150 THE CONTEMPORARY PACIFIC· SPRING/FALL 1989

Working Paper Series. Honolulu: PacificIslands Studies, University of Hawaii.

Islands Business. I988. Henry Naisali.Islands Business I4 (April): 20.

Keith-Reid, Robert. I988a. The Fishing IsGood. Islands Business I4 (July): 26-27.

---. I988b. Regional blocs grow.Islands Business I4 (February): 8-9,38.

Lomas, David. I988. King Taufa'ahauTupou.Islands Business I4 (February):9-II.

Loudon, Bruce. I988. Melanesians to Sign"Spearhead" Agreement. Australian(national daily, Sydney), I4 March, 4.

Mercury. I988. Pacific's New Power BlocBeats Drum of Freedom. Mercury (Hobartdaily), I5 March, 7.

Rampell, Ed. I988. Samoa's principled PM.

Pacific Islands Monthly 59 (September):46-49.

spc (South Pacific Commission). I988.Twenty-eighth South Pacific Conference,I7 August. Working Paper 7. Noumea.

SSD (South Sea Digest). var. Fortnightly,Sydney.

Melanesia in Review:

Issues and Events, 1988

FIJI

The dominating feature of I988 for Fijiwas its attempt to come to terms withthe consequences of the precedingyear's two military coups. While manyclaimed the country had now changedirrevocably through the installation ofde facto military rule, the Rabuka­dominated order, with Ratu Sir Penaia

Ganilau as President and Ratu SirKamisese Mara continuing as PrimeMinister in an interim government,accorded urgency to persuading pub­lics at home and abroad that Fiji wasreturning to normal. For the Austra­lian, New Zealand, United States, Brit­ish, and neighboring South Pacific gov­ernments, there was a predisposition totake the regime at its word about itsintentions. For the Mara government,the major objectives on the road toacceptability included acquisition oflegitimacy via constitutional change,economic recovery through incentivesand enlistment of foreign interests,and, not least, keeping a firm local lidon a potentially volatile mix of social,political, and ethnic conflict.

The proposed constitutional refor­mulation, in particular intentions .about parliamentary representation,saw details drip fed through a series offar from consistent statements.Through a major address to the nationin March, Ratu Sir Kamisese said thatit was the intention of his interimadministration to "hold free and openelections once a broadly acceptableconstitution was completed." Never­theless this would "have to ensure thefull protection of the fundamentalinterests and concerns of the indige­nous Fijian people, but at the sametime accommodate on a fair and equi­table basis the position of other com­munities" (PIM, May 1988 , 37).

Yet in July, when details for such asingle chamber parliament comprising71 seats were announced; such princi­ples of equity were hardly in evidence.Indians would elect 22 representativesfrom a communal roll; Fijians wouldhave 28 representatives although, inter-

POLITICAL REVIEW. MELANESIA

estingly, these individuals would beelected indirectly through the existingprovincial council structure. As well asbeing a denial of basic suffrage forfuture Fijian electors, this measure wasobviously designed to empower localchiefs. Other races, so-called generalvoters, would elect 8 representatives,while Rotumans would have I. Of the12 remaining seats, all would be filledby appointment: 8 by the president, 4by the prime minister (both postsreserved for Fijians), with 1 seat amongthese being permanently reserved forthe current commander of the coun­try's security forces.

As outlined, the proposal was a bla­tant gerrymander that favored thedominating eastern chiefly establish­ment. By abolishing the former systemof national election, where almost halfof the candidates elected to the lowerhouse of parliament were elected by"cross-voting" of electors of all races,the plan stymied any chance of a partywinning a majority of seats by multira­cial appeals. And for bodies such as theincreasingly fragmented Taukei move­ment and Fijian Nationalist Party,which had previously campaigned withvigor against aspects of chiefly rule atelection time, that opportunity wasnow curtailed.

Aware of these disquiets, and mind­ful that public discussion had beendriven underground, the regime wentthrough the motions of consultation byestablishing a Constitution Inquiry andAdvisory Committee headed by Colo­nel P. Manueli, a Rotuman and formercommander of the Royal Fiji MilitaryForce. While Ratu Sir Penaia Ganilaucalled on the public to cooperate withthis body, he acknowledged that

soundings about constitutional accept­ability had to realize there must be ajust and honest appreciation of the spe­cial position of the indigenous Fijiancommunity. While Ratu Sir KamiseseMara expressed hope that free andopen elections under the proposed planwould be possible before the end of1989, Rabuka himself was far lessforthcoming. For Dr Timoci Bavadra,ousted as prime minister by the May1987 coup, the plan was undemocratic,discriminatory, and unacceptable.

Questions as to whether Rabukawas sincere about any effective returnto the civil rule of law were sharpenedby his June promulgation of sweepingsecurity provisions by decree. This pro­vided for immediate arrest, detention,and search without warrant-measuresthat were employed arbitrarily tosilence and intimidate academics, law­yers, unionists, journalists, and dis­senters. Leading public figuresaccorded such treatment included FijiTimes editor Vijendra Kumar, foreignminister in the ousted Bavadra govern­ment, Krishna Datt, and the unionistMahendra Chaudhry. These sweepswere especially intense at mid-year fol­lowing the discovery by Sydney cus­toms authorities of an arms cache pre­sumed destined for Lautoka, and thesubsequent arrest by British police ofan Indo-Fijian, M. R. Kahan, chargedwith implication in planning this ship­ment.

Civil rights abuses by the regimewere criticized by Amnesty Interna­tional and the Indian government,while Australia indicated that any fur­ther increase of aid to Fiji wouldremain conditional on progress towarda return to constitutional rule and

THE CONTEMPORARY PACIFIC· SPRING/FALL 1989

relaxation of the June security decree.Under these conditions, it was not sur­prising that of the 3200 people who leftFiji on a permanent basis during thefirst seven months of 1988, 86 percentwere of Indian origin.

To combat sluggish economic per­formance, where inflation rose to II

percent and where unemployment wasat an official rate of 10 percent, theregime was active in attempting toattract foreign investment. Thisincluded plans for a tax-free zone per­mitting foreign enterprises with heavyexport orientation generous long-termconcessions, the establishment of for­eign textile concerns using cheap locallabor, and the sale of tourist and hotelassets to holdings such as the Japan­based Electrical Industrial Enterprises.

Because of retrenchment and adecline in imports, two devaluations ofthe Fiji dollar in 1987, and reasonablybuoyant world sugar prices, the coun­try's foreign exchange holdingsremained healthy at over F$200 millionfor most of 1988. Otherwise stringentregulations regarding Sabbath observ­ance were relaxed to permit cane har­vesting. For the longer term, and inrespect of operations such as the touristindustry, the economic future of Fijiwas seen as depending critically onwhether continuing political uncer­tainty could be resolved and confidencerestored.

Throughout Fiji during the year,social conditions on a daily basisremained outwardly calm, though suchplacidity was deceptive. Relationsbetween the two major communitiesremained sullen and distant. While DrBavadra attempted to rebuild supportfor his Labour Party along multiracial

lines in west Viti Levu, his Septemberclaims that the power of prayer hadfacilitated an accommodation with afaction of the Taukei movementheaded by the extremist Ratu MeliVesikula received a mixed responseamong Indian leaders.

Although the University of theSouth Pacific maintained a full pro­gram throughout the year, PacificIslands leaders conferring at theirregular Forum meeting in September(where Fiji was kept off the formalagenda), expressed private concern atthe university's longer term prospects.Within a climate of growing conserva­tism and fear of debate or criticism,such concern seemed justifiable.Finally, the year for Fiji was perhapsmost fittingly epitomized by Rabuka'sdecision, on the eve of the republic'sfirst anniversary, to promote himselfforthwith to the rank of major general.

RODERIC ALLEY

NEW CALEDONIA

A dramatic shift in the political situa­tion of New Caledonia occurred during1988 with the change of government inFrance from the conservative PresidentChirac to the second socialist presi­dency of Frans;ois Mitterrand. Solidlyconservative policies were in place inthe territory following the September1987 referendum, in which almost allof the 59 percent of the population thatvoted favored New Caledonia remain­ing part of France. Despite the strongopposition of the major Melanesianpolitical coalition, the Front de Libera­tion Nationale Kanake et Socialiste(FLNKS), the minister for overseasdepartments and territories, Bernard

POLITICAL REVIEW. MELANESIA

Pons, had then introduced a new stat­ute for New Caledonia. This promisedto disadvantage the Kanaks, who hadalready lost much ground under theconservative regime, by considerablyreducing the significance of theregional councils established under theprevious socialist government, by with­drawing power from the territorialcongress, by removing the distinct civilstatus of Melanesians in the territory,and by radically transforming Melane­sian land rights.

Land issues resurfaced in February1988, with a violent dispute over thelocation of a new hospital in the eastcoast town of Poindimie triggering themobilization of opposition to the Ponsstatute (IE, March 1988, 20). FLNKS

leaders vowed to boycott the upcomingregional elections and stronglyopposed the scheduling of the nationalpresidential elections on the same day,which they saw as a French govern­ment attempt to weaken the impact ofthe boycott. On 22 April, two daysbefore the elections, a commandogroup of Kanaks made a dawn raid onthe gendarmerie at Fayaoue on OuveaIsland, killing four gendarmes and tak­ing twenty-seven hostages. Some werereleased a few days later but others,along with police and officials whoarrived subsequently, were held in acoral cave in the north of the island.Further violent incidents followed asthe "muscular mobilization" sought byFLNKS leader Jean-Marie Tjibaou tookdifferent forms in different parts of theterritory. The two rounds of the presi­dential elections went ahead, andChirac, trailing Mitterrand in the firstround, launched a military raid againstthe Kanak militants on the eve of the

153

second round. The remaining twenty­three hostages were rescued in the raid,but nineteen Kanak militants, includ­ing their leader, Alphonse Dianou,were killed. Kanak anger and resent­ment increased as evidence accumulat­ed to suggest that some militants hadbeen killed after their capture (PIM,June 1988, 8; PR, 28 April 1988, I).

The reelection of Mitterrand andthe installation of Michel Rocard asprime minister brought an end to hard­line confrontationist policies in NewCaledonia, although tensions thereremained high. The process of estab­lishing dialogue with both pro- andanti-independence supporters began inMay when Rocard sent a six-man mis­sion to the territory. All but theextreme right-wing parties, the FrontNational (FN) and the Front Caledo­nien (FC), met with the mission (IB,June 1988, 6). Rocard achieved furtherdiplomatic success in June when FLNKS

leader Tjibaou, and Jacques Lafleur,leader of the loyalist RassemblementPour la Caledonie dans la Republique(RPCR), who had not met officiallysince 1983, both participated in talks inParis. A provisional accord was signedand discussed extensively by the majorfactions in New Caledonia (PIM, Aug1988,18; IE, Aug 1988, 9; PR, 7 July1988, I). Delegations from FLNKS andRPCR flew to Paris for a second meetingin mid-August. With only minoramendments to the original proposal,the Matignon Accord was signed byrepresentatives of both parties on 20August 1988 (PIM, Oct 1988, 12; Con­nell 1988; Fraser 1988).

The Matignon Accord introduced aone-year period of direct rule fromParis, exercised through a new resident

THE CONTEMPORARY PACIFIC. SPRING/FALL 1989

high commissioner, that commencedon 14 July 1988. In an effort to putsome political power back into Kanakhands, the territory was again dividedinto regions, two of which (the northand the Loyalty Islands) the FLNKS willcontrol after the elections scheduled formid-1989. The RPCR will dominate thethird, the politically and economicallyimportant southern region, whichincludes the Noumea urban area, theThio nickel-mining complex, and Yatehydroelectric dam, and the Isle ofPines tourist center. The reaction tothis part of the proposal was cautious,with concern expressed, especially byKanaks, that this new regionalarrangement will lead eventually topartition. The accord also includedprovisions designed to redress existingeconomic imbalances, with three-quar­ters of new government investmentdestined to go directly to the two ruralregions, and to specified developmentprojects in the north of the main island.Also proposed were various trainingprograms for Melanesians, the mostsignificant of which would increasetheir representation in the higher eche­lons of the public service. These pro­posals were generally welcomed,although there were Kanaks who sawthem as part of a move to increase thenumber of Melanesians willing to sup­port the continuation of the Frenchpresence.

The Matignon Accord provides fora new referendum on independence tobe held in 1998. By denying migrantsarriving during the next decade a votein the referendum, the accord effec­tively freezes the 1988 composition ofthe electorate. Nevertheless, thereseems little prospect of a majority vote

for independence even then, not leastbecause approximately 20 percent ofMelanesians consistently vote in favorof continued ties with France. Concernwas expressed within the FLNKS thatindependence was effectively beingpostponed for a minimum of ten years.One of the parties in the FLNKS coali­tion, Front Uni de Liberation Kanake(FULK), eventually split ranks over theissue to oppose the accord. Despiteopposition from this group as well asfrom the right-wing FC and FN parties,who are opposed to any notion of inde­pendence, the accord was eventuallysigned by the major political groupingsand endorsed by 80 percent of voters ina national referendum conducted on6 November (PR, 9 Nov 1988, I).

However, the referendum resultsraised some questions about the plan'slong-term prospects. Only 37 percentof French voters participated in the ref­erendum, somewhat less than the 40percent turnout that Prime MinisterRocard had argued would give it valid­ity. In New Caledonia, the turnout wasbetter (63 % ) and the yes vote lower(57%) than for the nation as a whole.Most of the no votes were cast in theEuropean-dominated electorates in thesouth and west of the Grande Terre,while in the largely Kanak areas the yesvote averaged around 80 percent. Thecampaign by Yann Celene Uregei andhis colleagues in FULK to persuadeKanaks to oppose the accord did notinflict much damage on FLNKS solidar­ity. But the RPCR campaign for a yesvote did receive a setback as significantnumbers of its traditional supportersfollowed the lead of the FC and FN andother small parties and voted no.Whatever the longer-term prospects,

POLITICAL REVIEW. MELANESIA

the acceptance of the Matignon Accordushered in a period of political stabilityin a territory still numb from the vio­lence in Ouvea.

The signing of the accord alsobrought a degree of relief in the Pacificregion and beyond as this trouble spotappeared to be more firmly directedtoward peaceful political evolution.The South Pacific Forum expressed itsapproval in September, relations be­tween France and Australia improved,and the United Nations DecolonizationCommittee responded sympatheticallyto the new French initiative. EvenVanuatu, France's most persistentregional critic, expressed support.What this means, of course, is that theFLNKS is likely to receive less externalsupport in the future as it continues towork for independence.

The economy was also boosted bythe signing of the Matignon Accord.Indeed, 1988 was one of the best yearsfor the economy this decade, with highnickel prices prompting talk of a newnickel boom. The prospects of in­creased foreign investment were good,not least in the tourist industry, whichreceived more attention from Japanesetourists and investors, raising the pos­sibility that a resort complex will even­tually be developed at Tiare. However,economic growth remained concen­trated around Noumea. Even with theMatignon Accord, it will be extremelydifficult to change the regional struc­ture of development.

Independence for New Caledoniaappears as unlikely now as in the past.The increased subsidies provided underthe terms of the accord will make it dif­ficult for the FLNKS to revitalize theagricultural sector and sustain visions

ISS

of an independent and socialist Kana­kyo Furthermore, there is little evidencethat France is now willing to abandonthis distant relic of empire. Rocard hasstressed that his ultimate aim is toensure that New Caledonia remainspart of France, a solution that is anath­ema to the FLNKS. The change in gov­ernment in Paris, despite all the dramaand acclaim, has effectively producedonly subtle, if elegant, change. Never­theless, the achievement of even a frag­ile peace represents a major successstory in this difficult period for NewCaledonia.

JOHN CONNELL

PAPUA NEW GUINEA

The opening of the vote of no-confi­dence season six months after a primeminister assumes office usually marksthe beginning of a difficult period inPapua New Guinea politics. This wascertainly the case in 1988 when theexpiration of Prime Minister PaiasWingti's constitutional grace periodprecipitated a frenzy of political activ­ity that culminated in his ouster in July.Things calmed down considerably inthe second half of the year as Wingti'sreplacement, Rabbie Namaliu, a forty­one-year-old Tolai from East New Brit­ain, settled into the difficult business ofkeeping a coalition government togeth­er. These events raised more starklythan before questions about the stabil­ity of the system of parliamentarydemocracy established in Papua NewGuinea at independence in 1975.

Prime Minister Wingti entered 1988with coalition management problemsthat centered on former defense com­mander Ted Diro and his supporters in

THE CONTEMPORARY PACIFIC· SPRING/FALL 1989

the Papua-based People's Action Party,the second largest of the five coalitionpartners. Diro's aspirations to be dep­uty prime minister had been put onhold after the 1987 elections, pendingthe outcome of an official inquiry intothe forest industry-including allega­tions of his gross financial misconductwhen he was minister for forests in thefirst Wingti government. Pressure torestore Diro to cabinet rank increasedin late January 1988 after the DistrictCourt acquitted him of five perjurycharges arising from his testimonybefore the commission, and some PortMoresby rascal gangs tried to force theissue with threats of violence (TPNG,28 Jan-3 Feb 1988, I; 18-24 Feb 1988,7). However, the court's decision,upheld by the Supreme Court in earlyAugust, was a technical one based onthe surprising absence of a perjuryclause in the Commission of InquiryAct, and by no means cleared Diro'sname. The allegation that Diro hadreceived a 1987 election campaign con­tribution of US$139,000 from the thenhead of the Indonesian security forces,General Murdani, was confirmed byWingti after meeting with Murdani inIndonesia in January 1988 (TPNG, 28Jan-3 Feb 1988, 2).

It was clear early in 1988 that thecrucial Papuan bloc in the governmentwas split between support for Diro andloyalty to the prime minister. ButWingti employed some innovative tac­tics in his fight to survive the vote ofno-confidence expected in April. Earlyin March, with no more governmentministries available to attract or retainsupporters, he unveiled plans to putbackbench MPS in charge of twenty­seven statutory bodies (TPNG, 10-16

March 1988, 3). In April, some twomillion kina were diverted from theCivic Action Programme to supple­ment existing "slush funds" available toindividual MPS for use in their constitu­encies (TPNG, 14-20 April 1988 , 3).Then on II April, less than three hoursinto its first 1988 session, and after themotion of no-confidence had beenintroduced, Parliament was abruptlyadjourned by the government. On thesame day Wingti reluctantly appointedDiro to the cabinet as part of a last­ditch attempt to retain the support ofthe People's Action Party and save hiscrumbling government (PR, 14 April1988, I).

Opposition cries of foul play weresilenced by the announcement on 20April of a Grand Coalition of NationalStability, based on Wingti's People'sDemocratic Movement and oppositionleader Michael Somare's Pangu PatioThe move was initiated by Wingti in anapparent bid to rid himself of Diro andthe People's Action Party, but immedi­ately fell into disarray as both sidesscrambled for ministries and attemptedto include their allies in the deal (PR,28 April 1988, 4). The crisis deepenedin late May when another attempt at agrand coalition of the two partiesfailed. This time Rabbie Namaliu, whohad replaced Somare as Pangu leaderthe previous week, signed the memo­randum of understanding on behalf ofthe opposition on 26 May (PR, 26 May1988,3). The "irrevocable commit­ment" to stay together until the 1992elections lasted less than a week.Declaring the agreement void, ostensi­bly because Somare had turned downthe foreign affairs portfolio, Wingtiannounced a "revitalized" coalition

POLITICAL REVIEW. MELANESIA

government that excluded both Panguand Ted Diro. This was made possibleby bringing Michael Mel and hisHighlands-based National Party intothe government, while retaining thesupport of most of Diro's colleagues inthe People's Action Party (PR, 9 June1988,1).

Wingti's claimed support of morethan seventy MPS was eroding quicklyas Parliament reconvened on 27 June.At first, the unrest was most apparentamong Papuan ministers such as AllanEbu, Galeva Kwarara, and Akoka Doi,who had been pushed aside to accom­modate the Highlands members of thenew coalition. But the defection of PaulPora and four of his fellow Highland­ers in the newly recruited NationalParty proved to be the crucial factor inWingti's defeat. On 4 July the eleventhvote of no-confidence since 1978 wascarried in Parliament 58 to 50, andPapua New Guinea's fourth prime min­ister, Rabbie Namaliu, set about form­ing a government of "reconciliation,reconstruction and unity" (PIM, Aug1988,10).

Namaliu, who holds a master'sdegree from a Canadian university,was first elected to Parliament in 1982,and served as foreign minister in the1982-1985 Somare government. In July1988 he announced a six-party coali­tion government consisting of Pangu(13 ministries), People's Action Party(4 ministries), Papua Party (1 ministry),Melanesian Alliance (4 ministries),National Party (3 ministries), andLeague for National Advancement(1 ministry). Two independents alsoreceived cabinet positions, making atotal of 28, the maximum allowedunder the constitution (PR, 21 July

157

1988, 3-4). The distribution of portfo­lios reflected Namaliu's attempt to bal­ance regional interests, with each of thenineteen provinces getting a ministry,while simultaneously rewarding thosewho had defected from Wingti's coali­tion. Wingti's foreign minister, AkokaDoi, became deputy prime minister,while Paul Pora was rewarded with thekey finance and planning ministry.Michael Somare reversed his grandcoalition decision of late June andaccepted the position of minister forforeign affairs.

The prime minister's statement ofearly August indicated some newemphases in government policy, butforeshadowed no radical change ofdirection for Papua New Guinea. Someof the new priorities were reflected inthe November budget, with moreresources allocated for education andto combat the serious "law and order"problem. However, Namaliu hadinherited his own law and order prob­lem in the form of an unrepentant TedDiro, who expects to become deputyprime minister if and when he iscleared of the criminal charges pendingagainst him. The stabbing attack byPort Moresby rascals on Judge TosBarnett, who headed the commissionof inquiry that uncovered that evidence·against Diro, added an ominous newdimension to the whole affair in earlySeptember (PIM, Oct 1988, 10).

As expected, Namaliu moved fast toincrease to thirty months the period ofimmunity from no-confidence votesafforded to incoming prime ministers.The proposed constit~tionalamend­ment was approved by cabinet earlyin October, but had yet to begin itslengthy journey through Parliament

THE CONTEMPORARY PACIFIC. SPRING/FALL 1989

at year's end (PR, 13 Oct 1988, I).Whether this proposal, or some varia­tion of it, eventually achieves the neces­sary two-thirds-majority support intwo separate sessions of Parliamentremains to be seen. Certainly it was notin place by the time Namaliu's own six­month honeymoon with Parliamentfinished in January 1989.

The biggest loser in the mid-yearmaneuvering for power was the Peo­ple's Democratic Movement, whichsuffered a further setback when its gen­eral secretary, Gabriel Ramoi, and aformer police minister, Peter Kuman,resigned in August to launch the SocialDemocratic Party. Their central policyplank was restrictive foreign invest­ment policy that would allow a class ofPapua New Guinean "captains ofindustry" to develop (TPNG, 4-10 Aug1988,2). Another opposition partylaunched in 1988 was the MelanesianUnited Front headed by Utula Samana,former leader of the Morobe Indepen­dent Group and public service ministerin the Wingti government, who advo­cated, among other things, replacingthe nineteen provincial governmentswith seven states (TPNG, 14-20 July1988, I). The long-established People'sProgress Party received a boost in Julywhen its founder, former Prime Minis­ter Julius Chan, was acquitted by theleadership tribunal of charges arisingfrom the Placer share issue investiga­tion (TPNG, 7-13 July 1988, 3). How­ever, like other members of the opposi­tion, Chan had to decide at the end of1988 whether he was prepared to sitout the remaining three-and-a-halfyears of his term on the oppositionbenches. The alternative was to mounta bid for government power via a voteof no-confidence after 4 January 1989.

On the economic front, the rates ofinvestment and growth remained slug­gish in all sectors except mining during1988. Exploration for minerals reachedboom proportions with some one-hun­dred-fifty companies spending about150 million kina searching for gold, oil,and gas. Development work continuedat several major gold deposits, and aspectacular gold rush occurred on theslopes of Mount Kare in Enga Prov­ince, with local alluvial miners andassorted entrepreneurs vying for quickfortunes (IB, Oct 1988, 6).

Papua New Guinea's headlong rushtoward a mining bonanza falteredsomewhat in 1988 as domestic groupsdisagreed about the appropriate distri­bution of the benefits of mining. In lateFebruary production ceased for severaldays at the giant Ok Tedi copper andgold mine after local people rampagedthrough company housing facilities atTabubil, demanding the repatriation ofsquatters from other provinces andmore local participation in the venture(TPNG, 3-9 March 1988, 7). Industrialproblems, centering on union demandsfor better housing facilities, sparkedmore rioting and forced longer closuresin July and August (TPNG, 29 Sept-5Oct 1988, 1,2).

The unrest at the sixteen-year-oldBougainville copper and gold mine inNorth Solomons Province was moreserious. A long-standing disputebetween the mine's multinational oper­ator, Bougainville Copper Limited, andlocal landowners was revived in Marchwhen the Panguna Landowners Associ­ation demanded a massive increase inlevels of compensation. In May, road­blocks and a sit-in protest closed themine for six hours (TPNG, 19-25 May1988,4). In August, and again in early

POLITICAL REVIEW. MELANESIA

September, the group warned thatnational government responses to itsdemands were unacceptable andthreatened further action against themine (TPNG, 4-10 Aug 1988, 5). Thethreat was realized in late Novemberand December when buildings wereburned, personnel and equipmentstoned, and facilities bombed withstolen explosives. Squads of policewere flown in and issued with shoot­to-kill orders as the violence escalated(PR, 8 Dec 1988, I). Productionresumed later in the month after theprotagonists agreed to negotiate, but along-term settlement was not in sightas 1988 drew to a close.

The year was generally good forPapua New Guinea's foreign relations.The Matignon Accord took some ofthe steam out of the New Caledoniadecolonization issue, allowing rela­tions with France to improve. Therewere indications that the Namaliu gov­ernment would place less emphasis onthe Melanesian Spearhead groupingthan had its predecessors, and a deci­sion was made to allow the Soviets toopen their first resident mission in thePacific Islands. However, relationswith Indonesia were soured by a seriesof incidents on the Irian Jaya border,including one in July when Papua NewGuinea and Indonesian soldiersexchanged fire. Nevertheless, ForeignMinister Somare returned from a brieftrip to Jakarta in early Novemberapparently reassured that good rela­tions had been restored.

ItWas a iJatticularly busy year for .the Defence Force, which got involvedin hostile encounters with both Indone­sian security forces and the Papua NewGuinea government. In February, For­eign Mininster Doi lambasted the Aus-

159

tralian media for suggesting that TedDiro, sacked army chief Tony Huai,and other disgruntled Papuans wereplotting a coup (TPNG, 4-10 Feb 1988,3). Early in June there was a briefstandoff of another sort betweenWingti's ailing government and thearmy, when two planeloads of armedsoldiers took over the Lae airportordered closed by the civil aviationminister, Hugo Berghuser (TPNG, 9­15 June 1988, 3). Meanwhile, the coop­erative arrangement negotiated withthe us military in 1987 moved intohigh gear in 1988. Officials and mili­tary officers met several times duringthe year to exchange information anddiscuss training requirements. InNovember, American army engineersarrived to start the first of severalplanned civic construction projects inNorth Solomons Province (TPNG, 1-7Dec 1988, 4). The Australians did theirpart for regional security by earmark­ing one million kina to upgrade thenaval facilities on Manus Island, sup­plying additional patrol boats, andagreeing to support the development ofa helicopter capability for borderpatrol work (Backgrounder, 9 Nov1988, iv).

TERENCE WESLEY-SMITH

SOLOMON ISLANDS

The year 1988, marking the tenth anni­versary of Solomon Islands indepen­dence, was simultaneously exciting anddifficult. Among the events thatreflected political and social change inthe islands were the retirement of SirBaddeley Devesi as governor general,and the inauguration of his successor,Sir George Lepping. The Americansupgraded their consulate in Honiara to

160 THE CONTEMPORARY PACIFIC· SPRING/FALL 1989

an embassy, and several new institu­tions, including the National Agricul­tural Training Institute at Fote, Malai­ta, and the Japanese-funded MalariaTraining and Research Centre in Ho­niara, were opened in the service ofeconomic development. The year wasdifficult largely because of concerns forthe state of the economy-especiallythe growing deficit in the government'srecurrent budget-and its effects;debates over whether the form of gov­ernment should be changed; andcharges of corruption leveled againstthe government of Ezekiel Alebua.

The weak economy and budget con­straints have resulted in the generaldeterioration of public facilities,including schools, in recent years, a sit­uation made more poignant by the rev­elation in late 1987 of a major scandalinvolving the misuse of millions of dol­lars of educational development funds.Among the top-ranking governmentand business officials implicated in theaffair were former Prime Minister SirPeter Kenilorea (in 1988 deputy primeminister and foreign affairs minister),and then Minister of Education DannyPhilip (TPNG, 10-16 March 1988, 1­2). Despite attempts by the Alebua gov­ernment to stall the proceedingsbecause of their likely impact on thenational elections scheduled for late1988, an official inquiry into the matterheaded by Michael Lodge finally gotunderway in early March.

The affair centered on a 1981 low­interest loan of A$9.8 million providedby the World Bank to fund a five-yearproject designed to dramaticallyupgrade curriculum, buildings, andequipment in primary schools. How­ever, according to the Solomon Islands

National Teachers' Assocation (SINTA),

which insisted on the inquiry, many ofthe classrooms were never built orshoddily built; textbooks were pur­chased overseas instead of locally;expatriates were hired to prepare cur­riculum materials rather than to trainlocal curriculum writers; school mate­rials were purchased at several timestheir normal price from Honiara Sta­tionery Supplies through the interven­tion of then Minister of EducationDanny Philip; and about A$3.4 millionof the funds were unaccounted for.Large consulting fees were paid to Aus­tralians, particularly to a Dr Rod Trey­vaud, who has been implicated in simi­lar scandals elsewhere. His company,South Pacific Development Associates(SPDA), whose directors included SirPeter and several other governmentofficials, had been awarded the con­tract to administer the funds.

The inquiry panel eventually pro­duced a III-page report that was pre­sented to Cabinet in October 1988 (SN,10 Oct 1988, I). However, this andother alleged scandals, together withmounting dissatisfaction over prevail­ing economic and social conditions,prompted charges of government inef­fectiveness. Indeed, the Alebua govern­ment was obliged to deal with two pro­test demonstrations as well as a motionof no confidence in Parliament during1988.

On 22 March, between six hundredand fifteen hundred people (newspaperaccounts varied) led by Alvin Wako,member of the Honiara Town Councilfor Vura Ward, marched down Men­dana Avenue to Parliament. The grouppresented a petition to Alebua thatalleged government corruption and

POLITICAL REVIEW. MELANESIA

secret French aid. It also criticized thegovernment for its financial practicesand handling of certain developmentprojects (SN, 25 March 1988, I). Ale­bua denied the allegations in the gov­ernment-owned newspaper, but notuntil May (SN, 13 May 1988 , 4-5).Two days later, another peaceful dem­onstration by an estimated one thou­sand Guadalcanal people and theiIsupporters was held outside the highcourt building. Concerned aboutrecent brutal murders of Guadalcanalpeople by in-migrants, the demonstra­tors petitioned the government to repa­triate unemployed persons from otherprovinces living illegally on Guadal­canal. They wanted all alienated landson Guadalcanal, including Honiara,taken over by the Guadalcanal Provin­cial Government, squatters removedfrom traditional land, and customaryland registered to prevent individualsale. The group also insisted that thegovernment abolish the present systemof provincial government in favor of afederal system that would give eachprovince autonomy to run its ownaffairs (SN, 31 March 1988, 3).

The government withstood severalcalls for the dissolution of Parliamentduring the year and survived a vote ofno confidence by one vote on 31March. Allan Qurusu, MP for NorthChoiseul and parliamentary leader ofthe Solomon Ano Sasafenua party(SAS), authored the motion, chargingcorruption, lack of control over thePublic Service, investment policiesfavoring foreigners, low morale amongcabinet ministers, and economic poli­cies that hurt domestic consumers.Had the no-confidence motion suc­ceeded, former Prime Minister Solo-

161

mon Mamaloni stood ready to form acaretaker government (SN, 8 April1988,1-2).

One victim of the challenge to thegovernment was Minister of NaturalResources Danny Philip, who wassacked by Alebua after he failed toshow up for the parliamentary vote(SS, 8 April 1988, I). In his press state­ment of 5 April, Alebua said that hewas under "considerable pressure fromhis Constituency and his Party" to dis­miss Philip, who had been implicatedin the World Bank loan scandal (SN, 15April 1988, I).

Reviews of the Constitution and sys­tem of government were among themost important tasks undertaken bythe Solomons government during theyear. A variety of issues promptedthese investigations. First, there isstrong support in some areas for split­ting up existing provinces into two ormore smaller provinces. For example,Choiseulleaders have for some timewished to break away from WesternProvince to form their own province(see Rilifia 1988, 9). Second, most pro­vincialleaders favor further decentral­ization of political power to provincialgovernments, although they disagreestrongly about the appropriate distri­bution of other government-controlledresources. Third, traditional chiefs andelders have periodically argued for the"restoration and recognition of theroles once held by traditional leaders"(SN, 27 May 1988, 3). The difficultiesassociated with this quest for recogni­tion became apparent in August whentraditional leaders were not invited toattend the Provincial GovernmentConference (SS, 9 Sept 1988 , 3)·

At that conference the Provincial

THE CONTEMPORARY PACIFIC· SPRING/FALL 1989

Government Review White Paper 1988,which had been endorsed by Parlia­ment in April, was presented and dis­cussed by provincial premiers and areacouncil presidents. This was one oftwo reports recommending changes tothe structure of government that theSolomons government had before it in1988. The other was the three-volume,800-page report of the ConstitutionalReview Committee, led by formerPrime Minister Solomon Mamaloni,submitted to the prime minister in earlyFebruary 1988 after eleven months ofstudy (Solomon Islands 1988a). Thismade two distinct sets of recommenda­tions without indicating a preferencefor either. Under the first plan, theSolomons would become a "federalrepublic" consisting of an unspecifiednumber of states of equal status, eachwith considerable autonomy. Custom­ary law and leadership would be givenprominence, and the paramountcy ofindigenous Solomon Islanders vis-a-visother citizens would be established. Apresident would replace the queen ashead of state and would enjoy signifi­cantly more power than the governor­general does under the existing consti­tution. The second plan was much lessambitious, calling for retention of thepresent unitary form of government,but with a further decentralization ofpower to the provinces. More signifi­cant was the proposal for a bicamerallegislature, with senators appointed toa new upper house. A president withlargely ceremonial functions wouldreplace the governor-general. By year'send, no decision had been made re­garding which, if any, of these optionswould be adopted.

The Solomon Islands faces many

challenges, including a rapidly growingpopulation, a sluggish economy, thelowest educational levels in the PacificIslands (Crocombe 1988, 12), pressureto restructure national and local gov­ernments, and the need for local devel­opment. The urgency of these prob­lems was more widely recognized in1988 than in previous years and, moreimportant, the political will to dosomething about them began toemerge. This was especially evident inthe area of national human resourcesplanning, where activity reached a levelin 1988 that would have been unthink­able even a few years ago. The spurhere was undoubtedly the release of theresults of the 1986 census that showedpopulation growing at 3.5 percent ormore annually, one of the highest suchrates in the world, and revealed thatmore than fifty percent of the popula­tion is under the age of sixteen. The sit­uation was discussed at a high-levelseminar in Honiara in June, to whichAndrew Nori, minister of home affairsand provincial government, delivered apreliminary population planning policystatement (Solomon Islands 1988b). InJuly, Prime Minister Alebua dwelt onpopulation issues in his speech markingthe tenth anniversary celebration (SN,8 July 1988,8-9), and in September asecond high-level workshop on popula­tion issues and policy development washeld in Honiara to discuss a draftnational population policy (SolomonIslands 1988c). In October, Governor­General Sir George Lepping added hisendorsement of the need for humanresource development in a speech toParliament (SN, 10 Oct 1988, 4-5).

In the international arena, the Solo­mons joined Papua New Guinea and

POLITICAL REVIEW. MELANESIA

Vanuatu in signing the Principles ofCooperation that formalized their rela­tions as members of the MelanesianSpearhead group. Under the terms ofthe document, signed in Vila on 14March, spearhead members agreed toconduct cultural exchanges; to pro­mote local and regional culture; toundertake economic and technicalcooperation; to work toward armscontrol, disarmament, and the reduc­tion of international tensions; and tolimit super power influence in theregion (SN, 18 March 1988, 1-2).

DAVID WELCHMAN GEGEO

VANUATU

What to many outsiders has been theunpredictable course of Vanuatu poli­tics continued on its turbulent waythrough much of 1988. The year wasmarked by a bitter leadership strugglebetween Prime Minister Father WalterLini and Barak Sope, the two mostprominent individuals in the rulingVanua'aku Pati (vp). At year's end, Liniwas the apparent victor with Sope,four of his supporters, and the youngrepublic's president all in police cus­tody facing serious charges.

The leadership struggle began at theend of 1987, a year of difficulties thatincluded a devastating hurricane,growing external concern over Libyanand Soviet influence, an apparent lossof confidence in the country's financialcenter, a decline in the price of copra, aslump in tourism, and a cut in Frenchaid in retaliation for Vanuatu's supportfor the Kanak independence struggle inNew Caledonia. Despite these prob­lems, and the effects of a seriousstroke, Walter Lini managed to lead

the VP to a solid victory in the generalelections of November 1987, thus con­solidating the political control he hadexercised since the country achievedindependence in 1980.

However, the VP suffered some lossof support in the 1987 elections. Al­though its members won 26 of the 46seats in Parliament, the predominantlyfrancophone Union of Moderate Par­ties (UMP), led by Maxime Carlot, cap­tured 42 percent of the vote, signifi­cantly more than the 33 percent it hadattracted in the 1979 elections. Further­more, for the first time in three victori­ous elections, Lini faced a challenge tohis leadership of the VP. Barak Sope,longtime secretary-general of the partyand member of Parliament for the capi­tal, Port Vila, was left out of the newnine-member cabinet after an unsuc­cessful bid to replace Lini (PIM, Jan1988,13-15). Sope was eventuallyappointed minister for transport, tour­ism, and public works in January 1988,but the resultant political peace provedshort-lived.

On 16 Mayan antigovernment dem­onstration in Port Vila erupted into amajor riot that caused extensive dam­age to city shops and resulted in thedeath of one man (lB, June 1988, 13;PR, 26 May 1988, 1,3). The protestwas a response to the abolition by theminister for lands of the Vila UrbanLand Corporation (VULCAN), whichhad managed urban land in Vila onbehalf of the government and the land­owners since independence. The aboli­tion was justified by the government ongrounds of cost efficiency and sus­pected financial irregularities, but itwas widely perceived to be primarily apolitical move aimed at Barak Sope, a

THE CONTEMPORARY PACIFIC. SPRING/FALL 1989

VULCAN board member, who used thecorporation as a power base. Fearingfurther violence that the small VanuatuMobile Force would be unable to con­trol, Father Lini sought and receivedguarantees of military support fromAustralia, New Zealand, and PapuaNew Guinea. Barak Sope was sackedfrom the cabinet, and further violencefollowed, with Sope threatening tobring down the VP government unlessthere was a change in its land policy.He argued that the appropriation ofVULCAN was "the way communist gov­ernments work," and rebuked the Aus­tralian government for intervening indomestic political issues by, amongother things, flying in riot controlequipment (PIM, July 1988, 10-12).

A month later Father Lini moved tohave Sope and four other VP membersexpelled from Parliament after theyhad joined sixteen members of theopposition in a no-confidence motionagainst the government. In addition,eighteen Melanesian exiles from theIndonesian province of Irian Jaya,including members of the Black Broth­ers rock band, were ordered to leavethe country because of their associationwith Sope. Initially Lini could not raisea quorum to expel the rebel MPS, butlate in July some twenty-three mem­bers, still only half of the full house,voted to expel Sope and four of his sup­porters. Later the same week, theentire opposition UMP was expelled onthe grounds that its members hadrefused to take their places in Parlia­ment on three consecutive days;-Thesedecisions precipitated a constitutionalcrisis and, in the absence of Vanuatu'schief justice, the chief justice of theSolomon Islands was asked to hear the

cases brought before the SupremeCourt. Justice Gordon Ward found allthe sackings to be lawful, despite thelack of a quorum in Parliament whenthe first group was expelled (PR, 4 Aug1988,1).

Domestic discontent resurfaced inOctober when the Vanuatu AppealsCourt restored Sope and his four sup­porters to their seats in Parliament butupheld the dismissal of the eighteenopposition members of the UMP. In thesame month, the Vanua'aku Pati Con­gress expelled 128 party members,allegedly for their support of the newlyformed Melanesian Progressive Pati(MPP) led by Barak Sope (IB, Dec 1988,28). By-elections were held on 12 De­cember to fill the seats formerly held bythe expelled UMP members of Parlia­ment, but were boycotted by the UMP

and Sope's MPP, whose members hadresigned from their newly restored par­liamentary seats early in November.The VP won 14 of the seats, 6 unop­posed, giving them control of 35 of the46 seats in Parliament. The small TanUnion party won 3, and 1 seatremained vacant for want of candi­dates.

A dramatic new dimension wasadded to the conflict late in Novemberwhen Vanuatu's president, Ati GeorgeSokomanu, whose constitutional roleis largely ceremonial, warned thatVanuatu was in danger of becoming aone-party state and called for an earlygeneral election. Lini angrily rejectedboth suggestions, but on 16 DecemberSokomanu declared Parliament dis­solved and two days later swore in afive-man interim government led by hiscousin, Barak Sope. The SupremeCourt quickly judged these actions ille-

POLITICAL REVIEW. MELANESIA

gal, and proceedings to dismiss Soko­manu from office were initiated in Par­liament. On 20 December Sope and hisfour colleagues in the abortive interimgovernment were formally chargedwith sedition. The following day Presi­dent Sokomanu was arrested andcharged with inciting members of thepolice and mobile force to mutiny, acharge that carries a maximum sen­tence of life imprisonment. However,until there is an effective opposition inParliament, Lini's victory must beregarded as a hollow one.

The political disturbances of 1988did little to help Vanuatu's ailing econ­omy. The expected growth of the tax­haven-based financial sector, previ­ously the only thriving source ofincome for Vanuatu, failed to material­ize, and the country's other mainincome earners, copra and tourism,declined. The trade deficit increased,domestic and foreign investment werehesitant, unemployment increased,particularly in Port Vila, and infra­structure deteriorated, especially in thetransport sector. Although foreign aidand European Economic Communitycopra price supports helped reduce thebalance of trade problem, the generaleconomic decline further weakened theposition of the Vanua'aku Patio

The combination of economic andpolitical crisis led to a mellowing ofsome of the more radical strands ofVanuatu's foreign policy. The one-yearfishing agreement with the SovietUnion lapsed early in 1988 and negotia­tors failed to agree on terms for itsrenewal. There was little evidence ofany dealings with Libya during theyear. Most dramatically, Barak Sopebecame less critical of France following

his alliance with the UMP opposition,and the government muted its attackson French policy in New Caledoniaafter the Matignon Accord was signedin August. All of Vanuatu's politicalleaders expressed a desire to normalizerelations with France and to end theanimosity arising from the expulsion ofthe French ambassador in October1987 and the subsequent abrupt declinein French aid. Vanuatu's foreign policythus became much more like those ofother members of the MelanesianSpearhead group during 1988.

JOHN CONNELL

ABBREVIATIONS

IB Islands Business, monthly,Suva

PIM Pacific Islands Monthly, SuvaPR Pacific Report, fortnightly,

CanberraSN Solomon Nius, weekly, Gov­

ernment Information Service,Honiara

SS Solomon Star, weekly, HoniaraTPNG The Times ofPapua New

Guinea, weekly, Port Moresby

References

Backgrounder. 1988. Weekly publication ofAustralian Department of Foreign Affairsand Trade, Canberra. 9 November.

Connell, John. 1988. New Caledonia: TheMatignon Accord and the Colonial Future.Occasional Paper no. 5. Canberra: RIAP.

Crocombe, Ron. 1988. Prepare for YourFuture. Solomon Star, 22 July, 12.

Fraser, Helen. 1988. New Caledonia: Anti­Colonialism in a Pacific Territory. PeaceResearch Centre Monograph no. 3. Can­berra: Australian National University.

I66 THE CONTEMPORARY PACIFIC. SPRING/FALL I989

Rilifia, A. S. 1988. Private View: Choiseulfor a Separate Province. Solomon Star, 14October, 9, 13·

Solomon Islands. 1988a. 1987 Constitu­tional Review Committee Report. SolomonMamaloni, Chair. Honiara: GovernmentPrinter.

-. 1988b. Towards a National PopulationPlanning Policy. Paper presented to the

High-Level Seminar on the 1986 PopulationCensus of Solomon Islands, Honiara, 14June 1988.

-. 1988c. Draft Population Policy of Solo­mon Islands. Honiara: Ministry of Healthand Medical Services.