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Original pagination: p.113-135 1

GreekOntologyandthe'Is'ofTruth

MOHANMATTHEN

Thisisanessayabouttheontologicalpresuppositionsofacertainuseof'is'inGreek

philosophy Ishalldescribeitinthefirstpartandpresentahypothesisaboutits

semanticsinthesecond.

Ibelievethatmystudyhasmorethanesotericinterest.First,itprovidesan

alternativesemanticaccountofwhatCharlesKahnhascalledthe'is'oftruth,thereby

sheddinglightonanumberofissuesinGreekontology,includinganEleaticparadoxof

changeandAristotle'sresponsetoit.Second,itfindsinthesemanticsofGreekabasis

foradmittingwhathavebeencalled'nonsubstantialindividuals'or'immanent

characters'intoaccountsofGreekontology.Third,ityieldsaninterpretationof

Aristotle'stalkof'unities'whichiscrucialtohistreatmentofsubstanceinthecentral

booksoftheMetaphysics.

I.ACOMPREHENSIVEUSEOFABSOLUTE'IS'

I.1SomeExamples

Thereisauseof'is'inGreekphilosophythatcomprehendsboththeideaexpressedby

our'is'ofexistence(whetherornotthatmarksaseparateuseof'is'inGreek)andthat

expressedbythecopula.Forexample,AristotlesometimesstatesthePrincipleofNon

Contradictioninthisway:"Itisimpossibleforthesamethingbothtobeandnottobe".

Itisobviousfromthegeneralityofthisprinciplethateventhoughtheuseof'is'it

containsisabsolute(andwouldthusnormallybeidentifiedasdenotingexistence),itis

meanttocomprehendbothexistentialandpredicativestatesofaffairs thatis,it

prohibitsathingexistingaswellasnotexisting,andequallyitprohibitsathingbeing

bothFandnotFforanyvalueof'F'.1(SimilarlyforPlato'scategoryofthings"thatare

andarenot" Republic478de thesearethingsthatbothexistandfailtoexist,thatare

FaswellasnotF.)

Therearemanyotherexamplesofthisuseof'is'.Thusconsiderthegeneralityof

Plato'sandAristotle'sdefinitionoffalsity(andofAristotle'scorrespondingdefinitionof

truth):Tosaythatwhatisisnotandwhatisnotisisfalse.(SeeSophist,240deandMet,

1011b2627).Again,thereisAristotle'sstatementatDeInterpretatione19a23:'What

isnecessarilyiswhenitis;andwhatisnotnecessarilyisnotwhenitisnot'etc.Thisis

supposedtocovernotonlyexistentialsituationslikethatalludedtoin'Therewillbea

seabattletomorrow',butalsosituationsthatAristotlehimselfcharacterizespredicatively,asin'Thiscoatwillbecutup'.FromanearlierperiodthereisProtagoras'

famousdictum:'Manisthemeasureofallthings,ofwhatisthatitis,ofwhatisnotthat

itisnot'.Obviouslythisappliestowhatisabsolutely,butasPlatounderstooditinthe

Theaetetus,italsoappliestowhetherthewindiscold,orwhetherthewineisbitter.

I.2HowNotToTreatTheseExamples


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Theoccurrencesof'is'abovecannoteasilybeassimilatedtoanyofthemorefamiliar

usesof'is'.Forexample,theycannotbetreatedasinstancesofthesocalled

'incompletecopula'2becausetheprinciplesinwhichtheyoccurrangealsoover

existentialsituationsbestdescribedintermsofabsolute'is'.3Conversely,theycannot

(giventhenormallyacceptedexistentobjects,individualsubstancesandproperties)betreatedasinvolvingthe'is'ofexistencebecausethiswouldleaveoutpredicativestates

ofaffairs.

Itmightbethoughtthatagoodwaytodescribeouruseof'is'isasakindof

schematicvariable,thatisasstandingfornoonenotion,butdoingdoubledutyfortwo

ormoredifferentnotions,standingforwhicheverismostappropriateatagiven

moment.Thusonemightbeinclinedtosaysomethinglikethis:"WhenPlatosaysthat

sensiblethingsbothareandarenot,hemeansboththattheyexistanddonotexistas

wellasthattheyareFandnotFforatleastsomevaluesof'F'."

Usefulthoughsuchaperiphrasismightbeasareminderoftherangeofthe

quantifiersthatmightgovernoccurrencesofour'is',forexampleintheprincipleofnon

contradiction,itisclearlyinadequateasatheoryofhow'is'comestobeusedinthis

way.Afterall,itsoundsgrammaticallyunacceptabletoabbreviate'isF'by'is'(exceptin

thelimitedrangeofcasesmentionedinnote2),andsoweneedtoexplainhow

philosopherssodiverseintimeandstyleasProtagoras,PlatoandAristotlecametouse

soopaqueastylisticdevice.

Theproblembecomesparticularlyacutewhenwenoticethattherearetimes

whenthesephilosophersseemtotreatcomprehensiveusesof'is'asstandingfora

unitarynotion.Threeimportantexamplesofthismaybementionedhere.Platoslides,

asKahnhasnoticed,4betweentwoformulationsoftheeternalityofForms hesays,

withnoindicationthatthesearedifferent,boththatsomethingiseternallyFandthat

theFitselfiseternally.Inasimilarvein,Aristotleputshistheoryofcategoriesindifferentways,sayingsometimesthat'is'issaidinmanyways(EN,1096a23),

sometimesthatthecategoriesare"figuresofpredication"(Met,1017a23),andinyet

otherplacesthatthecategoriesarekindsofthethingsthatare(Cat,Ib25:notethat

ontaembodiesanabsoluteconstructionofeinai).ItisasifAristotledoesnotdistinguish

herebetweentheclaimsthattherearemanysortsof'isF'constructions,thatthereare

manysortsofexistence,andthattherearemanyusesoftheverb'tobe'.Finally,we

shouldnoteanunusuallyexplicituseofthe'AnFis'/'SomethingisF'transformation.In

describingProtagoreanrelativismintheTheaetetus(156ff.),Platodescribesatheoryof

perceptioninwhichaperceiverandathingperceivedcometogether,therebybegetting

"twins",one

ofwhich

isasensation

and

the

other

issomething

described,

for

example,

asawhiteness(156d),asweetness(159d)orabitterness(159e).Theresultofthis

birthisthatthepassiveparent,thethingperceived,comestobecharacterizedbythe

correspondingadjective thatis,itbecomeswhite,orsweet,orbitter."Theobjectthat

joinedinbegettingthecolourisfilledwithwhitenessandbecomesinitsturn,not

whitenessbutwhite,whetheritbestickorstone"(56e;cf.159de).Hereanequivalence

isestablishedbetween'(An)Fnesscomestobe'and'SomethingcomestobeF.5


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Allthesephilosophers(IamassumingthatProtagoraswasaccurately

representedbyPlato,butifthisisfalseread'Plato'sProtagoras'for'Protagoras')were

making,intheexamplescited,claimsinthetheoryofBeing:Platoisinterestedin

establishingthatForms(ascontrastedwithsensibles)arethingsthatare(notthings

thatareandarenot),AristotleinshowingthatthereisnotjustonekindofBeing,and

ProtagorasinshowingthatBeingismeasuredbymen.ButBeingherecomprehends,aswehaveseen,boththeexistentialandthepredicative,andtheformulationofthese

claimsdisplaysastrangeambivalencebetweenthe'is'ofpredicationandthatof

existence6 justthatambivalencethatwefoundinour'is'.Thisseemstoshowthat

Greekphilosopherstendtotreatour'is'asunitary,oratleastthattheytreatitas

correspondingtosomeunitarynotionofBeing.Itisthusnotmerelybyplaceholding

thatitacquiresitscomprehensiveness.

I.3AFormalCharacterizationofComprehensive'Is'

LetuslookonceagainatAristotle'sonticstatementoftheprincipleofnoncontradiction

(e.g.atMet,1006a45).

O:Itisimpossibleforthesamethingbothtobeandnottobe.

Evidently(seenote1),thisprincipleismeanttobeequivalenttoapredicative

statement:

P:Itisimpossibleforthesamethingbothtobelongandnottobelongtothesamething

atthesametime(+somequalificationsthatdonotconcernushere:Met,1005b18).

TheconditionunderwhichPandOareequivalentis:

C1:Forallxandythereisazsuchthatxbelongstoyifandonlyifzis.7

ThusAristotle'suseofOandPtostatethesamelawimpliesthatheatleastimplicitly

subscribestoCl.

AsimilarresultcanbeobtainedbyscrutinizingAristotle'sdefinitionsoftruthand

falsityatMetaphysics1011b25:ajudgementistrueifitsaysthatwhatisisorwhatis

notisnot,otherwiseitisfalse.Byinspectingthedefiniensanddefiniendumwederive:

C2:For

all

propositions,

p,there

isan

xsuch

that

pistrue

ifand

only

ifxis.

C2accountsalsoforthe(presumed)equivalenceoftheonticstatementofnon

contradictionabovewiththealethicstatementoftheprincipleatMetaphysics1011b

14.

CIandC2constitutewhatIhavebeencallingthecomprehensivenessofthe'is'

thatwearediscussing.AndC2istheconditionthatjustifiescallingit'the'is'oftruth'.

OurtaskistoexplainwhyGreekontologistsacceptedtheseprinciples.


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I.4FurtherEvidenceandTwoBadTheories

Aninterestingapplicationofour"comprehensivenessaxioms"comesinconnectionwith

change.AtDeGenetCorr316b34317a10,319b2531andPhysics190a1012,

Aristotlemaintainsthateveryalterationisaccompaniedbyaperishingandacreation.Suppose,forexample,thatamanceasestobeartistic.Thischangeinthemanis

simultaneouslyaccompanied,hesays,byacreationofanunartisticandaperishingof

anartisticorbythecreationofanunartisticmanandtheperishingofanartisticman.

(Hedoessaythatthesearenotcreationsorperishingsinanunqualifiedsense.Thisisa

pointthatwillconcernuslater.Forthemomentweshallbeconcernedonlywithwhy

theyarecreationsorgenerationsinanysense.)

ThispointispresupposedalsobyAristotle'scharacterizationofpoiesisas

concernedwithgenesis(EN,1140a10).ItisevidentthatAristotleisherecontrasting

poiesis,anactivitythatderivesitsvaluefromaconsequence,withpraxis,anactivity

thathas"intrinsic"value(i.e.regardlessofwhatmightresultfromit),andthatthis

distinctionhasnothingwhatevertodowithwhethersomepreviouslynonexistentthing

isbroughtintobeing.Forexample,medicineinvolvespoiesis,thoughtypicallyweshould

notwanttosaythatitbringsanythingintobeing;ratheritbringsamantohealth.The

pointthatAristotleismakingisthatitisessentialtopoieseisthattheycreatechanged

circumstances,forthesegivethemtheirvalue.Butaccordingtotheterminology

establishedintheDeGenetCorrandPhysics,anychangeisaccompaniedbyagenesis;

thereisnodifferencebetweensayingthatanactivityresultsinchangedcircumstances,

andsayingthatitisconcernedwithgenesis.

EvidentlyClandC2groundtheseotherwisepuzzlingassertions.Acreation

occurswhensomethingthatwasnotcomestobe.Analteration,ontheotherhand,

occurswhensomethingthatwasnotFcomestobeF,orwhenafalse(undated)statementcomestobetrue.(SeeCat,4a22ff.)ButaccordingtoC1somethingisifand

onlyifxisF,andaccordingtoC2somethingisifandonlyifp.ThusifxcomestobeF,or

pcomestobetrue,somethingcomestobe.AndthisistheassertionthatAristotle

makes.

Interestingly,theDeGenetCorrandPhysicspassagestellushowtocharacterize

theentityinquestion:whenanXcomestobeFwearetosayeitherthatanFXcomesto

be,orsimplythatanFdoes.Wehaveencounteredtwootherpassagesinwhichthe

lattertransformationoccurs:Theaetetus156eand159de.Anditparallelstheduality

notedbetween'SomethingisF'and'AnFis'.Letuscallthistheindefinite

transformation.Itallows

us

togo

from

'Socrates

is/becomes

F'or

'Aman

is/becomes

F'

to'AnFis/comestobe'.Theothertransformation(observedatDeGenetCorr,319b

2531)allowsustogofrom'AnXis/becomesF'to'AnFXis/comestobe'.Letuscallthis

theattributivetransformation.Itispartofourtasktoexplainthesephenomena.

Theapplicationofcomprehensivenesstochangerepresentsaperhaps

unexpecteddegreeofcontinuitybetweenAristotleandhispredecessors.Parmenides,

forexample,hadargued(fragment8,lines68)thatcreationisimpossible,but

apparentlyconcluded(forexampleatline26ofthesamefragment)thatallchangeis


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impossible.Thishasbeendiagnosedasfallaciousreasoning,asaconfusionbetweentwo

quitedistinctusesof'is',namelytheexistentialandthepredicative.Andithasalsobeen

claimed8thatParmenideswasnotconfused;ratherthathewasusinga"fused"

conceptionofBeing,i.e.onethatcombinesexistenceandpredication.Theclaimisthat

inParmenides'caseatleast,comprehensivenessistobeexplainedby(con)fusion.

However,Aristotlecannotbeaccusedofanysuchconfusion,orfusion.IntheDe

GenetCorrheclearlydistinguishesbetweencreationandalter ation,whichcanbe

definedasfollows:

xiscreated=xwasnotandxis.

xisaltered=ForsomeF,xwasnotFandxisF.

Thesedefinitionsseemtopresupposeacleardistinctionbetweenabsoluteand

predicativeusesof'is';andtheyexploitthisdistinctioninordertoformulatethe

conceptofasortofchange,alteration,thatpermitsacon tinuingsubject.Itisthus

unlikely,tosaytheleast,thataconfusionoridentificationoftheseusescouldbewhat

explainsthecorrelativityofalterationsandcreations,orAristotle'scommitmentto

comprehensiveness.

ThesecommentshaveaconsequencefortheinterpretationofParmenides.

Whatinhiswritingsforcesustoassumethathistheoryof'is'istobeblamedforhis

conclusionthatallchangeisimpossible?Supposethatthedifferencebetweenalteration

andtheotherchangeswerepointedouttohim.Couldhenotstillargueasfollows?"I

nowrecognizethatalterationsarenotthesameascreations.Buteveryalterationis

accompaniedbyasimultaneouscreation(andbyadestruction).Ihaveshownthat

creationisimpossible thereisnosuchthing.Sothereisnosuchthingasalteration

either."Soevenifhedoesconfuseorfusedistinctusesof'is',itwillnotdoforAristotle

orforustocriticizehimmerelyonthegroundsofthiserror.ParmenidesissimplyemployinganinferencethatAristotleendorses.SinceAristotledoesnotthinkthat

changeisimpossible,itmustbepossibletoadmitchangeintothelogicofeventhis'is'.

Theproblemthenisthis:Whattheoryof'is'permitsthedistinctionbetween

alterationandcreationgivenabove,andatthesametimeallowsAristotletoholdthat

everyalterationisaccompaniedbyacreation?Thatis,whataccountsforCIandC2

above,sincetheseyieldthedesiredresult?

Ofsecondaryimportancetousisthisquestion:sincemerelydistinguishingbetween

alterationandcreationwillnothelpAristotleevadetheParmenideanconclusionthat

thatchangeisimpossible,howdoesheevadeit?

I.5Kahnonthe'Is'ofTruth

LetuslooknowattheproposalofCharlesKahn.9

Ignoringforpresentpurposestheadmirableandusefulsyntacticsutb tletiesof

Kahn'saccount(mostofwhichIcanleaveuntouched,sinceIamconcernedwith

semantics),theproposalconcerningthesemanticsof'is'inphilosophicalcontexts

comestothis.Thecopulahastwofunctions.Itjoinspredicatetosubject,anditstatesof


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thesentenceinwhichitoccursthatit(thesentence)istrue.Further,thereisan

"essentialambiguity"inthissecondfunctionof'is':itcanbetakennotonlyassaying

thatthesentenceinwhichitoccursistrue,butalsothatthefact"corresponding"to

thatsentenceisso,orobtains.

Itisveryimportanttorealizethatbeingso,orobtaining,asappliedtofactsis

notexistence.ItisthereforeimportanttodistinguishKahn'spro posalfromonemadebyWigginsaccordingtowhichPlatounderstoodtruthappliedtosentencesas

equivalenttoexistenceappliedtothecorre spondingfacts.10IfindWiggin'sproposal

implausible(evenasanaccountofordinaryintuitions)forthefollowingreason.Suppose

that'Johnispale'istrue,andsupposethatitistruepreciselybecausethereisafact,

John'sbeingpale.NowsupposethatJohnacquiresatanandisnolongerpale.'Johnwas

pale'isnowtruenevertheless.Isitnotplausibletosaythatthefactthatoncemade

'Johnispale'trueistheverysameasthefactthatnowmakes'Johnwaspale'true?Ifso,

ceasingtobetruedoesnotcorrespondtogoingoutofexistence.Itwouldbemore

appropriatetosaythatthefactinquestioncontinuestobe,butceasestoobtain,orbe

so.ThisispreciselywhatKahndoessay:heiscarefultodistinguishbetweenbeingso

andexistence.11

WecanseehowwellmeasuredKahn'sproposalistoaccountingforthe

comprehensivenessaxioms.Whyisthereathingthatisforeverytrueproposition?

Because'is'canmean'istrue',andsotosayofapropositionthatitistrueistoposita

thingthatis,namelythepropositionitself.Whyisthereathingthatisforevery

propertythatbelongstoanindividual?Becausethereis,foreachsuchpair,atrue

propositionthatassertsthattheconnectionholds.

Still,theproposalisnotassimpleasitmaylook.Toillustratethis,letusexamine

thequestionofhowcopulamodifiersaretobetreated.SinceKahn'sclaimisthata

singleoccurrenceofaverbis"overworked"or"overdetermined" i.e.thatithas,

simultaneously,twofunctions onewouldimaginethatanymodifierswouldsimultaneouslyaffectbothfunctions.Butitiseasytoseethatthiscannotbeso.

Considertense.Itseemsthat'Socrateswassitting'containsatensemodifieron

thecopula.Butwecannotallowthismodifiertooperatemorethanonce.Oursentence

sayseitherthatitistruethatSocrateswassitting,orthatitwastruethatSocratesis

sitting.ItcertainlydoesnotsaythatitwastruethatSocrateswassitting.Buthoware

wenonarbitrarilytoreadthesameverbintworolesatonce,buttheverbmodifieronly

once?Thedifficultyextendstonegatedcopulae thesesayeitherthatthepositive

joiningofpredicatetosubjectisfalse,orthatthenegativejoiningistrue,andobviously

notthatthenegativejoiningisfalse.

Kahncould

attempt

toget

out

ofthis

difficulty

by

asserting

that

the

modifiers

operateonasentenceasawhole,ratherthanonthecopula.Butthisisnotatenable

theoryoftensesinGreekoranyotherIndoEuropeanlanguage.Noristhereany

evidencethatAristotlerecognizedsententialoperatorsasdistinctfromcopulamodifiers.

YetKahnattributestoAristotleanexplicitawarenessofthe"veridicalnuance"ofthe

copula.(HecitesMet1017a3135andBook ,chapter10.)Thusitwillbedifficultfor

himtodealsatisfactorilywithAristotle'stheoryofthemodifiers.


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Secondly,considerAristotle'sdefinitionoftruthandPlato'ssimilardefinitionof

falsity:Tosaythatthatwhichisisandthatwhichisnotisnotistrue.Kahn'sclaimisthat

theseusesof'is'represent"theveridicalconstructionproper"(PhronesisXXVI,p.106).

Nowtheveridicalconstructionis,werecall,"*essentiallyambigbuous"between'istrue'

and'isso'.Aristotlecouldnothavebeenusing'is'inthefirstofthesesenses,forthen

hisdefinitionwouldbetrivialanduninformative.Sohemustconsciouslyhavebeenusingthesecondsense.Canitbeplausiblyheld,though,thatAristotlewasthisclear

abouttheambiguityintheveridicalconstruction,andyetmadenomentionofit,even

towarnhisreadershowhewasusing'is'?Ithinknot.

Finally,KahnisrobbedoftheabilitytotreatoftheEleaticparadoxofchangeby

assimilatingittothatofnegativeexistentials.Heisofcourseawareofthis,andhasan

articledefendingtheviewthatParmenidesdependedinsteadonthe"factive"natureof

'knows'.12ItisnotmyintentiondirectlytotakeissuewithKahn'sinterpretationof

Parmenides.ButitisrelevanttonotethatParmenideswasreportedbysomeofthe

ancientsinawaythatdoesnotsupportKahn'sthesis.Forexample,PlatohastheEleatic

StrangerintheSophistreporttheviewsof'myfatherParmenides'inawaycompletely

independentofknowledge(heusesotherpsycho logicalattitudes,believingand

saying),andexplicitlytiedtotheproblemofnegatingbeing.Letuswaivethequestion

ofwhoisrightaboutParmenides,KahnorPlato.Thequestionis:WhataccountisKahn

togiveofthesubstantialdegreeofcredencethatPlatoobviouslygivestotheargu

menthereports?

Theseobjectionsshow,atmost,thattheapplicationofKahn'sproposalto

certainancienttextsisnotunproblematic.Thereis,however,anothermoreconclusive

objectiontohisproposal.Itisthat'istrue'andthecopulaaregrammatically

incongruent.Theformerattaches,typically,tonominalizationsofsentencesorto

phrases,suchas'Pythagoras'theorem',thatalludetosententiallycomplete

utterances.13Thelatter,bycontrast,playsanessentialroleinsentenceformation,intheweldingtogetherofsubsententialparts.IwantnowtoarguethatAristotlewas

explicitlyawareofthisfeatureofthecopula,andmakesitanessentialpartofhis

accountofbeing.MyaccountofAristotle'sphilosophicalgrammarwillyieldan

explanationofthecomprehensivenessphenomenadescribedabove,andshedslighton

theotherissuesmentionedintheopeningsectionofthepresentessay.

II.ARISTOTLEONTHESYNTAXANDSEMANTICSOF'IS'

II.1'Is'asDyadic:DeInterpretatione,14InDe

Interpretatione13,Aristotle

distinguishes

between

nouns

and

verbs.

Both

are

significant(semantikos),hesays,butnounssignify,whereasverbssignifyabout.

Moreovernounsdonotcarrytense,whereasverbsdo.14

Now,'is'carriestense,andinthisrespectitislikeaverb.However,itismade

clearthatinotherrespectsitisnotlikeaverb.First,itisnotsignificant,asverbsare,but

onlyconsignificant:"Byitselfitisnothing,butitconsignifiessomecombinationwhich

cannotbethoughtofwithoutthecomponents"(16b2426).Secondly,itisrequiredin

anywholesentence."Falsityandtruthhavetodowithcombinationandseparation.


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Thusnamesandverbsbythemselves forinstance'man'or'white'15whennothing

furtherisadded arelikethoughtsthatarewithoutcombinationorseparation"(16a

1214).

Theargumentseemstobethis:'Is'consignifies"somecombination"(and'isnot'

signifiesseparation?).Truthbearersrequirecombinationorseparation.Therefore

truthbearersrequire'is"or'isnot'(orsomeequivalent).Letuscallauseof'is'monadicifitmustbecompletedbyexactlyonetermto

formasentence,dyadicifitrequiresexactlytwo.Aristotle'sremarkssuggest(a)thatthe

copulaisdyadic,and(b)thatasubject predicatesentencewillincorporateanoun(the

subject),averb(sincethepredicatewillsignifyaboutthedenotatumofthesubject)and

acopula(orequivalent)to"combine"or"separate"these.

Atfirstsightthisseemsabadtheory.Forcopulaearerequired,itwouldseem,

exactlywhereotherverbsareabsent.Forifwehaveafiniteverblike'runs'wecanform

asentencewithoutthecourtesyofacopula,e.g.'Themanruns'.However,awider

examinationofthetextsprovidesuswithanAristotelianresponsetothis.'Theman

runs'isequivalent,hethinks,to'Themanisrunning'where'running'istheparticiple

functioningasanadjective,and'is'isthecopula.(SeeDeInt,21b9;Met,1017a28and

1028a15;Phys,185b27.)

HerethenisoneplausibleaccountofAristotle'stheoryofthesubject predicate

sentence:

(a)Itconsistsinthefirstinstanceoftwoparts anounandaverbphrase.Thenoun

carriesnotenseandsignifiesthesubject;theverbphrasecarriestenseandsignifies

abouttheontologicalsubject.

(b)Theverbphrasecanbesplitupintotwofunctional(asopposedtosyntactic)parts.It

instantiatestheparadigm:

Copulaequivalent+predicabledenoter.

Thisisnotagrammaticalbutasemanticobservation,forsometimesthefunctionalparts

willnotcorrespondtosyntacticparts.Forexample,'runs'(averbphrase)cannotbe

syntacticallybrokenupinconformitywiththeparadigm,butissemanticallycongruent

with'isrunning'.Ontheotherhand,'isrunning'and'iswhite'arebothsyntacticallyand

semanticallyinstancesoftheparadigm.

ThistheoryimprovesonPlato'sSophist(26le263d)grammarinatleasttwo

ways.Platohadheldthattherearetwopartsofspeech,nounsandverbs,bothofwhich

revealbeing(261e262a),andthatacombinationofoneofeachsortconstitutesa

statement.By

making

the

role

ofthe

copula

equivalent

separate

from

that

ofnouns

andverbs,Aristotleisabletoaccountforadjectivalpredicationssuchas'Themanis

white'.Secondly,heisabletoaccountforthedifferencebetween'therunningman'and

'Themanruns',bothofwhicharecombinationsofnounandverb,butonlyoneofwhich

expressesastatement.Thedifference,accordingtoAristotle,isthatonlythecomplete

sentencecontainsthecopulaequivalent theotherphrasehasthesamenounand

predicabledenoter,butlacksanythingthatconsignifiesBeing.16


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(c)Unfortunatelyfortheclarityofbothhisexpositionandhisownthought,Aristotle

usestheterm'verb'(rhema)todenoteboththeverbphrasetakenasawhole,andthe

predicabledenoterbyitself.Hepresum ablyintendsittomean'verbphrase' hesays

'averbiswhatconsignifiestime'(16b6),thatverbsareinflected(16b16)andthat

verbssignify about.Ontheotherhand,heprobablyhaspredicabledenotersinmind

whenhesays(16b19)"Whenutteredbyitselfaverbisanounandsignifiessomething","7thepointbeingthatpredicabledenotersstandtopredi cablesinjustthe

waythatnounsstandtowhattheydenote.18Thusapredicabledenoterrequires'is'

beforeitcanbeadjoinedtoanountoyieldasentence.(Thisexplains17a1011,which

hasbeentakenasevidencethat'is'isaverb.)

ThetheorythatIhavepresentedmakesAristotleabsolutelyclearandexpliciton

theroleandtypeof'is':thecopulalinkssubsententialdenotingexpressions,converting

theseintosentences.Therewouldseemtobenorolehereforthesententialoperator

rolethatKahnenvisages.19KahnmaywishtorespondbysayingthatitisAristotle's

intentionheretodealwithonlyoneofthetwofunctionsofthecopula,reservingfor

Metaphysicsr,1017a3135,E4,ande10adiscussionoftheveridicalnuance.Ishall

returntothesepassageslater,afterIhavediscussedwhynosuchambiguityisrequired

toaccountforthefacts.

II.2'Is'asMonadic:AnotherLookatDeInterpretatione14RevealingthoughtheaboveaccountisaboutAristotle'sphilosophicalgrammar,Idonot

thinkittellsthewholestory.OneindicationofthisisthatnowhereintheDe

InterpretationedoesAristotleexplicitlymentiondyadic'is',althoughhedoesmention

monadic'is'.(IamindebtedtoDavidHitchcockforthisobservation,whichseemsto

havebeenneglectedbyeverycommentatoronthatwork.)Thushesaysthrice(16a9

19,16b1926,and16b2829)thatbothnounsandverbsneedtobesupplementedby'is',butcanweconcludethat'Manrunning'issimilarlylackingan'is'?Aristotle'sclaim

seemstobethateachnounandeachverbislackingconsignificationofbeingandthis

permitsustoconcludethatthereisaneedforamonadicuseof'is' thus'Manis'and

'Runningis'aresentences20 butwheredoeshesaythatthereisadyadicuseof'is'to

complete'Manrunning'?ItisdifficulttoadaptAristotle'sremarksabout'is'inthefirst

fourchaptersoftheworktodyadic'is'.

ButhowcanAristotlemanagewithoutadyadic'is'?Howcouldhethenaccount

for'Themanisrunning',andothersuchexamplesencounteredinthelastsection?The

followingisasomewhatconjecturalsuggestion;therestofthepaperdealswiththe

advantagesofadopting

it.

TworemarksintheDeInterpretationesuggestthatthemonadic'is'which

attachestosimplessuchasnounsandverbscanbeappliedalsotocomplextermsthat

involveacombinationofsimples.Thus:"Even'goat stag'signifiessomethingbutnotas

yetsomethingtrueorfalse unless'is'or'isnot'areadded"(16b1618).And:"Even

thelogosofmanisnotyetastatementmakingsentence,unless'is'or'willbe'or'was'

orsomethingelseofthatsortisadded"(17a1012).


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Appendedtothesecondoftheseremarksisasignificantcomment."Toexplain

whytwofootedlandanimalisaonenotamanybelongstoadifferentinquiry;certainly

itisnotbybeingsaidalltogether."Whenwelooktooneoftheplaceswherethis

"differentinquiry"isconducted,MetaphysicsZ12,wefindthefollowing:"Inthecaseof

manandpalethereisapluralitywhenonedoesnotbelongtotheother,butaunity

whenitdoesbelongandthesubject,man,hasacertainattribute;forthenaunityisproducedandwehavethepaleman."(Myhyphenation;1037b1417.)Aristotlethen

goesontocontrastthisunity,thepaleman,withdefinitionalunitiessuchastwofooted

landanimal.

Theseremarkspointtoacertaincorrelativitybetweenadjectives,including

participles,inattributiveandpredicativepositions.Wearedealingnowwithaproblem

thatariseswhenweseetheminpredicativeposition,namelythatAristotledoesnot

seemtonoticethatthe'is'insuchsentencesisdyadic.Butperhapsthereasonthat

Aristotledoesnotmakeanexplicitpointofthisisthat

Themanisrunning

canbetransformedintotheequivalent

Therunningmanis.

CouldAristotlenotbeassuming,inotherwords,thatallusesof'is'corre spondtoa

monadicuse,andinparticularthatthecopulacanbermiademonadicbymovingits

complementtoattributiveposition?21Suchamonadicuseof'is'wouldbeattachednot

toanounoraverbbuttoacomplexterm.Thatmonadic'is'canbethusappliedto

complextermsisexplicitlypermittedbytheDeInterpretationebuttheexistenceof

dyadic'is'isnot.

HerethenisasecondaccountofAristotle'stheoryofthesubject predicate

sentenceintheDeInterpretatione.

(a)Allsubjectpredicatesentencescanberegardedasconsistingof'is'appliedtoa

singleterm.(b)Thetermtowhich'is'isappliedmaybesimpleorcomplex.Examplesofsimpleterms

are'man'or'running'.Acomplextermconsistsofanoun22modifiedbyapredicable

denoterinattributiveposition.

(a)and(b)neednotbetakenasgrammaticallyanalysingsubject predicate

sentences,forobviouslythelatterincludesentenceswithpredi cabledenotersin

predicativeposition,anditwouldbeagrossmistaketoassimilatethissyntacticpattern

totheonethatwearenowdiscussing.Rathertheclaimissemantic:boththedyadic'is'

andthemonadic'is'providesemanticparadigmstowhichallsubjectpredicate

sentencescanbeassimilated,howeverthesesentencesmaybephrased.23Aristotle

sometimesuses

one

ofthese,

sometimes

the

other,

tomake

various

points

about

ontology.

III.PREDICATIVECOMPLEXES

III.IIntroducingPredicativeComplexes

Letusnowintroducethenotionofapredicativecomplex anentityformed,asAristotle

suggestsinMetaphysicsZ12,fromauniversalandaparticularwhenthatparticular


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instantiatesthatuniversal.(ThepredicativecomplexconsistingofxandFdoesnotexist

whenxdoesnotinstantiateF.)Theproposalinthefirstinstanceisthattermsconsisting

ofasubstantivewithanadjectiveinattributivepositionrefertosuchcomplexeswhen

theyrefertoanythingatall.Forexample,'artisticCoriscus'willrefertoapredicative

complexwhenCoriscusisartistic,andtonothingotherwise.

Itwillbeobviousthatpredicativecomplexescorrespondrathercloselytocertainmodernconceptionsoffacts,andtoRussell'sconceptionofatrueproposition.Thereis

howeveradifference:themodernconceptionsIalludetoareconstructsoutof

individualsandproperties,wherepropertiesare,likeFrege'sconcepts,ofatypedistinct

fromthetypeofindividuals.TheAristotelianconceptionthatIamtryingtoreconstruct

consistsofindividualsandpredicables,where,becauseoftheseparationof'is',the

predicablesareobjectsinFrege'ssenseofthatterm(universalobjects,ofcourse).A

predicativecomplexisthereforethedenotatumofapartofasentence,anddoesnot

correspondtoasentenceasawhole.Anaptwaytoepitomizethisdifferenceistonote

thattheRussellianentitycorrespondingto'Coriscusisartistic'couldbereferredtoas

'Coriscusbeingartistic':theAristotelianentity,ontheotherhand,ismoreproperly

called'Coriscus artistic'or'artisticCoriscus'.ThepointofAristotle'sremarkson'is'asI

understandthemisthatacompletethoughtisformedbyattributing(monadic)beingor

nonbeingtooneofthesecomplexes,andthatthecomplexesdonotcontaineitherof

theseasconstituents.

Thenotionofapredicativecomplexenablesustoexplainthefirst

comprehensivenessaxiom:

C1:Forallxandythereisazsuchthatxbelongstoyifandonlyifziswithouthavingto

assumethatthelast'is'thatoccursinthisprinciple(whichismonadicandabsolute)

meansanythingotherthan'exists'.Thisisbecauseapredicativecomplexisa"unity"

thatexistsonlywhenoneofitscomponentsinstantiatestheuniversalthatistheother.

Thus'Simmiasislarge'isequivalentto'LargeSimmiasis',andthelatterisequivalentto'LargeSimmiasexists'.

Theseequivalencesmarksignificantadvantages.Thefirstofthemmakessense

oftheattributivetransformationnotedearlier,andthusofthepredicativeattributive

dualitieswenotedearlier thePlatonicdualitybetweensayingthatsomethingis

foreverbeautifulandsayingthatsomebeautyforeveris,andtheAristotelianduality

betweenthecategoriesbeing"figuresofpredication"andkindsofthingsthatare.

Theequivalenceof'Simmiasislarge'and'LargeSimmiasexists'enablesustosee

whyParmenidesandPlato(Sophist237241)thoughtthatfalseandnegativesentences

areparadoxical.Itisbecausenegativesentencessaythatpredicativecomplexesfailto

exist,and

false

positive

sentences

pre

suppose

reference

toanon

existent

predicative

complex.Thustheproblemoffalseandnegativestatementsreducestotheproblemof

falseandnegativeexistentials.Andweareabletoachievethisreductionwithout

resortingtothedubioustechniqueofmakingtruthfactexistence.

Ourhypothesishelpsmakesensealsooftheoccurrenceofphraseslike'artistic

Coriscus'and'musicalman'intheparagraphsonaccidentaloneness,beingand

samenessinMetaphysics 6,7and9respectively.Foritisplausibletointerpret

AristotleassayingthatwhereCoriscusisaccidentallyartistic,theartisticisaccidentally


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thesameas,andisaccidentallyonewith,Coriscus,andthatartisticCoriscusaccidentally

is.Thesetheses(whichIshallnotworkoutindetailhere)helpmakesenseofthe

followingsortofutterance:

ExamplesofaccidentalonenessareCoriscusandtheartistic,andartisticCoriscus

(foritisthesamethingtosaythatCoriscusisonewiththeartisticandthatartisticCoriscusisone).(Met,1015b1719)

Ofparticularinteresttousisthecorrelationofthedyadic'isonewith'andthemonadic

'isone'intheparentheticalremark,usingpreciselythedevicethatIhavecalledthe

attributivetransformation.24

III.2DoesAristotleAnalyseTruthinTermsofExistence?

Itseemsreasonabletosupposethatifthenotionofapredicativecomplexcanaccount

forthefirst,predicative,comprehensivenessaxiom,thenitcouldaccountforthe

second:

C2:Forallpropositions,p,thereisanxsuchthatpistrueifandonlyifxis.

ThismaywellbethepointofamuchdiscussedpassageinMetaphysics:

'Tobe'and'is'indicatealsothatsomethingistrueand'nottobe'thatsomething

isnottruebutfalseasisthecasewithaffirmationsanddenials.Forexample,

thatSocratesisartistic(estiSokratesmousikos),thatthisistrue.(1017a3135)

Thetraditional,andpossiblymoststraightforward,readingofthesewordsisassaying

that'is'canmean'istrue'.

Thecruxisinthewords'ThatSocratesisartistic,thatthisistrue' towhatdoesthe'this'refer?Presumablytothenearesttruthbearer:thatSocratesismusical.Butthe

'is'inthenearesttruthbearerisnotnaturallytakenaspredicatinganythingofthe

wholesentenceinwhichitoccurs.Sothereissomedifficultyinunderstandingtheclaim

inthemoststraight forwardway.25

IshouldthereforeliketotakeAristotle'swordsinasomewhatmoreobliqueway,

namelyasclaimingtheequivalenceof'ArtisticSocratesis'and'ThatSocratesisartisticis

true'.Thepointwouldthenbethat'is'saidofpredicativecomplexesindicatesthesame

thingas'istrue'saidofthecorrespondingjudgement.

ThisistosomeextentconfirmedbyMetaphysicsE4ande10whereinitis

claimedthat

being

asapplied

tocomposite

objects

is"combination

and

separation",

whichinturnparallelstheclaimmadeinZ12thatacertain"unity",thepaleman,is

broughtintobeingwhenthemanbecomespale,andthetalkintheDeInterpretatione

about'is'consignifying"combinationandseparation".Aristotleexplicitlyclaims(1027b

18ff.,1051b3335)thattruthshouldbeunderstoodintermsofthisbeing.Andwe

havealreadynotedthatAristotledefinestruthandfalsityintermsofanabsolute'is'.


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IproposethereforethatAristotlebetakennotassayingthatthereisauseof'is'

thatmeans'istrue';justthattruth,whichisappliedtopro positions,canbeanalysedin

termsofexistenceappliedtoanothersortofthing.26

III.3Change

Ourconceptionofapredicativecomplexhelpsusunderstandhowtotakethenotionof

creationinanaturalway asthecomingintoexistenceofathing andstillunderstand

why,accordingtoAristotleexplicitly,andaccordingtoParmenidesimplicitly,every

alterationisaccompaniedbyanalteration.Thetrickistoregardeveryalterationas

accompaniedbythecreationofonepredicativecomplex,andbythedestructionof

another.

ObviouslythiswillworkonlyifapredicativecomplexlikepaleConscusisnot

identicalwithCoriscus;foritrequiresthatpaleCoriscusceasetoexistwhenCoriscus

continuestoexist.Soourproposalsdemandthatonatleastoneuseoftheterm,'pale

Coriscus'benoncoreferentialwith'Cor iscus'.27

ThereisconfirmationofthisatTheaetetus159b160d.HerewefindSocrates

explaining,onProtagoras'behalf,thatadraughtofwinecanseemsweetandpleasant

tohimselfinhealthbutbittertohimselfinsickness.Whatisstrikingaboutthispassage

fromourpointofviewistheuseoftheterms'healthySocrates'and'sickSocrates'to

refertomomentaryobjects.Sincetheterm'Socrates'wouldrefertoanenduringobject

(whetherornotProtagoraswouldacknowledgetheexistenceofsuchobjects)itseems

thattheterminologyherepresupposesthattheterm'healthySocrates'can,asour

theorydemands,beunderstoodasnoncoreferentialwith'Socrates'.(ThusProtagoras

mightwanttosaysomethinglike'Socratesdoesnotexist,heisnothing,buthealthy

Socratesexistsmomentarily',or'Socratesisnothingbutaconstructoutofcomponentslikethemomentaryhealthy Socrates'.)

AninspectionofthepassagesjustcitedfromtheTheaetetusandearlierfrom

Metaphysics shows,bytheway,thattermslike'acolour','abitterness'and'an

artistic'(or,withappropriateostensions,'theartistic')areusedasindefinitedescriptions

forthingslikethewhitestick,thebitterwineetc.,thatisforpredicativecomplexes.

(WenotedearlierthatProtagoraswaswillingtosaythingslike'Abitternesscomesto

be',andthiscouldhardlybetakenasannouncingthecreationeitherofe.g.wine,a

substance,orofauniversal.)WehaveshownthatartisticCoriscusisnotCoriscus.We

cannowsupplementthiswiththeindefiniteidentity:artisticCoriscusisanartistic(nota

man).28This

helps

us

toaccount

for

the

indefinite

transformation

described

which

enablesustogofrom'Cor iscus/Amanis/becomesartistic'to'Anartisticis/comesto

be'.And,be causepredicativecomplexesareindividualsthatarenotsubstances,italso

suggeststhattheymightbetheindividualsoutofwhichAristotlecon structscategories

otherthansubstance.29

III.4TheExpandedOntology


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Predicativecomplexesconstituteathirdontologicalrealmdistinctbothfromindividual

substancesandfrompredicables.30

MuchofwhatAristotlesaysaboutunitiescanbeunderstoodasmaking

distinctionsintherealmoftheseentities.Thusaccidentalunitiesarepredicative

complexesinwhichthepredicablebelongsonlyaccidentallytotheindividualsubstance,

andessentialunitiesarethosewherethisrelationisessential thustwofootedCoriscuswouldbeanexampleofanessentialunity.

Aninterestingpossibilityconcernsathirdkindofunity,whichIshallcalla

definitionalunity.Anexampleofthiswouldbematterwithform,forinstancean

ensouledbody.Thisisnotanessentialunitybecauseitispossibleforthebodytolack

thesoul andafterdeathitwill.ButAristotleseemstowanttoholdthatitisnotsimply

anaccidentalunityeither,becausewhenanunityofthissortcomestobe,anew

substancecomestobe.(Thecomingtobeofadefinitionalunityisthusgeneration

simpliciter.)Itispossible,then,thatAristotleconceivesofindividualsubstancesas

themselvesbeingpredicativecomplexes,albeitofaspecialsort,inasmuchasthey

possessdefinitionalunity.SoifAristotleistodistinguishbetweenindividualsubstances

andotherpredicativecomplexes,whicharenotinthecategoryofsubstance,itbecomes

importantforhimtodistinguishdefinitionalunityfrommerelyaccidentalunity,andthis

iswhatheattemptstodoinMetaphysicsZ.

SomesuchnotionofdefinitionalunityisrequiredtohelpusmakesenseofDeA

nimaII,12,inwhichAristotlecanbeunderstoodasimplyingthetruthofanumberof

identitiesoftheform'Amanisidenticalwithabodywithcertainactualities'.The

objectionhasbeenmadetothisthatitimpliesthatmenareidenticalwithbodies,which

isfalsebecausebodiesoutlastmen.Thedifficultyissolvedbymakingmenpredicative

complexes,andbodiescomponentsofthesecomplexes.Obviously,thisisplausibleonly

ifsomepredicativecomplexesareindividualsubstances.

AsimilarmovesuggestsaninterpretationofAristotle'srepresentationofchange.WesawearlierthatAristotle'srefutationoftheParmenideanproofthatthereisno

changecannotdependsolelyontheobservationthatalterationdoesnotinvolvenon

being.ItisconceivablethatAristotledependsinsteadonthedifferencebetweenthe

generationofcomplexesandthegenerationofsimples;thisissupportedbyhis

terminology,whichdistinguishesbetweengenesisqualifiedandunqualified.Ifthisis

right,AristotlewouldrejectthegeneralityoftheParmenideanprinciplethatthereisno

creationordestruction,andacceptitonlyinarestrictedrealm,namelysimples.To

justifythisrestrictionwouldbeamajortask,butitwouldnotbefarfetchedtogroundit

onacorrespondentrestrictionoftheprinciplethatnegativeexistentialsarelogically

faulty.Perhaps

Aristotle

wants

tosay

that

only

those

statements

that

deny

the

existenceofsimplesarefaulty.Perhapsthisisinturnjustifiedbyobservingthatthereis

nodifficultyinunderstandingwhatisassertedwhenwesaythatsomecombinationof

simplesfailstoexistprovidedthatweknowwhatthesimplesare,sincethisis

equivalenttosayingthatthesimplesarenotcombined.Ifthisistherightmove,andif

ourproposalaboutindividualsubstancesbeingdefinitionalunitiescomposedofmatter

andformisaccepted,thenthewayisopenforAristotletorepresentthecomingtobe

ofindividualsubstancesasqualified,relativetotheunderlyingmatter.


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Itisreasonabletoidentifyaccidentalpredicativecomplexeswithimmanent

charactersinthephilosophyofPlato,andwithnonsubstantialindividualsinAristotle.

Platoinsists(Phaedo102d5ff.)thatinadditiontothebearersofproperties,like

Simmias,andthepropertiestheybear,suchaslargeness,thereisathirdclassofentity

exemplifiedbythelargeness inSimmias.HealsosaysthatwhereSimmiasadmitsthe

small,thelarge nessinSimmias"retreats".Thismeansthatthereisanequivalencebetween'Simmiasislarge'and'ThelargenessinSimmiasexists' andthissupportsthe

identification.Aristotletooseemstocountenancesuchaclassofentities:inCategories

2hementionsitemsliketheindividualknowledgeofgrammarthatareinbutnotsaid

ofanysubject.31

Gatheringthesesuggestionstogetherweshouldconcludethatpredicative

complexesarereferredtonotonlybyphraseslike'theFX',butalsobyphrasessuchas

'theFinX','theFofthisX','X'sF'and'ThisF'.Ofcoursesomeofthesephrasesmightbe

ambiguous;andforinstance'theFX'mightalsobetakenasreferringtotheunderlying

substance,and'theFofthisX'mightbetakenasreferringtoaproperty.

Ihavearguedinthisessayfortherecognitionofasortofentitythatisnotfamiliarin

modernontologies.Ihavearguedonthebasisofasyntacticandsemanticanalysisof

certainusesof'is',andfoundtextualsupportfortheanalysisincertaintextsofAristotle.

Inaddition,therecognitionofpredicativecomplexesenablesustogiveaunified

treatmentofanumberofpuzzlingfeaturesofGreekontology.

ItispossiblethattheGreeksmayhaveregardedpredicativecomplexesnotin

thewayIhavepresentedthem,namelyasconstructedentitiesderivativefrommore

basictypes,butastheentitiesgiveninperception,andsoepistemicallyandeven

ontologicallyprior.Ifso,wemayfindthatinpositingtheForms,Platowasmakingabreakwithanontologyofpredicativecomplexes,not,asisusuallythought,withan

ontologyofindividualsubstances.Similarly,itispossiblethatAristotlepositedindividual

substancesagainstthebackgroundofanontologycomposedofpredicativecomplexes

andPlatonicForms.Thesepossibilitiesoffertheprospectofaricherappreciationofthe

developmentofGreekontologythanisnowcustomary.32

McGillUniversity


16/20


NOTES

1Thestatementofnoncontradictionwithabsolute'tobe'isimpliedatMetaphysics 1005b24

and1006a1,andoccursexplicitlyat1006a4.Thejuxtapositionofthesestatementswiththe

longer,predicativelyphrasedstatementat1005b18showsthatnodistinctionisintended

betweenthetwowaysofstatingtheprinciple.

2Theincompletecopulaisanapparentlyabsoluteuseof'is'thatisactuallyellipticalforsome

copulativeuse.Anuncontroversialexamplewouldbe:'IsTomwelldressed?Yes,heis.'Ivery

muchdoubtthatonecouldjustifyaruleofgrammarthatpermitspredicatedeletionexceptin

suchcasesofrepetition,andsoIsuspectthatthetheoryoftheincompletecopulais

grammaticallyadhoc.Fortunately,thetheorythatIwillpresenthererendersthisitem

unnecessary.

3AsimilarpointismadeinM.F.Burnyeat(ed.)NotesonMetaphysicsZ(Oxford:TheSub

FacultyofPhilosophy,1980).Theuseof'is'at1028a18issaidnottobetheincompletecopula

onthegroundsthatitpredicatesexistenceofcertainuniversals.(Actually,theinterpretationto

beadvancedherewillimplyagreementwiththeassessmentthatthisisan'is'ofexistence,but

notthatitssubjectisauniversal.)

4CharlesKahn,"SomePhilosophicalUsesof'tobe'inPlato",PhronesisXXVI(1981),see

especiallypp.107109.

5ItseemstomethatProtagoraswouldhavebeenpreparedtosayalsothatsomethingisF

wheneveranFis,wereitnotforthefactthatthedurativeimplicationsof'is'areinconsistent

withhisendorsementofHeracliteanflux(asPlatoportrayshiminthedialogue,160ae).But

whetherthisistrueornot,itisgenerallytruethatfactsaboutthedurativecopula,'is',are

paralleledbyfactsaboutthemutativecopula,'becomes'.

6Itis,Ithink,significantthattheCategories4listofthingsthatareincludesitemsthatare

predicated.

7ThussupposethatClistrue.LetCbeanentitythatisifandonlyifAbelongstoB.(Thereis

suchanentity;Clensuresthis.)Thenif,perimpossibile,AbothbelongedanddidnotbelongtoB,

Cwouldbothbeandnotbe(andconversely).ThusClimpliesthat0andPareequivalent.AgainsupposethatCldoesnothold.Thentherewouldbeanindividualthatbothwasandwasnot

withoutsomexbelongingtosomey,andconversely.

ThusthefalsityofCIimpliesthat0andParenotequivalent.ThusCIifandonlyifOandPare

equivalent.

8SeeMontgomeryFurth,"ElementsofEleaticOntology",JournaloftheHistoryofPhilosophy6

(1968).

9Kahn'stheoryisstatedinseveralarticlesandabook.Ofthesethemostusefulfromasynoptic

pointofviewarethefirstandthemostrecent:"TheGreekVerb'ToBe'andtheConceptof

Being",FoundationsofLanguage2(1966),andthearticlecitedinnote4,above.

10DavidWiggins,"SentenceMeaning,NegationandPlato'sProblemofNonBeing",inG.

Vlastos(ed.),Plato1,(GardenCityN.Y.:AnchorBooks,1971).

11Seehis"WhyExistencedoesnotEmergeasaDistinctConceptinGreekPhilosophy",

ArchivfurGeschichtederPhilosophie58(1976),esp.pp.3267.TheargumentIgiveismine;

Kahnreliesonatypedistinctionbetweenexistenceandbeingso.ThetroublewithKahn's

argument,asIseeit,isthatitdoesnotpreventbeingsobeingwhatcorrespondstoexistencein

thisothertype,withallthelogicalpropertiesthatWigginswants.Anotherargumentwitha

conclusionsimilartoKahn'sbutbasedonthequestionableassumptionthatoneandthesame

eventcanrecur,isfoundinRoderickChisholm,"EventsandPropositions",Nous4(1970).


17/20


Forasophisticatedrepresentationofeventsandthenotionofoccurrenceeasily

extendibletofactsandbeingso,seeRichardMontague,"OnTheNatureofCertain

PhilosophicalEntities",inR.H.Thomason(ed.),FormalPhilosophy:SelectedPapersofRichard

Montague(NewHavenandLondon:YaleUniversityPress,1974),especiallypp.148150.

12CharlesKahn,"TheThesisofParmenides",TheReviewofMetaphysicsXXII(1969).

"ParmenidesisconcernedwithknowledgeinthesenseinwhichitimpliesTruth...The'is'which

Parmenidesproclaimsisnotprimarilyexistentialbutveridical"(p.712).Thustheobjectsof

knowledgemustbe,i.e.mustbetrue.

13Itis,Ithink,asignificantfeatureoftheconstructionthatKahncalls"theveridical

constructionproper"thatitneverallows'is'toattachdirectlytoasentenceorsentence

nominalization.Ratheraverbofthinkingorsayingisrequired:'Thingsareasyousay'etc.(There

areidiomaticexceptionstothisrule:'Thesethingsare'isaformulaofassentinGreek,and'So

beit'isallowedinEnglishaswellasGreek.)Someexplanationisrequiredofthisdifferencewith

'istrue'.

14Itisunclearwherethisleavesadjectivessuchas'white'andcommonnounssuchas'man'

thesedonotcarrytensebuttheydosignifyabout,thatistheyareusedinpredicateposition.

Perhapssignifyingaboutissupposedtobecompatiblewithsignifying(cf.Met,1006b1415).I

shallmakeasuggestionaboutadjectivesinduecourse.15Isthesuggestionthat'white'isaverb?Butitlackstense.

16ThetheorythatIamattributingtoAristotleissimilartotheoneheldbyPeterAbelard.

Abelardraisestheproblemof'therunningman'andsolvesitinthewayoutlinedhere,andhe

introducesexplicitlythenotionofthecopulaequivalent;hecallsthistheviscopulativa.See

MartinM.Tweedale,"Abelardandtheculminationoftheoldlogic",chapter6ofNorman

Kretzmann,AnthonyKenny,JanPinborg(ed.),TheCambridgeHistoryofLaterMedieval

Philosophy,(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1982),especiallypp143148.Mypointis

thatmostoftheingredientsofAbelard'saccountarelatentinAristotle's,andthattheyare

requiredtomakesenseofwhatAristotlesays.

Forafurtherinterestingaccountofsomeoftheproblemsdiscussedhere,seeJ.M.E.

Moravcsik,"Aristotle'sTheoryofCatogories",inhisAristotle(GardenCity,N.Y.:132AnchorBooks,1967),pp129132.ItwouldseemthatMoravcsik'sinnocentlookingremarkonp.

129,thatAristotle"treats'being'asaverb"createsdifficultiesinMoravcsik'sdiscussion.We

haveseenthatthisclaimoughttobequalified.

17ThisrecallsAbelard'spointthatthereislittledifferencebetweenadjoining'is'toanounand

adjoiningittoadjectivesorparticiples.Bothproceduresyieldaverbphrase.WhydoPlatoand

Aristotledistinguishinsosharpawaybetweencommonnounsandpredicabledenoters?For

oneanswertothisquestion,seeJ.M.E.Moravcsik,"TheDiscernibilityofIdenticals",Journalof

Philosophy,LXXIII(1976).

18SomeauthorshavethoughtthatAristotlethinksofthesubstructureofthedeclarative

sentenceinmuchthesamewayasPlatodoesintheSophist.Theythusdistinguishthistheory

fromthatoftheearlyPlatowho,accordingtothem,thoughtofpredicatesasnamesof

universals,atendencythatleadstothetheoryoftranscendentforms.Ihaveinmindparticularly

G.B.MatthewsandS.MarcCohen,"TheOneandtheMany"ReviewofMetaphysics21(1967

68),andJoanKung,"AristotleonThises,SuchesandtheThirdManArgument",PhronesisXXVI

(1981).TheseauthorsattributetoAristotletheinsightthatpredicatesarenotnames,andtryto

foundthepriorityofsubstancesovernonsub stancesonthedifferenceinlogicaltypeor

functionbetweenthesetwocategoriesofexpression.IbelievethattheDeInterpretatione

passagesdiscussedhereinthrowsomedoubtontheusefulnessofthisapproachbecausethey

showthattheinsightattributedtoAristotleiscompatiblewiththerebeingnamesforitemsin


18/20


thenonsubstantialcategories.Forfurtherdiscussionoftheimplicationsofthispointseemy

"Aristotle'sSemanticsandaPuzzleConcerningChange",forthcomingin1984ina

supplementaryvolumeoftheCanadianJournalofPhilosophydevotedtoarticlesonAristotle.

19Kahniscertainlyawarethattherearetypedifficultiesinhisconceptionofthe'is'oftruth:

seehisreviewofJonathanBarnes,ThePresocraticPhilosophers,intheJournalofPhilosophy

LXVIII(1981).Seealsonote11above.MypointhereisthatAristotle'sciarityontypequestions

intheDeInterpretationemakesitunlikelythatanytypeconfusioncanbeattributedtohim.

20Itmightbedoubtedthat'Runningis'isalegitimateGreeksentence,butseetheresultsof

whatIhavecalledthe"'indefinitetransformation"insection1.4above.Notealsothat

predicabledenotersoccurinthelistofontainCategories4.Thisparticipleembodiesan

absoluteuseof'is'.

21Theremarksmadeinthelastsectionaboutseparatingthepredicabledenotingfromthe

sentencecompletingfunctionscontinue,ofcourse,tohaveforceinthisnewrepresentation.

WecanthusunderstandAristotle'scommentatDeInt16b19,"Whenutteredbyitselfaverbis

anounandsignifiessomething...butitdoesnotsignifywhetheritisornot".andtheremarksat

16a1219,asapointedrejectionofPlato'sview(Sophist26le)thatnounsandverbsare"two

sortsofrevealersofbeing".Theseparationofthecopulawouldnotpermitthisbyitselfsince

thecounterpoisedopinionsareclearlystatedintermsofmonadic'is'.Theseparationofthesentencecompletingfunctionandtheidentificationofthiswith

monadic'is'alsothrowssomelightonAristotle'scharacteristicdoctrinethatBeingisnota

genus.Generaaredenotedbypredicabledenoters;'is'doesnotdenoteapredicable.Thefailure

tounderstandthispointcanleadtothemisplacedexpenditureofphilo sophicalefforton

explainingthelackof"cognitivecontent"ofBeingorexistencetoexplainAristotle'sviews:see

JosephOwens,"TheContentofExistence",inMiltonMunitz(ed.),LogicandOntology(New

York:NewYorkUniversityPress,1973).Owenscorrectlytreats'exists'asgrammaticallya

predicate,butseemstoassumethatthereforeit

mustbesemanticallysimilartootherpredicates.Putintheseterms,theproblembecomesto

accountfortheAristoteliandoctrineaboutBeingnotbeingagenuswithoutthehelpofthe

Aristotelianaccountof'is'notbeingapredicabledenoter.22InGreekitispermissibletoconstructanounphrasewithouttheuseofanoun forexample

'hoienagora'means'themenintheagora'.Iamnotsurewhetherthisrequiresabroadeningof

thedefinitionof'complexterm',becauseAristotlemaywellwanttoassertthatnounsare

implicitlypresentinsuchphrases "optionallydeleted"asweshouldsay adoctrinethatis

madehighlyplausiblebytherequirementthatthearticleinsuchphrasesagreeingenderwith

theappropratenoun.(Itisthisrequirementthatenablesustotellthatthephrase'hoienagora'

referstomen.)

23Iambeingcautioushere:Iwanttodistingushbothsyntacticallyandsemanticallybetween'x

isF'andFxis'.Ithinkthatgiventheexistenceofwhateverisdenotedby'Fx','F'and'a',thetwo

sentencesareequivalentbuthavedifferent"senseandreference".Aparallelexamplewouldbe

thepair'Thesnowiswhite'and'Thatthesnowiswhiteistrue'.Giventheexistenceofboththe

snowand

the

proposition

that

snow

is

white,thetwostatementsareequivalent;butwhereas

thesecondmakesaclaimaboutthefirstpro position,thefirstmakesaclaimaboutthesnow.

Myclaim,elaboratedin111.2,isthatAristotlesometimesexplainsthetruthconditionsof

dyadic'is'sentencesintermsofmonadic'is'sentences,notthatheignoresoreliminatesthe

former.InthisrespecthiseffortsarecomparabletoTarski's,whoexplainedthetruthconditions

ofsentencescontaining'true'intermsofsentencesnotcontaining'true'.

24Commentatorshavebeenbaffledbythisandthustheyhavenotalwaysunderstoodthis

passageinaccordancewiththesmoothestreadingoftheGreek seeChristopherKirwan'slucid


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discussionofthecontroversiessurroundingtheselinesinhiscommentary,Aristotle's

MetaphysicsBooks, ,E(Oxford:TheClarendonPress,1971).

Note,however,Kirwan'sremarkthat"theartisticCoriscusisaunifiedcomplexinwhich

Coriscus somehowdetachedfromhisartistry isasimplepart"(134).ItseemsthatKirwan's

awarenessoftheimplicationsofhisownsuggestionthatartisticCoriscusisacomplexisnot

sufficientlyexplicit.CoriscusisdistinctfromtheartisticCoriscussimplybecauseheisaproper

partofthelatter thereisnoneedtodetachhimfromhisartistrytosecuretheresult.

25Kirwanmakesthispointwellinhiscommentary,op.cit.

26Pointssimilartothosemadeinthissectionaretobefoundalsoinanunpublishedpaperby

JohnThorpe,"AristotleonBeingandTruth",readatthemeetingsoftheCanadianPhilosophical

AssociationheldinOttawa,June1982.

27Notrealizingthatthereisthisuseofphraseslike'paleCoriscus',C.J.F.Williams,inAristotle's

DeGenerationeetCorruptione(Oxford:TheClarendonPress,1982),saysthat319b20ff.

(discussedabove)"requiresanincoherentunderstandingof'Anunmusicalmancameinto

existence'sinceithastoforbidtheinferenceto'Amancameintoexistence'."Thesamecause

accountsforthetextualtranspositionmadebyPhiloponusandJoachimat319b2820.SeeH.H.

JoachimAristotleonComingtoBeandPassingAway(Oxford:TheClarendonPress,1922),p.

109.Leftwhereitisinthemanuscripts,theoffendingsentencesaysthatthemusicalmanandtheunmusicalmanareaffections(pathe)ofwhatunderlies.

28TheseindefinitedescriptionsareusedinthePhysicstoidentifyaitiai,anditispossiblethat

properlyspeaking,aitiaiarepredicativecomplexes.Thiswouldaccountfortheapparent

intensionalityofaitiativecontextsnotedbyJ.M.E.Moravcsikin"AristotleonAdequate

Explanation"inSynthiese28(1974).Ontheotherhandtherelationof'accidentalsameness"

i.e.therelationthatholdsofapairofpredicativecomplexesorapredicativecomplexandan

individualsubstancewhentheindividualsubstancesinquestionareidentical makesitpossible

toaccountfortheapparentextensionalityofaitiativecontextsnotedbyJamesBogeninhis

commentonMoravcsik'spaper,provo cativelytitled"MoravcsikonExplanation",Ioc.cit.

29Letusdistinguishbetweentwoformsofwords,'XisY'and'XisaY'.Thesehavebeenthought

tobeformsofpredication,thefirstaccountingforcrosscategorialpredicationandthesecondforintracategorialpredication.Iammoreinclinedtothinkthat'XisaY'isinfactnotpredicative

atall,butexpressesanidentitystatement,inwhichoneofthetermsisexpressedindefinitely.

Theseidentitiescanbeusedtomaketheschemeofcategorieshierarchicallyconsistentinthe

followingway.SupposethatxisanFandyisaG,andsupposethatwehavegroundsfor

supposingeitherthattheindividualsorthepredicablesbelongtodifferentcategories.Thenwe

puttheothertermintodifferentcategoriesaswell.Thisprocedurewouldofcoursenotbe

availableinthecaseofpredicationasnormallyunderstood.Thedifferenceisthatwhereas

somethingcanhavepropertiesindifferentcategories,itcannotbeidenticalwiththingsin

differentcategories.

30Whenthisfactisnottakenintoaccount,Aristotle'soddsoundingpronouncementsonthe

subjectofaccidentalsameness(see111.1)canbeinterpretedasincorporatingnon standardor

confusedviewsonidentity:seeNicholasP.White,"AristotleonSamenessandOneness",The

PhilosophicalReviewLXXX(1971),and"OriginsofAristotelianEssentialism",TheReviewof

MetaphysicsXXVI(197273),AlanCode,"Aristotle'sResponsestoQuine'sObjectionstoModal

Logic",JournalofPhilosophicalLogic5(1976),andS.MarcCohen,"EssentialisminAristotle",

TheReviewofMetaphysicsXXXI(197778).

31AlongercatalogueofAristoteliantextscommittedtotheexistenceofsuchentitieswillbe

foundinRobertHeinaman,"NonSubstantialIndividualsintheCategories".PhronesisXXVI

(1981),especiallypp.2957.


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32AnancestorofafragmentofthispaperwaspresentedtotheCanadianPhilosophical

AssociationinHalifax,June1980andwasacutelycommentedonbyDavidHitchcock.A

completedraftwascriticizedindetailbyCharlesKahn.Boththesephilosophersnotonlysaved

mefromerrorbutmadealargenumberofusefulpositivesuggestions.AlastairMcKinnonmade

itpossibletoprocessthefinalversiononMcGillUniversity'scomputer.

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