mass killings in aceh

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  • r

    1865

  • BACKGROUNDER WJXO
  • 1. A Brief History of Aceh The history of Aceh is a long and impressive one. The Acehnese Sultanate was once the most powerful in the region and in the 16th and 17th centuries was almost permanenlly at war with kingdoms in Malacca and with the Portuguese. During the reign of Sultan Iskandar Muda (1607-1636), Aceh controlled parts of the mainland including Johore, Pahang, Kedah and Perak. It was during this period that a distinct Acehnese culture came into being, with strong Muslim values becoming intertwined with Acehnese social structures. The Acehnese proudly call their region "Serambi Mekah", the Verandah of Mecca'. They are a distinct people, influenced by their contacts with Arabs, Indians and Portuguese. Banda Aceh, the capital, is nearer to Asian capitals like Singapore, Rangoon, Pnom Penh and Colombo than to Jakarta.

    When the various parts of the Indonesian archipelago were incorporated into the Dutch colonial empire, Aceh proved to be one of the most difficult areas for the Dutch to subdue. In 1903 after 30 years of war, the Dutch more or less managed to pacify Aceh but resistance was never really extinguished. After the Japanese occupation from 1942 - 1945, the Dutch fought to restore their rule over the archipelago but Aceh was the one place where they did not even try.

    Following the transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia in 1949, a Muslim-inspired rebellion in Aceh fought the Republic of Indonesia for more than a decade and only after long deliberations and the promise of special status did the Acehnese agree to become part of the Indonesian Republic. Daud Beureuh, who died in 1988, was the leader of the rebellion and won concessions from Jakarta. Both Indonesian presidents, Sukarno and Suharto, recognised that they had to treat Aceh with greater caution than other parts of the country.

    Aware of the sensitivity of the relationship with Aceh, the authorities in Jakarta avoided imposing too much control from the centre in religious and educational affairs. Aceh was the last bastion of the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP), formerly a Muslim party federation, while the government party, G O L K A R , always suffered heavy defeats in elections despite heavy-handed manipulations. In 1982 Aceh was the only province to send a majority of non-GOLKAR MPs to Parliament.

    Only after the PPP was forced to shed its Muslim character in 1986 and accept the Pancasila state ideology did G O L K A R manage to creep forward. GOLKAR fortunes in Aceh improved at the 1987 elections after a devout Muslim of Acehnese birth was appointed governor. By making promises of material gains in the form of development projects, the governor convinced many Muslims to switch to GOLKAR. Even so, GOLKAR's 1987 victory in 1987 was shaky while the PPP held its majority in the three northern districts, Aceh Besar, Pidie and Aceh Utara.

    The G O L K A R victory in Aceh led some Aceh watchers to draw hasty conclusions about the rapid pace of "Indonesianisation", believing the Acehnese had starting to accept the notion of being Indonesian first and Acehnese second. But developments since 1989 belie that assessment.

    2. The Roots of the Conflict On 4 December 1976 Tengku Hasan di Tiro proclaimed the Independence of Aceh/Sumatra, "reestablishing Aceh as the successor state to the historie state of Aceh". In this re-declaration as he called it, Hasan di Tiro, the chairman of the Aceh/Sumatra National Liberation Front and head of state of Aceh/Sumatra, declared Aceh "free and independent from all political control of the foreign regime of Jakarta and the alien people of the island of Java ".

    Hasan di Tiro, as the direct descendant of the Tengku di Tiros who ruled Aceh and fought the Dutch, was born in Tiro in the Pidie district of North Aceh, now one of the strongholds of the GAM. The Tengku di Tiro dynasty has by tradition ruled also as the religious leaders of Aceh and in this connection fought a holy war against the Dutch infidels in the late 19th century. Hasan di Tiro has taken" it upon himself to piek up the banner of Aceh independence from his forebears. His independence declaration came after he had lived for more than two decades as a refugee from the Sukarno regime in the US where he built up substantial business interests.

    The first phase of the insurrection began a year before the 1977 general election in Indonesia and intensified friction between the Acehnese nationalists and the Indonesian authorities. Many of the 1976 gcr.eration of GAM activists were killed or imprisoned, while others fled the country and are now exiled in Swcden. From 1977 to 1979, hundreds of Acehnese nationalists were incarcerated for alleged involvement with the GAM. Hasan di Tiro, who has been able to move easily in and out of Aceh, went abroad to reorganise the struggle and rally support from outside. Now it appears that GAM forces are everywhere.

    The second phase of the insurrection began in 1989 and achieved much greater success. The eighties were used to develop a better organisational structure for GAM and many young Acehnese received

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  • training abroad. Hasan di Tiro does not conceal the fact that Libya has provided scholarships and military training for young GAM activists; he argues that the Indonesian military also receive training abroad, in western countries. Several thousand trained Acehnese guerrillas may have joined the armed struggle against the government in Jakarta, and they appear to be well supplied with firearms.

    3. Social and Economie Aspects The insurrection found fertile soil in the region, in particular in the areas along the north-eastern coast where an industrial boom has been under way for the last decade. The local people have gained nothing from the boom which has relied on a workforce from other parts of the archipelago. Aceh is a leading producer of natural rubber, coffee, tobacco, pepper and coconut oil and possesses vast areas of tropical rainforest. The development of a plantation economy has created deep cleavages between the new settlers from Java - the transmigrants - and the local population. With the indigenous population disgruntled by their marginalisation in the rush for industrial growth, Hasan di Tiro has attracted widespread support from the Acehnese, already steeped in the tradition of otherness and a separate national heritage. Numerous clashes have occurred between ABRI and armed GAM units, disrupting daily life in Aceh. The cautious approach Jakarta took towards the Acehnese has now been replaced by a frenzy of brutality. Methods used during the mass killings of 1965/66 and during the barbarous military operations in East Timor are now being repeated in Aceh.

    Aceh is rich in natural resources. It contributes some 30% of Indonesia's oil and gas exports. The Arun complex is the largest LNG (liquified natural gas) facility in the world and has made Indonesia the world's leading L N G exporter. The discovery of the Arun natural gas field in 1971 changed the social complexion of the eastern coast of Aceh. This huge complex in Lhokseumawe with associated industries has transformed the population pattern. Industrialisation has attracted many outsiders, with most jobs in hi-tech plants like Arun reserved for qualified engineers and managers from elsewhere. The new professionals live in fenced-off enclaves with their own shops, schools, hospitals and golf-links. The Arun plant, known by the initials PTA, is disparagingly referred to by the locals as 'pantang terima orang Aceh' or 'no jobs for the Acehnese'. The PT Arun plant has become the centrepiece of Indonesia's energy industry; last year Jakarta quietly moved 3,000 special troops to Lhokseumawe to guard the Arun compound and the other projects that have mushroomed around it.

    Many other industrial plants have been set up along the north-east coast. They include PT Kertas Kraft Aceh, partly owned by the Suharto family, with an output of 165 thousand tons of cement-bags a year. Other new installations are PT Aceh Asean Fertilizer and another giant fertiliser plant, Pabrik Pupuk Iskandar Muda. The industrial boom is concentrated in the three north-eastern districts of Pidie, Aceh Utara and Aceh Timur, the heartland of the armed nationalist Acehnese rebellion.

    The eastern part is also traditionally the agricultural centre of Aceh. During the agri-business boom of the eighties many plantations were established, both state and privately owned, attracting many Javanese transmigrants. Within a short period, the industrial and agribusiness boom has caused the population to expand, reaching a density of 105/km2, five times that in the west.

    These developments have widened the gap between the Acehnese and the newcomers. The powerful undercurrent of distrust for everything emanating from Jakarta has been greatly reinforced. Local people feel that Aceh's distinct traditions are being submerged by newcomers bringing different values. An alien set of criteria for land ownership, the use of workers in cash erop plantations, modern entertainment such as third rate soft-porn western films, oriental video and the like have come as a cultural shock for the more traditional Acehnese. Moreover, the Acehnese feel like second-class citizens in their own country, with all the best jobs are reserved for the non-Acehnese.

    GAM has made the state and privately-owncd PT Arun and PT K K A the strategie target for their activities; since late 1989 many armed clashes have occurred between the guerrillas and the Indonesian military. So far the guerrillas have not managed to penetrate the heavily guarded PT Arun while PT K K A was reportedly attacked and a sentry ambushed. Reports of a fire at PT K K A are difficult to verify.

    4. Human Rights Violations Reports of human rights violations in Aceh began to appear intermittently in the national and international press during 1990. But reporting in the Indonesian press has now been limited to the official government version after warnings to the editors. Amnesty International and Asia Watch have expressed deep concern at the massive scale of human rights abuses in the area. A submission about the atrocities was made by TAPOL at the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva in February this year.

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  • While in the first half of 1989 it appeared that the Indonesian military were fighting a limited war against armed units of GAM, by July 1989 ABRI was using heavy handed methods reminiscent of the brutal pacification of East Timor between 1975-1985. Summary executions, random mass arrests and barbaric torture, disappearances, 12-hour curfews, house-to-house searches and the deliberate creation of an atmosphere of fear and terror are now the order of the day.

    Some people in government argue that ambushes and attacks against isolated army and police posts by the armed rebel units justify the heavy handed measures taken by the Indonesian army in retaliation, but the high death toll and wanton killing of civilians testify to the brutality of the Indonesian military.

    In November 1990 Major-General Djoko Pramono, military commander of North Sumatra, admitted that many people had been killed in Aceh and that killings were occurring every day. In his own words the military commander made it clear that killing people suspected of being rebels was official policy. He said:

    / have told the people the important thing is, if you see a GPK, you should kill hint. There's no need to investigate. Just shoot hm or knife hint. People are forced to do this or that and if they don't want to, they are shot or gel their throats slit. So I have instructed people to carry weapons, machetes or whatever. If you see a GPK, just kill him. [Tempo, 17 November 1990] [NB: 'GPK' stands for 'Gerombolan Pengacau Keamanan' or 'security disruptor gangs', the term officially used for GAM.]

    Killings Estimates of the death toll since mid 1990 range from a conservative figure of 2,000 to 10,000, the figure used by Hasan di Tiro. Both GAM and the Indonesian army have been responsible for killings but GAM armed units have been selective, targeting military, police, informers and occasionally, Javanese working in factories or on plantations. The Indonesian army has been responsible for the vast majority of the killings which have been perpetrated in a systematic way. In the early period, before the Indonesian press became wary of reporting atrocities in Aceh, several journals revealed that the random killing of civilians was becoming widespread.

    A variety of motives lie behind the killings. Revenge for the ambush of police or military personnel. Intensive military operations have been

    conducted in the mountainous area of Pidie district, in parts of the North Aceh district and in the coastal areas of the East Aceh district. In these three districts the military have exhorted the local people to become vigilantes and take part in army-conducted manhunts of alleged rebels. Many hundreds of youngsters, organised in 'bands to defend the state', have been armed with spears and traditional daggers to chase and kill rebels in the forests and mountains.

    As a warning to Acehnese not to join the ranks of the rebels. People have been shot and their bodies left by the roadside, in rivers or in the felds, to be discovered and hastily buried by local people, creating an atmosphere of fear. With few exceptions, relatives have refrained from filing complaints to the authorities for fear of reprisals. Most of the dead have been buried without being identified

    As a way to dispose of detainees. By the end of 1990 the prisons and garrisons were overflowing with prisoners; it is thought that the general view among army officers was to bring only a small number of prisoners to trial. So, what to do with the rest? While some have been released after they were forced to sign loyalty statements and attend loyalty ceremonies, dozens, perhaps hundreds, have been summarily shot.

    Mass killings and public executions Reports about mass killings began to leak out late last year but recent reports in the international press reveal the gravty of the situation.

    In June 1991, a Dutch journalist published accounts of two mass murders in Aceh. One occurred on 12 September 1990 on ihe road from Bireuen to Takengon at the 25km marker. A truck carrying 56 detainees from Rancong Prison, Lhokseumawe stopped and the detainees were forced to alight; all were shot dead and their bodies thrown down a ravine. Another massacre occurred on the 'KKA' road (named after the paper factory, Kertas Kraft Aceh) along which pine logs are transportcd to the coast for the production of cement-bags. Last December, a Javanese truck driver was shot dead. In April, a truck took 41 men and women 30km from Takengon where they were shot dead. Local people insist that the murders were the work of army death squads wearing civilian clothing.

    On 15 May, Reuter reported five public executions by the Indonesian military, quoting a resident of Sigli: "On Saturday night (May 4) they shot five people in public in Sigli in front of everyone. I saw it with my own eyes."

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  • Such incidents which have come to light as a result of brief investigations by journalists suggest that Aceh has been turned into a killing field, in Jakarta's desperate bid to crush a revolt that threatens an important lifeline of the Indonesian economy.

    Arrests, torture and intimidation Besides official detention centres and prisons, people have been locked up in a variety of military garrisons, police stations or special houses. The three most frequently mentioncd are the detention centre of the Bukit Barisan military command in Medan, known as Gaperta, the Rancong camp (barracks of the special red-beret troops) and the military detention centre in Lhokseumawe. Arrests occur without warrants, torture is routine and relatives are hardly ever informed of the whereabouts of the detainee. The following pattern of arrests has emerged:

    Villagers are rounded up after a GAM action, taken from the village and held for a time. Reports of such incidents vary but in all cases people are routinely beaten. After interrogation, some are released while others are transferred to other detention centres. Relatives are not informed of the detainee's where-abouts.

    There are arrests of persons who have been blacklisted or who were previously arrested. Among those picked up in the first wave of arrests were many who had been incarcerated in the late seventies.

    People are arrested because army intelligence believe they can provide information. It is believed that Indonesian intelligence agents have set up a fake GAM network in neighbouring Malaysia where many Acehnese activists have taken refuge. By means of infiltration, the Indonesian intelligence are trying to trap many new GAM recruits.

    Arrests are followed by stage-managed political trials. The Indonesian judiciary has a long tradition of conducting political trials in order to construct a subversion case around the alleged terrorist activities of a movement and as a showcase for foreign consumption. So far, 24 trials have been announced and more are likely to follow. None of the defendants tried thus far appear to be leading GAM activists. The charges against the defendants lack substance. The nature of the trials suggests that the Indonesian military have failed to track down the leadership of the movement but are staging the trials to prove to the outside world that GAM is a dangerous terrorist organisation. The triais have proceeded at such a pace that it has been difficult to obtain a comprehensive picture. Most trials have lasted for only in 3 or 4 sessions. Most sentences are between 10 and 15 years and human rights lawyers have described the trials as a fraud; defence teams must have the approval of the military and the judges have shown little respect for the rules. [The June 1991 Asia Watch Report gives a comprehensive analysis of the trials.]

    Torture Torture is common, usually starting with severe beatings with rifle butts and kicks at the time of the arrest, followed by torture during interrogation. Methods include electric shocks to sensitive parts of the body, often the genitals, the use of burning cigarettes on the body, beatings with blocks of wood and the use of crude torture instruments for a long period of time. Some defendants were seen to be in bad physical shape at the trials.

    A Black Paper issued by the Information Department of the Aceh/Sumatra National Liberation Front (Black Paper) gives details of the commonest forms of torture:

    - squeezing testicles with pliers; - holding down the victim's feet under heavy chairs on which soldiers sit, till the victim's toes are broken; - nailing down the victim's hand as if for crucifixion; - immersing the victim in boiling water; - placing the victim in a pool of filthy water for hours or days at a stretch; - stringing the victim upside down; - using cigarettes or hot irons to inflict burns.

    The use of torture is commonplace to extract confessions in signed interrogation reports (Berita Acara Pemeriksaan, BAF). The confessions are constructed in such a way as to provide convincing proof of a conspiracy concocted by the authorities. In many cases, the events mentioned in the confessions never even occurred. Defendants appear as witness for the prosecution in other trials being held concurrently and come

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  • with testimonies that all fit into a grand scheme of conspiracy against the state. The courts routinely reject pleas that the confessions were extracted by force.

    Intimidation In the districts of Pidie, North Aceh and East Aceh, people live under wartime conditions. There are travel restrictions and after-dark curfews which are imposed without advanced notice or official proclamation. Anyone caught violating these regulations faces grave consequences. In villages where frequent GAM activities have occurred, people have been assembled and forced to read out pledges of allegiance to the Indonesian republic and the Pancasila, the state doctrine, in the presence of military and government authorities. They are then made to parade round the town, waving the Indonesian flag. A report in the Los Angeles Times [15 June 1991] quotes an Acehnese resident as describing how an army officer, wanting to intimidate an entire town, "fires a single shot in the air, at which point all single males must run to a central square before the soldier fires a second shot. Then, anyone arriving late or not leaving home is shot on the spot."

    Released prisoners have been forced to sign loyalty pledges promising not to follow the Hasan di Tiro and to refrain from participating actively or passively in activities that are considered to be a threat to order and political stability.

    The war has disrupted life in many villages and some families living along the east coast have taken the decision to leave their homes, fleeing by boat to Malaysia. More than 200 refugees have reached the beaches of Penang. No doubt many more would follow but naval patrols have been reinforced, making the crossing extremely hazardous. Fishermen have been prevented from taking out their boats and some suspected of transporting people across the narrow straits have been shot dead.

    5 The International Dimension Western governments have taken no concrete action to condemn the atrocities in Aceh. The U K and U S governments have privately expressed concern to the Indonesian Government but only the European Parliament has expressed public concern by passing a resolution calling on the Indonesian authorities to stop the killings and torture, and appealing to member states to ban the supply of arms to Indonesia.

    But the flow of weapons and military assistance from Western governments to Indonesia continues. In June 1991, a new agreement was concluded between British Aerospace and the Indonesian state aerospace company, IPTN, for the co-production of Hawk fighter/trainer jets. In the last two decades, British arms manufacturers, aided and encouraged by the Government, have concluded many deals with Indonesia which is now British Aerospace's main customer outside the Middle East.

    The Standard response to protests about the sale of war equipment to Indonesia is that it can be justified "when sold to meet legitimate defence needs.... We pay particular attention to the human rights record of the country concerned and do not agree to the supply of equipment which, in our judgement, is likely to be used for internal repression." [Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd to Timothy Raison M P , 3 Apr i l 1990.] The government refuses to acknowledge that by selling arms to the Suharto regime, it is bolstering its armed forces which are engaged in violent repression and gross violations of human rights.

    The flight of Acehnese refugees to Malaysia has added a further dimension to the conflict in Aceh. The Malaysian government, under pressure from Indonesia, announced that the refugees would be returned. The threat has not yet been carried out, but the situation of the refugees is not secure as Kuala Lumpur, in defiance of international law, has refused to allow the U N High Commission for Refugees access to the refugees to determine their status and decide whether they are entitled to asylum.

    Resources Tapol Bulletin no. 94, 96, 99, 100-105 Asia Watch Report: Indonesia: Hurnan Rights Abuses in Aceh, December 27, 1990 Asia Watch Report: Indonesia: Continuing Human Rights Violations in Aceh, June 19, 1991 N R C Handelsblad [ 13 Apr i l 1991 & 1 June 1991 ] Memorandum from Tengku Hasan di Tiro to the Lord Avebury, January 11, 1991 A Black Paper, Information Dept. A S N L F , November 1, 1990 Los Angeles Times [ 16 June 1991 ]

    Tempo [ 17 November 1990 ] and reporls from other Indonesian dailies and weeklies.

    27 June 1991

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