megacities in south africa: a solution for the new millennium?

MEGACITIES IN SOUTH AFRICA: A SOLUTION FOR THENEW MILLENNIUM?

ROBERT CAMERON*

Department of Political Studies, University of Cape Town, South Africa

ABSTRACT

This article focuses on the area of metropolitan governance in South Africa. It traces its evolution and looks at theperformance of metropolitan government in the three major cities in the country, namely Cape Town, Johannesburg andDurban. It then focuses on new government policy for metropolitan areas. Particular attention is paid to the impendingintroduction of unitary-tier structures (`megacities') in metropolitan areas. The ®ndings of the article are that there is noconclusive local or international evidence to suggest that either the unitary- or two-tier model is a better system fordealing with metropolitan problems, or that institutional reform at local level is capable of bringing about major politicalchange. There are undoubted theoretical advantages associated with unitary-tier structures. Two-tier systems are oftencharacterized by duplication, ine�cient use of resources and complex service arrangements. However, the costs ofdisrupting local government structures that have recently been put in place could well be far greater than any potentialsavings that can be made through the amalgamation of existing local structures into a megacity. Unitary structuresshould accordingly be introduced in a way that will minimize administrative disruption so that o�cials can focus onservice delivery. Copyright # 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

INTRODUCTION

Local government in South Africa has changed substantially since 1994. First, there has been thederacialization of local government. Pre-interim negotiating forums consisting of representatives of historic-ally advantaged as well as historically disadvantaged communities were created in the period prior to localgovernment elections (1994/95). This was followed by the country's ®rst non-racial local government electionswhich took place in 1995/96 and heralded the end of municipal apartheid (see Cloete, 1995; Cameron, 1996).

Second, there has been the elevation of local government from a `Cinderella' level of government towards apowerful sphere in its own right with constitutional powers and functions. The 1996 Constitution (RSA, 1996)makes provision for three spheres of government which are distinctive, interdependent and interrelated.Furthermore, national or provincial government may not compromise or impede a municipality's ability orright to exercise its powers and functions. Local government now has substantiallymore powers to run its owna�airs.

Third, there has been the creation of new local government structures. The most notable of these has beenthe establishment of metropolitan governments in the major cities of South Africa.Metropolitan areas are thepowerhouse of South Africa's economy, and the optimal governance of such metropolitan areas is of crucialnational importance. This article focuses on this vital area of metropolitan governance. It traces its evolutionin South Africa and looks at the performance of metropolitan government in the three major cities in thecountry, namely Cape Town, Johannesburg and Durban. It then focuses on new government policy formetropolitan areas. The 1996 Constitution, the White Paper on Local Government and the LocalGovernment: Municipal Structures Act are examined in this regard. Particular attention is paid to the

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND DEVELOPMENT

Public Admin. Dev. 20, 155±165 (2000)

Copyright # 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

*Correspondence to: Professor R. Cameron, Department of Political Studies, University of Cape Town, Private Bag, Rondebosch7700, Cape Town, South Africa.

impending introduction of unitary-tier structures (megacities) in metropolitan areas. Finally, a briefevaluation of the prospects of these new unitary structures in the new millennium is undertaken.

THE IMPORTANCE OF METROPOLITAN AREAS

Why study metropolitan government? Metropolitan areas are important for a number of reasons. First,metropolitan areas require speci®c consideration in government reorganization. The density of the pop-ulation, the existence of multiple, overlapping externalities and the need to co-ordinate services over largerareas while simultaneously ensuring proximity between the rulers and the ruled are just some of themetropolitan-speci®c issues that have to be taken into account in organizational reform (see Paddison, 1983,p. 259).

A second reason is the scale of metropolitan government. The Greater Johannesburg MetropolitanCouncil (GJMC), Cape Metropolitan Council (CMC) and Durban Metropolitan Council (DMC) could beranked the sixth, seventh and ninth provinces in terms of the size of their budgets. The GJMC budget was69.3 per cent of that of Gauteng, the CMC budget was 84 per cent of that of the Western Cape and the DMCbudget was 34.5 per cent of that of KwaZulu-Natal. When taken collectively, the metropolitan and large-citybudgets of municipalities in the metropolitan provinces are approximately 90 per cent of the size of thebudgets of Gauteng, Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal (Sutcli�e, 1998, pp. 10±11).

A third reason is the need for economic competitiveness, within the context of greater globalization, whichhas led to a much freer movement of capital across national boundaries. There has been a marked increase inintercity competition to attract mobile capital. The argument is that for a metropolitan area to be inter-nationally competitive, there should be governmental control over a territorial base and populationresources comparable with those of its political competitors (Barlow, 1991, pp. 299±300). Metropolitangovernment is thus of crucial importance in the creation of national wealth.

EVOLUTION OF METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA

Prior to 1994, no form of metropolitan government existed in South Africa. The Regional Services Councils(RSCs) Act contained within it the seeds of metropolitan government. However, in practice, most RSCs didnot take over metropolitan-type functions from existing local authorities (Cameron, 1993).

During the 1993 constitutional negotiations of the Local Government Negotiating Forum, the NationalParty (NP) government of the time, supported by many smaller white local authorities, promoted theconcept of weak metropolitan government and strong primary local authorities (PLAs). The NP govern-ment's concern was that strong metros with extensive powers and functions could be controlled by theAfrican National Congress (ANC), which was likely to adopt policies inimical to white suburbanites such asextensive taxation and the location of low-income housing in a�uent areas. However, given past residentialpatterns, there was a fair chance that whites could control a fair number of PLAs, particularly the wealthierones (Cameron, 1996).

The model of strong metros/weak PLAs was rejected by the ANC, which, with support from the MajorCities Association,1 favoured strong metropolitan government. An ANC policy document of May 1992stated:

The key issues facing our cities ± disparities in service provision, rapid urban growth, the housingcrisis and ine�cient apartheid city structure ± cannot be e�ectively addressed by lower-tierauthorities, whose focus is too small. The ANC believes that the metropolitan tier would be anappropriate tier to add to address these issues. This tier will control the primary sources of urban®nance, and will be responsible for allocating funds for development and services. It will

1The Major Cities Association consisted of the larger cities in the country, many of which subsequently became metropolitanauthorities. It has subsequently been abolished. There is currently no national association representing larger cities in the country.

156 R. CAMERON

Copyright # 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Public Admin. Dev. 20, 155±165 (2000)

co-ordinate the provision of city-wide service and allow democratic control over broaderdevelopment decisions. It will set the policy framework for that metropolitan area, within whichthe lower tier(s) will operate (African National Congress, 1992, p. 6).

The 1993 Constitution (RSA, 1993) made provision for separate metropolitan, urban and ruralgovernment (Section 174(2)). Part 1 of the Local Government Transition Act (LGTA, 1993) de®ned ametropolitan area as any area ± comprising the areas of jurisdiction of multiple local governments ± which:

. is densely populated and has an intensive movement of people, goods and services within the area;

. is extensively developed or urbanized and has more than one central business district, industrial area andconcentration of employment;

. economically, forms a functional unit comprising various smaller units which are interdependenteconomically and in respect of services.

Furthermore the LGTA made provision for transitional metropolitan councils (TMCs) with at least thepowers and duties of RSCs. However, this was not mandatory ± each TMC had the discretion to decidewhich functions it would take over from existing local governments. This was to ensure that TMCs were notoverloaded with new functions which they might lack the capacity to perform. Such metropolitan authoritieswould replace RSCs and take over their right to levy two taxes ± the regional services levy and the regionalestablishment levy. They would also have the power to claim levies and tari�s from the lower-tier structures,transitional metropolitan substructures (TMSs), in respect of any of their functions. Finally, provision wasmade for an equitable contribution from any constituent TMS based on the gross income of such TMSs.

It was clear that the thorny issue of the metropolitan±local relationship had not been resolved at nationallevel. It was left initially to local negotiating forums, and later to TMCs and TMSs, to negotiate the precisenature of this relationship.

Di�erent metropolitan areas negotiated di�erent metropolitan±local models. In the Western Cape theCape Metropolitan Negotiating Forum (CMNF) negotiated a relatively weak co-ordinating TMC and, as acorollary, TMSs with strong operational and implementation capacity. After the elections there was a shifttowards a complementary model of metro government whereby each level of local government would assumeresponsibility for its functions. The CapeMetropolitan Council (CMC) was given exclusive powers in respectof bulk service functions, while retaining a policy, co-ordinating and funding role in areas of dual CMC andmetropolitan local council (MLC)2 responsibility (MLCs still had large-scale operational capacity in respectof most of these dual functions) (Sewell, 1998; Cameron, 1999).

In Durban the Greater Durban Negotiating Forum agreement also made provision for a complementarymodel of metro±local relationships with provision for metropolitan and TMS governments with eachlocal government regulating its own a�airs. Intramunicipal co-operation was the basis of the metro±local relationship (McCarthy, 1998a; Cameron, 1999). In Greater Johannesburg a centralist form ofmetropolitan±local relationship was negotiated giving the GJMC extensive planning, budgetary and sta�ngpowers. After the election there was an attempt to give TMSs more powers, although this process was ratheruneven and the Greater Johannesburg model remains more centralized than the other metros in the country(Emdon, 1998; Cameron, 1999). In Pretoria the metropolitan council has limited functions and powers. TheCentral TMS is in e�ect the metropolitan authority and controls almost two-thirds of the aggregatemetropolitan budget (McCarthy, 1998b).

PERFORMANCE OF METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT

The Cape Metropolitan Area (CMA) two-tier system, at least initially, appeared to be working satisfactorily.An exhausting reorganization process was handled in a largely co-operative way by the municipalities. The

2In terms of the Local Government Second Amendment Act of 1996 the designation of lower-tier local governments in metropolitanareas changed from TMSs to MLCs.

MEGACITIES IN SOUTH AFRICA 157


handing-over phase on 1 July 1997 happened relatively smoothly without major service delivery problems.There is, however, evidence that at least some departments in some of the smaller municipalities are notperforming. The responsibility for land use and transport planning and economic development was unwiselysplit in a vague fashion between the CMC and MLCs. This is leading to con¯ict between the CMC andMLCs. There were also signs indicating that integrated development planning for the CMAwas turning intoa `turf battle' between the CMC and the MLCs (see Cameron, 1999).

In the CMA the MLC boundaries consisting of a balance of rich and poor areas were set up by theprevious board to facilitate redistribution, and to some extent this is already occurring. This is supplementedby CMC grants. However, service delivery, in particular housing, has been impeded by the tendency of someMLCs to regard their boundaries as sacrosanct (Cameron, 1999).

The two-tier system in the CMA, although imperfect in some ways, laid a reasonable foundation for theperformance of service delivery and redistribution. However, there is a growing concern that cuts in grants(due to constraint of the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy) are a�ecting thecapacity of some departments in CMA municipalities to deliver services (Cameron, 1999; see also Sewell,1998).

The Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Area (GJMA) has gone through a disruptive process. In theGJMC area there has been a shift from centralization to decentralization and then back to centralizationagain. In addition, the four MLCs did not really conform to existing service areas, and this also requiredsubstantial administrative reorganization.

The GJMA municipalities went through a severe ®nancial crisis in the 1996/97 ®nancial year whichimpacted negatively upon service delivery. Wildly optimistic capital expenditure which was not balancedwith adequate income meant that the GJMA municipalities were heading towards insolvency. The crisis wasalleviated by a R585 million loan by the Development Bank of South Africa (DBSA) (Cameron, 1999).

The Committee of Ten (the Management Committee consisting of councillors from the GJMC andMLCs) was set up in the aftermath of the ®nancial crisis. It reduced capital expenditure by R1.1 billion(Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Council, 1997). The trimming of the capital expenditure had as acorollary the reduction of money for services in disadvantaged areas. GJMC capital expenditure as apercentage of total expenditure was only 8 per cent in 1997/98 (Sutcli�e, 1998, p. 12). A further problem hasbeen the fragmentation of planning between the GJMA and MLCs. This has made it di�cult to plan on ametro-wide basis and has contributed to the apparent disjuncture between metro-wide service needs andbudgetary priorities (Cameron, 1999). An organizational review undertaken by consultants has alsohighlighted the poor political leadership and administrative management in the GJMA municipalities (PriceWaterhouse and Partners, 1998). All this has contributed to little strategic planning and accordingly littlelinking of planning and budgets. The consequence of all these factors is that there has been very limitedservice upgrading in the GJMA municipalities.

Unlike Cape Town and Johannesburg, Durban has not had the time-consuming task of unbundling themajor erstwhile cities, with North Central and South Central Local Council still being serviced by oneadministration which is largely the old Durban City Council bureaucracy. Durban o�cials who werecontacted were unanimous in saying the division of functions and powers between the DMC and MLCs hadworked relatively well (see Province of KwaZulu-Natal, 1996).

The two-tier system has nevertheless created certain problems. The chairperson of the DMC executivecommittee, Margaret Winter, argued that the metro lacked su�cient powers to get its policy implemented.She argued that while the DMC and MLCs agree on joint plans, nobody takes responsibility for imple-mentation. This indicated a clear need to give more powers to the metro (see Cameron, 1999).

Discussions with Durban Metropolitan Area (DMA) o�cials also revealed a concern that the DMC lacksthe teeth to implement planning and other joint service decisions. This is an impediment to the metroperforming a strategic role in the DMA. An analysis of the DMA suggests that there are con¯icts arounddevelopment projects between metro and local councils which bedevil city-wide planning and development(Anon, 1997, p. 9).

158 R. CAMERON


On the other hand, there has been a reasonable degree of redistribution in the DMA. A DMA reportstated that the boundaries of the DMA's MLCs were demarcated in such a way that the proportion ofwealthy to poor residents in each of the councils was relatively similar. As a result, DMA councils were ableto provide a signi®cant transfer of resources within their own boundaries. In addition, it was stated thatduring 1995/96 and 1996/97 approximately 60 per cent±70 per cent of the DMC capital budget was spent inareas of greatest need (Durban Metropolitan Council, 1997, pp. 24±27). McCarthy (1998a, pp. 21±22)argued that the increase in total capital expenditure for Durban, from R110.2 million in 1996/97 to R156.7million in 1997/98, is associated with greater levels of commitment towards previously underdeveloped areas.Redistribution could nevertheless be improved by allocating additional powers to the metro council (DurbanMetropolitan Council, 1997, pp. 24±27).

Notwithstanding the problems listed above, most o�cials and academic commentators agree that theDMA system has worked relatively well from both a functional and redistributive point of view (seeMcCarthy, 1998a).

THE 1996 CONSTITUTION

The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, created a new framework for local government.Provision is made for a three-sphere government comprising national, provincial and local spheres which aredistinctive, interdependent and interrelated. The principle of co-operative governance underpins inter-governmental relations. As with the 1993 Constitution, there is a chapter dealing with local government.Section 151(3) of the 1996 Constitution states that a municipality has the right to govern, on its owninitiative, the local government a�airs of its community, subject to national and provincial legislation.Section 151(4) says that national or provincial government may not compromise or impede a municipality'sright or ability to exercise its powers or perform its functions. These clauses indicate a fundamental shiftaway from the system of provincial control of local government which has characterized South Africa'sintergovernmental system since 1910 (see Cameron, 1995, 1996).

Section 155(1) of the 1996 Constitution makes provision for the following categories of municipalities.

. Category A: a municipality that has exclusive municipal executive and legislative authority in its area.

. Category B: a municipality that shares municipal executive and legislative authority in its area with aCategory C municipality within whose area it falls.

. Category C: a municipality that has municipal executive and legislative authority in an area that includesmore than one municipality.

The 1993 Constitution made provision for ®xed categories of metropolitan, urban and rural localgovernments. This had to lead to numerous demarcation disputes as to what were metropolitan, stand-alone(urban) towns and rural local governments (see Cameron, 1999). The 1996 Constitution's concept ofcategories was created to provide greater ¯exibility when it came to the establishment of local governmentstructures.

Section 155(3) of the 1996 Constitution states that national legislation must:

(a) establish the criteria for determining when an area should have a single Category A municipality orwhen it should have municipalities of both Category B and C;

(b) establish criteria and procedures for the determination of municipal boundaries by an independentauthority.

WHITE PAPER ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT

The White Paper on Local Government was released in March 1998. The Constitution only laid down thebroad outlines of local government. The policy details had to be ®lled in by the White Paper and legislation



based on the White Paper (Provincial A�airs and Constitutional Development Ministry, 1997, pp. 1±2). TheWhite Paper (Department of Constitutional Development, 1998, p. 59±60) provided three compellingreasons for the establishment of metropolitan government.

. Metropolitan government creates a basis for equitable and socially just metropolitan governance.

. Metropolitan government promotes strategic land use planning and co-ordinated public investment inphysical and social infrastructure.

. Metropolitan government is able to develop a city-wide framework for economic and social developmentand enhance the economic competitiveness and well-being of the city.

Two types of metropolitan government were proposed, both of which were variants of single-tierauthorities (pp. 64±67).

Option 1 provided for metropolitan governments with ward committees. This would entail having ametropolitan council which exercises the complete range of municipal powers and duties (legislative,executive and administrative), as well as ward committees which are area-based committees whose bound-aries coincide with ward boundaries.

Option 2 consisted of metropolitan governments with metropolitan structures. This system entailed thecreation of a system which would consist of:

. a metropolitan council with original (legislative, executive and administrative) powers for all municipalfunctions;

. metropolitan substructures which have no original powers ± their powers and functions must be devolvedfrom the metropolitan council ± but will have advisory, supervisory and decision-making powers.

The White Paper caused a storm of protest, particularly in the opposition-controlled provinces of WesternCape and KwaZulu-Natal. The major complaint was that the White Paper did not o�er any real option ±the only choice was one between the two variants of the single-tier option. As a result of the uproar, theMinister of Constitutional Development appointed a task team to look at all options in metropolitan areasin the White Paper and the existing models.

This research team for metropolitan government systems undertook a review of the Cape Town,Johannesburg, Durban and Pretoria metropolitan areas. The report came out strongly in favour of single-tier cities. It stated that, administratively, there was a need to have an e�ective deployment of sta� acrossa metropolitan region in order to deal with the equitable geographical distribution of services andopportunities within metro areas. At a ®nancial level there was a need for the creation of a single ®nancialframework and single budget for metropolitan areas as a whole. Furthermore, in order to deal with some ofthe historical inequities, it stated that there was a need for a single valuation roll and for rates and levies to beset across the metropolitan areas as a whole (Sutcli�e, 1998, pp. 107±108).

LOCAL GOVERNMENT: MUNICIPAL STRUCTURES ACT

The Local Government: Municipal Structures Act (LGMSA, 1998) has in e�ect replaced two-tiermetropolitan structures with unitary-tier authorities. As pointed out, opposition parties, most notably theDemocratic Party (DP) and the (now) New National Party (NNP), fought vehemently against the intro-duction of megacities. There was also ®erce opposition from Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal provincesand local governments to this Bill (although Durban metropolitan municipalities, under party-politicalpressure from the ANC, tempered their opposition). Despite this opposition, the Act was passed byParliament and promulgated on 18 December 1998.

160 R. CAMERON


Section 2 of the Act says that areas which must have single `A' municipalities are areas that can reasonablybe regarded as:

(a) a conurbation featuring ±(i) areas of high population density,(ii) an intense movement of people, goods and services,(iii) extensive development,(iv) multiple business districts and industrial areas;

(b) a centre of economic activity with a complex and diverse economy;(c) a single area for which integrated development planning is desirable;(d) having strong interdependent social and economic linkages between its constituent units.

This de®nition is a de facto description of metropolitan areas which means that Category A municipalitieswill be introduced in such areas. This de®nition points to the city region or urban region as the basis of themetropolitan area which would encompass the economically interdependent suburban, rural areas andinformal settlements. It would conform to the view that there should be coterminous political and economicboundaries. This can be contrasted with the `brick and mortar' view of metropolitan government whichwould draw boundaries at the urban edge. Incidentally, earlier versions of the Structures Bill conformedmore to the `brick and mortar' approach.

Section 4 of the Act states the following.

(1) The Minister must apply the criteria set out in Section 2 and determine whether an area in terms of thecriteria must have a single Category A municipality or whether it must have municipalities of bothCategory B and C.

(2) The Minister may determine that an area must have a Category A municipality after consultation withthe MEC [member of the executive council in a province] for local government in the provinceconcerned, the Demarcation Board, South African Local Government Association (SALGA) andorganized local government in the province.

Section 5 gives the Minister the power to determine whether an area should have a single `A' municipality.When declaring an area as a metropolitan area, the Minister designates the area by identifying the nodalpoints of the area but must leave the determination of the outer boundaries to the Demarcation Board. Thishas caused some concern. Section 155(3) of the 1996 Constitution states that local government boundariesmust be demarcated by an independent authority. Critics of the Bill argue that Section 5 of the Act gives theMinister the power to decide where megacities should be established. Criticisms of this provision come fromtwo sources.

The ®rst source of criticism comes from those who want stronger provincial powers. It is argued thatthe Act's conferral of this power is incompatible with the Constitution. The Minister's role restricts theprovincial legislature's power to determine the di�erent types of municipalities to be established in theprovince (Section 155(5)) and the provincial governments' power to establish municipalities of theirprovinces (Section 155(6)). Underpinning these complaints is the concern that the Minister is imposingmegacities in provinces against their wishes (see Breitenbach, 1998).

The other source of criticism emanates from those calling for a more independent view of demarcatingmetropolitan boundaries. The determination of what is metropolitan or not should best be left to aprofessional demarcation board (see Cameron, 1999).

There were two Constitutional Court challenges launched against the Act, one by the Western Capeprovincial government and the other by the KwaZulu-Natal provincial government. The Court has just ruledthat Sections 4 and 5 of the Act are unconstitutional, concluding that the function of declaring metropolitanareas should be performed by the Municipal Demarcation Board (Department of ConstitutionalDevelopment, 1999).



In reality the ruling is not likely to delay the metropolitan demarcation process signi®cantly. Thesubstantive challenge against the legality of the nationwide single-tier system failed. In addition, the Ministerhad already determined a single nodal point for ®ve metropolitan areas, namely Cape Town, Durban, EastRand, Johannesburg and Pretoria, yet he had to consult the Demarcation Board when determining thesenodal points. In practice he relied heavily on the Board's detailed submission which recommended the same®ve metropolitan areas. At most there might be a slight technical delay.

EXECUTIVE MAYOR

Sections 7 and 8 deal with the types of municipalities, which are in e�ect di�erent types of executive systems;provision is made for a variety of executive options, some of which include the mayoral executive system. Themayoral electoral system allows for the exercise of executive authority through an executive mayor in whomthe executive leadership of the municipality is vested and who is assisted by a mayoral committee. Theexecutive mayor will be indirectly elected by a council from its ranks.

This is a somewhat truncated version of the executive mayor model. Section 151(2) of the 1996Constitution, which states that `the executive and legislative authority of a municipality is vested in itsmunicipal council', seems to prohibit the appointment of a directly elected mayor.

While a comprehensive discussion of the executive mayor is perhaps beyond the ambit of this article, someof the reasons advanced for this system can be brie¯y mentioned.

. The ability of such mayors to run cities e�ciently and innovatively and not be tied down by bureaucraticred tape. This is of particular signi®cance given greater globalization where cities are seen as areas foreconomic competition in the global marketplace. Executive mayors could play a key role in attractinginvestment.

. The fact that such a mayor would be a high-pro®le public ®gure, which should clarify accountability andheighten interest in civic a�airs. This is of particular salience in metropolitan areas where metropolitanauthorities have often been accused of being remote and lacking visibility.

. This system would bring local government into line with the form of executive system used in bothnational and provincial spheres of government.

The executive mayor would have substantial powers which include:

. identifying the needs of the municipality and reviewing and evaluating these needs in order of priority;

. making recommendations to the municipal council about strategies, programmes and services to addresspriority needs through the integrated development plan and the estimates of revenue and expenditure;

. recommending or determining the best way, including partnership and other approaches, to deliver thosestrategies, programmes and services to the maximum bene®t of the community (Section 56).

Only time will tell whether the introduction of executive mayors in metropolitan governments will lead tobetter governance of such bodies.

METROPOLITAN SUBCOUNCILS

Certain types of metropolitan municipalities may establish metropolitan subcouncils (Section 61). If ametropolitan municipality decides to establish metropolitan subcouncils, it must do so by passing, after aprocess of public consultation, a bylaw which, inter alia, determines the number of subcouncils to beestablished, determines for each subcouncil an area within the municipality consisting of a cluster ofadjoining wards, establishes in each area a subcouncil under a distinct name, provides an equitable ®nancialframework in terms of which the subcouncils must function, and regulates any other relevant matters.

Each metropolitan council consists of the councillors representing the wards included in the subcouncilarea, and an additional number of councillors determined by the metro council (Section 63). A metropolitan

162 R. CAMERON


subcouncil only has such duties and powers as the metro council may delegate to it in terms of Section 32.Section 32(2) states that this delegation is subject to a number of conditions. It must be in accordance withthe Constitution and the Act; must be in writing; is subject to any limitations, conditions and directions themunicipal council may impose; may include the power to subdelegate a delegated power; and does not divestthe council of the responsibility concerning the exercise of the power or the performance of the duty. It mustbe reviewed when a new council is elected.

In addition, the municipal council may, or at the request in writing of at least one-quarter of thecouncillors must, review any decision taken by a committee or functionary in consequence of a delegation orinstruction, and either con®rm, vary or revoke the decision subject to any vested rights (Section 32(3)). Thecouncil may also require its executive committee or executive mayor to co-ordinate or review any decisiontaken by a committee or functionary in consequence of a delegation or instruction.

Section 64(1)(2) states that the metropolitan subcouncil may make recommendations to the metro councilon what duties and powers should be delegated to it.

Certain types of metropolitan municipalities may have ward committees. The object of a ward committeeis to enhance participatory democracy in local government (Section 72). If a metro or local council decides tohave ward committees, it must establish a ward committee for each ward in the municipality. A wardcommittee consists of the councillor representing that ward in the council (Section 73(2)(a)), who must alsobe the chairperson of the committee, and not more than 10 other members (Section 73(2)(b)).

A metro or local council must make rules regulating the procedure to elect the Subsection 2(b) members ofa ward committee taking into account the need for women to be equitably represented in a ward committee;and for a diversity of interests in the ward to be represented (Section 73(3)).

The functions and powers of a ward committee are to make recommendations on any matter a�ecting itsward to the ward councillor, or through the ward councillor to the metro or local council, the executivecommittee, the executive mayor or the relevant metropolitan subcouncil. It has such duties and powers as themetro or local council may delegate to it in terms of Section 32 (Section 74).

What is the di�erence between subcouncils and ward committees? Subcouncils are intended to bedecentralized administrations to which the metro can, for example, delegate local planning decisions. On theother hand, the ward councils would approximate electoral districts and are clearly intended to be a vehicleto promote local democracy and participation. While functions and powers can also be delegated down toward councils, they are not meant to be bodies which take major administrative decisions.

A problem is the vagueness of the nature of the powers that can be delegated to subcouncils (in particular)and ward councils. The Act says nothing about the nature of these powers. There is a general concern insome circles that metropolitan authorities will be run in a highly centralized fashion, leading to a majorbottleneck of, for example, planning decisions. This Act does nothing to allay such fears.

ELECTION OF METROPOLITAN AUTHORITIES

For the 1995/96 elections, 40 per cent of councillors were elected by proportional representation, while theremaining 60 per cent were elected on a ward basis. The 60 per cent ward representation was further divided:half of these councillors (50 per cent) represented traditional white local authorities, including coloured andIndian areas (`A' category wards), whereas the other half (50 per cent) represented largely black localauthority (African) areas (`B' category wards).

At metropolitan level the 40 per cent proportional representation provision also applied. However, theother 60 per cent had to be nominated by TMSs from within their own ranks on a pro rata basis, according tothe respective number of registered voters.

This formula was one of the compromises reached between the then NP government and the ANC in the1993 local government negotiations. This formula was intended to over-represent minorities, in particularwhites, in the interim period of transformation. It did, however, have the unintended consequences of



bolstering the ANC ward seats in the Western Cape province where Africans have traditionally been aminority (see Cameron, 1999).

In terms of the Local Government Municipal Structures Act, the number of ward councillors in ametropolitan or local council must be 50 per cent of the total number of councillors (as opposed to 60 percent previously) (Section 22). Schedule 1, Section 3 states that the number of wards in a metropolitan or localmunicipality must be equal to the number of ward councillors determined for the municipality. Also, thiswas to ensure greater proportionality in the electoral system as required by the Constitution. It was alsointended to ensure greater representation of women, who generally tend to be elected via party lists ratherthan through ward constituencies. The power-sharing references that were in the LGTA have been expungedfrom the LGMSA.

CONCLUSION

Whether unitary-tier structures in metropolitan areas are going to lead to better governance of cities andredistribution of resources when they are introduced in the new millennium remains to be seen. There is noconclusive local or international evidence to suggest that either the unitary- or two-tier model is a bettersystem for dealing with metropolitan problems or that institutional reform at local level is capable ofbringing about major political change (see Barlow, 1991; Keating, 1991; Cameron, 1999). Indeed, it is notclear whether the ANC's preference for megacities is based as much on concerns about fragmentation ofpolicy under a two-tier system as on the party's desire to centralize power at local level. Having said that,there are undoubted theoretical advantages associated with unitary-tier structures. Two-tier centres arecharacterized by duplication, ine�cient use of resources and complex service arrangements (see GreaterToronto Area Task Force, 1996, pp. 137±138). Furthermore, as the White Paper suggests, a single-tiergovernment should lead to more co-ordinated planning and greater redistribution.

Notwithstanding what is said above, the costs of disrupting local government structures that have recentlybeen put in place could well be far greater than any potential savings that can be made through theamalgamation of existing structures into a megacity. Both Cape Town and Johannesburg have gone througha major administrative reorganization process which has led to redistribution and service delivery issueslargely being put on the back burner. There is concern that another local government reorganization couldonce more lead to major administrative disruption.

There is, however, increasing political consensus in the larger metropolitan authorities that the unitarystructures should be introduced in a way that will minimize administrative disruption so that o�cials canfocus on service delivery. If this is achievable, the single-tier system could well lead to better governance ofmetropolitan areas in the long term.

REFERENCES

African National Congress. 1992. Ready to Govern: ANC Policy Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa. ANC: Johannesburg.Barlow IM. 1991. Metropolitan Government. Routledge: London.Breitenbach AM. 1998. Submission to the Portfolio Committee on Constitutional A�airs. National Assembly: Cape Town.Cameron RG. 1993. Regional Services Councils in South Africa: past, present and future. Public Administration 71(3): 417±439.Cameron RG. 1995. The history of devolution of powers to local authorities in South Africa. Local Government Studies 21(3): 396±417.Cameron RG. 1996. The democratisation of South African local government. Local Government Studies 22(1): 19±39.Cameron RG. 1999. Democratisation of South African Local Government. A Tale of Three Cities. Van Schaik: Pretoria.Cloete F. 1995. Local Government Transformation in South Africa. Van Schaik: Pretoria.Department of Constitutional Development. 1998. White Paper on Local Government. DCD: Pretoria.Department of Constitutional Development. 1999. Cabinet Memorandum. DCD: Pretoria.Durban Metropolitan Council. 1997. Joint Councils of the Durban Metropolitan Area: Response to Green Paper. DMC: Durban.Emdon E. 1998. Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Area. In Further Research into Metropolitan Government Systems, Sutcli�e M

(ed.). Department of Constitutional Development: Pretoria; 70±90.Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Council. 1997. Local Councils ± Incorporating the Metropolitan Council and the Four Metropolitan

Local Councils. Consolidated Financial Statements for the Year Ended 30 June 1997. GJMC: Johannesburg.

164 R. CAMERON


Greater Toronto Area Task Force. 1996. Greater Toronto Report. Queen's Printer for Ontario: Toronto.Keating M. 1991. Comparative Urban Politics. Power and City in the United States, Canada, Britain and France. Edward Elgar:

Aldershot.LGMSA. 1998. Local Government: Municipal Structures Act, Act 117 of 1998. Government Printer: Pretoria: RSA.LGTA. 1993. Local Government Transition Act, Act 209 of 1993. Government Printer: Pretoria: RSA.McCarthy J. 1998a. Greater Durban Metropolitan Area. In Further Research into Metropolitan Government Systems, Sutcli�e M (ed.).

Department of Constitutional Development: Pretoria; 18±32.McCarthy J. 1998b. Greater Pretoria Metropolitan Area. In Further Research into Metropolitan Government Systems, Sutcli�e M (ed.).

Department of Constitutional Development: Pretoria; 33±46.Paddison R. 1983. The Fragmented State: the Political Geography of Power. Basil Blackwell: Oxford.Price Waterhouse and Partners. 1998.Organisational Review: Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Council and Local Councils. First Draft

Report. Price Waterhouse and Partners: Johannesburg.Province of KwaZulu-Natal. 1996. Proclamation No. 38 of 1996 in Terms of Local Government Transition Act No. 209 of 1993: Making of

Enactments. Province of KwaZulu-Natal: Pietermaritzburg.Provincial A�airs and Constitutional Development Ministry/White Paper Working Committee. 1997. South Africa's Local Government:

a Discussion Document: towards a White Paper on Local Government in South Africa. PACDM/WPWC: Pretoria.RSA. 1993. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993. Government Printer: South Africa.RSA. 1996. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996. Government Printer: Pretoria.Sewell B. 1998. Cape Metropolitan Area. In Research into Metropolitan Government Systems, Sutcli�e M (ed.). Department of

Constitutional Development: Pretoria; 47±69.Sutcli�e M (Ed.). 1998. Further Research into Metropolitan Government Systems. Department of Constitutional Development: Pretoria.

APPENDIX. SELECT LIST OF ACRONYMS

CMA Cape Metropolitan AreaCMC Cape Metropolitan CouncilDMA Durban Metropolitan AreaDMC Durban Metropolitan CouncilGJMC Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan CouncilLGTA Local Government Transition ActMEC member of the executive councilMLC metropolitan local councilPLA primary local authorityRSA Republic of South AfricaRSC Regional Services CouncilSALGA South African Local Government AssociationTMC transitional metropolitan councilTMS transitional metropolitan substructure



megacities in south africa: a solution for the new millennium?

Documents