mercenaries deborah advent

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MercenariesAuthor(s): Deborah AvantSource: Foreign Policy, No. 143 (Jul. - Aug., 2004), pp. 20-22+24+26+28Published by: Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive, LLCStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4152906

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THINK

AGAIN

By Deborah Avant

"How is it in our nation's interest," asked U.S. Sen. Carl Levin recent-

ly, "to have civilian contractors, rather than military personnel, per-

forming vital national security functions ...in a war zone?" The

answer lies in humanity's long history of contracting force and the

changing role of today's private security firms. Even as governments

debate how to hold them accountable, these hired guns are rapidly

becoming indispensable to national militaries, private corporations,

and nongovernmentalgroups across the globe.

"Private Security CompaniesA r e Mercenaries"

No. The term "mercenary"describesa wide vari-

ety of military activities, many of which bear littleresemblance o those of today'sprivatesecuritycom-

panies. The mercenaryactivityassociatedwith enti-ties such as the British East India Company cameabout when nation-states chartered companies toestablishcolonies and engagein long-distancetrade.

Mercenary units that fought in the AmericanRevolution were effectively leased to the British

Army by the Hessians.The soldiers of fortune thatran riot over the African continent in the 1960s

were individuals or small ex-military groups that

operated in the shadows.

Modern contractors most resemblethe military

enterprisers f the lateMiddleAges.Before he riseofthe nation-state,nearlyall force was contracted.From

the 12th centurythroughthe peace of Westphalia n

1648, military contractors often employed soldiers

trained within feudal structures, sending them to

whomever ouldpay,fromItalian ity-stateso theVat-

ican.Fightingwars,maintainingorder,and collectingtaxes were amongthe variouspoliticaltasks filledbythesemilitaryenterprises. ome historians inktherise

of contractedforces in the late Middle Ages to the

inabilityof thefeudalsystem o address heincreasingly

complexneedsof a modernizing ociety, uchas thepro-

DeborahAvant sassociateprofessorof politicalscienceand inter-

nationalaffairsat the GeorgeWashingtonUniversityand author

ofa

forthcomingbook on

privatesecurityand political change.

20 FOREIGN POLICY



tection of trade routes for merchants.Similarreasonsexisttoday:Themarketpressures,echnology, ndsocial

changeof a globalizedworld createmultipledemandsthatnationalmilitarieshavedifficultymeeting.

Today'sprivatesecuritycompaniesarecorporateendeavors that perform logistics support, training,security,intelligence work, risk analysis, and muchmore. They operate in an open market, work for

many employersat once, and boast of their profes-sionalism. These companies staff their projects notwith permanent employees, but with individuals

drawnfrom vast databasesof ex-militaryand formerlaw enforcementpersonnel.These databases ist indi-vidualsby experienceand specialtyso contractors ancustom-fit each job with qualified employees. Indi-viduals may appearin severaldatabases,move easi-

ly from one contract (andcompany)to the next, andfreelancewhen not under contract. Although manyof these individualsarequitehonorable, he industry'sstructure allows ample opportunity for some whobear disturbing similarities to the 1960s-style sol-diers of fortune to enterthe corporatemix.

" T h e B u s h Administrationa s Dramatically

ExpandedU s e o f

Military Contractors"

Wrong. The United States ramped up militaryoutsourcingduring the 1990s, after the end of theCold War brought reductions in force size andnumerous ethnic and regional conflicts emergedrequiring ntervention.During the first Gulf War in

1991, the United Statesdeployedabout one contrac-tor forevery50 active-dutypersonnel.Ethnicconflictsin Bosnia and Herzegovina in the mid-1990s andKosovo in 1999 saw that ratio increase o about 1 to

10, roughlyequalto that of the recentwar in Iraq.SinceU.S. PresidentGeorgeW. Bush announced

the end of "major combat operations" in Iraq in

May 2003, however,securitycontractorshave flood-ed the country. The unstable environment hasstretchedcoalition forces thin, and the absence of aU.N. mandate has made tools such as U.N. peace-keepers and international civilian police unavail-

able, drawing private security companies closer tocombat as the Iraqi insurgency continues. Mediaattention on contractors in Iraq, such as the Amer-icans who allegedly abused Iraqi detainees at the

Abu Ghraibprison,has also raisedpublicawarenessof securitycontractors o a higherdegree han in pre-vious conflicts.

"Contractors D o n ' t E n g a g e i n Comba t o r

O t h e r Essential Military T a s k s "

False. AlthoughU.S. DefenseSecretaryDonaldRumsfeldaidthePentagonwouldoutsource ll butcoremilitaryasks, hese asksarechanging,ndmili-tarycontractorserformmanyof them.Contractorshave the technical xpertise o supportncreasinglycomplexweapons ystems, uchas theUnitedStates'B-2bomber ndApache elicopter. ontractorsftenprovide eyservicesnpeacekeepingndgovernance-buildingmissions,rom taffingivilian oliceo train-

ingfledglingmilitaryndpolice orces.Thewaronter-rorismalso increaseshe importance f intelligence

services,which contractors

providereadily-even

including,as we now know, prison interrogation.Asthe Iraq conflict demonstrates,many militarydutiesthat may not technically be considered core tasksnonethelessbecomeso in the midstof war.Truckdriv-

ing may not sound like an integralmilitaryresponsi-bility,but if a driverdelivering uel to troops passesthroughcombat zones, the truck drivermay have amore intense military experience than anticipated.

Similarly, anguage interpretationmay sound mun-

dane,but two of the four contractorsmplicatedn the

Tagubareporton the AbuGhraibabuseswere hiredas

interpretersr

translators.

JULY I AUGUST 2004 21



ThinkAgain]

"Mi l i t a r y Contractors A r e Cheaper

t h a n Regular Soldiers"

Prove it. Numerous studies on privatizationand outsourcing uggest hattwo conditionsmustbe

present or the privatesector to deliverservicesmore

efficientlythan the government:a competitivemar-ket and contractorflexibilityin fulfillingtheir obli-

gations. But governments requentlycurtailcompe-tition to preserve reliability and continuity. For

instance, military contractor Kellogg, Brown &Root (a subsidiaryof Halliburton)won a no-bidcontract to rebuildIraqioil fields in 2003 because

the Pentagondetermined t was the only companywith the size and securityclearances o do the job.Moreover, governments often impose conditionsthat reduce contractors' flexibility. For example,when the U.S. Army outsourcedROTC raining in

1997, a long list of requirementsor trainersresult-ed in a higherestimatedcost than that of the previ-ous program.A 2000 reporton logistics supportinthe Balkans by the U.S. government's nvestigativearm, the GeneralAccountingOffice (GAO), faultedthe militaryfor poor budgetaryoversight.Perhaps

most telling,cost-effectivenesss not one of the threereasonsfor outsourcing isted in a 2003 GAO eporton militarycontracting.(The reasons:to gain spe-cialized technical skills, bypass limits on military

personnelthat can be deployed to certain regions,and ensure that scarce resources are available for

other assignments.)News reportson the war in Iraqhave noted the

relativelyhighsalariesof contractors-some $20,000

per month, tripleor more what active-dutysoldiers

earn-but such figuresfail to explain whether con-tractors are indeed cost-effective. Some analysts

arguethatcontractors reultimately heaperbecause

they allow the military to avoid the expense of

recruiting, raining,and deployingpersonnel.How-

ever,most contractors are recruitedand trainedby

governmentsat some point in their careers.In addi-

tion, U.S. militaryleadershave voiced concernthatthe lureof corporatecontractorsunderminesArmy

personnel retention-a worry shared by militaryleadersfrom Britainto Chile.

"Contractors A r e Accountable to N o O n e "

An exaggeration. Many governmentsregulate security contractors to greater or lesser

degrees. In the United States, for example, theFederal Acquisition Regulations and additional

Department of Defense rules govern contracts

with private security firms. The fact that contrac-tors can be fired makes them at least minimallyaccountable for their actions. For instance, formerSierra Leone dictator Valentine Strasser firedU.K.-based Gurkha Security Guards (GSG) for

refusing to provide security for army trainingfacilities in 1995.

That said, market accountability differs from

accountability in well-run military organizations.Military forces are beholden only to their govern-ments, which can use severalmethods, from with-

holding funds to personnel discipline, to hold an

organizationor individual to account. Contractors

are accountable o a rangeof employersandrespondmost effectivelyto market incentives.When decid-

ing how to respondto a request,for example, con-

tractorsconsiderhow that requestmightaffecttheir

other customers, broader market reputation, and,ultimately, heir earnings.GSGmanagersreportedlyworried that training Sierra Leone'stroops would

give thecompanya mercenary eputation hat might

endanger future contracts. Given its work with

employerssuch as the Britishgovernment, his con-cern madegood businesssense.

The use of contractors to avoid governmental

accountabilitys moreworrisome. n the UnitedStates,for instance,the executive branchhirescontractors.

Although the U.S. Congress approves the military

budget, its access to informationabout contractsis

22 FOREIGN POLICY



Think Again

oftenlimited.Thepresident an usethisadvantage oevaderestrictions n U.S. actions,effectively imitingcongressional hecks on foreignpolicy.

Furthermore,contractors can facilitate foreignpolicy by proxy,allowing the government(or partsof

it)to

changeevents on the

ground,but at a dis-

tance that allows for plausibledeniability.In 1994,the United States licensed U.S. company MilitaryProfessionalResourcesInternational MPRI)to pro-vide advice and training to the Croatian govern-

ment. The country's president, Franjo Tudjman,received the advantagesof U.S. militaryassistance,but through a private entity. The British govern-ment has encouraged imilarcontractswith statesin

which British firms have commercialinterests.For

example,in 1986 the British

governmentloaned

money to Mozambique'sgovernment o hireBritish

security firm Defense Systems Limited, which in

turn trained soldiersto protect a Britishcompany'stea and sugarestates from rebels.

"Contractors V a l u e P r o f i t s M o r e t h a n P e a c e "

Notalways.

Although many critics arguethat militarycontractors have an economic interestin prolonging conflict rather than reducing it,

employees of private military companies rarelyhave been accused of aggravatingconflict inten-

tionally to keep profits flowing. Indeed, manyhuman rights advocates regardsuch organizationsas a way to hasteninterventions hat Westernpow-ers might otherwise avoid, such as the 1994 geno-cide in Rwanda.

Yet contractors sometimes worsen the condi-tions for long-termstability.In 1995, when British

securityfirmExecutiveOutcomes (EO)helped Sier-ra Leone'sarmy defend its capital from rebels, the

contractors found the army undependable n retak-

ing the country'sdiamond mines. The mines were

key to EO'spayment, and the mining companies

employedEOsubsidiaries.BecauseEO's take in the

mines was so high, the firmturned insteadto local

militias,inadvertently trengthening parallelforce.

Tensions between the local army and the militias

contributedto a coup, and the militias spoiled sev-

eral iterationsof peace negotiations that followed.

Although EO helped with short-term security, its

activities did not enhance the conditions for long-term peace. This example also demonstrateshow

countrieswith naturalresourcesor wealthynonstateactors are privileged n the securitymarket.

"Contractors Operate Outside t h e L a w "

Frequently. The legal status of contrac-tors varies considerably. Sometimes they are sub-

ject to the laws of the territory in which they

operate and other times to those of their hometerritory, but too often the distinction is unclear.Last March, Zimbabwe arrested some 70 employ-ees associated with British private security firm

Logo Logistics, who were accused of plotting to

depose President T6odoro Obiang Nguema of

Equatorial Guinea. Their legal status remains amatter of dispute.

The Coalition ProvisionalAuthority (CPA), heU.S.-ledentitychargedwith governingIraqthroughJune 2004, stipulated that contractors are subject

to the laws of their parent country, not Iraqi law.

Even U.S. legislation created to address this issue

(the Military ExtraterritorialJurisdiction Act of

2000) lacks specificsand entruststhe U.S. secretary

of defense with initiating prosecutions. Countriesthat opposed the war may have a particularlyhard

time prosecutingcontractorsfor crimescommitted

in Iraq.That is especially true of countries such as

South Africa that claim contractors from their

country are exporting services without the gov-ernment'spermission.

The status of contractors is even more con-

tentious under international law. Most security

company activity falls outside the purview of the

1989 U.N. Conventionon Mercenaries,which gov-

ernsonly suchegregioussoldier-of-fortune ctivities

24 FOREIGN POLICY



Think Again ]

as overthrowing a government.Human rights law

generally binds only states, reducing the formal

legal responsibilities of contractors. For example,when personnel from the U.S. outsourcing firm

DynCorp (hiredby the United States to trainpoliceofficersin the Balkans)were implicated n sex-trade

schemes, neither the contractors nor the U.S. gov-ernment was subject to international legal action.These legal muddles can also restrict the rights of

private security personnel. Long concerned about

the status of contractors on the battlefield,the U.S.

military worries that even as contractors become

moreinvolved n the useof lethalforce,theyare also

less likely to receive prisoner-of-war(Pow) status

if captured by enemy forces. Yet, when the Revo-

lutionaryArmedForces of Colombia (FARC) guer-rilla group took three U.S. military contractors

hostage in 2003 and grantedthem Pow status, the

U.S. governmentstill officially designatedthe con-

tractors as kidnapees.

" O n l y Governments H i r e P r i v a t e

Security Companies"

Wrong. Securitycontractors work for govern-ments, transnationalcorporations,and nongovern-mental organizations (NGOs).Oil, diamond, andother extractive ndustrieshire contractors o guard(or to train locals to guard)their facilities,and theUnitedNations and NGOs mployconvoy guards.In

Iraq, nearly every foreign entity-from the CPA oBechtel to ABC News-requires private security.Therefore,contractorpresence s not dependentonthe U.S. militaryor the CPA.

Theprivate inancing f security whether ia con-tractors,militias, rrebels)diffuses ontrolovertheuseof force,creatingmanyproblematic ideeffects.Mis-

takes and confusion can increasewhen contractors

work for states as well as commercialparties n the

same territory,potentially under different rules of

engagement.Securitycontractors'reliance on local

employees o cut costsandgainlocalknowledge s also

problematic.Dozens of private ecurity irmsworkinginIraqhaveactively ecruitedraqis--oneof thelargest

operations n Iraq, he SteeleFoundation, eports hat

two thirdsof itsemployeesareIraqi-sometimesjoin-

ingwithfledgling raqi ecurity ompanies hatreport-

edly hireex-RepublicanGuards.The CPAneverhadclearcontrolof theseforces;how a new Iraqigovern-mentwill regulateandoversee hemis unknown.

"The U n i t e d Nations S h o u l d Outsource

Peacekeepingo P r i v a t e Contractors"

No. Those who advocate that the UnitedNationshire privatecontractors are not looking to replaceU.N. peacekeeping forces. Rather, they hope tomake them more flexible and easier to use. For

instance, a 2003 proposal by U.S.-basedadvocacygroup International Peace Operations Associationto provide private forces for DemocraticRepublicof the Congo suggested teaming military contrac-tors with local forces. That is a bad idea:Withoutfirmgovernmentcontrol, the local forcestrainedbymilitary contractors could destabilize the environ-

ment after the contractors eave.

Outsourced peacekeepingis also unlikely.TheU.N. SecurityCouncil and GeneralAssemblyhave

been reluctantto consider it becauseof weak gov-ernments'concernthat privatesecurityforcescould

be used against them. Additionally,national mili-

taries that participate in peacekeeping missions

(whichgreatly nfluence heirrespective overnment's

policies) see contractorsas competition.Peacekeep-

ing operationsgive thesemilitariesmoneyand pres-

tige and sometimeskeep them afloat.

That said, the Report of the Panel on United

Nations PeaceOperations-or"Brahimi

Report"-

26 FOREIGN POLICY



ThinkAgain

releasedin August2000 lists severalways in whichU.N. forces could work together more effectively.Military contractors could train them for greater

flexibility and capacity. However, the report lists

major stumbling blocks to effective peacekeepingoperations suchas insufficientmember tatesupportand lack of clear mandates)that are unlikely to besolved through privatization.

"Private Military Contractors

Undermine S t a t e P o w e r "

Not always. Military contractors can

enhance the power of individual states, as whenfailed states like Sierra Leone essentially buy an

army.Contractors are also quite useful to powerful

nations such as the United States,which is manag-ing the chaos in Iraqwith fewer troops than manybelievednecessary by increasing ts personnelpool.States that embraceprivate securityhave a flexiblenew foreign-policy tool partly because privateforces ease the political restraints typical amongdemocracies. Those states that do not tap into themarket lose relativepower.

Ultimately, owever, ontractors nderminetates'collective monopoly on violence. The fact that theUnitedStates,Britain,Australia,ndthe UnitedNationshire private securitymakes it hard for nations that

oppose militarycontracting o restrictsecurity irmsbased in their country.Africa's civil wars have ledextractivecompaniesand NGOs o hiresecurity.This

practice an reduce tate controlover national errito-

ries, furthercomplicating onflict resolution.Indeed,

privatesecuritycreatesoverlapping laimsto author-

ity, potentially feedingthe problemsthat prompteddemand or privatesecurity n the firstplace. [I

[Want to Know More?

David Shearer rgues or contractor nvolvementninternationalnterventionsnhis seminalarticles"Pri-

vate ArmiesandMilitary nterventions"AdelphiPapers,Vol.316, 1998)and"OutsourcingWar" FOR-EIGNPOLICY,Fall 1998). For a more skepticalview,consult Ken Silverstein'sPrivateWarriors(New York:

Verso,2000), which ties theprivate ecurity ndustry's evelopmento theweapons rade.A reportbytheInternational Consortium of InvestigativeJournalists, "Making a Killing:The Business of War" (Wash-

ington:Public ntegrityBooks, 2002), also casts a critical yeon manydifferent acetsof theindustry.

PeterW.Singer's ookCorporateWarriors: heRiseof thePrivatizedMilitary ndustry Ithaca:Cor-nell University Press, 2003) provides a good overview of the private security industry and its potentialcosts and benefits.For information about the role of contractors in Africa'swars, see Peace,Profit or Plun-

der?ThePrivatisationof Security n War-tornAfricanSocieties(Pretoria:nstitute orSecurityStudies,

1999), edited by Jakkie Cilliers and Peggy Mason. For historical perspectives, see Janice E. Thomson'sMercenaries, irates, ndSovereigns:tateBuildingandExtrateritorialViolencenEarlyModernEurope(Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1994). A report by Tony Vaux, Chris Seiple, Greg Nakano, and

Koenraad Van Brabant, "Humanitarian Action and PrivateSecurityCompanies" (London: International

Alert, March 2002), analyzes the issues transnational nongovernmental organizations face when con-

sidering private security. For an international legal debate on private military contractors, consult JuanCarlos Zarate's "The Emergenceof a New Dog of War: PrivateInternationalSecurityCompanies, Inter-

national Law, and the New World Disorder" (StanfordJournal of International Law, Vol. 34, 1998).

))For links to relevant Web sites, access to the FP Archive, and a comprehensive index of related

FOREIGNPOLICYarticles, go to wwvw.foreignpolicy.com.

28 FOREIGN POLICY

mercenaries deborah advent

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