maximizing operational safety at roadway incidents for the...

Maximizing Operational Safety 1

Running head: MAXIMIZING OPERATIONAL SAFETY AT ROADWAY INCIDENTS

Maximizing Operational Safety at Roadway Incidents for the Honolulu Fire Department

William H. Melemai III

Honolulu Fire Department

Honolulu, Hawaii

March 2009


I hereby certify that this paper constitutes my own product, that where the language of others is

set forth, quotation marks so indicate, and that appropriate credit is given where I have used the

language, ideas, expressions or writings of another.

Signed: ____________________________


Abstract

This descriptive research project dealt with analyzing emergency responder safety while

operating at roadway incidents. The problem was the Honolulu Fire Department (HFD) had not

developed the essential safety systems for operating at roadway incidents potentially exposing

personnel to significant risks. The purpose of this project was to prevent injury and death to

HFD firefighters operating at roadway incidents. This study endeavored to answer four

questions. How concerned are emergency responders about the risk of being injured or killed

while operating at roadway incidents? How are roadway workers injured or killed? What

approaches have been successful in preventing injuries and deaths at roadway accident scenes?

What warning is most effective in preventing motorists from colliding with traffic stopped for a

roadway incident? Research was conducted by literature review and survey. Most survey

respondents had safety systems in place which they agreed were effective yet a significant

number of injuries and deaths were still reported. Responders rated this risk to be high or

extremely high causing them to be very concerned for their safety. Organizations suffering

casualties were expectedly, extremely concerned. Injuries were mostly caused by careless

drivers while deaths were caused predominantly by drunk drivers. The most successful

prevention approaches included the use of blocking vehicles, wearing high visibility vests and

placing cones and flares to control traffic. The most effective warnings included traffic cones,

uniformed traffic officers and traffic flares. Recommendations included designating and

dispatching specific apparatus to act primarily as protective barriers, ensuring all personnel wear

their mandated high visibility traffic vests, establishing a traffic safety support vehicle dedicated

to deploying traffic control devices and establishing standard operating procedures (SOPs)

regarding safe work practices while operating at incidents in or near moving traffic.


Table of Contents

Page

Certification Statement ……………………………………………..2

Abstract ……………………………………………………………..3

Table of Contents …………………………………………………...4

Introduction …………………………………………………………5

Background and Significance ……………………………………… 6

Literature Review …………………………………………………..10

Procedures ………………………………………………………….17

Results ……………………………………………………………...21

Discussion ………………………………………………………….27

Recommendations ………………………………………………….32

References ………………………………………………………….36

Appendices

Appendix A: Survey Cover Letter…………………………………40

Appendix B: Survey Instrument…………………………………...41

Appendix C: Survey Results……………………………………….48


Introduction

Travelers on Honolulu’s roadways spend a substantial amount of time inching along in

traffic. They currently experience 42,000 daily vehicle-hours of delay. By 2030, this is

projected to increase over seven-fold to 326,000 daily vehicle-hours of delay. There will be an

estimated 57 percent increase in traffic on the main cross town thoroughfare Highway One (H-1)

during morning rush hour in 2030 compared with 2003. (City and County of Honolulu

Department of Transportation Services [CCHNL DTS], 2005, p. 2-1)

Because people spend so much time in traffic, they conduct many activities while

traveling from point A to point B such as eating, putting on make-up, combing hair, reading the

paper, and the ever-present talking on the cell phone. All these activities decrease focus on

driving and traffic flow. (United States Fire Administration [USFA], 2004, p. 31)

These increases in delays and traffic congestion will likely translate into more driver

frustration, irritation and impatience. Most people are all too familiar with those who try to

make up time by cutting others off, weaving through lanes in search of short cuts and speeding to

reach their destination in a timely manner. Some drivers may be impaired by alcohol or other

substances. In fact, Mothers Against Drunk Drivers (MADD) reports on average someone is

killed by a drunk driver every 40 minutes. (Mothers Against Drunk Drivers [MADD], n.d.)

People do not condone these actions and cringe when they encounter them. When these

maneuvers are combined with inattentive driving behavior the probability of roadway accidents

occurring also increases. Predictably, most of these incidents will require some kind of

emergency response intervention by the HFD to mitigate. These unsafe behaviors will also


increase the potential risk to HFD personnel who may be exposed to them while operating at

roadway incidents.

The problem was the Honolulu Fire Department (HFD) had not developed the essential

safety systems for operating at roadway incidents potentially exposing personnel to significant

risks. The purpose of this project was to prevent injury and death to HFD firefighters operating

at roadway incidents. The research that follows endeavored to answer four questions. How

concerned are emergency responders about the risk of being injured or killed while operating at

roadway incidents? How are roadway workers injured or killed? What approaches have been

successful in preventing injuries and deaths at roadway accident scenes? What warning is most

effective in preventing motorists from colliding with traffic stopped for a roadway incident? The

research document will also satisfy the National Fire Academy’s (NFA), Executive Fire Officer

Program (EFOP), Executive Development (ED) course requirements for the applied research

project (ARP) (Department of Homeland Security [DHS], 2008). Research was conducted by

literature review and survey.

Background and Significance

The HFD serves the City and County of Honolulu, which encompasses the entire island

of Oahu, an area of 604 square miles. King Kamehameha III established the HFD in 1850. It

was the first fire department in the Hawaiian Islands and is the only fire department in the United

States established by a ruling monarch. The HFD is considered the 16th largest metro fire

department in the U.S. The HFD budget for fiscal year 2008 was approximately $80 million.

The HFD received initial accreditation from the Commission on Fire Accreditation International

in 2000, and reaccreditation in 2005. The Fire Operations section of the HFD is staffed with

1,185 career fire fighters from 44 stations distributed among 5 battalions. Fire Operations


provides fire suppression, technical rescue, emergency medical service (EMS), and hazardous

materials incident response to over 900,000 residents and over 5,000,000 visitors annually. Fire

Operations resources consist of 42 engine companies, 13 ladder or quint companies, 2 rescue

companies, 2 hazardous materials companies, 2 tower companies, 1 fireboat company, 5

battalion commanders, 1 assistant fire chief, 5 water tankers, 1 mobile command center (MCC),

2 helicopters, and one helicopter tender. The HFD also has 57 civilian support staff, and 5

contract employees. (Honolulu Fire Department [HFD], 2007) According to the HFD’s Records

Management System (RMS) data base, HFD Fire Operations responded to approximately 50,600

emergency incidents in 2008. Three other divisions support the Department’s field operations:

Administrative Services, Planning and Development, and Support Services. The Support

Services Division includes the Training and Research Bureau, Fire Prevention Bureau, and Fire

Communication Center.

In 2004, the HFD responded to a total of 4,086 roadway incidents. During the next four

years through 2008, this total averaged slightly above 4,000 responses. Although there were no

official reports of injury or death occurring to HFD personnel during this period, from time to

time there were informal descriptions shared among HFD members of near miss incidents

involving fellow HFD personnel who escaped serious harm by sheer luck or happenstance.

These were told during training sessions, drills, post alarm debriefings or whenever fire fighters

gathered. Some accounts may have been exaggerated or embellished for dramatic flare. But

they basically spoke to the need for a safety system when operating at roadway incidents. They

also indirectly highlighted the concern HFD personnel had for their personal safety.

Although the HFD policy and procedure manual (PPM) mandates the wearing of all

Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) while operating at roadway incidents such as auto


extrications and auto fires (Honolulu Fire Department [HFD], 2007, ¶ 4-02.03.102) there have

been instances when HFD personnel were not attired in the required equipment. Occasionally,

some were even captured on film by the omnipresent news camera technicians. These clips were

aired on the evening news showing HFD personnel either not having their helmets, gloves, or

turnout jackets on or not wearing them properly, much to the consternation of HFD management.

Having the equipment was not the issue. Using and wearing the equipment properly was.

In May of 2002, the HFD Driver Training Program (HFD-DTP) Manual established

procedures for safe and efficient operation of fire department vehicles and maintenance of

Department vehicles. It also provided basic information for Department drivers to fulfill the

responsibilities of their positions and to implement company training programs to maintain a

high degree of proficiency in the operation of Department vehicles. (Honolulu Fire Department

[HFD], 2002)

Although Parts VI and VII of the HFD-DTP discuss components that contribute to

roadway operational safety, there is no comprehensive outline or plan that describes a systematic

roadway incident operational safety process. Part VI relates to the issue of parking emergency

vehicles. It tells drivers to ensure their vehicle can be seen by oncoming traffic they should use

emergency warning lights, safely place flares and portable warning lights, or safely locate

another emergency vehicle were oncoming traffic can be alerted. Part VII advises drivers to

always position the first-arriving apparatus to protect the scene, patients, and emergency

personnel by angling the apparatus to create a barrier and protection for the pump panel. (HFD,

2002)

In 2004, the HFD PPM dictated the resource dispatch assignment for auto accidents with

no extrication necessary to be one (1) engine. If extrication was necessary two (2) engines and


one (1) rescue or aerial with extrication tools would be dispatched. (HFD, 2007, ¶ 4-03.04.004)

This requirement has remained unchanged five years later. Other than this specific reference to

roadway related incidents the HFD PPM is silent on operational safety procedures or systems

despite a steady five year average of 4,000 plus roadway incident responses and forecasts

predicting more traffic volume, more delays and more frustrated motorist inclined to speed and

drive recklessly leading to more roadway incidents HFD personnel will respond to.

In 2006, The Apparatus Operation Manual (formerly known as the Driver Training

Program Manual) was being revised and updated. (Honolulu Fire Department [HFD], 2007)

In 2007, the Apparatus Operation Manual continued to be revised. (Honolulu Fire

Department [HFD], 2008). There is no confirmation that these revisions contain information on

a systematic approach to roadway operation safety.

Over the past five years The HFD has invested heavily in outfitting personnel with PPE

and state of the art equipment and apparatus designed to keep personnel safe while responding to

and operating at all incidents. During this period the HFD has responded to a total of 20,312

roadway incidents without experiencing any injury or death to their personnel despite not having

systems in place to maximize operational safety and prevent exposing personnel to multiple

hazards. Although no harm has occurred yet, it may be unrealistic to think that this year, much

less in the next five years HFD will be as fortunate. This research is a proactive effort that may

help prevent injury and death to HFD personnel by identifying appropriate methodologies or

strategies to maximize roadway incident operational safety. This study may also establish a

framework to assess the effectiveness of other safety initiatives in the HFD.


The research problem is linked to content of the ED course which declares organizational

culture and change can occur due to singular events such as would immediately happen with the

injury or death of HFD personnel operating at a roadway incident.

The research problem is linked to the USFA operational objective “to respond

appropriately in a timely manner to emerging issues” (DHS, 2008, p. II-2). The research

problem is also linked to the USFA operational objective to reduce loss of life of firefighters

(DHS)

Literature Review

The Literature Review began by scrutinizing various reference materials at the NFA’s

Learning Resource Center. Research continued at various Honolulu Public libraries, book stores,

and the University of Hawaii’s libraries. Research was also accomplished using Google’s

Scholar search engine (http://scholar.google.com/). The quest for reference material started with

obtaining information related to roadway incidents involving public safety responder agencies.

This was followed by searches in journals and websites related to roadway incident operations

and scene safety best practices. Finally, the HFD’s own internal documents, manuals and

publications were examined for the Literature Review.

As the frequency of roadway incidents increased, it was reasonable to expect that the

level of risks to roadway workers operating at them would also increase. Perhaps more

importantly, the concern workers may have of being injured or killed would also increase. This

concern could negatively impact their operational effectiveness. A number of authors subscribe

to this premise.

For example, Dealy comments that at one time fire departments primarily fought fires

and roadway accidents were a relatively small part of the job. Today the trend has reversed to


where major fires are a rare occurrence and roadway accidents have become common place

leading to an increase in the number of rescue personnel deaths and injuries caused by secondary

collisions at incident scenes. (Dealy, 2001)

Cohen (Cohen, 1999) relates emergency responders themselves are increasingly falling

victim to “secondary incidents,” or mishaps that occur as they attend to the original incident to

which they were dispatched within the actual duration of the primary incident without lane

blockage involved, and within the actual duration plus 15 minutes with lane blockage involved

and on the same roadway segment which average 1 mile in length.

Repeating this theme of increased hazards and risks is Casner who says roadway dangers

have increased exponentially with the number of cars on the road and increased distractions like

driving while reading the paper; shaving; putting on makeup and talking on cell phones.

(Casner, 2007)

In an online PowerPoint presentation, Sullivan (Sullivan, 2002) shares sobering

comments made by Chicago Fire Department Commissioner James Joyce who emphasizes

responders should operate at roadway incidents as if someone is trying to run them over.

Organizations that actually experience having a member injured or killed are particularly

concerned about the risks associated with operating at roadway incidents. For example,

Delaware fire fighters who just lost a member who was struck by a speeding motorist while she

was providing medical treatment at an accident scene expressed their apprehension. In an online

news article they describe how upset they were about the situation and nervous that if they go

back on the highway it could happen again. The thought of a motorist winging through warning

signs, barriers and blocking apparatus is always on the back of their minds. (Porter, 2008)


Britt, Adler and Castro describe this similar attitude occurring among combat soldiers

where fear becomes a heavy burden as they see those around them being wounded and killed.

They listen “to the agonizing cries of the wounded enough that they cannot consciously endure

the thought of that happening to them”. (Britt, Adler, & Castro, 2006, p. 7)

Determining how roadway workers are injured and killed was facilitated by reviewing

reports produced by The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH).

NIOSH conducts investigations of fire fighter line-of-duty deaths on the roadways through their

Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program which describes specifically how fire

fighters are killed and injured. (National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health [NIOSH],

n.d.) One common cause appears to be firefighters being struck by careless unsafe drivers as

outlined in a December 15, 2008 NIOSH report reviewing the circumstances surrounding the

death of a volunteer Assistant Chief in North Carolina struck by a tractor-trailer while operating

at a motor vehicle crash on June 14, 2008. (NIOSH)

Another common way firefighters are killed or injured is by being run over by motorists

that drive while intoxicated, drive recklessly and fail to use due caution for the safety of

responders in roadways as described in a Firehouse.com news article. (Caspi, 2005)

Being struck by speeding motorists is another way firefighters are injured and killed as

related in an on-line article that describes a group of nine fire fighters working at the scene of an

accident in France on a motorway bridge when an 81-year old man driving at more than 90 mph

- twice the speed limit - ploughed into them. (Henley, 2002)

Law enforcement is not immune to being injured or killed on the roadways and they

encounter the same kinds of intoxicated, reckless, speeding motorists as fire fighters. According

to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), traffic crashes claim the lives of more law


enforcement personnel than any other cause of death in the line of duty, including shootings.

(Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI], 2004)

The towing and recovery industry is also exposed to multiple hazards at roadway

incidents that they need protection from. According to the National Traffic Incident

Management Coalition (NTIMC) website the Towing and Recovery Association of America

(TRAA), had five towers that were killed at traffic incident scenes during the first three months

of 2006. (National Traffic Incident Management Coalition [NTIMC], n.d.)

The Emergency Medical Service (EMS) suffers its share of casualties too as EMS

Responder.com reported a New Jersey EMT attempting to cross a highway median to assist at a

minor accident was struck and killed by a northbound vehicle in the roadway. (EMS

Responder.com, 2004)

Understanding how workers are injured or killed while operating at roadway incidents

can help responders develop effective approaches to protect themselves and prevent a similar

fate from occurring to them. A number of writers offer some concrete examples.

For instance, apparatus placement is crucial to keeping emergency responders safe.

Peters emphasizes the importance of giving serious consideration to firefighter safety when

deciding on apparatus placement at roadway incidents to help them avoid being injured or killed.

(Peters, 2004)

This sentiment is echoed by (International Association of Fire Chiefs, National Fire

Protection Association [IAFC, NFPA], 2008) that says emergency vehicles can be positioned to

block traffic and protect the incident scene.

NFPA 1500, section 8.4.26 says apparatus shall be utilized as a shield from oncoming

traffic wherever possible. (National Fire Protection Association [NFPA], 2002, p. 33)


Smoke says laws and regulations do not stop alcohol impaired drivers that kill

firefighters. Department of Transportation (DOT) standards cannot keep speeding 18-wheelers

from crashing into emergency scenes. Proper highway response training and developing the

necessary skills to create a barrier between you and moving traffic will. (Smoke, 2005)

The Phoenix Regional Standard Operating Procedures Safe Parking While Operating in

or Near Vehicle Traffic (City of Phoenix, 2003, p. 1) stresses the need for all personnel to

understand and appreciate the high risk that firefighters are exposed to when operating in or near

moving vehicle traffic. The standard directs drivers to position apparatus such that they protect

the scene, patients, emergency personnel, and provide a protected work area. (City of Phoenix,

2003, p. 1) It allows for additional blocking apparatus during highway operations if needed due

to increased speeds, traffic volume and congestion. (City of Phoenix, p. 3)

Moore discusses assigning apparatus drivers to use the apparatus to completely block

obstructed lanes or shoulder areas plus one more lane. Although normally accomplished with

large vehicles, when done with smaller police or chief officer vehicles it should always be done

to the right when possible to allow the driver to exit the vehicle downstream from oncoming

traffic. (Moore, 2003, p. 27)

Solomon (Solomon, 2002, p. 112) says responders must be cautious about parking

apparatus on both sides of a highway and expecting through traffic to pass safely between them.

He adds, “If it is necessary to have emergency vehicles on both sides, very strong consideration

must be made to shut down that route to all but emergency-related activity.”

There appear to be some variations as to whether apparatus can, may or shall be used to

provide a protective block or shield for emergency responders but the essential message is to

absolutely use them for that purpose.


Cohen (1999) recommends considering additional methods to successfully prevent injury

and death to roadway workers. These include individual and group training with other agencies

to enhance inter-operable capabilities, preplanning to provide flexible operational options,

implementing incident command system, educating the public about their duties when

approaching an emergency scene, using media to provide traffic updates, and supporting

legislation to regulate roadway incidents. He also comments many states already have programs

in place that speak to safe and effective roadway operations. Maryland has both the CHART

(Chesapeake Highways Advisory Routing Traffic) and FITM (Freeway Incident Traffic

Management) programs. Both Pennsylvania and Delaware have well-developed fire police

training programs and support resources. Fire Police are commonly found throughout the mid-

Atlantic/northeast corridor, particularly in the rural areas. Usually serving under both a police

and fire chief, fire police are generally former volunteer firefighters who have transitioned to

duties that consist primarily of directing vehicle and pedestrian traffic around emergency scenes,

enabling other emergency responders to attend to the emergency incident. These resources

should be used rather than reinventing the wheel.

Effectively warning motorists is also an important step to preventing collisions with

traffic stopped for a roadway incident and assures maximum safety for responders and victims.

Some of the more effective approaches include the use of flares, traffic cones and barrier tape as

described in Fundamentals of fire fighter skills, which explains that before anything else

happens, roadway incidents “must first be secured with proper traffic and scene control devices.

Flares, traffic cones or barrier tape are all measures that can keep the public at a safe distance

from the scene.” (International Association of Fire Chiefs, National Fire Protection Association

[IAFC, NFPA], 2008, p.33)


The NFPA 1500, Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health Program,

section 8.4.27 requires that Department of Transportation (DOT) approved warning devices such

as traffic cones, retroreflective signs stating “Emergency Scene” and illuminated warning

devices such as highway flares and/or other appropriate warning devices be used to warn

oncoming traffic of the emergency operations. (NFPA, 2002)

The manual on uniform traffic control devices (MUTCD) states “where special emphasis

is needed, signs may be placed on both the left and right sides of the roadway. Signs mounted on

portable supports may be placed within the roadway itself. Signs may also be mounted on or

above barricades.” (Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration [DOT,

FHA], 2003, p. 6F-2)

The Nova Scotia Emergency Responders Traffic Management Manual suggests using a

safety support vehicle to enhance initial set-up and secure the scene of a roadway incident. The

vehicle would function as a mobile warning device to oncoming motorists by blocking a lane or

parking on the shoulder. It would also be equipped with traffic control devices such as cones,

signs, and portable barriers capable of outlining the perimeter of an incident scene or securing

the site. (Nova Scotia Emergency Responders [NSER], 2006)

Another important approach to help maximize responder safety is the use of traffic vests

for all personnel. The Emergency Responder Safety Institute (ERSI), committed to reducing

deaths and injuries to America's Emergency Responders asserts on their Responder Safety.com

website that high-visibility safety apparel is the first line of protection for responders working on

or near the roadway. (Emergency Responder Safety Institute [ERSI], 2008, p. 1)

The Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Title 23 Part 634 requires that “all workers

within the right-of-way of a Federal-aid highway who are exposed either to traffic (vehicles


using the highway for purposes of travel) or to construction equipment within the work area shall

wear high-visibility safety apparel.” (Code of Federal Regulations [CFR], 2007, p. 177)

Previous to 2007 there were no NFPA requirements for firefighters to wear high visibility

apparel. However, the present 2007 edition of NFPA 1500, Standard on Fire Department

Occupational Safety and Health Program, paragraph 8.7.10 states:

When members are operating at a traffic incident and their assignment places them in

potential conflict with motor vehicle traffic, they shall wear a garment with fluorescent

and retro-reflective material visible from all directions. (NFPA, 2007)

Oriel reports this need is also acknowledge by Emergency Medical Service (EMS)

responders in the first-ever national study of EMS fatalities entitled, "Occupational Fatalities in

Emergency Medical Services: A Hidden Crisis," that says providers might need to wear brighter,

more reflective colors due to the danger of being hit by passing cars while working on the side of

a road or highway. (Oriole, n.d.)

Procedures

The data collected in this descriptive research project was obtained from the responses to

a twenty-four question survey instrument created by this researcher. This process was initiated

on the website SurveyMonkey.com® on December 19, 2008. The survey design and formulation

stages were mentally taxing. The survey was administered as a test to five HFD personnel on

January 12, 2009. Some goals of this test include evaluating the competency of the

questionnaire, estimating the length of time to take the survey, determining if the wording is

clear and seeing which items produce irritation, embarrassment, or confusion. (SurveyMonkey

[SM], 2008)


Adjustments were made to change certain demographic fields from requiring, to not

requiring a response in order to maintain the anonymity of respondents. The finished product

required dozens of revisions to ensure that answers to all four research questions posed at the

outset of this undertaking could be acquired.

The initial step entailed creating a cover letter (see appendix A) that addressed among

other issues, ethical considerations such as using language that was reasonably understandable to

participants, informing participants that they were free to participate or decline to participate or

to withdraw once they started. (APA, 2001) It was important that the letter neither stated, nor

implied participation was coerced. The letter explained the purpose for the survey and ensured

anonymity unless a participant was interested in receiving the results. As further assurance,

participants were told all survey data would be destroyed once this project was completed.

Once the letter was completed attention turned to developing the survey. (See appendix

B) Both qualitative (open-ended questions) and quantitative (forced-choice questions) were

used. Babbie stressed a poorly designed questionnaire renders results meaningless so he

recommended making items clear; avoiding double-barreled questions; keeping items short so

they can be read, understood and answered quickly; avoiding negative and irrelevant items.

(Babbie, 1990) Busha and Harter recommended avoiding slang, jargon, and technical terms;

developing consistent response methods; sequencing questions from the general to the specific;

placing questions with similar content together in the survey instrument, and using an attractive

questionnaire format that conveys a professional image. (Busha & Harter, 1980)

Question one of the survey captured demographic data such as rank, position, years of

service, location and organization size. This was done to determine if the answers respondents

gave for specific questions might be influenced by these characteristics. For instance, a


respondent with a higher rank or multiple years of service would be expected to have more

knowledge of organizational roadway procedures and a greater concern for the safety of those he

supervises.

The next three questions were general in nature and aimed at determining how many

organizations had safety systems, when they trained on these systems and to what degree they

agreed that their safety systems were effective.

The first research question dealing with how concerned emergency responders are about

being injured or killed while operating at roadway incidents was answered by survey questions 5

through 17. The questions were presented in order of least severe to most severe starting with

near misses (questions 5-7), followed by injuries (questions 8-12) and finishing with deaths

(questions 13-17). Respondents were asked how many of each incident type their organization

experienced. Then they were asked to reveal how concerned they were about such an incident

occurring to them. Their five choices ranged from Not at all Concerned, Somewhat Concerned,

Concerned, Very Concerned and Extremely Concerned. They were also asked to rate the risk of

this happening to themselves and to individuals who performed a similar job as them. Their

choices included Not a Risk, Slight Risk, Moderate Risk, High Risk and Extremely High Risk.

The second research question about how roadway workers are injured or killed was

answered by survey questions 9, 10, 14 and 15. Respondents were asked to select from a

randomized list of five choices describing how personnel in their organizations might have been

injured or killed. They were also given the choice to specify other ways that were not listed. In

order to determine what contributed to these incidents, respondents were asked to choose any or

all factors from a randomized list of nine and to specify other reasons not listed.


The third research question related to successful approaches that prevent injuries and

deaths at roadway incidents was answered by survey questions 18 and 19. Question 18 asked

respondents to choose from a randomized list of twelve approaches and to specify others not

listed. Question 19 asked respondents to reveal how important they thought these twelve

specific approaches were in preventing injuries and deaths at roadway incidents from. Their five

choices included Not Important, Somewhat Important, Moderately Important, Very Important

and Extremely Important.

The fourth research question related to the most effective warning to prevent motorists

from colliding with traffic stopped for a roadway incident was answered by survey questions 20,

21 and 22. Question 20 asked respondents to choose from a randomized list of nine warning

devices and to specify others not listed. Question 21 asked respondents to identify how often

their organizations used these devices. Their five choices included Never, Sometimes, Often,

Always and N/A. Question 22 asked respondents to rate the effectiveness of the same list of nine

devices described in question 20. Their rating choices included Not Effective, Somewhat

Effective, Effective, Very Effective, and Extremely Effective.

Survey question 23 was intended to get a general sense of how respondents rated their

most recent roadway incident response experience. Their choices were Worst Possible,

Generally Negative, Somewhat Negative, Generally Positive and Best Possible.

The survey was sent via internet email with an attached link to SurveyMonkey.com® to

fire, police, EMS and towing and recovery organizations on February 1, 2009. These

organizations were selected because they were the ones most likely to have relevant experience

with the topic of roadway incident operational safety. They were also chosen to avoid sampling

bias that would occur if participants were exclusively students who were attending NFA


concurrently with this researcher and/or selection was based on NFA/EFOP affiliation. Police

and EMS email addresses were selected from the City and County of Honolulu email server

while fire email addresses were selected from NFA EFOP and NFPA class lists. Towing and

recovery organization emails were obtained from internet websites. This researcher chose to use

the internet as a method to conduct survey research because of the time and costs savings

compared to mailed paper format surveys or long distance telephone interviews mentioned by

Wright. (Wright, 2005)

Limitations in the selected method include not knowing for certain whether the recipient

of the emailed survey is the person who actually completes and returns it. Also respondents can

misrepresent their demographic information, respond in socially desirable ways or conceal their

true feelings about the content of the survey. (Wright, 2005)

Results

The collection period for survey responses was set for twenty days beginning February 1,

2009. There were a total of 83 responses with the majority (42) being received on February 2nd.

Respondents represented fire, police, EMS and towing and recovery organizations.

Survey question #2 showed that 71 respondents or 85.5% indicated their organization had

a safety system for operating at roadway incidents to minimize hazards to their personnel.

Eleven respondents or 13.3% did not have a safety system. One individual did not know whether

or not his organization had such a system.

Survey question #4 asked respondents to indicate how much they agreed that their safety

system was effective. On a scale of 1 to 4 with 1 being “Strongly Disagree” to 4 being “Strongly

Agree”, forty-three respondents or 52.4% “Agree” that their system was effective while 28


respondents or 34.1% “Strongly Agree” their system was effective. The rating average was 3.21.

Only one individual selected “Strongly Disagree”.

Survey question #6 asked respondents how concerned they were about experiencing a

near miss collision. On a scale of 1 to 5 with 1 being “Not at all Concerned” and 5 being

“Extremely Concerned”, thirty-one respondents or 38.8% were “Very Concerned” while twenty-

nine respondents or 36.3% were “Extremely Concerned” about this occurring. Only one

individual was “Not at all Concerned”. The rating average was 4.04.

Responses to survey questions #11 and #16 were intended to describe how concerned

respondents were about being injured or killed while operating at a roadway incident. On a scale

of 1 to 5 with 1 being “Not at all Concerned” and 5 being “Extremely Concerned”, survey

question #11 showed thirty respondents or 36.6% were “Very Concerned” while twenty-four or

29.3% were “Extremely Concerned” about being injured. The rating average was 3.80. Two

individuals indicated they were “Not at all Concerned” about being injured while operating at a

roadway incident. On the same five point scale, survey question #16 revealed twenty-four

respondents or 29.6% were “Very Concerned” while twenty-two or 27.2% were “Extremely

Concerned” about being killed. The rating average was 3.65. Three individuals indicated they

were “Not at all Concerned” about being killed while operating at a roadway incident. Clearly,

the survey data indicated the majority of respondents were “Very” or “Extremely” concerned

about being killed or injured while operations a roadway incidents.

Survey questions #5, #8 and #13 were intended to discover how many incidents

organizations have experienced with near miss collisions, injuries or death while their personnel

were operating at roadway incidents.


Survey question #5 asked respondents to report how many near miss collisions their

organizations experienced. Fourteen respondents or 17.1% reported 1 incident. Twelve

respondents or 14.6% had two incidents. Eighteen respondents selected “other” as their answer

to this question. One individual reported 3 incidents; another reported 4 and one said his

organization had 5 incidents with two that resulted in death. One commented the total incidents

are unknown in his organization because they are “not always reported.” Another echoed that by

saying “we don’t have stats for that.” And still another said that information “is not logged or

documented, but happens frequently due to ‘tourist drivers’.” One respondent said they had

“several per year for the past 20 years” and another commented “every time we are on the

interstate” we experience a near miss collision.

Survey question #8 asked respondents to report how many injuries their organization

experienced. Six respondents or 7.2% reported one incident for a total of six injuries. Nine

respondents or 10.8% reported 2 incidents for a total of 18 injuries. Eight respondents or 9.6%

selected “other” as their answer. One of these respondents related there are “thousands yearly in

industry.” Another said, they “Don't keep exact stats but numerous over the years. One EMT

was killed working at a roadway incident.” Survey question #13 asked respondents to report

how many deaths their organization experienced. Three respondents or 3.8% reported one

incident for a total of three deaths. Five respondents or 6.3% selected “other” as their answer.

One respondent believed there were “3 to 5” deaths that occurred in his organization. Another

respondent related there are “approximately 70 yearly in industry.”

Although the reporting percentages were relatively low, the total number of reported

injuries (24) and deaths (possibly 8) is significant when measured by any standard.


Responses to survey questions #9 and #14 were intended to describe how roadway

workers are injured or killed while operating roadway incidents. The choices respondents had

were “Struck by drunk driver”, “Struck by speeding driver”, “Struck by rubbernecker”, “Struck

by careless driver”, and “Struck by inattentive driver”.

Survey question #9 showed the majority of respondents, 11 or 57.9% reported their

personnel were injured after being “Struck by inattentive driver” or “Struck by careless driver”.

Eight respondents or 42.1% reported their personnel were injured after being “Struck by drunk

driver”. One respondent who selected “other” as his answer reported a Hurst tool operator was

injured by an ambulance driver that ran over his hydraulic cables dragging him on the pavement.

The respondent related the driver “had no situational awareness”. This would probably most

closely relate to being “Struck by inattentive driver”.

Survey question # 14 showed four respondents or 80% reported their personnel were

killed after being “Struck by drunk driver”. Three respondents or 60% reported their personnel

were killed after being “Struck by careless or inattentive driver”. One respondent described a

death in his organization as being caused by a “freak accident”. He said the deceased was “hit

by another car other than the one being assisted” similar to a secondary collision. Essentially the

data showed injuries were caused by inattentive or careless drivers, while deaths were

predominantly caused by drunk drivers.

Responses to survey questions #18 and #19 were intended to describe what approaches

have been used and been successful in preventing injuries and deaths to personnel operating at

roadway accident scenes. Both questions had twelve identical but randomly arranged choices for

respondents to select from. They also had “other” as an answer choice.


Survey question #18 showed respondents identified four main approaches. The most

frequently mentioned approach was “Positioning vehicles and apparatus to protect personnel at

incident scene”. Seventy-seven respondents or 95.1% identified this as their top approach.

Seventy-four respondents or 91.4% identified “Placing traffic cones and flares to systematically

control and channelize traffic flow” as their second most frequent approach. The third most

frequent approach cited by sixty-seven or 82.7% of respondents was “Wearing of high visibility

vests by all personnel”. “Implementing incident command system” was mentioned by sixty-six

or 81.5% of respondents as the fourth most frequent approach.

Survey question #19 asked respondents to rate how important these twelve approaches

are in successfully preventing injury and death to personnel operating at roadway incidents. On

a scale of 1 to 5 with 1 being “Not important” and 5 being “Extremely important”, survey

question #19 showed sixty-one respondents or 74.4% thought positioning apparatus was

“Extremely important” and the highest rated approach with a 4.70 average. The second highest

approach gaining an “Extremely important” rating with forty-eight responses or 58.5% was

wearing high visibility vests. The rating average for this response was 4.38. The third highest

approach considered “Extremely important” by thirty-five respondents or 43.8% was

implementing incident command system with a 4.14 rating average. The fourth highest approach

considered “Extremely important” by 34 respondents or 41.5% was placing traffic cones with a

4.22 rating average.

Responses to survey questions #20, 21 and #22 were intended to describe what kinds of

warning devices organizations use to prevent motorists from colliding with traffic stopped due to

a roadway incident, how often they use them and how effective they are.


Survey question #20 asked respondents to select the devices they used from a random list

of nine choices. Three devices were identified by respondents as being used most frequently.

The first device cited by sixty-six respondents or 83.5% was traffic cones. The second device

identified by fifty-five or 69.6% of respondents was traffic flares. The third device mentioned by

fifty-three or 67.1% of respondents was uniformed traffic control officers. Eight respondents

selected “other” as their answer. One respondent related “directional arrow boards are intrinsic

to their apparatus and placed ahead of scene as warning devices”. Another commented that his

organization uses “high visibility chevrons on the rear of their apparatus and coordinates with

Police and Highway Patrol for traffic control”. Another said, “We just purchased several sets of

‘Powerflares’”.

Survey question #21 asked respondents to identify how often they use any of the nine

randomly listed devices from question #20. On a scale of 1 to 4 with 1 being “Never” use to 4

being “Always” use the three devices identified in question #20 were “Always” used by the

majority of respondents. Traffic cones were used most often by 32 or 39.5% or respondents.

Uniformed traffic control officers were the second most used device by 30 or 38.5% of

respondents. Traffic flares were the third most used device by 27 or 35.5% of respondents.

Survey question #22 asked respondents to rate the effectiveness of the warning devices

on a scale of 1 to 5 with 1 being “Not effective” and 5 being “Extremely effective”.

Interestingly, uniformed traffic control officers received the only “Very Effective” rating of the

three devices identified in survey questions #20 and #21. Thirty-seven or 49.3% of respondents

gave them this rating. By comparison traffic flares and traffic cones only received 21.5% and

29.6% “Very Effective” ratings respectively. Despite this variation, traffic cones, traffic flares


and uniformed traffic control officers were identified as the most effective warning to prevent

motorist from colliding with traffic stopped for a roadway incident.

Discussion

The literature review and survey results were compared to identify areas where

similarities or contrasts in describing the current status of the issues raised by the research

questions existed.

Although survey results showed that 85.5% of responders had a safety system for

operating at roadway incidents and 86.5% of them either “Agree” or “Strongly Agree” that their

system is effective, various authors painted a gloomy picture that actually raised concerns for

emergency responders operating at roadway incidents. Dealy (2001) pointed out the frequency

of roadway incidents is increasing. Cohen (1999) said emergency responders are falling victim

to “secondary incidents”. Casner (2007) stated roadway dangers have increased exponentially.

Sullivan (2002) related responders should operate as if someone is trying to run them over.

Porter said fire fighters who loose a member become “upset about the situation and nervous that

if they go back on the highway it could happen again. The thought of a motorist winging

through warning signs, barriers and blocking apparatus is always on the back of their minds.”

(2008) Britt, Adler and Castro describe this similar attitude occurring among combat soldiers

where fear becomes a heavy burden as they see those around them being wounded and killed.

They listen “to the agonizing cries of the wounded enough that they cannot consciously endure

the thought of that happening to them”. (2006)

All of these issues were reflected in the responses to the specific survey questions aimed

at determining how concerned respondents were to being injured or killed while operating at a

roadway incident. Sixty or 75.1% of respondents were “Very Concerned” or “Extremely


Concerned” of experiencing a near miss collision. Fifty-four or 65.9% of respondents had the

same levels of concern for being injured. Forty-six or 56.8% of respondents expressed the same

levels of concern for being killed. These were amazing numbers because they strongly

suggested more attention needs to be paid to the topic of roadway operational safety. One

shortcoming of the survey design was simply asking how concerned respondents were about

being injured or killed. Though clearly important, this does not answer an even more

fundamental question of what effect this concern may have on their attitude, behavior or

motivation to avoid risky situations. Perhaps further research could determine what effect, if

any, these relatively high levels of concern for safety would have on their ability to function.

The survey results related to how roadway workers are injured or killed while operating

at roadway incidents did not align exactly with findings in the literature review but they came

close. One common way firefighters are injured or killed is by being struck by careless unsafe

drivers. (NIOSH) Caspi says another way firefighters are injured or killed is by being run over

by intoxicated, reckless drivers. (2005) Henly related speeding motorists also cause injury and

death. (2002)

Results from the survey showed that twenty-four individuals were injured. Of this total,

nearly 58% of them were injured by inattentive or careless drivers. With all other factors being

equal, it is not clear if being hit by an inattentive or careless driver results in an outcome “better”

than death. But it seems to this researcher that both types of drivers would have quicker reflexes

and reaction time when their attention was restored allowing them to avoid or glance off of

objects and people resulting in less damage. Again, further research may be able to address this

possibility.


The survey showed that as many as eight individuals were killed. Of this total 80% were

struck by a drunk driver. Perhaps being struck by a drunk driver who has diminished reflexes

and reactions contributes to a more tragic outcome. Further research could possibly answer this

possibility as well.

The Literature Review provided examples of effective approaches organizations take to

prevent their workers from being injured or killed while operating at roadway incidents. Many

authors emphasized using apparatus to increase scene safety. Peters (2004) suggests apparatus

placement is crucial to keeping emergency responders safe. The IAFC and NFPA (2008) say

emergency vehicles can be positioned to block traffic and protect the incident scene. NFPA

1500, section 8.4.26 says apparatus shall be utilized as a shield from oncoming traffic wherever

possible. (2002) Smoke (2005) relates creating a barrier between you and moving traffic will

keep vehicles from crashing into emergency scenes. The Phoenix Regional Standard Operating

Procedures Safe Parking While Operating in or Near Vehicle Traffic directs drivers to position

apparatus such that they protect the scene, patients, emergency personnel, and provide a

protected work area. (2003) Moore discusses assigning apparatus drivers to use the apparatus to

completely block obstructed lanes or shoulder areas plus one more lane. (2003) Cohen (1999)

recommends additional prevention approaches include group training with other agencies to

enhance inter-operable capabilities, preplanning to provide flexible operation options,

implementing incident command system, educating the public about their duties when

approaching an emergency scene, using media to provide traffic updates, and supporting

legislation to regulate roadway incidents.

The survey results identified three approaches recommended in the literature that were

used by the majority of organizations to prevent injury and death to personnel operating at


roadway incidents. The first approach used by an overwhelming seventy-seven or 95.1% of

respondents was “Positioning vehicles and apparatus to protect personnel at incident scene”.

Warning signals, channeling devices and signs might work fine for controlling alert, attentive,

law abiding motorist. But they probably will do little for preventing inattentive, careless, and

intoxicated drivers from colliding into roadway workers. The research and survey results

strongly emphasized using apparatus to block an incident scene provides the maximum roadway

protection. The second approach used by seventy-four or 91.4% of respondents was “Placing

traffic cones and flares to systematically control and channelize traffic flow”. This approach,

though sound, still has the aforementioned limitations. The third approach used by sixty-seven

or 82.7% of respondents was “Wearing of high visibility vests by all personnel”. This complies

with CFR Title 23 Part 634 that requires “all workers within the right-of-way of a Federal-aid

highway who are exposed either to traffic (vehicles using the highway for purposes of travel) or

to construction equipment within the work area shall wear high-visibility safety apparel.” (2007)

The HFD mandates the use of these vests and personnel are adapting to this new requirement.

The Literature Review found examples of what warning is most effective in preventing

motorists from colliding with traffic stopped for a roadway incident. The IAFC and NFPA

related flares, traffic cones or barrier tape are all measures that can keep the public at a safe

distance from the scene. (2008) The NFPA 1500, Standard on Fire Department Occupational

Safety and Health Program, section 8.4.27 requires that Department of Transportation (DOT)

approved warning devices such as traffic cones, retroreflective signs stating “Emergency Scene”

and illuminated warning devices such as highway flares and/or other appropriate warning

devices be used to warn oncoming traffic of the emergency operations. (2002) The Manual on

Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD) states “where special emphasis is needed, signs may


be placed on both the left and right sides of the roadway. Signs mounted on portable supports

may be placed within the roadway itself. Signs may also be mounted on or above barricades.”

(DOT, FHA, 2003)

The Nova Scotia Emergency Responders Traffic Management Manual suggests using a

safety support vehicle to enhance initial set-up and secure the scene of a roadway incident. The

vehicle would function as a mobile warning device to oncoming motorists by blocking a lane or

parking on the shoulder. It would also be equipped with traffic control devices such as cones,

signs, and portable barriers capable of outlining the perimeter of an incident scene or securing

the site. (NSER, 2006)

The survey results identified two devices mentioned in the literature that were rated

“Effective” in preventing motorists from colliding with traffic stopped due to a roadway incident.

One device was not mentioned but was rated “Very Effective”. Traffic flares were the first

device mentioned in the literature and was rated “Effective” by 42 or 53.2% of respondents.

Traffic cones were the second device mentioned in the literature and was rated “Effective” by 34

or 42% of respondents. Uniformed traffic control officers was not mentioned in the literature but

was rated “Very Effective” by 37 or 49.3% of respondents.

The survey results also revealed that for some responders an inverse relationship exists

between their rank and level of concern for personally being injured or killed. It appeared the

higher a respondents rank the lower his level of concern of being injured or killed. This same

relationship seemed to exist for rating the risk of being injured or killed. Perhaps this could be

due to reduced exposure to hazards higher ranking responders experience while operating at

roadway incidents. Or this may also be attributable to a heightened sense of responsibility

supervisors have for the welfare and safety of their subordinates.


This research focused on exploring ways maximum operational safety at roadway

incidents could be achieved. This study was not an attempt to place blame, or criticize the

personnel, policies, procedures, strategies, or tactics of the HFD. It is assumed those who review

this research will be of the same mind set. After reviewing the literature and analyzing the

research data this researcher is convinced using apparatus to block traffic from intruding into

incident scenes is the one sure way to maximize safety and prevent injury and death. Setting up

warnings to alert motorist, wearing vests to increase visibility and placing signs to direct traffic

flow all have an important role. But the data shows responders are being injured and killed even

with these measures in place. This writer was amazed at the relatively high number of survey

respondents who indicated their organization members were injured or killed while operating at

roadway incidents.

The implication for the HFD is that it should be equally grateful that it has not

experienced any of these events despite the high annual frequency of roadway incidents that its

personnel respond to. Certainly a safety system can and should be expediently implemented

especially in light of the increases in roadway congestion and potential incidents that are

projected for the future. Implementation will require adaptive change on multiple levels.

Recommendations

The recommendations derived from this study are offered to improve the safety systems

employed by firefighters operating at roadway incidents in the City and County of Honolulu. By

analyzing the data from the survey responses and reviewing relevant literature the following four

recommendations are presented for consideration.

The first recommendation is to establish or designate specific vehicles or apparatus to act

primarily as protective barriers that block moving traffic from emergency responders operating at


roadway incidents. This will create a safer environment and allow the responders to concentrate

on their tasks without being distracted by the concern of being injured or killed. This peace of

mind will translate into better efficiency and focus. The presence of additional emergency

vehicles or apparatus that are immediately recognizable to the general public due to their lights,

large size, conspicuous color and signaling devices can also serve as a very tangible warning to

approaching motorists that a significant incident has occurred requiring them to proceed

prudently. These vehicles or apparatus should be automatically dispatched to all roadway

incidents to protect responders and prevent what may initially appear to be a routine call from

becoming a tragedy.

The second recommendation is to ensure all personnel wear their mandated high visibility

traffic vests while operating at roadway incidents. This recommendation is particularly

important when low lighting or low visibility conditions exists such as during inclement weather,

night time operations or in heavy wildfire regions. Like all personal protective equipment

provided to and mandated for use by emergency responders, traffic vests must be worn every

time at roadway incidents without exception. This may take a period of time to adjust to

attitudinally in much the same way always wearing a seat belt while riding the apparatus did.

But the adjustment must be made. Equipment designed to protect the emergency responder will

not perform that function if it is not used. Supervisors may be successful in obtaining full

compliance if they take a positive approach and consistently remind personnel to use their traffic

vests, reinforce the importance of doing so by setting the proper example and always wearing it

themselves and reward compliance by verbally acknowledging consistent usage.

The third recommendation is to establish or dedicate a vehicle designed to carry and

efficiently deploy a variety of warning signals, detour signs, cones, flares, barriers, flood lights


and other essential traffic controlling equipment that can respond to roadway incidents and help

keep responders safe by warning motorist, illuminating low light conditions, channeling traffic

and blocking access. This recommendation is based on the fact that most emergency vehicles

and apparatus are already at maximum carrying capacity when it comes to hauling essential gear

and paraphernalia. There is no room to safely carry more equipment of any kind much less

traffic control devices. A dedicated vehicle with a trained operator could be simultaneously

dispatched to any incident with other responders and immediately increase scene safety by

rapidly placing the appropriate early warning signs and equipment. This would free responders

from having to expend valuable time performing this task and allow them to expediently engage

in more urgent life saving, incident stabilizing and property conserving activities such as

suppression, triage, extrication and treatment. Dedicating an apparatus to perform a specific

specialized function is not a new idea. Some examples include light wagons, SCBA compressor

trucks, rehabilitation canteen trucks, water tanker trucks, fuel tender trucks and fire investigation

vans. A traffic control device truck should be added to this list.

The fourth recommendation is inspired by NIOSH which mentions repeatedly in their fire

fighter fatality investigation reports a way to minimize risks (and conversely to maximize safety)

is to establish, implement, and enforce standard operating procedures (SOPs) regarding safe

work practices while responding to calls in or near moving traffic. These practices could include

ensuring the placement of various types of warning devices (portable signs, orange traffic cones,

flares and/or portable changeable message signs) to inform drivers of what to expect when

approaching an incident scene as would be accomplished via implementing recommendation

three. It could also consider positioning flaggers on or near the shoulder of the roadway

upstream (approaching traffic) from the incident scene. An excellent starting point in developing


a customized SOP is the Phoenix Regional Standard Operating Procedures Safe Parking While

Operating in or Near Vehicle Traffic document. Maryland, Pennsylvania and Delaware all have

well-developed fire police training programs and support resources as well.


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Appendix A


Appendix B


Appendix C

maximizing operational safety at roadway incidents for the...

Documents