medina mmas final prospectus 14 oct 05

7/28/2019 Medina MMAS Final Prospectus 14 Oct 05

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14 October 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Graduate Degree Programs

SUBJECT: MMAS Prospectus

1. Essential Information.

a. Submitted by: Major Elizabeth A. Medina, CA, Section: 6D

b. Proposed Topic: Operationalizing the Interagency (IA) Coordination Mechanisms

between the State Departments Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization

(S/CRS) and the Department of Defense (DoD) for Planning and Execution.

c. Proposed Research Committee:

(1) Chair: Mr. Bob Walz, DJMO, and 684-3979.

(2) Second Reader/Consulting Faculty: Dr. Judy Jones, DJMO, and 684-3976.

(3) Third Reader: LTC Marcus Fielding (AUS), DJMO, and 684-3906.

(4) Fourth Reader: Mr. Mike Czaja, CA/SOF, and 684-3735.

d. SGA: Mr. Edwin Kennedy, 6D, CTAC, and 684-3144.

e. Focused Program: ASI 6Z

f. Problem Statement: In the past decade of post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization in

Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, the US military has conducted operations which

include transition to and from Department of State (State) responsibility. Uniquely, for

operations in Iraq, the Secretary of Defense created an organization called Office of

Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) to be responsible for the occupation of

Iraq, replaced after a year by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) which then transferred

sovereignty to the Iraqi people. As the military has been called upon to plan, transition and work

more frequently with other government agencies, President Bush recognized the need for a

deployable civilian diplomatic corps that could institutionalize the US reconstruction and

stabilization efforts under State: S/CRS. Despite the responsibility to be given to S/CRS, in post-

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conflict environments, and failing or failed states, that have the potential to be hostile

environments, the military will continue to provide significant support since we historically have

the bulk of the resources required and/or available.

g. Proposed Research Question: To reach the level of interoperability required in the

Contemporary Operational Environment (COE), can the government operationalize the

coordination for planning and execution of reconstruction and stabilization operations between

S/CRS and DoD? The term operationalize in this paper will mean to establish doctrine,

organization, training, leadership, material, personnal, facilities, planning and execution that will

translate strategic goals into tactical action.

h h. Qualifications:

(1) Education: In 1989, I completed a year of school at the national university of France,

the Sorbonne, studying French Civilization. In 1991 I completed a Bachelors of Science in

French and Political Science. By 1999, I completed my course work, the first three chapters, and

the majority of my research on a thesis regarding Hepatitus C for a Masters in Public Health. I

must re-do my research to bring it current before finishing my thesis and earning my MPH. In the

meantime, Im pursing this Masters in Military Arts and Sciences in strategy while at Command

and General Staff Officers Course (CGSOC). In related schools, Ive attended the Army Force

Management Course, completed course work for the Joint Campaign Planners Course, completed

Federal Emergency Management Courses on emergency management, and taken courses at Touro

University on Emergency and Disaster Management to include terrorism and bio-terrorism.

(2) Interagency experience: After college, in 1992, while still a reserve officer, I worked

as a civilian for the World Banks Dutch Executive Director, for the Georgetown Cardiology

Department and finally from 1994 to 1996 for a United States Agency for International

Development (USAID) contract company in international health, focusing on program

management and evaluation. I also served as an emergency and disaster management volunteer

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for the American Red Cross. During this time, I hosted tours for multiple Civil Affairs (CA)

units that provided an introduction to States crisis action center, USAID, the United Nations

High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) representative for Washington DC, and the Non-

Governmental Organization (NGO) umbrella organization called InterAction to promote

understanding and interoperability.

(3) Military experience: In 1984, I enlisted into the Army as a medic. I came home to

attend college and was commissioned into the Military Intelligence (MI) branch in 1987. I served

as a reserve component officer until 1996. Then, I became an Active Guard and Reserve (AGR)

officer. I have served with the 25th Light, 10th Mountain, 82nd Airborne, 3d Mechanized Infantry

Divisions. I have served overseas in humanitarian assistance operations in Haiti, in support of the

SOUTHCOM Commander in partner-nation capability building with Colombia and Ecuador, and

in stabilization and support operations in Iraq, specifically working with the Country Teams, and

the partner nation interagency community. I have worked at the tactical, operational and strategic

level in civil military operations planning for three of the four geographical combatant commands

(COCOMs) and understand that critical translation of strategic objectives must occur at the

operational level for tactical units to achieve the required effects. I have been assigned as both an

instructor and course manager for MI and CA schools, as well as have been assigned to teach

Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC). I understand the doctrinal base of operations for

these branches. I have been responsible for the training, operations and peace- and war-time

deployments of a reserve CA battalion and command which has helped me understand the full

range of interoperability issues required for stabilization and reconstruction not only between the

military and the interagency organizations but the partner- and coalition-nations as well.

(4) During my 21 years of civilian and military service, I have noted a continued gap in

interoperability of the US interagency community with regard to organizing, planning, training

and executing the transition of operations with specific respect to non-lethal effects. I understand

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the role and the current practical application of the Joint Interagency Coordination Groups

(JIACGs) at both SOUTHCOM and CENTCOM. I understand and have experienced a

successful Interagency Transition Planning Team (ITPT) between DoD and State, under

Ambassador Jeffries and LTG(R) Kicklighter for OPLAN Sovereign Iraq. In Iraq, I worked with

RAND Corporation European and National Strategy Analyists. I have since worked with the US

Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC) and US Army Special

Operations Command (USASOC) to begin the brainstorming of what Special Operations Force

(SOF) and CA plug-ins must exist at the operational and strategic levels to give us better success

in post-conflict planning. I continue to work with friends assigned to SOUTHCOM, CENTCOM,

S/CRS, as Defense Attaches, as employees of USAID, as employees of other government

agencies and in the intelligence arena.

2. Thesis.

a. Chapter One: Introduction. My topic is the operationalizing of the interagency

coordination mechanisms between S/CRS and the DoD. Since the Goldwater-Nichols Act which

forced a joint environment in the late 1980s, weve been directed to further integrate all US

national elements of power through interagency planning and coordination. During the late

1990s and early 2000s we received Presidential Defense Directive (PDD) 56 and the

Interagency Handbook for Complex Contingencies that mandated interagency coordination.

However, there was no follow-through on the planning and execution so we continued to see the

existence of critical gaps through the spectrum of operations and up and down the levels of

implementation. In this chapter, I will look at what requirements, doctrine and mandates exist,

what is being improved, what is being built from scratch and what has yet to be built. I will

evaluate how well these organizations and processes have worked to date as well as how well

they may work in the new and contemporary operational environment.

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(1) Assumptions. I will assume that State will retain the mission of US reconstruction

and stabilization efforts despite any party change in the White House and that the establishment of

the S/CRS will become law during the next session of Congress by December 2005 as well as the

provision of the first crisis response funds for that organization. I will also assume that the

majority of resources, primarily personnel and funding, will continue to come from DoD. I will

further assume that the US National Security Strategy (NSS) will continue to state the Global

War on Terrorism (GWOT) requirements to protect our citizens through preventative means

which leads to the importance of planning for failing and failed states.

(2) Delimitations. Facets of the issue that will not be covered are: changes to the national

oversight structure as defined in the NSPD-1; likelihood of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters

(SJFHQ) being involved or engaged; how the interagency body will complete the specific type of

planning and execution; or what types of missions the interagency body should be coordinating

whether reconstruction and stabilization alone or a more broad repertoire of missions.

b. Chapter Two: Literature Review. Relevant literature is from the past five years, as the

Bush administration has been in the White House only since then and with the event of September

11th, 2001, the policies and strategies have changed significantly from previous versions. Because

of these recent policy changes, both military and civilian official publications have been published

recently that define and relate to this subject. As well, similarly recent studies and reviews of

these policies and publications are also abundantly available.

(1) National Strategy Documents. The National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-

1, U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS), National Military Strategy (NMS), National Strategy

for Homeland Security (NSHS), National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT), all place

heavy emphasis on interagency coordination, integration, interoperability and familiarity to

achieve strategic objectives in the COE.

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(2) Military Publications. Joint publications, the Unified Joint Task List (UJTL) Joint

Forces Command (JFCOM) pamphlets, Army doctrine, coalition doctrine, and CA doctrine are

built on the premise that interagency coordination and planning is key to national success.

JFCOM has published a substantial amount of material in the past five years regarding the SJFHQ

and the prototype interagency coordination group called the JIACG. Recently, all of the

COCOMs have established JIACGS, but each with different foci. This paper will discuss the

general benefits and limitations of the current JIACG as covering only one or two of the sectors

of coordination, law enforcement/lethal and intelligence but not the diplomatic/humanitarian/non-

lethal sector. The National Defense University (NDU) has been chartered to be the training

center for interagency coordination and continues to host interagency conferences as well as offer

training in interagency management of complex crisis operations, with a handbook that describes

the Pol-Mil planning that takes place under the new NSPD-1 structure of the Policy Coordination

Committee (PCC). NDU supports the JIACG concept with an additional recommendation that

there be a national interagency contingency coordination center.

(3) National Studies and Effectiveness Reviews. Many of the related national studies

completed by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) in the past six months, the Center for

Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) phase I and II reports on Beyond Goldwater-Nichols

(BG-N), US Army War College (USAWC) and Command and General Staff Officers Course

(CGSOC) student theses find that critical gaps remain: an identified lead agency, infrastructure

and processes for interagency coordination, and relationships that will produce the kind of

operational planning and execution that is required to address post-conflict reconstruction and

stabilization. Michael Donley of Hicks & Associates Inc has written two papers entitled

Rethinking the Interagency System which are best suited as a baseline for my research. In these

two papers Donley identifies specific shortcomings and alternatives to the current system, or lack

of a system. His noted key problems are: the lack of horizontal and vertical integration efforts

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[and interoperability]; the legitimacy of decision-makers below the President; the weakness of

operational level planning, coordination and execution; and the lack of institutional development

and support for interagency coordination.

(4) Pending Documents. There are currently two bills before the legislature, one in the

Senate Foreign Relations committee for review, and one in the House Committee on International

Relations for review to establish a legal basis for the S/CRS. S/CRS has developed its own

structure with direction from the Policy Coordination Committee (PCC), through its own

divisions and management staffs to the Humanitarian Stabilization and Reconstruction Teams

(HSRTs) at the COCOM. It has also drafted a task list that mirrors the military UJTL. S/CRS is

currently soliciting candidates for their cadre positions as well as exercising with some of the

COCOMs on standard contingency plan (CONPLAN) and functional plan (FUNCPLAN)

exercises. However, it is in the future that these tasks and positions will become offical against

which they can assign work and hire quality candidates. Lastly, the 2005 Quadrennial Defense

Review (QDR) will also address the shortcomings of the current interagency coordination

mechanisms. I will keep gathering newly published documents to add to the collection of primary

resources.

c. Chapter Three: Research Design. To be able to present my thesis in a comparison and

contrast method, I will need to follow a number of steps to identify what exists and what should

exist for operationalizing interagency coordination.

(1) Step one of my reseach will be to identify the non-disputed requirements, roles and

responsibilities for interagency coordination mechanisms at the tactical, operational and strategic

levels stated in relevant NSC publications, the military pubs, State pubs, S/CRS documents,

Congressional Record and budget authorizations married up with the multiple studies that make

additional recommendations and provide insight.

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(2) The next step will be to identify all of the current efforts by S/CRS, Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), JFCOM, the COCOMs, Special Operations Command (SOCOM),

and Department of the Army (DA) to build or improve the required doctrine, organization,

training, leader development, materiel, personnel and facilities (DOTLMPF) elements. This paper

will specifically include what planning and execution processes are being built or improved as

well.

(3) The third step will be to determine what is not being developed but needed as far as

DOTLMPF and planning and execution processes, to which I will refer as +PE from here

forward.

(4) The fourth step will be to diagram the existing or planned linkages with a specific

identification of responsibilities and deliverables at each level and for each entity, noting any gaps

or ambiguities. For instance, within SOCOM there is an effort to establish formal Modified Tables

of Organization and Equipment (MTOEs) for offical Civil Military Operations Centers (CMOC)

at the tactical, operational and strategic levels, which includes a National level CMOC that

includes planning support to S/CRS.

(5) The fifth step will be to look at recent operations, emergencies, and crises to

determine what external examples may exist for solutions to any remaining gaps, potentially

looking to other nations such as Colombia, Great Britian and Australia.

(6) And lastly, I will apply the possible solutions to the situation and make

recommendations necessary according to the DOTLMPF+PE analysis to be able to operationalize

national reconstruction and stabilization strategy.

(7) Expected Findings. What I expect to find with a DOTLMPF + PE analysis I will

address by element.

(a) Doctrine & Organization. There is a broad effort to update the doctrine both in

DoD and in State to fit the evolution of S/CRS. I do not know of any other agencies which have

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begun the updating or integrating of doctrine or organization, but will find out, specifically

looking at how the Country Teams, Military Attaches and MILGRPs are linked and related

through this process. There is not yet a corresponding publication by either JFCOM, NDU that

accomodates these updates but I expect that during the period of my research I will see movement

on that front.

(b) Training. I see State and DoD making efforts to be more inclusive of S/CRSs

HSRTs in COCOM exercises, but dont know of any inclusion at the lower operational or tactical

levels yet, such as in the Combat Training Centers (CTCs). I will try to identify what agencies are

involved in the JIACGs at each COCOM, how they are participating, down to what level and in

which sectors they are working, planning and executing. I will look to see what interagency

training continues to be provided and for whom by both JFCOM, NDU.

(c) Leadership. I will look specifically at the leaders of each of the entities, S/CRS,

the COCOMs, JFCOM, NDU, the ASOC and CAPOC Commanders to see what roles,

responsibilities and decision-making legitimacy they have. I will consider their leadership visions

as well as their leadership development philosophies for their subordinates to make sure that we

address the operational level capabilities.

(d) Material. Ill look at whether the organizations are working resources and funding

that are interoperable and able to relate to eachother no matter what the circumstances: peacetime

through wartime. I will need to look at what the Humanitarian Information Unit (HIU)

unclassified collaboration software is evolving into, as well as what the classified software sharing

capabilities are in the intelligence and law enforcement agencies. This information linkage will

need to be the back bone for both horizontal and vertical integration and interoperability. We

must all be able to plan off of the same operational picture.

(e) Personnel. Analysis will be looking at the recruiting, retention and deployability of

each of the interagency coordinating sections for each agency. This paper will look at whether

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the right people can be placed in interagency planning elements throughout the spectrum that can

create and deploy the horizontal and vertical relationships that will establish the initial institutional

linkages.

(f) Facilities. Proximity and access will be considered, looking back to the

informational back bone to identify whether the geographical or positional locations suit the

relationships and familiarity that must be developed between the layers and staffs and agencies.

(g) Planning and execution. I will look at the actual planning products, whether a type

of Pol-Mil plan, a Mission Performance Plan, a Bureau Performance Plan, a CONPLAN or

FUNCLAN, identifed as a responsibility of each element, each level and determine whether the

information required can be fed through the system so that the strategic guidance is clear and

understood, translated into operational guidance that can be measured by effects, and used to

write plans and orders at the tactical level no matter what the level of hostilities. The execution of

such planning will need to be conducted on a spectrum from State led operations through the

Country Team and MILGRP, to DoD led operations through the COCOM, JTF and Brigade

Combat Teams (BCTs).

(8) Expected recommendations. I expect that at the end of my research, I will continue

to see a gap in clear responsibility for specific elements of analysis. I expect that S/CRS will

remain responsible for US reconstruction and stabiliation efforts. I expect that the responsibility

will be identified clearly in the pending legislation. However, I do not expect that any one agency

or leader will be assigned the tasks of interagency training. I will recommend that NDU be

responsible for the academic training, and that JFCOM be responsible for the inclusion of the

organizations in all exercises, to include CTCs. I dont expect that any agency or leader will be

assigned the tasks of interagency planning products and coordinated exeuction. I will recommend

the COCOMs be responsible to provide plans to the Country Team and the related Bureau for

crisis plan approval. I dont expect that any agency or leader will be assigned the responsibility of

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communications interoperability. I will recommend that OSD be responsible for working with the

HIU to develop and field only systems that can be used between all agencies.

3. Initial Reference List:

Birmingham, Guillermo, Barndt, Luann, and Salo, Thomas,Achieving Unit of Effort: A Call for

Legislation to Improve the Interagency Process and Continue Enhancing InterserviceInteroperability So All May Labor as One. Joint Forces Staff College, Joint andCombined Warfighting School-Intermediate, 18 September 2003

Bogdanos, Matthew F. Joint Interagency Cooperation: The First Step. Joing Force Quarterly,Spring 2005, Issue 37, p10-18. March 2005.

Briem, Christopher. Joint is Dead: What is Next? Proceedings of the United States NavalInstitute, Vol 130, Issue 1, p56-59. January 2004.

Buss, John C. , USAWC Center for Strategic Leadership Issue Paper: the State Department

Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization and Its Interaction with the Department ofDefense, July 2005, Carlisle Barracks, PA.

Center for Strategic and International Studies. Beyond Goldwater Nichols Phase II Report, June2005, Washington DC.

Clays, Michelle M., The Interagency Process and Americas Second Front in the Global War onTerrorism. April 2003, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication 3-08, Interagency Coordination DuringPeace Operations; October 1996, Washington DC.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-MilitaryOperations, 2002, Washington DC.

Clinton, William. Presidential Decision Directive 56: Managing Complex ContingencyOperations; 1999, Washington DC.

Donley, Michael. Occasional Paper #05-01: Rethinking the Interagency System. Hicks &Associates Incorporated. March 2005. McLean, VA.

Donley, Michael. Occasional Paper #05-01: Rethinking the Interagency System, Part 2. Hicks& Associates Incorporated. May 2005. McLean, VA.

Drechsler, Donald R. Reconstructing the Interagency Process after Iraq. Journal of StrategicStudies, Volume 28, Issue 1, p3-30. March 2005.

Krasner, Stephen D & Pascuale, Carlos. Addressing State Failure. Foreign Affairs, Vol 84,Issue 4, p153-163. July/August 2005.

NAIC. The Failed States Index. Foreign Policy, Issue 149, p56-65. July/August 2005.

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National Defense University. The Interagency Management of Complex Crisis OperationsHandbook. January 2003. Washington DC.

National Intelligence Council. The National Intelligence Councils 2020 Project

Piscal, Richard. USAWC Strategy Research Project: A No Policy Policy for Nation-Building.

March 2005. Carlisle Barracks, PA.

Lugar, Biden, Hagel. S.R. 600.Establishment of the S/CRS. Congressional Record. January2005. Washington DC

Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. SCRS Post-ConflictReconstruction Essential Tasks. April 2005. Washington DC.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Unified Joint Task List. August 2005. Washington DC.

United States Joint Forces Command. The Joint Warfighting Center Joint Doctrine Series,

Pamphlet 4: Doctrinal Implications of Operational Net Assessment (ONA). February2004. Norfolk, VA.

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