marmasse, g. (penser le réel; hegel, la nature et l'esprit)

7/28/2019 Marmasse, G. (Penser le rel; Hegel, la nature et l'esprit)

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Hegel Bulletinhttp://journals.cambridge.org/HGL

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Gilles Marmasse. Penser le rel: Hegel, lanature et l'esprit. Paris: ditions Kim, 2007.ISBN 9762841744657 (pbk). Pp. 496. 35 .

Martin Thibodeau

Hegel Bulletin / Volume 34 / Issue 01 / May 2013, pp 120 - 123DOI: 10.1017/hgl.2013.5, Published online: 17 April 2013

Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S205153671300005X

How to cite this article:Martin Thibodeau (2013). Hegel Bulletin, 34, pp 120-123 doi:10.1017/hgl.2013.5

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Hegel Bulletin, 34/1, 120123doi:10.1017/hgl.2013.5

r The Hegel Society of Great Britain, 2013

Review

Gilles Marmasse. Penser le reel: Hegel, la nature et lesprit. Paris: EditionsKime, 2007. ISBN 9762841744657 (pbk). Pp. 496. 35 h.

Gilles Marmasses book is both a voluminous and an ambitious work.Throughout its 460-plus pages, Marmasse offers a detailed analysis of two ofthe three parts of Hegels system of philosophy, namely the philosophy of natureand the philosophy of spirit, or what Hegel calls the real sciences (die realen

Wissenschaften). Marmasses central hypothesis is that Hegel understands natureand spirit as opposed but nevertheless closely interconnected entities, and thatthe latter strives to solve the aporias implied by the former (10). In Marmassesown words, Hegels notion of spirit is to be conceived as nothing but the subject

who both theoretically and practically engages with nature considered as amanifold and contradictory given (10).

Although Marmasse often refers to the Phenomenology of Spirit, and to a lesserextent to Hegels earlier philosophical writings, his concern is essentially withHegels latest systematic works, namely Science of Logic, Elements of Philosophy of Right, the Heidelberg and Berlin Lectures and, of course, the different versions ofthe Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences. Yet Marmasse does not examine thecontent and issues inherent in Hegels argument as they systematically unfold inthe second and third section of the Encyclopedia. Instead, he chooses to focus onparticular themes, which in one way or the other are aspects of Hegelsunderstanding of the relationship between nature and spirit. This approachallows him to shed light on some key notions by which Hegel conceptualizes thisrelationship, such as negation and sublation, and furthermore to revisit a

certain number of controversial issues, which in many ways continue to be at thecentre of the debates surrounding Hegels philosophy as a whole.It is by briefly outlining two such controversial issues that I wish to illustrate

the position defended by Marmasse throughout his book. First of all, in chapter6, Marmasse challenges the common view of the notorious habilitation thesis onthe orbit of the planets that Hegel wrote in 1801 as he was attempting to secure aposition at the University of Jena. Hegel is generally thought to have erroneouslycondemned the discovery by Johann Tietz in 1766, and published by JohannBode in 1772, of the mathematical equation that allowed the calculation of the

distance between the planets of the solar system. Hegel is furthermore accused ofhaving simply ignored Giuseppe Piazzis important discovery of the planet Ceres

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while he was writing his habilitation thesis. However, as Marmasses detailedanalysis demonstrates, such accusations prove to be unfounded. Hegel,Marmasse argues, did not ignore Piazzis discovery. Instead, he was beingcautious about what, at the time, was still an unconfirmed hypothesis. As for

Tietzs and Bodes mathematical conjecture, Hegel, in line with Newtonianphysics, was resolutely sceptical about the possibility that, in the fields of physicsand astronomy, mathematics and geometry could successfully replace experienceand observation.

What is significant here, beyond the sole episode of the Dissertationschrift, is thecommon reproach that Hegel simply omits, and even goes against, factual truthsof the natural sciences and common empirical experience. According to manyauthors, Hegels philosophy is a more or less extravagant intellectual enterprise

which forces empirical reality into the procrustean bed of pure, a priori thought.

For Marmasse, this reproach is based on a misunderstanding of Hegelsconception of the relationship between philosophy and the empirical sciences.Hegel, Marmasse argues, insists that empirical reality, experience in general, or

whatever is given as external world or nature is nothing but the starting pointor the presupposition of philosophy. For Hegel, philosophical investigationbegins with what first presents itself as an immediate, irrational, empirical andfactual given. Hegel does not conceive of philosophy as a discipline competing

with the empirical sciences, nor does he consider its task to consist in theelucidation of the foundations of such sciences. Rather, Marmasse argues, Hegels

view is that philosophy differs from empirical sciences in that it does not extrapolateor generalize on the basis of the multifarious aspects of empirical reality. Instead,philosophy is concerned with what Hegel calls the concept of such reality, with itsinternal logic or principle. For Marmasse, this conception of philosophy is bestdescribed as a process of idealization, which is essentially a process by which reason,for its own sake, establishes and generates the immanent unifying principle governingthe manifold of empirical reality. As Marmasse writes:

Philosophy does not undertake to know the world as it initially

is, but rather transfigures it according to its own requirements.When one says that philosophy has to do with concepts, thismeans that it does not refer to the objects as they are given, butrather to the thoughts of those objects that it forges (45).

It is in this sense that philosophy, unlike the empirical sciences, is autonomousand legislative rather than dependent upon reality.

The second controversial issue concerns Hegels system of philosophy as such.In Chapters 3, 5 and 12 Marmasse challenges the common objection that Hegels

system purports to conceptualize the complex, manifold and more or lessunpredictable life of a given object, a given figure or a given moment of spirit,

Review

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but actually obeys a deterministic, necessary and/or teleological logic. Accordingto Marmasse, such a criticism fails to take into account the logic that rules thetransition from one section, or one moment, of Hegels system to another. AsMarmasse indicates, the key notions to understand the developmental process of

Hegels system are negation and sublation. Each moment of the system can besaid to develop by means of a process of negation and sublation: every analysisbegins with an immediately given which is then negated, and in turn, negated andsublated into a higher unifying principle. This procedure entails, Marmasseargues, that each moment relates to all other momentsor, to use Hegels

vocabulary, is meditated by the otherbut without being positively conditionedby it. In other words, the relationship between the moments within the system isby no means to be understood in positive terms, as the deterministic andespecially the teleological models suggest.

Although Hegel often describes the systematic process in terms ofdevelopment (Entwicklung), progression (Fortgang) or actualization (Verwicklichung),such vocabulary is not intended to describe a process by which, for example, apossibility contained within a specific moment is simply being actualized in thefollowing one. Instead, what is being actualized is the result of a negation andsublation of what in the preceding stage came to be perceived as inadequate,insufficient or one-sided. As Marmasse puts it: insofar as the moments mutuallynegate each other, the Aristotelian scheme according to which a form realizesitself within matter is inadequate to describe the becoming of an Hegelian cycle(131). Marmasse clarifies this by using an example drawn from Hegelsphilosophy of history, according to which the modern world is not the result ofan inherent possibility allegedly contained in what Hegel calls the oriental world.

Admittedly, Hegel considers the notion of freedom to have been present alreadyin the oriental world. Yet, in the course of history leading from the oriental to themodern world, the initial determination of freedom necessarily comes to beconsidered as inadequate to its own concept and is therefore being negated andsublated time and again. For Marmasse, negation and sublation are to be understood

as referring not to a simple process of actualization, but rather to a transformationthat deeply changes both form and content. As a result, the modern notion offreedom cannot in any way be considered as being simply the actualization of what

was formally and potentially present within the oriental world.This being said, Marmasse does not limit himself to an analysis and defence of

Hegels philosophy, but also explores the ambiguities and difficulties in the developmentof Hegels argument. By doing so he identifies a certain number of themes and issues,

which, in his view, have lost their relevance for us. As he straightforwardly states inhis concluding remarks: in a certain way, Hegelianism belongs to the past by its

themes of investigation, its presuppositions and method. Today, Hegelianismessentially is not an object of debate but of history (405).

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Does Marmasses book live up to its ambitions? In many ways it does so withgreat success. Indeed, throughout its fourteen chapters Penser le reel providesnumerous extremely valuable insights into Hegels philosophy of nature and spiritas well as many insights into his logic. Moreover, Marmasse convincingly

responds to both the recurrent criticism mentioned above and other pervasivecriticisms of Hegels systematic philosophy. In particular, Marmasse, in my view,accurately challenges Karl Lowiths view that Hegels philosophy of history isnothing but a philosophical transposition of the Christian, eschatological,conception of the end of history. According to Marmasse, this readingdisregards the fact that, for Hegel, history is not divine, but unfolds, so to speak,

within the element of human finitude and mortality. Therefore, Hegels famousthesis on the end of history is not to be understood as a flight out of history, butrather as an immanent process that is affected by finitude and realizes itself

only partially. Furthermore, Marmasse also accurately defends Hegel againstHeideggers claim that Hegels philosophy is the accomplishment of metaphysicsunderstood as onto-theology. In Marmasses view, the ultimate element in the

Encyclopedia is not a being, but rather an activity of idealization of being (79).Nevertheless, Marmasses thematic approach entails that his examination of the

various texts that Hegel devoted to these subjects is rather fragmented and lacksthe in-depth analysis that each of them would require. More often than not,Marmasse refers to different aspects of Hegels philosophies of nature and spiritnot for their own sake, but in order to illustrate how Hegel conceives of therelationship between logic, nature and spirit. Evidently, dealing with so manycomplex issues within a single work is a very challenging task. As I see it,Marmasses book would have benefited from reducing the number of issuesdiscussed in relation to both Hegels philosophy of nature and spirit.

First and foremost intended for students and scholars working in the fields ofHegel studies, German idealism and post-Kantian philosophy, Marmasses work

will surely be appealing to anyone interested either in specific aspects of Hegelsphilosophy of nature or of spirit or in Hegels philosophy as whole. Although

dealing with extremely complex issues, Marmasses style is simple and precise,and his explanations are instructive and illuminating. Moreover, he develops anuanced position that is likely to convince many readers. For these reasons, thisbook offers a significant contribution to the study of Hegels mature system ofphilosophy.

Martin ThibodeauSt. Paul University (Ottawa, Canada)[email protected]

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marmasse, g. (penser le réel; hegel, la nature et l'esprit)

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