Making Cooperation Work Informal Governance in the EU and Beyond (forthcoming with Cornell University Press, 2013)

Mareike Kleine European Institute London School of Economics

UNC Chapel Hill Center for European Studies

7 September 2012

The EU as an International Organization Background

Commonalities: -  Organization of 27 states based on international treaties -  No monopoly of violence, although strong legal system

Differences: -  Far more ambitious objective (a genuine Internal Market) -  Legislative process at its core constantly produces rules

EU is most successful international organization to date

The “Community Method” (conventional wisdom)

Commission

Council

European Parliament

Commission

Nat. Admin.

Agencies

Agenda Setting Decision-Making Implementation

The Puzzle: Why Informal Governance?

AGENDA SETTING

VOTING

IMPLEMENTATION

The “Community Method” (reality)

Commission Council

European Parliament

European Council

COREPER Working Groups Comitology Expert groups

Presidency

Nat. Admin.

Agencies

European Council

Presidency

Commission

Pre-Setting Agenda Setting Decision-Making Implementation

Why Informal Governance? Central Argument

Informal Governance (IG) adds flexibility to sometimes overly rigid legal rules.

It serves to resolve potentially disruptive conflicts that cooperation may suddenly generate at the domestic level.

Formal and informal rules complement each other in order to sustain a level of cooperation that would otherwise be

impossible to sustain.

Structure of Talk

1  Theory

2  Empirical Strategy and Evidence

3  Informal Governance and the Eurocrisis

4  Positive and Normative Implications

Liberal Regime Theory The demand for added flexibility

  Commitments create value by managing expectations.

  But: Commitments are subject to shocks.

  EU: Shocks to the domestic politics of collective action.

Demand for situational flexibility

Liberal Regime Theory The supply of added flexibility

  Informal norm of discretion: states should collectively depart from rules to accommodate gov under pressure

  Norm remains informal b/c it serves to resolve conflicts that are fundamentally political in nature.

  Adjudicating government resolves tension between commitment and suspension of rules.

Formal and informal elements complement each other to achieve and sustain level of economic integration.

Liberal Regime Theory Testable Implications

1)  Variation in practices of informal governance:   Issue-specific: with propensity for shocks   Over Time: simultaneously and constant

2)  Institutions to cope with moral hazard:   Adjudicatory authority of “biased” government   Co-evolution of authority and informal governance

Making Cooperation Work Table of Content

  Introduction and Theory

  Informal Governance in the EC (1959-2009)   Formal and Informal Governance   Agenda Setting   Voting   Implementation

  Coping with Moral Hazard   Institutional Solutions to Moral Hazard   The Council Presidency   Agenda and Adjudication   Case Studies

  Conclusion and Extension

Evidence I Informal governance in the EC (1959-2009)

Evidence II Coping with Moral Hazard

  Descriptive Inference: The Council Presidency systematically accompanies informal governance.

  Multivariate Regression: Issues are dropped when Presidency faces incentives to collude with claimant.

  Case Studies: Presidency is denied authority when it faces incentives to collude with claimant.

(cf. Kleine 2012, in Review of International Organizations)

Positive Implications EU and IOs

  Int’l law and politics: IG complements formal rules by adding political flexibility to them.

  Institutions and time: IG renders commitments adaptable to dynamic strategic context.

  Autonomy: Informal governance ensures collective state control of supranational actors.

Normative Implications European Union

  Input: IG makes EU more responsive, i.e. it includes the voice of those that are most affected by int’l cooperation and reduces salience of EU politics.

  Procedure: IG increases makes legislative process opaque.

  Output: Domestic distributive effects of EU are weaker than formal rules (and literature) suggests.

Implications for the Eurocrisis

  IG (bailout, bond purchase) sustains formal commitment to Euro by adding political flexibility in times of crisis.

  Informal governance ensures collective state control of supranational actors such as ECB.

  IG has (so far) mitigated the domestic distributive impact of the Eurocrisis; yet

  IG has made processes opaque and reduced accountability.