medication safety—reliability of preference cards

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Dawson - Orsini - Cooper - Wollenburg SEPTEMBER 2005, VOL 82, NO 3 Medication Safetv- Reliability of Preference Czrds Anthony Dawson, RN; Michael J. Orsini, RPh; Mary R. Cooper, MD; Karol Wollenburg, RPh edication use in penoperative settings involves a complex M process that has the potential to result in serious errors. During a surgi- cal procedure, different medications are added to the surgical field, and this can increase the risks of mishaps at any stage of the medication deliveryprocess. Possible Droblems include I misidentification of medications or solutions; inadvertent intravascular or organ infusion of a potentially toxic substance; infusion and infusion-device problems; timing of medication administration, specifically of preoperative antibiotics; miscommunication of verbal orders; and outdated preference cards.' This article describes an analysis of preference cards that was conducted as part of an overall evaluation of the intra- operative medication-use process at a major metropolitan academic medical center. The objective of the analysis was to ascertain the medication-error poten- tial associated with the use of the prefer- ence card system. A secondary subanaly- sis was performed to evaluate the process of using and maintaining the cards. MED I CAT I ON SAFEIY DURING SURGERY The American Society of Health- System Pharmacists defines a medica- tion error as any preventable event that may cause or lead to inappropriate med- ication use and patient harm while the medication is in the control of the health care professional, patient, or consumer.* (p165) Such events may be related to profes- sional practice; health care products; procedures; and systems, including pre- scribing, communicating orders, label- ing products, packaging and nomencla- ture, compounding, dispensing, distrib- uting, administering, educating, moni- toring, and using? Preventing medication-related errors is a goal shared by many national pro- fessional organizations. The Joint Com- mission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) has incorporat- ed medication safety goals into its stan- dard~~ and has revised its medication management standards for 2006 to . . . increase safe practices surround- ing the selection and procurement of ABSTRACT A CLINICAL ANALYSIS of surgeons' preference cards was initiated in one hospital as part of a com- prehensive analysis to reduce medication-emr risks by standardizing and simplifying the intraoperative medication-use process specific to the sterile field. 0 THE PREFERENCE CARD ANALYSIS involved two subanalyses: a review of the infor- mation as it appeared on the cards and a failure mode and effects analysis of the process involved in using and maintaining the cards. a THE ANALYSIS FOUND that the preference card system in use at this hospital is outdated. Variations and inconsistencies within the prefer- ence card system indicate that the use of prefer- ence cards as guides for medication selection for surgical procedures presents an opportunity for medication errors to occur. AORNJ 82 (September 2005) 399-414. AORN JOURNAL 3 99

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Page 1: Medication Safety—Reliability of Preference Cards

Dawson - Orsini - Cooper - Wollenburg SEPTEMBER 2005, VOL 82, NO 3

Medication Safetv- Reliability of Preference Czrds

Anthony Dawson, RN; Michael J. Orsini, RPh; Mary R. Cooper, MD;

Karol Wollenburg, RPh

edication use in penoperative settings involves a complex M process that has the potential to

result in serious errors. During a surgi- cal procedure, different medications are added to the surgical field, and this can increase the risks of mishaps at any stage of the medication delivery process. Possible Droblems include

I

misidentification of medications or solutions; inadvertent intravascular or organ infusion of a potentially toxic substance; infusion and infusion-device problems; timing of medication administration, specifically of preoperative antibiotics; miscommunication of verbal orders; and outdated preference cards.' This article describes an analysis of

preference cards that was conducted as part of an overall evaluation of the intra- operative medication-use process at a major metropolitan academic medical center. The objective of the analysis was to ascertain the medication-error poten- tial associated with the use of the prefer- ence card system. A secondary subanaly- sis was performed to evaluate the process of using and maintaining the cards.

MEDICATION SAFEIY DURING SURGERY The American Society of Health-

System Pharmacists defines a medica- tion error as

any preventable event that may cause or lead to inappropriate med- ication use and patient harm while the medication is in the control of the

health care professional, patient, or consumer.* (p165)

Such events may be related to profes- sional practice; health care products; procedures; and systems, including pre- scribing, communicating orders, label- ing products, packaging and nomencla- ture, compounding, dispensing, distrib- uting, administering, educating, moni- toring, and using?

Preventing medication-related errors is a goal shared by many national pro- fessional organizations. The Joint Com- mission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) has incorporat- ed medication safety goals into its stan- d a r d ~ ~ and has revised its medication management standards for 2006 to

. . . increase safe practices surround- ing the selection and procurement of

ABSTRACT A CLINICAL ANALYSIS of surgeons' preference

cards was initiated in one hospital as part of a com- prehensive analysis to reduce medication-emr risks by standardizing and simplifying the intraoperative medication-use process specific to the sterile field.

0 THE PREFERENCE CARD ANALYSIS involved two subanalyses: a review of the infor- mation as it appeared on the cards and a failure mode and effects analysis of the process involved in using and maintaining the cards.

a THE ANALYSIS FOUND that the preference card system in use at this hospital is outdated. Variations and inconsistencies within the prefer- ence card system indicate that the use of prefer- ence cards as guides for medication selection for surgical procedures presents an opportunity for medication errors to occur. AORNJ 82 (September 2005) 399-414.

AORN JOURNAL 3 99

Page 2: Medication Safety—Reliability of Preference Cards

Dawson - Orsini - Cooper - Wollenburg SEPTEMBER 2005, VOL 82, NO 3

nzedica t ions; address safe medication management practices for medica- tions that are brought into an organ- ization by a licensed independent practitioner; and address risks asso- ciated with medications that are used as part of a procedure, regardless of whether there is a spec@ order for the rnedi~ation.~

AORN has emphasized the impor- tance of safe medication practices in the OR by recommending practices for health care providers to manage and administer medications on the surgical field.s The Institute for Safe Medication Practices (ISMP) has presented case studies of mix-ups and misinterpreta- tions on the surgical field, along with safe practice recommendations to pre- vent these types of mishaps from occurring.6

Opportunities exist for improving medication safety during surgery. An analysis of medication error reports submitted to the US Pharmacopeia’s MEDMARX reporting system found that 731 of 150,000 medication events occurred in the OR. Ten percent of the reported OR medication errors resulted in temporary or permanent harm or death.‘ Errors involving medications commonly administered on the sterile field accounted for 19% of all reports?

Many of the OR error reports involved problems with preoperative antibiotics or medications given by anesthesia care providers? After under- taking an extensive self-study of med- ication errors encountered in the prac- tice of anesthesiology, anesthesia care providers have built a body of work that demonstrates their accomplishments in

succeeded in reducing anesthesia errors through better use of technology, stan- dardized pdelines and protocols, and the adoption of an approach to patient safety that embraced human factors and

improving medication The Y

improved systems. The use of patient simulation for research, training, and performance assessment has further contributed to this accomplishment.R

Very few studies have examined medication-error risk during surgery with respect to medications that are pre- pared and administered on the surgical field. Systems that sup- port safe medication prac-

dence of medication tices can reduce the inci- Anesthesia error^,'"'^ but many estab- lished medication safety practices have yet to be adopted in ORs. Although guidelines and recom- mendations have been published to address some of the issues regard- ing intraoperative med- ication use on the sterile field: a comprehensive systems analysis of this process has not appeared in the literature. Further- more, no one has com- bined the various recom- mendations published by national professional or- ganizations in an effort to build a safer system.

care providers reduced

anesthesia errors through better

use of technology,

standardized pro toco Is, and an approach to patient safety that considered

ANALYSIS OF SURGEONS‘ PREFERENCE CARDS human factors.

Many 0% in hospitals throughout the United States use preference cards to communi- cate physician preferences for each sur- gical procedure. Traditionally, prefer- ence cards contain important informa- tion, such as specific supplies needed for the procedure, special equipment, the surgeon’s preference for setup and positioning, and other detailed instruc- tions. In addition, preference cards essentially serve as the physician’s orders for medications that the surgeon typically uses for a given procedure.

AORN JOURNAL 401

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SEPTEMBER 2005, VOL 82, NO 3 Dawson - Orsini - Cooper - Wollenburg

Systems for maintaining these cards include use of both electronic data files and handwritten changes.

As part of a comprehensive analysis to reduce medication-error risk by stan- dardizing and simplifying the intraoper- ative medication-use process specific to the sterile field, a clinical analysis of sur- geons' preference cards was undertaken at NewYork-Presbvterian Hospital, a

The end result of a failure mode

and effects analysis is an action plan

that provides recommendations

on potential wuys to redesign

processes to prevent

patient harm.

2,246Sbed, not-foi-profit, academic medical center in metropolitan New York. The analysis was conduct- ed at the Weill Cornell Medical Center, one of five centers at NewYork- Presbyterian. The Weill Cornell Medical Center houses 38 ORs in which approximately 24,000 sur- gical procedures are per- formed each year, account- ing for 27% of all surgeries performed in the hospital.

When a surgical proce- dure is scheduled at the hospital, it is logged in the OR calendar system, and the staff members in central sterile supply (CSS) pull the surgeon's preference card from a computer database. If there is an add-on or emergency case, the peri- operative nurse calls in the reauest to CSS. The

CSS staff members ire responsible for assembling trays and soft goods but have no role in obtaining medications or items such as surgeon-specific implants. The preference card then is clipped to the case cart, and the circu- lating nurse or surgical technician retrieves it when the cart is sent to the OR. The circulating nurse is responsible for retrieving and preparing the med- ications for the procedure.

METHODOLOGY The preference card analysis involved

two steps: first, a review of the informa- tion as it appeared on the original cards, and second, a failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) of the process involved in using and maintaining the cards. Medication errors can result from sys- tem failures in a process, so it is impor- tant to have a tool for analyzing system deficiencies. Failure mode and effects analysis is a proactive, systematic method for identifying and preventing product or process problems before they OCCU~. '~ The use of FMEA concedes that errors are inevitable and predictable.'x The steps that a hospital should follow in conducting an FMEA have been described by various organi~ations.'~ The end result of an FMEA is an action plan that provides recommendations on potential ways to redesign processes to prevent patient harm.17

The hospital hred a research phar- macist to manage the project and per- form the data collection and analysis. In part one, 392 preference cards (ie, 18% of the total) were randomly selected from a database of 2,175. To be included in the analysis, two or more medica- tions had to be listed per card. A web site designed to help researchers per- form random sampling" was used to generate random numbers for each service with preference cards that met the inclusion criterion. The number of preference cards chosen for each service was equal to the proportion of prefer- ence cards with medications in the database for that service. Table 1 con- tains the data elements collected for review. A pilot study of 20 preference cards was conducted to evaluate and adjust the project plan. A computer database was created to hold the data.

Medications were defined as any medicinal substance, agent, product, or solution that is intended to be adminis- tered to a patient during the course of an

402 AORN JOURNAL

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Dawson - Orsini - Cooper - Wollenbq SEPTEMBER 2005, VOL 82, NO 3

invasive or surgical pro- cedure. These included such substances as sterile water or saline, irrigation solutions, dye, topical agents, and IV agents.

In the second part of the analysis, an interdisci- plumy team was assem- bled to conduct an FMEA of the process involved in using preference cards. This team was composed of front-line staff mem- bers, including periopera- tive nurses, surgical tech- nologists, pharmacists, and two members of the hospital’s patient safety department. During an 11- week wriod. the FMEA

TABLE 1 Preference Card Analysis Data Elements

Number of medications listed

Number of medications with specific-use instructions

Number of high-risk medications

Number of medication mixes with and without specific instructions

Inclusion and accuracy of calculations for mixtures

Number of abbreviations related to medications listed on cards

How often medications with similar names appear on cards

Frequency of trailing zeros

Lack of leading zero before a decimal

Use of nonmetric units

Instances of ambiguous or incomplete instructions

Whether medications are listed by generic or brand names

Any mistakes identified

T i e to update

I

team met weekly and created a series of flow charts that ultimately resulted in the construction of a highly detailed map of the processes involved in using prefer- ence cards. A modified version of the 10- step FMEA process as outlined by JCAHO was f0llo~ed.I~

This FMEA was a subanalysis of a comprehensive review of the entire sterile field medication-use process. It reviewed all the steps related to pref- erence card use, including how the cards are updated or revised, and showed the role the cards play in the prescribing subprocess. Worksheets adapted from JCAHOs FMEA work- bookI8 were used at the end of the mapping process to allow the team members to assess and score the fail- ure modes they identified for each step of the process, including the caus- es and effects. Failure modes for each step in the process were determined. Criticality scores were then calculated to identify and prioritize vulnerabili- ties in the process. At the conclusion, specific steps in the process where errors were likely to occur were identi-

fied and classified by category on six worksheets that represented the final results of the FMEA.

FINDINGS The two independent subanalyses of

the process-the analysis of the 392 preference cards and the FMEA-yield- ed similar results in that the top con- cerns identified in one subanalysis reflected those identified in the other subanalysis. The major concerns noted were as follows. 0 Changes made on preference cards

by perioperative nurses were not double-checked by surgeons.

0 Medications were listed on a prefer- ence card, but the card was outdat- ed, contained wrong or missing information, or the card layout made the medications hard to find.

0 The preference card was incorrect for the surgical procedure that was to be performed.

0 The medications listed on the prefer- ence card were not what the surgeon wanted or intended to use.

The links between the findings of the

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Abbreviations, a known source of medication errors, appeared on 97% of the preference cards, and at least two medications that

have similar names appeared on 19.6% of the cards.

two analytical processes became appar- ent as the results were analyzed.

SUBANALYSIS I: PREFERENCE CARDS The preference card analysis revealed

numerous potential sources of error. The key findings showed signhcant varia- tion in the aspects and function of pref- erence card use, including instructions, abbreviations, timely up-date of cards, and clarity in communicating numeric values (eg, zero to the left of decimals, nonmetric units). Similar (ie, sound- alike, look-alike) medication names, high-risk medications, and the use of brand versus generic medication names also were issues.

INSTRUCTIONS. Medication-specific in- structions were scarce and often unclear. The average number of medica- tions per card was 4.93. The average number of listed medications accompa- nied by specific instructions of any kind was 0.65 medications per card. Medication instructions were defined as the quantity of medication to be admin- istered, how to mix the medication, and the calculations to mix it appropriately. The average number of medications per card was compared to the average num- ber of medications with instructions per card by surgical service. The transplant surgical service had the highest percent- age of listed medications with specific instructions (ie, ‘lo%), and the cardio- thoracic surgical service had the lowest percentage (ie, 0.9’/0).

The majority of instructions were incomplete or unclear. Examples include 0 “hep-saline for flushes ready,” 0 “soak in povidone iodine M strength,” 0 ”diatrizoate meglumine or iohexol x

0 “have epinephrine/saline irrigation

0 ”heparin solution age dependent-

0 ”usually kanamycin sulfate irrig

1 bottle-250 cc NS 0.9% IV,”

ready,”

please ask MD,” and

before closure.”

MWNG INSTRUCTIONS. Of 73 medication mixes identified, 60.3% contained mix- ing instructions. One example was, ”mix bupivicane 0.25% plus lidocaine 1% and mix in a one-to-one ratio.”

ABBREVIATIONS. Abbreviations, a known source of medication errors,Z’,22 were used on 97% of the cards. The average number of abbreviations per card was eight with a range of one to 39. Examples included 0 “1% Lido W/Epi & 1% Lido PL 25%

0 ”uses 1,000 cc L/R 50 cc 1% Lido & 1

0 “have Epi Sol.” The abbreviations that most frequently appeared were U for units and mcg for micrograms.

TIMELY UPDATES. The average time it took to update the preference cards was 427 days, or 1.17 years, with the overall range varying from two days to 2.4 years. When a preference card was updated, it was unclear whether the entire card was updated (eg, soft goods, supplies, medications).

CLARITY IN COMMUNICATING NUMERIC VALUES. On 2.1% of the cards, there was at least one number less than one with no zero to the left of a decimal point (eg, .05). Approximately 36% of the cards reviewed had at least one nonmetric unit associated with a medication, usu- ally related to package size (eg, ”one bottle” instead of ”30-mL vial”).

SIMILAR MEDICATION NAMES. At least two medications with names that looked or sounded similar appeared on 19.6% of the cards. Examples include 0 epinephrine and ephedrine, 0 glycine and saline, 0 papaverine and phenylephrine, 0 kanamycin and neomycin, 0 lidocaine plain and lidocaine with

0 bupivacaine 0.25% and bupivacaine

HIGH-ALERT MEDICATIONS. High-alert

bupivacaine hydrochloride,”

mg,” and

epinephrine, and

0.5%.

404 - AORN JOURNAL

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medications are those that have been identified in the medication safety litera- ture as medications that may cause sigruf- icant patient harm if they are used incor- rectly." On 52% of the preference cards, there were no high-risk medications list- ed. There was one high-risk medication on 27% of the cards, two high-risk med- ications on 7% of the cards, and UP to

Some preference cards called for

the use of restricted

antibiotics (eg, vancomycin) ,

and others listed particular

medication package sizes that were not available in

the OR.

three high-risk medica- tions on 14% of the cards. High-risk medications identified include bupiva- caine with epinephrine, calcium chloride, cardio- plegic solution, epineph- rine, heparin, lidocaine, lidocaine with epineph- rine, and phenylephrine.

BRAND VERSUS GENERIC NAME. Although hospital policy requires that generic names be used for all medications, only 24% of the preference cards listed medications exclusively by generic names. Medi- cation names typically appeared as a combina- tion of brand and generic names. On 75.8% of the cards, brand and generic names were used inter- changeably on the same card, and the brand and generic names did not always match (ie, the incorrect generic name

was listed for a brand or vice versa). ADDITIONAL FINDINGS. Among other find-

ings, some preference cards specifically called for the use of restricted antibi- otics, such as vancomycin. Other prefer- ence cards listed a particular medica- tion package size (eg, epinephrine 1:1,000, 30 mL vial) that was not avail- able to OR personnel.

The most significant additional finding appeared to be that the med-

ication listed on the preference card did not match the medication being used in the procedure. For example, in one case, 1 mg epinephrine was mixed with 20,000 units of thrombin for topi- cal administration, but epinephrine was not listed on the preference card for that type of procedure. Another procedure relied on a card that had no local anesthetics listed. Although bupi- vacaine did not appear on the card, bupivacaine 0.25% routinely was used by the surgeon. Examples of additional errors found in the sample include 0 bupivacaine 0.25% with epinephrine

1:200,000 listed under supplies and bupivacaine 0.25% with no epineph- rine listed in medication instructions;

0 ferric subsulfate referred to on the card as ferrous sulfate; and

0 gentamycin sulfate ointment 0.1% package size listed as 5 g-the smallest size available at that strength is 15 g.

SUBANALYSIS II: FMEA RESULTS The detail of the map of the preference

card process constructed by the FMEA team (Figure 1) reveals the presence of multiple steps with a number of potential system failure points throughout. A total of 22 decision points, or steps, were iden- tified in the preference card process. Four of these steps were hghlighted as targets for more in-depth analysis based on the actual experiences of the team members. Table 2 includes these four target steps along with 12 individual failure modes associated with the steps.

The FMEA team was asked to assign a criticality score for each of the 12 fail- ure modes that were identified. Criticality scoring helps determine how harmful a failure mode may be if it is allowed to occur, and also helps to pri- oritize corrective action initiative^.'^,'^ The higher the score, the greater the chance of harm.

To determine criticality, team mem- bers were asked to score each of the

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AORN TOURNAL 407

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failure modes using three variables (ie, severity, fre- quency, likelihood of de- tecting error). The scoring for each variable was on a 10-point scale, as follows: 0 severity of effect (1 =

no effect, 10 = death); 0 frequency of failure

(1 = never occurs, 10 = happens often); and

0 chance of detecting error (1 = always de- tected, 10 = never detected). Team members' scores

for each variable were averaged, and the aver- ages for each of the three values were multiplied to determine the criticality score. Criticality scores for the 12 identified failure modes are listed in Table 3.

Table 4 provides a

TABLE 2 Target Steps 1 Through 4 in

Preference Card Process 1. Changes to preference cards are not checked by the surgeon

0 Incorrect medication(s) listed

0 Incorrect calculations 0 U~ppro~eed abbreviations 0 Surgeon's intent for medication is incorrect, incomplete, or

0 Incorrect mixing instructions

ambiguous

2. Medications listed on preference card 0 Card is outdated

0 Medications on card do not match written or verbal orders 0 Cannot find medications on card because of card layout

0 card is w m g

3. Card is incorrect for the surgical case to be performed 0 Multiple procedures and surgeons for one case results in

multiple cards 0 Procedure to be performed has changed

4. Medications on preference card are dispensed but are not what surgeon wants 0 Card is outdated 0 Cad is wrong 0 Incorrect card for this procedure has made it through the p'ocess

(ie, cad A is pulled for the procedure when card B should have been pulled)

breakdown 6f the scoring variables for the top five failure modes. Of all the failure modes identified, the two that were deemed most hazardous were outdated and incorrect medication information on the preference cards. These results correspond with the find- ings of the card analysis.

DISCUSSION National organizations, such as

JCAHO, AORN, and the Ism, have for- mulated recommendations that pro- mote interdisciplinary collaboration in the administration of medications and emphasize the need for proper review of medication orders. These organizations also have recommended the develop- ment of systems for managing and administering medications on the s'ugi- cal field. Such systems are not in wide- spread use in the OR with respect to medications on the sterile field (ie, no single, systematic approach to med-

ication safety, standardization, and pharmacy and physician oversight exists to Serve as a model). The prefer- ence card system review described in this article marked the beginning of a comprehensive evaluation of the intra- operative medication use process. The methods used to conduct the analysis were basic, fact-finding approaches aim- ed at breaking down and identifying the numerous steps in a complex process.

The findings of both subanalyses showed that the steps routinely fol- lowed in the OR in regard to preference card use are not as clear or straightfor- ward as they are widely thought to be. The presence of outdated and incorrect information on the cards underscores the need for an overhaul of the prefer- ence card system as part of a proactive risk-reduction strategy.

Inconsistencies and variations in any complex process can increase the poten- tial for error risk. This analysis did not

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TABLE 3 Criticality Scores

Failure Mode Card is outdated

Card is wrong or incomplete

Incorrect card for this procedure has made it through the process

Multiple procedures and surgeons for one procedure results in multiple cards

Surgeon’s intent for medication is incorrect, incomplete, or ambiguous

Medications on card do not match written or verbal orders

Unapproved abbreviations

Incorrect mixing instructions

Incorrect calculations

Incorrect medication($ listed

Procedure to be performed has changed

Cannot find medications on card because of card layout

criticality score 177.8

176.1

149.3

144.6

138

118

115.4

109.6

92.6

70.4

66

64

TABLE 4 Criticality Score Breakdown for Top 5 Failure Modes Identified

Failure Mode Card is outdated

Card is wrong or incomplete

Incorrect card for this procedure has made it through the process

Multiple procedures and surgeons for one

multiple cards

Surgeon’s intent for medication is incorrect, incomplete, or ambiguous

procedure results in

Severity of effect (S)

6.1

6.6

7.8

6.3

6.8

Frequency of failure 0

5.5

5.8

5.8

5.6

5.8

Detectability Criticality (S x F x D)

177.8 @) 5.3

4.6 176.1

3.3 149.3

4.1 144.6

3.5 138

attempt to quantify the error risk mher- ent in the preference card system; instead, its objective was to identify major areas of concern. One underlying concern that arose throughout the analysis was the variation in medica- tion nomenclature. Unlike the routine, standardized terminology that was

used for supplies and equipment on the preference cards, no standardization was found for the medications that were listed. On 24%, of the analyzed cards, medications were listed by gener- ic name only. A majority of the cards contained medications that were indi- cated by a combination of brand and

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generic names. Typically, the medica- tion list at the top of a card showed a medication requested for the procedure by its generic name; however, if any instructions accompanied it, the refer- ence to medications was given by brand name. The analysis showed that the brand name listed in the instructions was not always correct for the generic name written on the medication list.

The visual appearance of the prefer- ence card also was a concern. The lay- out was not always clear or user- friendly. It was not easy to negotiate, and the print was small. Frequent lack of punctuation made the names of medications run together and confus- ing to read. Sterile field medications could be found under different sub- headings, such as ”supplies” or ”other.” On some cards, there was a question as to what constituted a med- ication; for instance, IV solutions and topical antiseptics were misplaced in a section labeled “sutures,” while the medications section was left blank.

Another concern was that clear instruction for how medications should be mixed was not always pro- vided. The data did not reveal any cal- culations, although mixing ratios were listed (eg, mix lidocaine, bupivacaine, and sodium bicarbonate 4:42). Within the analysis sample, 73 medication mixes were identified, but only 60.3% of them had mixing instructions. Additionally, there was no clear differ- entiation between calculations for adult and pediatric mixes.

The presence of high-alert medica- tions on the preference cards also was identified as an area of concern. Many medications that appeared on a list of high-alert medications published by the ISMP also were listed on the pref- erence cards.

Typically the task of updating and editing the preference cards was left for nursing staff members to handle. A

nurse often was the only member of the OR staff who would transcribe, review, and edit the preference cards without any oversight or double-checking on the part of a pharmacist or physician. Updates and edits to the preference cards generally became low-priority tasks amid the many responsibilities and duties facing a nurse or OR team leader during the course of a day.

Surgeons often were unaware of what was on the preference cards.

team members over a period of time, it is not preference card unusual to develop a sense of complacency or system indicate false security. During observation in the OR in that akhOUCJh conjunction with this analysis, surgeons were perioperative heard referring to their ”usual meds” as an order before the procedure, although they may not have known what was

Inconsistencies Working with the same within the

nUrSeS Use these cards daily, their

listed on the card. usage may IMPLICATIONS A N D provide a false FUTURE GOALS

This analysis found that the preference card system in use at this hospital is outdated and that the risk of potential medication errors in the ORs is greater than expected. The striking similarity of the results of the independent subanaly- ses underscores the significance of the findings in regard to safe medication han- dling on the sterile field. Variation and inconsistencies within the preference card system indicate that although periopera- tive nurses use these cards on a daily basis, their usage may provide a false sense of security. Use of preference cards as guides to medication selection for sur- gical procedures offers an opportunity for

Sense of security*

AORN JOURNAL 4 1 1

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medication errors to occur. The findings presented here are part

of an ongoing analysis that, when con- cluded, will enable the hospital to final- ize and fully implement its risk reduc- tion strategy. The three goals of this strategy are to 0 standardize all sterile field medica-

tions to a set list of medications, medication mixtures, and medica- tion concentrations;

0 simplify ordering methods from three (ie, written, verbal, preference cards) to one method; and

0 redesign the system to incorporate the creation of a best practices system for handling medications on the ster- ile field. The implications of the analysis

findings apply not just to this hospital, bu t to all hospitals that use preference cards in their ORs. The goal of proac- tively reducing the risk of medication errors in this area can be achieved through standardization of the prefer- ence card system; use of automation to reduce variation; and by regular, rigor- ous review of the medication orders on preference cards by OR pharmacists and surgeons. *3

Anthony Dawson, RN, MSN, is a black belt-performance excellence at NewYork-Presbyterian Hospital, New York.

Michael J. Orsini, RPh, BS, is a research pharmacist, NewYork- Presbyterian Hospital, Weill Cornell Medical Center, New York.

Mary R. Cooper, MD, JD, is chief quality officer, NewYork-Presbyterian Hospital, New York.

Karol Wollenburg, RPh, MS, is vice president and apothecary-in-chief at NewYork-Presbyterian Hospital, New York.

Editor’s note: The authors thank the members of tke perioperative staffat NewYork-Presbyterian Hospital for their contributions to this article.

MEDMARX is a registered service mark of the United Stafes Phrmacopeia, Rockville, Md.

NOTES 1. S C Beyea, ”Wake-up call-standardiza- tion is crucial to eliminating medication errors,” A O R N Joiirnnl 75 (May 2002)

2. ”Suggested definitions and relationships among medication misadventures, medica- tion errors, adverse drug events, and adverse drug reactions,“ American Journal of Health-System Pharmacy 55 (January 1998)

3. “Facts about the 2005 National Patient Safety Goals,” Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, h t tp://wwzw. jcako.org/accredited+organizations /pa tieii t +safety/05+npsg/npsgfacts. ht m (accessed 12 JuIy 2005). 4. “Joint Commission seeks input on pro- posed revisions to medication management standards,” Joint Commission on Accredi- tation of Healthcare Organizations, htfp:// U7Ww.jcaho.org/ii~s+Y00nl/news+r~lease~nr chiues/nr~122104.kfm (accessed 22 March 2005). 5. ”Safe medication practices in periopera- tive settings,” in Standnrds, Recommended Practices, and Guidelines (Denver: AORN, Inc, 2005) 196-198. 6. Institute for Safe Medication Practices, ”Cutting errors out of the operating room,” Medicnfion Safety Alert! 7 (March 6,2002). 7. S C Beyea, R W Hicks, S C Becker, “Medication errors in the OR-A secondary analysis of Medmarx,” AORN Journnl77 (January 2003) 122-134. 8. D M Gaba, “Anaesthesiology as a model for patient safety in health care,” S M ] (Clin- ical Research Ed) 320 (March 2000) 785-788. 9. E C Pierce, Jr, “The 34th Rovenstine Lecture. 40 years behind the mask: Safety revisited,” Anesthesiology 84 (April 1996)

10. A D Auerbach, H J Murff, S D Islam, ”Pre-anesthesia checklists to improve patient safety,” in Making Health Care Safer: A Critical Analysis of Patient Safety Prnctices (Rockville, Md: Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, US Department of

1010-1013.

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965-975.

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Health and Human Services, 2001) Also available at ktfp://z7vzow.ahcpr.gov/clinic/pfsafe ty/ckap23.kfm (accessed 12 July 2005). 11. R H James, "1,000 anaesthetic inci- dents: Experience to date," Anaesthesia 58 (September 2003) 856-863. 12. F K Orkin, "Patient monitoring during anesthesia as an exercise in technology assessment," in Monitoring in Anesthesia, third ed, L J Saidman, N T Smith, eds (London: Butterworth-Heinemann Publishers, Inc, 1993). 13. D W Bates, "Fre uency, consequences, and prevention of alverse drug events," lournal of Quality in Clinical Practice 19 (May

14. M M Donnells, B J McDonald, J M Trimble, "Improving care through a med- ication administration process action team," Journal of Nursing Care Quality 9 (April 1995) 38-44. 15. J A Thomas, V Martin, S Frank, "Improv- ing pharmacy supply-chain management in the operating room," Healthcare Financial Management 54 (December 2ooO) 58-61. 16. J C Garrelts et al, "Automated medica-

1999) 13-17.

tion distribution systems and compliance with Joint Commission standards," Ameri- can Journal of Healfk-System Pharmacy 58 (December 2001) 2267-2272. 17. "System analysis: To RCA or FMEA? That is the question!" Joint Commission Per- spectives on Patient Safety 3 (March 2003) 7-8. 18. "Using failure mode and effects analy- sis in healthcare," FMEA Info Centre, kt tp://zinuwfMeainfocentre.com/download/using failure-mode-and-efects-analysis-iTi-kealth care.doc (accessed 12 July 2005). 19. "System analysis: Helpful tools for effective FMEAs," Joint Commission Perspec- tives on Patient Safefy 3 (Au ust 2003) 5-6.

dornizer.org (Accessed 12 July 2005). 21. J P Santell, "Beware of abbreviations: A 'do not use list' can help avoid problems," US Pharmacist 29 (November 2004) 58-63. 22. "Abbreviations can lead to medication errors!" U S P Quality Review 80 (July 2004). 23. "ISMP's list of hi h-alert medications," Institute for Safe Mejication Practices, http://ww. ismp.org/MSAar f icles/highalert .ktm (accessed 12 July 2005).

20. Research Randomizer, a ttp://www.rnn

Contingency Plan for Noncompliant Medicare Claims Ends eginning Oct 1, 2005, the Centers for Medicare B and Medicaid Services (CMS) wi l l not process

incoming electronic Medicare claims that are not compliant with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), according to an Aug 4 , 2005, new release from CMS. Claims that do not meet the standards required by HIPAA will be returned to the filer for resubmission.

ALL payers were required by law to conduct HIPAA-compliant transactions as of Oct 16, 2003. Only about 31% of Medicare ctaims were compliant at that time, however, and other payers had even fewer compliant claims. To address this problem, CMS established a contingency plan that allowed i t s trading partners to submit claims in electronic for- mats currently in use. Contingency plans were not to be used indefinitely, however, and an enforce- ment guidance directed covered entities to make reasonable and diligent efforts to come into com- pliance and, in the case of health plans, to assist

their trading partners in coming into compliance. This change affects claims for services provid-

ed under fee-for-service Medicare. The contingency continues for other electronic health care transac- tions, bu t CMS expects to end the contingency plan for these transactions in the near future.

To enable electronic submission of HIPAA- compliant claims, CMS continues to make available free and low-cost software through Medicare carri- ers and intermediaries. The submission of HIPAA- compliant claims begins a streamlining process that will allow use of the same software to gener- ate identical claims for all payers using standard formats and coding.

CMS Ending Contingency for Non-HIPAA-Compliant Medicare Claims (news release, Baltimore: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Aug 4, 2005) http:,f,f www.cms. h hs.gov/media/press/release.asp?Counter=l528 (accessed 8 Aug 2005).

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