men as cultural ideals: cultural values moderate gender
TRANSCRIPT
Men as Cultural Ideals: Cultural Values Moderate Gender Stereotype Content
Amy J. C. Cuddy and Elizabeth Baily WolfHarvard Business School
Peter GlickLawrence University
Susan CrottyZayed University
Jihye ChongAsian Center for Theological Studies and Mission, Korea
Michael I. NortonHarvard Business School
Four studies tested whether cultural values moderate the content of gender stereotypes, such that malestereotypes more closely align with core cultural values (specifically, individualism vs. collectivism) thando female stereotypes. In Studies 1 and 2, using different measures, Americans rated men as lesscollectivistic than women, whereas Koreans rated men as more collectivistic than women. In Study 3,bicultural Korean Americans who completed a survey in English about American targets rated men asless collectivistic than women, whereas those who completed the survey in Korean about Korean targetsdid not, demonstrating how cultural frames influence gender stereotype content. Study 4 establishedgeneralizability by reanalyzing Williams and Best’s (1990) cross-national gender stereotype data across26 nations. National individualism–collectivism scores predicted viewing collectivistic traits as more—and individualistic traits as less—stereotypically masculine. Taken together, these data offer support forthe cultural moderation of gender stereotypes hypothesis, qualifying past conclusions about the univer-sality of gender stereotype content.
Keywords: gender stereotypes, stereotype content, culture, individualism, collectivism
Men are stereotyped as self-oriented and women as other-oriented. The preceding statement represents a consensus based ondecades of research (Kite, Deaux, & Haines, 2008; Wood & Eagly,2010). However, theories of intergroup social stratification, whichposit that people attribute the most culturally valued traits todominant groups (Ridgeway, 2001; Ridgeway, Boyle, Kuipers, &Robinson, 1998), imply that gender stereotype content should varydepending on differences in nations’ core cultural values. Specif-ically, because men dominate (both economically and politically)in virtually all nations (UN Development Programme, 2013),national stereotypes of men should reflect the culture’s mostvalued traits. If so, in cross-national comparisons, men should bestereotyped as collectivistic (i.e., other-oriented) in collectivistic
cultures and individualistic (i.e., self-oriented) in individualisticcultures, qualifying past conclusions about cross-cultural consis-tency in gender stereotypes.
The logic for our hypothesis that cultural values moderategender stereotypes is supported by several theories. Expectationstates theory (Berger, Conner, & Fisek, 1981; Berger &Zelditch, 1998; see Correll & Ridgeway, 2003, for a review)proposes that widely shared cultural beliefs associate statuscharacteristics and expectations (i.e., personal traits and abili-ties that are highly socially valued) with higher status groups,and that both advantaged and disadvantaged groups assignsocially valued traits more to higher status group members thanto lower status group members (e.g., Ridgeway, 2001; Ridge-way et al., 1998). Similarly, social dominance theory and sys-tem justification theory describe how people justify existingsystems of social stratification by endorsing legitimating mythsand stereotypes that attribute the most culturally valued traits todominant social groups (Ho et al., 2012; Jost & Banaji, 1994;Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994; Sidanius & Pratto,1999). Even social identity theory, which emphasizes prefer-ence for one’s in-group, suggests that social hierarchy shapesthe form that in-group favoritism takes: because high statusgroups, who have greater social influence, claim the mostsocially valued traits as their own, lower status groups rely on“social creativity” to redefine less valued traits as favorablydistinguishing them (Tajfel, 1981). In sum, all of these theoriesoffer support for the notion that people should assign the mostvalued traits in each culture to dominant groups.
Amy J. C. Cuddy and Elizabeth Baily Wolf, Department of Negotia-tions, Organizations, and Markets, Harvard Business School; Peter Glick,Department of Psychology, Lawrence University; Susan Crotty, College ofBusiness Sciences, Zayed University; Jihye Chong, Department of Chris-tian Counseling, Asian Center for Theological Studies and Mission, Korea;Michael I. Norton, Department of Marketing, Harvard Business School.
Susan Crotty is now an independent market research and managementconsultant in Charlotte, NC. We thank Bonneil Koo for his help with Study3 data collection; Tori Brescoll, Adam Galinsky, Kathleen McGinn, andTyler Okimoto for their helpful comments on this research; and NicoThornley for his help preparing the manuscript.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Amy J. C.Cuddy, Harvard Business School, Soldiers Field Road, Boston, MA 02163.E-mail: [email protected]
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Journal of Personality and Social Psychology © 2015 American Psychological Association2015, Vol. 109, No. 4, 622–635 0022-3514/15/$12.00 http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pspi0000027
622
Given that men possess higher status than women in virtuallyevery society (e.g., UN Development Programme, 2013), malestereotypes theoretically should match each society’s core culturalvalues. Although there has been extensive research on how statusbeliefs develop (e.g., Ridgeway et al., 1998), underlie racial prej-udices (e.g., Ho, Sidanius, Cuddy, & Banaji, 2013; Sidanius &Pratto, 1999), and drive behavior (see Correll & Ridgeway, 2003),to our knowledge, no research has empirically tested whether corecultural values shape the specific content of gender stereotypes.
Culture Moderates the Content of Gender Stereotypes
We propose and test the cultural moderation of gender stereotypeshypothesis (which, for brevity, we subsequently refer to as the culturalmoderation hypothesis): Stereotypes of men more closely align withcore cultural values than do stereotypes of women. In other words,characteristics that are particularly valued in a culture should beascribed more to men in that culture when compared with cultures thatdo not particularly value those characteristics. By “valued,” we do notmerely mean positively valenced characteristics, but characteristicsthat garner respect because they match core cultural values. Forexample, as the women-are-wonderful effect shows, women are pos-itively evaluated as a group because they are associated with likabletraits (e.g., nurturance and warmth; Eagly & Mladinic, 1994). Per-ceivers evaluate such traits as highly positive; however, in Western,individualistic nations, these traits are not highly respected or valuedin that they are associated with unpaid work, rather than with highstatus roles such as leadership and management (Koenig, Eagly,Mitchell, & Ristikari, 2011) or with having power (Glick et al., 2004).
In the current paper, we examine the cultural moderation hy-pothesis in the context of the individualism–collectivism (I-C)dimension, which not only closely parallels the self-oriented–other-oriented distinction central to gender stereotypes but alsorepresents one of the most fundamental and widely studied culturalvalue distinctions in psychology (e.g., Oyserman, Coon, & Kem-melmeier, 2002; Triandis, 1989). For these reasons, comparinggender stereotypes in individualistic versus collectivistic culturesoffers an ideal context in which to test the cultural moderationhypothesis. Individualistic cultures emphasize individual rightsand self-assertion, valuing self-oriented traits such as indepen-dence and autonomy; by contrast, collectivistic cultures emphasizesocial connectedness and fulfilling social roles and obligations,valuing other-oriented traits such as nurturance and deference(Hofstede, 1980; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Schwartz, 1994;Triandis, 1989; Wan et al., 2007).
Gender stereotype researchers have most frequently used theterms agency (i.e., self-oriented) versus communion (i.e., other-oriented) to capture gender stereotype content. Based on priorresearch, we view agency–communality and individualistic–collectivistic as different labels for the same dimension. A com-prehensive factor analysis by Abele and Wojciszke (2007) in aWestern sample supports the idea that agentic and communal traitsare synonymous with, respectively, individualistic and collectivis-tic traits. Specifically, Abele and Wojciszke selected 300 traitscharacterized in prior research as indicating agency, masculinity,self-profitability, competence, or individualism versus communal-ity, femininity, other-profitability, warmth, or collectivism, andasked Polish1 participants to rate each of the traits on how wellthey matched one of the dimensions listed above. Based on their
analyses, Abele and Wojciszke (2007) concluded that agency andindividualism on the one hand, and communion and collectivismon the other, are synonymous: agency and individualism bothrepresent a focus on the self, whereas communion and collectivismboth represent a focus on others. For consistency and because ourhypotheses concern the cultural values of I-C, we use the labels“individualistic” and “collectivistic” to refer to the stereotypedimensions that are often labeled as agency–communion.
Putting the Cultural Moderation Hypothesis inContext: Relation to Past Theories
Past theories suggest that structural factors—most prominently,the relative degree of gender inequality and separation in genderroles—affect the content of gender stereotypes. We do not viewthe cultural moderation hypothesis as incompatible with thesetheories. Rather, it adds a previously unexamined reason for cross-cultural variation in gender stereotypes (cultural values) that priortheories do not address. Below we outline how the cultural mod-eration hypothesis is distinct from prior theories.
Ambivalent Sexism Theory
Ambivalent sexism theory focuses on social structural differ-ences between men and women, emphasizing how men’s greaterpower and status, combined with intimate interdependence be-tween the sexes, affects gender attitudes (Glick & Fiske, 1996,2001). The theory posits that both hostility toward women whochallenge men’s power and patronizing benevolence towardwomen who conform to traditional expectations combine to rein-force gender inequality. Further, it proposes that men are alsotargets of ambivalence because status and power foster both ad-miration and resentment. Cross-cultural studies measuring ambiv-alent sexism toward both sexes support the theory’s contention thatstructural gender inequality predicts greater ambivalence towardboth sexes (i.e., higher scores on benevolent and hostile sexismtoward both women and men; Glick et al., 2000, 2004).
Ambivalent sexism research has focused more on stereotypevalence than content. However, in their development of the Am-bivalence Toward Men Inventory, Glick and Fiske (1999) con-tended that men’s structural power creates stereotypes of men asdominant. Glick et al. (2004) tested this idea in three nationalsamples. Respondents rated their spontaneous stereotypes of menand women on (a) valence and (b) the degree to which the traitswere associated with dominance. These ratings revealed that al-though male stereotypes were rated less positively overall thanfemale stereotypes, male stereotypes were more strongly associ-ated with dominance.
Dominance represents a trait dimension distinct from individu-alism and collectivism. For example, cross-cultural researchershave explicitly considered hierarchy/dominance to be separatefrom I-C, proposing an orthogonal “horizontal–vertical” dimen-sion (e.g., Triandis & Gelfand, 1998). Individualism does notimply desire to exert authority over others, but rather freedom fromauthority; likewise, collectivism does not necessarily imply a flatsocial structure but can include strict hierarchies that differentiate
1 Poland is an individualistic culture; on Hofstede’s (2001) national I-Cscale Poland scores 60.
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623MEN AS CULTURAL IDEALS
roles and obligations. Similarly, although gender research hassometimes conflated dominance traits with agency, factor analysesby Rudman and Mescher (2013) have shown that dominancerepresents a dimension distinct from agency in gender stereotypes.Thus, both relevant research literatures (on cultural values, ongender stereotypes) suggest that ambivalent sexism theory makespredictions about a trait dimension (dominance) this is distinctfrom the individualistic–collectivistic dimension relevant to thecultural moderation hypothesis.
In sum, the focus on different causes (structural gender inequal-ity vs. core cultural values) and different dimensions in stereotypesabout men (dominance vs. cultural values such as individualismand collectivism) distinguish ambivalent sexism theory from thecultural moderation hypothesis. However, we do not consider thetwo approaches to represent mutually exclusive alternatives, butrather as addressing different pieces of the gender stereotypecontent puzzle.
Stereotype Content Model
Although not specifically a theory about gender, the stereotypecontent model proposes two universal dimensions of stereotypecontent: warmth (traits such as sincere, good-natured, and friendly)and competence (traits such as intelligent, capable, and skillful). Agroup’s structural cooperation versus competition (i.e., interdepen-dence) with other groups in society determines stereotypes aboutits warmth, whereas a group’s socioeconomic status determinesstereotypes about its competence (e.g., Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu,2002). Previous research demonstrates that warmth and compe-tence are universal dimensions of cognition and that, across cul-tures, a group’s perceived interdependence predicts stereotypesabout its warmth and its perceived status predicts stereotypes aboutits competence (Cuddy et al., 2009; for reviews, see Cuddy, Fiske,& Glick, 2008; Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007), which subsequentlypredict specific patterns of intergroup emotions and behaviors(Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2007).
Abele and Wojciszke’s (2007) comprehensive factor analysis(reviewed above) suggested that competence traits are part of thegeneral agentic or individualistic trait dimension and warm traitspart of the general communal or collectivistic trait dimension,making it important to consider how the stereotype content modelrelates to our current hypothesis. Although we agree that warmthoverlaps with collectivism, we suggest that competence is notuniversally associated with individualism, but that cultural valuesmoderate whether individualistic or collectivistic traits are associ-ated with competence. If collectivistic traits have greater value andgarner more respect in collectivistic (compared with individualis-tic) cultures, then to be considered “competent” (a universally highstatus trait; Cuddy et al., 2009) in such cultures ought logicallyalso to require demonstrating collectivistic traits (e.g., the ability topromote group harmony would be more associated with compe-tence in a collectivistic vs. individualistic culture). By contrast, inindividualistic cultures, competence should be linked to individu-alistic traits, as Abele and Wojciszke demonstrated in a Western,individualistic sample from Poland.
Stereotype content model theorists have not previously consid-ered whether competence is more or less associated with individ-ualistic versus collectivistic traits depending on cultural values. Ina recent series of studies, however, Torelli, Leslie, Stoner, and
Puente (2014) provide suggestive evidence consistent with such acultural shift. They found that people in collectivistic (comparedwith individualistic cultures) placed much greater importance onenacting collectivistic behaviors to attain status, success, respect,and admiration from supervisors at work. These findings suggestthat collectivists (compared with individualists) view collectivistictraits as more aligned with status and competence.
A cultural shift in the traits associated with demonstratingcompetence would fit with our overall view that men are assignedculturally valued traits. In collectivistic cultures, we posit that menare viewed as more collectivistic and that competence (which isuniversally valued) is associated with collectivistic traits. By con-trast, in individualistic cultures, we posit that men are viewed asmore collectivistic and that competence is associated with individ-ualistic traits. In other words, competence should be stereotyped asmasculine in both individualistic and collectivistic cultures, but wesuggest that the specific traits associated with demonstrating com-petence are moderated by cultural values.
Although viewing men as competent as well as having culturallyvalued (individualistic or collectivistic) traits requires a shift in“what is considered competent,” there is no reason to expectcultural moderation in the association between the stereotypecontent model’s warmth dimension and collectivistic traits. Rather,we posit a cultural shift in how much these traits are valued orrespected, such that warmth (which remains part of the generalcollectivism dimension) garners more respect in collectivistic (vs.individualistic) cultures.
In sum, the cultural moderation hypothesis has important impli-cations for the stereotype content model, introducing a previouslyunanticipated hypothesis. Specifically, we aim to show that cul-tural values moderate the degree to which people view individu-alistic or collectivistic (warm) traits as being related to competencein a manner that supports assigning both competence and cultur-ally valued (individualistic or collectivistic) traits to men as thedominant group.
Social Role Theory
Social role theory (Eagly, 1987; for a recent review, see Wood& Eagly, 2010) posits that the gendered division of labor deter-mines both gender stereotype content and gender differences inactual behavior. In general, women’s traditional domestic andrelational roles require collectivistic traits and behaviors (e.g.,successful child-rearing requires nurturance and putting others’needs first). By contrast, success in the competitive job markettypically requires men to enact individualistic traits (e.g., lookingout for their own interests and cultivating self-assertion). Enactinggendered roles demands role-consistent behavior, shaping person-ality and inducing hormonal changes that reinforce gender differ-ences in behavior. Role divisions also create social pressure toconform to gender stereotypes; counterstereotypical behavior isdiscouraged and punished in both children and adults. Stereotyp-ical behavior then further reinforces gender stereotypes. The linkbetween social roles and stereotypes is supported by research usingexperimental manipulations of social roles in hypothetical groups(e.g., Hoffman & Hurst, 1990) and examining historical and pro-jected increases in American women’s perceived individualism asthey have increasingly moved into the paid workforce (Diekman &Eagly, 2000).
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624 CUDDY ET AL.
Social role theory differs from the cultural moderation hypoth-esis because roles and cultural values represent distinct constructs.Social role theory makes predictions about stereotypes based onthe specific behaviors required by role-defined tasks. For example,being an effective caregiver to young children requires behaviorssuch as closely monitoring the child’s needs or providing food andcomfort that, in turn, require certain kinds of traits (e.g., a nurtur-ing disposition). Women’s caregiving role, therefore, leads them toenact and develop nurturing traits, which become incorporated intostereotypes about women. By contrast, cultural values representmuch broader, socially shared beliefs about which behaviors andtraits are generally important, good, right, or desirable (Schwartz,1994; Triandis, 1989). Cultural values transcend specific roles ortasks, representing a much broader social agreement about valuedtraits.
In other words, roles are task-specific and cultural values arenot. Social role theory broadly predicts gender stereotypes ofwomen as collectivistic and men as individualistic because of thepan-cultural tendency for women to be assigned child-rearing anddomestic roles and men to have greater involvement in competitivemarkets. However, social role theory does suggest that culturalvariations in gender stereotypes would occur on the basis of thetraits required for specific gender-segregated roles within eachculture (A. Eagly, personal communication, February 28, 2014).For example, a high proportion of women in the workforce wouldnot alter stereotypes of women’s collectivism if working womenmainly held jobs that require nurturing traits (e.g., day care worker,elementary school teacher, nurse) instead of individualistic asser-tion. By contrast, our cultural moderation hypothesis suggests thatvariations in cultural values, a factor not accounted for in socialrole theory, influence the content of gender stereotypes.
It is possible that cultural values influence the behavior requiredby different social roles. For example, Torelli et al., (2014) foundthat within collectivistic cultures, communal behaviors (e.g., pro-moting social harmony) are viewed as correlated with success inmale-dominated business roles. Therefore, men in collectivistic(compared with individualistic) cultures may engage in more col-lectivistic behaviors to gain success, which in turn may createmore collectivistic cultural stereotypes about men. Although it isbeyond the scope of the current paper to test whether culturalvalues influence the specific behaviors required by social roles indifferent cultures, the possibility represents one way to reconcilesocial role theory with our notion that cultural values moderategender stereotypes.
In sum, as with the other theories reviewed above, social roletheory makes predictions that are distinct from, but not incompat-ible with, the cultural moderation hypothesis. We suggest thatcultural values represent one of many social factors that determinegender stereotype content.
Overview
Four studies test the cultural moderation of gender stereotypecontent hypothesis: stereotypes of men align more closely with thecore cultural values of a given culture than do stereotypes ofwomen. This hypothesis identifies a cause distinct from the struc-tural factors identified by ambivalent sexism theory, the stereotypecontent model, and social role theory; as noted above, we do notpropose that cultural moderation is a direct competitor to these
other theories, but rather suggest that it identifies an additional,previously overlooked factor that contributes to cross-cultural vari-ation in gender stereotypes. In Study 1, we examine the extent towhich people from an individualistic (the United States) versus acollectivistic (South Korea) culture stereotype men and women onindividualism and collectivism. In Study 2, we develop and use amore sophisticated measure of I-C, asking Americans and Koreansto rate men and women on behaviors reflecting the two traits—such as the closeness of their friendship ties. Study 3 uses thesesame measures to explore whether bicultural individuals (KoreanAmericans) perceive men and women as more individualistic orcollectivisitic depending on the culture they consider (the UnitedStates or South Korea). Study 3 therefore tests how temporary (asopposed to chronic) cultural framing affects gender stereotypes.Finally, to determine whether these two-culture comparisons gen-eralize, Study 4 reanalyzes the most extensive cross-cultural data-set on gender stereotype content: Williams and Best’s (1990) studyof more than two dozen diverse nations, in which respondentsclassified the stereotypic masculinity of 300 traits. These data areuniquely suited to testing whether national levels of I-C moderategender stereotype content on relevant (individualistic vs. collec-tivistic) traits.
Study 1: Individualistic and Collectivistic Stereotypes
In Study 1 we asked Korean and American participants to ratethe extent to which their societies viewed two traits—communaland individualistic2—as more typical of women or of men. Wechose these two countries because they are high on collectivism(South Korea) and individualism (United States). Specifically, on Hof-stede’s (2001) commonly used Bipolar Individualism–CollectivismScale, which ranges from 1 to 100 with higher numbers represent-ing greater individualism and lower numbers indicating greatercollectivism, United States scores 91 (individualistic) and SouthKorea scores 18 (collectivistic).
We anticipated cultural moderation such that (Hypothesis 1; H1)Koreans would rate the term communal as more typical of menthan do Americans, and (Hypothesis 2; H2) Americans would ratethe term individualistic as more typical of men than do Koreans.
Method
Participants. The Korean sample included 103 students (62%female, Mage � 21.8) at the Seoul National University in SouthKorea who completed the questionnaire in exchange for coursecredit. The American sample included 78 undergraduate and grad-uate students (59% female, Mage � 26.5) who completed thequestionnaire online, along with several unrelated ones, for pay-ment. Three non-U.S. residents were dropped from the sample,bringing the final N to 75.
Materials and procedure. All participants read the followinginstructions in their respective language:
2 We chose communal as a synonym for collectivistic because webelieve the former is less awkward than the latter when used to describeindividuals (“He is communal” vs. “He is collectivistic”), whereas “indi-vidualistic” works to describe both individuals and groups. Jihye Chong,who conducted the studies in Korea, agreed that communal was morenatural than collectivistic.
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625MEN AS CULTURAL IDEALS
To what extent is each of the following traits viewed by society asmore true of women or more true of men? Using the scale below,please rate the extent to which each trait generally applies to womenor men. There are no right or wrong answers. We are simply askingfor your impressions.
They were then asked to rate the two traits—communal andindividualistic—on a 7-point scale: �3 (much more true ofwomen), �2 (somewhat more true of women), �1 (slightly moretrue of women), 0 (equally true of women and men), �1 (slightlymore true of men), �2 (somewhat more true of men), �3 (muchmore true of men). The Korean version of the questionnaire wastranslated and back-translated by two bilingual translators. Nodiscrepancies were identified in the back-translation.
Results and Discussion
We first conducted a 2 (culture: Korea vs. United States) � 2(trait: communal vs. individualistic) mixed analysis of variance(ANOVA) with repeated measures on the second factor. As pre-dicted, the interaction between culture and trait was significant,F(1, 175) � 120.41, p � .001, �p
2 � .41.3 For more focused testsof our hypotheses we conducted two one-way ANOVAs testingthe effect of culture on the two traits of interest. We found supportfor both of our hypotheses: (H1) Koreans (M � 0.79, SD � 1.30)rated the term communal as more typical of men than Americansdid (M � �1.13, SD � 1.34), F(1, 176) � 92.00, p � .001, �p
2 �.34, and (H2) Americans (M � 0.77, SD � 1.38) rated the termindividualistic as more typical of men than Koreans did(M � �0.76, SD � 1.24), F(1, 176) � 59.40, p � .001, �p
2 � .25.Not only were ratings of the masculinity or femininity of the termscommunal and individualistic moderated by culture, but all meansdiffered significantly from the midpoint of the scale (0: equallytrue of women and men). Koreans rated “communal” as charac-teristic of men (i.e., as significantly greater than zero), one-samplet(102) � 6.12, p � .001, d � 1.21, and “individualistic” ascharacteristic of women, one-sample t(102) � 6.20, p � .001, d �1.23; whereas Americans rated “communal” as characteristic ofwomen, one-sample t(74) � 7.33, p � .001, d � 1.70, and“individualistic” as characteristic of men, one-sample t(74) �4.80, p � .001, d � 1.12 (see Figure 1).
These results provide initial support for the cultural moderationhypothesis, demonstrating not only moderation in the content ofgender stereotypes by cultural value systems, but a reversal ingender stereotypes in a collectivistic compared with an individu-alistic society: men (compared with women) were viewed aspossessing significantly more of the culturally valued trait—com-munality in Korea and individualism in the United States—and,conversely, women were perceived as possessing more of theopposing, and less culturally valued, trait than men.
Study 2: Perceptions of Individualistic andCollectivistic Behaviors
Study 1 provided support for our hypothesis at the level of traitjudgments; in Study 2, we move beyond traits to measure percep-tions of men and women on behaviors reflecting the traits ofinterest—individualism and collectivism. Collectivistic cultures,significantly more than individualistic cultures, stress cohesion andcloseness within their respective communities; members of a rel-
atively small community, a culturally important social network,are often expected to be “connected” to others in their community(e.g., Triandis, 1989). In Study 2, American and Korean partici-pants were presented with segments of social networks within asmall community, and then asked to predict the social closenessamong members of the network. For instance, they were told that“Katie and Linda are friends” and that “Linda and Mary arefriends”; our measure of perceived collectivism was participants’perceptions of (a) whether Katie and Mary—one node removed inthe network—were also friends, and (b) how close their friendshipwas. Our goal in constructing these particular dependent variableswas to begin to establish convergent validity by measuring partic-ipants’ perceptions of behaviors that reflect individualism andcollectivism—the extent of closeness within a meaningful socialnetwork (i.e., the targets’ own community) —rather than simplyasking participants to rate the targets on the specific traits (i.e.,individualism and collectivism) themselves. Participants rated ei-ther members of all-male networks or members of all-femalenetworks.
Based on the results of Study 1, we predicted that (Hypothesis3; H3) Americans would perceive men to be more individualistic(i.e., as having weaker ties within their community’s social net-work) than women, but that Koreans would perceive men to bemore collectivistic (i.e., as having stronger ties within their comm-unity’s social network) than women.
Method
Participants. The Korean sample included 100 undergraduatestudents (52% female, Mage � 22.0) at the Korea University in
3 Sex of participant had no main or interaction effects in Studies 1–3, forwhich sex of participant was known. Sex of participant data were notavailable for Study 4 analyses.
Figure 1. Study 1: Ratings of the extent to which “communal” and“individualistic” are more typical of women (�0) or men (�0) as afunction of participants’ culture (Korea or United States).
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626 CUDDY ET AL.
Seoul, South Korea who completed the questionnaire in exchangefor course credit. The American sample included 100 undergrad-uate students (56% female, Mage � 20.1) at Rutgers University inNew Jersey who completed the questionnaire, followed by severalunrelated ones, in exchange for course credit. One incompletequestionnaire was dropped from the analyses.
Materials and procedure. Participants were randomly as-signed to complete a questionnaire that measured perceived col-lectivistic orientations of male or female targets. They read avignette about a fictitious American (in the American sample)or South Korean (in the Korean sample) small town whoseresidents had purportedly completed a questionnaire that as-sessed their social networks by measuring their reports of whotheir friends were. American participants read the followingdescription (whereas South Korean participants read an identi-cal description in Korean, but describing Korean individuals ina Korean town):
All of the following people reside in Winterport, Massachusetts.Recently, five hundred Winterport residents completed the CiTY(Communities, Towns, and Youth) Survey, an in-depth questionnaireon the health of communities and local economies. The followingpeople were participants in the CiTY Survey, which also assessedpeople’s social networks—people’s reports of who their friends are.
All participants were presented with five segments of a socialnetwork made up of town residents, each of which listed two pairsof friends. To make the task more engaging, three of the networksincluded three people with a shared friend (e.g., “Matt and Georgeare friends. George and John are friends”) and two included fourpeople without a shared friend (e.g., “Adam and Sam are friends.Joe and Tom are friends.”).4 Because social networks in smallcollectivistic communities are expected to be quite close-knit,participants in collectivistic cultures should not see it as particu-larly unusual for people in the same community, even without anexplicitly identified shared friend, to also be friends.
For each of the segments, participants were asked to estimate thecollectivism between the first and last person listed (Matt andJohn, or Adam and Tom, respectively). On a 10-point scale rang-ing from “0%–10%” to “91%–100%,” they answered the question,“What’s the probability that [the first person] and [the last person]also are friends?” Next, they were asked to “circle the picturebelow that best describes the relationship between [the first per-son] and [the last person]” followed by a 5-point scale depictingthe relationship between two circles, ranging from two distant,nonoverlapping circles to two almost entirely overlapping circles(adapted from Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992). To create a com-posite measure of perceived collectivism, we combined the re-sponses from the circles measure with the responses from theprobability measure. Because the two scales differed in number ofpoints (5 points for the circles; 10 points for the percentages), wefollowed Aiken’s (1987) recommendation to equate ratings ondifferent scales before merging them, by first converting responseson the circles measure from a 5-point to a 10-point scale, and thenaveraging them to create a composite measure of perceived col-lectivism (South Korea � .85, U.S. � .78).
The questionnaire was originally written in English. The Koreanversion was translated to Korean by a bilingual translator, and thenback-translated by a second bilingual translator. No discrepancieswere identified in the back-translation.
Results and Discussion
To test our hypothesis (H3) that Americans would perceive mento be more individualistic than women, but that Koreans wouldperceive men to be more collectivistic than women, we entered theperceived collectivism ratings into a 2 (culture: South Korea,United States) � 2 (sex of target: male, female) between-subjectsANOVA. The culture by sex of target interaction was significant,F(1, 195) � 9.27, p � .003, �p
2 � .05 (see Figure 2). Simple effectstests using the overall error term revealed that, as we predicted,American participants rated the male targets as marginally lesscollectivistic (i.e., more individualistic, M � 4.14, SD � 1.16) thanthe female targets (M � 4.65, SD � 1.28), F(1, 195) � 3.11, p �.08, �p
2 � .02. Most importantly, Korean participants showed thepredicted opposite pattern, rating the male targets (M � 4.95,SD � 1.75) as significantly more collectivistic than the femaletargets (M � 4.22, SD � 1.51), F(1, 195) � 6.48, p � .01, �p
2 �.03. Similarly, Americans rated the male targets as significantlymore individualistic than Koreans, F(1, 195) � 7.80, p � .006,�p
2 � .04, and Americans rated the female targets as nonsignifi-cantly more collectivistic than Koreans, F(1, 195) � 2.26, p � .13,�p
2 � .01. There were no main effects, Fs � 1, ps � .35.Consistent with Study 1, these results support our hypothesis
that men are perceived as possessing more of the characteristic thatreflects a fundamental value in their culture: collectivism in SouthKorea and individualism in the United States. As in Study 1, thecontents of the gender stereotypes reversed, with men beingviewed as more collectivistic than women among South Koreans.These data offer further evidence that gender stereotypes of indi-vidualism and collectivism are not universal, but are moderated bycultural values: In cultures where collectivism is valued, men—and not women—were seen as having more collectivistic socialnetworks.
Study 3: Manipulating Cultural Frames
Studies 1 and 2 revealed that Americans and Koreans differed intheir ratings of the I-C of men and women, thus suggesting thepresence of cultural differences in how men and women areperceived. However, given that we could not randomly assignparticipants to cultures, Studies 1 and 2 do not allow us to makeany claims about the causality of the relationship between culturalvalues and the contents of gender stereotypes. Taking a step closertoward establishing a causal link, we manipulated the culturalframe of Korean American participants, randomly assigning halfof them to complete a survey in English and rate American socialnetworks, and the other half to complete the same survey inKorean and rate Korean networks. For bicultural people (e.g.,Chinese Americans), language (e.g., Mandarin vs. English, respec-tively) cues the associated culture (e.g., Chinese vs. American,respectively), thus priming that culture’s norms and values (e.g.,collectivism vs. individualism, respectively; Ross, Xun, & Wilson,2002).
4 All names used in the U.S. version of the questionnaire were among the50 most popular names in the United States for at least one decade of the20th century, according to U.S. Census Bureau data. Although we were notable to identify a similar resource in South Korea, popular names were alsoselected for the Korean version of the questionnaire.
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627MEN AS CULTURAL IDEALS
We expected that completing the questionnaire in Korean aboutKorean targets would prime a Korean cultural frame, whereascompleting the questionnaire in English about American targetswould prime an American cultural frame. We therefore predictedthat (Hypothesis 4; H4) results from Korean American participantswho completed the survey in English would resemble those of ourAmerican participants from Study 2—rating women as more col-lectivistic than men—whereas results from those who completedthe survey in Korean would resemble those of our Korean partic-ipants from Study 2—rating men as more collectivistic thanwomen.
Method
Participants. Sixty Korean American Rutgers University un-dergraduate and graduate students (47% female, Mage � 20.0)volunteered to complete the questionnaire. Four incomplete ques-tionnaires were excluded from the analyses. Participants wererecruited at meetings of extracurricular organizations and via ac-quaintances. Seventy-three percent of the participants were born inthe United States, whereas 27% were born in South Korea. For95% of participants, both parents were born in South Korea.Eighty-one percent of participants reported that Korean was theprimary language spoken in their childhood households; only theseparticipants (n � 47), who we expected to have equal access toboth cultural frames, were included in the analyses.
Materials and procedure. We used the same materials as inStudy 2. Half of the participants completed the survey in English—about Americans in a town in the United States—and half com-pleted the survey in Korean—about Koreans in a South Koreantown.
As in Study 2, we collapsed across all 10 items to create acomposite closeness measure (Korean � .67, American �.88).
Results and Discussion
To test whether (H4) participants who completed the survey inEnglish rated women as more collectivistic than men and thosewho completed the survey in Korean rated men as more collec-
tivistic than women, we conducted a 2 (cultural frame: American,Korean) � 2 (sex of target: male, female) between-subjectsANOVA. We found no main effect of cultural frame (F � 1, p �.30), but there was a main effect of sex of target, with male targetsreceiving overall lower closeness ratings than female targets, F(1,43) � 7.74, p � .008, �p
2 � .15. Most importantly, however, thismain effect was qualified by the predicted interaction, F(1, 43) �23.31, p � .001, �p
2 � .35 (see Figure 3). Simple effects tests usingthe overall error term revealed that, as predicted, participantscompleting the American version of the questionnaire rated maletargets as significantly less collectivistic (i.e., more individualistic,M � 3.31, SD � 1.10) than female targets (M � 5.88, SD � 1.78),F(1, 43) � 27.30, p � .001, �p
2 � .39. Participants completing theKorean version of the questionnaire, on the other hand, rated maletargets as more collectivistic (M � 5.26, SD � 0.83) than femaletargets (M � 4.58, SD � 0.75), F(1, 43) � 2.23, p � .14, �p
2 � .05,although this effect did not reach statistical significance. Similarly,participants completing the survey in English, as opposed to Ko-rean, rated the female targets as significantly more collectivistic,F(1, 43) � 6.78, p � .01, �p
2 � .14, and participants completing thesurvey in English, as opposed to Korean, rated the male targets assignificantly more individualistic, F(1, 43) � 18.70, p � .001,�p
2 � .30.These results extend our results from Study 2 by demonstrating that
a shift in cultural frame can change people’s perceptions of the extentto which men versus women are collectivistic-individualistic. Bicul-tural Korean Americans primed with a Korean frame perceived menas more collectivistic than women, whereas bicultural Korean Amer-icans primed with an American cultural frame perceived women asmore collectivistic than men. As with Studies 1 and 2, these resultssupport the cultural moderation hypothesis, with a reversal in theusual stereotypic expectations when collectivistic cultural values weremade salient.
Study 4: Reanalyzing Williams and Best
The studies presented thus far are limited to comparing twonations. Study 4 tests the generalizability of Studies 1–3’s results
Figure 2. Study 2: Collectivism ratings for male and female targets as afunction of participants’ culture (Korea or United States).
Figure 3. Study 3: Collectivism ratings for male and female targets as afunction of cultural frame condition (Korean or English/American).
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628 CUDDY ET AL.
in two ways, by (a) comparing across many nations and (b)constructing broader measures of collectivistic and individualistictraits. We accomplished these aims by reanalyzing the extensivedata collected by Williams and Best (1990). These data areuniquely well suited for our purposes because Williams and Bestexamined gender stereotypes using over 300 trait adjectives (fromGough and Heilbrun’s [1965, 1980] Adjective Check List) in 27nations.5 Further, the nations in Williams and Best’s samples splitfairly evenly into collectivistic versus individualistic cultural valuecategories, based on Hofstede’s (1980, 2001) widely used classi-fication system. By contrast, other cross-cultural studies that haveexamined gender stereotypes either did not record specific stereo-type contents, failed to use an extensive trait list, or did not surveysuch a diverse set of nations.6
Williams and Best (1990) asked respondents to classify whether,in their nation, each of 300 traits is “more frequently associatedwith men than with women” or “more frequently associated withwomen than with men” (p. 51). Respondents were told to skipitems that they could not classify as more characteristic of eithermen or women. Instructions indicated that respondents shouldreport the “characteristics generally said to be associated withwomen and men in our culture” (Williams & Best, 1990, p. 51)independent of their personal beliefs. Thus, responses should havereflected general cultural stereotypes.
For each nation, Williams and Best (1990) reported a stereotyp-ical masculinity score for each trait, which represents the percent-age of respondents who classified that trait as associated with menrather than women (adjusting for the number of individuals whodid not respond). Scores could range from 0 (never associatedmore with men than with women) to 100 (always associated morewith men than with women). Scores lower than 50 indicate that atrait is stereotypically feminine; scores greater than 50 indicate thata trait is stereotypically masculine. Williams and Best consideredscores greater than 67 to indicate “focused-male stereotypes” andscores below 33 to indicate “focused female-stereotypes.”
We used the national scores Williams and Best (1990) reportedfor each trait to construct masculine stereotype scales for individ-ualistic (e.g., individualistic, assertive) and collectivistic (e.g.,helpful, tactful) traits. This allowed us to test whether I-C culturalvalues, as assessed by Hostede national I-C scores, moderategender stereotype content, as assessed by masculinity scores forindividualistic and collectivistic traits from Williams and Best’sdata.
Specifically, we hypothesized that (Hypothesis 5; H5) the moreindividualistic the national culture, the more members of thatculture would stereotype individualistic traits as masculine and(Hypothesis 6; H6) the more collectivistic the national culture, themore members of that culture would stereotype collectivistic traitsas masculine. Because both Hofstede (2001) and Williams andBest (1990) reported national averages rather than individual re-spondent data, we tested our hypotheses using nation as the unit ofanalysis.
As noted in the general introduction, there are theoretical andempirical reasons for suspecting that competence is defined dif-ferently in individualistic versus collectivistic cultures (i.e., com-petence is aligned with culturally valued traits). If competence isassociated with individualistic traits in individualistic cultures, butcollectivistic traits in collectivistic cultures, then cultural valuesshould moderate whether stereotypes about men’s competence are
related to stereotypes about their individualism and collectivism.Therefore, we constructed a separate masculine stereotype scalefor competence (distinct from individualistic traits) from Williamsand Best’s (1990) data. This allowed us to test two further hypoth-eses: (Hypothesis 7; H7) in individualistic cultures, masculinityscores for competence will positively correlate with individualistic(but not collectivistic) traits, whereas (Hypothesis 8; H8) in col-lectivistic cultures, masculinity scores for competence will posi-tively correlate with collectivistic (but not individualistic) traits.
Method
Hofstede’s individualism–collectivism dimension. Nationalscores on Hofstede’s scale range from 1 to 100 on a single, bipolarI-C dimension: scores greater than 50 indicate individualism,whereas scores under 50 indicate collectivism. Hofstede (1980)originally surveyed IBM employees in 39 countries to assessnational differences in cultural values, including I-C, or people’stendency to prefer loose- versus tight-knit social frameworks andto frame their self-images around “I” versus “we.” Hofstede (2001)later expanded his research, eventually assigning I-C scores to 76nations. Hofstede’s ratings have been widely used in cross-culturalresearch, producing reliable correlations with core outcome (suchas extraversion, national wealth, exclusionism vs. universalism,life satisfaction) theoretically associated with individualism versuscollectivism (Hofstede, 2001; Hofstede & McCrae, 2004; Oyser-man et al., 2002). National I-C ratings were available for 26 of the27 nations surveyed by Williams and Best (1990).
Masculinity scales for individualistic and collectivistic traits.We used Oyserman et al.’s (2002) comprehensive review of theoryand research on individualism and collectivism to create perceivedmasculinity scales on these dimensions from the adjectives used byWilliams and Best (1990). Oyserman et al. suggest that, althoughnegatively correlated, individualism and collectivism are not nec-essarily “opposites” along a single dimension. Consistent with thisidea, we used the richness of Williams and Best’s adjective list tocreate separate masculinity scales for individualistic and collectiv-istic traits. We consider this two-scale (rather than a single bipolarscale) approach more rigorous because it yields two (rather thanone) tests for our moderator hypothesis, putting the hypothesis atgreater risk.
To select potential scale items, we relied on Oyserman et al.’s(2002) definition of individualism and collectivism (see their Ta-
5 Williams and Best (1990) collected data in 30 nations, but only usedthe full adjective list in 27 nations. The curtailed adjective list used in threenations was not sufficient for constructing reliable individualism andcollectivism scales. South Korea was not included in their study.
6 By contrast, Glick et al.’s (2000, 2004) cross-cultural studies primarilyexamined ambivalent sexism more than stereotypes. Their gender stereo-type measures allowed each participant to generate up to 10 traits for menand for women, but most provided far fewer; further, each participant couldgenerate a unique set of traits. Glick et al.’s (2000, 2004) main purpose wasto correlate participants’ subsequent valence ratings of the traits they hadgenerated to hostile and benevolent sexism; they did not systematicallyrecord stereotype content (but rather valence ratings). Thus, Glick et al.’sresearch does not provide a fixed or extensive trait list as Williams andBest did. Cuddy et al.’s (2009) cross-cultural stereotype content modelwork did not focus on gender (although in some nations, men and womenwere target groups) and examined warmth and competence, which we haveargued are not the same as individualistic and collectivistic personalitytraits.
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629MEN AS CULTURAL IDEALS
ble 1). Two of the authors independently sorted the 300 traits into“individualistic,” “collectivistic,” or “neither” categories. This firstpass quickly and consensually eliminated most traits (about 85%)as not fitting the core constructs. After completing the initial sort,we compared lists and attempted to resolve discrepancies throughdiscussion, erring on the side of maintaining traits in the poolpending statistical analysis to construct reliable scales. This initialsort yielded 21 individualistic traits and 27 collectivistic traits.
Traits were then eliminated on the basis of statistical analysis.Because Williams and Best (1990) reported sample averages(rather than individual respondent data) for each nation, the rela-tively small sample size (n � 26 nations) prevented use of ad-vanced techniques such as factor analysis (e.g., Comrey & Lee,1992). Therefore, consistent with Everitt and Skrondal’s (2010, p.225) suggested guidelines, we eliminated traits with item-totalcorrelations below .2. The final masculinity scale for individual-istic traits included 10 items ( � .74); the final masculinity scalefor collectivistic traits included 17 items ( � .89). All includedscale items, as well as items initially considered but later elimi-nated, are reported in the Appendix.
Both scales included a number of reverse coded items, whichgenerally represent traits that are valued only when reversed. Forexample, group harmony represents a core value Oyserman et al.(2002) ascribe to collectivistic cultures. We therefore classifieditems such as “quarrelsome” and “tactless” as reverse-coded col-lectivism items because they (negatively) relate to maintaininggroup harmony. These reversal items also illustrate why we de-cided, consistent with Oyserman et al., to construct separate mas-culinity scales for individualistic and collectivistic traits, ratherthan a single bipolar scale. Although individualists value self-expression and directness in asserting needs and opinions, thisdoes not necessarily imply being quarrelsome or tactless. Asexpected, however, the masculinity scales for individualistic andcollectivistic traits were negatively correlated, r(24) � �.65, p �.001. Observed values for each nation on both scales are includedin Figure 4.
Masculinity scale for competence traits. In contrast to indi-vidualism and collectivism (which are more typically assessed at
the cultural rather than individual level), a well-established com-petence scale has been validated in past research (Cuddy et al.,2008; Fiske et al., 2002). Williams and Best’s (1990) adjective listincluded several traits on this scale: capable, efficient, intelligent,and unintelligent (reverse scored), which we averaged to form amasculinity scale for competence ( � .66).
Results and Discussion
To test our hypotheses, we ran a repeated measures generallinear model, using Hofstede’s (2001) national I-C ratings as ourindependent variable and the masculinity scales for individualisticand for collectivistic traits as dependent variables. As expected,there was no main effect of Hofstede (2001) I-C rating on thecollectivistic and individualistic stereotype scales averaged to-gether (p � .13). However, there was a main effect of scale: acrosscultures individualistic traits (M � 71.22, SD � 7.65) were seen asmore masculine (i.e., less feminine) than collectivistic traits (M �34.65, SD � 9.49), F(1, 24) � 8.59, p � .007, �p
2 � .26.Regression estimates suggest that even for a national I-C score ofzero (i.e., extremely collectivistic) the regression model wouldpredict that individualistic traits (b � 62.94, SE � 3.22) would bestereotyped as more masculine than collectivistic traits (b � 47.46,SE � 2.95). However, given that Williams and Best (1990) definedvalues between 66 and 34 as gender-neutral, these regressionestimates suggest that in highly collectivistic cultures, neithercollectivistic traits nor individualistic traits are strongly associatedwith either gender.
In the most important test of the cultural moderation hypothesis,we found the predicted significant interaction between scale andnational I-C ratings, F(1, 24) � 19.73, p � .001, �p
2 � .45.National cultural values moderated scores on the masculinityscales. Supporting H5, that the more individualistic the nation, themore people would view individualistic traits as masculine, Hof-stede (2001) I-C scores positively and significantly predicted mas-culinity scores for individualistic traits, � .54, b � .15, t(24) �3.12, p � .005, see Figure 5. Supporting H6, that the morecollectivistic the nation, the more people would view collectivistictraits as masculine, Hofstede (2001) I-C scores negatively andsignificantly predicted masculinity scores for collectivistic traits, � �.67, b � �.23, t(24) � 4.43, p � .001; see Figure 6. In sum,regression analyses confirmed that the more individualistic theculture, the more individualistic traits are stereotyped as mascu-line, whereas the more collectivistic the culture, the more collec-tivistic traits are stereotyped as masculine. Both effects werestrong, with national I-C scores explaining 29% of the variance inthe perceived masculinity of individualistic traits and 45% of thevariance in the perceived masculinity of collectivistic traits.
In conclusion, we found strong support for our central hypoth-esis that cultural I-C moderates gender stereotype content: themore individualistic the culture, the more masculine individualistictraits are rated; the more collectivistic the culture, the more mas-culine collectivistic traits are rated. However, in an absolute sense,individualistic traits are generally viewed as more masculine thancollectivistic traits across cultures.
Competence in individualistic and collectivistic nations.Next, we tested whether competence (H7) is associated with indi-vidualistic traits in individualistic cultures and (H8) is associatedwith collectivistic traits in collectivistic cultures. To do so, we used
Figure 4. Study 4: Masculinity attributed to individualistic and collec-tivistic traits in 26 countries, ordered from least to most individualistic.Masculinity scores less than 50 indicate that the trait is ascribed more towomen than to men; masculinity scores greater than 50 indicate that thetrait is ascribed more to men than to women.
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630 CUDDY ET AL.
Hofstede’s (2001) national I-C ratings to dichotomize the nationsinto two groups: collectivistic (below 50 on the I-C scale; n � 11)or individualistic (above 50 on the I-C scale; n � 15). We thencorrelated the masculinity scale for competence with those forindividualistic and collectivistic traits. Our hypotheses suggest thatin individualistic nations, masculinity ratings for competenceshould correlate positively with masculinity scores for individual-istic (but not collectivistic) traits, whereas the opposite should betrue for collectivistic nations.
Consistent with H7, in individualistic cultures, the masculinityscores for competence and individualistic traits were signifi-cantly positively correlated, r(13) � .53, p � .04, whereas thecompetence and collectivistic traits scales were not correlated,r(13) � .006, p � .98. Consistent with H8, we found thatmasculinity scores for competence and collectivistic traits weresignificantly positively correlated, r(9) � .65, p � .03, whereasthe competence and individualistic trait scales were not corre-lated, r(9) � .14, p � .69.
These results suggest that the definition of competence varies byculture, with people in individualistic cultures associating compe-tence with individualism and people in collectivistic cultures as-sociating competence with collectivism.
General Discussion
We began by exploring a paradox created by two rich researchstreams in psychology: one suggests that men are universallystereotyped as more individualistic and less collectivistic thanwomen, and another suggests that individualism is valued more insome cultures whereas collectivism is more highly valued inothers. Would men—the dominant, higher status group comparedwith women in nearly every culture—still be perceived as indi-vidualistic in cultures that value the opposite, collectivism?
Our studies demonstrate that the commonly endorsed“individualistic-man” and “collectivistic-woman” stereotypes arenot universal, but rather are moderated by cultural values. Studies1 and 2 showed that in the United States, a nation with strongindividualistic values, people perceived men as more individual-istic and as having less close social networks than women; bycontrast, in South Korea, a highly collectivistic nation, peopleperceived men as more communal and as having closer networksthan women. This pattern was replicated in Study 3 when culturalframe was randomly assigned: Bicultural Korean Americansviewed men as more individualistic than women when taking asurvey in English about American social networks, but viewedmen as more collectivistic than women when taking the samesurvey in Korean about Korean social networks. In sum, the firstthree studies showed that members of a collectivistic culture,South Korea, perceived men as more collectivistic than women,deviating from the “universal” stereotype of male individualism.
To our knowledge, this represents the first time “collectivistic-man” and “individualistic-woman” stereotypes have been docu-mented. This counterexample punctures the claim that genderstereotypes universally characterize men as individualistic andwomen as collectivistic. Study 4 moved beyond a two-culturecomparison by reanalyzing Williams and Best’s (1990) founda-tional study of gender stereotypes, using data from 26 nations.Using a broader index of stereotypes about individualistic andcollectivistic traits, our reanalysis also supported cultural moder-ation: the more collectivistic the nation, the more masculine itrated collectivistic traits; the more individualistic the nation, themore masculine it rated individualistic traits. Although most of thecollectivistic nations surveyed by Williams and Best still stereo-typed men as more individualistic and less collectivistic thanwomen—compared with the crossover in the content of gender
Figure 5. Study 4: Masculinity attributed to individualistic traits as afunction of national scores on Hofstede’s (2001) Individualism/Collectivism dimension for 26 countries. Masculinity scores less than 50indicate that the trait is ascribed more to women than to men; masculinityscores greater than 50 indicate that the trait is ascribed more to men thanto women. National individualism scores less than 50 indicate that theculture values collectivism; national individualism scores greater than 50indicate that the culture values individualism.
Figure 6. Study 4: Masculinity attributed to collectivistic traits as afunction of national scores on Hofstede’s (2001) Individualism/Collectivism dimension for 26 countries. Masculinity scores less than 50indicate that the trait is ascribed more to women than to men; masculinityscores greater than 50 indicate that the trait is ascribed more to men thanto women. National individualism scores less than 50 indicate that theculture values collectivism; national individualism scores greater than 50indicate that the culture values individualism.
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631MEN AS CULTURAL IDEALS
stereotypes between the United States and South Korea in Studies1–3—Study 4 documented significant cultural moderation across arelatively large and diverse sample of nations, such that genderstereotypes converged in collectivistic nations: whereas in individ-ualistic cultures individualistic traits were strongly associated withmen and collectivistic traits were strongly associated with women,in collectivistic cultures, both individualistic and collectivistictraits were relatively gender neutral.
Why did we find “collectivistic-man” and “individualistic-woman” stereotypes in a collectivistic nation in Studies 1–3 butnot in Study 4’s collectivistic nations? It is possible that SouthKorea represents one of a limited number of highly collectivisticnations (South Korea scores 18 on Hofstede’s (2001) national I-Cscale, which places it among the most collectivistic nations) wheremen are stereotyped as collectivistic and women are stereotyped asindividualistic. It is unfortunate that South Korea was not includedin Williams and Best’s (1990) study, making direct comparisonimpossible. Speculatively, we suggest that stereotypes about menmay skew more toward individualistic (rather than collectivistic)traits even in somewhat collectivistic cultures because other forcessuch as social roles and male dominance represent counterforces tocollectivistic cultural values. As noted in the introduction, socialroles (Eagly, 1987) and power differences (Glick et al., 2004)influence the content of gender stereotypes. Because collectivisticnations tend toward greater gender traditionalism (Archer, 2006;Williams & Best, 1990), role differentiation and power differencesmay push male stereotypes in an individualistic direction. Forexample, if leadership roles are predominately occupied by menand objectively require individualistic traits (e.g., ambitiousness),whereas domestic roles such as childcare are predominantly occu-pied by women and objectively require collectivistic traits (e.g.,unselfishness) then, consistent with social role theory, men maystill be viewed as relatively more individualistic and less collec-tivistic than women.
The possibility that social roles and cultural values influencestereotypes in opposing directions represents one reason why thesignificant cultural moderation uncovered in our reanalysis ofWilliams and Best’s (1990) data was previously undetected: forcollectivistic nations, cultural value moderation may be swimmingupstream against other forces that skew male stereotypes moretoward individualistic than collectivistic traits. The current studiesshow that some collectivistic nations buck this general trend,sometimes to the point of a crossover in the “typical” genderstereotypes (of men as individualistic rather than collectivistic) andthat, across cultures, collectivistic nations stereotype men as rela-tively less individualistic and more collectivistic than individual-istic nations do.
In the collectivistic nations, stereotypes of men and womensignificantly converged: men and women are viewed as moresimilar on individualistic and collectivistic traits in these nationscompared with individualistic nations, where gender stereotypeswere more pronounced. Costa, Terracciano, and McCrae (2001)documented a similar convergence in men’s and women’s self-reported personality traits. Given that stereotypes can cause dis-crimination, one might conclude that women would face lessdiscrimination in collectivistic nations (where gender stereotypesconverge and sometimes even reverse) than in individualisticnations (where gender stereotypes diverge). Ironically, structuraland ideological indicators of gender discrimination indicate the
opposite: women generally face greater discrimination in collec-tivistic than individualistic societies as indicated by a strong cor-relation between national indicators of I-C and structural measuresof gender inequality (Archer, 2006). Of course, the I-C dimensionis confounded with other national differences—such as overalleconomic development, role-based gender segregation, educa-tional opportunities for women, and religious and political ideol-ogies—that serve to reinforce or to attenuate gender discrimination(UN Development Programme, 2013). Our results serve as areminder that discrimination does not stem solely from stereotyp-ing.
The current research contributes to the burgeoning literature onintersectionality, which focuses on “the meaning and conse-quences of multiple categories of social group membership” (Cole,2009, p. 170). Specifically, we provide new insight into howstereotypes vary on the basis of the intersection between genderand nationality, illuminating another domain in which consideringmultiple categories is critical to fully understanding gender. Ourfindings suggest that adopting an intersectional approach mighthelp clarify some puzzling past findings regarding gender andculture. For example, Western research paradigms have assumedthat certain qualities are masculine (e.g., assertiveness) and othersare feminine (e.g., compassion), but we show that other cultures donot assign those qualities the same gendered ascriptions. Thecultural moderation demonstrated here may help to explain whyindividual difference inventories that define “masculine” and“feminine” traits do not always replicate in non-Western, andtypically more collectivistic, cultures. For example, previous re-search has shown that the factor structure of the Bem Sex-RoleInventory does not replicate in Malaysia (Ward & Sethi, 1986),Taiwan (Peng, 2006), and China (Zhang, Norvilitis, & Jin, 2001).Speculatively, this may occur because of collectivistic nations’tendency not to associate masculinity with individualistic traits andfemininity with collectivistic traits. The current results suggestimportant cultural exceptions to prior theory equating masculinityand individualistic agency, and femininity and collectivistic com-munality (Bem, 1981; Spence & Helmreich, 1978; see Wood &Eagly, 2010 for a review).
Although the current studies’ core strength is that they representnovel evidence that cultural values moderate the content of genderstereotypes, they have important limitations. One limitation con-cerns whether stereotypes about men’s relatively higher collectiv-ism (in collectivistic cultures) apply mainly or even exclusively tomale-male relationships. Note that Studies 2 and 3—in whichperceived closeness in social networks represented the measure ofmen’s perceived collectivism—focused exclusively on same-sexrelationships. Would men be perceived as having similarly closerelationships with women in collectivistic nations? Given thatgender segregation tends to be higher in collectivistic nations,results for other-sex relations might paint a different picture. It ispossible that in collectivistic nations, men’s collectivistic traitsreflect their closeness within “old boys’ networks” in which mencooperate with each other but segregate from and discriminateagainst women. This possibility may reconcile why men can beviewed as both collectivistic yet dominant within collectivisticcultures. Nevertheless, the trait measures we used in Studies 1 and4 demonstrated significant cultural moderation effects, suggestingthat even if men are perceived as exhibiting collectivistic traits
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mainly within male-male relations, this collectivism generalizes tooverall stereotypes about men.
A second limitation is that Study 3 conflated the ethnicities ofthe targets described in the scenarios and the language in which thesurvey was taken. To be consistent with and reinforce the culturalsalience manipulation, participants read about social networksamong people with Korean versus American names in the differentversions of the survey. Thus, we cannot disentangle whether ourresults reflect cultural salience effects related to activating culturalvalues, beliefs that Korean and American men and women engagein systematically different behaviors, or both. Both mechanisms,however, are consistent with the main hypothesis that culturalvalues moderate gender stereotypes. It remains a task for futureresearch to determine whether these stereotypical beliefs relate tovalue-influenced perceptions, to actual differences in men’s andwomen’s behavior, or both.
In addition, although Study 4 makes an important contributionby documenting cultural value moderation of gender stereotypesacross a wide range of nations, there are several limitations due tothe fact that we reanalyzed existing data. First, we had to constructindividualistic and collectivistic trait scales from the measuresused by Williams and Best (1990). Because we could not select thetraits that were used in their study, we were unable to include theitems “communal” and “interdependent.” Second, because Wil-liams and Best (1990) reported national averages—such that wedid not have individual participants’ responses within nations, butonly an average for each nation—we could not factor analyze thetrait ratings. In short, the study was not originally designed to testour specific hypothesis. It is fortunate that Williams and Bestassessed 300 traits, making it possible to retrospectively constructscales with good face validity. Empirically, the individualistic andcollectivistic trait scales showed acceptable reliability and theirstrong correlations with national I-C indices further supports thescales’ validity.
Additionally, the Williams and Best (1990) data were publishedin 1990. We do not believe, however, that this invalidates theresults obtained here. Although globalization and Westernizationmay have increased individualism globally, the relative ranking ofnations on I-C has remained stable over time (Hofstede, Hofstede,& Minkov, 2010). Similarly, relative national rankings on genderinequality have remained stable year to year in the United Nations’annual Gender Inequality Index rankings (UN Development Pro-gramme, 2013). Arguably, changes in relative ranking of nationson these dimensions would only serve to attenuate the relation-ships between current I-C rankings and trait ratings in the Wil-liams and Best data, making it more (not less) difficult to observethe relationships we found. Nevertheless, future research could testthe cultural moderation hypothesis in contemporary cross-culturalsamples using trait scales specifically constructed to assess genderstereotypes about individualistic and collectivistic traits.
Finally, none of the studies reported here were experimental,although Study 3 used a quasi-experimental design that manipu-lated bicultural individuals’ cultural frame via language and na-tionality of targets. In part, this reflects the difficulty of experi-mentally manipulating deep-seated cultural values. We areskeptical about whether priming different values (e.g., trying toconvince Americans that most Americans hold collectivistic val-ues) could alter well-established gender stereotypes. Nevertheless,the non-experimental methods used here necessitate caution in
inferring causality, and reinforce the specific limitations men-tioned above concerning the many other factors (e.g., economicdevelopment) that are naturally confounded with cultural values onthe I-C dimension.
Conclusion
Are gender stereotypes universal? We have demonstrated sig-nificant cultural moderation of gender stereotypes: the first threestudies present strong evidence that in one culture, South Korea,men are seen as more collectivistic than women and women areseen as more individualistic than men. The fourth study suggeststhat across 26 nations, cultural values moderate the content ofgender stereotypes, such that collectivistic (compared with indi-vidualistic) nations characterize individualistic traits as relativelyless, and collectivistic traits as relatively more, masculine. At thesame time, nations that stereotype men as less selfish, more con-siderate, and more helpful (all collectivistic traits) should not bemisconstrued as a nirvana for women: collectivistic nations havegreater gender inequality relative to individualistic nations. Moregenerally, our results suggest that the convergence of two well-established literatures—one on the masculine-feminine content ofgender stereotypes, one on cross-cultural variation in I-C—offersnovel insight into both literatures: men are not merely individual-istic, but rather stereotypes of males reflect whichever construct isvalued most highly in a given culture. As a result, some culturesmay view men as more collectivistic than women—if and only ifthat collectivism is culturally valued.
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Appendix
Traits on the Individualism and Collectivism Trait Scales, Study 4
Trait scale
Traits Included versus ExcludedBased on Item-Total Correlations Individualism Collectivism
Included Ambitious ConsiderateAssertive FriendlyIndependent HelpfulIndividualistic KindSelf-Centered SincereSelf-Confident TactfulCommonplacea UnselfishDependenta WarmUnambitiousa Arroganta
Unassuminga Boastfula
Conceiteda
Egotisticala
Greedya
Rudea
Show Offa
Tactlessa
Thanklessa
Traits originally identified but excluded Frank GenerousHeadstrong LoyalOpinionated ModestOriginal ObligingOutspoken Aloofa
Pleasure Seeking Argumentativea
Self-Seeking Colda
Selfish Rebelliousa
Conventionala Unkinda
Inhibiteda
Self-Denyinga
a Indicates the item was reverse coded.
Received December 19, 2014Revision received June 1, 2015
Accepted June 6, 2015 �
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635MEN AS CULTURAL IDEALS