TORTS AND DAMAGES DIGESTVICARIOUS LIABILITYState

Meritt vs Govt

The facts of the case took place in the 1910’s. E. Merritt was a constructor  who was excellent at his work. One day, while he was riding his motorcycle along Calle Padre Faura, he was bumped by a government ambulance. The driver of the ambulance was proven to have been negligent. Because of the incident, Merritt was hospitalized and he was severely injured beyond rehabilitation so much so that he could never perform his job the way he used to and that he cannot even earn at least half of what he used to earn.In order for Merritt to recover damages, he sought to sue the government which later authorized Merritt to sue the government by virtue of Act 2457 enacted by the legislature (An Act authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit against the Government of the Philippine Islands and authorizing the Attorney-General of said Islands to appear in said suit). The lower court then determined the amount of damages and ordered the government to pay the same.ISSUE: Whether or not the government is liable for the negligent act of the driver of the ambulance.HELD: No. By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense. It follows therefrom that the state, by virtue of such provisions of law, is not responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor even negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the organization of branches of public service and in the appointment of its agents. The State can only be liable if it acts through a special agent (and a special agent, in the sense in which these words are employed, is one who receives a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official) so that in representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof, he executes the trust confided to him.In the case at bar, the ambulance driver was not a special agent nor was a government officer acting as a special agent hence, there can be no liability from the government. “The Government does not undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs, since that would involve it in all its operations in endless embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which would be subversive of the public interest.”

Rosete vs Auditor Gen.

This is an appeal from the decision of the Insular Auditor denying the claim of Inocencio Rosete and others against the Government in the amount of P35,376, for damages caused to buildings belonging to the claimant, which according to the appellant's claim were destroyed by fire that came from the contiguous warehouse of the Emergency Control Administration, ECA, located at No. 2262 Azcarraga, due to the negligence of a certain Jose Frayno y Panlilio in igniting recklessly his cigarette-lighter near a five gallon drum into which gasoline was being drained, and of the officers of the said ECA, which is an office or agency of the Government, in storing gasoline in said warehouse contrary to the provisions of Ordinances of the City of Manila.It is not necessary for us to pass upon the facts alleged by the appellant, but only on the question whether, assuming them to be true, the Insular Auditor erred in denying or dismissing the appellant's claim.The claimant contends that the Auditor General erred in not finding that the government agency or instrumentality known as the Emergency Control Administration of the officers thereof, were guilty of negligence in storing a highly combustible and inflammable substance in its warehouse on bodega in Manila in violation of City Ordinances, and therefore the government is liable for the damages sustained by the claimant under article 1903 of the Civil Code, which in its pertinent part reads as follows:

ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the preceding article is enforceable not only for personal acts and omissions but also for those persons for whom another is responsible.x x x           x x x           x x xThe state is liable in the scene when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damage should have been caused by the official to whom it properly pertained to do the act performed, in which case the provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable.

In the case of Merritt vs. Government of the Philippine Islands (34 Phil., 311), this Court held the following:

. . . Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code reads: "The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damage should have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in which cast the provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable."The supreme court of Spain in defining the scope of this paragraph said:"That the obligation to indemnify for damages which a third person causes to another by his fault or negligence is based, as is evidenced by the same Law 3, Title 15, Partida 7, on that the person obligated, by his own fault or negligence, takes part in the act or omission of the third party who caused the damage. It follows therefrom that the state, by virtue of such provisions of law, is not responsible for the damage suffered by private individuals in

consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor even negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the organization of branches of the public service and the appointment of its agents; on the contrary, we must presuppose all foresight humanly possible on its part in order that each branch of service serves the general weal and that of private persons interested in its operation. Between these latter and the state, therefore, no relations of a private nature governed by the civil law can arise except in a case where the state acts as a judicial person capable of acquiring rights and contracting obligations." (Supreme Court of Spain, January 7, 1898; 83 Jur. Civ., 24.).x x x           x x x           x x x"That the responsibility of the state is limited by article 1903 to the case wherein it acts through a special agent (and a special agent, in the sense in which these words are employed, is one who receives a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official) so that in representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof, he executes the trust confided to him. This concept does not apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the active administration and who on his own responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and which are regulated by law and the regulations." (Supreme Court of Spain, May 18, 1904; 98 Jur. Civ., 389, 390.)."That according to paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code and the principle laid down in a decision, among others, of the 18th of May, 1904, in a damage case, the responsibility of the state is limited to that which it contracts through a special agent, duly empowered by a definite order or commission to perform some act or charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to the claim, and not where the claim is based on acts or omissions imputable to a public official charged with some administrative or technical office who can be held to the proper responsibility. Consequently, the trial court in not so deciding and in sentencing the said entity to the payment of damages, caused by an official of the second class referred to, has by erroneous interpretation infringed the provisions of article 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code.' (Supreme Court of Spain, July 30, 1911; 122 Jur. Civ., 146.)"

There being no showing that whatever negligence may be imputed to the Emergency Control Administration or its officers, was done by an special agent, because the officers of the Emergency Control Administration did not act as special agents of the government within the above defined meaning of that word in article 1903 of the Civil Code in storing gasoline in warehouse of the ECA, the government is not responsible for the damages caused through such negligence.

The case of Marine Trading vs. Government, 39 Phil., 29, cited by the appellant, is inapplicable, because the plaintiff in that case recovered under the special provisions of articles 862, 827, 828 and 830 of the Code of Commerce and the Philippine Marine Regulations of the Collector of Customs, regarding collision of vessels, and not on the ground of tort in general provided for in article 1903 of the Civil Code.Act No. 327, in authorizing the filing of claims against the Government with the Insular Auditor, and appeal by the private persons or entities from the latter's decision to the Supreme Court, does not make any and all claims against the Government allowable, and the latter responsible for all claims which may be filed with the Insular Auditor under the provisions of said Act.In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is affirmed.

Fontanillas vs MailanmanPetitioners: Spouses Jose Fontanilla and Virginia FontanillaRespondents: Hon. Inocencio D. Maliaman and National Irrigation Administration (NIA)

FACTS    On December 1, 1989, the Court rendered a decision declaring National

Irrigation Administration (NIA), a government agency performing proprietary functions.  Like an ordinary employer, NIA was held liable for the injuries, resulting in death, of Francisco Fontanilla, son of petitioner spouses Jose and Virginia Fontanilla, caused by the fault and/or negligence of NIA’s driver employee Hugo Garcia; and NIA was ordered to pay the petitioners the amounts of P 12,000 for the death of the victim; P3,389 for hospitalization and burial expenses; P30,000 as moral

damages; P8,000 as exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees of 20% of the total award.

The National Irrigation Administration (NIA) maintains, however, that it does not perform solely and primarily proprietary functions, but is an agency of the government tasked with governmental functions, and is therefore not liable for the tortuous act of its driver Garcia, who was not its special agent.  For this, they have filed a motion for reconsideration on January 26, 1990.

NIA believes this bases this on:PD 552 – amended some provisions

of RA 3601 (the law which created the NIA)The case of Angat River Irrigation

System v. Angat River Workers’ UnionAngat Case: Although the majority opinion declares that the Angat System,

like the NIA, exercised a governmental function because the nature of its powers and functions does not show that it was intended to “bring to the Government any special corporate benefit or pecuniary profit”, a strong dissenting opinion held that Angat River system is a government entity exercising proprietary functions.

The Angat dissenting opinion:  Alegre protested the announced termination of his employment. He argued

that although his contract did stipulate that the same would terminate on July 17, 1976, since his services were necessary and desirable in the usual business of his employer, and his employment had lasted for five years, he had acquired the status of regular employee and could not be removed except for valid cause.

The employment contract of 1971 was executed when the Labor Code of the Philippines had not yet been promulgated, which came into effect some 3 years after the perfection of the contract.

ISSUE  Whether or not NIA is a government agency with a juridical personality separate and distinct from the government, thereby opening it up to the possibility that it may be held liable for the damages caused by its driver, who was not its special agent

HELD: YESReasoning the functions of government have been classified into governmental or constituent and proprietary or ministrant. The former involves the exercise of sovereignty and considered as compulsory; the latter connotes merely the exercise of proprietary functions and thus considered as optional. The National Irrigation Administration was not created for purposes of local government. While it may be true that the NIA was essentially a service agency of the government aimed at promoting public interest and public welfare, such fact does not make the NIA essentially and purely a

"government-function" corporation. NIA was created for the purpose of "constructing, improving, rehabilitating, and administering all national irrigation systems in the Philippines, including all communal and pump irrigation projects." Certainly, the state and the community as a whole are largely benefited by the services the agency renders, but these functions are only incidental to the principal aim of the agency, which is the irrigation of lands.NIA is a government agency invested with a corporate personality separate and distinct from the government, thus is governed by the Corporation Law. Section 1 of Republic Act No. 3601 provides:Sec. 1. Name and Domicile — A body corporate is hereby created which shall be known as the National Irrigation Administration. . . . which shall be organized immediately after the approval of this Act. It shall have its principal seat of business in the City of Manila and shall have representatives in all provinces, for the proper conduct of its business. (Emphasis for emphasis). Besides, Section 2, subsection b of P.D. 552 provides that:(b) To charge and collect from the beneficiaries of the water from all irrigation systems constructed by or under its administration, such fees or administration charges as may be necessary to cover the cost of operation, maintenance and insurance, and to recover the cost of construction within a reasonable period of time to the extent consistent with government policy; to recover funds or portions thereof expended for the construction and/or rehabilitation of communal irrigation systems which funds shall accrue to a special fund for irrigation development under section 2 hereof;Unpaid irrigation fees or administration charges shall be preferred liens first, upon the land benefited, and then on the crops raised thereon, which liens shall have preference over all other liens except for taxes on the land, and such preferred liens shall not be removed until all fees or administration charges are paid or the property is levied upon and sold by the National Irrigation Administration for the satisfaction thereof. . . .The same section also provides that NIA may sue and be sued in court.It has its own assets and liabilities. It also has corporate powers to be exercised by a Board of Directors. Section 2, subsection (f): . . . and to transact such business, as are directly or indirectly necessary, incidental or conducive to the attainment of the above powers and objectives, including the power to establish and maintain subsidiaries, and in general, to exercise all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law, insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act. DISPOSITION: The court concluded that the National Irrigation Administration is a government agency with a juridical personality separate and distinct from the government. It is not a mere agency of the government but a corporate body performing proprietary functions. Therefore, it may be held liable for the damages caused by the negligent act of its driver who was not its special agent.

ACCORDINGLY, the Motion for Reconsideration dated January 26, 1990 is DENIED WITH FINALITY. The decision of this Court in G.R. No. 55963 and G.R. No. 61045 dated December 1, 1989 is hereby AFFIRMED.  

TEACHERS AND HEADS OF ACADEMIC ESTABLISHMENT

Amadora vs CAFACTS: Alfredo Amadora was shot by a gun fired by his classmate Daffon while in the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos Auditorium at a date after the semester ended. He was there to submit a graduation requirement in Physics.Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence . Additionally, the herein petitioners, as the victim’s parents, filed a civil action for damages under Article 2180 of the CC against the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector the high school principal, the dean of boys, and the physics teacher, together with Daffon and two other students, through their respective parents.The complaint against the students was later dropped. After trial, the CFI of Cebu held the remaining defendants liable to the plaintiffs, representing death compensation, loss of earning capacity, costs of litigation, funeral expenses, MD, ED and AF.On appeal to the respondent court, however, the decision was reversed and all the defendants were completely absolved. Hence this petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.In its decision the respondent court found that Article 2180 was not applicable as the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos was not a school of arts and trades but an academic institution of learning. It also held that the students were not in the custody of the school at the time of the incident as the semester had already ended.ISSUE: how should Art. 2180 be applied in this case HELD: the petition is DENIED. The rector, the high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be held liable because none of them was the teacher-in-charge as previously defined. Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos cannot be held directly liable under the article because only the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades is made responsible for the damage caused by the student or apprentice 

Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. xxLastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.After an exhaustive examination of the problem, the Court has come to the conclusion that the provision in question should apply to all schools, academic as well as non-academic. Where the school is academic rather than technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of such student, following the first part of the provision. This is the general rule. In the case of establishments of arts and trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, who shall be held liable as an exception to the general rule.As stated in the dissent of Justice J.B.L. Reyes in the Exconde Case, under Art. 2180, he said, was imposed on (1) teachers in general; and (2) heads of schools of arts and trades in particular. The modifying clause “of establishments of arts and trades” should apply only to “heads” and not “teachers.”But of course, as long as the defendant can show that he had taken the necessary precautions to prevent the injury complained of, he can exonerate himself from the liability imposed by Article 2180, as stated in its last paragraph.In this connection, it should be observed that the teacher will be held liable not only when he is acting in loco parentis for the law does not require that the offending student be of minority age. Unlike the parent, who wig be liable only if his child is still a minor, the teacher is held answerable by the law for the act of the student under him regardless of the student’s ageIn any event, it should be noted that the liability imposed by this article is supposed to fall directly on the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades and not on the school itself. If at all, the school, whatever its nature, may be held to answer for the acts of its teachers or even of the head thereof under the general principle of respondeat superior, but then it may exculpate itself from liability by proof that it had exercised the diligence of a bonus paterfamilias.The school can show that it exercised proper measures in selecting the head or its teachers and the appropriate supervision over them in the custody and instruction of the pupils pursuant to its rules and regulations for the maintenance of discipline among them.The other matter to be resolved is the duration of the responsibility of the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades over the students. Is such responsibility co-extensive with the period when the student is actually

undergoing studies during the school term, as contended by the respondents and impliedly admitted by the petitioners themselves?This does not necessarily mean that such, custody be co-terminous with the semester, beginning with the start of classes and ending upon the close thereof, and excluding the time before or after such period, such as the period of registration, and in the case of graduating students, the period before the commencement exercises [During such periods, the student is still subject to the disciplinary authority of the school and cannot consider himself released altogether from observance of its rules.]In the view of the Court, the student is in the custody of the school authorities as long as he is under the control and influence of the school and within its premises, whether the semester has not yet begun or has already ended.As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school premises in pursuance of a legitimate student objective, in the exercise of a legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege, the responsibility of the school authorities over the student continues. Indeed, even if the student should be doing nothing more than relaxing in the campus in the company of his classmates and friends and enjoying the ambience and atmosphere of the school, he is still within the custody and subject to the discipline of the school authorities under the provisions of Article 2180.NOTES:The reason for the disparity [distinction of who should be responsible for students between academic and arts and trades schools] can be traced to the fact that historically the head of the school of arts and trades exercised a closer tutelage over his pupils than the head of the academic school. The old schools of arts and trades were engaged in the training of artisans apprenticed to their master who personally and directly instructed them on the technique and secrets of their craft. By contrast, the head of the academic school was not as involved with his students and exercised only administrative duties over the teachers who were the persons directly dealing with the students. The head of the academic school had then (as now) only a vicarious relationship with the students. Consequently, while he could not be directly faulted for the acts of the students, the head of the school of arts and trades, because of his closer ties with them, could be so blamed.It is conceded that the distinction no longer obtains at present in view of the expansion of the schools of arts and trades, the consequent increase in their enrollment, and the corresponding diminution of the direct and personal contract of their heads with the students. Article 2180, however, remains unchanged. In its present state, the provision must be interpreted by the Court according to its clear and original mandate until the legislature, taking into account the charges in the situation subject to be regulated, sees fit to enact the necessary amendment.

Palisoc vs Brillantes

FACTS: In March 1966, while Dominador Palisoc (16 years old) was watching Virgilio Daffon and Desiderio Cruz work on a machine in their laboratory class in the Manila Technical Institute (a school of arts and trades), Daffon scolded Palisoc for just standing around like a foreman. This caused Palisoc to slightly slap the face of Daffon and a fistfight ensued between the two. Daffon delivered blows that eventually killed Palisoc. The parents of Palisoc sued Daffon, the school president (Teodosio Valenton), the instructor (Santiago Quibulue), and the owner (Antonio Brillantes). The basis of the suit against Valenton, Quibulue, and Brillantes was Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

The lower court, as well as the CA, ruled that only Daffon is liable for damages and that Valenton, Quibulue, and Brillantes are not liable because under Article 2180, they are only liable “so long as they [the students] remain in their custody.” And that this means, as per Mercado vs Court of Appeals, that teachers or heads of establishments are only liable for the tortious acts of their students if the students are living and boarding with the teacher or other officials of the school – which Daffon was not.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ruling in the Mercado Case still applies.

HELD: No. The SC abandoned the ruling in the Mercado Case as well as the ruling in the Exconde Case as they adopted Justice JBL Reyes’ dissenting opinion in the latter case. Valenton and Quibulue as president and teacher-in-charge of the school must be held jointly and severally liable for the quasi-delict of Daffon. The unfortunate death resulting from the fight between the students could have been avoided, had said defendants but complied with their duty of providing adequate supervision over the activities of the students in the school premises to protect their students from harm, whether at the hands of fellow students or other parties. At any rate, the law holds them liable unless they relieve themselves of such liability, in compliance with the last paragraph of Article 2180, Civil Code, by “(proving) that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.” In the light of the factual findings of the lower court’s decision, said defendants failed to prove such exemption from liability.      The SC reiterated that there is nothing in the law which prescribes that a student must be living and

boarding with his teacher or in the school before heads and teachers of the school may be held liable for the tortious acts of their students.

St. Mary's Academy vs CarpitranosFACTS:

Herein petitioner, conducted an enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996 They visited schools from where prospective enrollees were studying.  Sherwin Carpitanos joined the campaign.  Along with the other high school students, they rode a Mitsubishi jeep owned by Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School. Such jeep was driven by James Daniel II, a 15 year old student of the same school.  It was alleged that he drove the jeep in a reckless manner which resulted for it to turned turtle.  Sherwin died due to this accident. 

ISSUE: WON petitioner should be held liable for the damages.

HELD:

CA held petitioner liable for the death of Sherwin under Article 218 and 219 of the Family Code where it was pointed that they were negligent in allowing a minor to drive and not having a teacher accompany the minor students in the jeep.  However, for them to be held liable, the act or omission to be considered negligent must be the proximate cause of the injury caused thus, negligence needs to have a causal connection to the accident.  It must be direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by any efficient intervening causes.  The parents of the victim failed to show such negligence on the part of the petitioner.  The spouses Villanueva admitted that the immediate cause of the accident was not the reckless driving of James but the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep.  Futhermore, there was no evidence that petitioner allowed the minor to drive the jeep of Villanueva.  The mechanical defect was an event over which the school has no control hence they may not be held liable for the death resulting from such accident.

The registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily be responsible to the public or to 3 rd persons for injuries caused while it is being driven on the road.  It is not the school, but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin.  Case was remanded to the trial court for determination of the liability of the defendants excluding herein petitioner.

ST. FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL VS. CA

FACTS: Ferdinand Castillo, a freshman student at the St. Francis High School, wanted to join a school picnic. His parents, respondents spouses Dr. Romulo Castillo and Lilia Cadiz Castillo, because of short notice, did not allow their son to join but merely allowed him to bring food to the teachers for the picnic, with the directive that he should go back home after doing so. However, because of persuasion of the teachers, Ferdinand went on with them to the beach. During the picnic, one of the female teachers was apparently drowning. Some of the students, including Ferdinand, came to her rescue, but in the process, it was Ferdinand himself who drowned. He died. Respondent spouses filed a civil case against petitioner and some of their teachers. Trial court found teachers liable but dismissed complaint against the school.

ISSUE: W/N petitioner school and teachers are liable.

RULING: Petition granted.

RATIO: Before an employer may be held liable for the negligence of his employee, the act or omission which caused damage must have occurred while an employee was in the performance of his assigned tasks. In the case at bar, the teachers/petitioners were not in the actual performance of their assigned tasks. What was held was a purely private affair, a picnic, which did not have permit from the school since it was not a school sanctioned activity. Mere knowledge by petitioner/principal of the planning of the picnic does not in any way consent to the holding of the same.No negligence could be attributable to the petitioners-teachers to warrant the award of damages to the respondents-spouses. The class adviser of the section where Ferdinand belonged, did her best and exercised diligence of a good father of a family to prevent any untoward incident or damages to all the students who joined the picnic.