT RATHER THAN THERIGHT TO SELF-DEFENSE

Very early on, the United Nations was able to definea concept for use of force that avoided the exerciseof that force leading to warfighting. Conversely,

today, the issue with regard to robustness is thelegitimization of a method of using force that, whileremaining clearly limited to peacekeeping, has thephysical and legal capability to ensure the safety ofthe local population, the soldiers, and the peaceprocess. We have seen that, given the low densityboth of population and the peacekeeping force, thesafety of either can only be ensured, if they arelocally or temporarily overmatched, by the use of anexternal intervention force. However, theseoperations cannot be considered legitimate byreference to the current justification for the exerciseof force in peacekeeping operations, whichamounts to the right to self-defense.

To justify the recourse to these interventions, thelegitimacy of the duty to protect should be substi-tuted for that of the right to self-defense. This stepforward should be established in a doctrine, whichI will outline below, which establishes the notion ofan intervention force as part of the missions; andgives the Security Council and the Secretariat thetools to limit its use to the protection of the force, itsmission and the local population and exclude itsuse for pursuing the objectives of the operation. Bydefinition, self-defense can only be defensive.Protection, on the other hand, can be seen astemporarily and locally offensive, when anoutclassed unit of the peacekeeping force has to berelieved by an intervention operation. If protectionis recognized as being a duty that justifiestemporary and locally offensive actions then twothings that have for a long time been seen as contra-dictory can be reconciled: giving the operationsrobust means of reacting against any aggression andprohibiting them from using those means to forcethe consent of the parties.

Patrice Sartre 9

28 James Sloan, “The Use of Offensive Force in UN Peacekeeping: A Cycle of Boom and Bust?” Hastings International and Comparative Law Review (2006-2007), p. 420.

29 Pineschi, “L’emploi de la force dans les operations,” p. 7.

The Objective ofRobustness: Protecting toPersuade

When the media, politicians, military experts, orresearchers recommend the setting up of “robust”operations, what they usually have in mind isprotecting the population or the peacekeepingmission itself. Failure to meet these objectiveseffectively is unacceptable and always highly visible.Sometimes more robustness is demanded in thehope that the mission will thereby be moreeffective, but this argument is an ambiguous one.We must keep in mind that peacekeeping does notattempt to achieve its objectives by force, and thattherefore more force does not mean more effective-ness, or at least not directly. Nevertheless,peacekeeping must retain its freedom of action tocontrol the area where a crisis is unfolding in orderto support the political objective, which is the firstobjective of robustness.

PHYSICAL AND LEGAL PROTECTIONOF THE PEACEKEEPING OPERATION

For the most part, members of peacekeepingoperations are outsiders to a conflict. They are oftenbrought into a crisis by the wish to help populationsin danger. The UN’s first responsibility is to preventthose that it involves in these conflicts frombecoming victims themselves, and this responsi-bility is of a higher order than that of protecting thelocal population. To a lesser degree, the UN also hasa duty to protect the installations and equipmentprovided at their expense by the internationalcommunity for carrying out its mission. The firstobjective of the robustness of operations is thus thephysical safety of the operation itself.

There is another, too-often neglected, objective ofrobust peacekeeping operations, which issometimes in opposition to the preceding one. Thisis the legal, and to a certain extent moral, protectionof their members, and this legal and moral protec-tion can have contradictory aspects.

On the one hand, the simple fact of beinginvolved in a peacekeeping operation creates anobligation to achieve results, at least in terms of

protecting the population, on the part of thepeacekeeping troops. They will be criticized for anyfailing in this area, morally at least and perhapslegally. We can all remember the attacks on UNofficials after Srebrenica and Kigali, for example.The UN has the duty to stipulate the rules ofengagement for those involved and provide themwith the means of a robustness that enables them toescape from such accusations.

On the other hand, the very exercise of robust-ness constitutes a legal and moral risk for thepeacekeeping soldiers since their own actions mayendanger a population. It is true to say that the UNhas not suffered from serious accusations in thisarea in the past, but we should not ignore the factthat the reason why the UN has not deserved thistype of criticism is because it lacked robustness, dueto a lack of resources and inadequate rules ofengagement.

A difficult compromise must be made betweenthe physical safety of the members of a peaceoperation and their legal protection. What is atstake here is the success of the mission and thephysical safety of the local population.

PROTECTING ORDINARY PEOPLE

Though it is not the first duty of a peacekeepingoperation, protecting the local population isnevertheless the one that is easiest to conceptualizeand most often demanded by public opinion.Obviously, this means protection against thefactions in conflict but it also means protectionagainst the collateral effects of the exercise of itsown force. First and foremost, physical protection iswhat is meant, but moral and social protection,which enable both individuals and human groupsto retain their dignity, are also important.

The United Nations Charter is an internationalrelations document that leaves all of the responsi-bilities for implementation in the hands of states,especially the safety of ordinary people. WhenArticle I refers to “the respect for Human Rights,”30its aim is to get them promoted within states and bythem, but nowhere does it confer on the UnitedNations a duty to substitute itself for states shouldthey fail to do so. If the organization has sometimeslacked vigilance in these areas, it is because its


30 Charter of the United Nations, Article 1, §3.

member states were expected to be the ones respon-sible.

Faced with its frequent failure in contemporarycrises, the UN has had to progressively supplementthe Charter, if not in law then at least in doctrine,with what the international community has calledthe “responsibility to protect.” But, in reality, it soonbecame clear that recognition of this responsibilityseldom permitted the UN to obtain from theinternational community the practical or legalmeans to provide it.

Jean-Marie Guéhenno has cautioned against theillusion that this protection can be providedwithout forces suitable for the size of the popula-tions concerned,31 and, he could have added, to thearea they occupy, not to mention their physicalenvironment. In many cases, there is a contradic-tion between these variables, and the capabilitiesprovided to the peacekeeping mission. For instance,the direct protection of 70 million inhabitants ofthe Democratic Republic of the Congo has neverbeen within the capacity of the few thousandsoldiers deployed by MONUC in a country offorests, marshes, and high plateaus.32 Therefore, ithas only been achieved, more or less effectively, asan indirect effect of MONUC’s progress inimplementing its mission.

I will not consider measures aimed at preventingthe peacekeeping force’s abuses of their positionwith regard to the population, notably in sexualmatters, as part of robustness, in the sense in whichI deal with it here. However, it is certain, as Jean-Marie Guéhenno admitted before the SecurityCouncil,33 that this behavior dishonors andtherefore reduces the robustness of peacekeepingoperations.

Conversely, as we saw above, part of robustpeacekeeping is ensuring that the use of force doesnot work against the local population. In practice, it

is rare for the use of force not to be accompanied by“collateral effects” on the surrounding population.Therefore, in the following paragraphs my concernwill be to develop a concept of robustness thatremains sufficiently in control of its force, by itsdoctrine, procedures, organization, and methods,to limit undesirable effects. This point is particu-larly crucial when peacekeeping forces are requiredto control an agitated crowd being manipulated bythe parties to the conflict.

MAINTAINING THE PEACEKEEPINGFORCE’S FREEDOM OF ACTION

The concepts of “robust peacekeeping” and“responsibility to protect” seem to be closely relatedand the first seems on the face of it a condition forthe second. Yet, Jean-Marie Guéhenno has warnedagainst making the concern for the protection ofcivilians,34 or, we should add, military personnel,the sole reason for the robustness of peacekeeping.In practice, the first objective of robustness shouldbe the freedom of action, the pre-condition for thesuccess of its missions: protecting itself, protectingthe populations, and retaining control of the crisisarea so that political progress is possible. Thisfreedom of action is all the more necessary becauseit is normal for a peacekeeping force to lack bothnumbers and resources. This means that it mustretain a mobility that enables it to exert its controlof the situation and to protect itself where andwhen it wants without hindrance.

Peacekeeping must indeed not let itself becomecoercive; this is what distinguishes peacekeepingfrom enforcement. But it must not give way either,and this is why it should be robust. Whateverviolence may be taking place between the parties, itmust continually keep open the space needed by thepolitical process to bring peace nearer; neithergiving way nor coercing, but protecting topersuade.

Patrice Sartre 11

31 Guéhenno, “Robust Peacekeeping,” p. 2.32 A few more than 5,000 initially, in 1999; a few more than 20,000 today for an area of more than 2,200,000 km2, or less than one peacekeeping soldier for 100 km2.

Without counting its police forces, France has a twenty-five times greater density of gendarmes in a country at peace and with a smaller population.33 Security Council meeting on February 23, 2006.34 Guéhenno, “Robust Peacekeeping,” p. 2.

A Doctrine of Robustness:Neither Coercing NorGiving Way

The term “doctrine” means a group of concepts thatenables planning of a coherent program of actionby international players, to present it to globalopinion in terms that are universally understood,and, as necessary, to evaluate the legal responsibili-ties of the various actors, in terms of what theyunderstand their mission to be.

Having attempted to define under whatconditions and to what end force might beexercised for peacekeeping, it has been concludedthat this might be to protect peacekeeping soldiersand the local population, but not to achieve theobjectives of the operation, since, being political,they can only be achieved by political means.However, I have not yet demonstrated how suchobjectives can be reached, or how to use force toattain objectives based on a desire to protectwithout risking the gradual escalation of such anintervention toward warfighting.35

This section tries to suggest a number ofelements that need to be introduced into thedoctrine of peacekeeping, enabling the Secretariatto devise, the Council to mandate, and the troop-contributing countries to carry out operations thatare robust but that do not contravene the principlesof the Charter nor lead to actions that are outsidethe parameters of peacekeeping. Such doctrineshould also enable the public to understand themandates, to see how suitable they might be for thesituations in question, and to assess their executionon the ground, whether at the operational ortactical level. In fact, the doctrine of peacekeepingshould enable any actor involved to explain theirdecisions in the light of their mission and thecircumstances at the time.

STRATEGIC ROBUSTNESS THROUGHTHE UNITY OF THE ACTORS

When analyzing the setbacks of peacekeepingoperations, not enough attention has been given in

reports to the evaluation of structural weaknessesand uncertainties at the highest level of operations,in order to understand areas of weakness when inthe theater. Global public opinion still has aconfused view about the failures that occurred inBosnia, Kigali, or Mogadishu.

Ad hoc reports analyzing these three failuresnotably failed to demonstrate that a superficial andcontradictory understanding of crises hadprevented a common approach to finding solutionsto them. On the other hand, these analyses oftenpointed to a certain lack of robustness in themandates as being the main reason for a lack ofrobustness in the operations themselves. I willattempt to demonstrate that it was not so muchrobustness in the mandates that was lacking—arobustness which could only come from the wordsused—as a clear manifestation of the solidarity ofthe Council with the troops engaged on the groundin the form of a specific response tailored to thecrisis in which they were engaged. Clarity and Agreement in the Analysesof Crisis Situations

It is no doubt true that the diversity of approachesamong members of the Security Council, andwithin international organizations and even withinthe Secretariat, is itself a strength. When themoment comes to act, however, this should notresult in an uncertain, let alone contradictoryassessment of the nature of the crisis and thesolutions to be applied. When there are contradic-tory points of view, the result is a kind of forcedunity around a weak and minimalist consensus.This no doubt assists the production ofcommuniqués, but it hardly facilitates the search foran understanding of the true sources of the crisis,which remain unaddressed, obscured by theconfusion of different assessments. In order toachieve any clarity in any assessment leading toaction and a harmonization of the variousapproaches that would enable action to be takencollectively, there has to be a shared analyticalframework, tailored to the actions to be taken. Asregards current crises, this particular frameworkmight include three main analytical components:36


35 “It is therefore essential that the application of the adjective “robust” to peacekeeping does not lead us to confuse legitimate robustness with regard to peacekeepingwith an imposition of peace that in fact constitutes a change in the nature of the intervention.” Alexandra Novosseloff and Patrice Sartre, “Réflexions sur unmaintien de la paix robust,” in Guide du maintien de la paix 2010, edited by Jocelyn Coulon (Québec: Athéna Editions, Septembre 2009).

36 A thorough analysis of major components is one of the main methods of statistical data analysis. It is reserved for numerical data, and the term is only used here byanalogy to indicate that crises can be studied according to three perspectives analyzed independently as an initial approach, with their correlations or interdepen-dencies studied by a second approach.

• The first perspective is a consideration of thebasic parameters of the crisis. In any countryundergoing a crisis, these are access to power,access to wealth, and identification with a specificgroup identity. Any analysis needs to identifyconflicts in each of these three areas, and thepoints where they overlap, thus causing fractureswithin a society that produce social tensions,themselves a motive force behind crises. Anawareness of these factors will enable us to avoidmaking errors in crisis management that turnlocal people irreparably against a peacekeepingmission. It will also make it easier to identify themost appropriate points of leverage for dealingwith the tensions that exacerbate the crisis andthreaten the peacekeeping mission. Finally, it willenable us to identify the divisions that themission will need to address in order to achievepeace.

• The second perspective is that of the structures ofthe crisis, particularly structures involvingviolence (regular forces and armed groups), thedistribution of wealth (both the official economyand trafficking), and structures that have asymbolic importance (parties, religions, ideolo-gies, etc.). It is necessary to understand how thesestructures are embedded in the foundationspreviously described, how they interrelate(whether through collusion, competition, orsynergy) and, above all, who are the majorindividuals involved in the crisis. If the linksbetween the mafias and certain armed BosnianCroat organizations had been recognized earlier,acts of violence against the civilian populationcould have been avoided; likewise, if the UN hadhad a better understanding of the link betweendiamond trafficking and armed groups in SierraLeone, it would have better understood the risksits troops were running when approachingmining sites.

• The third perspective is a thorough and openly-shared analysis of the roles of the various actorsin the crisis: their role in its origins, their place inthe structures relevant to the crisis, their person-alities and behavior, and even their networks ofpersonal relationships both within and outsidethe immediate crisis. It is here that the UN needsto apply the most innovative approaches tomanage crises more effectively and promptly, andalso to provide better protection for peacekeeping

missions and the local population. It needs tobecome more realistic, perhaps even morecynical, in the way it treats the real actors in thecrisis, those who will benefit from it continuing.Equally it should identify and support those whocan help it foresee threats and resolve the crisis.Because such a difference in approach goesagainst the principle of impartiality, it needs to bebased on a shared analysis conducted by allparties so that a vital difference between thepeople who are actually to blame for the troubles,the promoters of peace (even potential), and thevictims can be established and taken intoaccount. If an international consensus in terms ofpersonality and conduct had been reached at avery early stage on individuals such as RadovanKaradžić, Foday Sankoh, Charles Taylor, andtoday Laurent Gbagbo and Joseph Kabila, theattitude of the international community to themwould have engineered a narrower field ofmaneuver at an earlier point. The acceptance,now almost universal, of international criminaltribunals, makes individuals the subject ofinternational criminal law, legitimizing a sharedanalysis and stigmatization of their responsibilityfor the crises.Naturally, the objective is not to agree on a single,

monolithic analysis, unchanging over time, whichwould deprive the crisis managers of that freedomof judgement, which permits a spirit of initiative.Rather, any analysis of the situation needs to aim ata consensus on the basic realities of the crisis, aconsensus that is required for any action to becohesive and robust. This analysis must be based ontalking to experts, conducting inquiries on theground and hearing witnesses—all proceduresalready widely used by the UN and member states.But, in order to be effective in the time likely to beavailable and to achieve a coherent vision, it needsto be based on the three perspectives describedabove.

Such an analytical framework can and must bethe same for all crisis situations in order to form asingle point of reference for the main partiesinvolved in peacekeeping. Conversely, the result ofeach analysis will be specific to each crisis, and giverise to specific solutions for each. In fact, the aim isto provide all crisis managers with the means tomanage the cultural interface between themselvesand the actors in the crisis.

Patrice Sartre 13

The cultural interface is the diopter37 thatweakens and distorts the exchange of informationbetween two cultures. It is a major problem interms of crisis management, as much for the under -standing of the crisis as any for the influence it hason the way it unfolds. UN officials normally haveaccess to experience that enable them to be partic-ularly aware of the cultural interfaces of crises, andtheir effects, even if it does not permit them tomaster such interfaces completely. On the otherhand, military observers and peacekeeping troops,often thrown into crises about which they knownothing, and without serious preparation, are veryvulnerable to such effects, and even totally ignorantthat these cultural differences exist. The applica-tion, even if only in summary form, of the analyt-ical framework proposed above, would enable themto avoid the most serious errors in assessment,behavior, and action when they arrive in thetheater; moreover, it would encourage them toinitiate attempts to understand the crisis very earlyon, and to continue to deepen this understandingthroughout their mission. Ultimately, it is also afactor in harmonizing understanding betweencontingents often with very different culturalorigins.

MANDATES NEED TO BE SPECIFICRATHER THAN ROBUST

Such specific analyses have to be based on specificmandates, and the suitability of a mandate for acrisis situation is a primary condition for its robust-ness. In terms of a mandate, robustness does notmean strong language, but language that isappropriate to the situation, conveying directivesthat respond effectively and show that the Councilaccepts part of the responsibility for theconsequences.

Too often, the Council uses slogans that are fartoo general to be suitable, such as “all necessarymeasures.” However, the appropriateness of themandate and the certainty that the Council is fullybehind it constitute the first manifestation of robuststrategic management.

Such robustness is not limited to the mandate

itself. If not actually denying the importance of themandate in the robustness of the operation, Jean-Marie Guéhenno nevertheless insists on “buildingpolitical unity among member states throughbroader participation in both decision-making andoperational implementation, and in strengtheningcommand and control arrangements.”38 Reports onthe dramas in Srebrenica and Kigali clearly showthe divisions, hesitations, and ultimate indecisionof the Security Council. One is therefore amazed tolearn that the commander of Belgian troops in oneinstance and Dutch troops in another werecriticized, when the situation they had to managewas to a considerable extent the result of thedecisions (and then indecision) of the Council,whose consequences they managed as best theycould.

It is not surprising to learn that members of theCouncil, especially the major powers, have a widerange of interests in and opinions on crises aroundthe world. It is regrettable, but also understandable,that the simple awareness of their responsibilitiesfor resolving global crises and protecting localpeople is not sufficient to overcome thesedivergences. I noted earlier how the application of ashared analytical framework would probably enablethem to agree on joint diagnosis and action. But itis hard to understand how, having exposed the menand women on the ground to serious physical, legal,and moral risks, they can lose interest in whathappens to them, leaving the Secretariat, denudedof resources, to do what it can to extract them fromsituations of insurmountable difficulty.

Jean-Marie Guéhenno has a clear vision on thissubject, and he expresses it so clearly and with suchauthority that, unsurprisingly, much of whatfollows is based on one of his recent texts, alreadycited.39

It would be unfair to claim that all members ofthe Council are indifferent to maintaining unitywithin the Council. France in particular, whosemembership on the Council is an importantcomponent of its position in the world, is particu-larly concerned by this issue. However, too oftenthis unity is to be found in declarations, which only


37 A diopter is a concept from optics that designates the surface separating two areas of different refraction indices. On crossing it, one beam of light is reflected, andthe other refracted. Here, the analogy is used to indicate that, in passing from one cultural environment to another, information is both weakened and distorted.

38 Guéhenno, “Robust Peacekeeping,” p. 8.39 Ibid.

achieve unanimity in the most anodyne of terms,because the Council cannot, or will not, overcomethe differences about possible courses of action, andwhich conceal the fact that it is actually resigned toany action it takes being without significance. Thislack of shared impetus is even more shocking inthat it reflects a lack of commitment by themembers of the Council to the countries thatcontribute troops for operations.

That said, solidarity between the SecurityCouncil and troop-contributing countries is anessential element of robustness. Having shownthat successful and robust operations require takingrisks, Guéhenno considers that “there is much lesswillingness among troop contributors to take risksif the risks that they are expected to take are notshared by those who make the decisions.”40 It is wellknown that none of the permanent members of theSecurity Council were among the top ten troop-contributing countries for UN peacekeepingoperations, and only China and France are in thetop twenty.41

“While developed countries can give politicalsupport to a UN mission through non-militarymeans, their systematic absence in UN militarydeployments undermines and weakens the messageof universal commitment that such deploymentsshould convey, and can be construed as a lack ofstrategic commitment to the success of the mission(…) Burden-sharing is not only necessary to gatherthe necessary resources, it is necessary to makerobust peacekeeping operationally and politicallyviable.”42

“The tendency to adopt resolutions with an ever-increasing list of tasks does not ensure goodstrategic direction. The only way for the Council tomaintain its legitimate and necessary authority is tobe more directly involved in the execution andimplementation of its decisions. Only throughdirect participation in challenging operations canthe imperative of flexibility and operationaldecentralization be reconciled with the need forstrategic control by the Security Council.”43

It is utterly detrimental to the smoothfunctioning of peacekeeping operations that thedecision-makers and financial supporters of suchoperations should remain almost totally absentfrom them.44 Not only does such an absence implya degree of political distrust toward the country incrisis and toward the troop-contributing countries,but it also deprives Council decision-makers ofvaluable information required to make decisions.Those countries actually contributing troops on theother hand, generally not members of the Councilitself, see the latter make decisions that have littleconnection with reality. This weakness, a seriousone in terms of traditional “static” peacekeeping,can be fatal when peacekeeping becomes, or isobliged to become, “robust.”45

In this regard, it is notable that, contrary toNATO and EU decision-making mechanisms andthe proposals made in the Brahimi Report, theresults of planning work carried out by the UN arenot put to the Security Council for its approval, andso that body is never asked to show its support forthe methods of conducting the operations that ithas decided should be carried out.

Patrice Sartre 15

40 Guéhenno, “Robust Peacekeeping,” p. 9.41 In April 30, 2011, 2037 from China, mainly in Africa, and 1,467 from France, mainly in Lebanon. See www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2011/apr11_

1.pdf . It cannot be said that the presence of these two countries has no correlation with their foreign-policies.42 Guéhenno, “Robust Peacekeeping,” p. 9.43 Guéhenno, “Robust Peacekeeping,” p. 10.44 Only three of the top twenty financial backers of peacekeeping initiatives are also among the top twenty providers of troops (Italy, China, and France).45 Guéhenno makes a distinction between “static” and “robust” peacekeeping, and quite rightly, as I will attempt to show.

www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2011/apr11_1.pdfwww.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2011/apr11_1.pdf

46 Guéhenno, “Robust Peacekeeping,” p. 10.47 United Nations Departments of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and Field Support (DFS), “A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN

Peacekeeping,” New York: United Nations, July 2009, p. 4.

Cohesive Management atthe Strategic Level

Robust peacekeeping “has to be based on a genuinestrategic unity of vision among the triad of theSecurity Council, the troop contributors, and theSecretariat, which will implement the strategy. Thatunity of vision obviously depends on the politicalchoices made by member states, but it can benurtured by bringing this triad closer to themission.”46 For the triad to be a cohesive whole, twoinitiatives can be envisaged as part of a morethoroughgoing reform.

The New York headquarters must promote acommonality of views among the troop-contributing nations, that will lead national capitalsto give their units on the ground instructions thatare consistent with the ones that strategic managerswill be giving to their commanders in the theater.With regard to the UN itself, where the troopcontributors are not always represented in the bodymaking decisions about the crisis (the Council), anessential element when devising a peacekeepingoperation should be the early constitution in NewYork of a well-organized structure to consult withthe troop-contributing countries. This was the aimof the Military Staff Committee set up by theCharter but stifled by diplomats on the Council.DPKO took on the task of planning and managingthe operations of this committee with undeniableeffectiveness, and it would not be fair to claim that,in private, it does not concern itself with theopinion of the troop-contributing countries.However, only the formalization of explicit consul-tation at strategic level can establish a coherentchain of military command at operational level.

Once coherence between the Secretariat and thetroop-contributing countries has been achieved,the issue of involving the Council naturally arises.Some suggest that the Military Staff Committeeshould be reactivated, but this would mean up-ending a structure only intended for the military, inorder to introduce police-contributing nations, andstill leave humanitarian and statebuilding elementsout of the equation. Moreover, the purpose of theorganization would have to be changed, as it would

be difficult to take away from the Secretariat therole of strategic management, that it is generallythought to be doing well. It might be useful to drawinspiration from the role of the Military Committeeand the Committee for the Civilian Aspects ofCrisis Management (CivCom) at the EuropeanUnion, and their relationships with Political andSecurity Committee (PSC) in order to get thisrelationship right.

A ROBUST MEDIA APPROACH

During the peacekeeping dramas of the 1990s,troops deployed on the ground had only limitedaccess to the media, and that meant that they hadlittle information about what was being decided inNew York. Today, however, both mass media anddirect personal communication mean that imagesof the debates and problems in New York find theirway to the field, even if they only occupy a limitedplace in the Western media. The same can of coursebe said of the local populations in all but thepoorest crisis areas. The media can thus createcurrents of panic, discouragement, and ill-feelingbetween UN headquarters and the local level, bothwith the peacekeeping forces and the local popula-tions, which can greatly exacerbate the fragility ofpeacekeeping operations.

Therefore, great attention should be paid withinthe Secretariat and the Council in New York to howthe media report discussions and votes in theCouncil, planning work, and declarations made bythe Secretary-General. It is particularly importantthat this image is consistent with the ordersreceived by the troops and the relationshipsbetween the peacekeeping operation and theparties to the conflict. An important element of thisconsistency is the dissemination of a peacekeepingdoctrine that enables various players to share acommon language and be understood by thepublic.

ROBUSTNESS WORKS BY CONTROLLING THE AREA OF CRISIS

The New Horizon nonpaper makes an observationthat has so far not been sufficiently recognized,developed, or reflected upon: “Peacekeeping is


Patrice Sartre 17

largely an ad hoc system. Each operation isdeveloped and financed separately.”47 Eachoperation is organized in a particular way inresponse to a specific situation. Each one needs tobe robust in its own specific way, and the level ofthe theater is the key to this.

Nevertheless, there is a relatively fixed approachto the issue of robustness, which can be used toanalyse, resolve, and explain it, and this is anapproach based on the control of the area. Itconsists of envisaging a peacekeeping operation as apolitical operation, which requires an area to becontrolled by the military if it is to succeed. Themilitary’s role in the theater is to ensure thiscontrol, so as to support any action taken by thepolitical head of the mission, most often the SpecialRepresentative of the Secretary-General (SRSG).

If we understand robustness in this way, theconcept is one of deploying actors in the crisis areawho endeavor to control the physical, human, andtechnological elements. Except for rare cases likethat of UNIFIL, these actors are always very few innumber, and therefore vulnerable. To guaranteetheir protection, we might imagine a mechanismbased on punishing the spoilers, but this wouldundermine the spirit of peacekeeping and to itsassociated political constraints. Such protection isbetter obtained by control of exit from and entry tothe area, thus reducing dangers from outside;continuous in-depth research into information thatcan be used to understand the situation and antici-pate risks; and, finally, deploying interventionresources that are flexible enough to re-establishlocal and temporary military superiority each timethe parties contest it with a unit from thepeacekeeping force.

“Area Control” is a generic term used to describeall of the missions constituting the raison d’être ofpeacekeeping missions: interposition, interdictionof areas, protection of the local population, preven-tion of outbreaks of violence, control of movementand access, etc. This area control poses tacticalproblems that are not within the remit of this study,but there are also issues of vulnerability, given howastonishingly few troops are usually deployed onpeacekeeping operations.

Retaliation: An Effective Mechanism forRobustness, but One That is Hard toAccept

At the theater level, the weakness brought about bythe scarcity of peacekeeping forces might lead thecrisis manager to threaten the spoilers withmeasures involving retaliation in cases of aggres-sion. However, such measures pose humanitarian,legal, and political problems that are difficult forthe UN and even the European Union, even if thisoption seems quite natural to NATO.

The last fifteen years of peacekeeping operationshave shown us the extent to which crises oftenbring to prominence those who are insensitive tointernational legitimacy, and who respect forcealone. Yet peacekeeping operations seek to endcrises using the lowest possible level of force. Thiscontradiction can only be resolved by providingpeacekeeping forces with a mechanism enablingthem to put pressure—if possible in person—onthose leading the factions involved in the crisis.This would be a clear threat, which would consti-tute a radical departure from the principle of usingthe lowest possible level of force. This is not thesame as a reaction capability, which, as we will see,all peacekeeping operations should have, so as tocome to the aid of any of units in danger. It is rathera case of real punitive measures, which were shownto be essential in the former Yugoslavia,Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, and even Ituri.

The European Union does not currently have,and the UN will doubtless never have, suchmethods of retaliation at its disposal. Only NATOor an ad hoc coalition can supply such resources,since they are perceived as third parties quitedistinct from the peacekeeping forces. Srebrenicaalso taught us that such methods need to becarefully articulated at the political level by thehead of operations, and at the military level by thecommanders of the peacekeeping forces. It istherefore advisable that, when analysis of thespoilers recommended above proves it to benecessary, the development of peacekeepingoperations will then explicitly include deterrencemeasures, which will be submitted to the approvalof the Security Council, and born by implementa-tion procedures tailored to the object in questionand the peacekeeping doctrine put in place.

48 Guéhenno, “Robust Peacekeeping,” p. 2.

A Capacity for Mobile Intervention: AKey Factor of Robust Peacekeeping

While it is politically difficult for the UN to punishacts of aggression, it must find ways of preventingthem, and of rapidly strengthening the ratherfragile screen of observers and interposition unitseach time they are in danger, by temporarily andlocally outclassing those who threaten them.

This is what Jean-Marie Guéhenno means whenhe says that “the peacekeepers cannot afford to bein a static reactive posture, which would quicklyreveal the limitations of the force, but have to take aproactive posture, to keep the initiative, andcontribute to the gradual emergence of a stable andaccountable state.”48 Since air mobility has become acommon feature of UN peacekeeping operations,such methods of intervention no longer pose anyreal problem at the theater level. On the other hand,they pose tactical problems that we will assess later.

This mobility of the means of intervention willhave to be used less often, but more safely andefficiently, if force is not left vulnerable to surpriseattacks from outside the crisis area. Hence the needto confine it.Control of Entry and Exit from theTheater

It is strange that sealing off crisis areas has neverbeen a condition for managing a violent crisis, oreven a factor essential for its robust management.Without doubt, various embargos and sanctionregimes imposed on conflict areas have achieved acertain level of control over what enters and whatleaves. Quite recently, the UN mission in theCentral African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT)almost officially obtained this buffer function in themanagement of the Sudanese crisis. But there is nodoctrine or procedure at the UN, EU, or NATO thatwould enable a team mounting an operation torespond clearly to the questions: what can we do toknow who or what is entering and leaving the crisisarea? What types of movement do we absolutelyhave to control? Which ones do we not need tocontrol, and what palliative measures do we takewithin or outside the area of operations? Even theUnited Nations Interim Force in Lebanon—forwhich sealing off the area is an essential require-ment for success, and which saw the necessity of

managing maritime limits—was unable orunwilling to control the border between Lebanonand Syria in a systematic fashion, which are evenmore important to the success of its mission.

There are many examples of problems arisingfrom a lack of surveillance of traffic going into andout of crisis areas, and on the other hand muchevidence that such controls were effective as soon asthey were carried out: weapons and fightersbetween Guinea and Sierra Leone; diamondsbetween Sierra Leone and Liberia, Angola and theDemocratic Republic of the Congo; coltan betweenIturi and Uganda, combatants between Casamanceand Guinea-Bissau, etc.

Thus, it is impossible to claim to control a crisis atthe lowest possible level of violence without havingfirst reduced the risk of that one party becomingunexpectedly strong at the expense of the other;without interrupting the flow of goods fueling thecrisis and sustaining its leaders; without deprivingarmed factions of the space they need to maintainsafe areas and logistics bases, which give themgreater endurance than the peacekeeping force. It ishigh time that the crisis-managers’ club—the UN,the EU, and NATO—adopt a doctrine, procedures,legal instruments, and, above all, techniques forsealing off a crisis area, and integrate them into thedesign and planning of their operations.

Of course, such a policy, which is alwaysexpensive, will never be complete, and is usuallyonly partial, so it needs to be continued intensivelyand for a long period, using internal intelligence-sharing procedures on which the safety and thepredictive ability of the mission depend.Political and Military Perception andUnderstanding of the Crisis Area

For fifteen years now, the UN has been developingits “observers,” the only peacekeepers at the outsetof a peacekeeping mission, as an information-gathering network within the crisis area, whichMONUC, for example, has shown to be valuable ona daily basis. Beyond this, there is a contradictionbetween the clandestine, or at least secret, nature of“intelligence” as national armed forces see it, andthe transparency and loyalty that the global organi-zation owes to its member states at all times. At theUN, this contradiction has inhibited any progress


beyond the open management of “information-gathering” by its “observers.” On the other hand, atruly military alliance—NATO—has no qualmsabout gathering intelligence by any means, and therisk of terrorism provides justification for such anattitude.

Because it is responsible for the safety of itstroops in the face of new threats, the UN is lookingfor a similar strategy, but without a clearly defineddoctrine, and without resources. In the conceptionof an operation, information gathering has tooccupy a central, integrated position, and must notbe limited to purely military issues. It must first beconcerned with an analysis of the situation: theevolution of the crisis, what the structures involvedin the crisis, as well as the actors, are doing. It thenneeds to address the information-gatheringstrategy: the balance between human collection(overt, yes, but perhaps clandestine also?) andtechnical collection; a balance between informationprotection as regards the parties to the conflict andtransparency with regard to member states: at leastthe members of the Security Council, and wherepossible all states contributing to the operation inquestion. The operational concept also needs toaddress the means of gathering and using informa-tion: should these belong to the UN itself? Throughan internal structure or by materials purchasedfrom private entities? Or “leased” from memberstates? Unless the information itself—or even theproduct of its exploitation—is to be a service“bought in” from the most powerful members…but perhaps not the most impartial.

In all these areas, the UN still needs todemonstrate substantial progress in order toachieve a credible level of robustness, and some ofthese areas have inherent contradictions that raisedoubts about how successful it will be. Such contra-dictions are, quite properly, a worry to the NAM,49who tolerate them as a risk inherent in having toaccept information forced upon them by wealthycountries, who are its only beneficiaries, since theyhave cryptoanalytical capacities poorer countrieslack. So, does the UN see itself as authorized tobuild a truly intrusive network within the societieswhere it operates in order to prevent terrorist

attacks? Or are the host countries of suchoperations or host headquarters like the UnitedStates disposed toward accepting that the UN mayprotect its information using cryptography thattheir own services could not break? Delivering Robustness ThroughCybernetic and Media Strategies

The issue of cryptography warrants discussion. TheUN is the club to which all nations belong and wasnot formed to protect its intelligence against any ofthem. Moreover, there is no method similar tothose in articles 413-9 and following under theFrench criminal law that would enable the UN toprevent violations of UN confidentiality.50 Theprinciple of confidentiality is therefore illusory andwrong here. However, there are operationalsituations, particularly in peacekeeping, whereprotection of information, be it only temporary, is anecessity: conducting negotiations, preparing foraction, looking for war criminals on behalf of theInternational Criminal Court, inquiring into theconduct of UN agents, protecting the resources ofone faction against another, protecting sources ofinformation, etc. This is a contradiction that isinherent in any global organization, which needs tobe resolved if it is not to have a serious effect on therobust quality of certain difficult operations.

The case of Radio des Mille Collines in Kigaliconvinced operators, historians, and researchers ofthe necessity of controlling any media capable ofcalling for the deaths of peacekeepin

making un peacekeeping more robust: protecting the ......gaye (left) and abdul hafiz, united nations...

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