PROJECT

SUBJECT - JURISPRUDENCE

“TITLE”

M EDICAL J URISPRUDENCE:AN ANALYSIS

SUBMITTED BY:-

Harshit khare

R230208020

UNIVERSITY OF PETROLEUM & ENERGY STUDIES

INTRODUCTION:-

Forensic Science or Medical Jurisprudence, also called forensics, the application of science to

law. Forensic science uses highly developed technologies to uncover scientific evidence in a

variety of fields. Modern forensic science has a broad range of applications. It is used in civil

cases such as forgeries, fraud, or negligence. It can help law-enforcement officials determine

whether any laws or regulations have been violated in the marketing of foods and drinks, the

manufacture of medicines, or the use of pesticides on crops. It can also determine whether

automobile emissions are within a permissible level and whether drinking water meets legal

purity requirements. Forensic science is used in monitoring the compliance of various countries

with such international agreements as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Chemical

Weapons Convention and to learn whether a country is developing a secret nuclear weapons

program. However, forensic science is most commonly used to investigate criminal cases

involving a victim, such as assault, robbery, kidnapping, rape, or murder.

Medical Jurisprudence which teaches the application of every branch of medical knowledge to

the purposes of the law; hence its limits are, on the one hand, the requirements of the law, and on

the other, the whole range of medicine. Anatomy, physiology, medicine, surgery, chemistry,

physics and botany, lend their aid as necessity arises; arid in some cases all these branches of

science are required to enable a court of law to arrive at a proper conclusion on a contested

question affecting life or property.

The principles of science and law developed over the centuries in response to their differing

objects of interest. Science, engineering, and technology seek knowledge through an open-ended

search for expanded understanding, whose “truths” are subject to revision. Law, too, conducts an

open-ended search for expanded understanding; however, it demands definite findings of fact at

given points in time. When these two disciplines meet in the courtroom the differences between

the two cultures are magnified. For example, the legal tradition of adversarial proceedings

contrasts with the cooperative ethic of science. Even the search for truth does not serve the same

aims and may not be subject to the same constraints and requirements. Simply stated, science,

engineering, and technology1 aim to understand, predict, modify, and control aspects of the

natural and manufactured world, while the law seeks current truth about scientific and other facts

of cases in order to serve the much different goal of justice between parties (as well as other

societal goals).

In today's high-technology society the two professions are increasingly often forced to interact in

legal disputes involving patents, product liability, environmental torts, regulatory proceedings,

and criminal cases. Further, law and science encounter each other in the laboratory through a

number of federal actions governing intellectual property, research misconduct, access to

research data, and conflicts of interest. The fact-finding agendas of the two disciplines now

frequently have begun to overlap, if not merge. Because there is a general lack of understanding

of each culture, these interactions often lead to a cognitive friction that is both disturbing and

costly to society.

Fields of Forensic Science

A Medico-legal expert should look at a dead body more with the eyes of a legal man than with

the eyes of a medical man.1 Lyons2 has divided the wide field of Medical Jurisprudence under the

following heads:

I. Identification of (i) wounded and (ii) the dead

II. General examination of persons.

III. Death: (i) Natural (ii) Unnatural- homicide, suicide, accidental and fabricated.

IV Assaults,wounds and injuries

(i) Homicidal wounds,(ii) Sucidal wounds(iii) Accidental wounds(iv) Fabricated wounds and self- inflicted.

V Sexual offences, Virginity, Impotency, Defloration, Pregnency, Birth, Delivery,

Abortion,Infanticide, Foeticide and Unnatural sex offences.

VI Insanity; and

1 Woodroffmand Amie Ali, LAW OF EVIDENCE,(1979) 14th Edn, p 13012 L.A. Lyons, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE FOR INDIA, 5TH Edn,1914

VII Toxicology

MEDICAL EVIDENCE:-

A medical man is required to provide assistance to the cause of justice by furnishing certificates and reports consequent upon examination of a living person and a dead.

I. In civil cases, the opinion of a medical expert is revelant to prove,(i) Age, in matters of minority and majority disputes,(ii) Death, whether natural or unnatural,(iii) Ill health, required for leave on medical grounds from offices and exemption

from court attendance,(iv) Certificate of fitness forGovt. Services and other jobs, whatever this is

required according to rules,(v) Mental conditions of a person at the time of making a will,(vi) Mental capabilities of a person to manage his own state of affairs,

II. In criminal matters , the opinion of a medical expert may be required to prove,(i) Types of hurt, injuries and their severity,(ii) Post- mortem report regarding the cause of death, time since death, manner of

death, type of weapon or to prove the actual weapon involved in the case,(iii) Insanity and other mental disorders,(iv) Age, to decide minority or majority in sexual assault cases, validity of

marriage and cases of kidnapping,(v) Drunkenness, delirium tremens, etc,(vi) Virginity or otherwise of a woman,(vii) Impotence, sterility of a man,(viii) Pregnancy and childbirth, gestation period,(ix) Medico- legal facts in sexual offences,(x) Dying declaration

Other dutiesExamination of accused persons by medical practioner at the request of police officer under the provisions of Section 53 CrPC,1973- Section 53 states:“(1) When a person is arrested on a charge of commiting an offence of such a nature and alleged to have been committed under such circumstances that ther are reasonable grounds for believing that anexamination of his personalwill afford evidence as to the commission of an offence, it

shall be lawful for a registered medical practitioner, acting at the request of apolice officer not below the rank of sub-inspector, and for any person acting in good faith in his aid and under his direction, to make such an examination of the person arrested as is reasonably necessary in order to ascertain the facvts which may afford such evidence, and to use such force as it is reasonably for that purpose.

(2) Whenever the person of a female is to be examined under this section, the examination shall be made only by, or under the supervision of, a female registered medical practitioner.

Explanation- In this section and Section 54, ‘registered medical practitioner’ means a medical practitioner who possess any recognized medical qualification as defined in cluse (h) of Section (2) of the Indian Medicsal Council Act, 1956 (102 of 1956), and whose name has been entered in a State Medical Register.”

In Kapil Kumar v State of Assam3 the Gauhati High Court held that subjecting an arrested person to medical examination under Section 53 forms a part of investigation as defined in Section 2(4) CrPc.

Medical examination may include taking of blood, semen, sputum, urine, etc, and taking of their samples as well. The collection of sample may inflict some tourture or pain and this allowed by tlaw. Even such reasonable force can be used to subject an arrested person to medical examination that may discomfort him.

Evidentiary value of dying declaration

A dying declaration is relevant and material evidence in the prosecution of the offenders and a truthful and reliable dying declaration may form the sole basis of conviction even though it is not corroborated. But the court must be satisfied that the dying declaration is truthful. If the court finds that circumstances of the case , consider it unsafe to convict the accused on the basis of the declaration alone without further corroboration.4

A dying declaration cannot be equated with the evidence of an accomplice or the evidence furnished by a confession as against the maker of the confession. The declaration, like the evidence of an accomplice, does not come form a tainted source. Generally, the maker of a dying declaration cannot be tarnished with the same brush as the maker of a confession or an approver.5 The statement of a medical officer who had attended on the deceased showed that the deceased was in critical condition whe he reached the hospital. He was in severe bodily pain and in state of profound depression resulting from the injury. There was profuse bleeding from his injury, his

3 1983 Cri LJ (NOC) 66 (Gau.)4 Thurukanni Pompiah v. State of Mysore, IR 1956 SC 939 : (1956) 2 Cri LJ 315 Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay, AIR 1958 SC 22 : 1958 Cri LJ 106

pulse was feeble, and blood pressure was not recordable. In these circumstances the deceased could not be said to be in a fit mental and physical condition to make a statement of his own volition after he reached the hospital. 6

The dying declaration amply corroborated by circumstantial evidence as also by the medical

evidence cannot be ignored or discarded because it did not mention the mane of certain persons

and it did not account for certain injuries received by the accused persons.7

The fact that the language used in the dying declaration is chaste, while that used in F.I.R. as

well as the statement to the police officer have some words which are spoken in villages is not in

much significance because there is abnormal or unusual chaste and refined language while taking

to another.8

Where the deceased gave the narration in Punjabi but the statement was recorded inUdru it was

held that in Punjab, the language used in subordinate courts nad that employed by the police for

recording of statement has always ben Urdu. The recording, therefore , of the dying declaration

in Urdu cannot be a basis for saying that the statement was not correctly reproduced. This is

wholly inadequate reason for rejecting the dying declaration.9

When the deceased had died as a consequence of burns caused by her clothes being set on fire by

the accused and this is supported by her dying declaration, the correctness of which has not been

challenged by cogent reasons, conviction based on such evidence is sustainable.10

In Brij Raj Singh case11, there was mention of one shot in the dying declaration. The autopsy

report mentioned two injuries, one inward and the other outward which was indicative of two

wounds caused by two separate shots. The High Court held that the dying declaration cannot be

falsified on the ground that the victim must have sustained two wounds by two separate shots.

INSANITY:- The meaning of insanity in civil law, medicine and neuroscience is different from its meaning in criminal law.

6 Balak Ram v. State of U.P., (1975) 3 SCC 219 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 837 : AIR 1974 SC 21657 Ghurphekan v. State of U.P.,1972 SCC (Cri) 5318 Barati v. State of U.P., AIR 1974 SC 8399 Bakhshish Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1957 SC 90410 Tarachand Damu Sutar v. State of Maharastra, AIR 1962 SC 13011 Brij Raj Singh v. State, 1983 Cri LJ 1916 (All).

Insanity in LawInsanity or unsoundness of mind is not defined in the act. It means a disorder of the mind, which

impairs the cognitive faculty; that is, the reasoning capacity of man to such an extent as to render

him incapable of understanding consequences of his actions. It means that the person is

incapable of knowing the nature of the act or of realising that the act is wrong or contrary to

law12. A person, although of unsound mind, who knows that he is committing an unlawful act,

may not get the benefit of IPC, s. 84. The nature and extent of the unsoundness must be so high

so as to impair his reasoning capacity and that he may not understand the nature of the act or that

it is contrary to law.It excludes from its preview insanity, which might be caused by engendered

by emotional or volitional factors.

There are four kinds of person who may be said to be non compos mentis (not of sound mind)

(1) an idiot – an idiot is one who from birth had defective mental capacity. This

infirmity in him is perpetual without lucid intervals;

(2) one made so by illness – by illness, a person is made non compos mentis. He is

therefore excused in case of criminal liability, which he acts under the influence of

this disorder;

(3) a lunatic or a madman – lunatics are those who become insane and whose incapacity might

be or was temporary or intermittent. A lunatic is afflicted by mental disorder only at certain

period and vicissitudes, having intervals of reason13; and

(4) one who is drunk – this is covered under IPC, s. 85.

Insanity in Medical TermsThere is a difference between the medical definitions of insanity. According to medical science,

insanity is a disorder of the mind that impairs the mental facilities of a man14. Insanity is another

name for mental abnormalities due to various factors and exists in various degrees15. Insanity is

popularly denoted by idiocy, madness, lunacy, to describe mental derangement, mental disorder

and all other forms of mental abnormalities known to medical science. Insanity in medical terms

12 Basu’s Indian Penal Code, 9th ed, 2006.13 7 Russell, Vol. 1, (12th ed.), pp. 105.

14 KD Gaur.15 Srivastava, R.C., Law Relating to Crime and Punishment, 2006, Manav Law House, Allahabad.

encompasses much broader concept than insanity in medical terms. Therefore, the scope of the

meaning of insanity in medical terms is much wider when compared to its legal meaning.

ENGLISH LAW ON INSANITY

The English law on insanity is based on the Mc’Naghten rules.

Development of the Law

The insanity defence has a long history, and is evolved after many tests that have been tried and

tested.

Wild Beast test: It was the first test to check insanity that was laid down in the case of

Arnold Case in 1724. Justice Tracy, a 13th century judge in King Edward’s court, first

formulated the foundation of an insanity defense when he instructed the jury that it must acquit

by reason of insanity if it found the defendant to be a madman which he described as ‘a man that

is totally deprived of his understanding and memory, and doth not know what he is doing, no

more than an infant, than a brute, or a wild beast, such a one is never the object of punishment’16.

Good and Evil test: This test was laid down in the case of R vs. Madfield. The test laid down

in this case is ‘the ability to distinguish between good and evil’. In this case, the accused was

charged or treason for attempting to kill the King. The defence pleaded that he was not able to

distinguish between good and evil and ‘wild beast test’ was unreasonable. He was acquitted.

Mc’Naghten test: The law relating to the defence of insanity is to be found in the rules set

out in Mc’Naghten17 that delineate the circumstances in which an accused will be held not to

have been legally responsible for his conduct.

The Origin of the Rules on the Insanity Plea

Daniel Mc’Naghten was found to be insane and acquitted on a charge of murdering Sir Robert

16 Christopher Slobogin, An End to Insanity: Recasting the Role of Mental Disability in Criminal Cases,86 Va. L. Rev. 1199, 1208 (2000).

17 (1843) 10 Cl & F 200.

Peel’s private secretary, it being his intention to kill Peel. He was committed to the hospital but

there was public outcry about the leniency of the verdict. The matter was debated in the House of

Lords where it was decided to seek the opinion of the judges on legal principles relating to

insanity. The rules laid down were:

(1) everyone is to be presumed sane and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible

for their crimes until contrary is proved to the satisfaction of the jury;

(2) to establish a defence of insanity, it must be clearly proved that at the time of committing the

act, the accused was laboring under such a defect of reason, from the disease of the mind, as not

to know he was doing what was wrong18;

(3) as to his knowledge of the wrongfulness of the act, the judges said: ‘if the accused was

conscious that the act was one which he ought not to do and the same time the act was contrary

to the law of the land, he is punishable; and

(4) Where a person under insane delusion as to existing facts commits an offence in consequence

thereof, criminality must depend on the nature of the delusion. If he labours under partial

delusion only, and is not in other respects insane, he must be considered in the same situation as

to responsibility as if the facts with respect to which the delusion exists were real.

The Halsbury’s Laws of England explain that where on a criminal charge, it appears that, at

the time of the act or omission giving rise to the offence alleged, the defendant was laboring

under a defect of reason owing to a disease of mind so as not to know the nature and quality of

his act, or, if he knew this, so as not to know that what he was doing was wrong, he is not

regarded in law as responsible for the act. The question whether, owing to a defect of reason due

to the disease of the mind, the defendant was not responsible for his act is a question of fact to be

determined by the jury. Where the jury finds insanity is made out the verdict takes place in the

form of not guilty due to insanity19

The Constituent elements of the DefenceThere are three conditions to be satisfied in any case where a defence of insanity is raised:

18 Michael Allen, ‘Textbook on Criminal law’, 7th ed. 2003, at pp. 123.19 Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th ed., Vol. 11, para 30, pp. 27-28, as quoted in Justice Y.V.Chandrachud (ed.), Ratanlal and Dhirajlal, ‘Indian Penal Code’, 29th ed. Rep. 2004, at pp. 320.

(1) the accused was suffering from the disease of the mind – disease of the mind is a legal term

and not a medical term. The law is concerned with the question whether the accused is to held

legally responsible for his acts. This depends on his mental state and its cause complying with

legally defined criteria. Lord Denning defined it as ‘any mental disorder which has manifested

itself in violence and is prone to recur is a disease of the mind. At any rate it is the sort of disease

for which a person should be detained in hospital rather than be given an unqualified acquittal’.

The leading decision on what constitutes a disease of the mind was given in the case of Sullivan20

in which a distinction was drawn between insane and non-insane person automatism.

Lord Diplock defined disease of the mind as ‘mind in the Mc’Naghten rules is used in the

ordinary sense of the medical faculties of reason, memory and understanding. If the effect of the

disease is to impair these faculties so severely as to have either of the consequences referred to in

the latter part of the rules, it matters not whether the etiology of the impairment is organic, as in

epilepsy, or functional, or whether the impairment is itself permanent or is transient and

intermittent, provided that it subsisted at the time of commission of the act’;

(2) this disease gave rise to a defect of reason: where the defence of insanity is to succeed, the

disease of the mind must give rise to a defect of reason. The reasoning power of a person must be

impaired. The defendant must show that he was suffering from such defect of reason that he did

not know the nature and quality of the act he had committed, or if he did know, that he did not

know that what he was doing was wrong. If the accused is relying on the second limb, he must

show proof that he did not know that it was legally wrong; and as a result, he either did not know

that what he was doing was wrong: If the accused’s defect of reason is to be effective in

establishing the defence of insanity, the insanity must affect his legal responsibility for his

conduct as such he is not able to realise that what he was doing is wrong. Wrong here means

something that is contrary to law.21 Where the person knows the nature or quality of the act and

knows he was doing wrong, then the fact that he was acting under a strong impulse will not

entitle him to a defence under the rules.

20 (1984) A.C. 156 at 172 as quoted in Alan Reed and Peter Seago, ‘Criminal law’, 1999.

21 R vs. Windle (1952) 2 QB 826 as quoted in Harris, ‘Criminal law’, 22nd ed. 1st Indian Reprint 2000, atpp. 92.

In 1916, in the case of R vs. Codere22, the court of criminal appeal explained the principles:

(1) an objective moral test must be applied in cases where insanity is pleaded. The test of

insanity is ‘the objective standard adopted by the reasonable men’;

(2) an act is wrong according to that standard if it is punishable by law;

(3) the accused must be deemed ‘to know he was doing what was wrong’ if he was aware

that the act was one which was punishable; and

(4) the words ‘nature and quality’ do not refer to the moral aspects of what the offender was

doing but solely to the physical facts.

INDIAN LAW ON INSANITYThe Indian law relating to insanity has been codified in the IPC, s. 84 contained also the general

exceptions. Indian Penal Code, s. 84: ‘Acts of a person of unsound mind— Nothing is an offence

which is done by a person who, at the time of doing it, by reason of unsoundness of mind, is

incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that he is doing what is either wrong or contrary to

law’.

IPC, s. 84 and the Mc’Naghten rule:IPC, s. 84 deals with the law of insanity on the subject. This provision is made from the

Mc’Naghten rules of England. In the draft penal code, Lord Macaulay suggested two sections

(66 and 67), one stating that ‘nothing is an offence which is done by a person in a state of idiocy’

and the other stating that ‘nothing is an offence which a person does in consequence of being

mad or delirious at the time of doing it’ to deal with insanity. The Law Commissioners in

replacing these two provisions by IPC, s. 84 have adopted a brief and succinct form of the

Mc’Naghten rules. It has been drafted in the light of the replies to the second and third questions,

which is generally known as Mc’Naghten rules. But, IPC, s. 84 uses a more comprehensible term

‘unsoundness of mind’ instead of insanity. Huda says the use of the word ‘unsoundness of mind’

instead of insanity has the advantage of doing away with the necessity of defining insanity and

of artificially bringing within its scope different conditions and affliction of mind which

ordinarily do not come within its meaning, but which nonetheless stand on the same footing in

regard to the exemptions from criminal liability.23

22 (1916) 12 Cr.App.R. 21.23 Huda, S.S. Principles of Law of Crimes in British India, as quoted in K.D. Gaur,

‘Commentary on Indian Penal Code’, 1st ed. 2006, Universal, pp. 271.

Ingredients

This provision states that an unsoundness of mind is a defence to criminal charges. It is accepted

as a defence to a criminal charge on the theory that ‘one who is insane has no mind and may not

have the necessary mens rea to commit a crime’.24 The act of a mad person is unintentional and

involuntary, no court may correct him by way of punishment.25 To invoke the benefit of IPC, s.

84, it must be proved that at the time of commission of the offence, the accused was insane and

the unsoundness of mind was of such a degree and nature as to fulfill any one of the test laid

down in the provision. These are:

(1) firstly, the accused was incapable of knowing the nature of the act. It covers two situations,

namely, automatism and mistake of fact due to unsoundness of mind as a defence26; and

(2) secondly, that the accused was precluded by reason of unsoundness of mind from

understanding that what he was doing was either wrong or contrary to law. It covers those cases

wherein a man by reason of delusion is unable to appreciate the distinction between

right and wrong27. The accused is protected not only when, on the account of insanity, he was

incapable of knowing the nature of the act, but also when he did not know either the

act was wrong or it was contrary to the law. He is however, not protected if he knew

that what he was doing was wrong, even if he did not know that it was contrary to

the nature of the law or vice versa28. The defence of insanity may be established if it is proved

that at the time of committing the act, the party accused was laboring under such a defect of

reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature or quality of the act he was doing, or

if he did know it, that he did not know that he was doing what was wrong29. The benefit of this

provision may be taken only if at the time of committing the crime, the offender by reason of

unsoundness of mind was incapable of knowing the real nature of his act or that the act was

morally wrong or contrary to law30.

24 Gour, Penal Law of India, 11th ed. Vol. 1, 2000, pp. 602: ‘A mad man has no will’;Furoisis nulla voluntas east; as quoted in KD Gaur.25 Ibid.26 Pillai, K.N. Chandrasekharan, General Principles of Criminal Law, 1st Ed., reprint,2005, Eastern Book Company, Lucknow.27 Ibid.28 Geron Ali, (1940) 2 Cal 329 as quoted in Ratanlal And Dhirajlal.29 Mc’Naughten case.30 State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Ahmedullah AIR 1961 SC 998,Dahyabhai C. Thakur vs. State of Gujarat AIR 1964 SC 1563

The Cuttuck High Court has laid down certain principles in the case of Sundra Majhi31:

(1) every type of insanity is not legal insanity; the cognitive faculty must be so destroyed as to

render one incapable of knowing the nature of his act or that what he is doing is wrong or

contrary to law;

(2) the court will presume the absence of such insanity;

(3) the burden of proof of legal insanity is on the accused, though it is not as heavy as on the

prosecution;

(4) the court must consider whether the accused suffered from legal insanity at the time when the

offence was committed;

(5) in reaching such a conclusion the circumstances which preceded, attended or followed the

crime are relevant considerations; and

(6) the prosecution in discharging its burden in the face of the plea of legal insanity has merely to

prove the basic fact and rely upon the normal presumption of that everyone knows the law and

the natural consequences of his act.

The law on the point has been well summarised by their Lordships of the Calcutta High Court in

Kader Nasayer Shah in the following words: ‘it is only unsoundness of mind which materially

impairs the cognitive faculties of the mind that may form a ground of exemption from certain

responsibility, the nature and extent of unsoundness of mind required being such a nature would

make the offender incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that he is doing what is (1)

wrong or (2) contrary to law32.

Burden of proofThe principle that the court follows is that ‘every person is sane unless contrary is proved’33. The

onus of proving insanity is one the person who is pleading it as a defence. In the case of State of

Madhya Pradesh vs. Ahamadullah34, it was observed that burden of proof is on the accused. The

Supreme Court also upheld the principle in the case of S.W. Mohammed vs. State of

Maharastra35 and said that the accused have to prove that he is insane. However, this

311971 Cut LT 565.

32 1896 ILR 23 Cal 604 (608) as quoted in Gour, Hari Singh, The Penal Law of India,Vol. 1, 11th ed., 2002, Law Publishers (India) Pvt. Ltd., Allahabad.

33 Allen, Michael, Textbook on Criminal Law, 7th ed., 2003, Oxford University Press,34 AIR 1961 SC 99835 AIR 1972 SC 216

requirement of proof is not heavy as on the prosecution to prove the offence and is based on

balance of probabilities. It has been criticised that the McNaughton rules of the 19th century

England, on which IPC, s. 84 is based are outdated since they do not provide protection under

IPC, s. 84 to behaviour out of abnormality of mind, or partial delusion, irresistible impulse or

compulsive behaviour of a psychopath. Court in India also stressed the need for adopting a more

progressive attitude in the application of law related to insanity. The Indian Law of insanity must

be amended and the concept of diminished responsibility must be inserted.

PROVISIONS OF THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 197336

The procedure for the trial of insane person is laid down in the Code of Criminal

Procedure, 1973, Chapter XXV. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1972, ss. 328 and 329 deals with

the procedure to be followed in case the accused is a lunatic. It says that when a magistrate while

conducting an inquiry feels that the person is of unsound mind and consequently, incapable of

making his defence, he may ask a medical officer to examine the person and postpone the trial of

the case. Code of Criminal Procedure. 1973, s. 330 provides that when an accused is found to be

a lunatic, he will be released on bail provided that sufficient security is given that he will not

harm himself or any other person. If sufficient security is not given or the court thinks that bail

may not be granted, the accused will be detained in safe custody. Code of Criminal Procedure,

1973, s. 331 provides that when an inquiry is postponed under Code of Criminal Procedure,

1973, ss. 328 and 329, the magistrate will resume the inquiry at any time after the person

concerned ceases to be of unsound mind. The inquiry will proceed against the accused when the

magistrate thinks that he is capable of making the defence as per Code of Criminal Procedure,

1973, s. 332. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, s. 333 says that when the accused is at the time

of the inquiry is of sound mind, but he was of unsound mind at the time of committing the

offence, the Magistrate will proceed with the case. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, s. 334

states that when any person is acquitted on the ground that at the time of committing the offence,

he was by reason of unsoundness of mind incapable of knowing the nature of the act or that

it is contrary to law, the state will specify whether he committed the act or not. Code of Criminal

Procedure, 1973, s. 338 says that when the person detained under Code of Criminal Procedure,

1973, ss. 330(2) or 335 and the inspector general certify that in his judgment, he may be released

36 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, ss. 328 to 339.

without danger to himself or any other person, the state government may order him to be

released or to be detained in custody or to be sent to a public lunatic asylum. The Code of

Criminal Procedure, 1973 also makes favourable provisions for the infants.

JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION

Ratanlal vs. State of MP37

The appellant on 22 January 1965, set fire to the grass lying in the khalyan of Nemichand. On

being asked why he did it, the accused said; ‘I burnt it; do whatever you want’. The accused was

arrested on 23 January 1965. He was referred to a mental hospital. The psychiatrist of the

hospital reported that the accused remained silent, was a case of maniac depressive psychosis,

and needs treatment. The report declared the accused to be a lunatic in terms of the Indian

Lunatic Act, 1912. The issue before the courts was whether insanity might be used as defence

against a charge of mischief by fire with intent to cause damage under the IPC, s. 435. The

crucial point in this case was whether unsound mind may be established at the time of

commission of the act. The Supreme Court held that the person was insane and acquitted him.

Dayabhai Chhaganbhai Thakkar vs. State of Gujarat38

In this case, the accused was charged and convicted under the IPC, s. 302 for the murder of his

wife. The accused killed his wife with wife by inflicting her with 44 knife injuries on her body.

The accused raised the plea of insanity at the trial court. Trial court however rejected the

contention on the ground that the statements made to the police immediately after the incident

did not showed any sign of insanity. This conviction was confirmed by the high court. The

accused made an appeal to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court also upheld the conviction of

the accused and laid down certain criteria according to which a accused in entitled to the defence

under the provision. It said that in determining whether the accused has established his case

under the perview of Indian Pena lcode, 1860, s. 84, ‘the court has to consider the circumstances

which preceded, attended and followed the crime. The crucial point of time for determining the

state of mind of the accused is the time when the offence was committed. The relevant facts are

37 AIR 1971 SC 778.

38 AIR 1964 SC 1563.

motive for the crime, the previous history as to mental condition of the accused, the state of his

mind at the time of the offence, and the events immediately after the incident that throw a light

on the state of his mind’.

Ashiruddin vs. King39

In this case, Ashruddin had killed his son while acting under the delusion of a dream believing it

to be right. The accused had dreamt that he was commanded by someone to sacrifice his son of

five years. The next morning the accused took his son to mosque and killed him by thrusting a

knife in his throat. The Calcutta High Court observed that it was a case of insanity under IPC, s.

84 and discharged the accused from criminal liability. The court said that in order to enable an

accused to obtain the benefit of the aforesaid provision, he must establish any one of the

following three elements

(1) the nature of the act was not known to the accused;

(2) the act was not known by him to be contrary of law; or

(3) the accused did not knew that the act was wrong.

The Bench held that the third element was established by the accused, namely, that the accused

did not knew that the act was wrong. This was obvious on the ground that the accused was

laboring under the belief that the dream was a reality. However, this view of the Calcutta High

Court was criticised by Allahabad High Court in the case of Laxmi vs. State40 as ‘it will be open

to an accused in every case to plead that he had dreamt a dream enjoining him to do a criminal

act, and believing that his dream was a command by a higher authority, he was impelled to do

a criminal act, and therefore, he would be protected by IPC, s. 84. It also said that it was a case of

medical insanity and not legal insanity.

39 AIR 1949 Cal 182.

40 AIR 1953 All 534.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS REFFERED:-

1. Woodroffmand Amie Ali, LAW OF EVIDENCE,(1979) 14th Edn

2. L.A. Lyons, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE FOR INDIA, 5TH Edn,1914

3. Basu’s Indian Penal Code, 9th ed, 2006.

4. Russell, Vol. 1, (12th ed.)

5. KD Gaur.

6. Allen, Michael, Textbook on Criminal Law, 7th ed., 2003, Oxford University Press

7. The Penal Law of India, Vol. 1, 11th ed., 2002, Law Publishers (India) Pvt. Ltd., Allahabad.