marcel grob, rail -tech 2015, march 19, utrecht - movares · marcel grob, rail -tech 2015, march...
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Marcel Grob, Rail-Tech 2015, March 19, Utrecht
A faster introduction of new systems because of CSM REA? “Common Safety Method on Risk Evaluation and Assessment”
Introduction
Marcel Grob: ● Railway safety consultant ● 13 years of experience ● Living in Utrecht
Movares: ● Engineering consulting company ● 1100 employees ● Head office in Utrecht
Introduction | Aim | Process | Example | Conclusion
Overview
● Aim of CSM REA ● CSM REA process and steps ● Example: OV SAAL (Schiphol-Amsterdam-Almere-Lelystad) ● CSM REA results and challenges
Common Safety Method on Risk Evaluation and Assessment
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Introduction | Aim | Process | Example | Conclusion [email protected]
CSM REA
● EU Railway Safety Directive 2004/49/EC: announcement of Common Safety Methods, e.g. for risk evaluation and assessment
● Commission Regulation No 352/2009 on CSM REA ● For changes in the railway system ● Aims:
o harmonise risk management processes o maintain or improve overall safety level in Europe
● Commission Regulation No 402/2013 on CSM REA: o new requirements for Assessment Bodies o direct application from 21 May 2015
Common Safety Method on Risk Evaluation and Assessment
Introduction | Aim | Process | Example | Conclusion
CSM REA 402/2013 process scheme
Complete process
Introduction | Aim | Process | Example | Conclusion
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CSM REA 402/2013 process scheme Significance and hazard identification and classification
Introduction | Aim | Process | Example | Conclusion
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CSM REA 402/2013 process scheme Risk Acceptance Principles
Introduction | Aim | Process | Example | Conclusion
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CSM REA 402/2013 process scheme Risk evaluation and demonstration of compliance
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Introduction | Aim | Process | Example | Conclusion [email protected]
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CSM REA process and steps
● Significant change? o 6 criteria
● Hazard identification (HAZID) + determination of safety measures ● Per hazard: selection of Risk Acceptance Principle
o Codes of practice o Similarity with reference system(s) o Explicit risk estimation
● Demonstration of compliance with safety requirements ● Independent assessment
Summary of process
Introduction | Aim | Process | Example | Conclusion
Types of changes
● CSM REA 402/2013, Article 3 (1): applies to any change in the railway system in a Member State
● Infrastructure projects (e.g. OV SAAL) ● Introduction of new systems (e.g. new interlocking systems) ● New or adapted rolling stock ● Changes in processes and procedures ● Organisational changes
● Movares has broad experience in co-ordination of this process for
various types of changes
Introduction | Aim | Process | Example | Conclusion
Example: OV SAAL
Project characteristics: ● Increase capacity Schiphol-Amsterdam-Almere-Lelystad ● Short term: infrastructure upgrade 2012-2016 ● Amsterdam south branch (Cluster C): 2 tracks 4 tracks ● West and East contract ● Proposer: ProRail as infrastructure manager
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Schiphol-Amsterdam-Almere-Lelystad corridor
Introduction | Aim | Process | Example | Conclusion
Example: OV SAAL
Amsterdam RAI station
Introduction | Aim | Process | Example | Conclusion
OV SAAL Cluster C
● Basis: use of Rail Infra Catalogue of infrastructure manager: o approved products o approved regulations
● Safety management for the project, by order of ProRail
● Significant change ● Hazard identification
o top level: by ProRail o based on generic hazard analysis in safety management system
(SMS) of infrastructure manager o East and West part: by contractors, based on detailed design
● Focus on new products, deviations, local circumstances
Safety process
Introduction | Aim | Process | Example | Conclusion
OV SAAL Cluster C
● Risk Acceptance Principle: o Codes Of Practice, e.g. for application of approved systems o Reference systems, e.g. comparison to similar situations o Explicit risk estimation, e.g. for specific local derailment hazard
● Documentation in
combined safety case ● Independent assessment
Safety process
Introduction | Aim | Process | Example | Conclusion
Results and challenges
Positive effects of CSM REA can be observed:
● Structural attention improved safety level: o Before CSM REA: attention to risk management more arbitrary o Legal obligations increase attention to risk management o HAZID helps to identify specific risks, even if aim is to apply standards
● Harmonised risk management processes effective effort:
o Less discussion on required analysis o For standard risks and standard measures:
no detailed quantitative risk analysis
Potential positive effects of CSM REA
Introduction | Aim | Process | Example | Conclusion
Results and challenges
... but there are some challenges:
● Level of detail of steps: is it adapted to the aim?
● Criteria for ‘significant change’: o can they become measurable? o how should we combine the criteria?
● Limited use of reference systems: can we improve this?
● New systems: still need for explicit risk estimation
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Introduction | Aim | Process | Example | Conclusion [email protected]
Conclusion
Our conclusion: ● In general a step forward in the safety management process ● Some aspects may be improved further ● Limitations to faster introduction of new systems
Introduction | Aim | Process | Example | Conclusion [email protected] 17
Questions or remarks?
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CSM REA: • [email protected] • +31 - 6 – 2021 1661 Movares: • the Movares stand at the exhibition • www.movares.nl
Introduction | Aim | Process | Example | Conclusion