marketpulse 2012 vol 1 issue 2 · © 2012 corelogic proprietary and conﬁ dential. this material...

1© 2012 CoreLogicProprietary and confi dential. This material may not be reproduced in any form without express written permission.

he latest economic data indicates that the U.S. economy is showing signs of

life. On the all-important labor front, employment increased by 243,000 jobs in January (see Employment Growth Figure), which was the largest increase since last spring when job growth was fi rming. The unemployment rate fell to 8.3 percent in January, down from 8.5 percent in December and 9.4 percent a year ago. Unemployment claims’ four-week average declined slightly to 376,000, which indicates continued improvement in the labor markets as of late-January. The slow and steady improvement in the labor markets has translated into an improved consumer outlook as refl ected in the University of Michigan’s consumer sentiment index of 75 in January, the fi fth consecutive increase, and now at its highest level since February 2011.

Data as of December 2011

The MarketPulse™

Some segments of the economy are faring better than others. Retail, which had been healthier than expected in late summer and early fall, began to weaken. Retail sales increased only 0.1 percent in December, and excluding volatile auto sales, core retail sales fell 0.2 percent, the fi rst drop since May 2010. The pull-back in sales was not a surprise as spending had been trending above fundamentals for several months. By contrast, manufacturing continues to recover nicely as industrial production, a leading indicator of future manufacturing activity, grew 0.4 percent, and new durable goods orders increased 3.0 percent, in December.

After reaching a post-recession high of 3 percent growth over the prior year, real per capita disposable income softened in early 2011 and, as of

Inside News

Overview Article 1-2

Feature Article 3-5

Chart of the Month 6

In the News 6

National Statistics 7

CBSA Statistics 7

State Statistics 8

Graphs and Charts 9-11

Housing Statistics (Nov 2011)

HPI YOY Chg . . . . . . . . . . . -4.70%

HPI YOY Chg XD . . . . . . . . -0.9%

NegEq Share . . . . . . . . . . . . 22.2%

Shadow Inventory 10/2011... 1.6m

Distressd Clearing Ratio . . . . 1.03

Distressd Discount . . . . . . . 36.8%

New Sales (mn) . . . . . . . . . . . 0.026

Existing Sales (mn) . . . . . . . 0.187

Mean Actv List Price ... $292,000

Active DOM Mean . . . . . . . . . . 182

Months' Supply Listings . . . . . 6.8

Closed List Price %Chg . . . -6.5%

Media ContactsFor real estate industry and trade media:

Bill [email protected] (212) 995.8057 (offi ce) (917) 328.6539 (mobile)

For general news media:

Lori [email protected](901) 277.6066

Volume 1, Issue 2

February 9th, 2012

THeaded in the Right DirectionBy Sam Khater

Cont...

EMPLOYMENT GROWTH ACCELERATINGMonthly Change in Nonfarm Employment in Thousands

-1000

-800

-600

-400

-200

0

200

400

600

Jan

-05

May

-05

Sep

-05

Jan

-06

May

-06

Sep

-06

Jan

-07

May

-07

Sep

-07

Jan

-08

May

-08

Sep

-08

Jan

-09

May

-09

Sep

-09

Jan

-10

May

-10

Sep

-10

Jan

-11

May

-11

Sep

-11

Jan

-12

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Jan 2012

© 2012 CoreLogicProprietary and confi dential. This material may not be reproduced in any form without express written permission.

2

The MarketPulse - Volume 1, Issue 2

in sales indicates sales are running fl at relative to a year ago. Distressed sales continued a seasonal increase rising to a 28.1 percent share, up from 27.1 percent last month, but still down from 28.9 percent a year ago. Short

sales continue to be the story in the distressed segment as the short sale share rose 9.5 percent in December, up from 9.1 percent in November and 7.0 percent a year ago. In December short sales were 50 percent of REO sales activity, up from 31 percent as recently as last March. At the other end of the scale, sales of homes priced above $1 million declined to 1.2 percent of all home sales, the lowest share since November 2009. While that slice of the market is small, it is a barometer of the sentiment and fi nances of the affl uent. Home prices continued their slow slide down in

November 2011, was contracting at a rate of -0.9 percent (see Disposable Income Figure). In addition to the weak economy and soft labor markets, income growth weakened because government transfers (such as social security income, unemployment insurance income, etc.) began to drop in 2011. Excluding government transfers, income grew 1.4 percent over the prior year as of November of last year. Although the growth rate has slowed, it is an encouraging sign that income excluding transfers (i.e., compensation) has stabilized the last few months.

Housing Stuck in Neutral

The real estate and housing fi nance markets remained stuck in neutral as sales declined slightly, prices declined slightly, but originations activity improved. In December, sales declined 4 percent to an annualized (but not seasonally adjusted) rate of 3.3 million. Although sales were down, the longer term six-month movement

December, dropping 4.7 percent from a year ago. Excluding distressed sales, prices declined only 0.9 percent. Overall home prices are down 33.7 percent since the peak in 2006, to the lowest level since March 2003.

Due to a large rise in rate-term refi nances, mortgage originations increased to $107 billion in September, the highest monthly level since December 2010. The surge in rate-term refi nances occurred among higher balance borrowers taking advantage of lower rates as the average balance for rate-term loans increased 7.1 percent to $251,000, the highest monthly increase in more than 10 years. Year-to-date September 2011 originations topped $675 billion, down 19.1 percent from $835 billion a year earlier. The average FICO score for purchase borrowers

was 735, compared to 755 and 764 for cash-out and rate-term refi nances, respectively, in September; the debt-to-income (DTI) ratio for purchase borrowers was 35.6 percent compared to 32.3 percent for refi nance borrowers. Both FICO

scores and DTI ratios for purchase and refi nance borrowers have not moved much over the last few months and the credit and debt box for loans remains as tight as it has been since the peak of the crisis.

End.

DISPOSABLE INCOME GROWTH DECELERATESYear-Over-Year Change

- 12%

- 10%

-8%

-6%

-4%

-2%

0%

2%

4%

6%

8%

Jan

-05

Ap

r-0

5

Jul-

05

Oct

-05

Jan

-06

Ap

r-0

6

Jul-

06

Oct

-06

Jan

-07

Ap

r-0

7

Jul-

07

Oct

-07

Jan

-08

Ap

r-0

8

Jul-

08

Oct

-08

Jan

-09

Ap

r-0

9

Jul-

09

Oct

-09

Jan

-10

Ap

r-10

Jul-

10

Oct

-10

Jan

-11

Ap

r-11

Jul-

11

Oct

-11

Income Income Excluding Transfers

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis Nov 2011

“The slow and steady improvement in

the labor markets has translated into

an improved consumer outlook…”


3


here are many drivers of home prices such as mortgage rates, leverage, and months’ supply

of homes available for sale. However, income is the most fundamental, important, long-term driver of home prices. Between the mid 1970s and very early 2000s, home prices and per-capita income increased in a very linear relationship, with prices never deviating by more than 16 percent above incomes through several real estate and business cycles (Figure 1). That relationship changed in the early 2000s, and by 2005 home prices were 50 percent above incomes, more than three times higher than any previous deviation1.

Home price growth in the 2000s was not supported fundamentally by income growth. Therefore, other conditions such as low interest rates and relaxed mortgage risk and underwriting standards, including the combination of lower down payment requirements, expansive debt-to-income underwriting, the use of silent seconds, and income/occupancy misrepresentation, may help to explain the housing bubble. While research exists on many of these topics, there is very little empirical analysis of income misrepresentation or exaggeration. Two research papers2 attempt to quantify the exaggeration of income. The papers used loan data for several hundred thousand

loans and concluded that income was infl ated by 20 percent by borrowers that used alternative forms of income documentation.

The Formation of a Mortgage Income Bubble?

The exaggeration of income can greatly stretch a borrower’s ability to afford the price of a home, which leads to the following question: was the real estate bubble ultimately driven by an exaggeration of mortgage loan income—an income bubble? Income exaggeration led to excessive unmeasured credit risk because it effectively made leverage appear lower and affordability appear higher than they really were. Moreover, risk

layering led to a further mispricing of risk, income exaggeration being one of the most important and critical factors in the ultimate sustainability of the borrower’s ability to pay. After controlling for loan type, occupancy type, debt-to-Income ratio (as understated for low- and no-documentation loans, also called “low doc” and “no doc”), LTV, FICO and geography, which are the primary mortgage risk factors, low-doc loans defaulted at over twice the rate of full-doc loans.

This research builds on the previous work performed on income exaggeration and analyzes over 64 million loans originated in the 2000s.

T

Blowing BubblesBy Sam Khater

Cont...

FIGURE 1: WITH THE EXCEPTION OF REAL ESTATE BUBBLE HOME PRICES HAVE A

STRONG CORRELATION TO INCOMEIndex: Jan 1976= 100

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

Jan

-76

Feb

-77

Mar

-78

Ap

r-79

May

-80

Jun

-81

Jul-

82

Aug

-83

Sep

-84

Oct

-85

Nov

-86

Dec

-87

Jan

-89

Feb

-90

Mar

-91

Ap

r-92

May

-93

Jun

-94

Jul-

95

Aug

-96

Sep

-97

Oct

-98

Nov

-99

Dec

-00

Jan

-02

Feb

-03

Mar

-04

Ap

r-0

5

May

-06

Jun

-07

Jul-

08

Aug

-09

Sep

-10

Oct

-11

Home Prices Per Capita Income

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis Nov 2011

Footnote

1 This comparison is for per capita incomes, which doesn’t adjust for the rise in inequality. A bett er measure of the disparity would be a comparison between median household income and prices, however a consistent income series back to the 1970s is unavailable. If the data for household income was available back to the 1970s, the gap between prices and income would have been much larger because of the rise in income inequality.

2 Lacour-Litt le, Michael “Taking the Lie out of Liar Loans”, August 2009 and Jiang, Nelson, Vytlacit “Liar’s Loan? Eff ects of Originati on Channel and Informati on Falsifi cati on on Mort-gage Delinquency”, April 2011.


4


FIGURE 2: INCOME BUBBLE BY LOAN TYPEAlternative Doc to Full Doc Infl ation Rate

Incomes were imputed from the CoreLogic loan servicing database that provide the number of loans, the average original balance, the note rate and the back-end debt-to-income (DTI) ratio. While the imputation is a rough measure of borrower incomes for many reasons, it serves as a useful proxy to gauge general trends3.

To measure the extent of income exaggeration we compare the imputed income for low/no-doc loans to the imputed income for full-doc loans, which serves as the benchmark because incomes are verifi ed and much less likely to be subject to misrepresentation4. In 2006, when the housing market peaked, the average income difference between imputed low-doc and imputed full-doc incomes (i.e., the extent of the income bubble) was 31 percent and for imputed no-doc loans the difference was 49 percent (Figure 2). The income bubble peaked in January 2007 at 41 percent for low-doc loans and in November 2006 at 66 percent for no-doc loans. After the peak, the income bubble dissipated quickly and was gone by the fi rst half of 2009. The greatest impact of the income bubble was in the middle part of the decade. While CoreLogic estimates of the income bubble are large relative to the two previously cited research papers, there are timing differences. When examining the same 2002 to 2007

period the papers examined, the CoreLogic estimate of the low-doc income bubble was 20 percent and

the no-doc income bubble was 30 percent, which are very similar to the previous research.

Was the Housing Bubble Driven by the Income Bubble?

The ability to exaggerate incomes and afford higher payments helped add fuel to an overheated housing market

and led to unprecedented home price acceleration (Figure 3). Regression analysis reveals that between 1976

and 1999, the level of income alone explained 98 percent of the level of prices and 66 percent of the change in home prices. However, during the 2000s income levels explained slightly over 50 percent of the price level, and the change in incomes only explained roughly 40 percent of the change in

prices—both very large drops from the previous three decades. When including the low-doc share of loans, a measure of the popularity of loans with infl ated incomes along with income in the regression for the 2000s, they explained nearly 80 percent of the price level (up from

Cont...

-60%

-40%

-20%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

Jan-

02

May

-02

Sep

-02

Jan-

03

May

-03

Sep

-03

Jan-

04

May

-04

Sep

-04

Jan-

05

May

-05

Sep

-05

Jan-

06

May

-06

Sep

-06

Jan-

07

May

-07

Sep

-07

Jan-

08

May

-08

Sep

-08

Jan-

09

May

-09

Sep

-09

Jan-

10

May

-10

Sep

-10

Jan-

11

May

-11

Low Doc Income Inflation No Doc Income Inflation

Source: CoreLogic August 2011

“The ability to exaggerate incomes and

aff ord higher payments helped add

fuel to an overheated housing market

and led to unprecedented home price

acceleration.”

Footnote

3 This is an approximati on of nominal income because, for simplicity, we assume the represented rate is for a 30-year fi xed rate mortgage (FRM) since the majority of loans are FRM. Even when approximati ng for FRMs only the same income trends hold. The income comparison to Census esti mates of household income are not an apples-to-apples com-parison because Census income esti mates are based on the stock of all households, while these esti mates are for the households that bought homes with mortgages. Moreover, the mix of home buyers changes over ti me as the economy shift s over ti me by geography, credit quality, income and other characteristi cs.

4 Under typical underwriti ng standards full documentati on loans include verifi ed income supported by documents such as paychecks, tax returns and employment verifi cati on. Low documentati on loans typically verifi ed the source but not the amount of income, and loans with no income documentati on only had informati on on assets and employment that were disclosed but not necessarily verifi ed. Alternati ve documentati on generally designates the combinati on of low-doc and no-doc underwriti ng.


5


pattern is expected to look like.

Conclusion

The income bubble of exaggerated incomes in mortgage loans clearly stretched borrowers’ ability to afford more expensive homes, which helped to support the infl ation of the housing bubble. Fundamental house price growth supported by income growth gave way to low interest rates and relaxed mortgage risk and underwriting standards layering risks. Income infl ation in mortgage loans was extensive, supporting borrowers’ affordability well beyond what was truly sustainable. Mortgage income bubbles sustained housing bubbles in many markets throughout the country and resulted in millions of distressed mortgages and underwater homeowners. The problem with blowing bubbles: they eventually pop.

50 percent for income alone) and 67 percent of the change in prices (up from about 40 percent for income alone)5. The presence of the infl ated income low-doc loans had a strong and positive infl uence on prices during the last decade.

The infl uence of the income bubble on the home price bubble can also be seen at the metro level (Figure 4) which compares three large markets and clearly shows the relationship between imputed incomes and home prices. Imputed incomes in Las Vegas and Miami rose 60 percent between 2003 and 2006, which was more than three times the increase in Dallas incomes. Imputed income in Las Vegas and Miami rapidly declined as the housing market collapsed, and by late last year Miami’s imputed income was about the same as in 2003. Las Vegas’ imputed income by late last year was 20 percent lower than 2003—which refl ects the fundamentally weaker

Las Vegas economy relative to Miami. The changes in home prices in the two bubble markets clearly mirror income movements. In Dallas, despite some volatility, there is slow upward trend to both incomes and prices over the decade, which is what a normal

FIGURE 3: LOW AND NO-DOC LENDING'S RISE CLOSELY MIRRORS HOME PRICE

BOOM/BUSTHouse Price Index Share %

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

45%

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

200

220

Jan

-00

Jun

-00

Nov

-00

Ap

r-0

1

Sep

-01

Feb

-02

Jul-

02

Dec

-02

May

-03

Oct

-03

Mar

-04

Aug

-04

Jan

-05

Jun

-05

Nov

-05

Ap

r-0

6

Sep

-06

Feb

-07

Jul-

07

Dec

-07

May

-08

Oct

-08

Mar

-09

Aug

-09

Jan

-10

Jun

-10

Nov

-10

Ap

r-11

HPI Low Doc and No Doc Share

Source: CoreLogic August 2011

Footnote

5 The analysis concentrates on low-doc lending because it accounts for the overwhelming majority of alternati ve documentati on lending. Low-doc lending only accounted for 35 percent of loans at the peak, compared to 5 percent for no-doc lending.

End.

FIGURE 4: HOME PRICE BUBBLES OCCURRED WHERE INCOME BUBBLES WERE

PRESENTLeft Axis: Imputed Income (ths) Right Axis: House Price Index

0

50

100

150

200

250

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

Jan

-00

No

v-0

0S

ep

-01

Jul-

02

May

-03

Mar

-04

Jan

-05

No

v-0

5S

ep

-06

Jul-

07

May

-08

Mar

-09

Jan

-10

No

v-1

0S

ep

-11

Las Vegas Income

Las Vegas HPI

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Jan

-00

No

v-0

0S

ep

-01

Jul-

02

May

-03

Mar

-04

Jan

-05

No

v-0

5S

ep

-06

Jul-

07

May

-08

Mar

-09

Jan

-10

No

v-1

0S

ep

-11

Dallas, TX Income

Dallas, TX HPI

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

Jan

-00

No

v-0

0S

ep

-01

Jul-

02

May

-03

Mar

-04

Jan

-05

No

v-0

5S

ep

-06

Jul-

07

May

-08

Mar

-09

Jan

-10

No

v-1

0S

ep

-11

Miami, FL Income

Miami, FL HPI

Source: CoreLogic Sept 2011


6


-30%

-20%

-10%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

Jan

-00

Jun

-00

Nov

-00

Ap

r-0

1

Sep

-01

Feb

-02

Jul-

02

Dec

-02

May

-03

Oct

-03

Mar

-04

Aug

-04

Jan

-05

Jun

-05

Nov

-05

Ap

r-0

6

Sep

-06

Feb

-07

Jul-

07

Dec

-07

May

-08

Oct

-08

Mar

-09

Aug

-09

Jan

-10

Jun

-10

Nov

-10

Ap

r-11

Sep

-11

Non - Owner Occ Purchase Orginations House Price Index - R. Axis

n the mid-2000s there was an unprecedented rise in the non-owner occupied

share of mortgage originations for both investor and vacation homes in the city of Boise, ID. The chart shows the relationship in the non-owner occupied share of purchase originations and the year-over-year home price appreciation for Boise, ID. This rise in non-owner occupied purchase activity was closely followed by an unusually large increase in the home price index. This strong correlation lends credence to the theory that speculation by investor and second-home purchase activity was a driver in the house price

bubble in 2006-2007 in this CBSA. After house prices fell in this area, the investors fl ed this market. However, a troubling trend is the return of the investor in 2010 and 2011 followed

I

An Example of Speculation in Home Price Declines By Katie Dobbyn

NON-OWNER SHARE AND HOUSE PRICES FOR BOISE, ID

Share % YOY Chg

by a rapid improvement in the home price trend. This could be fueled by bargain hunters attracted to the lowest prices since 2002 and a low interest rate enviroment. End.

In the News

CoreLogic Records 4.7% Drop in Home Prices in 2011 DSNews.com – Feb 2, 2012Year-end data from CoreLogic shows home prices fell by 4.7 percent over 2011. It marks the fi fth consecutive year the ...

The Latest on Mortgage Rates: Still LowWall Street Journal – Feb 2, 2012CoreLogic reported Thursday that US home prices, including distressed sales, fell 4.7% in December compared with December 2010, the fi fth consecutive year of price drops. Excluding distressed sales, CoreLogic's home-price index fell .9% in December, ...

Who benefi ts from possible $25B mortgage settlement?USA TODAY – Jan 29, 2012 Market researcher CoreLogic says almost 60% of residential mortgages were at interest rates above 5% as of November, even though current interest rates are ...

What happens when you walk away from your home? Reuters – Jan 27, 2012 Almost 11 million homes are now underwater, says fi nancial information provider CoreLogic. Around 3.5 million homeowners are behind in their payments and ...

Obama Proposes Mortgage-Refi nance PlanWall Street Journal – Jan 24, 2012CoreLogic, a company that tracks 85% of all mortgages, estimates that 28 million homeowners could cut the interest rates on their loans by more than one ...

Recommended: Proposed mortgage settlement offers little relief for ... msnbc.com – Jan 24, 2012 ... borrowers with an average shortfall of roughly $65000 — or a total of $700 billion — in “negative equity,” according to the latest data from CoreLogic.

Source: CoreLogic Dec 2011

http://www.dsnews.com/articles/corelogic-records-47-drop-in-home-prices-2011-2012-02-02

http://blogs.wsj.com/developments/2012/02/02/the-latest-on-mortgage-rates-still-low/

http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/housing/story/2012-01-29/mortgage-settlement-questions/52873178/1

http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/27/us-housing-strategicdefault-idUSTRE80Q1XX20120127

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203806504577181652800384514.html?mod=googlenews_wsj

http://bottomline.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2012/01/24/10226930-proposed-mortgage-settlement-offers-little-relief-for-homeowners


7


Total Sales*

-New Sales*

-Existing Sales*

-REO Sales*

-Short Sales *

Distressed Sales Share

HPI MoM

HPI YoY

HPI MoM Excluding Distressed

HPI YoY Excluding Distressed

90 Days + DQ Pct

Foreclosure Pct

REO Pct

Pre-foreclosure Filings*

Completed Foreclosures*

Negative Equity Share

Negative Equity*

Months Supply SDQ Homes

Jan Feb Mar April May June July Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec YTD 2011 2011 2011 2011 2011 2011 2011 2011 2011 2011 2011 2011 2009 2010 2011

238 248 331 321 339 374 327 382 337 311 297 299 4,253 4,010 3,804

15 18 23 21 23 26 22 26 24 22 22 26 387 328 268

142 146 200 204 222 251 222 257 226 205 192 187 2,697 2,579 2,455

60 63 80 69 66 66 56 66 58 55 54 56 887 789 749

19 19 25 25 26 28 25 30 28 27 27 28 235 273 307

33.1% 33.1% 31.9% 29.1% 27.1% 25.3% 24.8% 25.1% 25.4% 26.4% 27.1% 28.1% 26.4% 26.5% 27.8%

-2.1% -1.8% -0.7% 1.3% 1.5% 1.4% 0.8% -0.2% -0.8% -1.4% -1.3% -1.4% -0.2% -0.3% -0.4%

-4.6% -5.0% -6.0% -6.1% -6.1% -5.6% -4.7% -4.2% -3.6% -3.8% -4.3% -4.7% -11.8% -0.2% -4.9%

-0.2% -0.5% -0.3% 0.7% 0.9% 0.7% 0.2% -0.5% -0.7% -1.0% -0.2% 0.2% -0.4% -0.3% -0.1%

-3.0% -2.6% -2.8% -2.7% -2.7% -2.6% -2.7% -2.8% -2.7% -2.5% -2.0% -0.9% -8.8% -1.7% -2.5%

7.8% 7.8% 7.5% 7.4% 7.3% 7.2% 7.2% 7.2% 7.2% 7.2% 7.2% 7.3% 6.8% 8.0% 7.4%

3.6% 3.6% 3.5% 3.5% 3.5% 3.5% 3.4% 3.4% 3.5% 3.5% 3.4% 3.4% 2.6% 3.2% 3.5%

0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.6% 0.5% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6%

143 125 137 116 116 116 108 136 123 124 131 137 2,395 2,068 1,512

79 64 82 75 74 75 65 69 76 58 57 55 965 1,087 829

23.0% 22.9% 22.7% 22.6% 22.6% 22.5% 22.4% 22.2% 22.1% 22.2% 22.2% 22.2% 23.2% 23.1% 22.5%

11,026 10,969 10,907 10,896 10,884 10,882 10,828 10,773 10,720 10,774 10,756 10,749 11,009 11,050 10,847

13.94 13.27 9.62 9.75 9.10 8.17 9.28 7.90 8.95 9.70 10.17 10.09 8.50 10.60 9.99

238 248 331 321 339 374 327 382 337 311 297 299 4,253 4,010 3,804

142 146 200 204 222 251 222 257 226 205 192 187 2,697 2,579 2,455

19 19 25 25 26 28 25 30 28 27 27 28 235 273 307

-2.1% -1.8% -0.7% 1.3% 1.5% 1.4% 0.8% -0.2% -0.8% -1.4% -1.3% -1.4% -0.2% -0.3% -0.4%

-0.2% -0.5% -0.3% 0.7% 0.9% 0.7% 0.2% -0.5% -0.7% -1.0% -0.2% 0.2% -0.4% -0.3% -0.1%

7.8% 7.8% 7.5% 7.4% 7.3% 7.2% 7.2% 7.2% 7.2% 7.2% 7.2% 7.3% 6.8% 8.0% 7.4%

0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.6% 0.5% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6%

79 64 82 75 74 75 65 69 76 58 57 55 965 1,087 829

11,026 10,969 10,907 10,896 10,884 10,882 10,828 10,773 10,720 10,774 10,756 10,749 11,009 11,050 10,847

NATIONAL SUMMARY

* Thousands of Units

Total Cum Dom Cum Sold Months Distressed Sales Mean Dom Mean Pre- Negative Supply Total REO Short Sales YoY YoY YoY HPI HPI 90 Days + Foreclosure Completed Equity Distressed Sales Sales Sales Shares Change Change Change MoM YoY DQ Pct Filings Foreclosures Share Homes

4,122 962 605 38.0% -19.9% 22.5% -4.4% -2.1% -11.8% 10.8% 4,706 1,348 24.9% 32.1

5,574 1,789 961 49.3% -5.3% 7.5% 6.6% -1.0% -6.2% 7.3% 7,487 2,367 23.1% 15.4

5,659 1,276 617 33.5% 20.8% 17.8% 0.8% -1.3% -9.0% 8.9% 8,455 3,120 34.5% 15.2

5,037 250 241 9.8% -10.6% N/A N/A -1.2% 0.4% 8.6% 386 71 10.5% 16.1

5,118 668 682 26.4% 4.2% N/A N/A -0.4% 0.2% 5.9% 2,419 375 27.7% 9.3

7,816 1,002 292 16.6% 0.1% 15.1% -1.3% -0.2% -3.2% 5.2% 1,217 1,353 10.3% 5.4

7,940 1,863 1571 43.2% -4.7% N/A N/A 1.1% -2.6% 7.6% 5,468 2,748 52.2% 6.9

5,524 2,330 997 60.2% 0.0% 12.7% 2.1% -0.6% -5.9% 10.1% 6,134 2,150 44.0% 12.4

5,645 689 317 17.8% 4.3% 9.9% -4.2% 0.5% 0.3% 5.1% 3,961 875 11.2% 5.7

2,456 540 137 27.6% -16.9% 17.8% -2.4% -0.2% -6.8% 5.0% 2,405 859 17.5% 12.5

N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A -0.2% -1.5% 5.8% 582 136 7.8% N/A

2,817 514 396 32.3% 19.6% 13.1% -9.2% -1.0% -5.1% 6.4% 694 577 16.6% 11.2

3,233 679 300 30.3% -2.4% N/A N/A -1.4% 0.2% 4.3% 2,400 1,075 22.7% 6.5

3,016 730 705 47.6% 13.5% 7.1% 5.2% -1.2% -7.2% 6.0% 2,404 734 28.3% 9.3

4,290 545 666 28.2% -7.4% 30.8% 3.6% -0.5% -7.4% 17.0% 1,901 783 47.1% 18.0

1,842 435 427 46.8% -10.1% 10.8% 4.0% -0.5% -4.7% 5.5% 2,297 579 17.5% 13.4

3,037 670 118 26.0% -6.8% 14.4% 3.4% -1.2% -4.0% 5.0% 1,280 680 17.1% 7.3

2,164 166 178 15.9% -18.0% N/A N/A -0.8% -2.9% 7.6% 296 42 18.8% 15.5

2,326 89 24 4.9% 15.5% N/A N/A -1.2% -1.3% 10.3% 525 131 5.4% 19.4

2,998 720 655 45.9% 9.2% N/A N/A -1.2% -8.6% 6.5% 2,723 963 29.1% 9.4

2,162 691 114 37.2% -30.1% N/A N/A -0.7% -1.2% 6.0% 1,729 1,020 40.8% 11.9

2,191 304 350 29.9% 2.1% N/A N/A -0.7% -2.4% 5.5% 1,083 1,147 17.5% 9.7

3,012 858 762 53.8% 1.0% 0.8% -1.4% -0.8% -9.1% 7.6% 3,079 1,142 40.3% 9.7

3,680 519 796 35.7% -7.2% 9.7% -13.5% 0.0% -0.8% 18.3% 1,520 1,205 51.9% 18.0

1,617 61 127 11.6% -15.4% 29.0% 11.0% -1.2% -4.1% 8.7% 236 29 13.2% 19.4

4,122 962 605 38.0% -19.9% 22.5% -4.4% -2.1% -11.8% 10.8% 4,706 1,348 24.9% 32.1Chicago-Joliet-Naperville, IL

Los Angeles-Long Beach-Glendale, CA

Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta, GA

New York-White Plains-Wayne, NY-NJ

Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV

Houston-Sugar Land-Baytown, TX

Phoenix-Mesa-Glendale, AZ

Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA

Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX

Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI

Philadelphia, PA

Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, WA

Denver-Aurora-Broomfi eld, CO

San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos, CA

Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL

Santa Ana-Anaheim-Irvine, CA

St. Louis, MO-IL

Baltimore-Towson, MD

Nassau-Suff olk, NY

Oakland-Fremont-Hayward, CA

Warren-Troy-Farmington Hills, MI

Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro, OR-WA

Sacramento--Arden-Arcade--Roseville, CA

Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL

Edison-New Brunswick, NJ

TOP 25 CBSA SUMMARY DECEMBER 2011

5,659 1,276 617 33.5% 20.8% 17.8% 0.8% -1.3% -9.0% 8.9% 8,455 3,120 34.5% 15.2

5,118 668 682 26.4% 4.2% N/A N/A -0.4% 0.2% 5.9% 2,419 375 27.7% 9.3

7,940 1,863 1571 43.2% -4.7% N/A N/A 1.1% -2.6% 7.6% 5,468 2,748 52.2% 6.9

5,645 689 317 17.8% 4.3% 9.9% -4.2% 0.5% 0.3% 5.1% 3,961 875 11.2% 5.7

N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A -0.2% -1.5% 5.8% 582 136 7.8% N/A

3,233 679 300 30.3% -2.4% N/A N/A -1.4% 0.2% 4.3% 2,400 1,075 22.7% 6.5

4,290 545 666 28.2% -7.4% 30.8% 3.6% -0.5% -7.4% 17.0% 1,901 783 47.1% 18.0

3,037 670 118 26.0% -6.8% 14.4% 3.4% -1.2% -4.0% 5.0% 1,280 680 17.1% 7.3

2,326 89 24 4.9% 15.5% N/A N/A -1.2% -1.3% 10.3% 525 131 5.4% 19.4

2,162 691 114 37.2% -30.1% N/A N/A -0.7% -1.2% 6.0% 1,729 1,020 40.8% 11.9

3,012 858 762 53.8% 1.0% 0.8% -1.4% -0.8% -9.1% 7.6% 3,079 1,142 40.3% 9.7

1,617 61 127 11.6% -15.4% 29.0% 11.0% -1.2% -4.1% 8.7% 236 29 13.2% 19.4


8


Total Cum Dom Cum Sold Months Distressed Sales Mean Dom Mean Pre- Negative Supply Total REO Short Sales YoY YoY YoY HPI HPI 90 Days + Foreclosure Completed Equity Distressed Sales Sales Sales Shares Change Change Change MoM YoY DQ Pct Filings Foreclosures Share Homes

745 59 22 10.9% -7.0% N/A N/A -1.1% 1.1% 2.3% 159 72 7.5% 2.5

2,570 272 85 13.9% -8.7% N/A N/A -4.1% -7.1% 5.7% 607 684 11.2% 12.3

2,515 235 138 14.8% -26.0% 21.3% 5.1% -0.3% -0.4% 5.2% 267 147 9.9% 6.2

10,820 2,623 1,965 42.4% -1.3% 13.8% 0.0% 0.3% -4.2% 7.1% 7,452 3,368 47.4% 6.9

34,317 10,266 6,755 49.6% 1.1% 9.8% 2.9% -1.3% -6.3% 7.0% 35,168 11,394 29.8% 11.1

6,328 1,286 584 29.5% -6.4% N/A N/A -1.1% -0.6% 4.1% 4,359 2,130 20.4% 6.0

2,394 221 247 19.6% -18.2% 18.7% -4.6% -1.4% -3.7% 7.2% 71 247 13.0% 14.5

731 53 19 9.8% 31.5% N/A N/A -1.0% 0.5% 5.6% 12 3 13.9% 7.1

472 70 25 20.0% -34.5% 28.7% 8.5% -2.5% -5.3% 6.7% 206 345 14.3% 22.1

33,697 4,690 4,735 28.0% -5.1% 23.3% 7.0% 0.1% -3.3% 17.4% 13,307 7,031 44.1% 15.6

9,344 1,812 756 27.5% 13.4% 16.2% 0.8% -1.0% -8.3% 8.0% 11,741 4,585 30.0% 12.6

895 104 71 19.5% -18.6% 21.1% 6.0% -0.6% -2.2% 6.6% 360 26 10.0% 12.6

3,232 218 119 10.4% -13.4% 20.4% 1.4% -1.2% -0.4% 4.2% 600 414 9.1% 4.6

2,381 474 165 26.8% -7.6% N/A N/A -1.4% -3.7% 5.2% 1,356 460 22.3% 5.1

7,013 1,327 795 30.3% -22.3% 22.1% -11.8% -2.4% -11.3% 9.2% 6,306 1,824 21.5% 24.2

N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A -0.3% 1.2% 6.6% 1,127 1,187 10.7% N/A

1,809 277 73 19.4% -16.0% N/A N/A -0.2% -0.9% 4.4% 333 77 10.0% 7.7

2,345 298 107 17.3% -43.9% N/A N/A -0.1% -2.7% 5.6% 647 225 8.6% 10.5

3,668 454 110 15.4% -2.6% 16.8% -7.3% 0.3% -2.5% 6.3% 1,386 292 14.6% 7.6

7,403 717 147 11.7% 29.7% N/A N/A 0.1% -3.0% 5.7% 576 515 15.6% 6.6

5,521 512 683 21.6% -6.6% N/A N/A -1.6% -3.6% 8.0% 719 84 23.3% 14.4

668 57 29 12.9% 11.8% N/A N/A -3.2% -2.7% 6.9% 142 57 8.1% 15.6

13,562 8,201 300 62.7% 23.9% N/A N/A -0.8% 0.0% 6.5% 5,259 9,700 34.7% 6.6

3,538 649 170 23.1% -23.5% 18.2% -3.2% -0.1% -7.5% 4.6% 2,925 996 16.3% 11.5

5,553 1,214 174 25.0% -8.8% 14.6% 0.7% -1.2% -4.1% 4.6% 2,004 1,366 15.7% 6.7

N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A -1.0% -1.0% 7.6% 337 97 23.9% 4.2

946 126 55 19.1% -16.3% N/A N/A -0.1% 4.4% 3.1% 335 171 8.4% 4.2

7,396 785 415 16.2% -13.8% 24.9% 6.1% 0.7% -0.2% 5.9% 5,571 2,033 11.9% 10.4

1,123 34 32 5.9% 16.6% N/A N/A 0.4% 1.2% 1.7% 19 121 7.0% 0.8

N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.3% 2.5% 3.0% 308 299 9.9% N/A

1,139 182 79 22.9% -13.7% 13.3% 5.3% -0.8% -3.5% 4.6% N/A 198 19.2% 7.8

5,947 307 490 13.4% -10.6% 40.5% 7.4% -0.9% -3.0% 10.6% 1,234 135 16.3% 21.8

1,550 215 99 20.2% -8.9% N/A N/A -1.0% -5.1% 5.7% 773 168 13.5% 9.3

6,045 2,405 1,168 59.1% 6.5% 8.5% 1.0% -0.6% -10.6% 13.4% 1,428 2,137 58.7% 10.3

12,079 595 294 7.4% -7.5% 22.7% 2.8% -0.1% 1.7% 7.9% 1,179 326 6.3% 12.4

9,116 1,888 678 28.1% -12.0% 16.0% 4.5% -1.4% -7.7% 6.9% 4,686 2,188 22.5% 11.1

4,222 377 113 11.6% -14.8% -0.6% 9.4% -0.2% -0.2% 5.3% 1,638 502 7.2% 5.0

3,638 559 467 28.2% -4.5% N/A N/A -1.2% -2.1% 5.4% 1,470 2,338 17.0% 9.2

9,362 990 339 14.2% -7.8% N/A N/A -0.9% -1.2% 5.9% 1,656 648 7.9% 9.0

781 99 94 24.7% -12.1% 18.2% 7.5% -3.0% -6.7% 7.5% 406 300 21.4% 12.5

4,755 625 295 19.4% -1.4% 26.2% 4.5% 0.3% 1.0% 6.7% 1,076 578 15.5% 8.8

N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.1% 3.0% 2.7% N/A N/A N/A N/A

7,539 1,240 380 21.5% 6.4% N/A N/A -0.6% -1.4% 6.3% 3,051 2,131 14.7% 6.4

28,869 3,275 1,099 15.2% -8.0% 11.4% -3.4% -0.8% -1.0% 4.8% 10,732 4,568 9.6% 4.9

3,822 749 336 28.4% 4.2% N/A N/A -0.7% -2.5% 5.0% 2,197 478 20.0% 5.6

6,992 1,182 717 27.2% -7.2% 32.6% 26.9% 0.0% 0.8% 4.1% 5,396 1,130 23.0% 7.3

N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 23.6% 10.1% -1.3% 4.0% 4.0% N/A N/A N/A N/A

6,404 1,122 787 29.8% 5.8% 14.7% -9.0% -1.1% -5.2% 6.2% 1,544 1,630 17.3% 11.2

3,260 441 227 20.5% -26.7% 21.1% 1.3% -1.1% -4.1% 4.6% 1,871 1,031 14.5% 10.9

N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A -0.7% 1.4% 4.1% 443 23 6.1% N/A

488 63 29 18.8% 1.3% N/A N/A -2.1% -5.6% 2.5% 64 57 12.9% 3.7

State

AK

AL

AR

AZ

CA

CO

CT

DC

DE

FL

GA

HI

IA

ID

IL

IN

KS

KY

LA

MA

MD

ME

MI

MN

MO

MS

MT

NC

ND

NE

NH

NJ

NM

NV

NY

OH

OK

OR

PA

RI

SC

SD

TN

TX

UT

VA

VT

WA

WI

WV

WY

745 59 22 10.9% -7.0% N/A N/A -1.1% 1.1% 2.3% 159 72 7.5% 2.5

2,515 235 138 14.8% -26.0% 21.3% 5.1% -0.3% -0.4% 5.2% 267 147 9.9% 6.2

34,317 10,266 6,755 49.6% 1.1% 9.8% 2.9% -1.3% -6.3% 7.0% 35,168 11,394 29.8% 11.1

2,394 221 247 19.6% -18.2% 18.7% -4.6% -1.4% -3.7% 7.2% 71 247 13.0% 14.5

472 70 25 20.0% -34.5% 28.7% 8.5% -2.5% -5.3% 6.7% 206 345 14.3% 22.1

9,344 1,812 756 27.5% 13.4% 16.2% 0.8% -1.0% -8.3% 8.0% 11,741 4,585 30.0% 12.6

3,232 218 119 10.4% -13.4% 20.4% 1.4% -1.2% -0.4% 4.2% 600 414 9.1% 4.6

7,013 1,327 795 30.3% -22.3% 22.1% -11.8% -2.4% -11.3% 9.2% 6,306 1,824 21.5% 24.2

1,809 277 73 19.4% -16.0% N/A N/A -0.2% -0.9% 4.4% 333 77 10.0% 7.7

3,668 454 110 15.4% -2.6% 16.8% -7.3% 0.3% -2.5% 6.3% 1,386 292 14.6% 7.6

5,521 512 683 21.6% -6.6% N/A N/A -1.6% -3.6% 8.0% 719 84 23.3% 14.4

13,562 8,201 300 62.7% 23.9% N/A N/A -0.8% 0.0% 6.5% 5,259 9,700 34.7% 6.6

5,553 1,214 174 25.0% -8.8% 14.6% 0.7% -1.2% -4.1% 4.6% 2,004 1,366 15.7% 6.7

946 126 55 19.1% -16.3% N/A N/A -0.1% 4.4% 3.1% 335 171 8.4% 4.2

1,123 34 32 5.9% 16.6% N/A N/A 0.4% 1.2% 1.7% 19 121 7.0% 0.8

1,139 182 79 22.9% -13.7% 13.3% 5.3% -0.8% -3.5% 4.6% N/A 198 19.2% 7.8

1,550 215 99 20.2% -8.9% N/A N/A -1.0% -5.1% 5.7% 773 168 13.5% 9.3

12,079 595 294 7.4% -7.5% 22.7% 2.8% -0.1% 1.7% 7.9% 1,179 326 6.3% 12.4

4,222 377 113 11.6% -14.8% -0.6% 9.4% -0.2% -0.2% 5.3% 1,638 502 7.2% 5.0

9,362 990 339 14.2% -7.8% N/A N/A -0.9% -1.2% 5.9% 1,656 648 7.9% 9.0

4,755 625 295 19.4% -1.4% 26.2% 4.5% 0.3% 1.0% 6.7% 1,076 578 15.5% 8.8

7,539 1,240 380 21.5% 6.4% N/A N/A -0.6% -1.4% 6.3% 3,051 2,131 14.7% 6.4

3,822 749 336 28.4% 4.2% N/A N/A -0.7% -2.5% 5.0% 2,197 478 20.0% 5.6

N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 23.6% 10.1% -1.3% 4.0% 4.0% N/A N/A N/A N/A

3,260 441 227 20.5% -26.7% 21.1% 1.3% -1.1% -4.1% 4.6% 1,871 1,031 14.5% 10.9

STATE SUMMARY DECEMBER 2011

488 63 29 18.8% 1.3% N/A N/A -2.1% -5.6% 2.5% 64 57 12.9% 3.7


9


-5%

-4%

-3%

-2%

-1%

0%

1%

2%

3%

-25%

-20%

-15%

-10%

-5%

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

Jan

-02

Jun

-02

Nov

-02

Ap

r-0

3

Sep

-03

Feb

-04

Jul-

04

Dec

-04

May

-05

Oct

-05

Mar

-06

Aug

-06

Jan

-07

Jun

-07

Nov

-07

Ap

r-0

8

Sep

-08

Feb

-09

Jul-

09

Dec

-09

May

-10

Oct

-10

Mar

-11

Aug

-11

All Transactions Excluding Distressed All Transactions - Right Axis

-40%

-30%

-20%

-10%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

IL NV

GA

OH

MN AL RI

CA

WY

DE

WA

NM AZ

MO WI

ID CT

MD

NH FL

NJ

MA KY

ME

LA

Current

-20%

-15%

-10%

-5%

0%

5%Ja

n-0

2M

ar-0

2M

ay-0

2Ju

l-0

2Se

p-0

2N

ov-0

2Ja

n-0

3M

ar-0

3M

ay-0

3Ju

l-0

3Se

p-0

3N

ov-0

3Ja

n-0

4M

ar-0

4M

ay-0

4Ju

l-0

4Se

p-0

4N

ov-0

4Ja

n-0

5M

ar-0

5M

ay-0

5Ju

l-0

5Se

p-0

5N

ov-0

5Ja

n-0

6M

ar-0

6M

ay-0

6Ju

l-0

6Se

p-0

6N

ov-0

6

-20%

-15%

-10%

-5%

0%

5%

Jan-

02

Mar

-02

May

-02

Jul-0

2

Sep

-02

Nov

-02

Jan-

03

Mar

-03

May

-03

Jul-0

3

Sep

-03

Nov

-03

Jan-

04

Mar

-04

May

-04

Jul-0

4

Sep

-04

Nov

-04

Jan-

05

Mar

-05

May

-05

Jul-0

5

Sep

-05

Nov

-05

New List Price - YOY Chg HPI YOY %Chg

0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

1.2

1.4

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

Jan

-02

Jun

-02

Nov

-02

Ap

r-0

3

Sep

-03

Feb

-04

Jul-

04

Dec

-04

May

-05

Oct

-05

Mar

-06

Aug

-06

Jan

-07

Jun

-07

Nov

-07

Ap

r-0

8

Sep

-08

Feb

-09

Jul-

09

Dec

-09

May

-10

Oct

-10

Mar

-11

Aug

-11

REO Price Discount Distressed Clearing Ratio - R. Axis

HOME PRICE INDEX

YOY HPI GROWTH FOR 25 LOWEST RATE STATES NEW LISTING/SOLD LISTING PRICE DISCOUNT

NEW LIST PRICE REO DISCOUNT

Prices ► The House Price Index (HPI) ended 2011 on a down note with the month-over-month growth rate showing a 1.4 percent decrease in December 2011. For the full year, the single-family combined index, including distressed transactions, decreased by 4.7 percent in December 2011 compared with December 2010. This is the fi fth year-over-year December decline, and translates into a 33.7 percent drop from the peak of this index in April 2006. The HPI, excluding distressed sales, ended 2011 basically fl at, and showed just a modest decrease of 1 percent from December 2010 to December 2011, an indication of how much of a role discounts on distressed sales have played in house price declines.

► The discount from initial asking price to selling price has fl attened out to about 6.5 percent where it has stood for the last eight months. We are again seeing the prices of new listings fall back—the year-over-year change in the prices of new listings spent only two months in positive territory before falling back negative.

Pct Change from Year Ago Pct Change from Month Ago

Min, Max, Current since Jan 1976

YoY Change


Source: CoreLogic Dec 2011Source: CoreLogic Dec 2011



10


0%

2%

4%

6%

8%

10%

12%

14%

16%

18%

3 m

onth

s

5 m

onth

s

7 m

onth

s

9 m

onth

s

11 m

onth

s

13 m

onth

s

15 m

onth

s

17 m

onth

s

19 m

onth

s

21 m

onth

s

23 m

onth

s

25 m

onth

s

27 m

onth

s

29 m

onth

s

31 m

onth

s

33 m

onth

s

35 m

onth

s

37 m

onth

s

39 m

onth

s

41 m

onth

s

43

mon

ths

45

mon

ths

47

mon

ths

49

mon

ths

51 m

onth

s

53 m

onth

s

55 m

onth

s

57 m

onth

s

59 m

onth

s

2011 Total 2010 Total 2009 Total 2008 Total 2007 Total 2006 Total

0%

2%

4%

6%

8%

10%

12%

14%

16%

18%

20%F

L

NV NJ IL

GA

MD

NY

MS RI

AZ

CA CT

ME

OH SC DE IN HI

MI

LA TN WA

NC

PA

AL

Current

0.0%

0.1%

0.2%

0.3%

0.4%

0.5%

0.6%

0.7%

0.8%

0.9%

0%

1%

2%

3%

4%

5%

6%

7%

8%

9%

Jan

-02

Jun

-02

Nov

-02

Ap

r-0

3

Sep

-03

Feb

-04

Jul-

04

Dec

-04

May

-05

Oct

-05

Mar

-06

Aug

-06

Jan

-07

Jun

-07

Nov

-07

Ap

r-0

8

Sep

-08

Feb

-09

Jul-

09

Dec

-09

May

-10

Oct

-10

Mar

-11

Aug

-11

90+ Days DQ Pct Foreclosure Pct REO Pct - Right Axis

0

50

100

150

200

250

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

Jan

-0

2

Jun

-0

2

Nov

-0

2

Ap

r-0

3

Sep

-0

3

Feb

-0

4

Jul-

04

Dec

-0

4

May

-0

5

Oct

-0

5

Mar

-06

Aug

-0

6

Jan

-0

7

Jun

-0

7

Nov

-0

7

Ap

r-0

8

Sep

-0

8

Feb

-0

9

Jul-

09

Dec

-0

9

May

-10

Oct

-10

Mar

-11

Aug

-11

Completed Foreclosures Pre- Foreclosure Filings - Right Axis

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

3 m

onth

s

5 m

onth

s

7 m

onth

s

9 m

onth

s

11 m

onth

s

13 m

onth

s

15 m

onth

s

17 m

onth

s

19 m

onth

s

21 m

onth

s

23 m

onth

s

25 m

onth

s

27 m

onth

s

29 m

onth

s

31 m

onth

s

33 m

onth

s

35 m

onth

s

37 m

onth

s

39 m

onth

s

41 m

onth

s

43

mon

ths

45

mon

ths

47

mon

ths

49

mon

ths

51 m

onth

s

53 m

onth

s

55 m

onth

s

57 m

onth

s

59 m

onth

s

2011 Total 2010 Total 2009 Total 2008 Total 2007 Total 2006 Total

CONFORMING PRIME SERIOUS DELINQUENCY RATE

JUMBO PRIME SERIOUS DELINQUENCY RATE SERIOUS DELINQUENCIES FOR 25 HIGHEST RATE STATES

OVERALL MORTGAGE PERFORMANCE PRE-FORECLOSURE FILINGS AMD COMPLETED FORECLOSURES

Performance ► Delinquency, foreclosure, and REO rates have leveled off recently, and on a year-over-year basis the number of mortgages in delinquency inventory has decreased. While the national average for the serious delinquency rate (SDQ, 90 days past due or more) is around 7 percent of all outstanding mortgages, this is driven by a few states. Florida and Nevada at 17.4 percent and 13.5 percent respectively, stand out as large drivers of SDQ rates. Nevada seems to be strengthening a bit, as the current SDQ rate for that state is 5 percentage points below its peak rate. Florida is currently experiencing an SDQ rate closer to peak levels.

► Auction fi lings, or those homes lost to foreclosure, totaled 830,000 for the full year 2011, down 24 percent from the full year 2010. Pre-foreclosure fi lings, otherwise known as notices of default, also decreased in 2011, from a total of 2.1 million for the full year 2010 to 1.5 million for the full year 2011.

By Origination Year

By Origination Year

In Thousands (3mma) In Thousands

Source: CoreLogic Nov 2011

Source: CoreLogic Dec 2011Source: CoreLogic Nov 2011



11


110

120

130

140

150

160

170

180

Jan

-02

Mar

-02

May

-02

Jul-

02

Sep

-02

Nov

-02

Jan

-03

Mar

-03

May

-03

Jul-

03

Sep

-03

Nov

-03

Jan

-04

Mar

-04

May

-04

Jul-

04

Sep

-04

Nov

-04

Jan

-05

Mar

-05

May

-05

Jul-

05

Sep

-05

Nov

-05

Jan

-06

Mar

-06

May

-06

Jul-

06

Sep

-06

Nov

-06

Active Sold

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

Jan-

02

Mar

-02

May

-02

Jul-0

2Se

p-0

2N

ov-0

2Ja

n-0

3M

ar-0

3M

ay-0

3Ju

l-03

Sep

-03

Nov

-03

Jan-

04

Mar

-04

May

-04

Jul-0

4Se

p-0

4N

ov-0

4Ja

n-0

5M

ar-0

5M

ay-0

5Ju

l-05

Sep

-05

Nov

-05

Jan-

06

Mar

-06

May

-06

Jul-0

6Se

p-0

6N

ov-0

6

Months Supply Distressed Homes Months Supply of Active Listings

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

MI

NV

CA

AZ FL

GA

CO UT

WA

VA ID OR IL

OH

MO

MD

NH RI

TN HI

NM SC MN

DE

CT

Current

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

Jan-

06

Ap

r-0

6

Jul-0

6

Oct

-06

Jan-

07

Ap

r-0

7

Jul-0

7

Oct

-07

Jan-

08

Ap

r-0

8

Jul-0

8

Oct

-08

Jan-

09

Ap

r-0

9

Jul-0

9

Oct

-09

Jan-

10

Ap

r-10

Jul-

10

Oct

-10

Jan-

11

Ap

r-11

Jul-

11

Oct

-11

Short Sales Share REO Sales Share

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

Jan

-06

Ap

r-0

6

Jul-

06

Oct

-06

Jan

-07

Ap

r-0

7

Jul-

07

Oct

-07

Jan

-08

Ap

r-0

8

Jul-

08

Oct

-08

Jan

-09

Ap

r-0

9

Jul-

09

Oct

-09

Jan

-10

Ap

r-10

Jul-

10

Oct

-10

Jan

-11

Ap

r-11

Jul-11

Oct

-11

Existing Home New Home REO Short

CUMULATIVE DAYS ON MARKET

MONTHS' SUPPLY DISTRESSED SALE SHARE FOR 25 HIGHEST RATE STATES

DISTRESSED SALES AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL SALES SALES BY SALE TYPE

Sales ► The bifurcation in the housing market is still evident in the real estate listings information which shows that the days on market for active listings is well above the days on market for those listings that ended in a sale and are no longer active. A small difference in these days on market numbers would signify little disconnect in buyer and seller expectations. This difference grew in 2011 from 16 days in January to 39 days December.

► Home sales ended 2011 down 5 percent for the full year compared with 2010. While REO sales fell a bit in 2011, short sales increased causing distressed sales to fall by only 1 percent from 2010 to 2011. Distressed sales made up 28 percent of all sales in 2011 which accounts for a signifi cant share of the overall home market for the year. As with home price declines and delinquencies, distressed sales are concentrated in a few states. Roughly 60 percent of the sales in Michigan and Nevada were distressed sales.

Mean

Min, Max, Current since Jan 2000

In Thousands


Source: CoreLogic Nov 2011Source: CoreLogic Dec 2011


corelogic.com

Defi nition

The total number of all home-sale transactions during the month.

The total number of newly constructed residentail housing units sold during the month.

The number of previously constructed homes that were sold to an unaffi liated third party. DOES NOT INCLUDE REO AND SHORT SALES.

Number of bank owned properties that were sold to an unaffi liated third party.

The number of short sales. A short sale is a sale of real estate in which the sale proceeds fall short of the balance owed on the property's loan.

The percentage of the total sales that were a distressed sale (REO or short sale).

Percent increase in HPI single family combined series over a month ago.

Percent increase in HPI single family combined series over a year ago.

Percent increase in HPI single family combined excluding distressed series over a month ago.

Percent increase in HPI single family combined excluding distressed series over a year ago.

The percentage of the overall loan count that are 90 or more days delinquent as of the reporting period. This percentage includes loans that are in foreclosure or REO.

The percentage of the overall loan count that is currently in foreclosure as of the reporting period.

The count of loans in REO as a percentage of the overall count of loans for the reporting period.

The number of mortgages where the lender has initiated foreclosure proceedings and it has been made known through public notice (NOD).

A completed foreclosure occurs when a property is auctioned and results in either the purchase of the home at auction or the property is taken by the lender as part of their Real Estate Owned (REO) inventory.

The percentage of mortgages in negative equity. The denominator for the negative equity percent is based on the number of mortgages from the public record.

The number of mortgages in negative equity. Negative equity is calculated as the diff erence between the current value of the property and the origination value of the mortgage. If the mortgage debt is greater than the current value, the property is considered to be in a negative equity position. We estimate current UPB value, not origination value.

The months it would take to sell off all homes currently in distress of 90 days delinquency or greater based on the current sales pace.

Percent increase in total sales over a year ago.

Represents REO sales divided by Completed Foreclosures.

Percentage calculated by dividing the mean new listing price by the mean sold listingprice.

Percent increase in cumulative days on market (DOM) for listing active at the end of the month.

Percent increase in cumulative days on market (DOM) for listing sold during the month.

Active Listings divided by 12 month average of sold listings for a given month.

The count of loans in serious delinquency (90 days +) as a percentage of the overall count of loans for the reporting period.

© 2012 CoreLogic

CORELOGIC and the stylized CoreLogic logo are registered trademarks owned by CoreLogic, Inc. and/or its subsidiaries. No trademark of CoreLogic shall be used without express written consent of CoreLogic. All other trademarks are the property of their respective holders. Proprietary and confi dential. This material may not be reproduced in any form without express written permission.

01-MARKETPULSE-0212

Variable

Total Sales

New Sales

Existing Sales

REO Sales

Short Sales

Distressed Sales Share

HPI MoM

HPI YoY

HPI MoM Excluding Distressed

HPI YoY Excluding Distressed

90 Days + DQ Pct

Foreclosure Pct

REO Pct

Pre-foreclosure Filings

Completed Foreclosures

Negative Equity Share

Negative Equity

Months Supply Distressed Homes

Total Sales YoY Change

Distressed Clearing Ratio

Listing Price Discount

Cum DOM Mean YoY Change

Cum Sold DOM Mean YoY Change

Months' Supply of Active Listings

Seriously DQ Pct

Source: CoreLogicThe data provided is for use only by the primary recipient or the primary recipient's publication or broadcast. This data may not be re-sold, republished or licensed to any other source, including publications and sources owned by the primary recipient's parent company without prior written permission from CoreLogic. Any CoreLogic data used for publication or broadcast, in whole or in part, must be sourced as coming from CoreLogic, a data and analytics company. For use with broadcast or web content, the citation must directly accompany fi rst reference of the data. If the data is illustrated with maps, charts, graphs or other visual elements, the CoreLogic logo must be included on screen or website. For questions, analysis or interpretation of the data, contact CoreLogic at [email protected]. Data provided may not be modifi ed without the prior written permission of CoreLogic. Do not use the data in any unlawful manner. This data is compiled from public records, contributory databases and proprietary analytics, and its accuracy is dependent upon these sources.

The total number of all home-sale transactions during the month.

The number of previously constructed homes that were sold to an unaffi liated third party. DOES NOT INCLUDE REOAND SHORT SALES.

The number of short sales. A short sale is a sale of real estate in which the sale proceeds fall short of the balance owed on the property's loan.

Percent increase in HPI single family combined series over a month ago.

Percent increase in HPI single family combined excluding distressed series over a month ago.

The percentage of the overall loan count that are 90 or more days delinquent as of the reporting period. Thispercentage includes loans that are in foreclosure or REO.

The count of loans in REO as a percentage of the overall count of loans for the reporting period.

A completed foreclosure occurs when a property is auctioned and results in either the purchase of the home at auction or the property is taken by the lender as part of their Real Estate Owned (REO) inventory.

The number of mortgages in negative equity. Negative equity is calculated as the diff erence between the current value of the property and the origination value of the mortgage. If the mortgage debt is greater than the current value, theproperty is considered to be in a negative equity position. We estimate current UPB value, not origination value.

Percent increase in total sales over a year ago.

Percentage calculated by dividing the mean new listing price by the mean sold listingprice.

VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS

Percent increase in cumulative days on market (DOM) for listing sold during the month.

The count of loans in serious delinquency (90 days +) as a percentage of the overall count of loans for the reporting period.

FOR MORE INFORMATION PLEASE CALL 1-415-536-3500The MarketPulse™ is a newsletter published by CoreLogic, Inc. ("CoreLogic"). This information is made available for informational purposes only and is not intended to provide specifi c commercial, fi nancial or investment advice. CoreLogic disclaims all express or implied representations, warranties and guaranties, including implied warranties of merchantability, fi tness for a particular purpose, title, or non-infringement. Neither CoreLogic nor its licensors make any representations, warranties or guaranties as to the quality, reliability, suitability, truth, accuracy, timeliness or completeness of the information contained in this newsletter. CoreLogic shall not be held responsible for any errors, inaccuracies, omissions or losses resulting directly or indirectly from your reliance on the information contained in this newsletter.

This newsletter contains links to third party websites that are not controlled by CoreLogic. CoreLogic is not responsible for the content of third party websites. The use of third party website and its content is governed by the terms and conditions set forth on the third party’s site and CoreLogic assumes no responsibility for your use of or activities on the site.

marketpulse 2012 vol 1 issue 2 · © 2012 corelogic proprietary and conﬁ dential. this material...

Documents