MASS EXODUSIraqi Refugees

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THE U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES

ISSUE BRIEF JULY 1991I

This U.S. Committee for Refugees report is based on a site visit to Iran that took place from April 17through May 1, 1991. Bill Frelick of the USCR staff was part of a delegation of three that also included EricGoldstein and Stephen Marks of Middle East Watch. Middle East Watch will be issuing a separate report fo-cusing on the human rights abuses that precipitated the flight of some 1.3 million Iraqi refugees into Iraq.The focus of this report is on the conditions of asylum in Iran. The team conducted interviews with about 200refugees in three provinces, Bakhtaran, Kordestan, and Khuzestan, visited eight refugee camps, one borderarea, and a mosque housing a large group of recent arrivals. They also met with Iranian officials from theInterior Ministry, Foreign Ministry, provincial and municipal governments. and the Iranian Red Crescent. Inaddition, the delegation met with other international refugee relief personnel from nongovernmental andintergovernmental humanitarian organizations operating in Iran.

The U.S. Committee for Refugees is a public information program of the American Councilfor Nationalities Service. Established in 1958, USCR encourages the American public to participate actively in

efforts to assist and protect the world's refugees.

THE U.S COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES1717 MASSACHUSETTS AVE. NW, SUITE 200 * WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036-2003TEL: (202) 347-3507 * FAX: (202) 347-3418 * E-MAIL: USER@IRSA-USCR.ORG

COVER PHOTO: Middle East Watch/Stephen Marks

@ 1991 American Council for Nationalities Services

MS EXODUSIRAQI REFUGEES IN IRAN

I. Introduction: A Cold Shoulder to theCountry That Shouldered the Burden

The massive hemorrhage of humanity out of Iraqin a matter of a few days in late March and earlyApril 1991 was unprecedented in the history ofthe UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR),and quickly overwhelmed the prepositioning ofstocks intended to support about 35,000 Gulf Warrefugees and displaced persons in Iran and 20,000in Turkey. Within days more than a millionrefugees headed into Iran and less than half thatnumber toward the border with Turkey. Worldattention was soon drawn to the drama on themountainsides of the Iraq-Turkish border whereTurkey refused to allow Kurdish refugees to enter,leaving them to cling desperately for life in thebitter cold, rain, and mud.

Less dramatic to the outside world was thelarger exodus to Iran. It seemed less dramaticprecisely because Iran acted decently. UnlikeIraq's other neighbors, Iran opened its bordersand mobilized its people to provide aid and sup-port. But the mass exodus to Iran failed to cap-ture international attention for reasons other thandramatic impact. Iran's isolation from the Westand the West's alienation from Iran caused anatmosphere of mutual suspicion, even hostililty,between Iran and potential donors. The refugeessuffered the consequences.

International support was slow in material-izing, and Iran has shouldered most of the burdenon its own. Although Iran acted in a manner thatis fully deserving of international support, thatsupport often appeared slow and grudging, par-ticularly from the United States. It is difficult forIranians to reconcile the levels of internationalassistance that have been pledged to Turkey,despite its often contemptuous treatment of the

Kurdish refugees, with the significantly moremodest levels of support for an Iranian govern-ment that has acted responsibly.

The total of reported funds allocated anddesignated for Iran, as of May 17, was about halfof that allocated and designated for Turkey, al-though the number of refugees in Iran was abouttriple the number in Turkey at that point in time.The United Nations Disaster Relief Organization(UNDRO) situation report of May 17 states thatIran had received $128.9 million in internationalassistance. In contrast, a total of $248 millionhad been spent on the Turkish/Iraq border. Thisfigure combines the UNDRO accounting of $57million with $140.1 million in U.S. Department ofDefense contributions and $31.6 million in Foodfor Peace (FFP) assistance, both of which weredistributed as part of Operation Provide Comfort.

Based on the refugee populations in Iranand on the Turkish border in April through mid-May when this money was being spent--about 1.3million refugees in Iran and 330,000 in the Turk-ish border region--it can be calculated that forevery dollar spent for an Iraqi refugee in Iran,$7.60 was spent on an Iraqi refugee on the Turk-ish border.

The U.S. contribution heavily weighted theassistance away from Iran. Of the $207.6 millionspent by the U.S. government between the timethe Iraqi refugee crisis erupted and mid-May, onlya relative small fraction went to assist refugees inIran--perhaps $20 million, at most.

The largest amount, $140 million, wasspent by the Department of Defense on OperationProvide Comfort to assist Kurds and other Iraqison both sides of the Turkey-Iraq border. The April27 flight carrying blankets donated by private U.S.groups is the only recorded Defense Departmentinitiative in Iran. The Office of Foreign Disaster

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Assistance (OFDA) allocated $12.9 million, virtu-ally all of which went for assistance along theTurkey-Iraq border. OFDA's allocations forUNICEF ($869,000) and ICRC ($131,000) wereearmarked for assistance in Iraq. Most of the$13.3 million in Food for Peace (FFP) food stocksmade available through the World Food Program(WFP) and the ICRC through April 15 were distrib-uted through Operation Provide Comfort. It is

....for every dollar spent for anIraqi refugee in Iran, $7.60 was

spent on an Iraqi refugeeon the Turkish border

unclear from OFDA accounting what percentage ofthe remaining $18.3 million in FFP food stocksreached refugees in Iran. But in any case, thebulk of this food was still in the pipeline and notdue to reach the region until July or August. Theremaining $23 million consisted of drawdownsfrom the State Department's Emergency RefugeeMigration and Assistance (ERMA) fund. Severalmillion of this was designated for use in Turkey,some of it through a fund established by the U.S.ambassador in Ankara; this left about $6 millionfor the ICRC and about $14 million for UNHCRAssuming that ICRC and UNHCR spent twice asmuch in Iran as in Turkey, the most they arelikely to have spent in Iran in U.S. funds would beabout $15 million.

UNHCR estimates that Iran itself currentlyspends $10 million per day on behalf of the refu-gees.

In some respects, this is an old story. Forthe past decade, Iran has been hosting some 2.35million Afghan refugees with only modest interna-tional support. In the period 1982-1990, some$81,797,100 was allocated for refugees in Iranthrough the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.During that same period of time, $406,513,600was allocated through UNHCR in support of theestimated 3.3 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan.In other words, for every dollar spent on an Af-ghan refugee in Iran, $3.54 was spent for an

Afghan refugee in Pakistan.It seems, therefore, that whether the

refugee is Iraqi or Afghan, if he chooses asylum inIran, he almost guarantees that he will receivesignificantly less in international assistance thanhis compatriots who seek asylum in neighboringcountries.

The KurdsThe Kurds are a nation without a country.

During this century, the Kurdish population,which spans the borders of Turkey, Syria, Iraq,Iran, and the Soviet Union, have been buffetedand forced to flee their homes either within thesame country or crossing into neighboring coun-tries, where they have often been greeted withsuspicion and hardship. The Kurds have alsobeen used and manipulated by the governments cthe region to cause each other problems. Iraq ha!supported Kurdish insurgencies in Iran and viceversa. In 1974, the Shah of Iran supported a .Kurdish revolt in Iraq, only to withdraw his sup-port when he won territorial concessions whollyunrelated to Kurdish aspirations. After theKhomeini Revolution of 1979, Iraq supported aKurdish insurgency in Iran that was demandinggreater autonomy. Then, during the Iraq-IranWar, Iran again supported Kurdish insurgents inIraq. During the closing months of that war, in1988, Iraq began to turn its chemical weaponsarsenal, which had been used against the Iranianmilitary during the course of the war, against itsown Kurdish population. In March 1988, in thecity of Halabjah an estimated 5,000 Kurds per-ished in a chemical attack. The panic that spreacthroughout Kurdish communities at the sight ancsound of Iraqi helicopters is aptly called the"Halabjah Syndrome." The Kurds know full wellwhat the Iraqi military and intelligence servicesare capable of doing. More than 100,000 fled in1988 to Turkey and Iran. Many of the Iraqi Kurd:who initially fled to Turkey moved on to Iran, stillfearful of return to Iraq, but unhappy with theirtreatment in Turkey.

Iran, not unlike Turkey, has its own secu-rity concerns with respect to its sometimes restiveKurdish population. It is apparent even to acasual observer traveling through Iranian

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Where Are My Sons? Inside a refugee tent in Bahramabad Kordestan Province in Iran, TaliaAmin Hassan, age 40, tells of the destruction of her village, Khidrikhan, on April 12, 1988, a monthafter the chemical attack on Halabia. Before destroying the village, soldiers abducted all of its youngmen. Three of her sons, Fateh Mohammad Khusroo, Latif Mohammad Khusroo, and Nurt MohammadKhusroo, were captured A fourth, Hassan Mohammad Khusroo, escaped, but returned on March 24,1988 in response to an amnesty declared by Saddam Hussein. He was then arrested and never seenagain. TallaAmin Hassan has heard nothing about any of her four sons since they were disappearedin 1988. In the exodus of 1991, she fled from the town of Qadir Kharam, where she had been livingsince 1988. USCR/B. Frelick

Kordestan that the authorities consider this a highsecurity area. Frequent checkpoints mark theroads of the province, armed sentries appear onmost hilltops and overlooking villages; barbed wireis much in evidence. Travelers are warned not todrive the roads of Kordestan after dark.

Just outside Sanandaj, the capital ofKordestan province, stands the Al Qods refugeecamp, temporary home to about 5,000 Kurds whoare crowded together in closely packed rows oftents. The camp perimeter is an earthen bull-dozed wall, giving the feeling of being inside a

colorless and dusty pit. Soldiers are very much inevidence. The mistrust and suspicion of theIranian authorities was at its height in Al Qods. Itwas impossible to talk freely with the refugees.One woman slipped us a note. It read:

We are Iraqan peoples leving in Qodscamp. Iranian Government they didn'thelp LLS just only on his people's helponly. I mean that Iran's Governmentdidn't help us like a government. Anduwe in this carnp- they didn't let us to gooL in this -Bastille'sjaiT. And also the

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"Chairman" of this camp has no a truward--and they sais still other govern-ments like United States and Germanyand United Kingdom doesn't send anyhelps like eates and equipments for thatwe sea or eat is not enof. And the mostuseful point in our lfe know is that wewant to go out looking for our brothersand mothers and childrens. Where theyare in Iran. But the Chairman in thiscamp don't let us to go. And we wantthe "United National" they arrange ourorders not Iranian Government. And wewant the UN they visit our and other'scamps and speaks to the Kurdish peoplefreely and alon. At last we means thatIran helps us. But it is not enof and isnot such like we want.

The Al Qods camp was the worst of theplaces we visited. It reflected the tensions ofKordestan province. In neighboring Bakhtaranprovince, where security appears to be far less of apreoccupation, the refugees themselves appearless anxious. At the border crossing nearNowsud, Kurds entering Iran are quickly friskedfor weapons; no other obstacle blocks their accessinto Iran. We observed much traffic in bothdirections, and we were free to cross back andforth into Iraq without interference. In Bakhtaran,we observed thousands of refugees living in make-shift shelters on the sides of roads. Lacking anyassistance whatsoever, these families live underthe shelter of their vehicles, and riggings of plastic,wood, and cloth. At the time of our visit, therewas no waiting period for vehicles on the Iraqi sideseeking ently into Iran. We also observed refugeeswalking--sometime great distances--to nearbytowns to stock up on provisions. As dusk ap-proached, these refugees would stream back intothe camp areas with food, fuel, or other provi-sions.

Kordestan stood in marked contrastThere was no spontaneous settlement of refugeeson the road sides. Unlike Bakhtaran, where wewere permitted to go to the border (and where, infact, a CNN satellite was camped out for a weekbroadcasting live reports about the refugee influx),we were not permitted to approach the border.And, in interviewing the refugees in Kordestan, we

learned that most had had to wait for a period ofdays on the Iraqi side before being trucked to thecamps. The town of Marivan near the Iraqi bordeis populated by Iranian Kurds. Many of therefugees told us how private citizens had openedtheir homes, some for many days, allowing thetired and sick refugees to rest, bathe, sleep, andeat But others said that the authorities hadrounded them up from Marivan and forced theminto the camps against their will. We met awoman at the entrance of the Dolenav camp, whchad been delivered there just moments before."We were in the house of someone we knew inMarivan," she said. "The soldiers came and hit u,They made us come to this camp. They hit uswith the butt of their guns. They couldn't speakKurdish. They filled a bus in Marivan andbrought us here." While in Marivan, we watchedthe authorities loading refugees into a dump tructo take to one of the area camps. A young, well-dressed man made the mistake of approaching u:on the street, asking if there was a way we couldhelp him resettle in the West. He promptly wasapprehended and put in the truck with the other

To our eyes, the treatment in Kordestarilooked harsh, the freedom of movement strictlylimited. But it also made us remember what washappening to the Kurds on the border with Turkeor the Shi'a on the border with Kuwait and SaudiArabia. Movement in Iran was being controlled,but at least it was being allowed. Iran did notpush refugees away. Although Iraqi Kurds inIranian Kordestan are at times and in some placekept under a watchful eye, they have been ac-corded the right to seek asylum. Iran is providinjfood, shelter, and medicine, and, most impor-tantly, protection--protection which has beennotably lacking elsewhere. Relative to its neigh-bors, Iranian conduct with respect to the refugeehas been exemplary.

The Shi'a RefugeesThe 68,000 Shi'a refugees in Iran's southwest

province of Khuzestan are not looked upon withsuspicion by the Iranian authorities. They shareIran's interpretation of Islam, and exhibit a strdnsense of solidarity with the Islamic Republic. Moof these refugees arrived a month or more earlierthan the Kurds to the north. They are moresettled in, look healthier, enjoy a more varied diei

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But life in the camps of Khuzestan is still harsh.Temperatures even in April are oppressively hot;the air is thick with flies. In two months time,summer temperatures will reach 1300. Findingenough water and avoiding the outbreak of dis-ease will be the principal concern. For now, therefugees wait. Unlike the Kurds, whose leaders are

engaged in negotiations with Baghdad, the Shi'aseem less optimistic that a political solution willsoon allow them to go home. They also remainstunned by the destruction of Karbala and Najaf,two of the holiest cities for the Shl'a faithful

Most of the refugees we found in the Dezfulcamp had come from the Tanuma neighborhood of

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Basra on the east bank of the Shatt al Arab.Because the U.S. bombing had destroyed thebridges linking the two sides of the river, thoseliving in the western part of the city had beenforced to flee to the U.S.-occupied zone in south-ern Iraq, those in the east to Iran. We were told bythe refugees in Dezful camp that a group of newrefugees had just arrived and were staying tempo-rarily in the mosque in Dezful town. When wevisited them, we were surprised to learn that thenew arrivals had come from the U.S.-occupiedzone in southern Iraq, had flown to Tehran viaKuwaiti airlines, and had then been bused toKhuzestan province. We learned that Iran hadagreed to take some 2,000 Shi'a refugees throughthis circuitous route. In refugee parlance, thismeans that Iran not only has been fulfilling itsobligations as a country of "first asylum", but alsoof "third-country resettlement," which is consid-ered in the international refugee framework as astep that rises above the obligations of interna-tional law, marking the resettlement country asdemonstrating particular generosity and responsi-bility.

Another crisis involving Shi'a refugeeslooms on the horizon. Another 400,000 to600,000 Iraqi Shi'a are reportedly internallydisplaced in the marshlands near the Iranianborder. Information about this latter group issketchy, but about 500 per day were managing tocross into Khuzestan at the time of our visit.According to Mr. Hamidyanpour, the head of theIranian Red Crescent in Khuzestan province,"When they arrive, they are wet from head to toe.They have no shoes. They haven't eaten for six toeight days; they are sick, and many are wounded."He said the Iraqi army was blocking their exit toIran. Relief workers in Khuzestan told us thateight cases of cholera and two of plague had beenconfirmed among the newest arrivals, suggestinghow appalling conditions might actually be in themarshes and swamps on the Iraqi side.

Refugee Needs in IranThe Shi'a refugees in the south were the

first group to seek refuge in Iran. The stocks thathad been prepositioned in anticipation of 35,000Gulf War refugees were quickly expended onthem. Most of the Shi'a refugees whom we inter-

viewed in the south had been in their camps forabout two months. Consequently, they were mor<fully adjusted to their surroundings and showed'signs of having adapted to their environment,through, for example, the opening of modestbazaars on the roadside, where refugee entrepre-neurs would sell eggs, cigarettes, smoked fish, orother commodities acquired in nearby towns. Btlife could grow considerably more uncomfortablethe summer heat and and a massive new refugeeinflux could tip the balance toward a much moreprecarious existence.

The immediate needs of the Kurdish refu-gees were more obvious, and the medium termprospects no less daunting. The most vulnerableamong the Kurds were the babies. Many weredehydrated, near death. Some powdered milk wbecoming available, but the water was polluted,raising concerns that the milk would be contami-nated. Everyone had diarrhea. Human excre-ment turned areas in close proximity to the tentsinto breeding grounds for disease. Health work-ers voiced concern about the unhygienic condi-tions that could easily lead to outbreaks of ty-.phoid, hepatitis, and cholera.

Food was essentially limited to bread andpotatoes, sustaining life for the short term, but -offering little in the way of nutrition. The qualitywas poor and delivery irregular. The diet wassupplemented by dates, but precious little else.Rice, sugar, vegetable oil, beans or meat, fruitsand vegetables were rarities or nonexistent

Despite the lack of resources, starvationand epidemic disease have been averted, thankslargely to the efforts of the Iranian Red Crescent,which, almost overnight, constructed large camp,and rapidly identified and moved the most criti-cally ill. We rode in ambulances transporting thesick from the border to the nearest border town;we also flew aboard an Iranian army Herculestransport plane carrying sick and injured refugee-from Bakhtaran to Tehran. Refugees told us thaitheir children had been inoculated. Others -showed us bottles of medicine they had been giveby the authorities for their sick children.

In every city and town in which we trav-eled, we saw collection points for donations fromthe Iranian people. Even among the refugees wh<voiced complaints, expressions of gratitude towarthe people and government of Iran were nearly

6 Mass ErMass Er6

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Most of the refugees arrving in Iran were hungry, il and exhausted. Only a third were able to be sheltered in tents.Food, medicine, and clean water were in short supply. Middle East Watch/S. Marks

universal.But many bf the refugees would ask us

when international assistance would begin toappear. While it is true that there is little evi-dence of international assistance in the camps, itis also the case that the food, medicines, blankets,and tents that have arrived are generally notmarked in a way that readily identifies the source.We saw the manifests of the first 87 planeloads ofinternational relief to arrive, as of April 24. Tents,blankets, tarpaulins, kitchen sets, and high-protein biscuits were the most frequently listeditems. The logistics of moving these life-savinggoods to the most needy refugees has been ex-ceedingly difficult. The Iranian authorities havehad virtually no contact with international agen-cies, and the lines of authority within Iran itselfappeared to be a confusing web. The glitches have

been largely bureaucratic, exacerbated by a deepsuspicion and ambivalence about the presence offoreigners in Iran. As the first Americans thatmany of these officials had encountered in years,we often experienced first-hand the level of dis-trust and suspicion directed towards Americans.However, among other officials the welcome waswarmer, and, despite a sense expressed amongsome refugees of having been deceived by theUnited States about the U.S. level of support forthe resistance, most of the refugees--both Kurdishand Shi'a--did not seem especially hostile towardsthe United States or to us as Americans. Refugeeamong both groups said that the U.S. bombingcampaign of Iraq had in fact avoided civiliantargets. The recently arrived Shi'a refugees fromSafwan spoke highly of their treatment by the U.Smilitary in the occupied zone of southern Iraq.

Mass Exodus 77Mass Exodus

The Failure of Early WarningEver since the Ethiopian refugee crisis and

famine of 1984, the refugee assistance communityhas been preoccupied with the concept of "earlywarning"--the idea that we should be able to seethe danger signs of mass exoduses and eitherprevent them from occurring or prepare to handleflows before their arrival. The Iraqi exodus ofMarch and April 1991 was the first great test ofthe new early warning consciousness. Theinternational community failed the test.

The initial failure was more understand-able, but also had fewer tragic consequences.In the immediate aftermat of Iraq's invasion ofKuwait, it will be recalled, more than a millionpeople were displaced-- 750,000 to Jordan,300,000 to Saudi Arabia, about 70,000 to Syria,another 60,000 to Iran, and 40,000 each toTurkey and the United Arab Emirates. Thistidal wave of humanity initially swamped thenetwork of international agencies expected torespond to emergencies; in the first week ofSeptember 1990, about 75,000 persons, mostlyAsian expatriate workers, remained trapped in abarren and desolate stretch of desert along theIraq-Jordanian border. The ripple effects ofreturning migrants and the loss of revenuesrocked local economies not only In countriesclose to the epicenter, such as Jordan andEgypt, but on distant shores, as well.Bangladesh, Indian, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Thai-land, Sudan, and the Philippines all had to copewith the sudden entry of tens of thousands ofjob seekers and the loss of their remittances. Inthe wake of that first wave, other vulnerablegroups were buffeted: hundreds of thousands ofYemenis expelled from Saudi Arabia; and Pales-tinians throughout the region were made acutelyaware of being tossed in the turbulence withoutan anchor.

Fortunately, the overwhelming bulk of thedisplaced people in the first wave had no fear ofpersecution in their home countries, meaning thatthere was no essential political obstacle to theirrepatriation. The costs, indeed, were enormous,and the logistics of rapidly moving hundreds ofthousands of people, a nightmare. But it wasdoable. The displaced persons wanted to go home,their home countries were willing to accept them,

and no one--least of all the temporary host coun-tries, particularly Jordan--wanted them to remain.The international community, therefore, was ableto right itself and respond well to the crisis.

After the wave crested and crashed, how-ever, the trough afforded the international aidcommunity a brief respite. By late November1990, the movement had slowed considerably.From that time, until the air war began on Janu-ary 16, 1991, the number of third country nation-als crossing into Jordan had fallen to 10,000.After the air war began, few refugees managed toexit Iraq or Kuwait. Transportation out of Iraq wasdangerous and uncertain; the borders with Tur-key, Syria, and Saudi Arabia were virtually closed.Even after President Bush declared the ceasefireon February 28. the waters were relatively still. Bythe first week of March, less than a thousandpeople were housed in Jordanian transit camps,fewer than 300 in Syria, and a total of 4,455 inTurkey.

The slowdown, ironically, produced acertain level of anxiety for international assistanceagencies. There was plenty of discussion aboutpreparedness and "early warning'--in fact, amuch-lauded UN "Regional Humanitarian Plan ofAction" was developed to meet the contingenciesarising from the conflict. But attention remainedfocused on the immediate past, on Jordan,which had preoccupied everyone's attentionduring the first wave. Jordan raised the fearthat prepositioned stocks would sit idle and goto waste. At the time, the director of a leadingU.S. voluntary agency told this writer, "The bestminds of the refugee world were convinced thatJordan would be inundated. At last count, therewere 600 refugees in the Jordanian camp. Whatdo you do when you raise money specifically forevacuees in Jordan, and then are not able tospend it?"

The best minds of the refugee communitydid indeed meet in Geneva on March 5 and,according to the UNDRO account of the meeting,decided to "undertake no new activities toincrease capacity and make no new purchases/stockpiling. Preparedness arrangements shouldgo ahead in Turkey for target of 20,000 per-sons.... For Iran, state of preparedness fortarget of 35,000 will continue."

8 M~s Exodus

8a Mass Exo~dus

The disproportion of the response-when it finally did come-with triple thenumber of refugees in Iran receiving lessthan half of the relief funds as their com-patriots on the Turkish border, suggeststhat there might well have been a blind

spot with respect to Iran.

By the time the full force of the secondwave hit in the first week of April, when, in thecourse of a few days more than 700,000 refugeespoured into Iran and about half that number tothe Turkish border, it was as though there hadbeen no preparation whatsoever. Desperaterefugees struggled to cling to life in the bitter cold,rain, and mud without food, water, medicine, orshelter. Confessing to have the advantage ofhindsight, we still must ask: Could we haveprepared better for the second wave? Could apowerful undertow have been detected that wouldhave warned us of the impending force of thedeluge?

Iran might have provided the warning.Elsewhere, the numbers of new arrivals weremodest and mostly represented third countrynationals. In that first week of March, however,significant numbers of Iraqis were fleeing theircountry for the first time. Within a few days thatweek, 3,000 Iraqi Shi'as had entered Iran'sKhuzestan province. Another 5,000 crossed into1am province.

Did Iran's isolation from the West create ablind spot in the eyes of the international refugeecommunity, dominated as it is by Western agenciesand donors? While Iran itself can be faulted for a lackof openness, the movement of thousands of Shfarefugees was known to the outside world by mid-March. Did we discount the warning these refugeesprovided because of who they were--Shra, stigmatizedby the West as fanatics and terrorists? Did we careless about their plight, assuming them to be Iran'sproblem? Te crushing of the Shia revolt in thesouth preceded that of the Kurdish revolt in the northby two weeks. Saddam's helicopter gunships laidwaste to Iraq's holiest Shfa shrines of Najaf and

Karbala 12 days before they were turned on theKurdish civilians of Kirkuk. Should these actions-and the refugee flows they created-have commandedour attention and mobilized our response?

The disproportion of the response--when itfinally did come--with triple the number of refugees inIran receiving less than half of the relief funds as theircompatriots on the Turkish border, suggests thatthere might well have been a blind spot with respectto Iran.

Although early warning failed in this impor-tant instance, that is no reason to reject the conceptThere are lessons to be learned from failure as well assuccess. This particular failure seemed due less to alack of information than to a lack of will to act on thatinformation. Whether the warning signs were de-tected seemed to depend largely on the biases of thosegathering the information. If those detecting a flow ofShi'a refugees toward Iran have little sympathy eitherfor Shras or for Iran, the information will sit, and noresponse will be forthcoming. When the flowchanges to one of Kurds (a group looked uponsympathetically in the West) toward Turkey (a keyregional ally), the movement of refugees touchesoff alarm bells and mobilizes the internationalhumanitarian disaster response machinery.

Future ProspectsThe emergency assistance needs for the

Iraqi refugees in Iran are still unmet. There is stilla critical need for clean water. In its June 11bulletin on operations in Iran, UNHCR reported."All outstanding items in the water, sanitation,and health sectors need to be urgently procured."In order to avoid epidemics. this continues to bethe highest immediate priority for assistance. Theneeds for food and medicine, of course, will beongoing.

The other immediate need is theprepositioning of emergency stocks in Khuzestan.If the failure of early warning is not to be repeateda third time in the same region within the sameyear, we need to prepare now for a possible influxof massive numbers of Shi'a refugees from themarshland region in southern Iraq.

In the medium term, shelter looms as themajor concern. International relief agencies saythat the worldwide supply of tents has been

Mass Exodus 9

exhausted. Only about a third of the needed tentsfor Iran have been procured. But tents are, atbest, a temporary solution. If there is an abun-dant supply of one thing in Bakhtaran andKordestan, it is rocks. A supply of mortar--andpermission to build--would enable the Kurds tobegin Immediately to construct shelters that willwithstand the arctic-like wind and cold that willwhip through these mountain camps in about sixmonths. There is good precedent for this. In1988, following the Halabjah exodus, Iran didpermit construction of permanent structures forthe refugees. When we visited Bahramabad campin Kordestan, we saw these structures once againbeing Inhabited by the new arrivals. By contrastin Turkey, there still remain today refugees intents in the Mardin camp since 1988, because theauthorities have refused to move them to morepermanent structures.

Assistance has been complicated by suspi-cion and bureaucracy. Although PresidentRafsanjani has invited international agencies toassist Iran in helping the refugees, and privateagencies such as our own have been welcomedinto the country to assess refugee needs, coopera-tion has not been nearly as forthcoming in theprovinces where the refugees are located. We weremet with deep suspicion by many of the localofficials. The difficulties we encountered weresimilar to those of the other international humani-tarian agency personnel whom we met in thecourse of our travels in Iran. Thus far, despitethe good intentions of many Iranians who genu-inely welcome international humanitarian assis-tance, recalcitrant elements threaten to deralcooperative efforts. Iranians and members of theinternational community alike need to focusefforts on the refugees and their needs, and en-deavor to downplay the myriad--but irrelevant--differences that separate Iran from the West.

The U.S. role in the relief effort will, ofnecessity. be a delicate subject. Animosity towardthe U.S. government is still quite intense amongmany segments of the Iranian government andsociety. In order to minimize a recurrence of thecharges made after the first direct U.S. shipmentof blankets by some Iranian authorities that theUnited States was sending "rotten goods," the U.S.should avoid direct, bilateral assistance in favor of

contributions for Iraqi refugee relief in Iranthrough multilateral sources, such as the UNHCRand ICRC.

Aside from depoliticizing humanitarianassistance, channeling aid through these multilat-eral agencies strengthens their ability to fulfilltheir mandates in their entirety. Although emer-gency assistance has been necessary and bilateralcontributions have been welcome, as time goes onthe bilateral approach generally should be scaledback to enable the UNHCR, in particular, toeffectively promote refugee protection, whileproviding assistance.

While emergency assistance is essential, itdoes not solve the refugee crisis. The Kurdishpopulation, in particular, raises important con-cerns for protection. Thus far, Iran's conduct hasbeen proper. But skittishness about the Kurds isno secret. In the weeks and months ahead, theinternational community needs to be on guardthat rights to protection are not overlooked aspolitical solutions to the refugee problem aresought

The refugees we interviewed clearly articu-lated a well-founded fear of persecution in Iraq.Many said they would not return unless SaddamHussein were gone. They spoke of brothers andsons who had returned from exile in response toearlier amnesties who were arrested and neverseen again.

President Bush once said that Saddam's"credibility is zero, zilch." Should we expect theKurds or the Shi'a to have any more faith in hisword when it is their lives they will be putting onthe line?

President Bush once said that Saddam's"credibility is zero, zilch." Should weexpect the Kurds or the Shi'a to haveanymore faith in his word when it is

their lives they will be puttingon the line?

Voluntary repatriation is regarded as thedurable solution of first choice for refugees wher-ever they may be. But repatriation, when involun-

10 Mass Exodus

tary and to conditions of danger, is the worstoption, violating as it does the international lawprohibiting refoulement, the essence of the UNRefugee Convention and Protocol. Therefore,steps toward repatriation must be taken carefullyand with full regard for the principles of refugeeprotection. The UNHCR, with 40 years of experi-ence in seeking durable solutions, must be en-trusted with a key role in ensuring that refugeerights to protection are respected as solutions aresought

Spontaneous returns have begun, not onlyfrom the Turkish border, but from Iran as wel.More than 500,000 refugees are estimated byUNHCR to have returned from Iran to Iraq as ofJune 11 (with up to 700,000 remaining in Iran).We also observed movement back into Iraq atthe crossing point in Bakhtaran, although itwas difficult to determine the ultimate destina-

tion or permanence of those crossing to theother side. But the fact that some opt to retunvoluntarily to conditions that still may be un-certain should not imply that others should becompelled to do so. Refugee fear of returnneeds to be respected. In the case of Iraq, thershould be no question but that those fears arewell-founded.

This humanitarian crisis demands apolitical solution. The situation is still fluid anshould not be allowed to stagnate. The UnitedNations should seek to play a role, as part ofthe general post-war reconstruction effort topromote a resolution of the grievances thatcaused the Kurdish and Shi'a uprisings. Safezones may be an important element towardmaking voluntary repatriation possible alongthe Iranian as well as the Turkish border. But.ultimately, the root cause of the displacement

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Unable to be accommodated in tents or other structures, many thousands rigged their own shelters out of sticks and ragtMiddle East Watch/S. Marks

Mass Exodus 1 .

will need to be addressed. The Kurds haveclearly stated their political goal--autonomy Inthe context of a democratic Iraq. Similar senti-ments are found among the Shi'a. Given thedegree of involvement of the international com-munity in Iraq's internal affairs up to this time,and the success of the international communityin promoting peaceful, democratic change InNicaragua, Haiti, and Eastern Europe, renewedefforts should proceed on the diplomatic front tomake Saddam's promises of a transition todemocracy more than empty rhetoric and thereturn of refugees more than wistful hope.

Until such a political solution is reached,the U.S. Committee for Refugees offers thefollowing conclusions and recommendations:

Conclusions

1. At the peak of the refugee influz, Iranhosted the largest refugee population of anynation in the world, some 4.16 million refu-gees. The sudden arrival of 1.3 million refugeescame on top of the 2.35 million Afghan refugeesand another 400,000 Iraqi refugees whom Iranhas hosted for the past decade. At the close of theIran-Iraq war in 1988, the Iraqi regime turned itschemical weapons on Iraq's Kurdish villages,causing another influx of about 100,000 refugees.About 10,000 Kuwaitis also became refugees inIran following the Iraqi invasion of their country.

2. Despite hosting one of the largest refugeepopulations In the world, Iran received far lessinternational assistance In support of refugeesthan neighboring countries hosting refugees ofsimilar backgrounds and with comparable needs.

o For every dollar reportedly allocated perIraqi refugee in Iran from the beginning ofApril through mid-May, $7.60 was spentfor an Iraqi refugee on the Turkish-Iraqborder.

o Out of $207.6 million in U.S. contributionsfor Iraqi refugees and displaced persons, as ofMay 17, perhaps $20 million, at most, went toassist those in Iran.

3. Despite bureaucratic delays and run-inswith International personnel, Iran has basi-cally acted in a decent and proper mannerwith respect to the Iraqi refugees, especiallycompared to the treatment of these refugeesby other countries in the region. Iran haskept its border open, despite concerns for itsown security and the financial burden posed bythe greatest rate of refugee influx ever recordedby UNHCR.

4. The emergency assistance needs for refu-gees In Iran are still unmet, especially thecritical need for clean water. A full twomonths after the influx of Iraqi refugees intoIran, basic water and sanitation needs have notbeen met. Some 539,252 registered refugees,as well as 100,000 to 150,000 not registered incamps, continue to live on the margin withbarely adequate diet, health care, and shelter.

5. The situation inside Iraq is still unsettled,and could result In new Influxes to Iran or In.returnees remaining in the border regionbecause of insecurity in their home citiesand villages. Hundreds of thousands ofKurdish returnees and displaced persons con-tinue to live with no assistance at all on theIraqi side of the border in close proximity to theIranian frontier, including an estimated170,000 in the Savoje enclave across fromIranian Kordestan and a large but indetermi-nate number across from the Piranshahr cross-ing on Iran's West Azerbaijan border. An un-known number of Shi'a displaced persons--perhaps numbering from 400,000 to 700,000,according to Iranian government sources--arebelieved to be in the marshlands to the north ofBasra. As this report goes to press, Iran reportsthat this population is in imminent danger ofattack by Iraqi forces.

6. The refugees we Interviewed clearly ar-ticulated a well-founded fear of persecutionIn Iraq. Although considerable numbers ofrefugees have repatriated from both Turkeyand Iraq, most of the refugees we interviewedexpressed a reluctance to return unless theirpersonal safety could be assured. It should also

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Kurdish refugees gave consistent accounts of having been attacked by Iraqi helicopters as they were attempting to flee tothe Iranian border. This child from Kirkuk was the victim of a helicopter attack. Prior to fleeing, his father had been arrested bLthe Iraqi authorities. His mother fled with her seven children. All seven of ighe children were ill or injured.

Middle East Watch/S. Marks

be noted that virtually no repatriation has beenrecorded among the Shi'a refugee population inIran, as of mid-June.

Recommendations

1. Iraqi refugees in Iran should not be punishedbecause they have fled to a nation isolated fromthe Western world. The aid is for refugees, not forIran. The disproportionate response on behalf of Iraqirefugees in Iran--especially when compared to theintemational, and particularly American, responsetheir compatriots on the Turkish border--can still becorrected. While the refugee population on theTurkish border has subsided, more than 500,000refugees from this influx who remain in Iran are notlikely to repatriate soon. They will continue to need

Mass Exodus

international assistance and protection in the monthEahead.

2. The immediate priority Is for clean waterand adequate sanitation. To avoid epidemics,this continues to be the highest, immediate assis-tance priority.

3. Contingency stocks need to be pre-positioned In Khuzestan province In anticipa-tion of the possible influx of massive numbersof Shi'a refugees, a half million of whom areestimated by Iranian authorities to be trappedin the swamps to the north of Basra and underimminent threat by the Iraqi army. The Iraqileadership should be warned, particularly by theUnited States, that a renewed attack on this Shi'apopulation will not be tolerated. The interna-tional community should insist that a UN moni-

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toring team (presently in southern Iraq as thisreport goes to press) have complete access to thisregion to assess the threat to displaced persons inthe marshes. The response of the internationalcommunity should have three simultaneous andimmediate goals: first, to prevent further dis-placement from occurring; second, to assist thosecurrently displaced within Iraq; and third, toprepare for the possible arrival in Iran of refugeesfrom among this population.

4. In the coming months, extreme cold In thenorth and blistering heat in the south willmean death for refugees if more secure shelteris not found. International agencies say thesupply of tents worldwide has been exhausted,but there are other means of providing shelter thatcan be undertaken now. There is little time for"winterizing" the Kurdish camps, and even less formaking the Shi'a camps tolerable for the summer.Any delay is likely to cause unnecessary sufferingand have the coercive effect of forcing refugees toreturn to Iraq before they might feel safe enoughto do so.

5. The government of the Islamic Republic ofIran needs to remove bureaucratic and politicalobstacles that interfere with the internationalassistance pipeline. Although PresidentRafsanjani has invited international agencies toassist Iran in helping the refugees, and privateagencies such as our own have been welcomedinto the country to assess refugee needs, coopera-tion has not been nearly as forthcoming in theprovinces where the refugees are located. Thusfar, despite the good intentions of many Iranianswho genuinely welcome international humanitar-ian assistance, recalcitrant elements threaten toderail cooperative efforts. Iranians and membersof the international community alike need to focuson the humanitarian task at hand, and not allowpolitical and cultural differences to interfere withthe job of assisting and protecting the refugees.

6. The U.S. should not allow Its prickly rela-tionship with the Islamic Republic to Inhibitcontributions on behalf of the Iraqi refugees inIran. The U.S. should direct its contributionsthrough multilateral agencies, such as the UNHigh Commissioner for Refugees, or the Inter-

national Committee of the Red Cross, ratherthan direct, bilateral assistance. This will makeless likely the chance for a repeat of the type ofrecriminations leveled after the first directplaneload of blankets was donated by the UnitedStates. While multilateral aid means less creditfor the individual donor, it also means less blame.The multilateral approach has the immediatebenefit of lowering the political heat and minimiz-ing potential conflicts between the United Statesand Iran over aid controversies.

7. The International donor community as awhole should channel aid for Iraqi refugees InIran through multilateral humanitarian agen-cies in order to enhance their ability to protectrefugees' rights while political solutions to therefugee problem are sought. Bilateral assis-tance, while filling an emergency need, tends toundermine the ability of humanitarian agencies tofulfill their mandates. The UNHCR, in particular,has an important protection role to play in Iran, aswell as an assistance role. Given the vulnerability ofthe Kurdish refugees, international monitoring ontheir behalf is an essential part of the UNHCR mis-sion. Uncoordinated arrival of bilateral assistanceundercuts the ability of UNHCR to perform its protec-tion mandate, and, at the same time, jeopardizes thehumanitarian and apolitical character of the interna-tional response.

8. Steps toward repatriation must be takencarefully and with full regard for the principles ofrefugee protection. UNHCR must be entrustedwith the key role In ensuring that refugee rlqhtsto protection are respected while solutions aresought No refugee should be coerced into returning;each refugee should be accorded the right to contin-ued asylum if he or she personally continues to fearpersecution in Iraq.

9. The International community needs to assewhy it failed to prepare adequately for thisrefugee emergency despite warning signals ofthe impending crisis. Lessons for the futureshould be drawn, not only about safe havens,international guarantees, the use of the military forhumanitarian emergencies, but also about how andwhy "early warning" failed to anticipate or avert thedisaster that came.

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14 Mass Exodus