marine corps intelligence activity · unclassified//for official use only iii unclassified//for...

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Marine Corps Intelligence Activity

Marine Corps Midrange Threat Estimate: 2005-2015

Information Cutoff Date: 1 July 2005

This is a Department of Defense Intelligence DocumentPrepared by:

Global Threats BranchProduction and Analysis CompanyMarine Corps Intelligence Activity

This publication supersedes the Midrange Threat Estimate: 2001-2010 (Unclassified), MCIA-1586-001-01, August 2001.

COPYRIGHT WARNING: Further dissemination of the images in this publication is not authorized.


MCIA-1586-001-05

(Reverse Blank)


Marine Corps Midrange Threat Estimate 2005-2015

EXECUTIVESUMMARY

The degree to which the United States can maintain its security in the 21st century will bedetermined by how well the United States responds to a transitioning world. Marine Corpsforces will be challenged by emerging technical, military, and geopolitical threats; by thegrowing resourcefulness and the ingenuity of non-state actors and terrorist networks; and bynatural disasters.

Globalization has both positive and negative effects on world dynamics.

■ States unable to keep pace with globalization will continue to grant increased powers tonon-state actors (non-government organizations, private security/military organizations,criminals, gangs and terrorists).

■ Failing states heavily populated with a costly aging population and a highly unemployedyouth provide breeding grounds for terrorist groups.

■ Demands of the modern and globalized state will continue to place increasing pressureon dwindling natural resources, including oil, water, and minerals. Unusual alliances willform to secure scarce resources.

■ Globalization has eroded national identity and unity through the expansion of media andcommunication systems, technology, and popular culture, resulting in a surge of globalreligious movements.

■ Globalization impacts characterization of modern warfare. Conventional war, while stilla threat (Iran, North Korea, China) has taken a back seat to asymmetric and irregulartypes of warfare. Suicide bombings, child solders and acts of terrorism defy the rules ofwarfare. The ease of global transportation makes it easy for jihadists worldwide to infil-trate Iraq, while global communications have provided radicals with an ability to fund,network, and organize.

Major natural and man-made disasters will continue to increase in frequency and severitythroughout the world and will produce permanent changes to societies, ecosystems andenvironments, along with material damage, loss of life, distress and displacement. As aresult, more complex humanitarian relief emergencies can be expected.

Infectious diseases will likely remain the world’s leading cause of death. This is due, inpart, to increased population density, poor sanitation, and increasing global transportation.

The explosion of information and communications technology propels the evolution ofpolitical and social values, actions, and forms of organization. Global media and the internetprovide adversaries the ability to shape global opinion and create an information operationsforce multiplier that the United States has yet to successfully counter.

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Threats in the 21st century will be unconventional, unforeseen, and unpredictable (U3) fromadversaries using asymmetric approaches and irregular tactics. Potential adversaries, statesand non-state actors, will be adaptive, creative and become increasingly sophisticated usinglessons learned from encounters with American weapons and tactics and apply those les-sons learned with increasing complexity, adaptability, and skill by using non-linear, irregu-lar activities.

Warfare in the 21st century has transitioned from conventional to asymmetric. Potentialadversaries of the United States recognize their relative impotence in conventional, force-on-force operations; they instead seek to draw the United States into arenas where its con-ventional capabilities and technological edge are blunted. Asymmetric threats and irregularwarfare are among the primary threats to U.S. Marine forces.

Future warfare will be increasingly shaped by the following:

■ Strategically, war will not be defined by direct military-on-military attack; instead, vio-lence will focus asymmetrically on undermining deployed troops and U.S. policies.

■ Tactically, warfare will include attempts to disrupt order and distract U.S. forces andundermine popular support and legitimacy for U.S. intervention. The enemy’s goal is notto test the “three-block” Marine but to require a marine on every block.

■ Organizationally, warfare will move from the hierarchy of military command to a morecell-based, leaderless group structure that maximizes convenience and tactical adapta-tion, emphasizes and minimizes network vulnerability.

■ Ideologically, warfare will be driven by new identities outside basic nationalism. State,cultural, religious, and individual perspectives will combine to create evolving groupsand objectives.

Twenty-first century threats will be enhanced by adversaries’ cultural and geographic famil-iarity with their environments. Future adversaries to the Unites States will be driven by ide-ologies that do not restrict the nature of conflict and will be unfettered by borders,boundaries, or rules. They will assimilate with the local populations using the urban envi-ronment for cover and concealment. They will also pursue understanding of U.S. militarytactics, techniques, and procedures to accumulate a modern, effective arsenal.

Information operations (IO), terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are thedominant strategic and tactical asymmetrical threats of concern domestically and overseas.

■ Extremist organizations (including terrorists), intelligence services and criminal groupsalong with nation states are likely to continue pursuing IO capabilities, including attackand exploitation capabilities, and propaganda and media manipulation.

■ Terrorism is the most likely asymmetric threat to U.S. interests at home and abroad. Ter-rorist groups will continue to be decentralized, self-reliant, innovative, and networked.

■ Ten countries are believed to have nuclear weapons. Terrorist groups and other rogue ele-ments will seek to obtain and/or develop WMD, including chemical and biological agents.

Potential adversaries will have increasing access to both low technology and high technol-ogy weapons, which used to be exclusive to nation-states. Future threats and strategies willemploy a variety of technologies in both conventional and asymmetrical ways. U.S.supremacy in conventional warfare will remain unchallenged until possibly 2020. Of the

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five principal operational dimensions that must be considered, the following technicalthreats are identified.

■ Maritime

❏ Availability of far-reaching reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition(RSTA) information will make it increasingly difficult for Marines to transit the seasundetected and untargeted.

❏ Shallow and restricted waters and adjacent areas provide an arena for mobile andstatic coastal defense guns, rockets, missiles, and mines. Most will have improvedlethality because of advances in sensor, propulsion, stealth, digital computer, explo-sives, or fusing technologies.

■ Firepower

❏ Artillery will be more self-contained and mobile with much-improved complementaryRSTA capabilities.

❏ Land-based artillery, missiles, and rockets will continue to outrange naval guns, andwill be capable of delivering conventional high explosives, dual-purpose improvedconventional munitions, weapons of mass destruction, mines, and/or precision-guidedmunitions (PGMs).

❏ PGMs will be deployed widely using an array of guidance systems that will allowincreased engagement ranges and accuracy.

❏ Advances in laser and power technologies will transform today's sensor-blinder into ahard-kill weapon.

■ Maneuver

❏ A wide variety of ground weapons ranging from small arms to exotic or high-end sys-tems, namely non-nuclear electromagnetic pulse (EMP) or laser devices, highlightedwith interjections of innovative or improvised systems, such as volumetric weapons orimprovised explosive devices.

❏ Natural and man-made obstacles, urban infrastructure, harsh climates, and increasedcombat capabilities of conventional forces may complicate the execution of expedi-tionary operations.

■ Air

❏ Sophisticated surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and modern integrated air defense net-works will proliferate. SAM guidance systems will be increasingly difficult to jam orevade, and will use nontraditional portions of the electromagnetic spectrum.

❏ Many systems will be capable of simultaneously employing radar, optical, and thermaltarget detection and tracking sensors that will be difficult to detect and counter.Advanced or improved aircraft, many with low radar signatures, will also proliferate.

❏ Unconventional uses of older types of man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS)by irregular forces remain a key concern. Lasers capable of shooting down aircrafthave already been fielded by some nations.

■ Information superiority

❏ Stealth technology and camouflage, concealment, and deception techniques will bemaximized to hide potential targets and/or protect tactical movements.

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❏ Key military facilities and capabilities will go underground, both physically in theearth and figuratively within urban areas.

❏ Mainstay Marine Corps communications will be vulnerable to electronic warfare tech-niques. Electronic attack systems will be capable of operating automatically againstmultiple sensors, and may involve radiofrequency devices. These systems will besmaller, low cost, have increased jamming or destructive power, and be adaptable to avariety of platforms.

❏ Qualitative improvements in command, control, communication (C3) and informationsystems will be prevalent. Information Operations (IO) techniques to subvert the U.S.and take advantage of potential psychological warfare opportunities is also expected.

The most prevalent destabilization factor in the world’s regions is the growing trend inIslamic extremism. Africa, South and Southeast Asia, Eurasia and the Middle East are allexperiencing gradual moves toward extremist Islamist views in many countries in theirregions. Although many of these developing regions are riddled with rampant infectiousdiseases and economic troubles, the primary motivating factors for U.S. Marine involve-ment in the regions will be ethnic conflicts and increasing terrorist activity.

The U.S. military must develop more agile strategies and adaptive tactics if it is to succeedin this complex environment. While the current U.S. capability overmatch in conventionaloperations will continue for some time, Marines must be equipped with the requisiteregional, cultural and language knowledge to effectively deal with persistent and emergingirregular, traditional, catastrophic, and disruptive threats in the littorals and complex urbanterrain. The face of the primary threats to the Marine Corps is changing and the Marinesmust change with it.

Information Cutoff Date: 1 July 2005

MCIA-1586-01-05

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Contents

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iiiForeword. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiSection 1: GLOBAL DYNAMICS AND THEIR EFFECTS ON U.S. SECURITY GLOBALIZATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Non-state Actors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2Violent Non-state Actors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

CULTURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5Exporting America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6Mirror Imaging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6Building a Cultural Foundation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

RELIGION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7Religion’s Effect on National Identities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8Religion’s Effect on War and Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9The Youth Population. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9The Aging Population. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10Urbanization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

CATASTROPHIC EVENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11Natural Disasters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11Man-made Disasters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

SCARCE COMMODITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13Oil and Energy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15Mineral Trade and Smuggling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15Water . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

DISEASE AND PANDEMICS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16AIDS/HIV. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17Smallpox. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18SARS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19Influenza . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19Effects of Disease on Military . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

INFORMATION REVOLUTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Section 2: TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY WARFARE SETTING THE STAGE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21ASYMMETRIC WARFARE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Full Spectrum Targeting. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23Specialized Environments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

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Contents (Continued)

ASYMMETRIC THREATS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24Threats to Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24Non-Combatants. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

INFORMATION OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25Cyber Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26Influence Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

TERRORISM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28Evolving Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29Tools and Tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30Piracy: Maritime Interdiction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION/EFFECT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31Nuclear Weapons Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31Biological Warfare Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31Chemical Warfare Capabilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32Strategic Space and Ballistic Missile Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32MILITARY DENIAL AND DECEPTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33SPACE AND COUNTERSPACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33BEYOND THE THREE-BLOCK WAR: THREATS TO OPERATIONS . . 33

Stability and Support Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34Small Wars/Counter-insurgency Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34Humanitarian Assistance/

Disaster Relief and Nation-Building. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35Peace Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35Combating Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35Counter-proliferation and Non-proliferation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36Combating Drug Trafficking and Crime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

ANTI-ACCESS STRATEGIES AND TOOLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37THE FUTURE OF ASYMMETRIC THREATS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Section 3: FUTURE TECHNOLOGY IMPACTS ON WARFAREMARITIME DOMINANCE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39Anti-ship Cruise Missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39Naval Mines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40Coastal Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

FIREPOWER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43Indirect Fire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43Anti-armor Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45Fire Control Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46Optical Devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

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Small Arms Fire and Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46Counter-Small Arms Technology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

MANEUVER DOMINANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47Armored Vehicles. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47Rotary-wing Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47Improvised Explosive Devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48Mine Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48Camouflage, Concealment, and Deception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

AIR DOMINANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50Fixed-wing Platforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50Stand-off Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51Air Defense Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

INFORMATION SUPERIORITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51Command, Control and Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51Over-the-horizon Communication Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52Line-of-sight Communication Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52Emerging Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54Global Positioning System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54Electronic Warfare Support Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

INCREASING CAPABILITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54Strategic Reconnaissance and Surveillance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54Space-based Platforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54Manned Airborne Platforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54Unmanned Vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55Electro-optics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

COUNTERMEASURES to U.S. CAPABILITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56Directed Energy Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56Electronic Attack Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56Electro-optic Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57Computer Network Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57Biometrics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

Section 4: REGIONAL ASSESSMENT AFRICA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59ASIA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

South Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61Southeast Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62East Asia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

EUROPE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64EURASIA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65LATIN AMERICA and the CARIBBEAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66MIDDLE EAST and NORTH AFRICA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68

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Appendix

STATES OF INTEREST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-1AFGHANISTAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-3ALBANIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-4BANGLADESH. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-5CHINA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-6COLOMBIA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-7ETHIOPIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-8GEORGIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-9HAITI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-10INDONESIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-10IRAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-11IRAQ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-13LIBERIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-13MAURITANIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-14NIGERIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-15NORTH KOREA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-16PAKISTAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-17PHILIPPINES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-18SAUDI ARABIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-19SYRIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-20UZBEKISTAN. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-21

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Marine Corps Midrange Threat Estimate 2005-2015

FOREWORD This estimate’s intent is to prepare the Marine Corps for potential 21st century threats. Con-ventional warfare is quickly becoming a secondary option to those who cannot compete inmajor theater conflict. Borderless, complex and adaptive, potential adversaries lurk in theshadows of the urban jungle and cyberspace, complicating the rules of warfare. Futureadversaries have unprecedented access to information, resources (personnel and funds) andtechnology – and are applying it asymmetrically against the United States and its deployedmilitary forces to mitigate our military strengths. The terrorist attacks on the United Statesin September 2001 were a defining moment for the conduct of future United States MarineCorps operations.

Effective planning for future operations requires cultural intelligence – a detailed knowl-edge of culture and customs, knowing about our enemy as well as analyzing what ourenemy knows about us. Awareness of local cultures in emerging threat environments will beincreasingly critical in determining who wins and who loses.

The U.S. military must develop agile strategies and adaptive tactics to succeed in the 21st

century threat environment. While the United States will continue to dominate conventionalcapabilities for some time, Marines must achieve the same level of capability in unconven-tional situations. Building on their expeditionary skills, U.S. Marines must increase theircapacity for decentralized, nonlinear operations in contested zones, including the littoraland complex urban terrain.

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(Reverse Blank)


Section 1:

GLOBAL DYNAMICS AND THEIR EFFECTS ON U.S. SECURITY

The degree to which the United States can maintain itssecurity in the 21st century will be determined by howwell the United States responds to a transitioningworld. Marine Corps forces will continue to be chal-lenged by emerging technical, military, and geopoliti-cal threats; by the growing resourcefulness andingenuity of non-state actors and terrorist networks;and by natural disasters.

Traditional military roles cannot be ignored. Marinesmust also keep a wary eye on states with strengtheningconventional and unconventional capabilities (Iran,North Korea), and particularly on the growing powerand influence of the People’s Republic of China. Asthe world transitions, so will the nature of MarineCorps missions.

In the 21st century, potential adversaries will use bothconventional and irregular warfare against the military

and technological dominance of the United States. Inthe near term, the United States will remain the domi-nant military power. However, asymmetric tactics, asdemonstrated in Afghanistan, Iraq, and during theSeptember 2001 attacks on the United States, haveeffectively challenged that dominance. To maintainsuperiority, the United States must be prepared torespond to asymmetric threat tactics, techniques, andprocedures in addition to the range of conventional,force-on-force threats.

The attacks of September 2001 marked the beginning ofa new concept in global confrontation that is ideologicaland borderless. Warfare in the 21st century will be deter-mined and affected by many non-military factors,including economic strength, public will, energy issues,irregular warfare, and geographic areas of instability.

GLOBALIZATION

Globalization is the logical outcome of U.S. and West-ern capitalism after the fall of the Soviet Union. With-out a Soviet economic bloc, economies opened tocheaper producers and larger markets. At the sametime, communication technology created a system thatenables individuals, corporations, and nation states toreach around the world faster and less expensively.

Changes to most societies have been significant.Everything from labor markets to potential movieaudiences is assessed on a global scale. States thatseem to be political adversaries are, in reality, eco-nomic partners (e.g., China and Taiwan). Nations thatcan adapt to the demands of globalization by maintain-

U.S. Service members provide security to enable an Iraqi woman to vote in 2005 during the country’s first election.

“Our security will require all to be forward-looking and resolute, to be ready for preemp-tive action when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our lives.”

President George W. Bush, 1 June 2002

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ing property rights, stable currency, an educated workforce, reliable financial institutions, and open access toinformation can benefit from trade and investment.

Money drives the changes. More than US$1.9 trilliontrades hands every day. If a state adapts to thedemands of globalization, money flows. If it does notor cannot, investors ignore the country. Globalizationcan severely weaken or even collapse states thatattempt to opt out of the economic system. Many feelalienated by the prospect of a single, dominant system.The resulting backlash will define many conflicts.

Some perceive globalization as exploiting weak statesand nullifying public social nets that once definednations and societies in exchange for enriching multi-national companies and Western consumption. Deceit-ful leaders and would-be revolutionaries can capitalizeon the anger this generates. As such, the same techno-logical tools being used to create global economicinterdependence can also be used to destroy it.

For those opposed to globalization, the United Statesis an obvious target. While most Americans saw theWorld Trade Center attack as an assault on the tallestbuildings in Manhattan, many foreigners saw theattack as an assault against a symbol of the economicculture we export. The United States dominates theglobal system, but does not own it. Potential adversar-ies and competitors will not defect from the system,but will leverage it to mitigate U.S. strength. Conflictfor the mid term will focus on two groups that are nowfighting for supremacy – those who have money andthose who have none.

Non-state ActorsNon-state actors began filling the void left by thosestates weakened by the transforming global economy.As a consequence, non-state actors are most powerfulwhere the local government is weakest. In the nearterm, U.S. forces are likely to face most conflicts inthose states with powerful and involved non-stateactors that are either in-country or quickly spring up inreaction to intervention. Understanding the role ofthese actors is vital in understanding the threat andfuture opponents on the battlefield.

A peripheral effect of globalization is the empower-ment of individuals and groups. With funding moreaccessible through modern technology and communi-cations, they become more independent of govern-ment. These groups and individuals not only influencetheir home countries and people, they can solicit sup-port for their causes from the entire world. Some non-state actors are helpful and vital to U.S. operationsabroad. Non-violent non-state actors such as non-gov-ernmental organizations (NGOs) feed the poor andhelp governments in crisis. In contrast, violent non-state actors, such as al Qa’ida, create an increasinglydangerous challenge.

Private Security Organizations

Private security organizations may become a threat toMarine forces, but not likely in a direct manner. Mostprivate armies have been contracted to conduct secu-rity, counter-insurgency, or training in developingcountries. Private security organizations will likelyhesitate to be involved in a conflict where they wouldface a professional and formidable foe like the UnitedStates. A much more likely threat would come from aninsurgent or terrorist group who has received trainingin improved tactics, techniques, and procedures frommercenary advisors.

With more non-state and private actors (media, aid,contractors) present in areas of conflict and crisis, pri-vate security has become a serious growth industry.The demand for security personnel since the Septem-ber 2001 attacks on the United States has created anew challenge for U.S. military forces. Iraq’s poorsecurity has generated a thriving private industry com-prising Iraqis and former military personnel fromBuilding destroyed by bombing.

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around the world who protect foreign contractorsworking on construction projects, journalists, seniorgovernment officials, and diplomats. Private securityforces in Iraq are estimated to number 20,000, makingit a larger armed contingent than the United Kingdom,the United States’ closest coalition partner. Privatesecurity organizations vary in goals, training, weap-onry and rules of engagement, and are unregulated byone authority. The likelihood of an incident occurringbetween Marines and security personnel will increase.

Private Military Forces Private military forces (PMFs, also referred to as mer-cenaries by some) have played key roles in conflicts inLiberia, Angola, Colombia, Sierra Leone, and Iraqsince the Thirty Years War (1618-1648). The end ofthe Cold War has given rise to thousands of PMFs.Even the strongest nations have outsourced many keyand, in some cases, highly sensitive military industries(training, defense) once thought of exclusively as gov-ernment responsibility. These hired militaries haverapidly taken central roles in security, strategy andtraining for foreign militaries, all of which can affectMarine operations.

At the same time, some governments have grownincreasingly dependent on PMFs. U.S. firms, for exam-ple, provided almost the entire logistical and mainte-nance support for the Saudi Army during OperationDESERT STORM. Today, PMFs are far more compli-cated than the mercenaries of the past, and are drivenby corporate profit, rather than individual gain. Assuch, the presence of PMFs has expanded exponen-tially. PMFs accounted for one of every 100 Americansinvolved in the Gulf War, and one of every 10 Ameri-cans in the Iraq War. PMFs fight battles, train advisors,and provide material support, including everythingfrom fighter planes and ships to laundry services andmeals. Some PMFs focus on security work for multina-tional corporations, the UN, or NGOs, includinghumanitarian groups. Others work to remove land-mines from war-torn areas in Africa and Asia.

Non-governmental OrganizationsThe presence of international organizations, particu-larly non-governmental organizations, has increaseddramatically over the last two decades. It is estimated

that the number of international NGOs rose from anestimated 6,000 in 1990 to nearly 26,000 in 1996 andby 2002, more than 37,000 international NGOs werereported. While most of these NGOs provide servicesin less-than-ideal situations during less-than-ideal con-ditions, their presence can have a significant effect onU.S. military activities. NGO personnel can impedemilitary operations by acting counter to the goals ofthe military mission, to include refusing to evacuatehostile areas or conducting inappropriate religiousactivity during humanitarian crisis when Marines arerendering aid. Reports by NGOs criticizing U.S. mili-tary action can also undermine U.S. legitimacy in theinternational community and communities in whichthey are operating.

In the current security environment, NGOs are oftenseen as semi-official distributors of Western govern-ment relief, rather than independent, impartial agen-cies who are there to help those in need, regardless ofpolitics, religion or ideology. This has led to increasedtargeting of NGO personnel, to include killings andkidnappings. It can also lead to subsequent withdrawalof NGO personnel, leaving the U.S. military to fill inhumanitarian gaps. Reductions in aid organizationsduring crises could result in increased relief tasking toU.S. Marines.

Violent Non-state ActorsViolent, non-state actors include terrorist groups,insurgents, and organized criminals. Their capacity forviolence can stem from myriad sources, includinggreed, religious or non-religious ideology, or a basicquest for power. Asymmetric tactics provide themflexibility in achieving their goals.

These violent actors are more challenging to U.S.forces than nation states because they are more diffi-cult to deter from offensive operations. A governmentis easily targeted because it has command and controlcenters and, generally, a highly centralized bureau-cracy, whereas violent, non-state actors operating incells and through networks can blend into the generalpopulation. Nations can be held accountable to stan-dards of international law and to their people, and vio-lators face economic or political sanctions from theglobal community. Non-state actors are difficult tohold accountable because they do not adhere to inter-

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national law and cannot be sanctioned. Self-electedleaders are loyal to themselves and their causes.

Violent, non-state actors tend to have a receptive audi-ence in the world’s growing youth population. Unem-ployed and disenchanted by the failed promises ofmodernization and trade, these young people will beeasy to recruit if some of their basic needs are not met.The changing demographics of the world will play asignificant role in how the United States may addresssome of the backlashes to globalization.

Organized CriminalsOrganized crime thrives in resource-rich states under-going significant political and economic transforma-tion. It also thrives in countries where governments areweak, vulnerable to corruption, and unable or unwill-ing to consistently enforce the rule of law. The dangerto Marine forces from organized crime comes in theshape of syndicates that form loose alliances withinsurgent movements for specific operations, as is thecurrent case in Iraq. The greatest danger from orga-nized crime is the trafficking in nuclear, biological, orchemical weapons of mass destruction. This dangerwill increase over the time of this estimate.

Transnational CriminalsIncreased global travel, information access, and com-munications capabilities have allowed transnationalcrime to become a significant destabilization factor.Often characterized as a law enforcement problem,crime is becoming a military problem, as well. Tran-snational crime is often based in regions with limitedcapital and high unemployment and birth rates. It pro-liferates in environments where citizens have limitedlegitimate economic opportunity. Criminal entrepre-neurs in developing and transitional countries provideaffluent countries with goods and services, drugs, andinexpensive human labor. They also profit fromregional conflicts, trading small arms and militaryequipment for commodities (such as diamonds) thatcan be sold in both legitimate and illicit markets.

The effects of criminal enterprises are significant. Thedrug trade undermines public health and fosters addic-tion; trade in human beings contributes to diseasespread. Trafficking women has had serious demo-

graphic consequences in some countries. Informationtechnology, exploited by transnational criminals, hasled to the spread of child pornography, internationalfinancial crime, and money laundering. Credit cardfraud facilitated by internet use reaps enormous profitsfor criminal groups and can be used to fund terrorism.

Historically, motivation for crime has been perceivedto be greed. “Traditional” crime syndicates, such asthe Japanese Yakuza or the Colombian mafia, runoperations that pursue long-term profit and invest inmajor international financial centers – safe havens toensure long-term viability. These traditional criminalelements tend to avoid connections to terrorist ele-ments. Overt terrorist collusion would bring scrutinythat would affect the survivability of their operations.In fact, many have interest in maintaining financialinstitutions that allow the organization to function.

Some groups, however, will align with international ter-rorist groups; they are unconcerned with market stabil-ity. Smaller groups, opportunistic and with shorter-termprofit goals, have emerged and appear to have little con-cern with being linked with terrorists. These groupshave risen from the many regional conflicts of the1990s. In the Balkans and in central Asia where agileorganizations are forming – organizations that operateacross regions and cultures. Elsewhere, Middle East ter-rorists are cooperating with crime groups in the tri-bor-der region of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay; al Qa’ida

Transnational Youth Gangs

While transnational youth gangs are not new, their recentalleged activity with al Qa’ida operatives highlights theirpotential threat. For decades, Chinese organized crimehas used local youth gangs in many U.S., Asian, andEuropean cities to significantly increase their illicit drugand human trafficking syndicates. Major smugglingroutes through Central America have given Chinesegangs increased access to the United States. Cities suchas New York, San Francisco, and Chicago have long beenmajor areas of operations for gangs such as the Triadsand Tongs. The rise of youth gangs in Central Americaand their connections to criminals in U.S. cities hasfocused more international attention on the increasedchallenges to law enforcement these groups represent.

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operatives are associated with crime groups in westernAfrica (diamonds); and the Philippines-based AbuSayyaf routinely conducts piracy in the south Pacific.

The links between transnational crime groups and ter-rorists are strongest in regions with corruption. Incountries with most severe corruption problems, thestate cannot effectively guard borders, regulate theflow of goods, or investigate transnational crimebecause the members of the state collude with, or mayeven control, the nation’s criminal elements.

Criminal organizations that smuggle nuclear materialare a possibility. The 2003 shut down of A.Q. Khan’snuclear smuggling ring in Pakistan proved that privateindividuals could significantly proliferate nucleartechnology without U.S. intelligence knowledge andto considerable profit. While A.Q. Khan’s group wasnot a traditional crime syndicate, his smuggling ringpointed to the ability to smuggle almost any valuableitem that is in high demand.

Street Gangs

Foreign policy experts have suggested that the tighten-ing of U.S. immigration policies has created an unin-tended threat: the transnational street gang. Since themid-1990s, Tens of thousands of immigrants with

criminal records have been deported to their homecountries, often in Latin America and Asia, each year.In 1996, around 38,000 immigrants were deportedafter committing a crime; by 2003, the number hadjumped to almost 80,000. Although many gang mem-bers have spent the majority of their lives in the UnitedStates, once arrested, their immigrant status oftenresults in deportation.

With little connection to their new country, the depor-tees seek ways to return to the United States, connectwith other deported gang members, or seek protectionfrom local gang members. Connecting with other gangmembers generally results in increased crime, vio-lence, and instability. The deported gang members arealso susceptible to being exploited by terrorismgroups; the El Salvadoran MS13 gang is allegedlylinked to al Qa’ida.

CULTURE

The post-Cold War era and events since 11 September2001 have given rise to a complex, multi-polar envi-ronment, where most wars are fought within nationsrather than between nations and the non-state actor hasrisen in military and political prominence, filling avoid often left by weak governments. Cultural differ-

Hizballah – From Terrorism to LegitimacyIn October 1983, Hizballah became a part of MarineCorps history when a truck bomb detonated at the BeirutMarine barracks, killing 220 Marines and 21 other U.S.service members. Formed earlier in the year by a group ofLebanese Shi’a who studied in Islamic schools in Iran,Hizballah’s primary goal was to bring a Khomeini-styleIslamic government to Lebanon.

During the Israeli incursion into Lebanon, Hizballah con-ducted a bloody civil war that ended in 2000 with Israel’swithdrawal. Hizballah is an international organizationwith cells throughout the world that raise funds, publishideology, conduct surveillance and conduct terroristattacks. Considered by the U.S. as a dangerous non-stateactor, Hizballah is a complex organization that may pro-vide insight to future terrorist groups.

Once a rag-tag militia, Hizballah has successfully trans-formed itself into a powerful political and social force.

Hizballah has become a media-friendly, computer-savvyorganization with its own press kits, several websites and atelevision station called Al Manar, which is officiallylicensed by the Lebanese government. It publishes newspa-pers and magazines, and markets a full line of propagandaproducts, including a series of videotapes depicting suicidebombers and guerilla attacks against Israeli soldiers. Atthe same time, a political wing represents Hizballah in theLebanese parliament; Hizballah charitable organizationsprovide medical care, social services, and education totens of thousands of poor families in southern Lebanon,filling a void left by a weak central government.

Combining the strategies of providing services with terror-ism bolsters credibility with local populations and builds alegitimacy needed to govern. The group’s evolution fromterrorism to politics poses both military and diplomaticdilemmas for the United States.

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ences not only serve as an impetus for war, but as anunderlying factor to numerous ethnic and regionalconflicts. The increasing number of conflicts has chal-lenged the United States and its allies to take a moreactive role in the world in order to effect global stabili-zation and security. The 21st century security environ-ment provides new challenges for the U.S and, morespecifically, for the United States Marine Corps.

Multiple definitions exist for culture – but most defini-tions are similar in describing culture as the dominantqualities of a specific area that collectively serve as afoundation for that area’s distinct environment. Cul-ture is made up of social, political, ethnic, economic,religious, historical, and linguistic factors. It definespeople, their behavior, beliefs, institutions, norms,morals, and values. Culture can unite peoples acrossnational boundaries as easily as it can divide peoplewithin those boundaries. Cultural barriers are oftenwrongfully over-simplified by treating them as lan-guage barriers; however, even language barriers arenot that simple. The language barrier is not limited toword-for-word translations but also includes idioms,slang, non-verbal gestures, and social conventions,which all make up communication. The translator’srole is made easier when he/she has a grasp of all theelements that make up the language of a culture.

Cultural knowledge and intelligence has becomeincreasingly important because traditional methods ofwarfare have proven inadequate in 21st century con-flicts, such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan. U.S. tech-nology, training, and doctrine designed to counter theSoviet threat are not adequate for low-intensity coun-terinsurgency operations where civilians mingle freelywith combatants in complex urban terrain.

The major combat operations that toppled SaddamHussein's regime were relatively simple because theyrequired the U.S. military to do what it does best: con-duct maneuver warfare in flat terrain using over-whelming firepower with air support. However, sincethe end of major combat operations in the campaign,coalition forces have been fighting a complex waragainst an enemy they do not fully understand. Theinsurgents' organizational structure is not military, buttribal. Their tactics are not conventional, but asymmet-rical; their weapons are not tanks and fighter planes,

but improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and suicidebombers. They do not abide by the Rules of War andthe Geneva Conventions, nor do they appear to haveany formal rules of engagement.

Exporting AmericaAmerican culture is exported more widely than anyother in the world. U.S. movies, music, history, lan-guage, business methods, and political ideologiesshow up in countless foreign nations. Commercialism,globalization, and capitalism have made the UnitedStates more transparent than any other country. Thiscan be a force multiplier for potential adversaries, asAmerican vulnerabilities and weaknesses are moreeasily illustrated and understood, placing U.S. forcesat a disadvantage. For example, Iraqi jihadists believethey have a stronger will than U.S. troops (because ofmedia portrayals of American society as frivolous) andcan therefore, outlast them in war. They feel that theirdevotion to their cause will be rewarded in the after-life. Their religious-based belief acts as a force multi-plier, which feeds the insurgency’s persistence.

Effective cultural intelligence is not only a force multi-plier but can also dispel dangerous and misleading cat-egorizations and generalizations. Humans fear whatthey do not understand. That fear manifests itself inmistreatment of people who are foreign, and disrespectfor practices that are unfamiliar. U.S. forces must bewell informed and prepared to fight an enemy that hasextensive knowledge of American culture and history(military and political) that it may use to its advantage.The U.S. military has a unique advantage in the cul-tural and religious diversity of the United States. Thisadvantage can be exploited when facing an increas-ingly informed enemy who seeks the upper handthrough its own intelligence and close observation ofAmerican culture.

Mirror ImagingWhile the consequences of a lack of cultural knowl-edge might be most apparent (or perhaps most deadly)in a counterinsurgency, a failure to understand foreigncultures has been a major contributing factor in multi-ple national security and intelligence failures. In thedays preceding Pearl Harbor, the U.S. governmentpicked up Japanese signals (including conversations,

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decoded cables, and ship movements), yet failed todistinguish signals and noise because it was unimagin-able that the Japanese might do something as irrationalas attacking the headquarters of the U.S. Pacific fleet.

In a similar instance of mirror imaging, or applyingone’s own standards in analysis of another’s antici-pated actions, India's nuclear tests on 11 and 13 May1998 came as a complete surprise to CIA analysts. Theanalysts believed Indians would not test their nuclearweapons because Americans would not test nuclearweapons in similar circumstances. Such ethnocentrism(the inability to put aside one's own cultural attitudesand imagine the world from the perspective of a differ-ent group) is especially dangerous in a national-secu-rity context because it can distort strategic thinking.

The conflict in Iraq also demonstrates the culturalimportance of successful intelligence. Misunderstand-ing jihadist motivations has caused the United Statesto readdress its assessment of the tenacity of the ongo-ing insurgency in the country.

Building a Cultural FoundationFirepower may achieve temporary battlefield superior-ity in conflict, but it will not necessarily achieve afavorable conflict resolution. In the current and poten-tial expeditionary operating environments, where mili-tary operations extend beyond combat and may alsoinclude nation-building and stability operations, it isimperative that equal weight be given to military andcultural factors. Understanding culture can helpaddress important military and civil issues, such asdetermining the extent of the enemy’s will to fight, ofresistance groups to persevere, or of the population tosupport insurgents, tribal leaders or warlords. Culturalintelligence is rapidly becoming as important to mis-sion fulfillment as are high technology weapons.

A deep cultural knowledge of future adversaries andpopulations within potential operating areas will beessential to successful U.S. military operations. Dis-tance culture (reviews of previous academic research)is not an adequate substitute for on-site culture (knowl-edge developed through focused fieldwork). First-handknowledge is far more difficult to develop during aconflict when association with Americans could putsources at risk. It is imperative that the groundwork on

cultural intelligence be conducted prior to the onset ofa crisis. Cultural databases must be populated prior toputting military forces on the ground. Immigrant andrefugee testimonies, travelers’ accounts, in-countryimmersion trips by military or civilian personnel, andeven debriefings of previously deployed military canbe collected, analyzed, and exploited. All theseresources can contribute to a clearer picture of thehuman terrain Marines can expect.

RELIGION

While religion has become a significant driver inworld dynamics, it is important to understand whatdrives the apparent resurgence of religious violence.

In the past 70 years, the United States fought twopolitical movements (fascism and communism) thatthreatened to take over many governments. Both ofthese ideologies were born of modern secular ideas.Their belief in science and an educated ruling classtook the place of religion for many. With the defeat ofthe Nazis and the fall of the Soviet Union, manyexpected the world to embrace secular capitalism. TheSeptember 2001 attacks on the United States provedotherwise. Religion, particularly in much of the devel-oping world, is a part of everyday debate. The per-ceived values of globalization, from global regard fortreatment of women in the Middle East to the loss oftraditional families in China, are driving many of theglobal religious movements today.

Modern religious fundamentalism represents, to anextent, a widespread rebellion against the acceptanceof secular modernity. While communist and authori-tarian regimes suppressed religion for their own gains,much of the oppression came under the guise of mod-ernization, creating a somewhat understandable suspi-cion of Western governance. Where there is reform,there are constituencies saying that moving towarddemocracy means adopting Western ideals, and invitesan increase in sexual immorality, crime, and violence.Segments of the population believe they have to returnto a more protective environment, in which the gov-ernment actively favors a particular notion of religiousand ethnic identity, and the enforcement of religiouslysanctioned values. This often leads to conflict. Inevery culture, wherever a modern, Western-style soci-

7



ety has been established, a religious counterculture hasdeveloped alongside it in conscious rebellion. Funda-mentalist movements are rooted in a belief that theirway of life and values are at risk of being destroyed,and with that comes strong reaction.

Massive change also drives religious movements. Ascountries attempted to do in 50 years what took theWest 300, modernization meant neglecting the spiri-tual aspect of transition, and viewing religion as anobstacle to progress. Moreover, development too oftenfailed to deliver even the material benefits it promised.The current resurgence of religion is a modern attemptto harness traditional identities for contemporary use.This has had implications, not just in Islamic states butalso in those attempting counter fundamentalismthrough Christianity, Judaism, Sikhism, Hinduism,Buddhism, and Confucianism. This backlash has cre-ated challenges for the United States.

Religion’s Effect on National IdentitiesMuch of the rise in religious politics could be regardedas filling the void while the secular nation-state is in aperiod of transition; especially states that are still author-itarian and/or corrupt. Globalization has significantimplications to traditional nationalism and the nation-state in several ways. It has weakened them economi-cally, not only through the global reach of transnationalbusinesses, but also by the transnational nature of theirlabor supply, currency, and financial instruments. Formany, globalization has eroded their sense of nationalidentity and unity through the expansion of media andcommunications, technology, and popular culture.

Some of the most intense movements for ethnic andreligious nationalism have arisen in states where localleaders have felt exploited by the global economy.They feel unable to gain military leverage against whatthey regard as corrupt leaders promoted by the UnitedStates, and resent what they see as an invasion of U.S.popular culture on television, the internet, and inmotion pictures.

Religion and ethnicity define public communities. Theneed for national identity persists because there is no sin-gle alternative form of social cohesion and affiliation thatcan dominate public life the way the nation-state did in

the 20th century. As such, religion, ethnicity, and tradi-tional culture establish nationalist activity and identity.

While this has occurred in many religions, Islamicextremism provides the most current example. Seen asan Islamic nationalist, Usama bin Ladin looks at SaudiArabia and Egypt as states governed by apostates orinfidels who corrupt and pollute the entire Muslim faith.He believes it is his obligation as a devout Muslim toincite armed revolt to transform those governments andothers like them with an ultimate goal of a transnationalform of Islamic rule. Palestinian terrorism is a similarexample. A significant PLO objective is to win indepen-dent statehood for the Palestinian people. But for seg-ments of the population, as well as for many non-Palestinian Muslims, that goal also has strong religioussignificance, and the struggle of the Palestinian nation-alist is interpreted as part of a wider Islamic campaign.

Religion’s Effect on War and TerrorismWar and violence are rarely solely about faith; theyinvolve politics, economics, nationalism, even a per-sonal sense of humiliation. However, conflict is oftenreligiously influenced, such as in Sri Lanka, Sudan,and Israel-Palestine. Religion in conflict provideslegitimacy, a mechanism for recruitment, and a vastarray of asymmetric tactics. Conflict for religious pur-pose has instant legitimacy. Concepts of cosmic warare accompanied by claims of moral justification. It isnot so much that religion has become a political tool,but that politics has become a religious tool. Throughenduring absolutism, worldly struggles have beenlifted into the level of sacred battle. Fighters are notjust joining a war but partaking in redemption. For thedisenfranchised, this can be a significant motivation.

Strict religious codes impart a sense of redemption anddignity to those who uphold them. The very act of kill-ing on behalf of a moral code is a political statement.Yet these are not just personal acts. These violentefforts of symbolic empowerment have an effectbeyond personal satisfaction and feelings of potency.Such acts break the state’s monopoly on morally sanc-tioned killing. By assuming the right to take life intheir own hands, the perpetrators of religious violencemake a claim of power on behalf of the powerless — abasis of legitimacy for public order other than that onwhich the secular state relies. Jihadists moving into

8



Iraq to fight Americans send a message that they havethe faith to fight a conflict that the neighboring rulersare either too weak or too spiritually corrupt to fight.

In these “religious battles,” there is no need to com-promise or to contend with society’s laws and limita-tions; one is obeying a higher authority. Inspiritualizing violence, religion gives the act of vio-lence remarkable power. Asymmetric and irregulartactics that require personal sacrifice and use of civil-ian targets exploit weaknesses of law enforcement, tra-ditional militaries and the state. Religion will continueto be a tool in future conflicts.

DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS

Current population studies estimate that in 2015, theworld population will reach 7.2 billion, 18 percentmore than the 6.1 billion people in 2000. Of thisgrowth, 95 percent is occurring in developing, alreadyoverpopulated countries. This will result in a dispro-portionate youth population. Concurrently, an agingpopulation in advanced countries may force govern-ments to realign their foreign policies to reduce the fis-cal burden and bolster elder-care programs. Otherimpacts to U.S. interests worldwide include people

from the disaffected middle class—highly educated,widely traveled, and unable to acquire desired jobs orassimilate into a larger society (such as Muslims inEurope). They may become isolated and turn to reli-gion as an outlet to affect change. Most of the Septem-ber 2001 terrorists were from this group.

The Youth PopulationIn much of the developing world, a disproportionatepercentage of the population falls in the age group of15-29. This anomaly may cause instability as largepopulations of restless, dissatisfied young people areconfronted with economic stagnation and unwelcomesocial change. Members of this demographic tend tobe highly politicized, outspoken, and motivated byperceived social, economic, and political injustices.States that fail to adequately integrate youth popula-tions into the economy are likely to perpetuate thecycle of political instability, ethnic wars, revolutions,and anti-government activities that already affectmany countries. Large youth populations are likely tobe the most disruptive to U.S. interests in Afghanistan,Colombia, Iraq, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Uzbekistan,the West Bank, and Gaza — all places where alienatedyouth are prime candidates to become foot soldiers inradical religious and nationalist movements.

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The Aging PopulationFertility rates are declining, and people are livinglonger. The National Intelligence Council estimatesthat by 2050, the number of people older than 65 willreach nearly 1.5 billion, about 16 percent of theworld’s estimated 10 billion people. The fiscal bud-get pressure will be strong, as the non-working popu-lation increases and the working-age population(those aged 15 to 64) decreases. Governments willhave to spend more on health care, pension programs,and other social welfare programs. Many nations,including the United States, will likely decrease mili-tary expenditures. Europe, known for its commitmentto social welfare programs, may offset these costs bydecreasing its involvement in international alliances,such as NATO; this could place more demands onU.S. forces to meet the world’s military and peace-keeping needs.

Declining birthrates could have a destabilizing effecton countries like Russia, whose population is decreas-ing at a rate of 750,000 per year. This type of trendplaces pressure on a country’s armed forces, labor sup-ply, and economic prosperity.

UrbanizationForty-seven percent of the world lives in cities. As ofearly 2005, one in six people, or nearly one billion,live as “squatters,” defined as those without deed orproperty rights who must rely on services outside thestate. These squatters are almost exclusively in devel-oping nations. Within a generation, more than half ofthe world’s urban population likely will be in this cate-gory. Not all live in shanty towns; some actuallybecome solidly middle class over time. This is an indi-cator of the states’ inability to provide basic servicesor legal rights for its people, and can often lead to adestabilized state.

In such regions, civil order often succumbs to power-ful criminal gangs. Although the state still functions, ithas lost significant control. There is a considerablenontraditional threat from Brazil to South Africa fromgangs who conduct black marketing; smuggle people,guns and drugs; and form alliances with terrorist orga-nizations. As public services disintegrate, residents areforced to hire private security or pay criminals for pro-tection. The following are some global urban issues:

■ In Brazil, police have fallen back on a contain-ment policy, surrendering certain areas, primarily

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World’s Urban and Slum Proportions.

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the squatter settlements, to gang rule. The richhave embraced helicopter transportation as ameans to avoid travel through these areas.

■ In Johannesburg, much of downtown, includingthe stock exchange, has been abandoned to squat-ters and drug gangs.

■ In Mexico City, crime rates soar despite the pres-ence of 91,000 policemen.

■ In Karachi, 40 percent of the population lives inslums, and gangland violence and pro-al Qa’idacells are present.

As cities around the world fall into disorder, theUnited States may be asked to assist in training localmilitaries for armed interventions.

CATASTROPHIC EVENTS

Major natural and man-made disasters can producepermanent changes to societies, ecosystems, and envi-ronments, along with material damage, loss of life,distress, and displacement. This often results in com-plex humanitarian relief emergencies that compromisesocioeconomic development and create escalatingdemands on diminishing resources.

Natural DisastersOn 26 December 2004, a massive tsunami in the southAsia left 280,000 dead or missing, and sparked one ofthe Marine Corps’ largest humanitarian relief opera-tions. The destruction seemed immeasurable, butfuture catastrophes may be much worse. Earthquakesand volcanic eruptions, floods, mud slides, anddroughts will continue to devastate countries alreadyhard hit by poverty and political turmoil.

The world has seen a sharp increase in natural disas-ters. There were about 100 each year in the early1960s, and as many as 500 per year by the early 2000s.The increasing devastation caused by earthquakes, tsu-namis, and hurricanes is not necessarily due to theirgreater frequency, however, but because populationshave grown and people have altered where they live(floodplains, mountainsides, coastal areas) and theconditions in which they live. As larger populationslive in more marginal areas in informal, substandardhousing, without the proper resources and technology,

the number of lives lost to natural disasters will con-tinue to increase.

Since 2000, the Marine Corps has conducted humani-tarian missions in Iraq, Indonesia, Afghanistan, SriLanka, Haiti, and Mozambique. This highlights thateven during the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT),humanitarian relief and other support missions remaina Marine Corps priority.

Man-made DisastersMan-made disasters refer to non-natural events thatcan be sudden, and have immediate calamitous conse-quences, or long-term, protracted affects. Man-madedisasters, such as the Chernobyl explosion or a damcollapse, usually have an element of human intent,negligence, error, or involve the failure of a system.These catastrophes are a growing threat as evidencedby trends over the past decade.

Man-made disasters can occur without apparent out-side influence, as with structural, building, or minecollapses. Power or telecommunication outages, whileoccurring suddenly, generally are not calamitousunless they extend over a long enough period of timeto strain resources and cause hardship. Explosions ofvolatile chemicals, fluids, or gas, can occur as a resultof error, sabotage, or terrorism.

An Indonesian man searches through rubble in Banda Aceh, Sumatra after the December 2004 tsunami.

11



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Man-made disasters, to include civil strife, civil war,and international war, can have both long- and short-term effects. On a national level, this involves war-like encounters between armed groups from the samecountry fighting within the borders. Such outbreaksmay cause large-scale medical problems such as epi-demics, food and water shortages, refuse accumula-tion, displaced persons, and refugees.

Disasters associated with civil strife and war havekilled more than 20 million people in 150 conflictssince 1945. In places like Congo, Rwanda, Burundi,Angola, Sudan, Somalia, Liberia, Northern Iraq,Chechnya and former Yugoslavia, war and civil strifehave claimed the lives of hundreds of thousands inrecent years. Land mines kill one person somewherein the world every 20 minutes. Trends of the pastdecade are clear: armed conflict and complex, man-made disasters are increasing in frequency and sever-ity throughout the world.

SCARCE COMMODITIES

Natural resources, such as water, minerals, and oil, arenot well distributed, and many of the world’s mostvaluable resources are in some of the most volatileand corrupt regions of the world. Access and con-sumption drive prices and create shortages that cannotbe quickly remedied.

A new dynamic is China, whose transforming econ-omy is straining world resources that have yet toadjust. With its economy growing at roughly 8 percenteach year, China has become the largest importer ofmany commodities, to include iron ore, copper andaluminum. In addition, China’s new, car-buying mid-dle class and surging manufacturing base creates oildemands that are noticeable at American gas stations.

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Security Implications of a Tidal WaveThe tsunami of December 2004 hit hardest in the archi-pelagic country of Indonesia. The regional change indemographics may have the most significant impact ofthese events. Indonesia now has villages where menoutnumber women 10-to-1, some having lost up to 80percent of their women. The Aceh province’s hard-hitvillage remnants consist almost entirely of widowers.Lamsenia, a once-thriving fishing and farming villageof 833 on the west coast, now has only 35 womenamong its 158 survivors, and all but one of those havemoved elsewhere. Gampong Pandee, on the edge of theprovincial capital Banda Aceh, was reduced from 1,139people to 246 — with only 20 women.

This crushing blow to the population will have unin-tended consequences if ignored. Frustrated men withoutprospect of a family may turn to other organizations fora sense of belonging. While there was hope for a newpeace out of tragedy in this contested region, the result-ing demographic imbalance may encourage future strife.

13



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While droughts, floods, and earthquakes are brought to mind when one thinks of human suffering, war is the root cause of many humanitarian crises. During conflict, populations are vulnerable to not only shrapnel and bombs, but to the famine and disease brought about by the environment created in conflict. This graphic illustrates the noncombatant casualties from war in Congo.

14



Demand has been strong from the economically resur-gent U.S. economy, the world's largest consumer ofcommodities. Historically, there has not been such astrong, synchronized rise in demand across so manydifferent commodities. Unusual alliances are formingto secure scarce resources. Examples include Chinaand Latin America (iron ore, soya); China and Africa(oil); and China and Eurasia (natural gas).

Demographic trends, specifically population growthand urbanization, will affect not only government bud-gets and security, but also environments and naturalresources. Deforestation, declining fisheries, and waterresource depletion are directly related to populationgrowth, as forests are cleared to provide housing, andmore food and water are needed. Natural disasters mayoccur where soil degradation leads to flooding andpopulation displacement.

Oil and EnergyThe International Monetary Fund warned in April 2005there may be sustained high oil prices over the next twodecades. Reports persist of an extended period of highdemand for raw materials and increasing oil prices ifinstability continues in major producing nations. Con-tinued growth by China and India will increase oil con-sumption matching consumption rates of otherdeveloped nation. This has the potential to significantlyimpact global energy demand, putting significant strainon resources.

Middle-class families with more disposable incomewill continue to acquire air conditioners, washingmachines, automobiles, and other resource-intensivedevices. In 2000, the Department of Energy reportedthat the number of cars in the world is expected toincrease by two-thirds over the next 20 years, produc-ing a staggering demand for gasoline, iron, aluminum,and chromium. The United States will not only be oneof the main contenders for these resources but also themain force to help manage conflicts associated withthese shortages.

Oil and Governance

Higher oil prices rarely translate into benefits for thepopulations of oil producing countries. Countrieswhose economies are overly dependent on oil revenue

tend not to be democratic. Among the top ten oil pro-ducers, only two (Mexico and Norway) are truly dem-ocratic and only three (Nigeria, Russia, andVenezuela) have elements of democracy. Althoughcountries that do not export oil also can be undemo-cratic, economies that rely exclusively on oil revenuepresent disproportionate rates of corruption. In coun-tries that discover large amounts of oil before theireconomies diversify, oil can have devastating effectson the population and environment.

Oil prices will likely remain high in the midrange.More oil revenue will allow authoritarian regimes tobuild support, making transitions to democracy moredifficult. Competition for resources may allow corruptregimes to maintain ties with the international commu-nity that would otherwise be severed. Such relation-ships tend to generate and perpetuate instability, notjust internally but worldwide.

Mineral Trade and SmugglingThe trade and smuggling of diamonds in West Africa,coltan in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, andgold in Indonesia have all been linked to violence andcivil conflict. Similarly, minerals have helped financeal Qa’ida’s terrorist operations.

When managed well, valuable mineral trade plays asignificant role in enhancing economic growth and sta-bility, such as in Botswana, Namibia, Chile, Bruneiand Gabon. However, the industry also has the poten-tial to threaten peace and security. The presence ofthese valuable resources can exacerbate the zero-sumeconomic competition common during conflict.

Minerals linked to conflict share one or more of thefollowing characteristics:

■ They are easily extracted or plundered;

■ They are valuable, easily transportable; and

■ Their extraction and sales are difficult to monitorand regulate.

Valuable minerals can affect the geographic focus,duration, and intensity of violent conflict.

Geographic focus: Even if controlling mineralresources is not the original cause of the conflict, it canbecome the source of fighting. The presence of miner-

15



als in remote regions can also reinforce secessionisttendencies. Conflict over resources in these regionsrarely receives international attention, allowing theconflict to fester.

Duration: Mineral wealth can finance continuedfighting, strengthen incentives to hamper the peaceprocesses, and undermine discipline in military forces.Struggles over ownership can also increase the com-plexity and duration of conflicts.

Intensity: Mineral wealth can finance arms purchases,raising the level of military and civilian casualties. Itcan also become a further point of antagonism fuelingthe conflict. However, the presence of these resourcescan also diminish conflict intensity, with proper lead-ership and management.

Water About a third of the world’s population lives in coun-tries suffering from moderate-to-high water stress(water consumption in these countries is more than 10percent of renewable freshwater resources). At least 80countries (or 40 percent of the world’s population)experienced serious water shortages in the late 20th

century. By 2020, an estimated two-thirds of theworld’s people will be living in water-stressed coun-tries; water use will have increased by 40 percent,including an additional 17 percent for food production.

Water is shared among nations, regions, ethnicgroups, and communities. Two or more countriesshare some 261 rivers, making trans-boundary waterresources management a critical issue. Water hasbeen a traditional source of dispute, and major waterdevelopment projects have led to violence and civilstrife. While water is often seen as a source of con-flict, it is seldom the only or most important reason.Issues regarding shared water resources are often dif-fused by the international community. However,water shortages are increasing, and the resultingdrought, crop failures, and conflicts will affect morelives each year.

DISEASE AND PANDEMICS

Infectious disease is the world’s leading cause ofdeath, and will present yet another challenge forMarine forces in the near term. Despite widespreadoptimism in the 1960s and 1970s, infectious diseasesare not declining in lethality. Driving the resurgence ofthis phenomenon is increasing population density,poor sanitation, and the revolutionary improvements inglobal transportation, which facilitate the rapid spreadof disease.

Emergent diseases such as Severe Acute RespiratorySyndrome (SARS), Ebola, and the Hanta virus are ini-tially difficult to diagnose (often mimicking other ail-ments), and spread rapidly when introduced to a

For some of western Africa, diamonds have brought aboutcivil war and worker exploitation, and have attractedsmugglers and corrupt government officials. During the1990s, diamonds fueled the civil war in Angola until 1999,when the UN Security Council acted to enforce sanctionson the UNITA rebel group’s diamond sales. Likewise,there have been diamond-related conflicts in Sierra Leoneand Liberia, where rebel groups control diamond-richareas and sell the gems to finance the purchase of armsand war supplies. Additionally, Hizballah is believed tohave a stake in the illicit trade.

It is also believed that al Qa’ida became involved after theUnited States and others began disrupting the group’s

financial operations in response to the 1998 U.S. Embassyattacks in Kenya and Tanzania.

The advantages to the diamond trade are clear: a smallhandful of diamonds can be worth millions; they are easyto smuggle; and they cannot be traced in the same manneras traditional money. While conflict diamonds onlyaccount for between two to three percent of the world’sdiamond production, profits in this segment total an esti-mated US$8 billion annually. In 2001, a new procedurecalled for the regulation of diamond exports by requiringcertification for all legitimate diamonds. However, theregulations are still voluntary and there are numerousloopholes that can be exploited.

Diamonds in Africa

16



population. Many other diseases are becoming antibi-otic-resistant. Improved transportation enables thesediseases to quickly spread without containment,becoming a global problem within hours. Major dis-ease epidemics cause social and economic instabilityand can weaken military preparedness. They also cancontribute to increases in crime and difficulty inresponding to crime.

The threat comes not only from the disease, but also theweakened state. With man’s ability to travel cheaply andquickly, any failure to locally contain an outbreak canresult in a global epidemic. Risk of high-casualty epi-demics is mitigated by health and prevention as a func-tion of a robust and transparent governance and civilsociety. The inability of a government to deal with health

issues point to underlying weaknesses in the state, popu-lations at risk, and a potential for future instability.

Infectious diseases contribute to regional instability byslowing economic growth and severely taxing nationaland regional medical capabilities. This then heightenspolitical and cultural tensions. Infectious diseases havealready affected the military readiness of many coun-tries around the world. While future outbreaks cannotbe predicted, the following illustrates different threats:

AIDS/HIVEstimates predict that by 2011, more than 80 millionpeople will have died from AIDS. The HIV/AIDS pan-demic has had a particularly devastating effect on sub-Saharan Africa, where almost three quarters of the

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world’s HIV-positive population lives. However, AIDSis not just Africa’s problem. China, India, and Russiaare reporting increasing numbers of AIDS infections.The following are several consequences of the globalHIV/AIDS pandemic:

■ Armies of sub-Saharan Africa may become unableto maintain regional stability.

■ Many countries will be unable to subsidizetreatment costs for growing numbers of patients.The rising costs may affect economies through-out the world.

■ By not being able to work, an infected youth pop-ulation can impede government attempts to beeconomically productive, care for its elderly pop-ulation, employ its military forces, and maintainstability within borders.

■ The disease may spread rapidly in China, India,and Russia, infecting a disproportionate amountof the world’s population, triggering major socialand political instability, and jeopardizing eco-nomic growth in Asia.

SmallpoxSmallpox is another highly contagious, and sometimesfatal, infectious disease. In the 20th century, smallpoxkilled 300 million people, more than the total warcasualties of 20th century. Although outbreaks haveoccurred over thousands of years, the disease was con-sidered eradicated after a successful worldwide vacci-nation program during the late 1970s. Scientists havenot found a treatment for the disease. Vaccination isthe only way to prevent contracting the disease.

The last naturally occurring case of smallpox in theUnited States was reported in 1949, and in the world in1977 (Somalia). Scientists fear that if the disease re-emerged, the fatality rate would be higher than 30 per-cent, because vaccination is no longer widely prac-ticed and the ability to produce an adequate supply ofvaccine to contain an outbreak has diminished.

Smallpox is considered a dangerous bio-weapon; it ishighly contagious, lethal, stable, easily deployable, andrequires a low infective dose. However, the threat islimited by the difficulty in obtaining samples and thetechnology needed to develop and keep the virus alive.

Successful disease prevention and treatment depends onculture. Illustrative of this dependence is the followingnarrative regarding the 2003 decision to discontinue poliovaccinations in a northern Nigerian province.

For 15 years, health officials were remarkably successfulin containing and eradicating polio. In 1988, there were350,000 new cases of polio in 125 countries, most of themin the developing world. That year four groups, WHO,Rotary International, UNICEF and the U.S. Centers forDisease Control (CDC), made it their goal to vaccinatepolio out of existence, and with the help of private andgovernment funding, they came close. By 2003, the viruswas confined to six countries, Nigeria, Niger, Egypt, Paki-stan, Afghanistan, and India, and seemingly headed forextinction by 2005.

However, the hard-line Muslim clerics in northern Nigeriaboycotted the immunizations due to religious and politicalrivalries, a failed drug trial, and reports of the controver-sial 1999 book "The River," which linked AIDS to poliovaccinations in the Congo in the 1950s. Muslim imamsand local politicians spread rumors that the vaccine couldmake women sterile, transmit AIDS, and/or that it was

made with pork products. The timing could not have beenworse. Of the 35 million Nigerians under 5 years old, 20percent have no polio vaccinations.

It took more than a year for health authorities to convincethe population of the benefits of vaccinations. But it wastoo late. Cases of polio genetically consistent with theNigerian strain had spread, in succession, through morethan 10 neighboring countries, including Chad, Came-roon, Central African Republic, Ivory Coast, and Sudan.In late 2004 the same virus appeared in Saudi Arabia, 2months before the hajj – a time when 2 million Muslimsfrom around the world trekked to Mecca and returned totheir home countries. By May 2005, polio had spread toIndonesia, its first outbreak in 10 years. To date, 16 previ-ously polio-free countries have reported new cases. Whilethe number of deaths from this outbreak were low (many ofthese countries quickly moved to revaccinate their popula-tion); this illustrates the vulnerabilities associated withincreased travel.

The resurgence of polio illustrates how rumor, culture, andmodern population migratory patterns (such as the Hajjand regional commerce) can intersect to spread disease.

Culture, Travel, and Disease

18



SARSSARS, another highly infectious disease, can spreadalmost anywhere within a 24-hour period. Globaltravel makes the disease extremely difficult to contain.Initial symptoms of SARS resemble other, more com-mon maladies, and are often treated as mild influenza.SARS antigens cannot be reliably detected until 10days after the onset of symptoms, further complicatingdiagnosis and treatment.

SARS is believed to have initially jumped from ani-mals to humans in southern China. The disease wentundetected and spread globally, impacting Asian andCanadian economies. Beijing’s initial reaction toSARS highlighted problems within China’s govern-ment and disease control. The rapid spread of SARSillustrated to the world that any disease is potentiallyonly a plane ride away.

Influenza An influenza pandemic similar to the 1918 outbreakthat killed 20 million to 50 million worldwide, includ-ing 500,000 in the United States, may be the greatestpotential disease threat. Smaller outbreaks of influenzain the 1950s and 1960s left thousands of Americansdead. Researchers have indicated that another influ-enza epidemic may be on the horizon. Recent cases ofhumans contracting avian (bird) flu have caused greatconcern with health care officials. These strains ofinfluenza can be fatal. Scientists believe that pandemicviruses are caused by a mutation of human and avianinfluenza. These avian virus strains have an astonish-ing ability to mutate, thus defeating existing vaccines.

Human infections with avian influenza viruses detectedsince 1997 have not resulted in sustained human-to-human transmission. However, because influenza canmutate and spread rapidly, monitoring for human infec-tion and transmission is vital. Because each year’s fluvaccine production relies on prediction of the sus-pected flu strain, and there are limited production facil-ities, the potential for a catastrophic event is high.

Effects of Disease on MilitaryAccording to the Armed Forces Medical IntelligenceCenter, disease and non-battle injuries accounted forthe largest percentage of hospitalization among

deployed U.S. troops during every major battle in the20th century. Marines will face increased threats fromdisease, especially when deployed to tropical climates,countries lacking sanitation services, or to regionsexperiencing viral outbreaks. The damage is amplifiedby exposure to untreated sewage, polluted water, haz-ardous waste and indigenous insects and vermin.Increased interaction with local populations, a require-ment for most Marine Corps missions in the near term,will raise the likelihood that Marines will come intocontact with infectious disease.

INFORMATION REVOLUTION

The explosion of information and communicationtechnology propels the evolution of political andsocial values, actions, and forms of organization. Thiscreates overlapping identities that are often global inscope (through such venues as the internet or special-ized schools). There is also an increasing appreciationfor the power of information operations (IO) in war-fare. With IO, one can use global media and internetconnections to shape global opinion and create an IOforce multiplier that the United States has yet to suc-cessfully counter.

The ability to inexpensively spread information hascreated a new emphasis on tailored language and theuse of symbols, traditions, myths, and metaphors toinvent and plant ideas, such as the conspiracy storiesthat surfaced after the September 2001 attacks. Infor-mation can be limitlessly played, reshaped, andreplayed. Images and simulations are sometimes assignificant as actual events because they becomeevents themselves. In this type of conflict, informationoperations are as important as actual warfare. Defeat isachieved through the perception of chaos and per-ceived inadequacy of opposing forces.

The world is undergoing a diffusion of power, geopo-litical uncertainties, and technological change. Just ascontrol of industrial technology was key to militaryand economic power during the past two centuries,control of information and information technologywill be key to power in the 21st century.

The global communication sphere (GCS) not onlygives the United States more access, but also makes it

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more vulnerable. It comprises all devices, media, andinterconnections used to disseminate informationworldwide. Emerging warfare threats rely on GCSaccess, which provides a mechanism to achieve andmaintain information access and superiority. The GCSis vital to conducting political warfare, empoweringleaderless cells to quickly coordinate and conductoperations anonymously.

With viewership multiplying, one propaganda mes-sage can have multiple effects. Adversary IO may tar-get local constituencies or sympathetic populations;however, mass media creates audiences with unpre-dictable reactions. One message can affect local andregional governments, regional powers, international

allies, and the American public. Messages can strikefear in opponents, inspire the faithful, or serve asrecruiting advertisements depending on the viewer.These secondary or tertiary effects make counter IOincreasingly challenging. The United States has beenunable to respond to this new trend effectively. Thethreat of this influence on future military operationscannot be overstated.

Advances in GCS allow terrorist cells instant reportson mission results against U.S. forces. Supporters rallyin chat rooms, build web pages, use e-mail, text, andinstant messaging to solidify their network. Opponentsuse America’s language and culture to camouflagethemselves in local populations.

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Section 2:TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY WARFARE

SETTING THE STAGE

The threat environment facing today’s Marines can bedefined in three words: unconventional, unforeseen, andunpredictable. As the United States continues to be theworld’s dominant military force, potential adversariesseek to undermine its strengths asymmetrically. Non-tra-ditional methods of warfare will be used and will varywidely. Adversaries, both states and non-state actors,will adapt, be creative, and become increasingly sophis-ticated. They will learn from encounters with Americanweapons, tactics, and doctrines and apply those lessonslearned with increasing complexity, adaptability, andskill by using non-linear, irregular operations.

U.S. military operations in the 21st century will likelyfocus on neutralizing asymmetric threats. Non-stateactors such as terrorists and insurgents will likely bethe primary threat to American national security andits interests for years to come. Asymmetric warfare isbased on surprise – doing the unthinkable or uncon-ventional to undermine the enemy’s strengths andexploit his weaknesses. States and non-states actorswill compensate innovatively for military and techno-logical weaknesses.

Future adversaries to the United States will be drivenby ideologies that do not restrict the nature of conflict.Success will be measured by the breadth of damage,

numbers killed, and amount of fear created and willhave no borders, boundaries, or rules.

The United States will remain the dominant power forat least the next 10 years. Its economy has weatheredglobal financial crisis well; it leads the world in devel-opment and use of the most significant technologies(civilian and military); and it has the most fluid andeffective capital markets. In addition, the UnitedStates’ advanced industrial research and developmentspending is nearly half the world’s total each year, andit maintains strong alliances with key nations.

The superiority of U.S. military concepts, technology,and capabilities has been illustrated consistently sinceOperation DESERT STORM. However, adversariesunderstand their inability to build forces equal to ourcurrent conventional warfighting capabilities. Mostfuture adversaries will only be able to pursue their objec-tives if they can avoid direct U.S. military confrontationand/or develop asymmetric means (operational and tech-nological) to reduce U.S. military superiority, render itirrelevant, or exploit perceived weaknesses.

Most nations develop and maintain militaries, not as ameans to fight the United States, but to defend them-selves locally and regionally. As such, conventionalmilitary threats will continue to come primarily fromIran, North Korea, and China. In addition, China andRussia export military equipment (less advanced sys-tems from China and more advanced systems fromRussia) to a multitude of countries. These weapon sys-tems are more advanced than what the buyers cur-rently have in their inventories. The extent to whichthese weapon systems will actually pose a threat onthe battlefield varies with each country’s military edu-cation levels, cultural views on redundant training, andresource and maintenance constraints. In many cases,the psychological effect of a nation having the region’smost capable weapons systems is a sufficient deterrentto conflict or provocation.

“I make the enemy see my strengths as weaknesses and my weaknesses as strengths while I cause hisstrengths to become weaknesses and discover where he is not strong.” — Sun Tzu

Security Search in an Asymmetric Environment.

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In the midterm, warfare will be increasingly shaped bythe four following assumptions. These will define thenew operational challenges facing Marines:

Strategically, war will not be defined by direct mili-tary-on-military attack; instead, violence will focusasymmetrically on undermining deployed troops andU.S. policies.

Since the U.S. military is perceived to be too strong tobeat conventionally, its future adversaries will focustheir efforts on undermining the United States’ legiti-macy for maintaining a presence in their regions andon affecting the political and popular will. The linesbetween war and peace, as well as civilian and com-batant, will be blurred intentionally to isolate and cre-ate confusion. Adversaries will attack economic,political, and social institutions to frustrate the localpopulation into challenging any authority charged tomaintain stability. Asymmetric tactics will becomestandard and adaptable. Concepts of guerrilla, terror-ist, and criminal will become blended and blurred.

Tactically, warfare will include attempts to disruptorder and distract U.S. forces and undermine popularsupport and legitimacy for U.S. intervention.

Creating chaos, disruption, and insecurity intimidatesthe local population, causing people to shift loyalties,refocus goals, or retreat. It triggers questions about thecosts of U.S. intervention and obligates considerableU.S. presence to maintain order.

The enemy’s tactical goal is to block attempts at societalorder that could affirm American objectives. To do this,adversaries will become skilled in manipulating disen-chantment with U.S. leadership. By disrupting basicservices, combatants can create insecurity and discord.They can then take advantage of the disgruntled popula-tion and recruit members by offering a better alterna-tive, even though they caused the initial problems.Future warfare will replace the Marine’s warrior role fora mayoral one; the enemy’s goal is not to test the three-block Marine, but to require a Marine on every block.

Organizationally, warfare will move from the hierar-chy of military command to a more cell-based, leader-less group structure that maximizes convenience and

tactical adaptation, emphasizes and minimizes net-work vulnerability.

Non-state adversaries will organize around continu-ously adapting cells or nodes that are ideal for theasymmetrical trends previously described. Their small,dispersed nature makes these cells difficult to pene-trate and target. They can be motivated by greed, patri-otism, religious fervor, naiveté, revenge, or boredom.They may have no true central direction, may or maynot work toward a common purpose, and may work ingroups or alone. Ultimate goals might vary among thefactions, but all cells will be united in their hatred anddistrust of the United States, a distrust that has signifi-cantly increased. Such cells can recruit, not onlyformer military components of the state, but also anyable person wanting to fight U.S. forces.

As technology improves, these cells will become moreefficient and more independent. Internet connectionsand cell phone communication allow organizations toconsolidate lethal knowledge, funding, and manpower.Reports of successful tactics can be relayed through-out the network, creating a faster adaptation loop, inwhich people learn and gain momentum. Factions cancoordinate through third-party websites. Of greatesteffect, organizations no longer must rely on a localconstituency or state sponsor for money and personnel(as was the case in traditional guerrilla war). Today,cells can recruit anyone with internet access. With thisinternational potential, ideology becomes crucial.

Ideologically, warfare will be driven by new identitiesoutside basic nationalism. State, cultural, religious,and individual perspectives will combine to createevolving groups and objectives.

Ideology may be the most radical concept in asymmet-ric warfare. Because ethnic, tribal, and religious iden-tities compete with the nation state, one’s identity is nolonger tied to the state in which he lives but to what hebelieves. Traditional and cultural boundaries will beblurred as individuals place their loyalties in some-thing that can provide them structure and order. TheUnited States has effectively battled standing armies toprotect the conventional territorial state. However, itwill be more difficult to counter the tactics of an ideo-logical organization, like communism, that operatesoutside traditional cultural boundaries.

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ASYMMETRIC WARFARE

The lack of military competitors to the United Statesmeans that U.S. military operations in this century willlikely focus on neutralizing asymmetric threats. TheJoint Staff defines asymmetric warfare as “attempts tocircumvent or undermine the opponent’s strengthswhile exploiting weaknesses using methods that differsignificantly from expected methods of operations.”

Asymmetric threats challenge the United States mili-tary by opening new venues for conflict. Terrorismagainst civilians is but one possibility; informationoperations is yet another. Asymmetric warfare can alsoappear in the doctrine or tactics, technology and objec-tives that an opponent adopts. Asymmetry is not a toolused solely by irregular forces, terrorists, insurgents,or weaker states. Asymmetric approaches are limitless.

Full Spectrum TargetingThe most successful asymmetric strategies against theUnited States will likely have several common fea-tures: a detailed understanding of U.S. capabilities andvulnerabilities; an asymmetry of objective (the adver-saries’ objectives will likely be more important tothem than ours are to us); and an integrated approachinvolving numerous symmetric and asymmetric ele-ments. Asymmetric approaches will focus on strategic,operational, and tactical targets.

Strategic asymmetries attempt to deter, preclude, ordegrade an opponent’s national command authority’sability to use military force. They generally focus onopponents’ national will/public opinion; nationalinfrastructure; the highest-level, civilian-military com-mand and control; and domestic mobilization capabil-ity. Examples of strategic asymmetric attacks againstthe United States would include:

■ Conducting an information campaign to undermineU.S. leadership’s ability by demonizing its actions,portraying it as aggressive, exploiting humanitarianor environmental sensitivities, or swaying publicopinion against the United States’ position.

■ Eliminating the safe-haven status of CONUS bystriking (or threatening) U.S. territory or itsnational infrastructure with WMD, conventionalweapons, terrorism, sabotage, computer attack, or

some other form of damage or destruction. Thegoal would be to deter the United States from ini-tiating, continuing, or escalating the conflict.

■ Employing strategic deception to hide or protect asurprise capability from the United States.

Operational asymmetries generally work against ourpreferred theater warfighting concepts. They would beattempts to undermine our ability to execute one ormore key elements of U.S. operational planning –dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focusedlogistics, full dimensional protection. Examples ofoperational asymmetries follow:

■ Damaging, degrading, or corrupting essential mil-itary C4ISR capabilities.

■ Attacking key nodes (in CONUS, en route, or intheater) in the U.S. mobilization and forcedeployment apparatus.

■ Sabotaging stockpiles and equipment.

■ Undermining foreign political support essential toU.S. freedom of maneuver (e.g. coalition opera-tions, territorial access, basing agreements, over-flight rights).

■ Conducting terrorist attacks against key overseasbases and facilities.

■ Threatening (or using) WMD.

Tactical asymmetries focus on U.S.-allied combatforces already engaged in theater. Examples includethe following:

■ Jamming, degrading, destroying, or denying theuse of global positioning systems (GPS).

■ Employing tactics that would increase collateraldamage and/or result in increased casualties(civilian and military).

■ Shifting operations to urban areas.

■ Using cover, camouflage, concealment, denial,and deception (C3D2) to hide and protect keycapabilities and facilities from U.S. intelligenceand precision attack.

■ Terrorist attacks against U.S. and allied troops.

■ Actions that violate what the U.S. considers ‘lawsof warfare,’ for which the U.S. has no analogousresponse (e.g., human shields, manipulatinghumanitarian aid as a weapon, using hospitals formilitary means).

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Specialized Environments Specialized, asymmetric environments represent themost likely scenarios U.S. forces will face. These envi-ronments (jungle, desert, mountain, urban) are usuallyfound at the lower end of the conflict spectrum but rep-resent a major percentage of the operating areas forU.S. military forces. An asymmetric environment maypose no specific threat to a U.S. military presence, atleast initially. In some cases, a U.S. presence alone mayact as a trigger or catalyst to asymmetric actions. Theirregular actions of warfighters and popular perceptionof those actions can generate hostility and asymmetricreactions, especially over time when expectations arenot realized, or if neutrality is (or is perceived to be)abandoned in favor of one side or another.

The 21st century environment will task U.S. forceswith situations ranging from humanitarian assistanceand peacekeeping to high intensity urban fighting. Cit-ies are likely centers of future involvement, as they arethe world’s population centers, transportation hubs,seats of government, sources of wealth, centers forindustry, and key nodes for communication and infor-mation networks. Humanitarian assistance operations,peace operations, reconstruction, and full-scale high-intensity combat may occur simultaneously in differ-ent neighborhoods.

ASYMMETRIC THREATS

Threats to Infrastructure Many adversaries believe the best way to avoid or off-set U.S. military superiority is to develop a capabilityto threaten the U.S. homeland. The infrastructure(finance, continuity of government, electric power,emergency services, gas and oil distribution, telecom-munications, transportation, and water supply) may bevulnerable to disruptions by physical and computerattack. The interdependency of the infrastructure cre-ates a vulnerability.

The information infrastructure also creates new vul-nerabilities. Increasing links to expanding informationinfrastructure from points around the world willexpose nations to threats from a variety of new anddifferent sources. These potential vulnerabilities canalso be opportunities for U.S. strategists, as future

adversaries may have similar dependencies on infor-mation and information systems.

The most immediate and serious infrastructure threat,however, will be from terrorist, criminal, and othersmall groups carrying out well-coordinated strikesagainst selected critical nodes. While conventionalmunitions attacks are most likely now, over time thesegroups will develop an increased capacity for WMD(particularly chemical) attacks, which would beaimed at producing large numbers of casualties, dam-aging key infrastructure components, or creatingwidespread fear and panic.

NoncombatantsNoncombatants represent security challenges for com-manders operating in the 21st century battle space.That their numbers are large and they are constantlypresent in the operating area during hostilities canhave operational and strategic consequences. Non-combatants can include refugees fleeing their homes,in-place civilians refusing to leave their homes, busi-nesses, and non-governmental organization personnelwho are assisting civilians for whatever reason, andeven the media. Noncombatants can restrict the flowof military traffic on roadways, create targeting chal-lenges by occupying buildings or conducting dailyactivities in the middle of a conflict, and can be usedby adversaries to influence U.S. military decision-making and action.

Adversaries may use noncombatants as camouflage,shields, and targets; they can be women, children, andthe elderly. Their presence inhibits protective fires andcomplicates evasion and personnel recovery efforts;limits maneuver by clogging lines of communication;strains combat service support assets; and restricts thetargeting of enemy forces and facilities. The effects ofconventional or WMD attacks on friendly forces aremagnified by the presence of noncombatants.

The mobile and fluid nature of modern non-linear war-fare also increases the probability of intermingling ofcombatants and noncombatants. An example occurredduring the flight of Iraqi soldiers from Kuwait City,when Kuwaiti citizens were used as hostages. In suchsituations, targeting and the employment of high

24



explosive ordnance is restricted due to the risk of highlevel of collateral damage.

Adversaries can use noncombatants to sway public-opinion on an international scale through the use ofmedia. They can portray noncombatant suffering andcasualties as the direct result of U.S. actions. Somemay attempt to distribute altered and misleading pho-tographic and video materials to the media to gainlocal, regional, and even international support andresources along with influencing U.S. national strat-egy and decision-making.

Child Soldiers

The use of child soldiers has increased because theyserve as a readily available and affordable way of gen-erating forces. The use of children in combat is a post-World War II phenomenon originating in developingnations, formed by cultural viewpoints that childrenare a resource and enabled by the proliferation ofsmall arms and light weapons. According to UnitedNations’ estimates, there are approximately 300,000child soldiers worldwide, and the number is expectedto increase. Children follow orders, require minimallogistics and pay and, due to their immaturity, havefewer inhibitions toward committing violence. Theirsize and agility are advantageous in guerrilla warfare.

The presence of child soldiers will complicate MarineCorps operations and force Marines to balance self-preservation against traditional American valuesregarding children. Expeditionary forces will have toprepare for the psychological impact of witnessingatrocities carried out by children, as well as being insituations where they are forced to kill or woundarmed children in combat.

Rehabilitating child soldiers during post-conflictpeacekeeping or reconstruction operations will also becrucial. Often, since the only skill former child sol-diers have is killing, much work has to be done beforechild veterans can become productive members ofsociety and not return to the life of a combatant. Thisprocess is greatly complicated by the deep psychologi-cal scars that affect boys and girls who have carriedout, been subject to, or witnessed acts of brutality. A14-year-old Afghan boy likely killed the first U.S. ser-vice member in Afghanistan.

INFORMATION OPERATIONS

Information Operations (IO) consists of various actionsundertaken to access, deny, or change data and/or per-ceptions of data as information. The Marine Corps facesunique and creative threats in all five aspects of IO: psy-chological operations (PSYOP), operations security(OPSEC), military deception (a subcomponent of denialand deception), electronic warfare (EW, includingdirected energy weapons, electromagnetic pulse weap-ons), and computer network operations (CNO) consist-ing of computer network attack (CNA), computernetwork defense (CND), and computer network exploi-tation (CNE).

Adversaries recognize our civilian and military reli-ance on advanced information technology and sys-tems. They also understand that informationsuperiority provides the United States with uniquecapability advantages. Many also assess that the forcedriving U.S. military actions is U.S. public opinion.Accordingly, numerous potential foes see informationwarfare—whether directed at military systems or theU.S. public—as a relatively low-cost means to under-mine support for U.S. actions or attack a key U.S.capability, and thereby counter its military superiority.

The non-state actor is a growing practitioner of infor-mation operations, particularly in influence operationssuch as media manipulation, propaganda developmentand distribution, and information access. Terrorists,insurgents, and other non-state adversaries will con-tinue to exploit IO advances like the internet to recruit,mission plan, raise funds, train, and spread disinforma-tion about the U.S. and its allies.

The internet provides anonymity and a global distribu-tion medium. This allows non-state actors to commu-nicate, develop, and produce multi-media propagandaand training venues, and to target both select andwidespread populations with tailored messages. Inaddition, the internet provides a medium wherebyadversaries may assess the impact of their own actionsagainst the U.S. through our own media and individualonline commentaries.

The availability of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS)tools to conduct IO—computers, digital multimedia

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recorders, and digital communications infrastruc-tures—continues to increase. As a result, the MarineCorps must anticipate that any potential adversary willhave an enhanced ability to conduct reconnaissance,coordinate activities, and spread ideology and infor-mation throughout the world.

Cyber Warfare Cyber warfare provides the ability to displace moreconventional warfare in terms of “non-kinetic” means.This threat will increase as technologies mature andmore sophisticated tools are developed. The level ofthreat, from limited hacking to an integrated attackcapability, will vary widely among adversaries. At

present, most nations probably have some program toprotect their own networks, but relatively few haveoffensive IO capabilities. Many with limited resourcesand tools will seek to develop a nominal IO capabilitythrough modest training and computer purchases or byhiring criminal hackers. Because nation states arelikely to be deterred by U.S. power, the most likelysources for an offensive IO attack will be from non-state actors such as terrorists, insurgents, cults, crimi-nals, and hackers, though some may be conducted as aproxy of a nation state.

Information systems can be targeted from anywhere inthe world using inexpensive hardware and software.The threat of unauthorized intrusions into computersystems and networks will increase as connectivity tothe internet increases and more sophisticated attacktools are developed. Such connections create vulnera-bilities that can be exploited by hostile actors, usingmalicious software, viruses, Trojan Horses and wormson the internet. In addition, physical attacks like cuttingpower cables or destroying hardware are the equivalentof physical denial of service attacks. Systems support-ing Marine Corps deployment during the time-phasedforce deployment data collection and execution wouldbe particularly vulnerable to attack or disruption.

It is argued that America’s energy sector would be thefirst domino to fall in a strategic cyber-terrorist attackagainst the United States. Each year, the average large

Muslim Fundamentalist Propaganda Discs.

The Incompetent Threat. The incompetent threat is anamateur who by some means (perhaps by following ahacker recipe or by accident) manages to perform someaction that exploits or exacerbates vulnerability.

The Hacker/Cracker. This threat implies a person withtechnical knowledge who understands the processes usedand has the intent to violate the security or defenses of atarget to some degree.

Disgruntled Employee or Insider. A trusted individualinside the organization, who develops animosity toward hisemployer; this is the ultimate inside threat.

Criminals. One who conducts information warfare activi-ties and attacks purely for economic purposes.

Political Dissidents. Groups who conduct IO for the pur-pose of spreading the basic message of their cause and toinvite others to action.

Terrorists. Terrorists hope to cause the media to provide agreat deal of publicity for their actions, thereby further dis-seminating their message of fear and uncertainty.

Competitor Nations. Other IO attacks may be nationsattempting to influence U.S. policy; foreign espionageagents seeking to exploit information for economic, politi-cal or military intelligence purposes; tactical counter mea-sures intended to disrupt a specific military weapon orcommand system; or an attempt to render a major cata-strophic blow to the United States by crippling the nationalinformation infrastructure.

The Cyberwarfare Actors

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utility company experiences about 1 million cyber-intrusions that require investigation to ensure that crit-ical system components have not been compromised.

Deregulation and an increased focus on profitabilityhave forced utility companies to move more of theiroperations to the internet, using supervisory controland data acquisition (SCADA) systems. These sys-tems manage the actual flow of electricity and naturalgas, and perform other critical functions at chemicalprocessing plants, water purification and delivery sys-tems, wastewater management systems andother various facilities. A cyber-terrorist with the abil-ity to control, disrupt, or alter the command and moni-toring functions performed by these systems couldthreaten national security.

Russia, China, India, and Cuba have acknowledgedpreparations for cyberwarfare and will continue topursue the development of IO capabilities; NorthKorea, Libya, Iran, and Syria have some IO capabili-ties. Even though many countries are developing IOcapabilities, few have demonstrated the means to fullyintegrate various IO tools into a comprehensive attackthat would cripple a country's infrastructure. However,some could develop the required abilities to mountsuch attacks over the next decade.

Cyber warfare may continue to showcase issues ofpolitical, ethnic, or religious disagreement even in theabsence of a capability to cripple infrastructure orimpact military capabilities. Regional and politicaltensions already have resulted in hacking activities invarious countries. Examples follow:

■ In 1999, hacking exchanges occurred betweenChina and Japan over the Nanking massacre;between China and Taiwan over the latter's inde-pendence of the former; and between India andPakistan over control of Kashmir.

■ In 2000, Armenians placed false information inthe Azerbaijan daily newspaper, Zerkalo.

■ The 1999-2000 tensions between Israel and Pales-tinians generated hacking activity, with the activ-ity of pro-Palestinian supporters expanding toinclude corporations and a pro-Israel organizationin North America as targets.

■ Supporters of the Former Republic of Yugoslaviaperformed virus and denial-of-service attacks onNATO computers.

■ A collision between an American surveillanceplane and Chinese fighter in April 2001 resultedin a hacking duel between United States andChina supporters.

■ The al Qa’ida Muslim Alliance, a hacker coalitioncomposed of GForce Pakistan, the Pakistan Hack-erz Club, and the Anti India Crew that appears tosupport al Qa’ida and the Palestinian cause,hacked several American sites, including that ofthe General Accounting Office, threatening tocontinue attacks against Indian, United States,and Israeli sites.

Extremist organizations, intelligence services and crimi-nal groups as well as nation states are likely to continuepursuing IO capabilities (al Qa’ida computers recoveredin Afghanistan illustrate this) and could threaten various

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27



systems with the proper tools and techniques to exploitvulnerabilities, and the intent to do so.

The Rise of the InternetThe internet is rapidly becoming the medium of choicefor potential adversaries for many reasons. Most nota-bly, the internet provides:

■ Easy access;

■ Little or no regulation, censorship, or other formsof government control;

■ Speed of information;

■ Ability to easily access and use multimedia tools(audio, video, text, graphics, etc.) and establish aweb presence;

■ Anonymity of communication;

■ Ability to shape coverage in the traditional massmedia; and

■ Ability to influence globally.

As internet cafes and wireless web access points pro-liferate, terrorist groups and other organizations willincrease their ability to conduct activities anony-mously. Use of free, web-based e-mail accounts, e-mail dead drops, code words, anonymous “re-mailer”sites to send untraceable e-mail and chat rooms makethis medium more attractive.

The internet has also increased the use of Voice-overInternet Protocol (VoIP) communications technologythat is not well regulated or accessible by lawenforcement. This technology uses hidden messagesencoded and embedded in apparently harmless filesusing steganography techniques. They are thenposted on public internet sites. Monitoring or con-trolling internet access during military operationswill be increasingly important.

While the number of internet users is leveling off inthe U.S, the number of users in the developing coun-tries is growing. In 5 years, much of the world willhave access to the internet. Foreign contributors willdominate political and social content. Distinctionbetween local and international is irrelevant, as aninternet café in Karachi has the same access to infor-mation as the desktop computer in Quantico. Islamicbulletin boards and message forums are well-knownplaces of jihad activity. The better known forums such

as al Ansar (now The Islamic News Network) are usedto promote jihadi propaganda and post messages forthe Western media, which monitors its activities.Thousands of other small internet groups have formedaround the goal of global jihad. In Iraq, most of thecommunication between various militant and terroristgroups, including Abu Musa al-Zarqawi and his sup-porters, is believed to be conducted through internetcafes. Most insurgent operations against U.S. militaryoperations and forces may have been planned andcoordinated through the use of the internet.

Cell Phones Cell phones are full scale media devices. Futuredevices will upgrade the quality and the speed of thenetworks. As developing countries forego land linesfor cellular towers, cell phones will become the pri-mary communication devices for most of the world’spopulation. The potential for cell phone use on themodern battlefield is discussed in Section 3.

Influence OperationsInfluence operations pose a significant threat to U.S.operations abroad in the near term. Since the attacks ofSeptember 2001, the enemy can say what he wants,when he wants and to whomever he wants, using glo-bal communications, and can magnify any perceivedU.S. mistake into an international call to arms. Adver-saries can exploit the U.S. military’s lack of local lan-guage and cultural knowledge and weaken the abilityof the United States to effectively communicate itsposition to a foreign population. Potential adversariesrealize that using the global media to win “hearts andminds” is their most effective strategy to defeat U.S.efforts at all levels. It is the core of modern asymmetri-cal warfare and until the U.S. counters the threat, itwill only get worse.

TERRORISM

Terrorism is the most likely asymmetric threat to U.S.interests at home and abroad. The terrorist threat to theUnited States will grow as disgruntled groups andindividuals focus on America as the source of theirtroubles. America is viewed as the vanguard of Glo-balism – and that perception will fuel direct targetingagainst U.S. interests. But generally, future terrorists

28



will strike at the targets they can reach. Terrorism willtend to occur in urban centers, often capitals. If softertargets are not available, the U.S. military may be tar-geted due to its overseas presence and its status as asymbol of power, U.S. interests, and U.S. influence.

The terrorist threat is highest in the following countries:Albania, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bosnia-Herze-govina, Colombia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Greece, Indonesia,Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Macedonia, Pakistan, Peru,Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Tur-key, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. Theseare likely to be high-threat areas for many years.

The characteristics of the most effective terrorist orga-nizations include: highly compartmented operationsplanning and networking, good cover and security,extreme suspicion of outsiders, and ruthlessness. Thesetraits make them very hard intelligence targets. Statesponsors (such as Iran) and individuals with the finan-cial means (such as Usama bin Ladin) will continue to

provide financial and technological support to terror-ists. The potential for terrorist WMD use will increaseover time, however, the most likely weapons of choicewill remain IEDs and suicide bombings. The produc-tion, delivery and execution of large IED attacks willcontinue to improve and become more lethal. IEDs aremore thoroughly addressed in Section 3.

Among these countries, those that are most aggres-sively seeking to acquire or develop WMD and theirmeans of delivery are Iran and North Korea, followedby Syria. The Bush Doctrine aims not just to preventthe spread of WMD, but also to “roll back” and ulti-mately eliminate them from the arsenals of thesestates, and prevent the terrorist groups they sponsorfrom acquiring them.

Evolving TerrorismTerrorism reaches far beyond any one border. TheUnited States is confronting a decentralized enemy

All terrorist groups present an asymmetric threat, but notall asymmetric threats use terrorism. Understanding termi-nology can aid understanding the threat. The following areterms commonly used regarding terrorism:

Antiterrorism: (AT) Defensive measures used to reducethe vulnerability of individuals and property to terroristacts, to include limited response and containment by localmilitary forces.

Combating Terrorism: (CbT) Actions, including anti-terrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerabilityto terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measurestaken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism), taken tooppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum.

Counterterrorism: (CT) Offensive measures taken toprevent, deter, and respond to terrorism.

Establishment Terrorism: Oppression of a populace bya ruling group or party. Well-planned and executed pro-grams with the specific goal of keeping the ruling group inpower (i.e. Cuba, North Korea, Iran).

Extremist: Of a character or kind farthest removed fromthe ordinary or average. Exceeding the bounds of modera-tion; going to the utmost in action and opinion; acceptednorms of behavior are subordinated to the “higher cause”.

International Terrorism: A terrorist group or organiza-tion that operates across international borders and targetsmore than one government or society. (expl: operatingagainst “Western democracies”)

Domestic Terrorism: Operates only within one country;target is within that country and terrorists usually comefrom within the country.

Terrorism: Calculated use of unlawful violence or threatof unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce orto intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit ofgoals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.

Terrorist: An individual who uses violence, terror, andintimidation to achieve a result.

Terrorist Group: Any element, regardless of size orespoused cause, that commits acts of violence or threat-ens violence in pursuit of its political, religious, or ideo-logical objectives.

Transnational Terrorist Group: Terrorist group ororganization that operates across international borders, butonly targets one government or society. (expl: operatingagainst the United States).

Defining Terrorism

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with no conventional military signature — a clandes-tine enemy who lives in the shadows and assimilatesinto the population. Contemporary terrorism exhibitsthe following trends:

■ Decentralized organizations;

■ Increased self-funding abilities;

■ Continuous innovation in terrorist tactics, tech-niques, and procedures and the use of weaponry;

■ Ties to international, transnational and nationalnetworks with increasing collaboration amonggroups; and

■ Established operational bases in failing states.

One of the greatest difficulties in combating terrorismis the amorphous nature of terrorist groups. Terroriststypically form networks that dissolve as soon as themission is accomplished, only to reappear else wherein a new form, with a new mission. Eliminating onecell rarely compromises entire operations.

The transformation of al Qa’ida is a prime example ofthis phenomenon. Once a sprawling, multimillion-dol-lar operation with its own training camps, businesses,and even guesthouses, al Qa’ida lost much of its infra-structure in the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan and later

crackdowns in Pakistan, Yemen, Saudi Arabia and thePhilippines. In its place, a more elusive foe hasemerged: a loosely affiliated network linked togetherby local militants, the internet, and a shared ideologyof radical Islam. Al Qa’ida leadership is ideological byway of its promotion of an anti-Western world view,and has reached a level of self-propagation.

Terrorist groups are moving toward self-reliance infunding. They have developed their own sources offinancing and therefore are not as reliant on state spon-sors. While this does not mean that state-sponsorshipfor terrorism will end, terror groups will focus on rais-ing money through direct donations, charity NGOs,criminal activities, and kidnapping. Extortion and thenarcotics trade account for another large portion of ter-rorist funding.

Terror groups are becoming more international innature, improving tactics, obtaining weapons andfunds, and establishing links to other groups throughinternet activity. Dissemination methods may includewebsites, email, chat rooms, web log (blog) sites, etc.

Terrorists are innovators. They will continue to uselow-tech counters to U.S. technological and militarystrengths, while at the same time continuing theirefforts to obtain and develop advanced technology andWMD. They often rely on international media tospread their message; terrorist groups have increasedthe sophistication of their propaganda and effective-ness of their manipulation. Al Qa’ida’s characteriza-tion of the GWOT as a “global war on Islam” to theMuslim world is a good example of the group’s grow-ing skill in IO.

Tools and Tactics Terrorists are adopting information technology (IT) asan indispensable command and control tool. Duringraids on terrorist hideouts, for example, authorities aremore frequently confiscating computers and other ITequipment. Instead of searching for leads in hand-writ-ten notebooks and address books, counterterrorismauthorities must now sift through hoards of informa-tion on CD-ROMs and hard drives. Also, increasingterrorist use of advanced encryption tools often delaysthe process of finding key files and information.

Searching for a Bigger BangTerrorist groups around the world are seeking to obtainand develop WMD. In March 1995, the Japanese terroristgroup Aum Shin Rikyo released sarin gas into the Tokyosubway system killing 1 and injuring thousands. After theevents of September 2001, anthrax attacks across Amer-ica killed five and caused widespread concern. Al Qa’idahas made the acquisition of WMD a priority. In August2001, Usama bin Ladin was visited by two former offi-cials of Pakistan's atomic-energy program—Sultan Bash-iruddin Mahmood and Abdul Majid—at a secretcompound near Kabul. Bin Ladin and his top lieutenant,Ayman Az-Zahwahari, questioned the two about thepotential for al Qa’ida to develop nuclear weapons. AfterMahmood and Majid were arrested on 23 October 2001,Mahmood told Pakistani interrogation teams, working inconcert with the CIA, that bin Ladin had expressed a keeninterest in nuclear weapons and had sought the scientists'help in recruiting other Pakistani nuclear experts whocould provide bomb-making expertise.

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Terrorist groups have not yet demonstrated a truecapability or intent to conduct a cyber attack on anynation’s infrastructure. However, as off-the-shelf tech-nology becomes less expensive and easier to acquire,the threat for cyber attack increases.

Piracy: Maritime InterdictionMaritime shipping is another possible vulnerability.Water covers almost three quarters of the earth and istraversed by more than 50,000 large freighters trans-porting 80 percent of the world’s traded goods. Piracyis at its highest level in the modern era, as attacks onshipping have tripled in the past decade as terroristgroups have begun co-opting pirates to conduct mari-time terror attacks.

Pirates are equipped with speedboats, automatic weap-ons and the latest in communication technology. Theeconomic concern for this activity is clear: most of the

world’s oil and gas is shipped across the water. Securityexperts have long warned that terrorists will attempt toram a hijacked ship loaded with volatile cargo, perhapseven a weapon of mass destruction, at a major U.S. port.Such an attack could devastate the international econ-omy while inflicting tremendous casualties and damageto the target port facility and surrounding area.

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION/EFFECT

Nuclear Weapons CapabilitiesTen countries are believed to have nuclear weapons.North Korea and Iran have nuclear weapon and compo-nent production programs. Several countries haverenounced their nuclear weapons programs but retainthe technical capabilities to resume them at any time.Fundamentally, any country with a nuclear technologi-cal base equivalent to that of the United States in the1960s, as well as advanced computer skills could designa nuclear weapon. Given access to nuclear reactors orother commercial or illicit nuclear/radiological sources,an adversary would be able to obtain sufficient materialto build an effective radiological dispersal device(RDD) or a low-yield nuclear weapon (~10 kilotons,near equivalent of a “Little Boy” bomb). RDDs arelikely to be employed by non-state antagonists or terror-ist organizations via irregular means.

Biological Warfare CapabilitiesBiological warfare (BW) is the use of pathogens or bio-logically derived toxins for military or terrorist applica-tions. Biological agents have been used as long as manhas fought wars. Contamination of wells, insertion ofdiseased carcasses into besieged cities, and distributionof smallpox-carrying blankets are all techniques thathave been used in the past to achieve militarily signifi-cant results. Biological weapons are assessed to be lessexpensive and easier to develop than nuclear and chem-ical weapons. These agents are employed to cause dis-ease in humans, plants, animals or to damageequipment. Future agents may be engineered to targetpopulations with a specific gene. Genocide may beenabled by such technologies, providing terrorists witha tool to selectively attack a given population.

BW agents are likely to threaten U.S. forces during theforecast period. A major concern will be the inability

Connecting the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea,the 630 mile-long Strait of Malacca is one of the busi-est ocean waterways in the world. An estimated 50,000ships pass through the straits in a year-more than dou-ble the number that navigate the Suez Canal andalmost triple that of the Panama Canal. Every day aquarter of the world’s trade passes through the strait,which is extremely vulnerable to terrorism. If terroristswere to hijack an oil tanker and scuttle it in the narrowarea of the 1.5-nautical-mile-wide channel, worldtrade would be severely disrupted for months.

Pirates have hijacked tankers in the strait to practicesteering them — the maritime equivalent of the Sep-tember 2001 terrorists training in American flightschools. According to Indonesia’s state intelligenceagency, detained senior members of JemaahIslamiyah, the al Qa’ida-linked Indonesian terroristgroup, have indicated that they have already consid-ered launching attacks on Malacca shipping. The con-sequences of such an attack would include a wild spikein world oil prices, drastic increases in shipping costs,and environmental disaster. Worse yet would be sev-eral such attacks occurring simultaneously in criticalmaritime chokepoints around the world. Given alQa’ida’s track record of executing synchronized spec-tacular attacks, this danger cannot be discounted.

Future Threat: Pirates of Islam

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to determine whether an attack has occurred. Thiscomplication occurs since affected individuals typi-cally have a delayed onset of symptoms. Currentforces lack sufficient warning methodologies that canappropriately identify the release of BW agents. Thisinadequacy is likely to continue to be a problem in thenext decade, and will be a significant burden to battle-field and civil operations.

Concern that BW agents could be used against theUnited States and Coalition partners grows. Evidencesuggests that terrorist organizations are aggressivelypursuing resources and materials suitable for develop-ing a biological capability. Equipment needed for thedevelopment of a rudimentary biological productioncapability consist of basic laboratory equipment such asPetri dishes, glassware, and small-size fermentors —less than 100 liters.

Chemical Warfare Capabilities Chemical Warfare (CW) is more problematic thanBW. CW agents can be produced in small laboratories,making the extent of proliferation of this capabilityunknown. More than 40 countries are estimated tohave some form of CW capability today, and the tech-nology is readily available. Designer agents/drugs willlikely be the wave of the future with substancesdesigned to achieve precise effects on the intendedvictims. The knowledge to produce such substances isreadily available and generally requires minimalchemistry education to understand and apply. Methodsof dispersal may also change. Nanotechnology mayenable the use of small robots as vectors that couldoperate in swarms and attack/inject victims with pre-determined doses of an agent.

CW agents consist of traditional chemical agents, non-traditional chemical agents, and toxic industrial chem-icals (TICs). Nontraditional agents (such as Novichok)refer to a group of agents not covered under the Chem-ical Weapons Convention; they are produced by abinary reaction of precursors, and are equal in toxicityto VX nerve agent. TICs are industrial by-productswith acute toxicity that may be used by adversarieseither conventionally or via irregular means. Myriadstates are assessed to have a CW capability or infra-structure (to include financial and academic resources,

industrial facilities, and scientists) that can support keycomponents of an offensive chemical program.

The dual-use nature of the equipment and materialsrequired to make chemical weapons, to include precur-sors, will make CW use by rogue elements a continu-ing concern.

Strategic Space and Ballistic Missile Capabilities There are many different ways to deliver a nuclear,biological, or chemical weapon to its target, but themost militarily effective vehicle is the ballistic missile.Given the weapon’s widespread effect, the use ofprimitive, low-accuracy delivery missiles will remaina preferred method. At one extreme is the modificationof older surface-to-air missiles such as the SA-2 to atactical ballistic role; at the other, indigenous develop-ment of a ballistic missile manufacturing capability. Inthe middle falls in-country assembly or purchase of athird-country missile, such as the SS-1 SCUD design.While Russia has eliminated intermediate-range mis-siles and is reducing its intercontinental missile inven-tories, China is modernizing and expanding its missilecapabilities. North Korea, Iran, Israel, India, and Paki-stan are building short- and medium-range missilesand are developing longer-range missiles. Dozens ofcountries have or are developing short-range ballisticmissiles and more are likely to buy them.

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE

Adversaries hoping to employ asymmetric approachesagainst the United States must have detailed intelli-gence on U.S. decision-making, operational concepts,capabilities, shortcomings, and vulnerabilities. Conse-quently, U.S. agencies face extensive intelligencethreats from many foreign nations and sub-nationalentities, including drug cartels, terrorists, internationalcriminal organizations, foreign commercial enter-prises, and various disgruntled groups and individuals.These intelligence efforts are generally targetedagainst the national security policy-making apparatus,national infrastructure, military plans, personnel, andcritical technologies. The open nature of the UnitedStates’ society make effective counterintelligence andsecurity much more difficult to achieve.

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MILITARY DENIAL AND DECEPTION

Many potential adversaries are undertaking more andincreasingly sophisticated military denial and decep-tion (D&D) activities against the United States. Theseoperations are generally designed to hide key activi-ties, facilities, and capabilities (e.g. mobilization orattack preparations, WMD programs, advanced weap-ons systems developments, treaty noncompliance)from U.S. intelligence to manipulate U.S. perceptionsand assessments of those programs, and to protect keycapabilities from U.S. precision strike platforms.Advances in satellite warning capabilities; the grow-ing availability of camouflage, concealment, decep-tion, and obscurant materials; advanced technology forand experience with building underground facilities;and the growing use of fiber optics and encryption,will increase the C3D2 challenge.

U.S. Marines must be prepared to face an adversary'suse of D&D during future operations, most likely as acomponent of an overall asymmetric warfare strategy.The effectiveness of D&D techniques can be magni-fied when employed as a part of a larger informationoperations campaign, as exemplified by the Serbiandeception campaign in Operation ALLIED FORCE.D&D represents a cost effective part of an asymmetri-cal strategy to overcome U.S. military superiority.

Future U.S. adversaries will likely be able to manipu-late computer data and databases. For example, theycould initiate computer network operations that eitherattack our information systems or insert false informa-tion. However, foreign D&D techniques need not behigh tech to be effective; simple decoys can effectivelymislead U.S. overhead collectors.

SPACE AND COUNTERSPACE

The United States’ reliance on (and advantages in) the useof space platforms is well known by our potential adver-saries. Many may attempt to reduce this advantage byimproving their own capability to use space-based assets,and/or by developing capabilities to deny or degrade U.S.space access. By 2015, these efforts will likely erode rela-tive U.S. strengths in areas such as satellite reconnais-sance, communications, mapping, and navigation.

The trend toward space commercialization willincrease the number of countries capable of usingspace-based platforms and capabilities for civilian andmilitary purposes. Programs already underway willsignificantly increase the quantity and quality of somespace services – particularly global mobile satellitecommunications and space-based imagery – availableto any country willing to pay. The proliferation of low-earth-orbit (LEO) satellite communications servicescould have a significant impact on the communica-tions architectures of many developing nations andmay enhance the tactical command and control capa-bilities of foreign military units.

Commercial satellite imagery with resolution of lessthan one meter is already on the market and willbecome increasingly available in the coming years.This may provide indications and warning, and mayaid technical analysis of military assets. It will alsoprovide those currently not using space assets withaccess to a new, significant form of intelligence infor-mation. Radar imagery has revolutionized worldwideassessments. Even relatively low-resolution imageryhas been demonstrated to have military intelligencevalue, and countries are pursuing or improving theircapabilities in this area.

Some countries are developing capabilities to threatenspace assets, in particular through denial and decep-tion, signal jamming, and ground segment attack. By2015, there will be increased potential for futureadversaries to employ a wide variety of means to dis-rupt, degrade, or defeat portions of the U.S. space sup-port system. Some countries are interested intechnologies that could be used to develop counter-space capabilities. These efforts could result inimproved systems for space object tracking, electronicwarfare or jamming, and directed energy weapons.

BEYOND THE THREE-BLOCK WAR: THREATS TO OPERATIONS

When the “Three Block War” concept was coined bythe Marine Corps Commandant, General Charles Kru-lak in 1997, it is doubtful that the extent of the role thatthe Marine Corps would take in 21st century, post-con-flict environments such as Afghanistan and Iraq wasanticipated. Not only have Marines had to maintain a

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combat-ready posture and conduct counter-insur-gency operations, they have constructed schools andmosques, settled disputes, served as interim police,provided security for polling stations, conducted train-ing for the police, National Guard and military forces,and acted as virtual governors.

These all-encompassing military missions, heavilyoverlaid with political, economic and humanitarianconsiderations, provide a glimpse into the future ofMarine Corps operations. In the 21st century, Marineswill be required to juggle concurrent military mis-sions. Marines will have to operate effectively acrossthe mission spectrum: conflict, peacekeeping, recon-struction, stability, and support operations. The MarineCorps has a history of participating in small wars,nation-building and counterinsurgencies. In the 21st

century, the Marine Corps will increasingly be facedwith threats and operations that move well beyond thelittoral that will include at a minimum, the following:

■ Stability and Support Operations;

■ Small Wars/Counter-insurgency Operations;

■ Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Relief andNation-Building;

■ Peace Operations;

■ Combating Terrorism;

■ Counter Proliferation and Non-Proliferation;

■ Combating Drug Trafficking; and

■ Noncombatant Evacuation Operations.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the restraininginfluence of superpowers on local conflicts has largelydisappeared. Local conflicts, long submerged in east-west rivalry, have reemerged in greater number, inten-

sity, and variety of cause. Most do not directly affectthe interests of the United States. Others affect univer-sal humanitarian interest in the amelioration of humansuffering. Some of these conflicts impinge on UnitedStates trade interests, access to markets and materials,the safety of our citizens, and the stability necessaryfor democratic life. These require a response in theform of stability and support operations.

Stability and Support OperationsMilitary force alone cannot win in stability and sup-port operations, but it can lose. War is sometimes saidto be simple in its concept but complex in its execu-tion. Stability and support operations are complex inboth concept and execution.

Stability and support operations provide the UnitedStates government with an alternative to war. They arenot merely the road to war nor a cleaning up afterward.They are a way to achieve national policy objectiveswithout entanglement in an unplanned, undesired, andunnecessary war. They are used in peacetime and inthe political-military state of conflict, a middle groundthat is neither peace nor war, either because no othermeans will work or because the values threatened,while important, do not justify the high cost of war.

Small Wars/Counter-insurgency Operations Insurgencies, due to the relatively weak nature of theirforces, typically employ irregular and asymmetric tac-tics such as ambushes, suicide bombings, sniperattacks, and deception. Because of the shock effect andlethality of suicide bombings, recent trends indicatethat insurgents are using them more frequently. Futuredevelopments may include rudimentary WMD, suchas radiological “dirty” bombs, and chemical or biolog-ical weapons. Insurgents will constantly developcounters to U.S. tactics and technology, often usinglow tech or COTS technology in ingenious ways.

The local population plays a significant role in anyinsurgency. Insurgents greatly benefit from popularsupport. The population provides logistical support,surveillance, and cover and concealment, as well as apool from which insurgents draw recruits. Civiliansalso provide insurgent forces with valuable informa-tion on Marine forces and vice versa. Marines patrol a market street in al Saqlawiyah, Iraq.

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Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief and Nation-BuildingWhile civilian agencies bear the brunt of responsibil-ity for most HA/DR missions, sudden natural disas-ters and human conflict often require a military forceor presence. The Marine Corps has a history of pro-viding for others during times of need and this tradi-tion will be continued in the future. Post-disasterrelief in the littoral will include responding to mari-time disasters, such as hurricanes and floods, butMarines must be prepared for the gamut of post-disaster relief operations they will face. Marines canexpect to be thrust into tense situations wherehumanitarian relief efforts may be seen as hostile actsin themselves, as was the case in Somalia in 1993.Factional fighting or instability complicates humani-tarian assistance measures and potential adversariesmay see the ensuing chaos as an opportunity. U.S.forces participating as part of international reliefefforts must be prepared to provide assistance inuncertain operational environments.

Civilian humanitarian groups will often need protec-tion to fulfill their mission. The new generation of ter-rorists does not spare humanitarian aid workers. Infact, terrorists often actively target them to createchaos. Humanitarian aid workers are a threat to insur-gents because they work to improve the plight of thepopulation, which in turn, improves the stability situa-tion, and therefore, lessens the chaos.

Peace OperationsPeace operations support diplomatic efforts to main-tain peace in areas of potential conflict. They stabilizeconflict between two or more belligerent nations orsub-national groups. Peacekeeping operations requirethe consent of all parties involved in the dispute, whilepeace enforcement is generally more dangerousbecause one or more of the sides refuses to honor theterms of peace.

While some military officials are uncomfortable withusing Marines in peacekeeping roles, national securitywill likely dictate that Marine forces respond to crisissituations and adapt to a peacekeeping role. When sta-bility comes to Iraq and Afghanistan, Marine forcesmay need to be ready to assume a peacekeeping pos-ture for an unspecified length of time.

Combating Terrorism Marine forces will play an increasingly larger role incombating terrorist activities throughout the world.The initial phases of Operations ENDURING FREE-DOM and IRAQI FREEDOM involved conventional

A U.S. Service member participates in a humanitarian assistance mission in al-Anbar province, Iraq in November 2004.

A U.S. Marine works with an Afghan soldier in operations in Nangarhar, Afghanistan, May 2005.

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combat operations against regimes that supported ter-rorist groups. Increasingly, however, U.S. Marineforces will need to fight terror groups in countries thatdo not necessarily support terrorism but are too weakmilitarily or politically to counter such groups on theirown; Philippines, Somalia and Yemen are examples.The challenges and demands of the GWOT will forcethe Marine Corps to respond to the terrorist threataround the world.

U.S. Marine forces will likely become more involvedin the United States’ efforts to train, equip, advise, andassist host country forces in uncovering terroristgroups. The true effectiveness of this effort remains tobe seen, but it may prove to be a valuable tool inallowing the United States to affect terrorism inregions where politics impede direct U.S. militaryaction. Convincing other countries to assist in theGWOT would also minimize further strains on theU.S. military. U.S. forces will be called upon to forgestrong relationships with host-country personnel, toshow great discretion in their conduct of operations, tomaintain a low profile in the host country, and to beable to react swiftly and effectively when promisingtargets arise.

Counter-proliferation and Non-proliferationCounter proliferation missions focus on using mili-tary power to protect the U.S. and national interestsfrom the proliferation of WMD and other weaponsystems. These missions can include raids to secureweapons and facilities, intelligence collection andanalysis, and support for diplomacy, arms controlverification and embargos. These missions extendnot only to weapons but also to command and con-trol, logistics support and intelligence-gatheringmechanisms that support these weapons.

Combating Drug Trafficking and Crime Drug trafficking and organized criminal activity notonly present a direct threat to homeland security byflooding American streets with dangerous drugs, butthese activities also fund insurgencies and terroristorganizations worldwide. Money from the sale of drugsfinances the acquisition of sophisticated weapons, mili-tary hardware, training, and services for terrorists andinsurgents in Colombia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan,

Palestine, and elsewhere. In some regions, this form ofprofiteering has allowed insurgent or criminal groupsto obtain influence and exercise power as de facto gov-ernments, such as the FARC in Colombia or the TamilTigers in Sri Lanka. In Sub-Saharan Africa, severalinsurgent movements have formed to seize control overvaluable mineral deposits, such as the violent RUFrebels of Sierra Leone. These movements are lawlessorganizations that increase the instability of the regionand greatly complicate U.S. or international interven-tion. It is likely that during the study period Marineswill be increasingly called upon to combat these trendsin drug trafficking and criminal activities.

Noncombatant Evacuation OperationsSince 1990, Marines have responded to State Depart-ment requests to evacuate embassies in Liberia (1990,1996, 2003), Somalia (1991), Sierra Leone (1992),Albania (1997), Eritrea (1998), and the DemocraticRepublic of the Congo (1998). The operational envi-ronments have ranged from permissive to hostile.

Evacuation operations are characterized by uncer-tainty. A noncombatant operation (NEO) environmenttypically presents threats that are non-linear, uncon-ventional, diverse, and difficult to predict. Threat per-sonnel and activities may be indistinguishable fromfriendly and neutral elements; hostilities may be initi-ated by terrorists, local guerrillas, partisan factions, orcriminal activities sanctioned by local groups. Actionagainst one of these elements could be deliberatelyportrayed by anti-American forces as an indiscrimi-nate attack on local nationals. The rise of anti-Ameri-can sentiment throughout the developing nations,combined with opportunistic and often well-fundedtransnational political/terror groups, increases the like-lihood of encountering hostility during any NEO.

Regardless of the threat environment at the onset ofthe operation, there is a possibility that it may change.The volatile situations that trigger a NEO are the samesituations that could also bring about spontaneous ororganized violence. U.S. citizens are often direct orindirect targets of this violence. Prior to the evacuationof Monrovia, Liberia, in 1990, factions that had beenambivalent toward the United States suddenly threat-ened to take hostages. This illustrates the dynamicNEO environment.

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Information operations can play a large part in the suc-cessful execution of a NEO. PSYOP, such as usingpublic radio broadcasts to project a positive image ofincoming U.S. military forces to the Host nations’government, military and populace can help create amore permissive NEO environment. Opposition forceswill likely attempt to create a hostile environment forthe Marines through rumors, posters, newspaper arti-cles, radio/television broadcasts, and web sites.

ANTI-ACCESS STRATEGIES AND TOOLS

The ability of the U.S. to maintain stability in strategi-cally important regions around the globe rests on theability to project power rapidly and decisively. As theexpeditionary force in readiness, the Marine Corps isthe key player in U.S. power projection operations andtherefore must be ready for any and all anti-accessthreats. Future threats likely will emphasize attackingU.S. military forces before they are already establishedon the ground. Increasing technological advances inanti-ship mines, diesel submarines, and coastal anti-shipmissile defense batteries will place landing forces atgreater risk. Proliferation of long-range missile technol-ogy would further enable attacks on staging areas.

Potential enemies will also use asymmetric means toconduct anti-access and area denial operations. Spe-cial forces or terrorist attacks on ships, ports and air-fields are a distinct possibility, as is the use of WMDin an anti-access attack. Logistical trains and foodand water supplies are also vulnerable to an asym-metric attack during the force build up phase, whilecommunication nets are vulnerable to disruption andexploitation. Anti-access propaganda and mediamanipulation can damage Marine missions before theforces hit the ground.

THE FUTURE OF ASYMMETRIC THREATS

Violations of the accepted Laws of War are becomingcommonplace and many enemies will actively seek tomanipulate these laws to their advantage. Houses ofworship, schools, hospitals, and cultural landmarks willserve as military fortifications and logistics depots. AnyU.S. attacks on these targets will be exploited to thefullest by enemy propaganda and sympathetic media.

Hand-held video cameras capturing images withoutcontext can be incredibly damaging to the U.S. mis-sion. Women and children will be used to transportweaponS, provide intelligence, and in some cases, toact as human shields. Enemies may also prevent non-combatants from leaving the battle space to compli-cate U.S. targeting. Ambulances will be used to ferrysupplies and militants, while taxi cabs will be used tolaunch RPG attacks. Enemy irregulars will fire weap-ons, discard them, and then blend into the civilian pop-ulation. They will use fake uniforms of police, medicalpersonnel or allied forces to launch surprise attacks.

Terrorists or insurgents infiltrate local authorities orsupport forces to gather intelligence or sabotage fromwithin. In some ways, the suicide bomber is the mostdifficult sort of asymmetric weapon: deterrence anddetection are difficult, and retaliatory response is diffi-cult because the immediate perpetrator is dead and theauthority behind the attack may or may not be identifi-able. Although asymmetric tactics are employed onthe tactical level, their effects are intended to be strate-gic.Adversaries will become increasingly creative,secretive, and manipulative. Threats will increase inscope and emphasize the unexpected.

In most respects, the United States has entered the mil-lennium in strong strategic shape. It remains theworld’s strongest nation – in political, economic, andmilitary terms – and is unlikely to face a global mili-tary challenger on the scale of the former Soviet Unionfor at least the next 15 years. However, China shouldnot be discounted. Its continued military growth andeconomic expansion could impact U.S. regional inter-ests in the mid-term.

The United States is at peace with the great powers, isfriends with the world’s strongest nations, and its mostimportant adversaries are largely isolated, contained,and struggling. These circumstances present the UnitedStates with an unparalleled opportunity to shape a morestable, prosperous, and democratic global order. Despitethese generally favorable conditions, however, the glo-bal security situation remains dynamic, complex, anddangerous. The explosive mix of social, demographic,cultural, economic, and political conditions that haveundermined stability since the end of the Cold Warremain. These conditions will continue to foster an

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uncertain strategic environment in which challengingcircumstances, opportunities, and irregular threats ariseon a near-daily basis. While each individual threat andchallenge is likely to be less significant than the global

military problem posed by the former Soviet Union,collectively they will present a formidable barrier to theUnited States’ strategic vision of worldwide prosperity,stability, democracy, and peace.

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Section 3:FUTURE TECHNOLOGY IMPACTS ON WARFARE

The United States is expected to remain a leader indefense technology research and developmentthroughout the time frame of this estimate. Despitethis position, the United States will face an increasingarray of sophisticated technical threats, as foreign andU.S. technology proliferates to determined, resource-ful adversaries. The United States will retain itssupremacy in conducting high-tempo conventionalwarfare throughout the time frame of this estimate.However, the extent of its military systems’ superior-ity will likely erode as state and non-state actors takeadvantage of emerging technology and proliferationof advanced systems, and apply COTS systems tomilitary functions.

The potential combat or disruptive power of adversar-ies will improve significantly with system upgrades,transfers, or proliferation of weapon systems and tech-nology. Low-technology projectile weapons, such asrocket propelled grenades, grenade launchers, andsmall arms remain capable of defeating well-armoredplatforms. The increased use of landmines and impro-vised explosive devices (IEDs) is also anticipated.

During the 21st century, the Marine Corps will con-tinue to train for expeditionary maneuver warfare,serving as a forward-postured, immediately employ-able force in a joint and/or multinational environment.The success of any given mission will hinge on theCorps’ capabilities to project power quickly and safelyand then conduct and sustain concerted, efficient oper-ations in any environment. The following are the fiveprincipal operational tenets that must be maintained:

■ Maritime dominance,

■ Firepower,

■ Maneuver dominance,

■ Air dominance, and

■ Information superiority.

This section will identify and describe the emergingthreat to these five tenets.

MARITIME DOMINANCE

Availability of far-reaching reconnaissance, surveil-lance, and target acquisition (RSTA) information,through either commercial means or organic assets,will make it increasingly difficult for the Marine Corpsto transit the seas undetected and untargeted. Shallow,restricted waters and adjacent areas provide an arenafor mobile and static coastal defense guns, rockets,missiles, and mines. Most of these will have improvedlethality because of advances in sensor, propulsion,stealth, onboard digital computer, explosive material,or fusing technologies.

Countries with regional aspirations, such as China,will continue to upgrade their fleets' reach, endurance,and combat power, building a moderate blue-watercapability. Most littoral navies will merely aspire tocontrol their country's 200 nautical mile exclusive eco-nomic zone. In either case, this will require a shift tolarger naval platforms with better seafaring qualities; itwill also provide them with superior platforms for sea-based aviation and advanced weapon systems. Regard-less of surface platform, the preferred armament willremain the anti-ship cruise missile. The continentalshelf is the ideal environment for a defensivelydeployed diesel-electric submarine. The littoral mix ofcomplex thermal layers, noisy marine life, coastal traf-fic, and complicated bathymetry seems designed tocomplicate antisubmarine search capabilities.

Anti-ship Cruise MissilesThe number and proliferation of supersonic missileswill gradually increase, although the development ofsubsonic, sea-skimming versions will continue to bethe main thrust of research and development.Advancement in four specific technological areas—propulsion, stealth, explosive materials, and guidanceand control (terminal maneuver capability)—maydrive revolutionary improvements. Newer anti-shipcruise missiles (ASCM) will use millimeter waveradar or imaging infrared systems to give the missilesthe ability to target a certain aim-point.

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Some newer missiles would have coherent radar thatallows better countermeasures discrimination. Rus-sia’s URAN and NOVATOR (3M-54E) missiles areadvertised to have such capability. The submarine-launched NOVATOR has already been proliferated toChina, thus enhancing the strike capability of China’sKILO636 submarine force. The equally available Rus-sian SS-N-22 Sunburn (Mach 2.5, 90 to 220 kilometerrange) is reportedly in the Iranian inventory. Somesources suggest the system was designed for use inrestricted waters such as the Baltic, the Black Sea andeven Far Eastern coastal waters, and that NATOamphibious groups were significant targets. The state-of-the-art supersonic stealthy joint Russia-India mis-sile, 3M55 Yakhont (BrahMos PJ-10), is being mar-keted online and is a fire-and-forget, low radar, crosssection missile with a range of 290 kilometers and apayload of at least 200 kilograms HE. The missile hasa radar altimeter to control the low-level cruise at from5 to 10 meters altitude, and pre-programmed evasivemaneuvers can be made during the terminal phase toavoid air defenses. The Yakhont is advertised to becapable of carrying a nuclear payload.

The upgrades planned for most ship-based missile sys-tems will effectively produce new weapons. Pointdefense missiles such as the NATO Sea Sparrow arebeing upgraded for effectiveness against supersonicsea-skimming missiles maneuvering at up to 4G.Thomson-CSF’s Crotale and BAE's Seawolf andSeaDart are also receiving major upgrades. All wouldbe effective in protecting a littoral navy from navalexpeditionary force attack. In the anti-ship arena, Aero-spatiale's MM 38/40 Exocet Block 2 standard (65-kilo-meter range) incorporates technology developed for thesupersonic ANS missile. The McDonnell DouglasRGM-84D Harpoon, sold nearly as widely as the MM-38/39/40 Exocet, has mostly been upgraded to Block1C standards, which enable it to reacquire lost targets.The Block 1D and 1G versions increase the range by75 percent, to 124 kilometers. European manufacturersoffer similar performance increases for the Saab RBS15M and Matra/OTOBreda Otomat. Russia's SS-N-22Sunburn reaches nearly Mach 2.5, flies at 10 meters orless, and includes high-G maneuvering in flight towardthe target. The Chinese are trying to enter the market,but their FL-7 supersonic air-to-surface anti-ship mis-sile has only a 30-kilometer range.

Naval MinesExpeditionary operations can only be sustainedthrough sea transport of equipment, supplies, and per-sonnel. In addition to traditional naval and land mines,a new category of anti-invasion mines specifically tar-geting landing craft and vehicles is being actively mar-keted. In terms of availability, variety, cost-effectiveness, ease of deployment, and potential impacton joint expeditionary warfare, mines are among themost attractive weapons available to any country deter-mined to prevent U.S. naval forces from achieving seacontrol and power projection ashore. Because today'sexpeditionary forces have limited capabilities to dealwith mines, they constitute a genuine asymmetricthreat in the littorals. The number of countries withmines, mining assets, mine manufacturing capabilities,and the intent to export mines has grown significantlyin the last decade. The types, sophistication, and lethal-ity of the mines available on the world market are rap-idly increasing. This has been compounded by theavailability of ex-Soviet bloc expertise in mining tech-nology and employment on the world market.

Sensor and Fuze Technology

While the contact-fuzed M-08 mine remains deadly,current generations of mines add sophisticated mag-netic, acoustic, or pressure sensors as well as elec-tronic logic circuits to give each munition a targetdiscrimination and counter-countermeasure capabil-ity. Fuzing, which arms and fires only after the rightcombination of sensor input is received, makes spoof-ing (causing the fuze to activate on deceptive signals)and clearing modern mines difficult. The developmentof a new fuze or fuze subsystem can, at little cost,make existing mines more survivable and effective.The nearly infinite combinations of sensors will createproblems for mine countermeasure efforts. The tech-nology of multi-sensor fuzes and logic circuits iswithin the capability of a large number of potentialmine developers and manufacturers.

Stealth Mines

Employing bottom mines has long been the easiestway to hide mines from mine countermeasure efforts.As detection capability has increased, mines thatincorporate a number of different detection avoidance

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measures are being manufactured. Nonmetallic cas-ings, oddly-shaped casings (non-cylindrical), anechoiccoatings (special coatings which absorb or diffusesonar signals), and casings that promote self-burialinto the sea floor are all means used to avoid detectionwhich will be marketed in the next 10 years. Thesemines are most effective in the shallower waters asso-ciated with littoral regions.

Mobile Mines

Mobile mines are mines launched from a submarine orother platform, and then travel to a designated pointunder their own power. This technique provides thelaunch platform with an extended standoff distanceand a degree of deniability.

The SMDM, a mobile mine offered by Russia, is mar-keted for export as an efficient, highly sweep-resistantweapon for use against surface ships and submarinesin constrained coastal waters that may be inaccessibleto conventional mine laying platforms. The SMDMcombines a bottom-influence mine with a torpedo toprovide a considerable standoff capability. These sys-tems, in conjunction with a stockpile that at one timereached hundreds of thousands of mines, present apotentially formidable mine proliferation threat.

Rising Mines

An ominous trend in mine warfare is to turn the mineitself into a remote weapons launch platform. TheRussian MSHM and Chinese EM-52 mines are able todeploy a torpedo against a selected target. Furtherdevelopment of encapsulated munitions technologylogically will lead to the development of mines able tolaunch explosive packages above the water surface.These mines could target air cushion vehicles (ACVs)and helicopters used in mine sweeping operations, andgive every minefield a self-protection capability.

Coastal Defense Commercially available weapons and technology haveimproved significantly. Of particular interest are systemsapplicable to coastal defense with enhancements in intel-ligence, accuracy, propulsion, range, warhead lethality,seeker technology, and stealth technology. The use ofGPS on ASCMs is a tactically remarkable development

that enables a missile to fly in an indirect pattern to thetarget, making it difficult to track and defend against.

In the future, coastal defense C4I systems can beexpected to provide integrated command and controlover coastal defense systems, including minefields,anti-ship missile batteries, artillery batteries, and airdefense systems. An example of this technology is theFinnish Integrated Coastal Defense C4I System, whichis designed to enhance defensive firepower against seainvasion. It can engage all surface targets and evenhelicopter air assault formations using dedicated,fixed, coastal artillery batteries; mobile and self-pro-pelled artillery units; and anti-ship missile batteries.The next logical step is to incorporate coastal mine-field defense and air defense systems into this archi-tecture and create a comprehensive, overlappingcoastal defense network.

Coastal Defense Missiles

Anti-ship missiles developed for naval use are widelyadapted to the coastal defense role. Families of short-,medium-, and long-range missiles are available.Weapons like the RBS17 exemplify short-range mis-siles, and are critical to defeating the assault phase ofan amphibious operation. A derivative of the U.S.HELLFIRE laser-guided missile, it is man-portableand in service in Sweden. Medium-range missiles suchas the Exocet, Silkworm, Seersucker, and Harpoon,are the standard coastal defense missiles today; how-

Mineclearing Technology.

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ever, longer-range missiles, such as the Progress firedfrom the SS-C-1B REDUT Coastal Defense MissileSystem, which advertises ranges out to 270 kilome-ters, have entered the marketplace.

A trend in coastal defense systems is the use of super-cavitating underwater missiles (torpedoes launchedfrom land- or ship-based systems and reach speeds ofmore than 200 knots). The Russians have reportedlysold 40 Shkval supercavitating torpedoes to the Chi-nese. In the mid-term we can expect to see supercavi-tating technology proliferated to threat countries. Thistechnology, coupled with the right fire control sys-tems, will significantly enhance overall coastaldefense capabilities.

Coastal Defense Artillery

Numerous gun systems optimized for coastal defenseare being marketed. These include mobile gun sys-tems and fixed-site armored turret guns. Coastaldefense guns are becoming increasingly mobile, haveorganic target acquisition capabilities, and frequentlyare tied to inertial or satellite navigation systems tooptimize shoot-and-scoot operation. When traditionalfield artillery, missiles, and other large caliber weaponsystems are included, comprehensive coverage of lit-toral minefields, beaches, and maritime approaches ispossible. Most of the states of interest identified in theappendix of this document that have littoral areas areassessed to have fixed, coastal gun batteries, supple-mented by mobile artillery (towed or self-propelled).The proliferation of these systems and the projectedimprovements are addressed in the Firepower portionof this assessment.

The increased range, reduced set-up time, andimproved targeting ability combine to make mobileartillery a greater threat in future foreign coastaldefense missions. Land-based artillery, missiles, androckets will, in general, continue to out-range navalguns, and will be capable of delivering conventionalhigh explosives, dual-purpose improved conventionalmunitions, weapons of mass destruction, mines, orprecision-guided munitions (PGMs). PGMs will bedeployed widely. Guidance other than semi-activelaser will allow for an increase in engagement ranges

and accuracy. These improved guidance systems willinclude infrared, millimeter wave, and acoustic.

Small Attack BoatsA trend among littoral navies is the use of small attackboats, favored for their speed, affordability, andmaneuverability, as well as versatility in incorporatingvarious lethal weapon suites. Common to these plat-forms would be the use of ASCM, signature reductiontechniques, and automated systems. Typical signaturereduction techniques include hull shaping, suppressedexhaust, infrared (IR) suppression coating, non-metal-lic hull, and camouflage. A variety of boats alreadyhave some of all of these features. Of concern to theMarines would be the Chinese C-14 catamaran, NorthKorean TIR, PEYKAAP, and semi-submersible TAE-DONG series torpedo boats. An example of a non-state group that develops and uses low-observablecraft is the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE),of Sri Lanka.

A new generation of optically guided ASCM is beingdeveloped for use on even smaller platforms. Repre-sentative of this development is the Chinese construc-tion of compact, high-speed C-14 catamarans,equipped with FL-10 ASCM, as well as the construc-tion of FL-10 ASCM for Iran.

Anti-Landing MinesThe Russian PDM-series mines were specificallydesigned to target landing craft and vehicles in or nearthe surf zone. Historically, these mines are not techni-cally sophisticated, being activated by tiltrod or contacthorn, but because of their area of deployment they aredifficult to counter and will pose a significant threat toany amphibious operation. The potential for upgradinga fuzing system to incorporate electronic discriminatorsto enhance a mine’s effectiveness and survivability iscurrently significant. Bulgaria, Poland, and China havemarketed the next generation of anti-landing minesusing influence fuzes. Foreign efforts are focused onbringing a greater sophistication to surf-zone mine-fields. Systems are available that remotely arm/disarmminefields in the surf-zone, thus allowing commercialshipping to continue in an area already mined, andallow small-boat counterattack through areas denied to/protected from U.S. amphibious forces.

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Given the current high level of interest in coastaldefense systems, the use of innovative means to dis-rupt U.S. amphibious operations in the future is astrong possibility.

FIREPOWER

Whether measured in terms of range or lethality, usingcombined arms operations will continue to give theUnited States superiority of firepower against anyenemy throughout the period of this estimate. Conven-tional military powers will focus on improving theeffectiveness of their armor systems, as opposed toproduction of newer tanks and armored fighting vehi-cles. Likewise, increased threat from artillery systemswill derive primarily from the improvements inammunition. An exception will be an increase in thenumber and caliber of Multiple Rocket Launch Sys-tems (MRLS). Improvements in the penetration capa-bility of RPGs and armor-piercing rounds present asignificant threat to state and non-state actors.

Toward the end of the time frame of this estimate, sci-entific advancements in the field of propellants andexplosives will begin to affect the firepower of poten-tial adversaries. Technologically advanced countrieswill be able to field systems with significantly greaterranges and explosive capability. Widespread prolifera-tion of these systems will likely not take place until the2015-2025 time frame, though some of these scientificdevelopments will be realized in the increasing lethal-ity of IEDs and more capable RPGs.

Indirect FireArtillery will be more self-contained and mobile, andcapable of quickly changing positions with minimalsetup times, with much-improved complementaryRSTA capabilities. Tube artillery will remain the back-bone of infantry fire support through the next decadefor countries with declining defense budgets. Nationsdeveloping new artillery capabilities will primarilyfocus their efforts on acquiring rocket artillery orMRLS, which can deliver larger quantities of muni-tions more rapidly than other systems, and also offergreater range and increased payload over traditionaltube artillery. With enhanced projectiles, MRL accu-racy is equivalent to tube artillery. For both tube artil-

lery and MRLS, features such as modular reload,improved chassis, and onboard fire control systemshave increased their lethality and appeal.

Tube Artillery

Improvements in artillery capability will be primarilyin ammunition and target acquisition systems. Sometarget acquisition systems have increased the systems’capability in a coastal defense role. The RussianBEREG 130-mm coastal defense system is a complexof vehicles and shelters that is completely self-suffi-cient for up to 7 days. Its gun directors reportedlymake the system effective against targets moving at upto 200 kilometers per hour at ranges in excess of 20kilometers, while tracking four targets simultaneously.The Chinese CF905 coastal defense system, with itsX-band phased array radar, can be slaved to a 155-mmhowitzer, 130-mm field gun, and 122-mm MLRS toengage naval targets as far as 40 kilometers away.

Multiple Rocket Launcher Systems

Simple to design, manufacture, and use, MRLS giveany force a massive strike capability against multipletargets and areas with a high density of fire. Expectedimprovements in payload, accuracy, range, fire con-trol, and rate of fire further enhance the lethality andusefulness of this type of weapon. Rockets are nowavailable with numerous types of warheads and rangesup to 70 kilometers. The world is saturated with 122-mm systems, and the trend is to upgrade and modifythese systems. Larger systems with increased rangeand payload are also being developed. Several newsystems have been fielded in the 240-mm and greaterrange. The North Korean 240-mm MRLS, the Iranian240-mm MRLS, and the Russian 300-mm Smerch arenotable examples of fielded systems, while the Chi-nese have recently offered their own version of theSmerch, the A100 300-mm MRLS, for open purchase.

Mortars

Infantry mortar support is likely to experience resur-gence in the next decade because today’s projectileshave greatly enhanced performance and much of theworld's armed forces are occupied with low-intensityconflict. The British, terminally guided Merlin andSwedish Strix projectiles offer fire-and-forget, anti-

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armor capability. The guidance of these projectilesplaces the ordnance into a top-attack mode against thearmored vehicle's weakest areas.

Projectiles

Trends in conventional munitions development willcomprise improved fragmentation steels, more brisantexplosives, controlled fragmentation, proximity fuz-ing, and controllable orientation of the munition atimpact. Concurrent functionality improvements con-sist of better submunitions, and improved fuzing andpropelling charges. These improvements will providethe capability to efficiently engage multiple types oftargets with fewer types of munitions. Improved con-ventional munitions (ICM) will continue to proliferate.Improvements in proximity and multi-option fuzingwill continue to enhance functionality by allowingmultiple targeting options for targets. Modular propel-ling charges will continue to allow for increased rangeas well as lower tube wear, allowing for functionalimprovements for the overall system.

Conventional munitions are projected to become moreaerodynamically efficient and to employ more brisantexplosives. Conventional munitions also will haveimproved cluster munitions for increased effectsagainst targets. Using conventional propellants andadvanced projectiles, fielded tube artillery can reachranges greater than 42 kilometers. Advances in guntechnology are expected to have less effect on artilleryeffectiveness than improvements and innovations inprojectile intelligence. Adding seekers and fuzing toprojectiles can transform “dumb” rounds into “smart,”artillery-delivered, high-precision munitions (ADHPM).This development has begun in earnest in five or sixcountries. Terminally homing, laser-guided munitionsare the most accessible ADHPM worldwide, with Rus-sia providing almost all the designs and expertise inthis category.

Advances in projectile design and seeker technologyare expected to further increase the accuracy and jam-ming resistance of the artillery system. To counter cer-tain types of EO countermeasures and for bettertargeting, countries will likely develop or purchasemunitions with multi-sensor seekers. Course-correctedmunitions will provide an unparalleled capability to

engage all types of targets, from armored vehicles todismounted troops, with 5 to 20 times less ammunitionthan is required using conventional projectiles. Theseprojectiles require no target signature, and work byreducing the substantial dispersion inherent in indirectfire artillery. These munitions incorporate guidancefrom inertial, GPS, or ground-based tracking devicesand correct the flight of the projectile to the calculatedflight path. Course corrected munitions are fielded in155-mm cannon and 122-mm, 220-mm, 227-mm, and300-mm rockets. In addition, course correction fuzeswill be available that will reduce dispersion of conven-tional projectiles by 60 to 70 percent.

Semi-active, Laser-guided Projectiles

The most common guidance method will be semi-active laser (SAL) guidance. At least 14 countrieshave fielded laser-guided projectiles, and at least 10others are expected to follow suit by 2010. Newlydeveloped ADHPM will contain submunitions thatdistribute fragmentation over a wider area than con-ventional projectiles and will provide a light anti-armor capability.

Laser-guided projectiles will be available in calibersfrom 98 mm to 240 mm for cannons, mortars, and rock-ets. China and Russia will not only be the major sourceof these munitions, but also the technology exporters.Most of these munitions will have fragmentation-high-explosive warheads, highly lethal against unarmored orlightly armored vehicles, and possibly effective againstheavily armored vehicles. By 2010, UAVs equippedwith laser designators are expected to increase the effec-tive range of these munitions by 20 to 25 kilometers.

Infrared-Guided Projectiles

Homing on the heat emissions of the target, infrared-guided projectiles are accurate and have the advantageof being fire-and-forget. IR sensors will be used onsensor-fuzed submunitions. IR guidance systems arecommon in missiles, but their application to artilleryprojectiles is still in development. An exception is theSwedish/French BONUS (BOfor NUtating Submuni-tion) projectile, which is a 155-mm cargo round thatcarries two sensor-fuzed, anti-armor munitions. Afterthe submunitions are ejected from the projectile, wingsunfold to stabilize each munition as it descends over

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the target area. A two-color IR sensor acquires targetsthat are subsequently attacked on their top surface byan explosively formed projectile warhead.

Radar Seekers and Fuzing Projectiles

Millimeter wave (MMW) sensors for sensor-fuzedsubmunitions in both Ka- and W-bands have alreadybeen fielded and will proliferate during the period ofinterest. A few advanced seekers for terminal-homingmunitions will be fielded in the period of interest, pri-marily in France, Germany, and Russia, and could finda variety of potential buyers.

Anti-armor Weapons

Guns

The placement of large caliber, such as 100-mm and105-mm, guns on infantry fighting vehicles and lightarmored vehicles is indicative of the trend to give allcombat echelons an anti-armor capability. The Russian125-mm Sprut-B smoothbore antitank gun exemplifiesthe upgrading of simple, dual-purpose, low-cost sys-tems for greater combat effectiveness. Dedicated anti-tank guns, as well as tank main guns will use kineticenergy projectiles and, although the 120-mm gun sys-tem will replace many 105-mm systems on armoredvehicles, it will not be fielded in quantities as great as125-mm systems, which have similar capabilities.

Anti-tank Guided Missiles

Most technological advances for anti-tank guided mis-sile (ATGM) systems will involve incrementalimprovements of currently operational systems. For themid-term, technological innovations will includedeployment of automatic target tracking and fully fire-and-forget guidance systems, fiber-optic systems,improved target-acquisition and night vision systems,and hardening of the systems against countermeasures.Certain ATGM warheads are capable of penetrating thethickest armor a tank can physically carry, and explo-sive reactive armor can also be defeated. Many ATGMsare equipped with thermal imaging systems to allownight combat under adverse weather conditions. West-ern countries are currently producing fire-and-forgetsystems or ones with active seekers capable of discrim-inating targets. Current developmental systems will be

fielded with the capability to penetrate 1,000 millime-ters of rolled homogenous armor, countermeasureresistant guidance systems, and the ability to selectattack profiles to more effectively engage the target.

ATGMs have a longer lethal range relative to that ofother direct-fire weapons. The KORNET will be oneof several widely proliferated Russian-designedATGMs in 2010. A laser-guided system with an inte-grated thermal imager, it has a range of 3.5 kilometers.SPIKE is an Israeli-designed ATGM with a charge-coupled device seeker, a fiber-optic link, and a rangeof around 4 kilometers; it is expected to be widely pro-liferated by 2010. Because of the fiber-optic link,SPIKE-type ATGMs are capable of being used in theindirect-fire (i.e., non-line-of-sight) mode. Remotelycontrolled ATGM systems have already been devel-oped and fielded, and are likely to be used by insur-gent or irregular forces or by regular forces inconjunction with anti-tank mines.

Munitions Development

Overflight anti-tank munitions include tube and rocketartillery-launched munitions, drones, and aircraft-launched, stand-off weapons employing either sensor-fuzed or terminally guided munitions to attack the rel-atively weak upper armor of the tank and infantryfighting vehicles (IFV). New materials technology(e.g. functional gradient material, depleted uranium) incombination with new processing techniques that giveunique properties (explosive processing, combustionsynthesis) will enhance penetration in developmentalsystems. Russia has fielded munitions with depleteduranium liners.

Systems capable of defeating first-generation explo-sive reactive armor (ERA) without degrading the basepenetration have been fielded in Russia. The FormerYugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) has beenable to develop, manufacture, and market effectiveantitank weapons. Its 120-mm RBR disposable rocketlauncher is one example of a system that matchesWestern performance standards (penetration of thestandard NATO heavy tank target or 2 meters of rein-forced concrete at 250 meters) being manufactured bya less developed country.

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Fire Control Systems To provide more accurate and responsive fires, thetrend regarding fire control is toward automation offiring data and tactical data. Most countries will seekto fill this need through COTS computer hardware andcommercial operating systems. The current trend ofautomated fire control systems (FCS) is currently rele-gated to cannons and rocket launchers.

Optical Devices Small caliber weapons with enhancement devices,such as optical, electro optical (EO), and FCSdesigned to improve the firing accuracy of small arms,are a serious threat to the Marines. Optical systems(e.g., ring sights, aiming lights, and red-dot collima-tors) and certain types of EO devices (i.e. first- andsecond-generation image-intensifiers) are being usedby elite forces and border troops of some countriesnow, and regular forces will be using these devices inlarge numbers in the short-term. After 2010, third-gen-eration image intensifiers and thermal imagers willbegin replacing the current systems and will becomethe standard. Infrared sensors and thermal imagingsystems allow the user to see at longer ranges at nightand also through many daytime battlefield obscurantslike smoke, dust, or haze

Small Arms Fire and ProtectionMany developing nations can manufacture small arms(assault rifles and machineguns) that are identical tothose used by some of the world's best-equippedarmies. Production of new systems by these and othercountries, accompanied by a large inventory of olderassault rifles and machineguns, has created a surplus ofsmall arms on the international market. For essentiallyeconomic reasons, truly innovative solutions to theclassic problems of reliability and recoil are unlikely tobe adopted. Although research will continue into prom-ising technologies, no breakthroughs are expected inthe area of light, medium, and heavy machine guns andlight cannons. Systems with incremental enhancements(rather than radical improvements) will continue to bea threat throughout the forecast period.

Rifles

The general development trend of assault rifles hasbeen toward weapons of decreased size and weight.Continued efforts to increase probabilities of hit andkill will lead to system integration of sighting devices,ammunition selection, and training support.

The sniper capabilities of many countries will increaseduring the forecast period. By the beginning of themid-term, sniper weapons will become a significantthreat. An increased proliferation and use of anti-mate-riel sniper weapons is also anticipated, using 20mmand higher caliber sniper weapons and advanced elec-tro-optics systems to target lightly armored vehicles.Minute-of-angle and sub-minute-of-angle accuracy arethe benchmarks of the modern sniper rifle; most sys-tems have performance characteristics similar to thoseof the Mauser Model SR 93. Future soft-target, long-range interdiction weapon development may mimicthe performance of the.409 Chey/Tak that exhibitsminute-of-angle accuracy to more than 2,500 meters.

Ammunition

Small caliber ammunition has decreased in size over thelast few decades. Older, heavier caliber systems (e.g.,7.62x39-mm) will continue to be encountered through-out the study period and beyond. The use of armor-piercing bullets against both materiel and human targetswill become commonplace by 2010. Other significantdevelopments in small-caliber ammunition includecase-less rounds; a 5.7x28-mm cartridge with a denseplastic core that can penetrate steel helmets or bodyarmor at a range of 150 meters; sabot, high-penetration,small caliber rounds; and special-use, subsonic, andsuppressed ammunition. Armor piercing rounds in5.45x39-mm, 7.62x39-mm, and 7.62x54R calibers areprevalent and their use by threat entities will continue toexpand throughout the forecast period.

Counter-Small Arms Technology

Individual Body Armor

Ceramic materials are the most ballistically efficientmaterials for defeating high velocity, small arms projec-tiles, especially armor piercing ammunition. Drawbacksin the use of ceramics for body-armor applications

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include high cost and an overall decrease in soldiermobility resulting from the lack of flexibility inherent inthese materials. However, several body armor develop-ment firms have developed prototypes of flexibleceramic armor. Several models incorporating Kevlar,fiberglass, silicon carbide, carbide ceramic, or othermaterials, are already commercially available.Advances in textile technology have contributed to thedevelopment of highly effective, lightweight bodyarmor that will be available to developing countries andterrorist organizations during the forecast period.

MANEUVER DOMINANCE

The United States will retain superior maneuver capa-bility over potential adversaries throughout the periodof this estimate. Potential adversaries are unlikely tocompete with the United States in the production oftanks and armored fighting vehicles designed to out-maneuver and engage U.S. forces. Similarly, the pro-duction and proliferation of advanced helicopters,including attack helicopters, is unlikely to challengeU.S. maneuver dominance. However, both state andnon-state actors have learned to avoid or surrenderareas where U.S. forces have a significant advantage.In terms of military systems and technology, advancesin foreign electro-optic technology provide adversar-ies with increasing capability to detect and engageU.S. systems at night and at greater ranges. Reports ofthe successful use of IEDs in Iraq will doubtlesslyincrease use of these weapons against U.S. forces.The use of IEDs, anti-tank mines, and remotely con-trolled anti-armor weapons will be accompanied withtactics designed to draw U.S. forces into urban areas.In urban areas, these attacks can be combined withincreasingly lethal RPGs, small arms using AProunds, and concentrated small arms fire in short-range, violent, and often lethal ambushes.

Armored Vehicles Worldwide tank production is at a historically lowlevel and is expected to remain far below cold war lev-els. Main battle tank (MBT) development is a costlyventure and most countries do not have the researchand development budget for new MBT designs. How-ever, fire control system upgrades will increase the

lethality of the MBT, while technology focuses ondefeating anti-armor weapons.

Many families of explosive reactive armors are mar-keted to protect tanks and armored personnel carriers.All work on a common principle: the incoming rounddetonates an explosive sandwiched between two metalplates applied over the existing armor; the plates expandoutward, dissipating the power of the incoming round.Developments include increasingly modular packages,flame-resistant explosives that are impervious to igni-tion by small arms fire, and hardening of the outer panelto break up or deflect long-rod penetrators.

Several active systems are already fielded in limitedquantities. An example is the Russian DROZD sys-tem, which detects incoming round using millimeterwave radar and destroys it with a directed explosivecharge. Another Russian system, the Shtora-1, emitsinfrared signals or obscurants to defeat the incomingATGM. Future technological developments will seekalternative ways to jam, spoof, or destroy the guidancesystems of incoming munitions.

Rotary-wing AircraftThe integration of rotary-wing platforms into the bat-tlefield will continue on a limited basis, delivering air-to-air as well as air-to-ground munitions from land andshipboard bases. Advanced attack helicopters, such asthe Russian Kamov Ka-52 HOKUM B, will proliferatein limited numbers, and present challenges to modernground forces.

Significant expansion of the rotary-wing flight enve-lope will involve the adaptation of tilt-wing technol-ogy. This technology will come into low-rateproduction within the estimate period. Non-traditionalproducers (such as South Africa) may also demon-strate their ability to produce rotary-wing aircraft on atechnological par with many traditional producers.Although the purchase of advanced rotary-wing air-craft will yield an advantage against regional adversar-ies, obtaining a sufficient number to affect aconventional conflict with U.S. forces would require agreat expenditure and would require a greater invest-ment in mobile air defense and fixed-wing combatcapability to protect them.

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Improvised Explosive DevicesIEDs will continue to be a main concern to Marine Corpsforces deployed to conflict areas throughout the world.As reports of successful attacks against the U.S. MarinesCorps in Afghanistan and Iraq continue, U.S. adversarieswill be encouraged to conduct similar attacks.

As terrorist and insurgents continue to share technol-ogy and techniques through the use of standardizedmanuals, mobile training teams, established trainingcamps, and the internet, the threat of IEDs will con-tinue to migrate from one terrorist group to the next.Due to the exchange of this information on globalscale, IED firing devices, homemade explosive mix-tures (HME), and tactics will continue to be perfected,thereby increasing the overall lethality and complexityof these attacks.

Improvements to IEDs can be expected throughout thetime frame of this estimate. Adversaries will respondto increased force protection measures and counter-IED technology by trying to improve IED lethality anddependability with enhanced primary explosivecharges or increasing overall explosive payload size,which produces increased blast damage.

In the mid-term, attempts to increase the overalllethality of IEDs using smaller amounts of explosivesand surgically attacking a target may become a muchlarger threat. Anti-armor IEDs being encountered

within Afghanistan and Iraq are designed to specifi-cally target armor assets through the use of shapecharges, improvised claymore mines, and improvisedexplosively formed penetrators. As this technologydevelops, the need to use large amounts of explosiveforce will be replaced by these less-cumbersome,more lethal devices.

Mine Warfare Landmines are affordable weapons to everyone fromfrom large, well-equipped armies to stateless organiza-tions. Indiscriminate marketing practices allow poten-tial adversaries to readily obtain and employ thesemunitions in significant numbers against U.S. forces.Landmine use will continue.

Virtually every possible technology has been used inconjunction with landmines and landmine sensors.However, this research and production activity hasbeen limited to developed nations, where the upgrad-ing of landmine stocks has always been the priority.Sensor systems for AP mines include seismic, imped-ance, IR, motion, vibration, acoustic, light, pressure,pressure-release, and trip line systems. Future devel-opments will expand the types of targets and theranges at which they can be engaged.

Off-route Mines Off-route mines are systems that are emplaced alongavenues of approach, main supply routes, and lines ofcommunication to attack mounted and dismountedunits from a standoff location as they maneuverthrough the battle space. The next generation of off-route mines will be omni-directional; the wide area

IED Explosive Types

Historically, most IEDs encountered by civilian securityforces and military units have contained homemadeexplosives (HME) as the main explosive charge. InAfghanistan and Iraq however, HME use is minimal, andmodified military ordnance items are incorporated intoIEDs as the main explosive charge.

Due to the relative ease with which these materials cannow be obtained in countries with large military ord-nance stockpiles, their continued use as the main explo-sive charge has become more common than that of HMEmixtures. Countries without large stockpiles, or whoseordnance is more tightly controlled than that of Afghani-stan and Iraq, will continue to see primarily HME mix-tures used as the main explosive charge.

Landmine Demonstrated Capability

The Austrian APM and AVM series of mines are made ina prismatic, reinforced-plastic case containing a plasticexplosive charge. A two-sensor fuze is available for theAVM series; the first detects moving targets and the sec-ond detonates the mine once its speed and range isdetermined. The mine can remain active from 3 to 60days and automatically selects targets moving in a col-umn, targeting any of eight passing vehicles out to 50meters from the mine. The AVM may also be effectiveagainst helicopters.

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mines will have a self-guiding, top-attack munition,directional warhead, or other projectile capable ofengaging targets 360 degrees. Currently, only theUnited States and United Kingdom have prototypes,however, the technology to develop and produce thistype of mine is within the capability of countries nowproducing off-route mines.

Anti-helicopter Mines

Anti-helicopter mines (AHMs) are the next technolog-ical step in restricting mobility. The mine consists of asensor and a munition; current designs incorporate apassive detection system (acoustic or electro-optic),which then triggers an active detection system (milli-meter wave radar), which in turn triggers the detona-tion of mines that project shrapnel into the air. Inaddition to the threat of state-manufactured AHMs,some non-state actors have employed improvised,anti-helicopter IEDs to some effect. AHM systemsmay see limited proliferation during the time frame ofthis estimate, but will not be the primary threat torotary-wing aviation. AHMs would primarily be usedin defense of likely LHZs, and would be subject toelectronic countermeasures, to include spoofing andjamming. From 2005 to 2015 period the main techno-logical threat to helicopters will be from man-portableair defense systems (MANPADs), while the most pro-liferated and employed threat will be from small armsfire and RPGs launched at hovering helicopters.

Camouflage, Concealment, and Deception Camouflage, concealment, and deception (CC&D)involve multiple technologies and techniques thatmake the target undetectable to the sensor, unrecogniz-able to the viewer, or change the appearance of anobject. The increased lethality of precision-guidedmunitions makes CC&D critical to survivability on themodern battlefield. Although improvements in CC&Dwill affect U.S. direct fire and ADHPM capabilities,the greatest effect will likely be on the ability of theUnited States to translate air dominance into successesin the ground campaign.

Camouflage

The display of U.S. sensor capabilities during Opera-tion DESERT STORM increased worldwide interest in

effective camouflage. Some paints, coatings, and netsare common. The simplest camouflage, a disruptivepaint scheme, can reduce detection ranges by 30 per-cent. Paints and coatings are able to absorb or diffusedifferent frequencies of the electromagnetic spectrum,thereby defeating reconnaissance and targeting sen-sors. As new ranges of frequencies are adapted toRSTA sensors and guidance systems, these frequen-cies are targeted by new camouflage systems.England, France, Sweden, and South Africa are lead-ing developers and exporters of camouflage systems.

Concealment

Concealment is gaining popularity, particularly bycountries with weapon systems and research and devel-opment programs that need to be concealed and/or pro-tected. Concealment techniques can take many forms,to include using natural terrain, existing buildings,other man-made structures, or underground facilities.

Decoys and Mockups

The development of higher performance sensors andthe proliferation of sensors have led decoy manufac-tures to develop high-fidelity decoys and mock-ups.Decoys may soon include mechanisms that countersensors operating in the radar, mid-IR, far-IR, and/or acombination of these bands.

Obscurants

There are four main mechanisms for obscurants toreduce contrast: scattering, absorption, reflection, andradiance. A combination of these methods may bepresent in a single obscurant. For instance, the parti-

Donkey cart used to conceal an MRL.

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cles in a black cloud will both absorb and scatter light.The light that is absorbed may later be reradiated at adifferent wavelength.

Most suspected and known obscurants included in for-eign military inventories are derived from World War Iand World War II technology, and many have notchanged significantly since World War II. Theseagents are effective in defeating the visible and near-IR bands of the electromagnetic spectrum and, in suf-ficient quantities, can seriously degrade or defeat themid- and far-IR bands as well. In most cases theamount of agent required to do this would be difficultto support logistically. Large-area smoke generatorsused in rear areas are a possible exception.

AIR DOMINANCE

The United States will be able to maintain air superior-ity in any conflict throughout the period of this esti-mate. However, the ability to sustain air dominancemay be challenged in the later time frame of this esti-mate (2010-2015) in certain regions where countriesare pursuing acquisition of advanced fighter aircraft. Agreater concern to Marine Corps operations will be thesystems, strategy, and tactics designed to mitigate theimpact of U.S. air superiority and air dominance. Froma systems perspective, increasing air defense capabil-ity and use of camouflage and decoys will reduce theeffectiveness of U.S. close-air support. Strategicallyand tactically, increased use of underground facilitiesand tactical placement of military assets in urban ordifficult-to-target areas will impede U.S. air powereffectiveness against military infrastructure.

Fixed-wing PlatformsFew countries have both the resources and the desireto equip their air forces with the most current genera-tions of aircraft within the next decade. However,many will bolster their existing force structures byacquiring systems from a global marketplace that havesignificantly greater capabilities. As a result, theMarine Corps will face adversaries in the future whomay be qualitatively inferior, but are nonetheless sig-nificantly more capable than they are today.

Two concurrent trends, multinational production ofnew aircraft and widespread upgrading of existing air-frames, will dominate the fixed-wing aviation arena.In addition to aircraft co-production, the number ofnations involved in the licensed production, as well asthe rebuilding and refurbishing of aircraft, willincrease. Within the aircraft subsystem technologyfield, some emerging nations (in industrial terms)could evolve into production leaders. Those nationsthat currently have the capability to design, test, andproduce indigenous aircraft systems will likely con-tinue to retain and expand this capability.

High-performance Aircraft

Economically developed countries, industrializingstates, and countries with regional ambitions will pur-sue acquisition of the most advanced aircraft. Themost demanding projected midrange threat is approxi-mated by a developed Su-37 fitted with thrust-vectoredengines, electronically scanned radar, and armed withramjet-powered derivatives of the Vympel R-77(NATO AA-12 Adder) missile.

Less-developed countries will concentrate on squeez-ing the best performance possible out of their existingsystems. Thousands of airframes, whether U.S.-manu-factured F-5s or ex-Soviet MiG-21s, will continue inservice throughout the period of this document. Myr-iad upgrade packages are being offered for these plat-forms, allowing users to improve system performanceto nearly state-of-the-art overall through upgrades tothe engines, electronics, avionics, or weapon systems.

Low-performance Aircraft

Utilitarian concerns will lead some countries to con-centrate on subsonic jet aircraft or trainers that have adual role, or are optimized for ground attack or coun-terinsurgency work. New stand-off weapons, ifadapted to these platforms, will give them the reachand striking power of a much more sophisticated airforce while limiting their maintenance and trainingrequirements. For example, more than 500 Dassault/Dornier Alpha Jets were built as a combination trainer/close support aircraft, and bought by countries fromGermany to Nigeria. These platforms can be armedwith guns, rockets, bombs, air-to-air missiles, guidedair-to-surface missiles, and reconnaissance pods.

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Stand-off Weapons Continued advances in stand-off weapons maydegrade the importance of platform performance. Aslong as the basic platform can get within launch range,the sophisticated weapon will do the rest. GPS-aidedmunitions can provide unsophisticated platforms witha true, all-weather, stand-off, fire-and-forget capabil-ity. Adding propulsion to the basic munition furtherincreases the stand-off range.

Air Defense SystemsIn the next 10 years, sophisticated surface-to-air-mis-sile (SAM) systems will proliferate. Moreover, theincreased use of missiles with dual seekers and radarseekers with anti-jamming capabilities will reduce theeffectiveness of U.S. SAM countermeasures. Most ofthese technological advances will be restricted to keynation-states, but proliferation to less technologicallysophisticated nations or non-state actors cannot beruled out. A greater threat in dealing with developingnations and non-state actors will be from the prolifera-tion of MANPADS. Like other SAM systems, MAN-PADS will improve throughout the midrange in termsof increasing seeker range and sophistication.

Because of U.S. stealth aircraft success, air defensedevelopers will pay particular attention to detectingand countering stealth technology. Technologicallyadvanced countries are likely to employ radar systemswith track-while-scan operation, planar antennas,pulse-Doppler radars, dual frequency (X/Ka) radartrackers, two- and three-dimensional radar systems,and low-power/low probability of intercept technologyto obtain a comprehensive air defense picture. Airdefense forces will also deploy sensors that can detecteven difficult targets. In less-advanced countries, evenas older systems proliferate, state and some non-stateactors may employ some of this new technology.

Missile range and speed have the potential to expandsignificantly if new propulsion technology is widelyfielded. Most nations with a missile industry are con-ducting research into ramjet and scramjet technology.This may permit missiles to achieve long-range andhigh maneuverability at speeds in excess of Mach 6.

The French ASMP and the Russian X-31 missilesapply this technology today.

INFORMATION SUPERIORITY

Command, Control and Communications

During the 2005-2015 time frame, the most pronouncedchallenge to U.S. technological superiority will be in thearea of information superiority. Developed nations willattempt to compete with U.S. information dominanceby developing like systems and systems designed todegrade U.S. capability. State and non-state actors willattempt to frustrate U.S. information dominance byusing COTS systems, low-technology systems, andadaptive tactics designed to counter U.S. capabilities.

Command, control and communications (C3) serves asa force multiplier by effectively coordinating forcesthrough quickly communicating combat information,thereby allowing rapid decision-making. The majorareas of concern from developed nations will beadvancements in their integrated battlefield-area com-munications systems (IBACS) and other military sys-tems. State and non-state actors will likely make use ofadvancements in civil infrastructure and COTS equip-ment, giving non-state actors an advanced C3 capabil-ity through the purchase of systems and servicesindistinguishable from those used by legitimate com-mercial and private entities.

IBACS

IBACS are integrated communication systems thatoffer a common transmission medium for voice, data,message, and other communication traffic. IBACStransform communications links into a grid architec-ture that provides higher peak capacity. More than 35countries have acquired IBACS and several others areconsidering acquiring them. IBACS provide improvedsurvivability of C3 networks by multiple switchingnodes to form a grid with multiple transmission pathsbetween nodes. The grid architecture guaranteesrobust network operation, since traffic can be routedaround damaged or jammed nodes. The robust natureof IBACS will make it difficult for Marine forces todisrupt adversary C3 capabilities.

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Cellular Systems

Many countries will install digital and analog cellularsystems in preference to traditional copper or evenfiber optic cable networks. Cell phones, personal dataassistants (PDAs), and pagers, as well as traditionallynon-computerized items such as games, cameras, ormusic players, are now functionally “converging” withcomputers and the internet. For example, individualsnow have the ability to send images and geo-coordi-nates of persons and objects across CN in near realtime with no more than their cell phones.

Military applications include adapting personal com-munications networks as part of a digital-battlefieldcommunications network; physical reconfigurationwith helmet-mounted headsets would be a reasonablemodification. In theory, each combattant could beincorporated into a secure cellular phone network tieddirectly to the commercial phone system, which wouldreduce reliance on combat radio net systems.

Fast hopping frequency synthesizer module technol-ogy uses higher hopping rates to provide greaterimmunity to interference and lower probability ofintercept for voice data and compressed video commu-nications. Adaptive preprocessing and noise filteringpermit operations in high noise levels. Cellular sys-tems will allow any adversary to have an effective C3capability using COTS cellular technology on civilnetworks. An attack on civil networks for the purposeof disrupting adversary C3 could be problematic forMarine forces.

Satellite Systems

Increased commercial demand for space-based ser-vices is driving the development of satellite technol-ogy, which in turn will provide easily obtainable,advanced services from communication and sensorC4ISR systems. Satellite communications will bereadily available to anyone, providing instant and reli-able communications at all levels of military, national,domestic, regional and global arenas. The followingsystems are expected to experience increased usageover the next 10 years: AceS, ARABSAT, ELLIPSO,ICO, ORBCOMM, Thuraya, IntelSat Inmarsat, Nano-satellites, VSAT, USAT. Some areas will establishregional SATCom systems, such as AceS and ARAB-

SAT. VSAT will continue to be extensively used inareas where telecom infrastructure is not available ordifficult to install, e.g. mountainous regions such asAfghanistan. Satellite systems, although more expen-sive than other communications, are well suited toadversary C3 functions. Since it is probable that anuninvolved third country may own the satellite systembeing used by an adversary, any attack on the systemwould be unacceptable; an adversary would thereforebe able to operate with impunity.

Trunk Mobile RadioTrunk mobile radio (TMR) is primarily used by publicsafety and police organizations. However, these sys-tems are inexpensive and easy to use. The two maindivisions of trunk mobile radio are PMR and PAMR.The simplest example of TMR is the “walkie-talkie”push-to-talk system. The most common standards are:TETRA, iDEN and TETRAPOL. These systems canbe easily adapted to adversary C3 functions. Its abilityto be camouflaged among legitimate users and theease of establishing TMR will make it difficult forMarines to counter this capability.

Over-the-horizon Communication SystemsMany existing over-the-horizon (OTH) technologieswill continue to be used, since they have proven reli-able. Technology improvements are expected to allowOTH communications to be easier and less expensiveto implement, and at the same time increase usablebandwidth. Despite its low data rate, HF will remain acost effective, virtually indestructible means of com-munications. HF offers a wide range of operating char-acteristics under software control and ease ofincorporating LPI capabilities. The most likely OTHtechnologies that will be used are; automatic linkestablishment, meteor burst communications and tro-poscatter communications. OTH allows an adversarylong-haul communications for C3 that will be difficultfor Marines to counter.

Line-of-sight Communication Systems Line-of-sight (LOS) communications are generallyused for all types of civil and military communications.Advancements in the use and capability of LOS sys-tems with advanced waveforms will occur in the next10 years. High data rate requirements will drive the

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development of terrestrial microwave, digital micro-wave, and millimeter-wave communication systems.Higher hop rates can be expected as LOS communica-tions go above UHF. These systems can be highlydirectional and difficult to exploit. Marine forces willfind it difficult to effect adversary C3 activities usingthese systems.

Emerging TechnologyGreater acceptance and standardization of digital com-munications technology will ultimately simplify bat-tlefield communications. The distinctions betweenhand-held voice radio, digital multipath modes, andhigh-rate data transfer links will blur and ultimatelydisappear. Military circuit-switched communicationnetworks will adapt to the multiservice, multimediaworld of the commercial sector. Further developmentsare possible in pulse-code modulation, delta modula-tion, and asynchronous transfer mode standards. Theresult will be a new generation of high-bit rate, low-error rate transmission systems that will support thedesired seamless interface.

Improved control of digital communications will pro-vide the capability for positive control of integrated,automated C3 systems with their significantly increasedcommunications bandwidth requirements. Fiber opticswill provide a high volume of secure communicationsthat will greatly enhance C3 protection. Alternate devel-opments may include systems that operate in nontradi-tional frequency ranges (for instance, ultraviolet light)and intentionally short-range communications.

Other technology expected to make gains in the next10 years includes Ultra-Wideband Communications,free space optics, orbiting metropolitan wireless com-munications, micro/nano-satellite systems and soft-ware defined radios. Marine EW equipment mustevolve if information dominance can be maintained.

Open Architecture Systems

Increased use of open architectures (OAs) in militaryC4ISR systems is accelerating foreign advancement inmilitary capability of rapid and accurate disseminationof combat relevant information. Using a blend of inter-connected commercial, civil, and military communica-

tions, military forces can transmit voice, data, or videoamong sensors, computers, command authorities, andcombat units.

OA systems are easily installed, allow rapid technol-ogy insertion, and reduce reliance on single equipmentsources at lower costs than proprietary designs.Because OAs integrate sensors, combat managementsystems, communications, and weapons, OA-basedsystems are ideally suited for all military C4ISR appli-cations, and, in fact, are produced by some Westerncountries for export.

OAs allow potential adversaries to integrate bothimported and indigenous components and leveragecommercial technology to their benefit. Effective use ofOA technology and architectures should allow anypower to rapidly achieve and maintain advanced C4ISRcapabilities, such as multi-sensor data fusion, computer-ized command decision aids, common situation aware-ness, and coordinated target engagement. Systemcapabilities can be greatly increased without any out-ward indication of the change, creating a potential forunderestimating the capability of a threat system. Thesecapabilities could allow quicker reaction times againstthreat weapons or platforms and improve the effective-ness of multi-axis responses. The increased prevalenceof these advancements will likely challenge future U.S.dominance over foreign militaries.

Wireless Network Technology

Eventually, most computer systems will be connectedto the internet. Most systems are physically connectedto fixed networks with cables. Fixed network systemswill likely be nearly obsolete in 10 years. A wirelesssystem can be installed in significantly less time and atsubstantial savings. Wireless technology includes:cordless telephones, fixed wireless local loops, wire-less private automatic branch, and wireless local areanetworks (W-LANs). W-LANs can transmit over RF,laser, directed infrared or diffused IR technology; RFis expected to be the most widely used. Several W-LAN standards, which are expected to continue intothe next 10 years, include: IEEE 802.X, 802.11a/g,802.11b, Bluetooth, and European HiprLAN 2.

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INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS

Global Positioning System Future navigational GPS will be miniaturized, digi-tized, and integrated with inertial navigation systems(INS) to provide reliability and redundancy. Thesesystems will be a tremendous combat multiplier, notonly improving navigation capability, but also aidingcommand and control, weapons delivery and guid-ance, sensor emplacement, intelligence functions, andrescue missions. Miniaturized and inexpensive inte-grated INS/GPS will be found in most sensors,weapon systems, and munitions.

Electronic Warfare Support Systems The future of electronic warfare support is digital andintegrated. Advances in electronic and platformsophistication provide significant electronic supportmeasure (ESM) capabilities. Performance upgradesare measured in order of magnitude: a radar warningreceiver can now produce data equivalent to an olderESM suite, and a new ESM suite provides signalsintelligence (SIGINT)-quality data. The proliferationof recently developed signal-processing software withCOTS hardware could have a major effect on upgrad-ing ESM capabilities. Compact and inexpensive air-borne SIGINT systems can relay sensor informationfrom landing sites to operators on the ground hundredsof kilometers away. Automatic direction-finding usingsingle-site-location techniques will eliminate the needfor several stations and highly trained operators to per-form triangulation. Marine forces must maintainawareness of the possibility that emissions may bemonitored, potentially allowing an adversary enoughadvance information so he may choose his ownmethod of engagement.

INCREASING CAPABILITIES

Strategic Reconnaissance and SurveillanceNumerous countries are establishing or expandingtheir ability to monitor their littoral regions, particu-larly their claimed 200-nautical-mile exclusive eco-nomic zone. These monitoring systems, even if

deployed primarily for commercial or law enforce-ment purposes, serve as de facto reconnaissance andsurveillance systems. While low cost systems may notmatch the technological superiority of advanced coun-try systems, they will be sufficient for national secu-rity needs. Naval expeditionary forces will be easilydetectable by these assets.

Space-based Platforms Some countries have or are pursuing a space-launchcapability, giving them the potential for orbiting areconnaissance satellite. Commercially availableremote sensing assets include the EADS Astrium’sInfoterra, French SPOT series, U.S. LANDSAT multi-spectral imagery and Spacing Imaging, ImageSatInternational Space, Canadian RADARSAT images,and Russian satellite photography.

In many cases, commercially available earth observa-tion satellites will meet a country's intelligence collec-tion requirements. Canada's RADARSAT program, acommercial synthetic aperture radar satellite, has manyadvertised applications, one of which is open-oceanfisheries monitoring at 10-meter resolution. Europeanand Asian countries will pursue military reconnaissanceprograms to avoid dependence upon either the UnitedStates or Russia for intelligence information duringperiods of crisis. These capabilities will allow anyadversary access to accurate geospatial information pro-viding critical information on Marine location. Counter-ing these capabilities may be complicated, sinceuninvolved third parties will own many of the assets.

Manned Airborne Platforms Airborne littoral surveillance will most commonlyconsist of commercial airframes modified to carry var-ious sensor systems. Active and passive systems willbe used for detection, identification, tracking, cuing,and possible targeting of airborne and maritime con-tacts. Such systems would be able to handle near-realtime collection, digital electro-optical imagery, andelectronic data transmission. Signals intelligencepackages and other less-sophisticated but capable sys-tems can be routinely installed on long-endurancecommercial airframes.

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Unmanned Vehicles The worldwide use of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)systems for tactical RSTA will continue to expand interms of both development activity and fielding of sys-tems. Potential adversaries may develop or procurehighly advanced electronic attack and guided missilecarrying systems. UAVs do not need to be high-tech tobe a threat; Hizballah successfully flew a camera-mounted drone over Israel.

Unmanned surface and underwater vehicles (USV,UUV) will also play a role in targeting emitters andsurface/sub-surface platforms, early warning, and useas countermeasures and decoys. These robotic systemshave the advantages of being flexible in time-sensitivetargeting, are expendable, and have greater sustainedbattle presence.

Hundreds of different types of UAVs are eitheremployed or in development; there are currently 50developer countries. While many are strictly low-endurance tactical systems, the success of the U.S.Predator system over Afghanistan and Bosnia demon-strated the UAV’s potential for long-endurance, highaltitude missions. For many countries’ littoral moni-toring missions, operating a Predator-like UAV wouldbe more effective in terms of cost, training, mainte-nance, and performance than a manned system.Because of the low cost and commercial availabilityand versatility, these systems will continue to prolifer-ate in number and capability. UAVs are also becomingstealthier, with RCSs as low as -30db.

Most UAVs are multi mission-capable and designed toaccept a variety of mission payloads. Steady advanceswill occur in the integration of multispectral sensortechnology to improve detection, recognition, and iden-tification capabilities that will enhance target acquisi-tion applications. Less than 1 percent of the cost of atypical standoff jammer, a UAV offers an inexpensiveoption to manned systems. UAVs have the potential tobe used as weapon platform, some with sufficientcapacity to be converted into a basic cruise missile car-rying various warheads, including a WMD warhead.

Electro-opticsImage intensifier-based devices, thermal imagers, laserrangefinders, and laser target designators have proven

effective in battlefield environments. Today many ofthese technologies are available through proliferationand the dual-use nature of the image intensifier devices.In the mid-term, technological advances will lead to theproliferation and the reduction in cost of more advanceddevices – making them available to state and possiblynon-state actors. Advances will also lead to smaller,lighter systems that can be integrated into a wider vari-ety of platforms, such as UAVs, or allow more capabil-ity on a given platform, such as the individualwarfighter. Having an image intensifier and thermalsensor on the same platform will provide a multi-spec-tral capability that is more difficult to counter.

Russia, China, middle-eastern, and Western countrieshave programs to develop laser range finders (LRFs).Low cost LRFs and more capable surveyor type LRFsare commercially available at sporting goods, depart-ment stores, or industrial supply houses. Theserangefinders are immediately usable in military appli-cations. State and non-state actors have LRFs today.

Russia, China, middle-eastern, and Western countrieshave programs to develop laser target designators(LTDs), which require the associated munitions, andare not generally considered dual-use systems. Thisspecific application of LTDs serves to limit prolifera-tion to non-state actors. Improvements in the laser area(uncooled systems, more sensitive laser detector tech-nology, and more efficient laser materials) will lead tosmaller, lighter systems that will allow integration onmore platforms.

Passive image intensifier devices that will give stateand non-state actors a night-operating capability arewidely available. Russia, China, middle-eastern, andWestern countries have programs to develop imageintensifier-based night vision systems. Commercialand military night rifle sights, night vision goggles,and intensified cameras are available at retail storesand over the internet. Commercial LRFs are availablewith an integrated image intensifying system - provid-ing a nighttime ranging capability. Active night visionsystems (near infrared cameras operating with nearinfrared illuminators–light emitting diodes or laserdiodes) are widely available for surveillance applica-tions. Marines can expect to encounter image intensi-fier-based night sights. Technology like electron-

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bombarded, charge-coupled devices (EBCCD) thatcan be expected in the midterm will increase the pro-liferation of the night vision capability.

Mid-wave and Long-wave thermal imagers are beingdeveloped for commercial and military applications.Commercial applications include fire fighters or factorymaintenance. Handheld commercial thermal imagersare available. In the near- and the mid-term, these typesof systems may be too expensive for wide proliferationamong non-state actors. Many state actors have thermalimager development programs and are fielding thermalimagers today for surveillance and fire control applica-tions. Advances in uncooled detectors and focal planearrays will lead to lower cost, smaller and ultimatelywidely proliferated thermal imagers. Future improve-ments include large-format focal plane arrays, moresensitive arrays, and multi-color arrays.

COUNTERMEASURES to U.S. CAPABILITIES

State and non-state actors will have increased capabil-ity to disrupt U.S. C4ISR capabilities in the form ofelectronic jamming and direct attacks on U.S. sensors,computer network attack (CNA) and computer net-work exploitation (CNE) of our networked systems,and technological limitations to U.S. human intelli-gence (HUMINT) capabilities.

Directed Energy WeaponsDirected energy weapons include lasers, radiofre-quency weapons, and particle beam weapons. High-energy lasers will transform the battlefield in the far-term, and will challenge the U.S. ability to maintainawareness of the battlespace.

Laser WeaponsMilitary application of laser technology is well estab-lished. The proliferation of laser devices on the battle-field significantly threatens unprotected sensors andhuman eyes, regardless of the laser’s intended use.Low energy laser weapons can affect specific functionof a target without physically destroying it. Lowenergy lasers are also used to detect optical devicesusing retro-reflection. Commercial lasers that can beeasily adapted to military applications are widelyavailable with various degrees of energy and wave-

length. High-energy lasers can be used to attack thesame range of targets but are designed to inflict a hard-kill or structural damage on the target.

High-energy laser weapons programs have beenreported in several countries. The Russians are offer-ing a truck-mounted, high-energy laser system. Lasersthat can shoot down aircraft are available and it maybe feasible to combine them with targeting systemsthat can engage aircraft. Proliferation of laser technol-ogy is expected to accelerate in the next 10 years.

Radio-frequency Weapons Radiofrequency (RF) weapons use intense pulses ofRF energy to disrupt or damage the electronic compo-nents of a target. State and non-state actors haveexpressed interest in RF weapons, and vulnerability ofsystems such as television and radio transmitters, tele-phone networks, computers, and automotive engines.RF weapons are designed to inflict a hard-kill, orstructural damage upon the target.

Electronic Attack SystemsThe counter/counter-countermeasures relationshipbetween emitters and EW receivers and jammers isexpected to continue. Currently, low-probability inter-cept (LPI) techniques have a slight edge against elec-tronic attack and electronic support systems. LPI is notone particular technique, but rather it is the use of var-ious methods and techniques to reduce the ability of anopponent to intercept or degrade a signal. Continuousdevelopment of complex wave forms, sophisticatedencryption schemes, higher frequencies and other LPItechniques will constantly challenge Marine Corpscapabilities to execute an electronic attack (EA). Toaffect an adversary’s ability to conduct well-coordi-nated warfare, one must affect an adversary’s com-mand and control.

GPS JammingMost information, encryption, targeting, location, andnavigation systems depend, sometimes exclusively, onGPS. Many adversaries are either developing or pur-chasing capabilities to defeat GPS usage. Attacks onGPS can take the form of jamming, delayed re-broad-casting or spoofing. Marines must be aware of GPSvulnerability to manipulation by adversaries.

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Electro-optic Countermeasures Recognizing U.S. military dependency on electro-optic systems, including precision-guided munitions,imagers, direct view optics, etc., many countries arefocused on developing countermeasures. Electro-optic(EO) guided-precision weapons include laser-guidedmunitions, semiautomatic command-to-line-of-sightmissiles, television-guided munitions, heat seekers,and more advanced terrain- and target-recognitionweapons. All systems that depend on optics will besubject to electro-optic countermeasures (EOCMs).This includes land, airborne and space-based systems.New EOCM devices have been promoted at armsshows and some have been fielded in limited quanti-ties. The near-term should see more rapid manufactureand deployment of EOCMs already developed. Infuture conflicts, optic systems will not be as effective,since many countries will have developed and fieldedEOCMs to detect and counter them. Marine forcesshould avoid dependency on EO sensors.

Computer Network Operations During the time frame of this estimate, market-drivenchanges to information technology, to includeincreases in computing power, convergence of tech-nology around digital, IP- (or IP-successor-) basedcommunication networks, and the increasing use ofCN in society, will have led to an environment inwhich most electronic devices will have some levelof interaction across the internet. An increasing per-centage of the COTS CN components available in theUnited States will be designed, produced, and assem-bled outside U.S. borders. Software and hardwarewill be increasingly designed and produced by non-U.S. entities, and control of (or visibility into) soft-ware design cycles will become increasingly diffi-cult. U.S. planners should anticipate and guardagainst CNA and CNE.

The object of CNA is to cause a specific effect on thefunctioning of an information system to modify pro-cesses, access, or data. Adversary nations, trans-national groups, or even individuals might choose toconduct CNA. Such activities could range in scopeand complexity from a hacker employing a simple tooldesigned to change, destroy, or manipulate data, to astrategic weapon meant to create confusion, distrust,

and/or disruption as part of a larger attack. Commonlyencountered types of CNA include the following:

■ Exploitation of specific software vulnerabilities(scripts, exploits);

■ Identification of open access points (retaineddefault passwords);

■ Brute force attacks (repeated guessing of passwords);■ Cracking (decryption of encrypted password files);■ Denial of service or distributed denial of service

attacks; and/or■ Domain name server cache poisoning.

Unlike CNA, which seeks to change the processing of,or access to data, the object of CNE is to obtain thedata or network architecture itself. Possible targets ofCNE span a broad range from encrypted passwords(ideal for later ‘cracking’) to documents containingtrade secrets, to the credit card numbers of unsuspect-ing consumers. Packet traffic flowing across a networkmay be of as much interest as memory contents, and“sniffing” programs have been developed to facilitatethe exploitation of both wired and wireless networktraffic. In most cases, a CN exploiter seeks to remainundetected for as long as possible to maximize oppor-tunities to obtain additional data. CNE may be com-bined with forms of CNA to provide the initial access,or to conceal or destroy traces of that access. Tools tofacilitate CNE, available openly in the commercialmarket and online, include ‘stumblers,’ ‘sniffers,’ and‘rootkits,’ which respectively seek access points,observe data in transit, and hijack the root-level privi-leges to conceal CNE from authorized users.

While the specific techniques may vary, all of the cur-rent tactics of CNA and CNE are likely to persist intothe future. As a result, the race between hackers andsystem designers, software developers, and users willcontinue. In most cases, employing appropriate TTPsto address known vulnerabilities (proper configura-tion, network monitoring, regular update of anti-virussoftware) will mitigate most threats. Nonetheless, riskof novel attack combinations, vulnerabilities, orhuman error will remain.

BiometricsBiometrics are the use of human characteristics to estab-lish or verify the identity of individuals. Biometric tech-

57



nology is highly effective and is expected to continue toimprove, becoming more reliable and more resistant tospoofing. As biometric databases proliferate, maintain-ing security of that information will become difficult.

Compromise of this data could provide an adversarywith detailed biometric information. Personnel attempt-ing to operate covertly may be specifically identifiedupon entry into a country without knowing it.

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Section 4:REGIONAL ASSESSMENT

Predicting the future of specific regions, nation statesor even organizations is a difficult undertaking, if notimpossible. Political, economic and demographic fac-tors weigh heavily toward driving instability, all ofwhich have the potential to impact military response.Each of these three factors contains variables that willdefine, and complicate, the broad spectrum of chal-lenges facing future operations’ planners.

This section is not predictive, but rather, highlights theissues central to creating conflict that could potentiallyaffect U.S. interests in a particular region requiring amilitary response.

The Regional Assessment addresses specific transna-tional issues in six regions (and four sub-regionswithin Asia) that MCIA envisions will potentiallyshape the region’s security environment and possiblyimpact the global security environment. “PotentialWildcards” depict possible events that could haveeffects on regional and/or global activities (such asanother attack similar to those of 11 September 2001).

AFRICA

Marred by instability, poverty, and ethnic tension,Africa is a concern. While recovering from colonial-ism, extreme ethnic diversity, and corrupt governancehave prevented the continent from sharing the globaleconomic progress of the last 15 years. Nowhere elsehave the economic benefits from globalization been solacking. Economically, Africa is in a class of its own,due primarily to the following:

■ Of the world’s 20 poorest countries, 19 are African.

■ GDP for the continent is only 2 percent of theworld’s GDP; roughly equivalent to South Korea’s.

■ Of billions of U.S. dollars in private investmentcapital (which fuels globalization), only 1 percentreaches sub-Saharan Africa.

Africa’s demographic statistics are equally dismal. Ithas the 30 countries with the highest infant mortalityrate and some of the lowest life expectancy rates in the

world. Half of Africa’s population is younger than 16,and nearly 70 percent is younger than 30.

The effects of HIV and AIDS challenge Sub-SaharanAfrica. Sub-Saharan Africa has 10 percent of theworld’s population, but is home to more than 60 per-cent of all people living with HIV. Prostitution, lackof education, and poor governance have helped propa-gate the disease. According to UNICEF estimates,Sub-Saharan Africa will have 20 million AIDSorphans in the year 2010. AIDS is affecting the popu-lation and potential development. It strikes mostlythose of wage-earning age. With diminishing immunesystems, debilitating diseases once under control,such as malaria and tuberculosis, are resurgent. IfAIDS is not checked, it could make Africa muchpoorer, as people who do not expect to live long,invest less in their futures.

AIDS also affects education. People stricken withAIDS are less likely to send their children to school. Astudy in Ivory Coast found that households afflicted byAIDS halved their spending on education. Huge num-bers of children lose their parents and often theirteachers. Women comprise 75 percent of HIV positive

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adults; this has created instability in the population astraditional families, the core of the culture, are deci-mated, and children are forced to look for other formsof authority. This has increased the child soldier andyouth gang populations. AIDS also complicates peacesupport operations because military contingents frommany Sub-Saharan African nations have incrediblyhigh rates of infection and are restricted from partici-pating in peacekeeping missions. Many of the conti-nent’s economies and militaries have been crippled bythe spread of the disease. Further economic declinecould allow extremists to exert influence.

Most African economies rely on being a passive sup-plier of commodities to the global market. Today,Africa provides more than 15 percent of U.S. oilimports, which is expected to rise to 25 percent in thenext decade as new oil fields come into production.Little of this money reaches the population, due to itscorrupt governments. Oil funds have fueled coupattempts and regional violence. Instead of being aresource, African oil too often fuels corruption andoppression, creating civil strife.

Conflict and instability still overwhelm much ofAfrica. Recent events in Darfur, Sudan have illustratedthe potential ultra violent ethnic conflict outside of thetraditional Christian-Muslim discord. Genocide inDarfur results from Muslim-on-Muslim ethnic identi-ties and social–economic factors. These types of flash-points crisscross Africa with minorities that usually gounnoticed by the West.

Small and light arms are broadly disseminated in Afri-can crises regions; that is a key factor in constantregional instability. These weapons have fueled a cycleof conflict in certain regions, such as central and west-ern Africa. DROC continues to recover from a 5-yearcivil war that left 3 million dead and embroiled most ofits neighbors. Cross-border populations only encouragethis regional instability, as fighters who have madepeace in one country may go fight in another for eco-nomic reasons. Liberia, Sierra Leone, and the IvoryCoast are all affected by this social trend.

Child soldiers are a concern. Children must be inte-grated into the social fold through education andemployment opportunities. Without a strong govern-ment to provide structure, education, and a viable

economy, these children view fighting as the onlymeans to obtain necessities.

These regions are getting help with stabilization. Afri-can countries, particularly Nigeria, have become moreactive in peacekeeping, as the demand for peacekeep-ers continues to rise. Last year, the UN and the AfricanUnion deployed more than 50,000 troops to countriessuch as Eritrea, Sierra Leone, DROC, and Liberia.However, troop discipline is poor and stories of abusesby peacekeepers may undermine future missions.

Islamic terrorist activity in sub-Saharan Africa willlikely increase. The region has porous borders, unsta-ble and corrupt governments, vast unpopulated areas,and substantial Islamic populations. Elements ofIslamic terrorist organizations may use sub-SaharanAfrican nations as recruiting centers, training grounds,safe havens, and mission planning sites. Internationalterrorists have targeted sub-Saharan Africa for attacksin Kenya and Tanzania. Somalia’s lack of nationalgovernment makes it a potential home for Islamic ter-rorism. There is also a high risk that Africa’s rawmaterials, such as diamonds, gold, and columbite tan-talite (coltan) could be hijacked by terrorists.Increased U.S. aid and cooperation with counter ter-rorism efforts may help mitigate these circumstancesto a degree, but they will not eliminate them.

One effect globalization is having on Africa is in com-munication systems. Cell phone subscriber growth inseveral sub-Saharan African countries exceeded 150percent last year, and there are now 8 mobile phonesfor every 100 people in Africa, up from 3 in 2001. Formany this is their first telephone. This growing technol-ogy could have social implications. Whether or not thishas a positive effect is still in question. However cellu-lar technology will provide some of the needed infra-structure for Africa to grow economically.

Africa has an alarming list of instability factors. Overthe next 10 to 15 years, Africa’s political, economic,and social environment will lead to significant MarineCorps involvement. Marines will conduct the spectrumof missions, from military training and humanitarianassistance to larger scale counter-terrorism nd peaceenforcement missions. Africa’s decaying infrastructure,complex cultural composition, and harsh physical envi-

60



ronment will significantly challenge future MarineCorps operations.

Potential Wildcards ■ Re-igniting the war in DROC, central Africa or

west Africa;

■ Widespread genocide within a country; and

■ Rapid growth of Islamic terrorist groups.

ASIA

South AsiaMost of the regional threat issues affecting south Asiarevolve around India and its neighbors. As Indiastrives to benefit from globalization and entice globalinvestors, the government will try to create regionalstability. This will not be easy. India is poor anddiverse; by some estimates, it has the world’s secondlargest Muslim population, which is fueling ideologi-cally driven violence in many areas. There is hope inan unlikely place: Kashmir.

Many speculate that the most dangerous flashpoint inthe world is the conflict between Pakistan and Indiaover the disputed Kashmir, since both countries arenuclear powers. However, both sides seem to agreethat fighting over Kashmir is hurting them financially.India and Pakistan need economic growth to quellinternal problems more than they can benefit by takinga hard-line stand on Kashmir.

Pakistan has regained its economic footing; however,its last surge against India in 2002 depleted its treasury.Pakistan acknowledges that war with a country that hasalmost 10 times its economy and 7 times the populationdoes not serve its long-term interests. Pakistan needsthe economic growth and its military to fight extremistswithin its own borders. India is also feeling economicrestraints. While vastly stronger than its Pakistani rival,India is attempting to maintain high GDP growth andcompete with China to attract foreign investment.

India’s integration into the U.S. economy through out-sourced call centers and software support has led to arelative economic boom. Reliant on direct U.S. invest-ment, India has come to value stability for its economicgrowth. During the 2002 standoff in Pakistan, business-

men and software companies registered concerns thatthreat of a nuclear exchange deters the companies theywant to attract. Both sides backed down, apparentlyfinding greater threats to and interests for their countriesthan Kashmir. However, India still believes Pakistan’ssecret service supports terrorists who carry out attacksin India territory. Progress could be erased overnightshould there be a change of Pakistan leadership.

Internally, India experiences both insurgent andextremist violence, much of which has ties to theregion. India has a worsening terrorist problem in itsnortheast. The seven states of the region are home tomore than 200 ethnic groups. This has created upris-ings with varying demands. One, the United Libera-tion Front of Assam (ULFA), seeks independence forthe state of Assam. Another, the National DemocraticFront of Bodoland, is fighting a war within a war for ahomeland for the Bodo people in Assam. India accusesother neighbors—Myanmar and especially Bang-ladesh—of harboring terrorists. Some accuse Bang-ladesh of deliberately fuelling the conflicts, as itsgovernment has become increasingly influenced byextremist Islamist groups. India is also concerned withthe forced expulsions of minorities from Bangladeshinto India. Both sides have placed paramilitary forceson the border.

Nepal faces the possibility of falling to Maoist rebels;India also perceives a threat. India has about 20 IndianMaoist, or “Naxalite” insurgent groups. Of its 593 dis-tricts, 157 are now affected in some measure by Nax-alism — 102 of these were added to the list recently,inferring that the movement may be growing. Indiabelieves that these groups have strong links with theirNepali counterparts. More significant than any practi-cal support, however, would be the ideological encour-agement of a Maoist victory in Nepal.

India knows the only way to counter these externalthreats influencing its population is to provide eco-nomic opportunity. Its growth in the 1990s wasimpressive but uneven. Compared with China, Indialags. Thirty-five percent of Indians live on less thanUS$1 a day, compared with 17 percent of Chinese.Some 47 percent of India's under-5-year-old popula-tion is underweight, compared with 10 percent inChina. Infant mortality is 65 per 1,000 in India against

61



30 in China; life expectancy at birth is 63 in India, 71in China; and adult literacy is 57 percent in India, and91 percent in China. India is still home to a quarter ofthe world's undernourished population.

India will continue to increase its regional influence.China is a prime motivation behind this strategy. Indiawill continue to be concerned about China’s rapid mil-itary modernization, increasing regional influence, andgrowing need for natural resources. Potentially, Chinacould present a threat to India’s interest in south Asia.

Two key aspects of this “great power” strategy are itsnaval modernization and nuclear programs. Hoping toachieve a blue-water naval capability over the next tenyears, India recently undertook a robust program ofnaval modernization. The Indian Navy decommis-sioned a number of older ships, purchased a Russianaircraft carrier, and received its first, indigenously pro-duced ship. Until de-nuclearization of the P-5 mem-bers, in accordance with the Nuclear Non-ProliferationTreaty, India will continue to develop and maintain anuclear deterrent.

India’s growth will create new challenges to the world(such as greater resource demand). It will also have aregional effect that is difficult to predict. India’s rela-tions with its neighbors illustrate a region that is influx and unstable.

Potential Wildcards

■ Assassination of Musharraf and/or overthrow/change of the Pakistani government;

■ Unexpected economic downturn within India;

■ Bangladesh moving to more extremist Islamistviews; and

■ Conflict between India and Pakistan over Kash-mir region.

Southeast AsiaSoutheast Asia should not be underestimated in U.S.interests in the near term. The economic importance ofsoutheast Asia could be seen as the world’s “chokepoint.” The narrow Strait of Malacca is the world'ssecond-busiest waterway after the Strait of Dover inEurope. Every day, a quarter of world trade, includinghalf of all sea shipments of oil bound for eastern Asia

and two-thirds of global shipments of liquefied naturalgas, passes through this strait. This alone makes theregion vital to all of the major Asian economies andthe world economy. Unfortunately, the region is alsohome to a worrisome transnational terrorism trend.

The Muslim populations highlighted in the map “Mus-lim Populations in Southeast Asia” have significantextremist populations that have shown a willingness totarget Western interests. In many respects, the extrem-ist groups in this region have degraded borders to cre-ate an Islamic network that has challenged authoritiesconfined to national borders. The region’s geographymakes any sort of border control nearly impossible.Across southeast Asia are thousands of remote islandsand expanses of jungles ideal for extremist groups tohide and train. The population is also alienated byissues such as economic collapse (Indonesia), corrup-tion, and minority discrimination (Thailand and thePhilippines), making the population susceptible toextremism. National separatist movements and insur-gent groups are already destabilizing certain regions.

Central to this network is the region’s internationalgroup Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). While experts believe itwas not formally created until the early 1990s, JI beganas an Islamist movement closely connected to a smallnumber of Islamic extremist schools in Indonesia, most

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notably, a village in Central Java. Persecution in the1970s and 1980s caused the leaders to relocate inneighboring Malaysia and Singapore. Abu BakarBashir and Abdullah Sungkar, JI leaders, were arrestedand imprisoned in Indonesia as part of a crackdown onradical groups. Bashir fled to Malaysia in 1982. JI’sleadership trained in Afghanistan over a 10-year-periodfrom 1985-1995 and this had a huge influence on shap-ing their world view.

Islamic fundamentalists from southern Thailand to thePhilippines are increasingly active after decades ofmuted conflict. In Thailand's four southernmost prov-inces, where the population is predominantly Muslim,the younger generation of the 31-year-old PattaniUnited Liberation Organization (PULO) is becomingmore inspired by Indonesian and Arab militants. Phil-ippine Separatist Islamic groups have hosted terror-training camps for militant groups from Indonesia andMalaysia for at least 7 years. While reforms have pro-gressed toward undercutting extremists, danger ofinstability persists.

China’s growing regional power is palpable. In the next5-10 years, China will extend its regional economicand diplomatic influence. Most countries in southeastAsia see China not only an economic threat, but an eco-nomic opportunity. A recent Thai banking surveyshowed that 76 percent of respondents consideredChina to be Thailand’s closest friend; only 9 percentchose the United States. In Laos, Burma, and parts ofCambodia, businessmen are making China’s Renminbiyuan the region’s second reserve currency; the U.S.dollar is the primary currency. Implications of this newinfluence may have significant long-term effects.

Potential Wildcards

■ Islamist membership surges due to a populationshock (economic collapse or natural disaster); and

■ Military or terrorist event in the Strait of Malacca.

East AsiaChina’s influence in trade and diplomacy has grownthroughout east Asia in the last decade. A high priorityfor China, it is expected that this trend of cultivatingeconomic and diplomatic relations will continue, withChina’s reach expanding beyond the region over the

next ten years. In addition, China’s rapid militarymodernization has caused concern for its neighbors. Itis likely that China’s regional clout will grow due to itsexpanding economic, diplomatic and military power.At the same time, it is likely that the east Asian regionwill seek to contain some of China’s expanding pres-ence to protect its interests.

As part of its strategy to unify Taiwan with the main-land, China fostered a closer economic relationshipwith Taiwan. As a result, there is an immense amountof official and unofficial economic activity betweenChina and Taiwan. Hundreds of thousands of Taiwansnow live and work in China, where the island’s compa-nies have invested an estimated US$100 billion. Two-way trade has grown more than ten-fold, reachingUS$61 billion last year; China is now Taiwan’s largestexport destination. Despite a growing economic rela-tionship, friction remains between the two countrieswith issue of Taiwan independence being the main con-tentious issue. China’s military modernization, ChenShui-bian’s pro-independence agenda, a rise in “Tai-wanese” ethnic identity, and the possibility of U.S.involvement in a cross-strait conflict, all contribute to acomplex and potentially volatile environment.

China’s relationship with Japan is also defined bydeepening economic ties and periods of tension. In 3of the last 4 years, Japan has been China’s biggesttrading partner. Last year, China became Japan’s big-gest trading partner. Japanese businesses employ onemillion Chinese through foreign investment. In 2004,China received US$6.25 billion in direct foreigninvestment from Japan. However, China’s diplomaticrelationship with Japan has not been as positive.Spring 2005 was a particularly tense period as thedecision by the Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi tocontinue with visits to the Yasukuni War Shrineinvoked mass protests within China against Japan.This incident highlights one of the most contentiousissues between China and Japan: historical animosityover Japanese war crimes during WW II. Japan is con-cerned with China’s rapid military modernization.Similarly, China is concerned with Japan’s tighteningsecurity relationship with the United States. Adding toChinese concern over Japan’s tightening security rela-tionship with the U.S., in a joint statement with theUnited States, Japan declared that Taiwan is a mutual

63



security concern. An additional area of friction is theSenkaku/Diayutai islands dispute. These islands strad-dle a key SLOC, may possess natural resources andwould expand fishing areas.

Equally complex, the Koreas present another dilemmafor China. China’s economic and diplomatic relation-ship has also significantly grown with South Korea.China’s position on North Korea is complex. WhileChina does not want North Korea to attain a nuclearcapability, she does not want North Korea to collapseeither. A divided Korean peninsula is in China’s short tomid-term interest for the following reasons: massiveflow of refugees over its border; a disruption in its tradewith South Korea; and the potential of an expandedU.S. presence on the peninsula. Through the six-partytalks, North Korea presents an opportunity for China toincrease its diplomatic clout. It is likely that China willcontinue supporting North Korea with economic aidwhile working to reign in its nuclear aspirations.

As China becomes more closely integrated with theregion, an economic crisis or massive political insta-bility within China could have dire consequences foreast Asia. The potential for these scenarios exists overthe next 10 years. Accordingly, there is a sense amongthe countries of east Asia that while relations withChina are important, relations with the United Statesalso need to be fostered, as well. Inspired in part byChina’s program of military modernization, thereseems to be a certain level of mistrust of China amongeast Asian countries. Ultimately, this perception mayhinder China’s aspirations in the region.

Potential Wildcards

■ An economic downturn destabilizes China;

■ Chinese attack on Taiwan;

■ Collapse of North Korea; and

■ North Korea takes an offensive action.

EUROPE

Europe in the mid term will struggle with new democ-racies, shifting demographics, and the war on terror-ism. How Europe handles these three issues willdetermine what kind of ally and force Europe will be.

Since 1989, democracy has swept eastward throughthe region. The European Union (EU) has expandedfrom the original 15 to 25 members with another 10countries hoping to join. From the beginning, coun-tries such as Poland, Slovakia, Lithuania, and Roma-nia have moved to reform, inspired by the prospects ofEU membership. With some exceptions, the prospectof joining a stable, peaceful economic zone hasencouraged good governance across central Europe. Inthe first days of the Ukrainian uprising, there was talkof EU membership. However, populations in westernEurope are beginning to rethink this expansion. With-out prospects of a greater EU, democracies that haveyet to emerge or establish a foothold (like Albania)may lose the impetus for reform.

If western Europe pulls back, it will be due to itschanging population. For the past 50 years, the UnitedStates and the nations of western Europe have beencharacterized as rich countries, sharing the same basicdemographic features: stable populations, low anddeclining birth rates, increasing elderly population. Inthe 1980s, however, the two sides began to diverge.

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The U.S. 2000 census illustrated that the population ofthe United States and western Europe are on very dif-ferent paths. The United States’ birth rate is rising,while western Europe's is falling. United States’ immi-gration outstrips Europe's and its immigrant popula-tion has a higher birth rate than native-bornAmericans. The United States’ population will soon begetting younger; Europe's is aging.

Behind this change lie demographic patterns with pol-icy implications. The percentage of children inEurope’s population is declining as the populationages. In 1985, United States and Europe had more orless the same proportion of the population youngerthan 14 years of age (around 20 percent). By 2020, theproportion of children in western Europe will haveslumped to 13.7 percent. In the United States it willstill be 18.6 percent. This may have long-term effectsfor European society, economy, and defense. Citizenssee their generous social safety net being unwound byglobalization when they need it most. Competitionfrom younger, less financially stable eastern Europeancountries may be less attractive. These realities willaffect not just expansion, but also future security.

Europe’s Muslim population is growing. Althoughmany Americans misunderstand and are far-removedfrom Islam, its presence is more prevalent in Europeancountries. The 15 million Muslim citizens of the EU(five times as many as live in the United States) arebecoming a political force. Nearly two-thirds of thispopulation resides in France and Germany. This demo-graphic may help explain the notable differencebetween continental Europe’s stance on the MiddleEast and that of the United States.

Europe’s Muslims are transplants from various coun-tries, who display diverse religious tendencies, butshare one common denominator with the Muslimworld: their sympathy for the Palestinians. Unlikemost of their Middle Eastern counterparts, growingnumbers of European Muslims can vote in legitimateelections. These outcomes affect European policytoward the United States and the Middle East.

Europe’s failure to fully and carefully integrate immi-grants into their society has created a cultural clash.Further, terrorist attacks in Spain and hate crimes in theNetherlands have rattled European perceptions of Islam

and their own commitments to liberal immigration pol-icies. While politically, the EU is forced to take noticeof the Muslim minority, Europeans may turn moreinward and defensive versus the American policy to actoffensively. U.S. counter terrorism policy may putincreasing pressures on the transatlantic alliance.

Potential Wildcards■ 1,000+ casualty terrorist event in the EU changes

its perspective on offensive operations;■ Persistent small Islamic attacks create widespread

anti-Islamic movements in the EU reinforcingperceptions of a clash of civilizations with theWest; and

■ Tightening of EU membership stalls democraticmovement in Belarus, Ukraine, and the Caucasus.

EURASIA

Peaceful revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine haveshown Eurasia that democracy is possible. However,the region has a volatile mix of valuable resources, badgovernance, and Islamic extremism. Much of theinstability in Central Asia and the Caucasus is theresult of the break up of the Soviet Union and the leg-acy of Soviet policy that dispersed ethnic groupsacross borders to prevent secessionist movements.Governments in the region are largely authoritarian,and generally demonstrate little interest in improvingoverall living conditions of its citizens. Declining gov-ernment services have decreased living standards.Additionally, disputes over oil reserves in the CaspianBasin have created competing political and economicinterests in the region. The growing youth population,drug trade, and rise in insurgent groups may also con-tribute to creating an atmosphere ripe for conflict. U.S.military presence is likely to increase in the region toassist in containing terrorist operations that may spillover from Afghanistan and Iraq.

The most significant success in the region has been thecompletion of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipelinefrom the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean throughAzerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey. This is seen as one ofthe most important oil pipelines in the world because itlinks the West to the newly discovered Kashagan oilfield off the coast of Kazakhstan. Kashagan is the larg-est oil field discovery in the past 20 years.

65



Another central Asian threat comes from a mixture ofdespotic leadership and expanding trans-regional ter-rorist movements. Heavy-handed dictatorships inUzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan may beencouraging Islamic movements that use popular dis-content to further their ambitions. The remnants of theIslamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), an al Qa’idaaffiliate, have been the most dangerous. Much of thegroup’s support was killed in Afghanistan; however,the IMU will likely regroup in the near term. Theremaining IMU faction has been linked with otherregional groups such as the Mujahidin of Central AsiaGroup, led by former IMU members. Many of themembers graduated from the same training camps inTajikistan, Pakistan, and Afghanistan before 11 Sep-tember 2001. Another fundamentalist Islamic move-ment, the Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami (TB), seeksimplementation of pure Islamic doctrine and the cre-ation of an Islamic caliphate in Central Asia. By oneestimate there are more than 10,000 followers in theregion. Several local governments have banned theorganization and jailed many of its adherents.

While these authoritarian regimes concern the UnitedStates, China has encouraged partnership with thesegovernments though the Shanghai Cooperation Orga-nization (or SCO). Crackdown on extremists helpedcut the ties that China’s Muslim Xingjian populationhad to the region. China has also made significantmoves to secure resources across the region, includingin Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.

All of these factors contribute to Russia’s powerdecline in Europe and central Asia. Moscow stillattempts to influence it, though it is losing power. Rus-sia will continue to pursue its development of a heavy-handed, centrally controlled democracy. Demographicpressures and the population decline in Russia mayundermine its potential as a nation.

Potential Wildcards■ Increased competition for oil creates friction;

■ Central Asia is destabilized by revolutions andIslamic extremism; and

■ Aging authoritarian regimes clash with globallyconnected democratic movements

LATIN AMERICA and the CARIBBEAN

Latin America’s corruption, crime, income disparity,and economic reform will continue to challenge itsgovernments. Globalization has also made many in thepopulation apprehensive. Financial collapses of Mex-ico and Argentina in the last 10 years have made popu-lations wary of what many see as the Americansystem. Ultimately, improving civil-military relations,governance, and creating economic growth will be keyto maintaining stability.

Poor governance across Latin America has made itspopulation desperate for change. These feelings havecreated a significant political trend. In South America,many are voting old-line conservative parties out andgranting power to untested leftist parties and outsiderpolitical figures. In Mexico, a leftist party that hasnever governed nationally leads the polls in the 2006presidential race. With the exception of Venezuela,these new governments are not taking extreme eco-nomic measures (such as nationalization) and appearto be progressing toward democracy. However, manyreflect growing Latin American attitudes of suspiciontoward the United States because many of the old par-ties had been supported by the United States.

The U.S. labor market is one of the most importantassets to Latin America. The economic influence ofmigrants (legal and illegal) is undeniable. The Inter-American Development Bank estimates that migrantssent more than US$45 billion to Latin America and theCaribbean last year, exceeding foreign investment andofficial development assistance for the third year in arow. Mexico received some US$17 billion in remit-tances, almost twice what it received 4 years ago.Immigration is the lifeblood of many hometownsacross the region. Smuggling (humans, materials, anddrugs) is a lucrative business. However, this growingblack market and its associated crime is threatening toundermine many Latin American countries.

The newest threat to Latin America stability comesfrom an unlikely source: youth gangs. Although esti-mates vary, experts believe that there are now nearly100,000 gang members across Central America andMexico. In 2003, the United States deported more than2,100 immigrants from the Dominican Republic with

66



criminal records and nearly 2,000 from El Salvador.The U.S. government does not track how many ofthese criminal deportees are gang members, but manyLatin American states see a connection and reportgangs are now one of the biggest threats to theirnational security. The countries that receive the depor-tees are usually ill equipped to handle the large num-ber of returning gang members. In 2003, Honduras, ElSalvador, Guatemala, Panama, and Mexico agreed towork together to find solutions to the challenges gangspose. Gangs, such as Mara Salvatrucha -13 (MS-13)which has had hundreds of members deported, con-tinue to illegally migrate back and forth, often carryinggoods or people.

Many fear that gangs are now linked with drug cartels.Gangs such as MS-13 have been implicated in massa-cres that authorities describe as a means of intimidationby drug cartels from Colombia and Mexico. Officialssuspect that the youth gangs are now acting as profes-sional killers and couriers for the drug cartels. If true,an alliance between the desperate, populous CentralAmerican youth gangs with the power and wealth ofthe drug cartels would be significant. This may meanthat Honduras, one of the poorest countries in theAmericas, would fall to criminal syndicates.

The Latin American drug trade into the United Stateswill continue to center around Columbia and Mexico.Numerous smaller cartels and independent traffickershave replaced the large Medellin and Cali cartels,complicating efforts to reduce trafficking becausethese groups work in teams of 10 to 20, adopt conser-vative lifestyles, and use legitimate businesses asfronts. As of mid-1998, the Colombian police countedsome 43 independent trafficking groups. In Mexico,the drug trade is beginning to undermine the legiti-macy of the state. Increasing drug violence, much of itnear the U.S. border, coupled with increasing evidenceof government corruption has worried Mexico’s elite.Mexico’s growing lawlessness and key role in smug-gling illegal goods and humans into the United States,makes it a growing national security problem. It isonly a matter of time before terrorists use these corri-dors to come into the country.

International Islamic terrorism has a presence in LatinAmerica. The tri-border area (the region where Argen-

tina, Brazil, and Paraguay meet) is an unlikely area forfuture planned operations for several reasons. Theeconomy of this tri-border area is dominated by smug-gling contraband, pirating music/software, and laun-dering money from cocaine sales. Much of this illicitmoney has been used to support anti-Western terroristgroups throughout the world, including Hizballah andHAMAS. Because of this, operatives are careful not toattract too much attention. Argentinian officialsbelieve that planners may have moved to the remotejungles of Brazil; to Brazil's financial capital, SaoPaulo; and west, to the free-trade zone of Iquique inChile's northern desert.

Terrorism is a concern for Latin American countries.However, domestic terrorism is more related to crimeand insurgencies than international jihad. Bombingcampaigns in Bogota and gang-related massacres inHonduras were intended to create fear and intimidation.This type of terrorism is used to cast doubt on the legiti-macy of the state, and will continue to be the most dan-gerous form of warfare to Latin American governments.

Relations between the United States and Venezuelahave been deteriorating. President Hugo Chavezblames the United States for the coup attempt againsthim in August 2002. Chavez’s alleged support ofFARC insurgents and ties to Cuban dictator Fidel Cas-tro have further strained relations. Venezuela is vital toworld energy markets; it holds the largest proven oilreserves in the Western Hemisphere (77.7 billion bar-rels) and ranks fifth in the world. Oil accounts forabout half the government revenues, and the UnitedStates is the single largest consumer of Venezuelanpetroleum. President Chavez’s efforts to nationalizeand his proposed land reform are only possible withthe income of higher gas prices. Without oil income,Chavez actions would be economically devastating.

Venezuela is also becoming an agent of instability inthe region. In Venezuela, the Chavez administrationhas created paramilitary groups called the BolivarianCircles. They are used to repress the opposition andserve as watchdogs of his movement. These groupsroutinely threaten, beat, and kill political opponents. Inaddition, Venezuelan officials are accused of providingoperational support to FARC elements operating alongthe Colombia-Venezuela border and ignoring their

67



presence in Venezuela. Venezuela’s recent order of100,000 AK-47s has made many nervous. Bolivia wasthrown into chaos by radical protesters, who want thecountry's gas industry nationalized. The United Statesbelieves that elements of Bolivia’s opposition are sup-ported and financed by Venezuela's government.

However, instability affects not just those countriesrelated to Venezuela. In April 2005, Ecuador's presi-dent was deposed by congress amid growing protests,and in Haiti a UN mission is struggling to organize anelection amid gang warfare and kidnappings. Insur-gencies continue to threaten Colombia.

Marines can expect to support counter drug and insur-gency efforts to foster strong democracies in theregion. With its poor governance and corruption,Latin America will continue to face challenges ofcrime and poverty.

Potential Wildcards

■ Growing crime gangs destabilize Central Amer-ica; and

■ Homeland terrorist attacks conducted withLATAM criminal assistance.

MIDDLE EAST and NORTH AFRICA

Although U.S. interests in the Middle East include oiland terrorism, it will likely be the issue of governancethat defines the future stability of the region. It is not agood time to be an autocrat in the Middle East. Sincethe colonial period, kings and “national liberation” par-ties that took power have clung ruthlessly to office. Thispower is now effectively under attack from all sides.

Muslim extremists, spurred by the GWOT, are clamor-ing to gain Islamic states; while an increasing youthpopulation, disenfranchised with stagnant economiesand empowered by access to satellite television, cellphones and the internet have grown increasingly rest-less. Middle East governments, notably Saudi Arabia,Egypt, Iran, and Syria will continue to experienceincreasing internal challenges to their authority. Eco-nomic stagnation, government corruption, and poorhuman rights records will continue to characterizeregional governments. Leaders do not want to lose

power by introducing democracy. The United Statesand its Arab allies therefore will struggle in a sort ofreform bargaining. Most of the region’s autocraticgovernments, from the Arabian Gulf to Morocco, arenow publicly supporting some means of politicalreform and democracy while straining in private toensure that their version of democracy denies the peo-ple a means to dispose of the current leadership. Thistension will likely create unexpected changes in gov-ernments that the United States cannot predict.

Frustration has arisen from dissatisfaction with theregion’s political economy over the past 30 years.Today, 20 percent unemployment or more is common.In Kuwait, Qatar, and UAE, per capita GDP hasdeclined over the last 3 decades. Much of this stagna-tion is a result of overreliance on oil and a populationexplosion. Sixty percent or more of the Middle East’spopulation is younger than 30. In the Gulf States, 43percent of the population is younger than 15. Many ofthe young have turned their backs on the secularbeliefs of their parents, since much of the moderniza-tion in the 1970s and 1980s failed to deliver economicbenefits. These frustrations have highlighted theIslamic population’s struggle to find its place in the eraof globalization while creating an unpredictable back-lash against modernity. Ironically, the tools of global-ization have empowered this movement.

Nowhere else has global communication had such aneffect on the power structure of a region. It is not loston many that the satellite stations, such as Al-Jazeera,speaks more for the average person in the region thanany government. The population of the Middle Eastcan transmit ideas uncensored for the first time thoughweb journals, home pages, and text messaging. Muchof this will be anti-American.

The U.S. image in the Middle East is poor. Widespreadbeliefs that the reason for the invasion of Iraq wasdriven by oil from the onset, along with images fromAbu Ghraib prison have significantly underminedfuture U.S. credibility with the population. Websitesand satellite television have endlessly compared theimages of the United States in Iraq with the otherinflammatory issue in the region, Israeli military oper-ations in Gaza and the West Bank. As such, new future

68



governments or regimes may keep their distance fromthe United States in the short term.

The security environment in Iraq is too dynamic topredict at this point. However, many will analyze thelessons of U.S. intelligence gathering and guerillawarfare tactics for the next 10-15 years. Failure tofind WMD in Iraq will have a negative effect onfuture counter proliferation actions; the main benefi-ciaries of this failure will be Iran and North Korea.Due to extensive and detailed media coverage of theIraq war, many countries are closely studying U.S.opposition tactics.

Iraq is also important to neighboring Iran and Syria asit is seen as a means to check U.S. power in the region.While neither country would like to see Iraq fall intocivil war, both see benefits in the U.S. military beingengaged in a prolonged battle against insurgencies.Both countries believe that if Iraq becomes peaceful,U.S. forces will then move to overthrow their regimes.

Iraq will also have a significant effect on the countriesthat are now seeing their populations join the insur-gency against the United States. Jihadists, who comehome from Iraq, will likely use their new skills toattack their own governments. This was the experienceof Jihadists returning from fighting Soviets in Afghan-istan. Governments of Syria, the Gulf states, and SaudiArabia will have to face extremists who will attempt tocontinue their campaign at home, creating instabilityin already weakened regimes. The impact from Iraqwill affect the political landscape for generations.

Regionally, Iran’s power has strengthened as the Shi’ahave been liberated in neighboring Iraq, and Iran-sup-ported Hizballah has shown itself as a power player inpost-Syria Lebanon. However, perceived threats fromthe United States will lead Iran to continue its nuclearprogram. To complete the program, Iran needs time.Open provocation with the United States is unlikely,thus, deterring Iran from continued funding and directsupport to terrorist groups will remain difficult.Whether Israel will allow another regional nuclearpower is questionable. However, public outcry from aunilateral Israeli strike against Iranian nuclear sitescould create instability in the region.

Iran has a strong undercurrent of support for Westernideals. Any crisis, such as an earthquake or a majorterror attack in Tehran, could create a massive desireto look to the West. However, any perceived hint ofUnited States intent to overthrow the governmentwould destroy pro-American sentiment instanta-neously. Any change of government would haveimplications with Shi’a populations across the region.

Lebanon will continue its slow road to democracy. Therecent evacuation of Syria (see Countries of Interest)from Lebanon has inspired many in the region. How-ever, elections in 2005 gave a strong showing of a pro-Syrian presidential candidate shocked many whothought Lebanon would reject any Syrian influence.While he was ultimately defeated by a coalition, it isclear that Syria is not through influencing Lebanesepolitical life.

No issue is more divisive in the Middle East than theIsrael-Palestinian conflict. Israel’s unilateral pulloutfrom Gaza and consolidation of West Bank settlementswith security walls may ease security problems. How-ever, Israel will face strong internal dissent that mightundermine that plan. The death of Arafat has opened anew path toward a two-state solution. With successfulPalestinian elections, the Middle East peace processtook its first steps in 5 years. However after 4 years ofIntifida and Arafat’s complete mismanagement of Pal-estinian funds, the Palestinian authority (PA) is stilldangerously weak. The lawlessness in the territoriesduring the Intifida created several armed factions thatwill not be co-opted easily.

The prospect of a Palestinian civil war should not beruled out. Religious parties, such as the terrorist groupHAMAS could gain power due to an image of notsuccumbing to corruption and being a provider ofsocial services where the PA could not. With Israelpulling out of Gaza, HAMAS’ stronghold, this will bethe first time HAMAS will have the opportunity tolegitimately hold political power. However, Gaza isdistinct as being one of the world’s most densely pop-ulated places and 75 percent of its population isyounger than 30; governing Gaza could be difficult. IfHAMAS is successful, it will likely strengthen reli-gious parties in the West Bank. Some experts worry

69



that if HAMAS can take control in Gaza, religiousmovements might spread back into Egypt.

In the Gulf, Saudi Arabia poses the most significantrisk to the United States economy and homeland.Saudi oil has given the kingdom influence bothregionally and internationally. The United States hadserious concerns with the Saudi population after 11September 2001. Researchers and academic terroristanalysts have questioned if jihadists leaving SaudiArabia for Iraq resemble the makeup of the 15 hijack-ers of 11 September 2001. If this is true, Saudi Arabiacontinues to have a problem exporting violent extrem-

ists from its middle class, which threatens not just theregion, but the world as well.

Potential Wildcards

■ Civil war in Iraq;

■ Stable, sovereign democracy in Iraq;

■ Revolution in Iran;

■ Possible Israeli unilateral response to Iran nuclearprogram; and

■ Saudi Arabia falling into extremist hands.

70



Appendix:STATES OF INTEREST

As the United States engages in the Global War onTerrorism, the U.S. Marine Corps engages in a spec-trum on conflict. As illustrated by the major regionalcontingencies to which Marines have responded inAfghanistan and Iraq, to the more traditional humani-tarian operations conducted in southeast Asia for tsu-nami relief, the Marine Corps must be prepared torespond to an array of contingencies.

The following pages list the 20 states of interest thatrepresent a wide range of potential future securitychallenges for the Marine Corps. There are two com-ponents to each summary: a country write-up and aliklihood ranking of six Marine Corps missions. Thecountry write-ups highlight the cultural, demographic,economic and political challenges facing many statesand regions. The mission liklihood rankings aredepicted by color-coded icons (quantitatively analyzedand ranked). These icons represent mission likelihood,based on an independent, data-driven methodologythat assessed the conditions for possible Marine inter-vention or assistance in the selected countries.

Each country discussed in this section is a concern tothe Marine Corps with regard to that region’s stability;they are also illustrative of the previously addressedinstability factors. Each country write-up highlightsthe issues that MCIA analysts believe are creatinggrowing concerns within each state, and in manycases, symptomatic of the region. This section isintended to provide a more specific look at some of theissues highlighted in the regional assessment. Indepen-dent of the analyst write-up, each country was quanti-tatively analyzed and indexed to judge the likelihoodof Marine Corps missions, specifically:

■ Major Regional Contingencies,

■ Counterinsurgency Operations,

■ Combating Terrorism,

■ Non-combatant Evacuation Operations,

■ Humanitarian Operations, and

■ Peacekeeping Operations.

In creating the liklihood ranking, the following meth-odology was employed to determine the likelihood

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that U.S. Marines will be participating in each poten-tial mission:

■ A quantitative analysis, based on a survey dataset, helped create a predictive index that rankedthe likelihood of Marine Corps mission require-ments for each country.

■ An analysis of political considerations not cap-tured by the quantitative index was incorporated.

A three-color system is used in this section to symbol-ize the relative likelihood of a mission type to berequired: red (likely), yellow (possible), green (low).These indicators are meant as a secondary assessmentoutside of the analysis used in the text.

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AFGHANISTAN

Afghanistan is supported by a combination of Westernaid and Western drug use. While its population has madesignificant strides in creating a new government, decadesof war and internal conflict have heavily damaged theinfrastructure and left an abundance of small arms andexplosives in the country. Warlords maintain substantial— and now constitutionally guaranteed — political influ-ence over the central government; even though their mili-tary influence is waning due to the growing AfghanNational Army. Nevertheless, insurgents are still activelytargeting soldiers, aid workers and counter narcotic activ-ities where possible. Afghanistan may be marginally bet-ter off than it was under the Taliban government, butKabul still relies on external support.

The priority challenge to Afghanistan is drugs. As theworld’s top heroin producer, few elements of its soci-ety are not influenced by some aspect of the drugtrade. Criminal networks have supplanted the agricul-ture system with poppy-based opiates and heroin, andthe drug trade is intimately connected to the financingof the insurgency and terrorism. While poppy cultiva-tion is down significantly this year, analysts remainskeptical that this indicates any long-term change.Many attribute the drop to new, inexperienced poppyfarmers planting in unfavorable soil and in places tooremote and inaccessible, even for drug traffickers. Thedrop could also be a form of market manipulation tocreate higher street prices. Afghani opium buyers areknown for being savvy at manipulating the market inthe past. While the Afghan government has progressedin its counterdrug effort, it must still balance internaleconomic realities with external counterdrug demands.

Drug funding allows warlords to finance personal andethnic patronage networks without giving credit to thegovernment. In the 3 years since the Taliban's demise,many people have been barely touched by the centralgovernment, and are instead exposed to factional vio-lence, drug lords, and bandits. Nascent democraticinstitutions are still fragile, and their success dependson the survival and effectiveness of President Karzai.Any transition from Karzai leadership would be diffi-cult, and his unexpected death could be catastrophic.Ethnic tensions still threaten Afghanistan’s power

structure and could cripple the future national assem-bly, as well as slow progress toward becoming a pro-Western democracy.

In addition to internal ethnic discord, tensions persistwith neighboring Pakistan and Iran. Many who live inthe historically ungoverned Pakistan territory border-ing Afghanistan are ethnically and religiously sympa-thetic to the Taliban and terrorists, for whom theyprovide a safe haven. This concerns the leadership inKabul. At the same time, Afghanistan’s historicalclaims to a greater “Pashtunistan” hamper improvedrelations with Pakistan.

The Afghan government cannot function withoutinternational humanitarian and coalition military assis-tance. However, this might become a liability as thegovernment attempts to assert its control. In general,Afghans support the U.S.-led presence in the country,but are beginning to protest and campaign for troopwithdrawal. The challenges for Afghanistan will be toremain stable, lessen its Western dependency, and con-tinue to reject extremism.

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ALBANIA

As Europe’s poorest and least-developed nation, Alba-nia has rampant corruption, a weak central govern-ment, and a failing infrastructure. Over the past 10years, Albania has endured state failure, extreme pov-erty, and widespread violence. Although it has notexperienced the ethnic conflict that undermined therest of the Balkans, Albania continues to lag far behindits European neighbors.

Albania’s economy failed in 1997, when thousands ofAlbanians lost their savings in fraudulent investmentschemes. This led to public anger and rioting that causedthe complete breakdown of Albanian society. A multina-tional military deployed to restore order, but successiveweak governments failed to address Albania’s problems.

Conditions worsened in 1998, when fighting betweenSerbs and ethnic Albanians broke out in neighboringKosovo. The conflict resulted with millions of refu-gees fleeing to Albania, the Former Republic of Mace-donia, and other states. The unresolved status ofKosovo has contributed to the instability in Albania.

The government has sought to reduce violent crimeand spur economic activity and trade. Albania’s econ-omy has been growing at a reasonable rate. Inflationhas declined considerably in the last few years and theAlbanian currency has become fairly stable. Despitethis progress, Albania’s economic system is fallingfurther behind the rest of the region.

The lack of economic opportunity has created a robustblack market, with links to Russian and Balkan crimegroups, making the country a hub of criminal activityin Europe. Albanian syndicates control a sophisticatedsmuggling channel that transports people, heroin, andcigarettes. The country’s porous borders and sea routesto Italy (only 50 miles at the narrowest point) havecaused all of Europe to focus on strengthening Alba-nia’s security and stability.

Albania must resolve its internal issues to have anychance at political and economic prosperity. Futureflare-ups in Kosovo or Macedonia have the potentialto drag Albania into chaos. While Albania will con-tinue to make limited economic progress, it willremain Europe’s weakest link.

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BANGLADESH

Bangladesh is often associated with natural disasters.Poverty, extreme population density, and Bangladesh’slow elevation has made it susceptible to massive natu-ral disasters that have required U.S. military humani-tarian assistance and extensive internationaldevelopment aid. Bangladesh will likely continue torequire humanitarian assistance.

In addition to concerns about natural disasters, manyare troubled by the rise of radical Islam in Bangladesh.Bangladesh’s moderate and secular traditions arebeing eroded through divisive governance. The gov-ernment is dominated by two competing politicaldynasties with no history of peaceful transition. Ani-mosities between these two parties have led to misuseof government power and government ineffectiveness,which has created a power vacuum, being filled bystrengthening Islamic parties, particularly in theneglected countryside.

Religious opposition outside the two political dynas-ties is granted instant legitimacy. Bangladeshis oftenaccept a religious identity and reject secular politicsthat are proving ineffective. Experts warn that this isthe most dynamic catalyst for change in Bangladesh.

These trends led to fears that al Qa’ida’s influence isgrowing in Bangladesh. While public evidence ofdirect al Qa’ida links is scarce, Bangladesh has showntolerance to radical views. Two hard-line Islamicgroups are members of the current coalition govern-ment. These parties support the Taliban and runIslamic religious schools in Bangladesh that encour-age extremism and support for al Qa’ida. Both partieshave links to the militant group, the Harakat-ul-Jihadi-al-Islami - Bangladesh (HUJI-B). HUJI-B was formedin 1992, allegedly with financial support from Usamabin Ladin. The group has an estimated 15,000 follow-ers and reportedly recruits members from students ofBangladesh’s more than 60,000 madrasahs (school forteaching Islamic theology).

Fazlul Rahman, leader of the Jihad Movement ofBangladesh was one reportedly of the five signatoriesof bin Ladin’s 1998 fatwa, calling for jihad against the

Jews and crusaders. Though few, these groups havehad strong effects. The current coalition government,is unlikely to crack down too greatly on these move-ments for fear of initiating a transition to oppositionrule, brought about by a minority, but decisive IslamicParty political influence.

The powerful urban middle-class resents the funda-mentalists and dismisses them as irrelevant, and thegovernment, which is heavily dependent on foreignaid, tries to contain the extremists to avoid upsettingrelations with Japan and other powerful donor coun-tries. However, Bangladesh’s weak and incompetentgovernment will continue to attract Islamic radicalsfrom across Asia who seek training and refuge. With-out action this could destabilize an already weak state.

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CHINA

China presents a dilemma for the United States in thatit must be viewed as both an economic partner andpotential security concern. China’s future course aseither a partner or an adversary will largely be deter-mined by the evolution of its nationalism and political-economic system. Global involvement will play a keyrole in both of these areas.

Nationalism is an intrinsic part of China’s political andeconomic development. China’s leadership uses eco-nomic growth as one of its primary levers of influenceover the Chinese public. Without continued growth,the regime’s stability and legitimacy would be threat-ened. Apart from an economic downturn causing inter-nal unrest, there is an additional scenario that couldinterfere with the regime’s ability to maintain eco-nomic health. China’s current political-economic sys-tem is a delicate mixture of free-market capitalism,authoritarianism and socialism. Eventually, China’sleadership will be forced to reconcile its restrictivepolitical system with an open economic system; thereconciliation could be gradual and peaceful or abruptand disruptive. The push and pull of an increasinglyvaried set of interests within Chinese society will, to alarge extent, determine the pace of this process.Although many Chinese are benefiting from economicgrowth, there is a growing segment of Chinese societythat feels disenfranchised.

Should economic growth stall, Chinese leadership willlikely rely on nationalism to maintain control. Despitethe political regime’s efforts, communism has beenundermined by capitalism. Along with increased eco-nomic wealth, there has been a rise in ethnic groupidentification and religious expression, as well assparks of political expression. The sense that Chinawill inevitably ascend to world-power status is anothercomponent of modern-day Chinese nationalism.

Chinese leadership uses nationalism surrounding Tai-wan’s reunification as another lever of influence. Thelegitimacy of the regime rests on its ability to reunifyTaiwan with the mainland. In the view of the Chinese,reunification will optimally be achieved through

peaceful means. A forcible reunification would causesevere economic and diplomatic repercussions forChina. If Taiwan’s leadership were to declare indepen-dence, however, China would likely use military forceagainst Taiwan. Given the significance that both theleadership and populace attach to reunification, theregime would be compelled to force Taiwan capitula-tion through any means necessary. An alternative sce-nario for using force against Taiwan is that Chinalaunches an attack to bolster nationalism in the face ofmassive internal unrest.

In the event of a cross-strait crisis, the United Stateswould be faced with a potentially lethal Chinese mili-tary threat. Since the late 1990s, the Chinese havesought to modernize the People’s Liberation Army(PLA) through a variety of means; acquiring moretechnologically advanced and mobile weaponry,developing an indigenous defense industrial base, areevaluation of doctrine, a streamlining of the military,and improved professional military education. Mostimportantly, a fair mount of this modernization effortis geared toward exploiting potential U.S. vulnerabili-

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ties. While China will face a number of stumblingblocks, it is expected that China’s military moderniza-tion effort will grow, resulting in a force that is morecapable and technologically sophisticated by 2015.

Globalization will, to a large extent, continue to driveChina’s actions internally and externally. In responseto the demands of globalization, China’s society andpolitical system may become more open and transpar-ent. Externally, China will likely continue to fosterregional and global relationships.

COLOMBIA

Colombia is among the 10 most dangerous nations inthe world. Its on-going civil war between the govern-ment, two leftist insurgent groups, and a growing para-military organization provide devastating numbers: 2million refugees; 3,000 kidnappings per year (a worldrecord); and more than 40,000 people murdered.Colombia’s civil war is causing spillover into severalneighboring countries, as well as the United States.While Colombia is afflicted by corruption, poverty,and a legacy of colonialism, the intense violence thatColombia experiences is funded by a drug economythat provides more opportunity to the rural poor thandoes the state.

Drug production is a driver for corruption and vio-lence, and threatens to undermine the state. Colombiais the top supplier of cocaine to the world; 90 percentof U.S. cocaine comes from Colombia. Many inColombia, from politicians to insurgents, are associ-ated with drugs and its profits. Although official esti-mates of coca cultivation have fallen and the numberof seizures has risen over the last 5 years, prices con-tinue to decrease in Europe and the United States asworldwide demand grows. Improvements in logistics,productivity, and new growing areas may have com-pensated for aggressive eradication programs.

Drug trafficking has merged with the nearly 40-year-oldcivil war between insurgents, paramilitary groups, andthe government. Of the three main warring groups, theRevolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) isthe oldest, largest, best-funded, and most internationallyrecognized and supported insurgent organization inLatin America. While its 17,000 members declare a

communist ideology, in practice, FARC has become ahybrid rebel/narco crime syndicate that challenges thedefinition of traditional insurgencies in Latin America.Its leftist ideals (and crime cash flow) has made it aregional actor with ties to indigenous dissidents inBolivia, Ecuador, Peru, Paraguay, and direct govern-ment ties with Cuba and Venezuela. The FARC evenhas an international committee that travels to variouscountries to recruit, solicit aid, promote its cause, andwiden its tactical knowledge. More than 65 percent ofthe FARC’s funding is from drug cultivation and trade.

Bogotá’s inability to stabilize the country has led tosignificant population displacements. Colombia’s civilwar has caused more than 2 million citizens to become

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refugees. Human rights reports suggest that about1,000 Colombians a day are forced to leave theirhomes and lands to save their lives. While many ofthese are internally displaced refugees, the porous bor-ders with Ecuador, Venezuela, Peru, Brazil, and Pan-ama, are attracting illegal crossings at an alarmingrate. The poorer countries of Ecuador and Panama,whose chronic political and economic problems, cou-pled with their inability to police their borders, areespecially vulnerable to increased economic and polit-ical instability caused by the influx of refugees.

Unless Bogotá quells corruption and strengthens gov-ernment services, Colombia will lack needed legiti-macy and its population will look to the drug economyfor support and opportunity.

ETHIOPIA

Ethiopia is one of the most diverse countries, bothgeographically and culturally, in its region. Its popula-tion is exposed to ethnic and regional conflict, as wellas crippling humanitarian problems.

Ethiopia is the only country in the Horn of Africa thatborders every other Horn of Africa country. Thenumerous ethnic groups combined with porous cross-border relations has resulted in a complex mix of reli-gions and identities. Ethiopia is evenly dividedbetween Christians and Muslims; relations between thegroups have generally been cordial. The governmentdiscourages religious extremism, but religious-ethnictensions may be one failed-government away.

Significant cultural, political, and historical differ-ences exist between highland peoples, who live in theheartland, and lowland peoples, who live in the south-ern and western parts of Ethiopia. To prevent the col-lapse of the state, a national party was created in whichregime-sponsored regional ethnic parties are subordi-nate. Prime Minister Meles has promoted a policy ofethnic federalism to decrease ethnic tensions by dele-gating significant powers to 10 semi-autonomousregional, ethnically based, administrative regions withthe hypothetical right of secession. Such decentraliza-tion might strengthen separatist groups such as theOromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the ethnic SomaliOgaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) who have

violently championed their self-determination. How-ever, even with this planned decentralization, succes-sion groups will continue to be brutally suppressed.

Ethiopia has been susceptible to multiple terroristattacks. Al-Ittihad al Islamiya (AIAI), a Somalia-basedterrorist group determined to unite the Ogaden regionof Ethiopia with Somalia, has been active in the coun-try since the mid-1990s. AIAI, along with the indige-nous insurgent groups OLF and ONLF, have carriedout kidnappings, assassination attempts, mining ofroads, and bombings of bars, hotels, and public build-ings. While Ethiopia appears to have remained freefrom terrorist attacks instigated by Middle Eastern ter-rorist groups, suspected AIAI ties with al Qa’ida couldlead to Middle Eastern group activity in the country.

Although terrorism is the focus of U.S. attention, theAIDS epidemic is of greater concern to most Ethiopi-ans. Ethiopia, usually identified with famine, has thethird highest number of HIV/AIDS infected people in

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the world. An estimated 3 million adults are infectedwith HIV, with almost half these cases in the capital,Addis Ababa. Since 2001, 1.2 million Ethiopian chil-dren have lost a mother, father, or both. It is an over-whelming problem for a poor country with a primitivehealth care system and large population. AIDS willdecimate key government and business elite, under-mining growth and discouraging foreign investment.Conflict has only contributed to the spread of the dis-ease in Ethiopia.

Ethnic strife, constant humanitarian crisis, and eco-nomic quagmires characterize not just Ethiopia, butthe region as well. If basic quality-of-life issues are notaddressed, Ethiopia, and many of its neighbors, willremain instable.

GEORGIA

Though Georgia has an ideal geography, climate, andnatural resources, it has a history of centuries of con-flict due to its religious and ethnic diversity. Its popu-lation is a mixture of ethnic backgrounds of peoplewho have been dominated, at one time or another, bythe Persians, Arabs, Turks, or the Russian empire.This has created multiple separatist regions with ties toregional actors. These factors establish a basis forfuture instability.

Many Georgians are prone to xenophobic attitudes,perhaps due to the country’s repressed, violent history.Its rural mountainous regions are dangerous and itsenvironment is harsh. The populace has existed as iso-lated clan societies for centuries. Conflicts between vil-lages and travelers are violent and common.

Georgia is a developing democratic country that lacksdemocratic tradition. Its repressed past as a formerSoviet republic is a major obstacle. Inadequate lawenforcement has contributed to a rise in corruption andorganized crime in government and non-governmentenvironments. In addition, economic conditions forGeorgian citizens are worsening, causing additionalpressure on the government.

Recent events have brought Georgia to the forefront ofthe Global War on Terrorism. The isolated PankisiGorge, located in northern Georgia, has historically

been a safe haven for al Qa’ida-linked extremistsusing the porous borders to flee nearby Chechnya. TheRussians have threatened to send forces into Georgianterritory to flush out the Chechen insurgents, increas-ing regional instability. An ill equipped and under-trained Georgian military is unable to meet thischallenge. Coupled with poor borders and contemptu-ous attitudes from the local population, controllingthese areas has proven to be a failing effort.

Georgia’s government has been too weak to establishterritorial sovereignty. Separatist regions prohibit uni-fication. In addition, outside countries, such as Russia,have impeded Georgia’s progression toward politicalconsolidation. This has economically affected Georgiaand the region as needed pipelines for Caspian Sea oilare held up or reconsidered.

With new leadership and a close friendship with theUnited States, Many Georgians are hopeful. However,regional conflict and cultural differences will likelykeep Georgia and the region from stabilizing soon.

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A-9



HAITI

Haiti is a Caribbean country with West African prob-lems. Most of its population can trace its roots toAfrica. Everyday life revolves around a culture andhistory that resembles more the African continent thanHaiti’s Latin American neighbors. Its demographicsand development also resemble Africa’s. Measure-ments of poverty, youth population, and life expect-ancy all rank Haiti with most of Africa, in the lowestquarter of countries; this is true of no other LatinAmerican/Caribbean country.

Improving Haitian life has proven nearly insurmount-able. In the past 10 years, U.S. forces have intervenedtwice and spent roughly US$1.4 billion in nonmilitaryaid, to little effect. Due to Haiti’s seemingly perpetualcrises, the possibility of U.S. force intervention and/orhumanitarian aid to Haiti is highly likely.

Since gaining its independence in 1804, Haiti has beenin political ruin. The Caribbean nation has lacked afunctioning democratic government for the past 6years. Coups and cronyism are the norm in Haiti, andthese self-defeating traditions will likely persist. InMarch 2004, rebel groups, protestors, and oppositionleaders removed then-President Jean-Bertrand Aristidefrom office in a rebellious change of government. Truedemocracy will likely elude Haiti for decades.

Haiti security situation is chaotic. Armed gangs/rebelsand former military groups control several of the capi-tal's sprawling slums without fear of repercussions.The National Police is incapable of providing a safeand secure environment for its people.

Haiti is prone to violent hurricanes and earthquakes,which devastate the island’s already poor infrastruc-ture and have killed thousands. Overpopulation has ledto deforestation, leaving the population vulnerable tothe effects of flooding and mud slides.

Due to its numerous problems, Haiti will not likelyfind its economic footing regardless of how much aidthe world pumps into the economy. External aid isessential in helping Haiti’s future economical develop-ment, but is a hindrance to becoming a self-sustaining

society. However, without external financial and mili-tary assistance, Haiti will remain in economic ruin.

INDONESIA

The archipelago of Indonesia does not lend itself toeasy governance or security. The country stretches for5,200 kilometers (3,200 miles) from west to east—fur-ther than from Los Angeles to New York, or from Lon-don to Baghdad. The archipelago contains more than17,500 islands. This makes border control next toimpossible. While the country is predominantly Mus-lim (the largest Islamic population in the world), Indo-nesia is home to myriad ethnic identities who speakseveral different languages. Quality of life varies radi-cally across the archipelago. Some provinces haveaverage incomes 12 times higher than others. Lifeexpectancy can vary by 13 years from one island to thenext. The population is transitioning to a democracywhile it recovers from economic collapse.

Over the past 6 years, Indonesia has undergone aremarkable transformation from near-dictatorship todemocracy. Despite this, Indonesians have little toshow for it. Since the economic collapse in 1996 andthe movement to democracy in 1998, Indonesia hasbenefited from only half the growth rate it averaged

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under dictatorship. At the same time, the unemploy-ment rate has nearly doubled. Economists estimatethat another 30 percent of the workforce is underem-ployed. These figures are climbing steadily as some 2million young Indonesians enter the job market yearly.

The newly emerging democracy has not yet thor-oughly overcome the traditions of corruption and inef-fectiveness. This feeling that progress has stalled isleading many, once secular, young Indonesians to radi-calize, and some liberal Muslims to turn orthodox.Indonesia’s social environment is ripe for recruitmentby non-state insurgent/terrorist groups who promiseopportunities the state failed to deliver. Violent groups(such as separatists in Aceh and Jemaah Islamiyaah),use the population’s economic, political, and socialfrustrations to support their antigovernment agenda.

If democracy fails, an ill-governed and impoverishedIndonesia might inevitably export terrorism, piracy,pollution, instability, and illegal immigrants to itsneighbors. It would also disrupt shipping in the Straitof Malacca, a transit point for a quarter of the world'sseaborne trade.

IRAN

The government of Iran feels threatened. Internally,calls for economic and social reform are increasingdespite the efforts by the government to improve theeconomy. Externally, the United States and its allieshem in Iran. The defeat of the Saddam Hussein’sregime removed a threat to Iran, but replaced it with asubtle, more powerful threat in the form of a fledglingdemocracy. The strengthening democratic government

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in Afghanistan similarly threatens the Iranian conser-vatives by serving as an example of the possibilities ofdemocracy. The West is also pressuring Iran’s allies,like Syria. Surrounded and almost completely isolated,Iran is digging in, expecting to be the next U.S. target.However, Tehran has a more immediate problem —the survival of its theocratic governance.

Demographically, Iran is a young country. In a popula-tion of 70 million, most (two-thirds) are younger than35 and, of those, almost half are younger than 14.Though the economy grew 6 percent in 2003, unem-ployment remains a problem. Sixteen percent of thepeople is officially unemployed, though the real figuremay be higher. At about 17 percent, inflation is risingfaster than wages. Though necessities, such as breadand potatoes, are heavily subsidized, many of theurban poor, whose monthly minimum wage is around$12, are in dire situations. It remains to be seen howlong a small group of aging clerics can impose its willfor a radical state on a predominantly educated societywhere 70 percent of the population has no memory ofthe 1979 Islamic revolution.

Maintaining regime legitimacy is, and will continue tobe, a problem. The 2004 elections resulted in a victoryfor the conservatives, after the Council of Guardiansdisqualified most of the reformers. As a result, onlyhalf of Iranians voted in the election, while not muchmore than a quarter of those in Tehran (population 8million) turned out. In contrast, the 2000 election hada 70 percent turnout. Western diplomats estimate thatbarely 15 percent of Iranians still support the rulingorder and a lifetime-appointed Supreme Leader.

Global communications are also affecting the popula-tion. Unlike the Arab Middle East, who are seeingchange led by Gulf State media channels, Iranians arebeing bombarded by Farsi programming from theworld's largest Iranian community outside of Iran: LosAngeles. The Iranians have also embraced the Internetwith online web logs (or blogs). From only a handful in2001, there are now an estimated 75,000 blogs; Farsi isnow the fourth most popular language for keepingonline journals. Such journals have been key in orga-nizing everything from earthquake relief to the 2003student protests. In a state that routinely shuts downpapers and journals, this forum for anonymous onlinediscussion has made the clerics understandably ner-vous and has created its own crackdown movement.

Whether secular or theocratic, Iranians are united intheir desire for the country to be acknowledged as aleading power, even the leading power, in the area.Nuclear ambitions fit into this goal. With Pakistan,India, and Israel all being nuclear powers, Iran sees itinsulting that the world believes Persians’ should not beallowed to have nuclear weapons. The clerics also see itas the only means to deter a U.S. invasion and buy sometime to undermine internal dissent. However, it wouldbe a mistake to believe that nuclear ambitions wouldevaporate with the removal of the clerics. Nuclearweapons are not an Islamic goal but an Iranian goal.

Currently, the government opposition seems to be stalled.High oil prices have allowed the cleric class to buy offenough critics or send them abroad. If the price of oildipped significantly, for example into the US$20 range,anger and frustration would likely again bring people outon the street. However, growing disillusion and knowledgeof opportunities online may overwhelm the influence ofpetrodollars. The clerics who rule from the revolutionknow that their power might die by a revolution.

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IRAQ

The outcome of war in Iraq will affect the region forgenerations. Creating a stable and sovereign Iraq willbe a challenge for Baghdad’s new leaders. The newlyforming government must establish a successful elec-tion process, combat terrorism, form a military,address Kurdish autonomy issues, and serve as a cen-tral front for jihadists fighting the United States andthe West. Iraq must rebuild itself from the ground-upincluding its own national identity. Today, the newgovernment is struggling to include all ethnic/religiousentities, address each of their key points of interest andmaintain the political structure. These difficulties arecompounded by factions that are not always concernedwith the best interests of the country. This precariousprocess of rebuilding basic governance while fightinga bloody insurgency will likely keep Iraq fractured andunable to assert its full sovereignty.

A weak central government is in the Kurds’ best inter-est. Kurds will exploit their current position as the sec-ond largest voting bloc in the Transitional NationalAssembly, to maximize leverage for their own agenda.The Kurds have not given up on autonomous controlof a greater Kurdistan in northern Iraq and possiblyareas of Iran, Turkey, and Syria. Kurdish autonomy innorthern Iraq can lead to conflict with one or severalof these countries, particularly Turkey.

The Sunnis may accept their minority status, renouncetheir claim to hegemony, isolate the more extremistand terrorist elements in their midst, and cooperatewith both the Shiites and the Kurds in the rebuilding ofIraq. Equally as likely, however, the Sunnis will con-tinue using violence and make the formation of a legit-imate, cohesive Iraqi body an unobtainable goal.

The need for security will ultimately spur ethnic coop-eration and determine the outcome of Iraq. The Iraqisecurity forces must first be able to maintain internalsecurity to assure the population that they can defendagainst insurgency and terrorism. The Sunni-led insur-gency has so far shown exceptional resilience, frustrat-ing both Coalition and Iraqi authorities. The Shi’itepopulation has relied on the fledging government forsecurity; however, it is unclear how long this will last.

Widespread Shi’ite on Sunni violence has beenavoided so far due to quiet cleric support of the elec-tions and leadership from Najaf. If cleric supportshifts, Shi’ite militias could spiral the country intocivil war over resources and past grievances. Foreignintervention and massive aid assistance are no guaran-tee of future stability.

Even if security is achieved, Iraq will need to protectitself from neighbors ready to influence its politics.Potential long-term U.S. basing will be highly unpop-ular with many Iraqis and the region. In the short term,oil resources will likely distort Iraq’s economic devel-opment and be a source of internal corruption.

LIBERIA

Liberia is at peace, for now, ending 14 years of civilwar in 2003. Africa analysts wonder how long Liberiacan remain calm. The fundamental flaws that pushedLiberia into failure persist and threaten not just thecountry’s progress, but the region’s as well.

Over the past few decades, Liberia has been in constantturmoil and its conflict has affected neighboring states.U.S. Marines have deployed to the country several

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times to evacuate Americans, provide humanitarianassistance, and help African peacekeepers.

Liberia is rich in resources. However, its wealth has notbeen used to improve the lives of its citizens. Proceedsfrom the country’s rubber, iron ore, exotic timber, dia-monds, and expansive merchant ship registry havebeen funneled into the bank accounts of Liberia’s elite.Charles Taylor, the notorious former president, referredto these national assets as his pepper bushes: alwaysthere for the picking. Unparalleled corruption remainssystemic to the population, not just the politicians.

Years of bloody tribal conflict have pitted the coun-try’s 17 ethnic groups, in various combinations,against each other. They will continue to cling to theseold rivalries until new national institutions emerge.Tribal violence will increase as different groupsjockey for power. The prolonged fighting has created apopulation of brutal fighters that will be hard to reinte-grate in the long term. Despite an extensive UN peace-

keeping mission, young Liberian soldiers with fewpeacetime skills, remain a threat to the greater region.

War has also created a refugee problem. The latestfighting caused a torrent of refugees to overwhelmMonrovia. A city of 250,000 in 1993, its populationgrew to more than 1.5 million by 2005, creating aquagmire of squalor, crime, corruption, and ethnic vio-lence. Further instability will likely push more peopleinto Monrovia, a city already at the breaking point.

Conflict threatens Liberia’s chances at stability. Ademocratic government has yet to be elected. Roadsare still impassable when it rains. Hospitals andschools are in ruins. Sanctions on diamond and timberexports have yet to be lifted. Soldiers have yet to bedemobilized. Former rebels have yet to be reinte-grated. The populace continues to rely on UN peace-keepers and international aid workers for protectionand basic needs.

MAURITANIA

The Global War on Terrorism has made Mauritania anew ally of United States. However, with three coupattempts in the last 2 years, Mauritania’s support maybe brief. Mauritania’s instability can be attributed to anunpopular leader, economic hardships, and ethnic ten-sions. Each of these factors ensures that terrorists willcontinue to use Mauritania as a safe haven.

The autocratic government that has brought Maurita-nia closer to the West could fall at any moment. Mau-ritania’s president has traded his public support for afriendship with the United States and Israel. The angryMuslim population and disgruntled military show nosigns of forgiving President Taya; more coup attemptswill likely occur. The next president will most likelybe more radical and less cooperative in the Global Waron Terrorism.

Mauritania’s instability is a result of economic stagna-tion. A combination of a lack of economic diversity,governmental corruption, high unemployment,increasing poverty rates, urbanization, and transform-ing arable land to desert have made Mauritania one ofthe world’s poorest countries. Mauritania’s capital,Nouakchott, was originally built for 30,000 people and

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now houses almost a million, many of whom live indire poverty. Due to Mauritania’s harsh desert climate,thousands of people who once were able to live off theland are now forced to move to overcrowded urbanareas where they often have no place to live and nomoney. While oil was discovered offshore in 2001,profits will likely go directly to the country’s elite,exacerbating the divide between the rich and poor.With little hope for a prosperous future, Mauritanianscould turn to extreme Islam and violent opposition thatthreatens much of the region.

The strict hierarchy between ethnic groups affects allaspects of Mauritanian society. A person’s educationlevel, profession, political beliefs, and income prima-rily stem from ethnic and tribal affiliations. Mauritaniastraddles a cultural divide between North Africa andsub-Saharan Africa. Political opposition, communityviolence, and coup attempts have been fueled by thisethnic discontent.

While the government has been focused on its internalproblems, terrorists have used Mauritania for fund-raising, smuggling, and recruiting. Vast amounts ofuninhabited land, porous borders, and a relativelysmall and under-equipped military have made thecountry a safe haven for terrorists. The United States’has helped train Mauritanians to combat terrorismthrough the Trans-Sahel Counter Terrorism Initiative.Despite this assistance, economic, political, and ethnicproblems will continue and probably increase, placingMauritania on the verge of turmoil.

NIGERIA

Blessed with fertile soil, an abundance of oil, and ahuge, energetic, talented population, Nigeria should bea picture of Africa’s success. Instead it is one of thepoorer countries and teeters on the edge of ethnic andreligious conflict while the state plunders resourcescompletely unchecked.

Oil supports and destroys Nigeria. Nigeria supplies10 percent of the oil consumed in the United States –slightly less than countries like Venezuela, Saudi

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Arabia, Mexico, and Canada- making it also impor-tant to U.S. interests. Since 1970, Nigeria hasreceived US$280 billion in oil revenues. Througheconomic mismanagement, graft, and theft, this vastfortune has been squandered. Like many Africancountries, Nigeria borrowed billions against futurecommodities revenues, putting itself deeply in debt.Nigerians are, on average, poorer today than when oilwas discovered. The effects of oil money and poorgovernance have undermined domestic industries,making Nigeria almost completely (95 percent)dependent on oil.

Nigerian society is complex with ethnic, religious,and political groups competing for wealth, land, andpower. The country is home to at least 250 ethnicgroups, many of whom clash regularly. Getting richhowever, is a uniting goal. Most Nigerians lack asense of national identity or civic pride. Even Nige-rians don’t trust one another. Harsh economic reali-ties have turned Nigerian cities into labyrinths ofovercrowded streets affected by crime, disease, pol-lution, and ethnic violence. Resulting corruptionand overcrowding have crippled municipal services.Firms wanting to set up in Nigeria must bring theirown infrastructure.

Despite all this, Nigeria has become an essentialregional power. Its military is an effective peacekeep-ing force, having deployed soldiers to Liberia, SierraLeone, and Sudan. Developments in Nigeria, whethergood or bad, political or economic, will echo through-out the region. Nigeria plays a lead role in increasinglyimportant African regional organizations such as Eco-nomic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)and the African Union (AU).

Nigeria will continue to be a concern to the UnitedStates over the next decade as its economic signifi-cance, social problems, and regional influenceincrease. The country will continue to gradually dete-riorate from the within. As the state decays, Islamicextremism will gain more of a foothold. However, itsstrong, somewhat democratic, federal government, inpartnership with its capable military, should keep thecountry moving forward.

NORTH KOREA

Technically, North Korea it is still at war with SouthKorea. The survival of its leadership is dependent onthe isolation of its people. For more than 6 decades, thepopulation has been taught to worship the Kim familyand despise America, Japan and South Korea, thescapegoats for all the country's woes. Any underminingof North Korea’s leadership may have disastrouseffects for the state. However, North Korea’s attemptsto retain power may only be delaying the inevitable.

North Koreans are the most isolated population in theworld. However, an indigenous population of some2 million ethnic Koreans live in China along the 877-mileborder and provides glimpses to the outside world thatcould eventually be destabilizing. A collapse of Kimfamily rule could cause a significant number of refugees

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A-16



to flee to neighboring countries. If this were to happen,U.S. forces could be called on to help with rebuilding andstabilizing efforts.

The contrasts across the Demilitarized Zone arestark. Average GDP per person in South Korea is atleast 19 times that of a North Korean. Given thesehuge differences, the South Korean governmentwants to reunify the peninsula gradually, startingwith economic measures that they hope will influ-ence North Koreans.

It is unlikely the North Korean government wouldaccept reform efforts that could end with reunificationunder South Korea. The solution to North Korea’sproblems seems obvious: join the international com-munity like other former communist countries, byabandoning the counter-productive policies of self-reliance and militarism. A significant change in courseposes a direct threat to the Kim regime, however, for itimplies something is wrong in a country where theleadership is considered infallible. It would requireKim Jong Il to renounce socialism, the Juche (self reli-ance) ideology, and the legacy of his father Kim IlSung (the “Eternal President”). In other words, resolv-ing North Korea’s crises requires that the Kim regimedismantle the foundation of its political legitimacy.Economic reform would inevitably lead North Kore-ans to realize that their closed world is not the socialistworkers’ paradise their leadership has long extolled.Should North Koreans glimpse the affluence of theirsouthern brethren, loyalty and support for Kim Jong Ilwould crumble.

The longer North Korea remains unchanged the moredifficult it will be to adapt its population to the outsideworld. North Korea requires nuclear proliferation andother provoking military actions to extort economicand humanitarian aid. Politically, opening up to marketreform is not an option. North Korea’s only economicassets are nuclear and missile technology, which ittrades for hard currency. Its aid-based strategy, how-ever, will eventually strain the patience of its benefac-tors. At any time, North Korea could lash out with asignificant arsenal of conventional and unconventionalforce capability.

PAKISTAN

Prior to the attacks on the United States on 11 Septem-ber 2001, Pakistan’s coups and nuclear testing hadresulted in sanctions that were ravaging an alreadydevastated economy and further weakening its mili-tary capability. Pakistan’s potential value to the UnitedStates increased significantly. Pakistan’s support forthe war on terrorism has been rewarded with billionsof dollars in debt relief. Sanctions were removed andPakistan’s GDP was jump-started. Military assistancepoured in. However, Islamabad is walking a tightropebetween Pakistan’s population and the internationalcommunity, which could affect future stability.

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The new direction of Musharraf’s government hasdetractors in its own ranks. While he is despised byIslamic extremists, his rule has unintentionally led totheir increased influence. Through a quarter of a cen-tury of intermittent military rule, Pakistan's generalshave nurtured the Islamists and their ideology of jihad.This provided them with a useful auxiliary force inAfghanistan and Kashmir. But Musharraf has gonefurther. In his efforts to create a viable and functioningdemocracy by eliminating corrupt secular party lead-ers, he inadvertently set conditions for unprecedentedcohesion of Islamic Parties and their subsequent elec-toral gains. Musharraf has succeeded in relegating theIslamists to the opposition by securing a slight major-ity among a broad multi-party coalition in the nationalassembly. However, the Islamic parties gained controlof two of Pakistan's four provinces. While they onlyrepresent 11 percent of the vote, their newly foundpolitical influence has challenged the secular, eliteclass that usually controls Pakistani politics.

While Islamabad’s pragmatic reconciliation with theWest and India is in the best interest of Pakistan, its popu-lation disagrees. Musharraf needs Western support andrealizes the futility of major combat with an Indian econ-omy seven times the size of Pakistan’s. Pakistani citizensdo not support the U.S.-led GWOT, but they do supportthe government’s backing of an anti-India insurgency inKashmir. The government knows that there is significantinternal discord among the five major ethnic groups, whoare unified only by the government’s pro-Islamic legiti-macy. Reconciling current foreign policy commitmentsthat are in conflict with the domestic populace will be thegreatest source of future instability.

Pakistan has a long way to go if it is to recover frommore than 5 decades of a poorly functioning democ-racy with sporadic military rule. Terrorist organiza-tions continues to recruit foot soldiers easily fromPakistan’s underserved poor, who are dissatisfied withlack of social services (filled instead by religious par-ties) and ineffective governance. For the first time, theMusharraf government has made inroads into previ-ously lawless tribal agencies on the Afghan border, butmuch of the territory is still available as sanctuary toterrorist and insurgent fighters.

Musharraf has moved Pakistan back into the main-stream of international society but may have strength-

ened Islamic parties in the process. Repeatedassassination attempts invite efforts to refocus Islama-bad overnight. Further, any U.S. homeland terroristattack based out of Pakistan would also place extremepressure on Islamabad that may not sustain domesticsupport. With such uncertainty, Pakistan’s new pathfeatures strong obstacles.

PHILIPPINES

The population of the Philippines is almost 91 percentChristian. Over the past few years, the Philippineeconomy has grown at a steady clip and its stock mar-ket seems to have moved toward recovery from the1997 Asian financial collapse. However, this recenteconomic growth has yet to be translated to the 5 per-cent Muslim minority isolated by a geographic separa-tion and historical discrimination. It is this reality thatwill make this region a continued hotspot in the GlobalWar on Terrorism.

The government is in financial crisis. Interest pay-ments on the national debt account for a third of allpublic spending. The budget deficit, despite muchbelt-tightening, came in at 3.9 percent of GDP lastyear. Taxes are not being effectively collected. Thegovernment will not be able get itself on solid finan-cial footing for the next 3 to 5 years. With the statecoffers empty, the Philippines has a weak central gov-ernment that is corrupt and haphazard in distributionof services. The small, Muslim population is uniquelyaffected by these problems.

The Philippine economy is marked by inequalities: inownership of assets, in income, in levels of technology,in production, and in the geographic concentration ofactivity. The National Capital Region (NCR), the regioncentered on Manila, contains 14 percent of the popula-tion and produces one-third of GDP. Income per head in2001 in the NCR, the richest region, was almost ninetimes that of the poorest region (the four provincesforming the Muslim autonomous region in Mindanao).An even greater disparity is evident nationwide betweenthe richest and poorest households. In 2000, the richest10 percent of the population had an income 23 timesthat of the poorest 10 percent. These statistics point to adangerous divide between rural and urban and in thecase of Mindanao, Muslim and Christian.

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The Muslim population is disadvantaged in terms ofpolitical and economic opportunities. Such familiesperpetuate this influence by building elaborate patron-age networks that function much as political parties doelsewhere. Any minority has a hard time creating thenecessary political machinery needed to work withinthis system. Under this type of system corruption flour-ishes, while minority political and ethnic oppositionmust look to other venues to express opposition.

Without political voice, radical groups have inroads toexploit tensions and create a public support base fortheir terrorist/insurgent activities. Such groups have

continued to survive the government’s aggressivecounter-terrorism efforts by establishing support net-works throughout Mindanao, and attracting financialand operational support from transnational terroristgroups and international donors.

Manila is attempting to pacify the Muslim regions;however, funding and resources are limited. Withouteffective economic and political reform, the Philip-pines will continue to struggle against terrorism.

SAUDI ARABIA

President Franklin D. Roosevelt cemented a relation-ship with the Saudi leadership that has lasted for threegenerations based on a need for oil. Internally, the AlSaud dynasty's monopoly of power has meant thatduring the 20th century, successive kings have con-centrated on modernization and on developing thecountry's role as a regional power, while holding thetitle as protector of the two holiest Muslim sites.However, the Saudi population sees a region reform-ing, while their monarch maintains nearly total con-

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trol of the government. Simmering resentment hascreated internal security concerns, stressing the cur-rent government structure.

Saudi Arabia’s long-term struggle to maintain internalstability of the kingdom requires more than counterter-rorism. Saudi Arabia’s population explosion is havinga major impact on its economy. Demographic pres-sures along with low oil prices caused the Saudi econ-omy to increased by only 1.6 percent annuallybetween 1990 and 2000, while growth in the country'spopulation grew at an annual rate of 2.7 percent duringthat time frame. A well educated and entitled middleclass was left with unexpected economic pressure; italso has the potential to become a danger not just tothe monarchy but a catalyst for global terror.

The monarchy has responded in unprecedented effortsto create jobs for tens of thousands of unemployed Sau-dis. The government has started an ambitious projectcalled "Saudization." The aim of the project is to shrinkthe country's inflated expatriate workforce, eventuallyreplacing it with Saudi nationals. The mismatchbetween the job skills of Saudi graduates and the needsof the private job market at all levels remains one of theprincipal obstacles to economic diversification anddevelopment; 4.6 million non-Saudis are employed inthe economy. However, Saudi Arabia’s Bedouin heri-tage, in which manual work is not honorable, impliesthat the program may fail. With oil prices rising contin-uously (analysts believe the kingdom breaks even atUS$22) Riyadh can literally buy time.

In early February 2005, Saudi Arabia took a small steptoward democracy, as men in and around the capitalvoted in the kingdom's first municipal election.Although the vote excluded women, it was the first inthe country that largely conformed to internationalstandards. The elections may lead to further reforms tothe Saudi royal family's absolute monarchy.

Predictions of the house of Saud’s fall have not beenrealized. But with a quarter of the world’s oil reservesand the religious center of Islam in the country, unex-pected failure of Saudi Arabia would be catastrophicto both the global economy and the Global War onTerrorism. While Saudi stability has defied critics,reforms and transitions can create change that carriesrisk for the world.

SYRIA

Syria is a country under a lot of pressure. Pressurecomes from Lebanon, where Syria’s troops wereforced out by an international consensus spurred bypopular protests. Pressure comes from Syrians beingable to see U.S. coalition troops across its Iraqi border.Pressure is coming from a young dictator who manybelieve has yet to fully take control of the country.

Like neighboring Jordan, Syria is ruled by a minor-ity. President Bashar Assad comes from the Alawi,which faces a 90 percent Sunni majority. Domesti-cally, President Assad is considered a weak presidentwho falters under pressure. His is systematicallyremoving internal threats from key positions withinSyria’s government; however, many of these key per-sonnel are influential and have loyal followers. Triballoyalty is more important than national loyaltythroughout the country.

President Assad is losing respect and confidence fromthe military because it is under funded. Syria caved tointernational pressure to withdraw troops from Leba-

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non. Syria lacks a plan to reintegrate the troops and itwill be hard to absorb them into a weak economy.

Syria’s prospects for long-term growth appear bleak.U.S. sanctions imposed on Syria have made the eco-nomic situation worse. Economic pressures from theloss of oil revenues, population growth, and uncer-tainty over the future of neighboring Iraq, have seri-ously strained Syria’s politics and made its populationrestless. The Iraqi conflict has the potential to radical-ize Syrian Islamist extremists who may use this as anopportunity to target Syria’s secular government anddisrupt the country’s stability. The movement towardIraqi Kurdish independence may encourage Syria’sKurdish population to demand greater political partici-pation in Syria. While Assad has attempted to pleaseall factions in Syria, emboldened groups could eventu-ally lead to conflict.

President Assad continues Syria’s commitment toregain the Golan Heights from Israel. The Israelis seelittle strategic need to vacate and have refused to leavebased on Syria’s support for international terrorism.Syria is in an increasingly precarious position betweenU.S.-supported Israel and U.S./Coalition-occupiedIraq. Syria also appears increasingly isolated from therest of the Arab nations.

Syria has looked to old friends through increased bilat-eral agreements with Iran and improved Pakistanitechnology transfers. There is speculation that Russiansurface-to-air missile purchases and recent chemicalweapons tests signal that the country is anticipating apotential invasion by U.S./Coalition forces. It is likelythat the Syrian government will try to wait until thepressure subsides.

UZBEKISTAN

Once an obscure outpost of the Soviet empire,Uzbekistan now stands as a critical location in theGlobal War on Terrorism. Located in the heart ofCentral Asia, north of Afghanistan, Uzbekistan pre-sents a dangerous mix of authoritarian rule and risingIslamic fundamentalism. A porous border, a rampantopium trade, and high-level governmental corruptionall add to Uzbekistan’s instability.

Despite these deep-seated issues, Uzbekistan seesitself as a regional power. It is at the geographic centerof the region and has the largest population: 25 millionout of 57 million in the five Central Asian states.Regional relations are not ideal; some Uzbeks regardthe Kazakhs and Kirgiz as their cultural inferiors. Alarge population of Uzbeks live in neighboring Kyr-gyzstan and Tajikistan, where they are discriminatedagainst openly. In addition to cultural issues, economicissues are also a point of contention with Uzbekistanand its neighbors. The country’s biggest problem,however, may be internal.

Uzbekistan's impoverished population is ruled by a sec-ular government that harshly suppresses any opposition.Numerous Islamic terrorist groups, such as the IslamicMovement of Uzbekistan (IMU), are finding willingrecruits among Uzbekistan’s disenfranchised. Funda-mentalist Islamic movement centers in the country'sdensely populated Ferghana Valley, which also juts intoand influences Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. The Islamfollowed in the valley is the highly conservative Wah-habi sect of Sunni Islam, which has ties to fundamental-ist groups in Afghanistan and the Middle East. Futureconflict in Uzbekistan is likely in the Ferghana Valley.

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Reform or regime change will likely come in a violentrevolution. Uzbekistan is a tribal-based society whereconnections to its ancient Turkic-Mongolian heritageremain strong. Western concepts, such as freedom ofspeech and freedom of association, are still foreignand threatening to Uzbekistan’s leaders. Regionaldemocratic reforms and exposure to global issues will

increase. As a result, friction will occur when theregion’s Islamic and increasing secular populationdemand rights and freedoms from a leadership steepedin 14th century political and cultural traditions. IfUzbekistan’s government were to fall to extremistforces, its central geography and significant popula-tion would have implications across the region.

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