*

112

Journal ol Experimental Psycliololy:Human Lenrninr and Memory

1V76,

Vol.

:,

No.

2,

IW-119

Memory and Levels of Processing in a Psycholinguistic ContextWilliam Marslen-Wilson and Lorraine K. Tyler

Department of Behavioral Sciences, University of Chicago

A levels of processing approach to memory was directly tested in a well-defined processing context by varying the depth to which spoken prosematerial could be processed. The effects of successively removing thesemantic and the syntactic levels of analysis produced decrements in im-mediate recall that were structured according to the clausal segmentationof the material. The resuits corresponded closely to the joint predictionsof a theory of sentence processing integrated with levels of processingmemory theory.

The levels of processing approach to mem-ory is, on the face of it, elegantly simple andplausible. As Craik and Lockhart (1972)point out, the perceiver is normally con-cerned only with extracting the meaningfrom his sensory input. Equally, it is im-portant for him to continue to rememberthese meanings. But the preliminary stagesof processing necessary to reach the level ofcomprehension are of little value in them-selves, once the input has been processed tothis level, and need no longer be retained.The memory system,

therefore,

is organizedprimarily to remember meaningful material,so that the nature and the persistence of amemory trace will be a direct function of thedepth to which the original stimulus wasprocessed—whether, and to what extent,meaning was extracted from it.

However, for the levels of processing ap-proach to have proper explanatory value,and for it to be testable, it needs to be com-bined with a theory of perceptual processing,in terms of which the notion of "level ofprocessing" can be independently and un-

This research was supported by a grant from tlieSpencer Foundation to the first author. The or-dering of the authors' names reflects their alpha-betical order only. We thank Dorcas Joslin fortechnical assistance, David Thissen and HowardWainer for statistical advice, and David McNeillfor the loan of laboratory equipment.

Requests for reprints should be sent to W. D.Marslen-Wilson, University of Chicago, Depart-ment of Behavioral

Sciences,

Committee on Cogni-tion and

Communication,

£8-48 South UniversityAvenue, Chicago, Illinois 60637.

ambiguously defined. This added require-ment has not been fully taken into accountin the experiments so far performed to testthe levels of processing hypothesis.

The experiments in question (cf. Bower& Kariin, 1974; Craik, 1973 ;' Gardiner.1974) have all used an incidental learningparadigm, in which the level of processingis manipulated by varying the orienting taskrequired of the subject. For example, inBower and Kariin (1974) the subject mightbe shown a picture of a face and asked tojudgeeither its gender or its honesty. How-ever, in interpreting the effects of these dif-ferent orienting tasks on later recognition, itis not clear under what definition of depththe levels of processing hypothesis has beentested. In particular, the level of immediateperceptual processing is not being directlyvaried because the input to the subjects re-mains the same in all conditions. Instead,these experiments may be varying the de-gree of "elaboration coding" of the stimulus(cf. Tulving & Madigan, 1970). But ineither case, these experiments do not consti-tute an adequate test of the levels of process-ing hypothesis because such a test dependson the precision with which the notion oflevel of processing has been specified andmanipulated.

We propose, instead, to test the levels ofprocessing hypothesis by directly varying thelevel of immediate perceptual processing, ina processing context where an independentlymotivated perceptual theory defines a se-quence of processing levels ranging from the

113 WILLIAM MARSLEN-WILSON AND LORRAINE XL TYLER

preliminary sensory analysis to the extrac-tion of meaning. An appropriate processingcontext is normal spoken language, in whichat least four levels of analysis can be read-ily distinguished and manipulated and theproperties of the memory representationhave already been directly linked to theorder of processing events at different lev-els of analysis.

First of all, the use of natural languageenables us to control the depth to which thesubject can process the material. For exam-ple, semantically anomalous material (calledsyntactic prose) is phonologically, lexically,and syntactically normal but cannot be pro-cessed or comprehended semantically be-cause its semantic structure is systematicallydisrupted. Similarly, by scrambling theword order of normal prose, we can producematerial that is syntactically as well as se-mantically unanalyzable. -in. dierecall of such materials can therefore be di-rectly tied to the available processing levelsin the original input, rather than to percep-tually ambiguous differences in responsetask requirements.

'

.Second, the existence of a psycholinguistic

model of immediate sentence memory andprocessing offers a well-structured frame-work for developing the levels of processingapproach. This psycholinguistic model viewsthe memory representation of normal spoken'language as changing systematically overtime, as a function of the order of speechprocessing events (Bever, Garrett, & Hur-tig, 1973; Jarvella, 1971; Sachs. 1967).

/ The listener initially segments the speechinto natural linguistic units (sentences andclauses), on the basis of its syntactic struc-

ture, and then interprets these units seman-tically. The completion of this semantic in-terpretation—presumably at or following theclause boundary—allows the preliminaryrepresentation at all linguistic levels to bereplaced by just a semantic representation.

The primary evidence for this clausal dif-ferentiation of the memory representationcomes from the experiments of Jarvella(Jarvella, 1970; 1971; Jarvella & Pisoni,1970). In these experiments, the subjectslistened to a continuous prose passage and

were asked at unpredictable interavls to re-call the immediately preceding section. Jar-vella found that the subjects' accuracy ofrecall was segmented according to the clausalstructure of the material. They were only-able to repeat with verbatim accuracy thelast clause they heard. Memory for earlierclauses was less accurate and faithful to theoriginal only at a semantic level. Accordingto the analysis outlined above, this is be-cause a multilevel representation of the lastclause is still available when testing is sig-naled, whereas processing of the eariierclauses has been completed, leaving oniy asemantic representation available in memory.

Although not originally stated as such,this psycholinguistic model of sentence mem-ory is effectively a levels of processing modelsince what is remembered at different delaysis determined by the level to which the inputis being, or has been processed. The levelsof processing approach can therefore be di-rectly tested in this clause-memory contextby examining the effects of reducing thedepth to which the material can be pro-cessed. Although recall of the last clauseheard should not be affected by these ma-nipulations, because it is not dependent ona semantic analysis, the preceding clausesshould be increasingly poorly recalled, rela-tive to normal prose, as the depth of avail-able processing is reduced. Experiment 1investigates the effects of removing the se-mantic level of analysis, and Experiment 2examines the effects of removing the syn-tactic level as well.

Experiment 1

JThis experiment tests the levels of pro-cessing hypothesis by comparing verbatimrecall for normal prose and for prose whichcannot be processed semantically (syntacticprose). If, in the clause memory task, re--jcall of the last clause heard is not dependentupon semantic processing of that segment,then performance on syntactic proie shouldbe unimpaired relative to normal prose.However, if recall of earlier clauses is basedon their semantic representation, then recallof syntactic prose should be far worse for Ithese clauses than recall of normal prose.

114

I

J

I

il

ii PSYCHOLINGUISTIC LEVELS OF PROCESSING IN MEMORY 114

Method tcnc« a"d 12 syntactic prose test sentences. TheSubjects. The subjects were 10 students at the ",, "S normal Prose ,ir" were read theUniversity of Chicago, who were paid lor their '°"OW,nS ""tructions:services and naive to psycholinguistic experiments. In this experiment you will hear ,by Miller (969) was chosen as the normal prose to the passage normally just as if foLnpassage. The materia] was slightly modified to telling you story The re^HnV ,-,u '""

randomly replacing all content words by new words ceding the interruption UV ?'"'f /Wj /rf«r?I ,KL* M«Sr T d H°rd "X«! i^SSb, inL^^S"s^spjfs^ssnasrsfs! ssr you can rememb- -«^ -*able length as well. The locations of the test T, L .sentences were identical in the two passages. Ex- a Jh* suh> ccts w"e also warned that they mustamp e

S

0f the two types of prose material follow aUe" d !° the meani^ of the material becau'.e They(test sentence italicized) : ***** be g.ven a comprehension test at the endv , T ° l

C

PaSSaSe - They Were then given tie normalNormal: It the total amount of future work to be Pr°

SC

- P?CtlCe passa Se- and their responses weredone were limited, there might be some olausi- f^"""'? '? make

SUre

that the-v understood the■, Tu° l i'

S

ar^me,lt: ''"ture work-, being lim- '

aS

n , and 'llat the^ could identify the precedingited. should be left for future generations to do. S^l* None of the subjects showed any diffi-But there is little reason to believe that this is ?■ '" d°'"= thls

"

true. There ts an enormous amount of work in- ' thf% had heard the normal prose testvoted m order to achieve full automation of f asss ?c.and had completed the comprehension testindustry; no one who can contribute to it will ,

SU

.bjects,vere tfven * modified version of theneed to go unemployed for centuries to come instructions for the syntactic prose. SimilarSyntactic: Ir the short ground of common men to "Stru«I.ons . cha"S<=d as appropriate, were read -obe done were applied, there might be other fe- v

SUb,e<

? who heard the syntactic prose firstll "VJ J0""'0 "

;

Clear state" bein? ''"ter- "°J the ssub

jects'

ects "°ti«d the relationship' be-ested, should be united for front suff«~stJons totuffn . !he two types of material.

do. But he is good street to plan that they are .J^T? ■/'''" cxPeriment. the recording wasclose. // ts an mnOcent pater of rooms' eon- ?°T

10,I

'^ng each test sentence, and the sub-stdered .» order to mention true solicitor ot com- J W"e a 'lowed 45 seconds to write down theirmttcc; nothing that may increase at them will 'esponses; Th? recording was then restarted with-open to go reassured for models to last. ?Ut yarning. The time allowed for responding waspThd t0 be "" tlla" ad^uate by all subjects!Short practice passages, containing two test sen

$esSl°n d about 45 minutes,

fences,

were constructed for use before each type Result? n„J r>.of matenai. A 10-question comprehension testd Discussion

was^made up for use after the normal prose The subjects' written responses wereThe test and practice materials were recorded llZ^r^F"0^ to a single

by a female reader with a natural intonation pat- f \°" ' "'^^ 0f not the>' «M«V (ver-bal a rate of 100 words per minute. The reader "^ reProcluced what they heard' \nvtl»tTl , whlCh were the test «ntencw, so divergence, including order errors wasJF^c^^-s^r scor!d as incorrect - The per«-^ °were long enough to enable t expert" to "ls ,

C

"- by material and clause, arestop the recording during testing while the subjects ""^ '" Table L Th? mean number ofTeltdtc'LrCTn^5- 7hl materials u'ere Pre"

S

C°rrect is P lottccl acr«>« word posi-sented to the subjects over headphones as a binau- tions in Figure 1ral monophomc signal. p 'Design and procedure A

mo,lifi

P H «,ci ■ ■- , USe lt Was n°t Possible to compute FJarvella's (1971) procedure wTsthow^d in th" dlreCt, -V" tW ° U""'" of variance«Per,ment. The subjects were tested individually WCrC Perf°f'"ed. using the multivariate pro-heard £if f

sound-atte"uated booth. Kach subject Sram (Finn, 1972), with one variable fmeanheard both types of test material, with the order number of words correct ) and four

factor,

)■

*nc

unit tactor corresponded to

i

f

WORD POSITIONS

subjects in the first analysis and to sentences c-ilVrf

h-t*.,

n, r-iin the second analysis. The results of these h "" C!aUSe *' and there was »analyses were used to der c Mm Pv fu Tr^T' F? 'T" effect E° th(Clark, 1973). Note that there is no tin ZTtZ T* *CW effect» but' a3error mean square when Mm F values are J?" bj! een material and c!au^computed. All significant statistics arl re £« T " ' " "" * theliable beyond the 5)1 level unless othenv se nc ease m2? Pr°5e ?"« h * 73^indicated. J?.Creaj,e ln nl<mber ot words correct from

There were strong main effects of type of cW oV°9<?T 2 f Smailer in"material, Mm P(l, 31) =30 6^6 of £° k a %- " . n°rmal prose" Us'mS *Mm F(l, 606) i 59.695, and ofwo d oo2 OhHn ?"* *«tion, Mm F(7, 60S) =7^9 with a «i«Sfi Vhe..Inc' eea

se.

c ot Clause 2 over Clause 1) iscant interaction be ween '"tvpe^of £ Tf"?*** "^ at the ■<*»and clause, Mm P(l 608)^23 417 The t, f n°rmal ProSe at the -°35 !eveLoverall effects can be seen in Figure ? 'which

,!,

i , gTeatCr dilTerentiation acrosspresents the smoothed data derived from this t ', °V

S

-Vntactic as °PP°^danalysis. Only the linear and quadrat c lZtmdt^: 1S ln accord "h the pre-components reached significance .

d,Ctl

°"s 0t *? !nte^d levels of process-' Recall of normal prose was much better J^i? P Sjfo!* nSuis»c model. According

than recall of svntacdc prose Claus % ( the n ' th^rlia^W-(Clause 1)second clause in the test entence) w^re "**»*** «—W on the basis of its se-; was re mantic representation.alone. In the clause-memory task, this produces a decrement inverbatim accuracy of recall because a seman-

tic description is indifferent to those syntac-

TABLE 1Percentage

of

Words Correct byMaterial and Clause= tic ai? d lex'cal details which do not change

Clause i ciau5e 2 meaning. Nonetheless, since this semantic i

—^- — representation reflects an analysis to the '43.0 7^6 deepest processing levels, an enduring trace IProse type

NormalSyntacticRandom word order 6 -2 67-3 remains in memory to enable the subject to

recall the earlier material.

115 WILLIAM MARSLEN-WILSON AND LORRAINE K. TYLER

CLAUSE 1 CLAUSE 212t

rl2o 10- \ /t\—^ X^7-\H N-—\ / x » ': \ / J "10 Eac y :i\

■■

\ /

,■<

lw m

§c- \ v-^ r\ Xl $

2° 6 ■-. / / C

CD

5

\

■ " -6m=> V ." ' 3

z "-.. .."-"' ' - 4 o< l g52- N / ~ NORMAL PROSE m

\.^ J " SYNTACTIC PROSE | 2 H

0-I— , , '*'-■.■' RANDOM WCRD-OROERI1234567812345678 ~°

FrcURE 1. Mean number of words correct,, recalled at each word position in each clausetor each prose type. ««««

116

WORD POSITIONS

Figure 2. Best-fitting quadratic curves for the mean number of words correctly recalled at

each word position for each prose type, plotted separately tor each clause.

" Syntactic prose, however, cannot be com- Therefore, to the extent that Clause 2 (as1

prehended, so that it falls short of the deep- opposed to Clause 1) recall is cased on a

est level of processing. Accordingly, the multilevel representation, syntactic prose re-

memory representation for syntactic prose call for Clause 2 differs relatively little irom

fades more rapidly over time, producing normal prose. That there is a sigmncant

poor recall of the 'earlier material, relative difference indicates that even at the snort

to normal prose. <£lly between the end ot the last clause and

The predicted picture is complicated by the onset ot testing, the lower levels oi: thu,

the superiority of normal over syntactic multilevel representation have started to

prose in Clause 2as well. This

difference,

fade. Note that even in normal prose, recall

although much smaller than in Clause 1, is of the last clause is not pertect

quite consistent over word positions (p = This overall interpretation ot Experiment

035 sign test). This suggests that recall 1 can be further tested by presenting the

of the last clause heard is influenced by the subjects with syntactically unanalysable ma-availability of a semantic level of analysis, terial (random^word-order prose). It theSuch a possibility is perfectly compatible effects of semantic factors on Clause 1 and -with the levels of' processing model but re- recall are levels .of processing effects thenquires some refinement of the psycholin- removing the syntactic level as well should

' ti model produce a similar dissociation across theSTt is no°t clear from Jarvella's formulation clause boundary. Recall of Clause 2 shouldjust when semantic analyses are initiated or be much less impaired, relative to syntactic

1 terminated. The present' results suggest that and normal prose, than recall ot Cause 1.

semantic processing of the last clause is al- This_additional reduction in processing

1 ready in progress at the time of testing. But level also tests an alternative explanation ot

\ because it has not been completed, lower- the poor recall of syntact.c prose namely> level information is still available. This re- that syntactic prose is remembered less well

suits in superior verbatim recall of the last because it was originally perceived .ess ac-

clausc in normal prose because the subject curately. However, if this is the case thenstill has available a full spectrum of process- recall of random word-order material should

in- levels. All of these levels, save the be much worse in Clause 2 than tor syntac-

decpest are shared with syntactic prose, tic prose. Miller and Isard (1963) showed

117 WILLIAM MARSLEN-WILSON AND LORRAINE K. TYLERI

J

i

II

that syntactic and semantic disruptions to-gether produced a much stronger effect onintelligibility than did semantic disruptionsalone. On the levels of processing account,recall in Clause 2 should only be marginallyaffected since lexical and phonetic informa-tion is still available as a basis for recall.

Experiment 2To maintain continuity with Experiment

1, it is necessary to present random word-order material, which has no syntactic struc-ture, in the same "clause memory" situa-tion. To do this, a clauselike segmentationneeds to be imposed on the material, since ithas no intrinsic clausal structure. This canbe done by reading the material with theappropriate intonation pattern, which signalsthe beginnings and ends of successive seg-ments. To further encourage the subjectsto use the same strategies as in normal andsyntactic prose, they are first exposed to thenormal prose passage before hearing therandom word-order material.Method

Subjects. The subjects were 10 studenu, re-cruited from the same population as in Experi-ment 1.

Materials. The 1,500-word syntactic prose pas-sage in Experiment 1 was transformed into ran-dom word-order prose by scrambling the wordorder of each sentence. For the twelve 16-wordtest sentences, the word order within each clausewas scrambled. Thus recall for the same wordswas being tested as in the previous experiment.The relative locations of the test sentences werethe same as in the syntactic prose. A practicepassage containing two test sentences was also con-structed. The random word-order materials wereread by a female reader at a rate of 160 wordsper minute, with an approximation to a normalintonation pattern.

Design and Procedure. The same procedureswere followed as in Experiment 1. All subjectsheard the normal prose passage first. This wasfollowed by the random word-order practice andtest passages.

Results and DiscussionThe same scoring procedures were used as

in Experiment 1. The percentage of wordscorrectly recalled in each clause is given inTable 1, and the number of words correctover word positions is plotted in Figure 1.Mm F values were computed from two sep-

i

arate multivariate analyses of variance, withthe significance level set at .05. There weresignificant effects of clause. Mm F'(l, 249)= 388.778, and of word position, Mm F'(7, 225) = 4.190. The quadratic curves de-

rived from these analyses are plotted inFigure 2.

Recall of_random word-order materialfrom "Clause. 2 did not differ significantlyfrom Clause 2 recall of syntactic prose butwas significantly worse than . normal proserecall (/> = .035

;

by-word-position sign test).Random word-order performance in Clause1 was extremely poor and much worse thaneither syntactic or normal prose fp = .004 ;sign test).

This very low level of recall in Clause 1raises the possibility that the subjects wereunable to identify the segment in question.Although the strong "clause effect" indi-cates that they could use intonational cuesto identify the mid-sentence break, it is pos-sible that these cues were insufficient to markoff the first clause in memory.

Accordingly, in an additional controlstudy, we reexamined performance on ran-dom word-order prose, using prompts to in-dicate which clause the subjects were torecail. However, even when the subjects wererequired to recall only the seven words fol-lowing the prompt, and where the promptwas the first word of the first segment, re-call of this segment remained at a very lowlevel (percentage words correct = 5.4%).

The results of the control study supportthe interpretation of Experiment 2 in a lev-els of processing framework. Reducing theavailable depth of processing from the syn-tactic to the lexical level produced an asym-metry in recall across the clause boundary.^Memory for the last clause in Experiment 2was unimpaired relative to syntactic prose.It is only at longer delays, marked off by theclause boundary, that the absence of a syn-tactic level of analysis has a significant ef-fect. The drastic reduction in performancefor the first segment demonstrates the jnx-

portance of the deeper levels of immediateperceptual processing for the formation ofan enduring memory trace. The failure ■

even of prompts to improve performance on

rii1

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1

iPSYCHOLINGUISTIC LEVELS OF PROCESSING IN MEMORY 118

random word-order prose indicates that onlythe most fragmentary representation of thismaterial is left in memory when testing issignaled. Note that exactly the same wordswere involved in the random word-order andthe syntactic prose conditions.

clause from a short-term buffer store to along-term memory store, where it is seman-tically represented. As stated, such a modelprovides no basis for any recall of the se-mantically unanalyzable material in Clause 1,nor does it predict any differentiation in thelong-term recall of syntactic as opposed torandom word-order prose. A._strict two-store model would also predict no differencesbetween prose types in Clause 2 either, be-cause recall of this segment of the materialis from a short-term store which can onlyrepresent the material at a phonetic or lexi-cal level of analysis, which all three prosetypes have in common.

Experiment 2 also tested a perceptual in-terpretation of the results, which would pre-dict a larger fall off in Qause 2 for unre-lated strings of words than for semanticallyanomalous but syntactically normal strings.However, no significant difference betweenrandom word-order and syntactic prose wasobtained in Clause 2. This suggests, again,that the experiments reflect the consequencesfor memory of available depths of processingrather than just difficulties in immediate per-ceptual analysis.

i

However, it is easy enough to emend astrict two-store model to account for the re-sults. One could, for example, allow seman-tic and syntactic factors to affect recall trom

the short-term store and postulate degreesof trace duration in long-term memorywhich would correspond to the differentiallevels of recall from Clause 1. But that isnot the point. As Craik and Lockhart(1972) have lucidly argued, the mukistoreapproach to memory is unsatisfying pre-cisely because it requires these proliferationsof additional theoretical constructs, which,apart from anything else, erode tlie binarydistinctions upon which the postuiation ofseparate stores was originally based. Wefind the levels of processing approach to pro-vide a more fruitful and parsimonious "setof orienting attitudes" (Craik & Lockhart,1972. p. 681), and this paper is one attemptto exploit its possibilities. And howeverthe results are accounted for. they do graphi-cally illustrate the differential suitability ofstructured and unstructured material forstorage in a natural verbal memory system.

General DiscussionThe principal aim of this research was to

test the levels of processing approach tomemory by directly varying the depth towhich the input could be processed, as op-posed to the earlier incidental learning testsof levels of processing, where the input washeld constant across processing conditions.We found that memory, for .spoken prose.ma-terials deteriorated as a direct function ofthe available depth of processing. Moresignificantly, this decrement in performancewas clearly structured according to the suc-cessive stages of processing specified in-amodel of sentence perception. As we arguedin the introduction, the levels of processingapproach can only be adequately tested inthe context of an independently motivatedprocessing theory. The pattern of resultsacross the clause boundary, for the differentprose types used in this experiment, pre-cisely follow the predictions of a levels ofprocessing memory theory integrated with apsycholinguistic processing model.

I

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119 WILLIAM MARSLEN-WILSON AND LORRAINE K. TYLER

1970, 21, 437-454.