measuring variability in color semantics
TRANSCRIPT
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MEASURING VARIATION
IN COLOR SEMANTICS
The main
topic yields
four
spin-offs.
First,
methods
are
presented
here
in
detail
(?3),
and there
is
a
review of
questions regarding reliability
in the
Ap-
pendix.
Second,
intercommunity
variation and
category change
are
addressed
with a
dynamic cognitive
model, which,
in
turn,
is based
on
a
distinction
be-
tween
cognition
and
perception
(?4).
The difference is
readily
definable
in
the
color
domain,
because its
neurological
bases are
known. Without this
distinc-
tion,
an
explanation
of
change
within universal constraints
would
be
impossible.
The model attributes both the structure and the
process
of
categorization
to
a
selective
emphasis
on different
perceptions;
but a further
construct of
social
variables
completes
the
account
of
intercommunity
differences
(?5.4). Third,
the data substantiate in detail the incremental nature
of
category change
and
variation
(?5).
And
fourth,
the
explanation
of
individually
compelled change
unites Berlin & Kay's BASICCOLORTERMwith Rosch's BASICLEVEL,which has
been
a
long-standing
desideratum
in
the
theory
of
categorization.
Its
resolution
deflates the
mounting
pressure
to redefine 'basic color
terms',
and it
recognizes
that the basic level of
categorization
is mutable
(?6).
THEORY
2.1. The data
from
Tenejapa
Tzeltal and
Navenchauc Tzotzil
offer an
op-
portunity
to
assess
the
explanatory capacities
of two
theories that model the
relation between
linguistic
variation and
change. One theory, articulated in
Weinreich et al. 1968, holds that change is socially motivated: any language
harbors a
range
of
variation,
and
change progresses when particular variants
are
assigned prestige
and
favored as markers
of
social
identity. The other theory
was
developed
in
MacLaury
1986
to
account for variation among basic color
categories:
each
individual
adopts
a
private strategy
for
coping with the novelty
that
impinges upon
him
or her
throughout daily life;
the
strategy always involves
attendance
both
to the
similarity
and
to the
distinctiveness of the entities that
he
or she
categorizes
and
names;
some
individuals attend more strongly to
similarity
and
others
attend
more
strongly
to
distinctiveness. The latter group
of
individuals will
name more
color
categories during standardized experi-
ments, such as the one that is used to determine how a subject categorizes and
names the
330-chip
Munsell color
array.
The
INDIVIDUALIST HEORY
was
devised
to
address
situations encountered
widely
and
repeatedly by
the
Mesoamerican
Color Survey (MCS).2 The survey
found that
as
a
rule
people
who
interact
daily
differ
in
the ways that they
categorize color,
even
though
shared
color
categories would facilitate the ex-
and
The
American
Heritage Dictionary (p. 263) explains
it
briefly.
See
MacLaury (1987a,
n.
2)
for
technical
specification
of stimulus
materials
used
in this
study.
2
The MCS was conducted during 1978-81 in Mexico and Guatemala in collaboration with eighty
teams of
language specialists
who interviewed
900
speakers
of
116
languages.
Some data were
pooled
with
the
World
Color
Survey (WCS)
of
1976-78,
in
which 25
speakers
in each
of 100
American, African, Austronesian,
and Asian
languages
were interviewed
by
members of the Sum-
mer
Institute
of
Linguistics
under an NSF
grant
to
Berlin, Kay,
and Merrifield
(see
Berlin
et al.
1985).
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LANGUAGE,
VOLUME
67,
NUMBER
1
(1991)
change
of
information.
To
illustrate with a
typical
case,
speakers
A
and
B
are
adults
in
middle
age
who have conversed
throughout
their
lives;
speaker
A
has
three basic color terms and
speaker
B
has
ten,
neither
seems
to
be
aware of
the
difference,
and
they
appear
to talk
past
each
other when
casually handling
the
Munsell color
chips. Rampant intracommunity
variation
was
described
pre-
cisely by
the
Munsell metric when it was
systematically applied
over a
wide
region by
putting
hundreds of
subjects,
one at a
time,
through
a
formal two-
hour
interview.
It is
essential to draw
upon
both
theories to
explain
variation
and
change
in
Tzeltal
and Tzotzil color
categorization.
The social
theory explains
the dra-
matic
difference between the
ways
that
color is
categorized
in
Tenejapa
Tzeltal
and
Navenchauc
Tzotzil,
but the
individual
theory
addresses the
astounding
range of nonagreement in each community.
2.2.
PRIOR
WORK. The
body
of
theory
has roots in two
traditions.
Weinreich,
Labov,
and
Herzog
(1968)
are
among
the
most recent
scholars who
demonstrate
that
linguistic change depends
on
variation.
Labov,
in
his classic
study
of
vowel
raising
on
Martha's
Vineyard
(1963),
shows
that
change
focuses on a
prestigious
variant
that native
Vineyarders
adopted
as
a
symbol
of social
membership.
In
an
independent tradition,
Berlin &
Kay (1969)
define
the
concept
of
BASIC
COLOR
ERMS
nd
show that their focal
referents
and
order
of evolution
are
universal; any language
increases
its stock of
basic
color terms in
response to
societal
complexity
or culture
contact
(cf.
Berlin & Berlin
1975, Dougherty
1975). Kay (1975) and Dougherty (1977) further note the relation of variation
to
basic
color-term
evolution:
different
speakers
of one
language can manifest
distinct
stages
of that
process,
with
younger speakers usually showing later
stages; yet
each
individual
system represents
some
stage
of the
predictable
sequence.
But
Kay
and
Dougherty
further
imply
that
each
individual passes
through
the
sequence
at a
different
pace,
sharing cognition only partially with
other
speakers
of the
language.
That
is,
either
color-term evolution
is privately
motivated or
the
shared
social
motive,
whatever
it
might
be, does not
foster
uniform
cognition.
DESCRIPTION
ND
DISPLAY
OF DATA
3. Before I
discuss
data,
it is
essential
to outline how
they
were
collected,
how
they
are
displayed
in
a
black-and-white
medium,
and
why they
constitute
an
advance over
prior
collections.
Earlier
fieldworkers
placed
acetate over
the Munsell
spectrum
and
asked an
interviewee
to circle with a
grease pencil
the
range
of each
native
color term
from
a
previously
elicited
list; further,
the interviewee
marked
the
focus
of
each term
(Lenneberg
&
Roberts
1956,
Berlin
&
Kay 1969, Dougherty 1975,
Berlin & Berlin 1975). Other researchers upgraded the method or experimented
with
options (Collier
et al.
1976, Hage
&
Hawkes 1975,
Berlin et al.
1985).
During
the
Mesoamerican
survey,
a
final
procedure
was added
and
refined
(Burgess
et al.
1983,
Greenfeld
1986, MacLaury
1986,
1987a-b).
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MEASURING
VARIATION
IN
COLOR
SEMANTICS
The
combinedefforts
have resulted
n a
particularpackage
of
equipment
and
procedures
for its use. Stimulus materials consist
of 330
Munsell
colors
or
'chips'.
Oneset
comprises
oose
chips
thatare
separately
numberedand
aligned
in random order. Two additionalsets are glued to a neutralmatte in spectral
order of lettered rows from
light
to
dark, B-I,
and numbered olumns
through
the
hues,
1-40;
each is called an
'array'.
One
arrayplaces green-blue
at
center;
the
other centers
red-yellow.
Both include achromatic
white-grey-black
n
an
unnumbered
eft
column, A-J,
in which
row
A is
pure
white,
row J is
pure
black,
and
rows B-I match the
eightbrightness
evels of the hue
columns
(see
n.
1).
Data are
elicited from an individual
speaker by
three
independent
proce-
dures.
First,
an
interviewee names the 330 loose
chips
one
by
one
in
their
random order. The investigatorrecordson a numberedsheet each nameas a
head lexeme with
any qualifiers
that
might accompany
it.
Second,
the inter-
viewee selects from one
of the
arrays
he best
example
or 'focus' of
each head
lexeme.
Third,
the interviewee
maps
the
range
of each head lexeme
by
placing
a
grain
of rice on each
color of
the
array
that the lexeme can name.
When the
interviewee
stops
mapping
he
range
of a
term,
the
investigator
requests
that
he
or she
place grains
on more of
the
colors that
the
term
can
name. The
request
is
repeated
for one
term until
the
interviewee insists that it can name
no color
chips
that
have not
already
been
covered with
rice.
Thus,
a
mapping
can
progressthrough
one or more
'steps',
which the
investigator
ecords
separately
in reference to the row letters and columnnumbers hat borderthe array.
Ultimately,
the
three
types
of
independently
elicited
data are
derandomized
and
organized
on
graphs
that
represent
the
Munsell
array.
In
their
organized
form, they
are
called, respectively, (1)
NAMING
RANGES
and
QUALIFIER
DISTRIBUTIONS, (2)
FOCI,
and
(3)
MAPPINGS
nd
MAPPING
STEPS.
A
mappingcan
consist
of
only
one
step
or of several. It
shows the full
extent of a
color category;
and,
if it
consists of
more than one
step,
the
order in which
the
steps were
executed
suggests
how the
category
s
internallyorganizedby
the
interviewee.
Correspondence
between
independently
elicited orders of
data
verifies the
accuracyof each in any set froman individual.Matchescan occur between a
naming range
and
its
mapping,
a focus and
a
first
mappingstep, a particular
mappingstep
and
the
distributionof a
qualifier,
and
many
other
possible pairs.
Analyses
of
individual
cognition
are
always
based
on such correspondences,
never
on
naming ranges alone,
foci
alone,
or
mappings alone. The various
responses
to
the
330 stimuli
produceamplequantificationor statisticalanalysis
of
patterns
shared
between
individuals.
(See
the
Appendix.).
Figure
1
provides
the
English-speaking
eader
with a reference by which to
gauge
the
Munsell
system
and
to
assess
how
speakers
of
Tzeltal and Tzotzil
have
named it.
The
figure
shows
derandomized
namingranges and the foci of
one English speakerwho used eleven termsto namethe 330 chips one by one.
Figures
2
and
3
show that two
Tzeltal
speakerseach used five terms to name
the
same
chips during
he
same
procedure.
Their
data can be directlycompared
with that
of
Fig.
1.
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LANGUAGE,
VOLUME
67,
NUMBER 1
(1991)
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FIGURES -3.
(1)
American
English
color
categories: naming ranges
and
foci; male,
age
35,
1980.
(2)
Tzeltal color
categories,
San Ildefonso
Tenejapa, Chiapas,
Mexico;
naming ranges
and
foci;
female, age
60,
1980.
(3) Tzeltal,
Tenejapa; male,
age
65,
1980.
Figures 4a-d show all naming ranges, foci and mappings from one
Tzeltal
speaker.
The
figures fully
exemplify techniques of elicitation and
display, and
they
reveal
characteristics of
early-stage color categorization that turned up
time
and again during the Mesoamerican survey. Figs. 4b-d represent
mappings
with lines, which allows the
display of two mappings in one diagram
so as to
show their
relationship and overlap. Mapping steps are bracketed by
numbers
embedded in
each line.
Mappings can also be depicted by shaded quadrates,
as in
Figs. 8b-c below.
Usually the mapping of a category covers more colors than its naming range
does;
a
category has greater
breadth than the normal use of its name
would
suggest,
and
the
mapping brings out this fact. Often a few uses of a
name fall
outside
of
the normal range,
where they correspond to the peripheral steps of
the
broad mapping. For
example, in Fig. 4a sak names bright red
(Gl); k'an
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LANGUAGE,
VOLUME
67,
NUMBER 1
(1991)
trials
during
the interview.
This
semantic relation is discussed in another
study,
where
it
is called
COEXTENSIVITY.3
ost
Tzeltal and Tzotzil consultants
mapped
both red-focused
?ah
or
?oh
and
yellow-focused
k'an or k'on
throughout
one
warm category, although some did not commingle the terms throughout red
and
yellow
colors
during
the
naming
procedure.
Coextensivity
occurs in
many
languages
of the Mesoamerican
sample;
it
is
reported
in color
naming by
other
investigators
both in Mesoamerica
and elsewhere
(Merrifield
1971:264;
Hage
&
Hawkes
1975:297),
and it is not confined
to the warm
category.
(See
Figs.
8b-c below for coextensive
mappings
of the cool
category.)
For reasons
that
are
explained
in
the work on
coextensive
ranges
(cited
in n.
3),
one
range
is
always
slightly
smaller
and more skewed than the
other;
the smaller
range
has
a less central focus or even a
polarized
focus,
which occurs
on the
periphery
of the category-as in Figs. 4a-b at 140-or even outside of the category
margin,
as in
Figs.
8a-b at H38.
Fig.
4c shows the
mappings
of sak and
2ihk',
'light-warm'
versus
'dark-cool',
which
together
cover all but ten colors of the Munsell
array
in a
relation
of
complementation;
neither
range
covers
the
opposite
focus,
unlike the
mappings
of k'an
and
?ah.
The
light-warm mapping
of
sak
is
unique
to Tzeltal
speaker
#4
in this
sample
from
Tenejapa.
Yet
speakers #2, #3,
#4,
and #5 all rendered
the
dark-cool
mapping
of
2ihk',
two of
the three
Tzeltals who were interviewed
in
Amatenango mapped
2ihk'
in
the same
way,
and
five of the
six Navenchauc
Tzotzil
speakers
rendered
a
dark-cool
mapping
of
2ik'.
Fig. 4d shows that the mapping of 2ihk' encompasses the mapping of yas,
revealing
a relation
of inclusion between the black-focused
dark-cool
category
and the
green-focused
cool
category. Yet,
in
Fig. 4a,
the
naming range
of
yas
is
highly salient;
the
green
and blue
portion
of the
mapping
of
pihk'
is not
corroborated
by marginal
uses of
that
name.
However, Figs. 2, 3,
and 5a
pro-
vide
better evidence
in
naming
data of the Tzeltal
dark-cool
category. For
example, speaker
#5
(Fig. 5a) applies
2ihk' to
J0, F17,
and
F29,
the colors on
which the
English speaker (Fig. 1)
focuses
black, green,
and
blue.
The
Tzeltal
dark-cool
category
is
more salient
in
dark than in
cool colors.
In
sum, Figs. 4a-d demonstrate three types of semantic relation: (1) coex-
tensivity (Fig. 4b), (2)
inclusion
(Fig. 4d),
and
(3) complementation (Fig. 4c).4
Identification
of Tzeltal basic color
categories
is far
from straightforward,
3
During
the
Mesoamerican Color
Survey,
the
coextensive relation between color terms first
emerged
in
Uspantec
data
(MacLaury
et
al. 1979), and it seemed very odd at the time. It took
three
years
thereafter to
develop the hypothesis that coextensive terms each name the same cat-
egory,
but
from
different mental
vantages.
It
took even longer to devise a numerical test (MacLaury
1987b).
The
results
eventually
led to
a
theory regarding the role of spatial analogy and viewpoint
in
categorization
and
cognitive change (MacLaury 1992).
4
MacLaury
1987b
relates these
semantic types to a continuum of change in the order stated
here-(l), (2), and (3)-and adds a fourth type, 'near synonymy', to the earliest end of the con-
tinuum. All
four
types
are most
exhaustively demonstrated in the warm category as it evolves
internally
toward a
complete
division
into basic red and yellow categories, although the types
pertain
to
categories
of
other
colors as
well. For the immediate purpose of comprehending the
Tzeltal
data,
it
is
sufficient to
note
that
each type of semantic relation differs from the others and
that
one of
them, coextensivity, has not been recognized as a distinctive type in prior literature.
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MEASURING VARIATION
IN
COLOR
SEMANTICS
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FIGURES 5a-b.
Tzeltal,
Tenejapa,
(a)
naming ranges
and
foci,
(b)
mappings;
male,
age
90,
1980.
using
Berlin&
Kay's
criteriaof
(a)
salience
and
(b)
not
being
encompassed
by
another
category
(superordination, nclusion,
nonhyponymy).
Tzeltal
speaker
#4
(Fig.
4)
probably
has three
basic
color
categories
of
white,
dark-cool,
and
warm,
although
she names
color with
five
salient
terms.
Two
terms coexten-
sively
name
one
warm
category,
k'an
and
?ah. The cool
category
yas
is not
basic,
because the
basic
dark-cool
category
pihk'
ncompasses
all
of
yas;
how-
ever,
the
interpretation
s
complicated
by
the
low
salience of
2ihk'
amonggreen
and blue.
The
white-focused
light-warm
category
might
be
vestigial;
at
least,
unlike
dark-cool
2ihk',
the
light-warm
range
is not
shared
with
other
Tzeltal
interviewees.It
is
interpreted
as
a basic
white
category
n
spite
of its
nonsalient
range
throughout
yellow
and red.
The
interpretation
f
three
basic
categories
classifies Tzeltal speaker#4 at Berlin& Kay's StageII, andspeakers#2, #3,
and
#5 are also
at
Stage
II.
(See
n.
14
below
for a
description
of the
stages.)
But
this
classification s not
clear-cut,
becauseall
the
individuals
are
advancing
to the
next
stage,
IIIa,
and
each shows
a
different
degree
of
progress.Likewise,
Tzeltal
speakers
#6,
#7,
and
#8
represent
distinct
phases
of
Stage
IIIa.
Before
further
analysis
of the
Tzeltal
data
(in
?5.3),
there
should
be some
attempt
to
account
for these
dynamics.
COGNITIVE
DYNAMICS
4.
Why
do
languages
differ n
number
of
basic
color
categories?
For
example,
why does English have eleven basic color categories while Tzeltal only has
about
three?
Although
'societal
complexity' might
have
much to
do
with
it,
that
notion in
itself
does
not
provide
a
cognitive
explanation
of the
differences.
Why
do the
Tenejapa
Tzeltal
speakers
differ
from
each
other,
even
when all
reside in
the
same
small
hamlet?
m
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LANGUAGE,
VOLUME
67,
NUMBER 1
(1991)
During analysis
of results
from
the Mesoamerican Color
Survey,
a
dynamic
model
of color
cognition
was
developed
to address the
question
of
category
change
and a host of
related observations
(MacLaury
1986)-including
differ-
ences
among
individuals
in
single
communities
as well as more dramatic
dif-
ferences
between related
languages,
such as Tzeltal and
Tzotzil,
and also
including
maximal
differences,
such
as those between
Tzeltal and
English.
The model rests on four axioms:
(1)
people perceive
six
purest-possible
colors,
fifteen
potential pairs;
(2)
the members of each
pair
are to
an
extent
similar and
to
an extent
distinct;
(3)
each
pair
differs
in these
extents;
and
(4)
an individual attends
simultaneously
to
similarity
and to
distinctiveness,
and
can
reciprocally
shift the
strength
of
the
attendances.
For the
purposes
of this
model,
PERCEPTIONs the automatic
registration
by
the visual cortex
of
pre-
cortical neural response to wavelength, including the similarities and differ-
ences that inhere
among
those
signals.
COGNITIONs
the
active
devotion of
attention
both
to
similarity
and to
distinctiveness,
and
it
is
the
selective em-
phasis
that
a
person places
on the two attendances.5 The
cognition
is
ceaselessly
asserted and unconscious.
Axioms 1-3
pertain
to
perception.
They
are
actually supported independently
by research
in
visual physiology.
Evidence
in
their
support
and their
effect
on
human color categorization are detailed
in De
Valois
& De Valois
1975, Kay
&
McDaniel
1978,
and
MacLaury
1987a.
In
short,
the
purest imaginable
ex-
amples of red, yellow, green, blue, white,
and black are the
only unique
color
percepts; others, such as brown, purple, orange, pink, and grey, are perceptual
blends
of unique hues.6 Colors
of some
pairs, e.g. red/green
and
yellow/blue,
cannot
be
seen
in the same
place
at
once
and, thus, they
contrast more
than
other colors. Among the
hues
of lesser contrast, yellow/red differ more
than
green/blue; green
and blue are the most similar of
all
unique pairs.
Since human
visual physiology is invariant throughout
the
species,
axioms
1-3
explain why
there
are
universals of human color
categorization (Berlin
&
Kay 1969, Kay
&
McDaniel 1978).
Axiom
4
is
cognitive,
since
only
the
mind
elects to attend 'more or
less'
to
what one sees. The axiom is truly a postulate, because it is supported only by
its
success
in
uniting disparate observations regarding the composition, se-
mantics, variation, and change of color categories (MacLaury 1986).
Individuals divide broad color categories into two or three narrow categories
as
they foreground perceived differences and suppress similarities; the pro-
cesses are
necessarily reciprocal. Thus broad categories, such as Tzeltal dark-
cool, red-with-yellow, and green-with-blue, divide into categories equivalent
to
English black, red, yellow, green,
and blue.
Coupling
of axioms 1-3
(invariant perception)
with
axiom
4
(mutable cog-
5
'Attend'
and 'attendance' have a precedent in psychological literature as technical terms (see
e.g. laccino & Sowa 1989, abstract). The more widely used equivalent, 'attention' (e.g. Wright et
al.
1990), cannot be pluralized as 'attendance' can be, which is why the rarer term is used here.
6
'Unique
hue' is
used
loosely.
The
term strictly pertains only to yellow, green, and blue; pure
white and pure black are extremes of reflectance, and purest red contains a slight input of yellow.
42
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MEASURING
VARIATION IN COLOR
SEMANTICS
nition)
allows
change
that,
nevertheless,
progresses
according
to
universal
reg-
ularities.
Berlin &
Kay
note that the
maximally
contrasting
colors,
such as
red/
green
and
yellow/blue,
are never
categorized
under the same name in
any
language.
A
language
that includes red and
yellow
in one
category
will
always
categorize green
and
blue
together, although
the reverse
prediction
does
not
hold;
since
red and
yellow
look
more
distinct,
they
will be
separately
cate-
gorized
prior
to
green
and
blue
in an
implied evolutionary
order as
speakers
of a
language increasingly
attend
to distinctiveness.
The same
engagement
of
perception
and
cognition
explains
other
regularities
of color
categorization.
First,
change
in
color
categorization
is
always
contin-
uous;
it never
progresses
by quantum
jumps.
Although
Berlin
&
Kay
classify
evolving
color-category systems
in seven
stages,
an individual can show
a
system that is between stages; for example, in Figs. 4a-d, superordinate light-
warm and dark-cool
categories
are less salient
than the cool and warm
cate-
gories
that
they
subsume.
Smoothly advancing change
conforms to the
model,
which
stipulates
that
people
decrease
their
emphasis
on
similarity
as
they
em-
phasize
distinctiveness
more;
the counterbalance of
strength
between the
two
attendances
prevents
change
from
surging
ahead
by
a
leap
from
an
old
system
to
a radically
different
new
system.
Second, as
systems
evolve
by division
of broad
categories
into
narrow
ones,
every
category undergoes
internal
reorganization.
For
example, the focus
and
judgments
of higher
membership
within
a category
gradually
migrate from
its
center to its edge; as attendance to distinctiveness is enhanced, half of a cat-
egory
is increasingly
contrasted
against the
other.
This
process is seen in
Figs.
4a,c-d,
where
the lighter
half
of the
dark-cool
category
is
nonsalient.
It is
also
seen in
Figs.
4a-b, where
the focus
of ?ah
is placed
at the
outer extreme
of
the warm
category-at
140 in
dark
maroon.
Third,
reorganization
involves
an evolution
of
semantic
relationships
within
a
category
from
near-synonymy
to coextensivity
to
inclusion
to
an
eventual
division and subsequent
complementation.
Each
semantic type
requires
stronger
attendance
to distinctiveness
than
its predecessor.
Evolution
of
se-
mantic relationships passes through a continuum of variants that are inter-
mediary to ideal
types.
Good
examples
of
ideal types
are
rare (see
n. 3
for
references).7
Fourth,
individuals
shift
toward stronger
attendance
to
distinctiveness
when
they
are
exposed
to novelty
at an
increasing
rate.
They
emphasize
distinc-
tiveness to sort
out new
experience
and
are
thereby
motivated
to evolve
color
7
As
a
category gradually
divides,
it
is not compulsory
that
it be named
with
two terms
at
any
specific point
in
its development.
But
whenever a
second
name is
adopted to
supplement
an
older
name,
the two
names must assume
a particular
semantic
relation
on the
continuum
of types.
The
segment of the continuum that the relation represents-that is, the type of relation-will be de-
termined
by
the
cognition
of the individual
who uses
the names,
that is,
by the
balance
of attend-
ances that he
or she
maintains.
For example,
Figs.
8b-c
below show
that speaker
#8 uses seleste,
which is
derived
from Spanish
celeste
'sky-blue'.
But she
accommodates
the loan
word to a coex-
tensive relation throughout
the cool
category.
The
other Tenejapa
Tzeltal speakers
of this
sample
have
opted
not
to apply
a second
term
to the cool
category.
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LANGUAGE,
VOLUME
67,
NUMBER
1
(1991)
categories
as
part
of a
general adaptive
strategy
of
regarding
the
world
more
analytically.
Exposure
to
novelty accompanies
societal
complexity
and
culture
contact,
although
it
can
also arise in small societies under harsh
conditions
where
people
must
improvise
by many
means from one
day
to
the
next. Novelty
directly
links all such situations
with
the
cognition
that
propels
change
in
color
categorization.8
Fifth,
different
members of
a
society
are
exposed
to
different
amounts
of
novelty,
and some will notice
novelty
more
than others.
Thus,
individuals
are
motivated
nonuniformly
to
attend to distinctiveness such that each
will
attend
at a
different
strength.
Although
each
person
is constrained
by physiology
to
conform to
a universal
order
in
subdividing
broad color
categories,
each
will
fall
out at a different
point
along
the
evolutionary
path.
The foregoing provides a very 'individualist' account of the rampantvariation
that is attested in the color
domain,
throughout
Mesoamerica
and
elsewhere.
Under that
explanation,
the
only
coherence within the domain
is
determined
by physiology.
Social factors
do not stabilize
color-category
evolution
at
a
predominantly
uniform
stage throughout
a
community.
Only
unvarying
ex-
posure
to
novelty might
tend to stabilize at one
stage
a
large
proportion
of
a
particular
population.
However,
the
individualist account
does not
explain
the
qualitative
differ-
ences
among
some societies.
Tenejapa
Tzeltal and
Navenchauc Tzotzil
exhibit
that
type
of
difference,
as
will
be shown
in
?5.3
and
?5.4.
Their
disparity
is
of
interest, because it does not follow from axioms 1-4. The difference suggests
that,
in
some
cases,
the individualist model
might
be combined with a
socially
oriented
account of
the kind
proposed
in
Weinreich et al.
1968.
ANALYSIS
5.
Before
describing
color
categorization
in
the two
communities,
and
before
attempting
to
integrate
individual and
social
models,
I will
provide
some
rel-
evant
ethnographic
information
in the
form of a
sketch of
social
differences
between
Tenejapa
and
Navenchauc
that
seemed
to
be
apparent
during
my
visits
there. These
differences
might
influence the
process
of
attending
increasingly
to distinctiveness.
5.1. DIFFERENT OCIETIES.
an
Ildefonso
Tenejapa
and
Navenchauc
are
corn-farming
communities located about
twenty
miles
apart
in
the state
of
Chia-
pas,
Mexico. Tzeltal
is
spoken
in
Tenejapa
and
Tzotzil is
spoken
in
Naven-
chauc. The
two
languages
are
closely-related
members of
the
Mayan
family
8
Languages
in
harsh
environs, such as
Eskimo
(Heinrich
1974)
and
Kung
Bushman
(Berlin
&
Kay
1969:33,
75),
have
more basic color
terms than attendant societal
complexity
might
predict.
The MCS found that
languages
in
isolated,
backland
villages
have more
basic
color
terms
than
languages of large, prosperous farming towns in the orbit of a city; the isolated areas are of poor
soil,
which
forces
people
to
improvise
diverse
livelihoods. Baines
(1985:283)
makes the amazing
observation that
Egyptian
color terms
remained at
Stage
lia 'from the
mid-3rd millennium
B.C.
to the Middle
Ages',
in
spite
of
vast societal transformation
over the
3000-year
period.
However,
although
the
change
was
great
and
the
society complex,
the
pace
of
change probably
was slow
in
comparison
to that which
pervades contemporary
Mesoamerica.
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MEASURINGVARIATION N
COLOR
SEMANTICS
which have
been
in situ for
at least 1500
years
and
which sharea
pre-Columbian
heritage. Radically
distinct circumstances
mpinge
on the two
communities.
Tenejapa
s
at
the
end of
a
twenty-mile
road
(paved
the
year
after
this
field
work
was
carried
out)
from the nearest
Hispanic
center,
San Cristobalde las
Casas.
Althoughmany
outsiders
visit,
the
remoteness
of
Tenejapa
has
shielded
it
from other
parts
of the
country.
In the
context of the heretofore slow
pace
of
change,
its
inhabitants
are
unlikely
to sense
destabilization
and are
either
neutral n their
attitudetoward
ncorporating ovelty
or
eager
to do so.
During
this
fieldwork,
a
preservation
officer from the
National Institute of
Anthro-
pology
and
History
informed
disappointed
ocal officials that
they
could
not
pave
asphalt
over cobbled streets or
replace
the
beam-and-Spanish-tile
oof of
the colonial
church with
two-by-fours
and
corrugated
tin.
Middle-aged
and
older people are monolingualand wear indigenousdress, althoughmen have
shed
broad-brimmed ibboned
headgear
or commercialhats.
People
under
age
thirty
are
bilingual
and wear
commercial
clothing.
Old and
young
women
alike
comfortably
underwent
the color interview
without
seeking
consent
from
a
husband or father. A few
men and women have
married
oreigners
without
even
minor social
consequence.
Thirty years
before this field
work, the Pan-American
highway was cut
through
Navenchauc; the village was
catapulted rom the
isolation of
a
moun-
tain
valley into the
twentieth-centurymainstream.
Interviews
were
arranged
by
a
native
interpeter-spokesman,
who
had
troublefindinganyonewho would
participate. He summonedfive of his young female relatives, two of whom
would not
volunteer until
others had gone first.
The man'smother,
about sixty
yearsold,
steadfastly
declined to be interviewed n
spite of
the
generous
wage,
and
a fifty-year-oldwidow
consented
hesitantlywith an eye
toward hereward.
Business was
conductedin a house
compound
within close earshot
of diesel
trucks passing on the
highway.
Despite the presence of a
primaryschool in
Navenchauc, all but the
spokesman
and
youngest
interviewee were monolin-
gual, and all
wore traditional
dress to the last
stitch. Elsewhere all
but a few
young construction workers wore
indigenous clothing,
including the broad
Tzotzil hat. In sum, it appears that the people of Navenchauc are trying to
maintain
inguistic and cultural
continuity while
undergoing
ntensive, unso-
licited
contact with
national society.
5.2. EMBLEMS F
IDENTITY.
avenchauc is more closely
engaged with the
world at large
than is Tenejapa.
Inhabitantsof
Tenejapamight still
take their
society for
granted,but outside
influence ntrudeson
Navenchaucto the
extent
that
no one can
ignore it or turn it
away. Its inhabitants
must
self-consciously
observe
tradition f they
are to maintain t at all.
Such a view can foster
socially
shared
emblems or symbolic practices
that shapethe
cognitive
organizationof
color categorization.
Tenejapadoes not broadcastthe
presence
of
any particular
value or shared
point
of reference that would
channel
the
organization
of color
cognition,
al-
though
an
acceptanceof
the
outside world
might encourage
some Tzeltals to
develop color
categories
toward the
number
used
in
Spanish.
Color
categori-
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LANGUAGE,
VOLUME
67,
NUMBER
1
(1991)
zation
is
evolving
in
Tenejapa
in much
the same
way
that it
is observed in
most
other
communities
visited
by
the
Mesoamerican
survey,
with neither
clear
incentive
to
speed
it
along
nor desire to
hold it back. It
might
be that
the
individualist
model
pertains
fully
to
Tenejapa.
In Navenchauc
the emblem
probably
is tradition itself. The
socially
shared
conservativism
might
encourage preservation
of an archaic
system
of
three
essential
categories
and
thereby shape
the
cognition
of color.
But the
shaping
of
cognition
involves
further
complexity:
abundant
novelty
has fostered
strong
attendance
to
distinctiveness,
which is
uniformly
evident
among
the data
from
all five Tzotzil interviewees
under
age
thirty.
The enhanced attendance to
dis-
tinctiveness
is in conflict
with the social
requirement
to
maintain
three
super-
ordinate terms. The
result is
a
shared
system
of color
categorization
that
is
unparalleled by other survey data: highly salient Tzotzil categories named with
Spanish
loanwords
are subordinated
to the archaisms at a taxonomic
depth
of
four
levels,
two levels
deeper
than
any
known
system
in Mesoamerica.
Broad
mappings
of
archaic
categories
are executed
fully,
but with a
multitude
of
tiny
steps-often
a dozen
or
more-and,
again,
the
numbers are
unprecedented
elsewhere.
The
tension
between
a
cognitive adaptation
and
a
socially
pre-
scribed emblem
gives
rise
to an
extraordinarily complicated system
of
color
categories,
described
in ?5.4.
5.3.
TZELTAL
COLOR
ATEGORIES.
ata
from seven Tzeltal speakers,
dis-
played in Figs. 2-8c, represent the way that color-category evolution usually
proceeds.
That
is,
they
show
the
range of
variation and taxonomic depth
that
was observed in
most
of the
communities
that
were surveyed
in
Mesoamerica.
The
demonstration
is valuable
for two
reasons:
it
exemplifies
the five
principles
of
change
that are
outlined
in
?4; and
this
typical case from Tenejapa
contrasts
with the
extraordinary
case
from
Navenchauc,
where
the same
principles
op-
erate
under a socially
enforced
distortion.
In
review, the
mainspring
of change
is shift
in strength
of attendance
from
similarity
to
distinctiveness,
a balance
that each
person
manipulates
in a
private
effort to
accommodate
novelty
in
general.
In
the color
domain,
the
chosen
balance concentrates ease of categorization at a particular point either on one
level or
between two
levels
in
a perceptual
hierarchy
of
potential
degrees
of
inclusion.
Among
dark-cool
colors,
the
potential
levels
of inclusion
are,
from
broad to
narrow, BLACK-WITH-GREEN-WITH-BLUE
t
level
1, BLACK
gainst
GREEN-WITH-BLUE
t level
2,
and
BLACK
gainst
GREEN
gainst
BLUE
t level
3.9
9
A
reviewer asks,
'What does
it mean
to be
at level
1 or level
2? How
does one
demonstrate
that
there
is
a
hierarchy,
and what
exactly
constitutes
inclusion?'
Inclusion
means that one
category
encompasses
the entire range
(or 'contents')
of another
category
plus more.
In the
cognitive
branches of
anthropology,
psychology,
and
linguistics,
relations
of inclusion
are
conventionally
discussed and diagrammed as a taxonomic hierarchy, with the most inclusive category highest
(Berlin
et al.
1974, figs.
2.1-6; Rosch
et al. 1976:386;
Taylor
1989, fig.
3.1). In that
view,
'level
1'
is
highest,
'level 2'
is next down,
and so forth.
Although
representation
of a taxonomy
as a
hierarchy
displays
relations of inclusion more
perspicuously
than does
any
other
schema, it
is not
proven
to
be
more
psychologically
real than
the alternatives,
such as
horizontal
nesting
of categories.
At
this
point
in the
discussion of color,
the levels
consist
of
the potential
groupings
and contrasts that
are
46
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MEASURING
VARIATION
IN COLOR SEMANTICS 47
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FIGURES a-b.
Tzeltal, Tenejapa, (a) naming ranges
and
foci, (b) mappings;
male, age 75,
1980.
An individual who strongly attends
to
similarity
maintains
one
basic
category
at level 1, a dark-cool category as in Figs. 4b-c. An individual who attends
less to similarity and more to distinctiveness
maintains two
basic categories
at
level 2, one black and the other
cool,
as do the Tzeltal
speakers
of
Figures
6a-
8c. An
individual who
attends
weakly
to
similarity
and
very strongly
to dis-
tinctiveness maintains
three
basic categories
at level
3; so,
for
example, English
speakers
contrast
basic
black, green,
and blue.
By establishing
a
certain
balance
of
attendances,
an individual
determines where in the
hierarchy
he
or she will
make basic contrasts most
naturally.
Since
the two attendances are
recipro-
cal-one weakens while
the other
strengthens-the preference
for basic cat-
egorization can slide smoothly through the perceptual hierarchy and can reside
between the
levels at
any particular
time. In that
case,
Berlin &
Kay's
char-
acteristics of a basic category, such as superordination and salience, will be
split
between levels.
For
example,
a
superordinate
dark-cool
category
will be
named with less salience than
the
cool
category
that it
encompasses,
as
in
Figs.
4a,c-d.
based
on
perceived
likenesses and differences
among black, green,
and
blue; they
are
perceptual
levels to which
categories
can
pertain. However,
the 'basic
level'
of
categorization
is
cognitive,
because it is the
point
within the
hierarchy
where an individual
categorizes
with least effort. Some
Tzeltals situate their basic level between perceptual levels 1 and 2. Furthermore, 'level' in Figs.
9-10
below refers
to
actual relations
of inclusion between
categories,
not to
perceptual
levels
per
se.
Since these relations of inclusion are
cognitive, they
do
not
match the three
perceptual
levels
one-to-one
in
every
case.
For a
distinction
between
perception
and
cognition,
see
?4.
Since
'per-
ceptual
levels' and
'cognitive
levels' can be
differentiated,
I
call
them both 'levels'
throughout
the
discussion rather than
designating
them
by separate
terms.
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48
LANGUAGE,
VOLUME
67,
NUMBER
1
(1991)
+
.1A
E
jua;
'~
G
+?i~~?~?~
,: H i |.s.s.ska pel.s.
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.
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rosado
asul
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im
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ii
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16
F
4
7
...................................................................
?
ihk'
naming
mapping
ya
ffj
naming
111i1111a11
apping
?
focus
FIGURES a-b.
Tzeltal,
Tenejapa,
(a)
naming ranges
and
foci, (b)
mappings;
female,
age
70,
1980.
@
1111111111222222222233333333334
1
A
1 2345678901234567890
1 234567890
1
234567890
B
W?Iz
focus
H iQA3rsaoO oad
seleste
?~
@
H38
C
-
Bseeste
mapped|
seleste
:
.
D. . .
-
five steps
|
............4g
rH
?:
h
mapped
^
@
J
1111111111222222222233333333334
+
1234567890123456789012345678901234567890
r
age
apped0.
E..
. .... ...~ - 2 - ,.,--_>-....
G
Hl 7.S
*-
nI-g
~ZZZC
~~r~C
I I I . ......................., ;
C
|if
age
37 1980
E~~~~~~~~~~~fiiiiPi
i
el est
tiiiiiiiiiiiiiifemale,g 7 90
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MEASURING VARIATION
IN COLOR SEMANTICS
The Tzeltal
speakers
constitute two
groups:
speakers
#2,
#3,
#4,
and
#5
maintain a
black-focused
dark-cool
category,
whereas
#6,
#7,
and
#8
do
not.
The first
group,
as mentioned above
(?3),
represents
Stage
II,
the second
Stage
IIIa.
Data from another
individual,
Tzeltal
#A,
are
not
shown;
she
falls
into
the second
group,
although
she alone
represents
Stage
IV.
Speaker
#8
differs
from
the
other members of
the second
group,
because
only
she names the
cool
category
with coextensive terms.
A
numerical
correspondence
among
different data
suggests
that
they
accu-
rately
reflect
cognition.
The four who
mapped
the black-focused
category
2ihk'
throughout
dark-cool colors
designated
the cool
category yas
with a
smaller
naming
range
than those who
mapped
the black-focused
category
over
only
dark
colors.
Speakers
#2, #3, #4,
and
#5
named the cool
category,
respec-
tively, 80, 101, 102, and 86 times-an average of 92 color chips per individual
that
were named with the
term
yas during
the
first
part
of the
interview.
Speak-
ers
#6,
#7, #8,
and
#A
named the
cool
category
124,
152,
119,
and 160
times,
an
average
of 139 uses
of
yas
(or
coextensive
seleste)
per
individual.
The
between-group
difference in the
size
of the
cool-category
naming
range
is
explained
by
the
model
of a
sliding
preference
for basic
categorization:
the
four
individuals
of the first
group
named
the
cool
category
fewer
times
because
it was more
difficult and
less
natural for them to differentiate at that level
than
it
was for
the
four members
of
the
second
group.
The
cognitive shift
between
attendances
to
similarity
and to
distinctiveness accounts for
variation in the
level of basic
categorization
and
the
consequent presence
or absence
of the
dark-cool
category;
and
the
shift
simultaneously accounts
for the further
cor-
ollary
of a
difference
in
size
of
the
cool-category
naming range.
This
model
of
cognitive
shift
predicts,
further, that a
degree of precision
that
is
sufficient
for one
individual who attends strongly
to similarity
is
deficient
for
another
individual
who
attends
strongly
to distinctiveness.
The difference
in
overview
surfaces
in
the
color naming of the
Tzeltal
speakers at earlier
and
at
later
stages,
who
appear
to name
colors
sloppily
versus
neatly; compare
Figs. 2, 3,
4a,
and 5a with
Figs.
6a and 7a.10
'Sloppiness',
however,
is
an
interpretation that would stem from the assumption that individuals directly
categorize
perception
and name what
they perceive,
either accurately
or less
so. But
the
stronger
attendance
to distinctiveness that
is characteristic
of later
evolutionary stages
simultaneously promotes
a sharper notion
of accuracy,
even
when all
speakers
name
colors with what seems
to be
equal care for
exactitude.
Finally,
the
model
addresses the grades
of
variation within
each group. In
the
first
group,
only speaker #4
maps the white-focused
category
with
a ves-
tigial
light-warm
range,
and
speakers #2,
#3,
and #4 map the
dark-cool cat-
egory
over
lighter
colors
(rows B-J) than
does speaker
#5 (rows
D-J). Speaker
#5 appears to be retracting his dark-cool category toward the restricted dark
range
that
characterizes the
second group.
10
The
naming ranges
of
speaker
#8,
like those
of
speakers
#2, #3, #4,
and
#5,
also
appear
'sloppy',
but for
a different reason.
Speaker
#8
adopts
seleste
and asul
as additional
names
of
the
cool
category,
and she
applies
coextensive
tah
to
yellow
more
than
do the other
Tenejapa
Tzeltals.
49
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LANGUAGE,
VOLUME
67,
NUMBER
1
(1991)
Speaker
#6,
who
is at
Stage
la,
belongs
to the second
group.
However,
his data show
qualities
that are intermediate to the two
groups:
he
has
retracted
the
black-focused
category
to
exclusively
dark
colors,
but he
has
not
added
terms
in
excess
of the five
that are shared
by
all
speakers.
Speakers
#7,
#8,
and
#A
have added words for blends
of
color,
such
as
kape
'brown'
(from
Spanish
cafe
'coffee/brown'),
rosa
'pink'
(Sp.
rosa
'rose/
pink'),
'in
'purple'
(Tzel.
'yucca
root'),
and
limun
'chartreuse'
(Sp.
limon
'lime/chartreuse')-a
further
corollary
of
stronger
attendance
to
distinctive-
ness.
Speakers
#7
and
#8
are more
discriminating
than
#6;
they
map
the
black-
focused
category
over
fewer
colors.
Speaker
#8
shows
exceptional
discrimi-
nation
by polarizing
all foci
except
that of coextensive
k'an;
she
placed
her
other six
chromatic foci
in the darkest
rows,
H-I.
In sum, the cognitive model of reciprocal strengths of attendance to similarity
and to distinctiveness accounts for the smooth
gradient
of variation
throughout
stages
and
substages
of Tzeltal color
categorization.
Theoretically,
different
individuals have
balanced the
strengths
of attendances as a
personal
adjustment
to
the
novelty
that each confronts
in a
day.
Differences between
the
privately
attained
balances cause each
person
to fall out at a different
point
along
a
continuous
sequence
of
color-category
evolution that is
constrained only
by
physiology.
The
Tenejapa
Tzeltal
might
aspire
to some emblem
of social
identity
in
their
use of
color
names,
although
such
a
construct
is not essential
to
explain
the
current variation in Tenejapa.
5.4.
TZOTZIL
COLOR
CATEGORIES.Color
categorization
in
Navenchauc
Tzotzil
is
very
different from that of
Tenejapa
Tzeltal.
Four
of
the six Tzotzil
interviewees
preserve
the
three-category system,
and five retain
the
dark-cool
category.
But
they preserve
it at
low salience and
as
the
highest
level of
a
four-
tier
taxonomy.
All three
levels of subordinate
categories
are
of
greater
salience
(see
n. 9).
The
Navenchauc
system
is
unique
among
the
Mesoamerican
data. An
ex-
planation of its unusual character requires some special construct in addition
to
those of
the
individualistic
variety,
perhaps
a
social variable. Labov
(1963)
puts
forth the
notion of
a
prestigious
variant in
his model
of
socially
motivated
phonological
change.
The
concept
of a
socially
valued
linguistic
form
fits well with
the hypothesis
that the
people
of
Navenchauc value the
maintenance of
many
sorts of
tradition,
including
early-stage
color
categorization.
Traditional
practices
might
provide
a
source of social
identity
under
the
relentless
encroachment of
outside
influ-
ences.
Labov
notes
that
'the
linguistic
form
which
began
to
shift was
often
a
marker of
regional
status'
(1972:178).
His idea
is
amplified
here to
construe
any time-honored behavior as a potential marker; the Navenchauc Tzotzil
might
seek to
stabilize
such markers as
islands of
identity
in
a
world
that
shifts
around
them.
Tzotzil
data
are
represented by
Figures
9-11,
speakers
#9, #10,
and
#11;
data
from the
other
three
speakers
(#C,
#D,
and
#E)
are
omitted.
Speaker
50
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MEASURING
VARIATION IN
COLOR
SEMANTICS
53
+;;
A
Ba
B
H
| ,dh I
: .
7
D
7
jF
1 1_
-
1111111111
S F
1234567890123456789 iS
3
(
focus
asul
d
kafe
morero
.
B
. : : : : : : :
: : : : : : ; ;
: : : : : : : : ; : : : : : : : : :
: : : : : : .
b
C
8
Ilf4-I4w4.4
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DH11lf
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LANGUAGE,
VOLUME
67,
NUMBER 1
(1991)
uba,
kafe,
selestre, limun,
and
asul
(whose
forms
derive from
Spanish
uva
'grape/purple',
'cafe
'coffee/brown',
celeste
'sky-blue',
limon
'lime/char-
treuse',
and
azul
'blue').
According
to this
model,
if the broad
categories
had
not
been
adopted
as emblems of
identity,
by
now
they
would
have
retracted
to narrower
ranges;
that
is,
dark-cool and
coextensively
named
warm
would
have retracted to
black, red,
and
yellow.
Since
the retraction is
discouraged
by
a social
value,
other
terms have
been innovated to name the
finer
order
of
differentiation mandated
by
current
thinking.
Tzotzil
speakers
#10
and
#11
show variants of
the
emblematic
dark-cool
category
that is retracted to row
D
or
E,
and
#10
shows
a variant
of
the
subordinate
complexity.'3
Speaker
#11,
age
50,
shows
only
two
taxonomic
levels;
she
established color
categories
as
an adult before intrusion
of
the
high-
way.
5.5.
INDEPENDENTEVIDENCE
OF
COGNITIVE
IFFERENCE.
The
Tzotzil
speak-
ers
map
color
categories
with
more
steps
than do the Tzeltal
speakers,
as
is
shown
by
the
following comparison.
The
comparison presents,
first,
the
range
of each
category
that is shared
between the
two
languages
(e.g.
'dark-cool');
second,
the
name of the
category
in
Tzotzil
and in
Tzeltal
(e.g.
2ik'/2ihk');
and
third,
the
average
number of
steps
with
which
the
speakers
of
each language
mapped
the
category (e.g.
13.5:8.5),
always
in the order
Tzotzil:
Tzeltal
for
each name and
each
average:
'dark-cool'
2ik'/2ihk'
13.5:8.5;
'cool'
yo?/yas
7.4:5.0; 'warm' with red focus?ohl/ah 5.6:4.0; 'warm' with yellow focus k'on/
k'an
7.8:4.0; 'white
sak/sak
4.5:2.8.
The
consistently larger
number of Tzotzil
mapping steps
indicates
that,
on
the
average
and within the
present
sample,
the Tzotzil
speakers
attend to
dif-
ferences
among
colors
more
strongly
than do the Tzeltal
speakers.
These
num-
bers are
consistent with the
greater
taxonomic
depth
of Tzotzil
color
categorization,
which
I
have also attributed
to
a
stronger
attendance to
dis-
tinctiveness. The
taxonomic
depth
and
the
average
number
of
mapping
steps
per category
are
independent
orders
of
data.
The
averages
are based
on
the
Tzotzil data
from
Navenchauc and
on
the
Tzeltal data both from
Tenejapa
and from
Amatenango
del
Valle,
where three
individuals
were interviewed. The
differences
in
averages
between
Tenejapa
and
Amatenango
are as
follows:
'dark-cool'
2ihk'
9.0:7.5;
'cool'
yas
5.75:4;
'warm'
with red
focus
?ah
4.5:3.0;
'warm'
with
yellow
focus
k'an
4.25:3.5;
'white' sak
2.75:3.0.
The
Amatenango
averages
are
lower
than
those
of
Te-
nejapa,
except
for
the
sak
averages.
However,
each
Tenejapa
Tzeltal
average
is lower
than
its Navenchauc Tzotzil
counterpart.
The
averages
of
mapping
steps
for
'dark-cool',
'warm',
and
'cool'
can
be
calculated
only
from the data
representing
the
stages
that
contain
those
cate-
gories, basic or secondary.'4 Two speakers at Stage IV, Tzotzil #E (with a
13
Tzotzil
speakers
#C
and
#D,
whose data are
not diagrammed,
show
similar
complexity
to
a
depth
of
four and three
levels
respectively,
and
speaker
#E
shows a
Stage-IV
system
with
two
taxonomic
levels.
14
Stages
II-IV
contain
the
following
basic
categories:
II [white,
warm,
dark-cool],
as
mapped
54
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MEASURING VARIATION
IN
COLOR
SEMANTICS
total of
37
mapping
steps)
and Tzeltal
#A
(with
17
steps),
are
excluded
from
the
calculations,
although
their
relevant numbers
are: 'cool'
yoslyas
15
steps:
7
steps;
'white'
saklsak
2:1; 'black' 2ik'/2ihk'
11:3. The three
Stage-IIIa
Tzeltals
mapped
black
2ihk'
with
3, 2,
and
2
steps, respectively.
DISCUSSION
6.
The
cognitive
model of
gradual change
has
implications
for the
growing
theory
of
categorization
(e.g.
Rosch et al.
1976,
Medin & Smith
1984,
Taylor
1989).
These
implications
concern
the
basic
level of
categorization
and
the
definition
of basic color
terms.
6.1.
MOBILITY
OF THE BASICLEVEL
OF CATEGORIZATION.erlin
et al. 1974
find that
biological
folk taxonomies
can
have as
many
as
five
major
levels. But
the middle level-which Berlin calls FOLKGENERICCATEGORIES is learned first
by
children. It
pertains
to concrete
and
imageable meanings,
and it is
named
with
simplest
terminology,
named with the
largest
inventory
of
terms,
most
frequently
named,
and
named with least effort. This is
the level
of
cognition
on which
people
achieve
basic
partitions
of their environment
and
interact most
directly
and
comfortably
with
it;
for
example,
tomato
is a
'folk-generic'
cat-
egory,
as
opposed
to
the
superordinate
category vegetable
or a
subordinate
category
such as
Roman tomato.
Rosch
et al.
(1976; cf. Taylor
1989:46-51)
rename
this concept
the BASIC
EVEL
f categorization.
They
couple
the
concept
with prototype
theory by
showing
that a
BASICOBJECT
ategory
constitutes
the
most
abstract
level on
which
prototypical
members
manifest
the maximum of
attributes that typify
the category
and
a minimum
of attributes
that
characterize
prototypes
of other
categories.
Berlin
and his
coworkers
further
show that
the
'generic'
or basic level is not
immutably
pegged
to physical
form,
and
others
have
repeated
the
finding (Rosch
et al
1976:432,
Dougherty
1978,
Mervis
&
Rosch 1981:93).
Thus,
some items
that are originally
classified
as subtypes
of
basic concepts
are later
promoted
to basic
status.
For example,
a few
Tzeltals
have
promoted
a divergent
species
of oak to the
generic level,
while
the majority
of
speakers
classify
that
taxon on
the specific
level
(Berlin
1972:74-79).
Or,
from another perspective, it could be said that some Tzeltals have moved their
basic level 'downward'
to incorporate
the
divergent
taxon.
The
data regarding
Tzeltal color
categorization
shows that
in this domain
the
basic level
is
highly mobile.
As individuals
shift
the
strength of
cognitive
attendances from
similarity
to distinctiveness,
the
basic level
of color
cate-
gorization
moves toward
greater differentiation
and specificity.
Superordinate
categories
fall into disuse and
diminish
in range;
for example,
dark-cool
pihk'
in
Fig. 9b;
IlIa [white,
warm, black,
cool]; IIIb [white,
red,
yellow, dark-cool];
IV [white,
black,
red, yellow,
cool].
Stages II
and
IIIb
can include
cool as a nonbasic
category,
as mapped
in Fig.
4d. For these reasons, mapping steps are counted for dark-cool categories only from Stage-lI and
Stage-IIIb
data,
for warm categories
only from
Stage-lI and Stage-IIIa
data, and
for white and cool
categories
from data of
Stages
II, liIa, and
IIb. Likewise,
mapping
steps of
black categories are
counted
only
from
Stage-IlIa
and Stage-IV
data. Data
regarding
Stage-IV
cool and white
categories
are
counted separately,
and data regarding
red and yellow
categories
of Stage
IIIb
and Stage
IV
are not
counted.
55
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8/9/2019 Measuring Variability in Color Semantics
24/30
LANGUAGE,
VOLUME
67,
NUMBER
1
(1991)
retracts from
green
and from
blue toward its black focus. Subordinate cate-
gories
gain
in
usage
and
expand
in
range;
for
example,
cool
yas
broadens its
range
and is named
more often
during
the Munsell interview. In
effect,
the
basic
categorization
shifts
from the level of
combining
BLACK-WITH-GREEN-
WITH-BLUE to
the level of
contrasting
BLACK
against
GREEN-WITH-BLUE. In
the
future,
Tzeltal
speakers might
move
their
basic color
categorization
to the level
of
maximum
contrast
of
BLACK
against
GREEN
against
BLUE,
as have
speakers
of other
Mesoamerican
languages
after
they
innovated a term for a
separate
basic
category
of
BLUE
MacLaury
1986,
figs.
8.12a-c).
6.2.
SPLITTING
CRITERIAOF BASICCOLORCATEGORIES.Berlin
&
Kay
identify
the
basic
status of
a
color
category-a
BASIC COLOR
TERM-with
operational
criteria:
(1)
monolexemic,
(2)
non-context
specific,
(3)
not included in the
range
of another term, and (4) highly salient.'5 Criteria (1) and (2) are not proble-
matical
here,
but
(3)
and
(4)
warrant
discussion.
In
Tzeltal,
as the basic
level
of
categorization
moves from the level of
BLACK-WITH-GREEN-WITH-BLUE
o the
level
of BLACK
against
GREEN-WITH-BLUE,
riterion
(3)
continues to
pertain
at
the broader level
while criterion
(4)
gains prominence
at the
more
specific
level.
That
is,
'dark-cool'
2ihk'
of uneven salience
continues
to
encompass
consis-
tently
salient 'cool'
yas.
When
does one
stop
calling
'dark-cool' a
basic
category
and start
thinking
of 'cool' as
basic?
This question has no clear answer, because change
occurs
gradually as the basic level continuously moves. Many Tzeltals place the basic
level somewhere
between
the
tight
grouping of
BLACK-WITH-GREEN-WITH-BLUE
and the unequivocal
contrast
of BLACKagainst GREEN-WITH-BLUE;
few
have
arrived at the
latter,
Stage
lia.
For this reason, it is difficult
to specify
the
exact
number
of
basic
color
categories that each Tzeltal speaker
maintains.
The fact that
there
is flux
in
basic status is not
an
indictment
of the