merrill v. lynch - order to vacate gag order

7/23/2019 Merrill v. Lynch - Order to Vacate Gag Order

1/35

UNITED STATES

DISTRI T

COURT

SOUTHERN

DISTRI T

OF NEW YORK

-----------------------------------x

NICHOLAS MERRILL

Pla in t i f f ,

-

agains t

-

LORETTA

E. LYNCH in her o f f i c i a l

Capacity as Attorney General of

The

United

Sta tes , and

JAMES B. COMEY in his of f ic ia l

Capacity

as Director of

the

Federal

Bureau

of Invest iga t ion ,

Defendants.

14-CV-9763

VM)

DE ISION AND ORDER

-----------------------------------x

VICTOR

MARRERO

United States i s tr i c t Judge

Pla in t i f f Nicholas Merri l l ( Merr i l l ) brought su i t

seeking in junct ive r e l i e f agains t defendants

Loret ta

E.

Lynch, in her o f f i c i a l

capaci ty

as At torney General of the

United Sta tes , and James

B. Corney,

in h i s o f f i c i a l

capaci ty

as

Director

of

the

Federal

Bureau of

Invest iga t ion

(col lec t ive ly, Defendants or the Government )

.

(Dkt.

No.

1

( Complaint

o r Compl. ) .

Now

before the

Court

i s

M err i l l s motion for summary judgment, made

pursuant

to

Rule

56 of the

Federal

Rules

of

Civi l

Procedure ( Rule

1

The Court

notes

tha t ,

a t the

t ime Merr i l l

i n i t i a t ed th i s l i t i ga t ion ,

Er ic

Holder,

J r .

served as

the

Attorney

General of the United Sta tes ,

and

i n t h a t of f i c i a l capaci ty ,

was

a

named

defendant .

Pursuant to

Federa l Rule of

Civ i l Procedure

25(d), the

Court subs t i tu te s

Lore t ta

E.

Lynch

fo r Er ic

Holder,

J r .


2/35

56 )

/

seeking t ha t an

order

to li t a non-disc losure

requirement imposed by a National Secur i ty Let te r ( NSL )

from

the Federal

Bureau

of Inves t iga t ion (the FBI )

(Dkt.

Nos.

16,

17.)

The Government opposes Merr i l l ' s

summary

judgment

motion,

and

a lso

moves to

dismiss

the Complaint

or

for summary judgment.

(Dkt. Nos.

24,

25.)

I

BACKGROUND

In 2004, Nicholas Merr i l l was the

owner

and

opera tor

of Calyx

In te rne t Access ( Calyx ) , a

now-defunct

company

tha t provided a

number

of in te rne t services to i t s c l ien t s ,

including an in te r face

for maintaining

t he i r own

websi tes ,

2

The fac tua l

summary presented

here in der ives from

the fol lowing

documents:

Complaint, f i l ed Dec.

11,

2014, Dkt.

No.

l ; P l a i n t i f f ' s

Memorandum of Law in Support of i t s Motion

fo r Summary Judgment,

dated

Mar. 10, 2015, Dkt. No.

16

( Pl .

Mem. );

P l a i n t i f f ' s Rule

56. l

Statement , dated Mar. 10,

2015,

Dkt.

No.

18;

the Declara t ion of

Nicholas Merr i l l in

Support

of

Pla in t i f f ' s

Motion fo r Summary Judgment,

dated

Mar.

10,

2015,

Dkt.

No.

19

( Merr i l l

Deel . ) ;

the Declara t ion

of

Jonathan Manes in Support of

Pla in t i f f ' s

Motion for Summary Judgment,

dated Mar. 10,

2015,

Dkt.

No.

20

( Manes Deel . ) ; Government 's

Memorandum

of

Law in Support

of

the Government 's Motion to

Dismiss

or

for Summary Judgment, and in Opposi t ion to P l a i n t i f f ' s Motion for

Summary Judgment, dated Apr.

24,

2015,

Dkt.

No. 25 ( Gov' t Mem. ); the

Declara t ion of Gary Perdue in

Support

of the Government Motion, dated

Apr.

23,

2015,

Dkt.

No.

30

( Perdue Deel . ) ; the Government 's

Rule

56.1

Counter-Statement , dated Apr. 24,

2015,

Dkt. No. 26; Reply Memorandum

of Law in Fur ther

Support

of

P l a i n t i f f ' s

Motion for

Summary

Judgment

and in Opposi t ion

to

Government Motion

to Dismiss

or fo r Summary

Judgment,

dated June

11, 2015,

Dkt.

No.

36

( Pl .

Reply

Mem. );

Pla in t i f f ' s

Rule

56. l

Counter-Statement , dated

June

11,

2015,

Dkt.

No.

37; the Second Declara t ion of Jonathan Manes in Support of

Pla in t i f f ' s

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment

and

in

Opposi t ion

to

Government

Motion

to

Dismiss

or for

Summary Judgment, dated

June 11,

2015,

Dkt.

No. 38

( Second

Manes

Deel . )

; Reply Memorandum of Law in Further Support of

the

Government 's

Motion

to Dismiss or

fo r

Summary

Judgment,

and in

Opposi t ion

to Pla in t i f f ' s Motion for

Summary Judgment,

dated Ju ly

31,

2015,

Dkt.

No.

42

( Gov't Reply Mem. ).

Except

where

spec i f i ca l l y

referenced, no fur the r

c i t a t i on

to

these

sources wil l be made.

- 2 -


3/35

e lec t ron ic

f i l e

s torage ,

and

emai l

accounts .

In February

2004, an FBI agent served Merr i l l with an NSL ( the 2004

NSL )

which

was accompanied

by an

at tachment (the

Attachment )

l i s t i n g the types of records

the FBI

sought

from

Calyx. Under the US

PATRIOT

Act,

Pub.

L. No. 107-56

505(a), 115 Sta t . 272,

365

(2001) ,

3

in

e f fec t

then (and now

under

the US FREEDOM Act of

2015, Pub.

L. No. 114-23, 129

Sta t .

268)

/

the

FBI

can

i s sue

NSLs,

a type of

adminis t ra t ive subpoena

reques t ing

subscr iber informat ion

and

t o l l

b i l l i ng records

informat ion,

or

e lec t ron ic

communication t ransac t iona l

records

from a

wire or

e lec t ron ic serv ice

provider . 18

u.s.c.

2709 (a)

.

In i t i a l l y , the 2004 NSL proh ib i ted Merri l l from d isc los ing :

(1) t ha t he was the rec ip ien t of an

NSL,

(2) the

iden t i ty

of the

t a rge t

of the underlying

invest iga t ion ,

and

(3)

the

contents

of both the 2004 NSL and

the

Attachment.

The

Court f i r s t examined the

2004

NSL

in

Doe

v.

Ashcroft , 334 F. Supp.

2d

471 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)

( Doe

I ) .

In

Doe

I ,

the Court found an e a r l i e r vers ion of 18 U.S.C.

Sect ion 2709 ( Sect ion

2709 ), which provides the s ta tu tory

3

The

r e levan t s ta tu to ry provis ions regarding

NSLs

were amended by The

US

Pa t r io t

Improvement and Reauthor iza t ion Act of 2005,

115,

116(a) , Pub.

L.

No. 109-177, 120 Sta t .

192,

211-14 (Mar. 9,

2006)

( the

Reauthor iza t ion Act ) , and

the

US P a t r i o t Act Addi t iona l Reauthor iz ing

Amendments Act

of 2006,

4(b) , Pub. L.

No.

109-178, 120 Sta t .

278,

280

(Mar. 9, 2006)

( Addi t ional Reauthor iza t ion Act ) .

- 3 -


4/35

author iza t ion

for

the

FBI

to

issue

NSLs to

be

unconst i tu t ional

on i t s face.

Further , the Court

found the

Sect ion 2709 nondisclosure requirement unconst i tu t ional

under the

Fi r s t

Amendment as

an

unjus t i f i ed pr ior re s t ra in t

and

content-based re s t r i c t ion

on

speech. The Government

appealed to the

United

Sta tes

Court

of Appeals for the

Second

Circui t ,

and while the appeal was pending, Congress

amended

Sect ion 2709 to include a requirement

that , to

prohib i t disc losure of an NSL the FBI must

ce r t i fy tha t

disc losure

may

resu l t in an enumerated harm i . e . , a

danger to the nat ional secur i ty of the United Sta tes ,

in terference

with

a

cr iminal , counter ter ror ism,

or

counter in te l l igence

inves t iga t ion,

inter ference

with

diplomatic re la t ions ,

or danger

to

the l i f e or phys ical

safe ty

of

any

person.

18

u.s.c.

2709(c)

(1).

Congress

also enacted a

sec t ion

providing for jud ic ia l

review

of

an

NS

request or

re la ted

non-disclosure requirement .

See 18

U.S.C.

3511

( Sect ion 3511 ) .

The

Second Circui t remanded

to

t h i s Court

for fur ther considerat ion in

l i gh t

of these

amendments. See Doe v.

Gonzales,

449 F.3d 415 (2d Cir.

2006).

On

remand, in

Doe

v. Gonzales, 500 F. Supp. 2d 379

(S.D.N.Y.

2007)

( Doe

I I ) , the Court

again found

Sect ions

4


5/35

2709 (c) and 3511 b) unconst i tu t ional

on

the i r face. The

Court ru led

tha t

the

nondisclosure

requirement

vio la ted

the

Firs t Amendment

because t was not narrowly t a i lo red in

scope o r

durat ion.

Further , the Court

found

the jud ic ia l

review

provis ion

vio la ted the

cons t i tu t iona l

pr inc ip le s of

checks

and balances,

as

well as separa t ion of powers.

The Government appealed Doe I I , and the Second Circui t

aff i rmed in par t and reversed in par t . See John Doe

v.

Mukasey, 549 F.3d 861 (2d Cir. 2008). The Second

Circui t

inval ida ted two

primary

aspects

of

Sect ions 2709 and

3511:

1) tha t FBI ce r t i f i c a t ion of cer ta in r i sks i s

en t i t l ed

to

a conclusive

presumption

(absent

bad

fa i th by the courts;

and

2)

the fa i lu re to provide

for

Government- ini t ia ted

jud ic ia l review.

See id .

a t 884.

The

Circui t

Court

construed the

remaining

par t s

of Sect ions

2709

and

3511

to

provide

cer ta in procedural safeguards

(as discussed in f ra ,

and held

that ,

with

those

safeguards, those

s ta tu tory

sec t ions were

const i tut ional . See

id . a t 883-85.

The Second Circui t then remanded to

t h i s Court

to

determine whether, in the l igh t of the Circui t Court s

reading of the s ta tu te and the procedural guidance t

provided,

the non-disclosure

requirement was cons t i tu t iona l

as-appl ied

to

the

NS

i s sued to

Merr i l l . On remand,

in Doe

- 5 -


6/35

v. Holder, 665 F. Supp. 2d

426 (S.D.N.Y.

2009)

( Doe I I I ) ,

the Court found the Mukasey standard sa t i s f ied . The Court

held tha t

a

good

reason

exis ted to

bel ieve

tha t

disc losure may r e su l t in a

harm re la ted to an

authorized

ongoing inves t iga t ion to protec t

agains t

in te rna t iona l

t e rror i sm or

c landes t ine

in te l l igence ac t iv i t i e s ,

and tha t

the

l ink between

disc losure

and the

r i sk

of harm

[was]

subs tan t i a l . Id.

a t 432.

Following

Doe

I I I ,

Merri l l

moved

for pa r t i a l

recons idera t ion

of

Doe

I I I

as t appl ied

to

the Attachment.

See Doe v. Holder, 703 F. Supp. 2d

313 (S.D.N.Y.

2010)

( Doe

IV ).

The

Court

granted

the motion in

par t and denied

t in

part ,

order ing

cer ta in information

disc losed.

The

Court found tha t two categories of mater ia l contained in

the

Attachment

should

be

disc losed:

1)

mater ia l

within the

scope

of

what

the NS s ta tu te iden t i f ies as permissible for

the FBI to obta in through the use of NSLs, and 2) mater ia l

tha t the FBI

has

publ ic ly

acknowledged

t

has

previous ly

requested by

means

of NSLs. See id. a t 316. The Court was

not persuaded

tha t

disc losure of these two categories of

informat ion

would ra i se

a

substant ia l

r i sk

tha t any of the

s ta tu to r i ly enumerated harms

would

occur . Id . As

to the

r e s t

of the

Attachment,

the

Court

found tha t the

Government

- 6 -


7/35

had demonstrated a reasonable l ike l ihood tha t disc losure

of the Attachment in i t s

en t i r e ty

could

inform

current

t a rge t s of law

enforcement

inves t iga t ions

including

the

par t i cu la r t a rge t of the Government's ongoing

inquiry

in

th i s

ac t ion,

as wel l as, poten t i a l ly fu ture t a rge t s as to

cer ta in types of records and

o ther

mater ia l s the Government

seeks through nat ional secur i ty inves t iga t ions

employing

NSLs. Id . a t 317. In so f inding,

the

Court noted

tha t

otherwise innocuous b i t s and pieces of data , when pieced

together ,

could

inform

current

and

poten t i a l ly fu ture

t a rge t s of the inves t iga t ion as to the types of records and

other mater ia l s sought by the government.

After the Court

decided

Doe IV, Merri l l and the

Government reached an agreement under which Merri l l

could

iden t i fy

himself as

the

rec ip ien t

of the

NSL. Doe

v.

Ashcroft , No.

04-cv-2614

(S.D.N.Y.),

Dkt.

No. 204

( July

30, 2010 Stip. and

Order

of

Dismissal ) . )

And

in 2014,

the

par t i es

reached

an agreement tha t

Merri l l

could f ree ly

discuss

most

aspects

of the NSL, including the iden t i ty of

i t s

t a rge t but he

could

not

discuss

the

Attachment

ident i fying cer ta in types of records the FBI

sought,

except

for those por t ions

of the

Attachment iden t i f i ed for

d isc losure in Doe IV. Doe v. Ashcroft , No. 04-cv-2614

- 7 -


8/35

(S.D.N.Y.) , Dkt. No.

227

( Apri l 15, 2014 St i p .

and

Order

Mod.

J . ) . )

Shor t l y

t he r e a f t e r ,

on December 11,

2014, Merr i l l

f i l e d

the

Complaint

aga ins t

the Government. At t he

t ime

Merr i l l

f i l e d h is i n s t a n t

ac t ion ,

Sec t ion

3511(b) (3)

a l lowed

NSL

r e c i p i e n t s

to

cha l lenge

non-d i sc losu re

requirements

annua l ly .

18 U.S.C.

35l l (b)

(3)

( in e f f ec t

Mar.

9,

2006 - June 1, 20 15). As such, M e r r i l l' s Complaint

proceeds as a

separa t e

a c t i o n

from

Doe I

and

ts progeny.

At i s sue in

t h i s l i t i g a t i o n i s whether t he

Government

can

con t inue t o p r o h i b i t d i s c l o s u r e o f t he

redac ted

Attachment

under Sec t ions 2907

and

3511 (as amended

on June

2,

2 015) .

Merr i l l

a s s e r t s

t h ree

causes o f

ac t ion : 1)

t ha t

t he non-d i sc losu re o rde r

p r o h i b i t i n g

d i scuss ion

o f

the

Attachment

i s

a

permanent

o r

e f f e c t i ve l y

permanent ban

on

speech p r o h i b i t e d by the

F i r s t

Amendment;

(2) t h a t

the

nond isc losu re orde r i s no t j u s t i f i e d

under Sec t ion 3511

because

the Government

cannot e s t a b l i s h a good reason to

be l i eve t ha t d i sc losu re may r e s u l t in

an enumerated

harm

r e l a t e d to an au thor i zed i n v e s t i g a t i o n t o

p r o t e c t

aga ins t

i n t e r n a t i o n a l

t e r ro r i sm

o r

c l andes t i ne i n t e l l i gence

4

As

amended,

Sec t ion

3511

no longer requi res an NSL

r ec ip ien t

who

unsuccess fu l ly

chal lenged a nondisc losure

requirement

to wai t a

year or

more

before

again seeking

j ud i c i a l

r e l i e f . (See Gov' t Reply Mem 3.)

- 8 -


9/35

ac t i v i t i e s ;

and (3) tha t ,

under

Sect ions

2709 and 3511,

once an NSL rec ip ien t has been permi t ted to ident i fy

himself , to

ident i fy the t a rge t

of

the NSL

and to d isc lose

the outcome

of the NSL then

the FBI cannot cont inue

a

non

disc losure

order

as

regards

o ther

aspec ts of the NSL.

Merr i l l argues t ha t he seeks

d isc losure

in order to

con t r ibu te

to publ ic discuss ion

as

to the

types

of

e lec t ron ic

communications

t ransac t ion records

t ha t the

FBI has sought and cont inues to

seek

through NSLs.

For

the

reasons

discussed

below, the Court

f inds

t ha t

the Government

has

not s a t i s f i ed i t s burden of

demonstra t ing

a

good reason to expect t ha t d isc losure of

the NSL

Attachment

in i t s

en t i r e t y

wi l l

r i sk

an

enumerated

harm,

pursuant

to

Sect ions 2709 and

3511.

Therefore ,

Merr i l l ' s

motion

for

summary

judgment

i s

GRANTED and

the

Government 's

cross-mot ion

to

dismiss

the

complain t

or , in

the a l te rna t ive , for summary

judgment

i s DENIED

I I .

DISCUSSION

A

STANDARD OF

REVIEW

Merr i l l

has moved for summary judgment, pursuant

to

Rule

56, and the Government has

cross-moved to dismiss ,

pursuant

to Federa l

Rule

of Civ i l Procedure

12

(b) (6) ( Rule

12

(b) (6)

) ,

o r in

the a l t e rna t ive

for

summary judgment,

- 9 -


10/35

pursuan t to

Rule

56. In cons ider ing a motion to

dismiss ,

the Court may

r e l y on

the

f ac tua l

a l l e ga t i ons s e t

f o r t h

in

the

compla int

i t s e l f and not on a d d i t i o n a l m at te r s a s se r t e d

in a f f i dav i t s ,

exh ib i t s o r o the r papers submit ted

in

conjunc t ion

with

the

motion. See Fr ied l

v . City of

New

York,

210

F.3d

79, 83-84 (2d Cir . 2000) . Because bo th s ides

have submit ted

subs t an t ive

dec la ra t ions o r o the r mater i a l s

not included in

the

Complaint , t he Cour t cons iders

the

Government 's

motion

as one

fo r

summary judgment .

The

Court may grant summary judgment

on ly i

it f inds

t ha t

t he re

i s

no

genuine

d i spu te

as to

any mater i a l

f ac t

and the

movant

i s

e n t i t l e d

to judgment as a

mat t e r of law.

Fed.

R. Civ.

P. 56(a) . The ro le of a

cour t

in ru l ing on

such a

motion i s

not

to reso lve

d i spu ted i s sues

of

f a c t

bu t

to as ses s

whether

t he re a re

any

f ac tua l i s sues to

be

t r i ed , while reso lv ing ambigui t ies

and drawing reasonab le

in ferences

aga ins t

the moving

par ty . Knight

v. Uni ted

Sta tes Fi re

Ins .

Co., 804 F.2d

9,

11 (2d

Cir .

1986) The

moving

par ty bears the burden of proving t ha t

no

genuine

i s sue of mater i a l

f a c t

ex i s t s o r t ha t by reason of the

pauc i ty

of

evidence

pre sen ted

by

t he

non-movant, no

r a t i ona l f a c t f

i nder could f i nd in

favor

of

the non-moving

10


11/35

party .

See

Gallo

v. Prudent ia l

Resident ia l

Servs . , 22 F.3d

1219, 1223 (2d Cir .

1994).

B

NON DISCLOSURE

ORDERS UNDER

SECTIONS

2709

ND

3511

On June 2,

2015,

Congress

enacted

the

USA FREEDOM

Act,

which, among

other s ta tu tory

changes, rev ises

Sect ions

2709

and 3511. The Government has ind ica ted

i t s

bel i e f tha t

these

changes to

Sect ions 2709 and

3511 r a t i fy

and codify

the

Second

Circu i t ' s decis ion

in [Mukasey] (Gov' t Reply

Mem a t 2.)

The

Government

notes tha t

the House Committee

Report

exp l i c i t l y ind ica ted tha t the rev is ions

to

Sect ion

3511 correc t [

] the cons t i tu t iona l defec ts in

the

issuance

of NSL

nondisclosure

orders

found

[ in

Mukasey] and adopts

the concepts suggested by

tha t

cour t

for a

cons t i tu t iona l ly

sound

process .

(Gov't Reply Mem a t 2 n.2 (quoting H.

Rep.

No.

114-109,

a t

24

(2015))

.)

In Mukasey, because of disagreement on the

panel ,

the

Second Circui t l e f t open the question whether

NSL

non-

disc losure orders were subjec t to

s t r i c t sc ru t iny

or a

l ess-exact ing scru t iny .

5

See 549 F.3d a t 877-78. Under

e i ther

l evel

of scrut iny,

however,

the

Second

Circui t

5

The Second C i r c u i t d i d n o te t ha t ,

f o r

purposes o f t he s p e c i f i c

l i t i g a t i o n

b e fo re

it

in

Mukasey,

t he Government

conceded

t h a t

stri t

s c r u t i n y

i s t h e app l i cab le s t anda r d . 549 F.3d a t 878. Here, too , t h e

Government

has conceded

t h a t t h e

high ,

indeed s t r i c t ,

s c r u t i n y

ap p l i ed

by [Mukasey]

c o n t r o l s

t h i s case . (Gov' t Mem. a t 11 . )

- 11 -


12/35

iden t i f i ed

two

l imita t ions

required

by the Fi r s t Amendment:

1) the Government must i n i t i a t e jud ic ia l review of non-

disclosure requirements i f

an

individual

subjec t

to the

non-disclosure

requirement

so

requests ,

and

2)

tha t

jud ic ia l review must be meaningful. See id. a t 878-83. As

to th i s second

l imita t ion,

the Second Circui t indica ted

tha t , to sa t i s fy F i r s t Amendment procedural requirements,

1) the

Government

has the burden

to

2) show tha t a good

reason ex is t s

to

expect tha t 3) disclosure of receipt of

an

NSL wil l

r i sk

an

enumerated

harm.

6

Id.

a t

881.

Firs t , by

placing

the burden on

the

government to show

a good reason, a d i s t r i c t

cour t

does not have to f ind a

negat ive, i . e . , tha t no

good reason

ex is t s to bel ieve tha t

disc losure may r i sk one of the enumerated

harms.

Id.

a t

876. Second,

as

to

the

good

reason

requirement:

[ ]

reason wil l

not

qual i fy as 'good' i f

it surmounts

only a s tandard of fr ivolousness. We unders tand the

s ta tu to ry

requirement

of a f inding tha t an enumerated

harm 'may r esu l t ' to mean

more

than a conceivable

6

When

Mukasey

was

decided , Sec t ion

3511 prov ided

t h a t a c our t cou ld

modify o r s e t a s ide a

nond i sc losu re

requ i rement i it found

no

reason

to be l i e ve

t h a t d isc losu re

may endanger the

na t iona l s e c u r i t y o f

the

United S t a t e s ,

i n t e r f e r e

wi t h a

c r imina l ,

c oun te r t e r ro r i sm, o r

coun te r in te l l igence inves t iga t ion ,

i n t e r f e r e wi th d ip loma t i c

r e l a t i o n s ,

o r

endanger

the

l i f e

o r

phys i c a l

s a f e t y

o f

any

pe r son .

18

U.S.

C.

35l l (b)

(2) - (3)

( in

e f f e c t

Mar. 9, 2006 June 1,

2015)

(emphasis

added)

.

At

t h a t

t ime,

under Sec t ion

3511,

a c our t was a l s o t o

t r e a t

an

o f f i c i a l

c e r t i f i c a t i o n

o f t h a t danger as

conc lus ive

absen t a f ind ing

o f

bad

f a i t h . This

ve rs ion

of

the s t a t u t e

remained in e f f e c t - - except

in the Second

C i r c u i t

as modif ied by Mukasey - - u n t i l June 2,

2015,

when the USA FREEDOM Act took e f f e c t .

-

12

-


13/35

poss ib i l i ty . The upholding of nondisclosure does

not

requi re the

certa inty ,

or even

the

imminence of, an

enumerated harm,

but some reasonable

l ike l ihood must

be

shown. The Government acknowledges

tha t while

the

reason

to

bel ieve s tandard in subsection

35ll(b)

unquest ionably

contemplates

a

deferen t i a l

s tandard of

review, in no way does t

foreclose

a

cour t from

evaluat ing

the reasonableness of the FBI's

judgments.

Id.

a t

875.

The Second

Circui t

then addressed whether courts could

be

required

to apply a conclusive

presumption

(absent bad

fa i th) to

the FBI cer t i f ica t ion :

While the court

wil l

normally

def e r to

the

Government's

considered

assessment of why disc losure

in a par t icu la r case may

r e su l t

in an

enumerated

harm

re la ted to such

grave matters

as in te rna t iona l

t e rror i sm

or

clandest ine in te l l igence

ac t iv i t i e s ,

t

cannot, consis ten t

with

s t r i c t

scrut iny

s tandards ,

uphold

a nondisclosure requirement

on

a conclusory

assurance tha t

such a l ike l ihood exis t s .

Id.

a t

881. Instead, the Government must a t l eas t indica te

the nature of the

apprehended

harm

and

provide

a

cour t with

some

basis to assure i t s e l f

tha t

the l ink between

disc losure

and

the r i sk

of

harm i s

subs tan t i a l .

Id. a t 881

(emphasis added) .

Final ly ,

as

to the th i rd requirement, the Second

Circui t s ta ted tha t the s ta tu to r i ly

enumerated harms

are

necessar i ly

keyed to the same s tandard tha t

governs

information

sought by an NSL

i . e .

re levant to an

authorized inves t iga t ion to protec t agains t in te rna t iona l

-

13

-


14/35

t e r ror i sm or clandest ine

in te l l igence

ac t iv i t i e s . Id. a t

875.

The sec t ions of the

US

FREEDOM Act amending Sect ions

2709

and

3511 incorporate port ions

of

Mukasey's

holding and

reasoning.

As in e a r l i e r

vers ions

of the s ta tu te , under

Sect ion 2709, the

government

may requi re non-disclosure for

four

s ta tu to r i ly enumerated

reasons, with ce r t i f i c a t ion

from an FBI of f ic ia l : i f disc losure could impl ica te 1 a

danger

to

the nat ional secur i ty

of

the United

Sta tes ; 2)

in te r ference with

a

cr iminal , counter ter ror ism, or

counter in te l l igence inves t iga t ion;

3

in te r ference

with

diplomatic re la t ions ;

o r

4) danger to the

l i f e

or

phys ical

safe ty of any

person.

18 U.S.C. 2709(c) 1) (B).

However,

Sect ion

2709

now a lso provides

tha t

an NSL

or a

nondisclosure

requirement

accompanying

an

NSL

i s

subject to

jud ic ia l

review

under Sect ion 3511, and tha t an

NSL must

include

notice of the ava i l ab i l i t y

of

jud ic ia l review.

18

u.s.c.

2709(d).

Most

re levant to the issue

a t

hand, the

US FREEDOM

Act made

s ign i f i can t

changes to Section 3511, the

s ta tu tory

provis ion

governing jud ic ia l review of NSLs. The curren t

vers ion

of Sect ion

3511

includes a

rec iprocal

notice

procedure (see Mukasey, 549 F.3d a t 879) providing

for

- 14 -


15/35

government- in i t ia ted review

of a

non-disc losure requirement

a f t e r not ice by the r ec ip ien t of

in ten t

to

chal lenge

the

non-disc losure

requirement.

18

U.S.C.

3511(b) 1) (A). And

no longer does Sect ion 3511

s t a t e

t ha t cour t s a re to give a

conclusive presumption, absent

bad f a i th , to the o f f i c i a l s

ce r t i f i c a t i on .

Now,

under

Sect ion 3511:

Standard A

d i s t r i c t

cour t

of the United Sta tes

sha l l i ssue a

nondisclosure order

i f the cour t

determines

t ha t there i s reason to bel ieve tha t

disc losure of

the

informat ion subjec t

to the

nondisclosure requirement during the appl icable t ime

per iod may

resu l t in

-

A) a

danger to

the

nat iona l secur i ty of

the

United

States ;

B) i n t e r fe rence

with a

cr iminal , counter te r ror ism,

or counter inte l l igence

inves t igat ion;

C)

i n t e r fe rence

with

diplomat ic

r e l a t ions ;

or

D) danger to

the

l i f e o r physica l safe ty of any

person.

18 u.s.c.

35ll(b)

3)

The Court agrees wi th the Government tha t ,

a t

leas t as

concerns

the re levant s ta tu to ry

provis ions

for the

case

a t

hand,

the

amended

Sect ions

2709 and 3511 codify

the

Mukasey

standard for j ud ic i a l review

of a non-disc losure

requirement

i . e . , tha t the Government

has

the

burden

to

show

tha t

a

good

reason

ex is t s

to

expect

tha t

disc losure

of

r ece ip t of an

NS

wil l r i sk an enumerated harm.

7

Therefore,

7

The Government argues t h a t [u] l t i m a t e l y , t he que s t i on under [ the

amended Sect ion] 2709

(c) and

[Mukasey] i s

whethe r the government

has

-

15

-


16/35

the

Court

wil l now

tu rn

to the appl ica t ion of the

Mukasey

standard,

as re f l ec ted

in Sect ions 2709 and

3511, to

the

port ions of the

Attachment

tha t

Merri l l

i s current ly

prohib i ted from discuss ing publ ic ly .

B PPLIC TION

TO THE

TT CHMENT

The Court now turns to

whether

the Government has

sa t i s f i ed

i t s

burden

of showing a

good reason exi s t s to

bel ieve

tha t disc losure of the

Attachment

could

resu l t

in a

s ta tu to r i ly

enumerated

harm re la ted to

an authorized

ongoing inves t iga t ion to protec t agains t in te rna t iona l

t e r ror i sm or

clandest ine in te l l igence ac t iv i t i e s .

The

Government

argues tha t

disc losure of

the

Attachment

would

reveal

law enforcement techniques tha t the

FBI has not acknowledged in

the

context of NSLs would

indica te

the

types

of information the FBI

deems

important

for inves t iga t ive purposes, and could lead to

poten t i a l

t a rge t s

of

inves t iga t ions

changing the i r

behavior

to evade

law enforcement detec t ion . (See Gov' t

Mem

a t

6.)

The Court

agrees tha t such

reasons

could,

in some

circumstances,

cons t i tu te good reasons for d isc losure . As the Second

Circui t s ta ted

in Mukasey, i t i s

obvious and

unarguable

met

ts

burden

o f showing a

'good

r easo n ' t o

ex p ec t t h a t

d i s c l o s u r e

w i l l r i s k

an

enumera ted

harm,

and ' some

b a s i s '

t o

conc lude t h a t

t h e

di sc losur e i s

l i n k ed

to

t h e r i sk .

(Gov' t Reply Mem. a t 8 . )

- 16 -


17/35

that

no

governmental i n t e r e s t

i s

more compelling

than

the

secur i ty of

the

nat ion. 549

F.3d

a t 878 (quoting Haig

v.

Agee,

453

U.S. 380, 307 (1981)) . Similarly , the Second

Circui t has ind ica ted tha t the government has

a compelling

i n t e r e s t

in

combatt ing

crime,

corrupt ion ,

and

racketeering. Sani ta t ion Recycling Indus. ,

Inc.

v.

City

of ew York,

107

F.3d

985,

998 (2d Cir. 1997). Such

in te res t s para l le l some

of

the Section 2709 enumerated

harms - -

i . e . ,

whether disc losure could impl ica te a danger

to the

nat ional secur i ty

of

the

United

Sta tes or

in te r ference

with a criminal ,

counter ter ror ism, o r

counter in te l l igence

inves t iga t ion.

However,

as

the Mukasey

Court

held,

cour ts

cannot, consis tent with

the Fi r s t

Amendment, simply accept the

Government's

asser t ions that

disc losure

would

impl ica te

and

crea te

a

r i sk

to

these

in te res t s . The Government must st ll

provide

a

cour t

with

some basis

to

assure i t s e l f

tha t the l ink

between

disc losure and

r i sk

of

harm

i s subs tan t i a l . See

Mukasey,

549 F.3d

a t

881 (emphasis added).

Here, the Government

has

not

demonstrated a good

reason to expect

tha t

publ ic disc losure

of

the

par t s of

the

Attachment tha t

remain

conf ident ia l would

r i sk

one of these

enumerated

harms; nor

has the Government

provided the

Court

-

17

-


18/35

with

some

basis to

assure

i t s e l f

tha t the l ink between

disc losure

and r i sk

of

harm i s

subs tan t ia l .

The

Government's

j u s t i f i ca t ions

might

cons t i tu te good reasons

i f the informat ion contained in the Attachment t ha t i s

st ll

redacted

were

not ,

a t l eas t

in

substance even i f

not

in the precise form,

a l ready

disc losed by

government

div is ions and agencies , and

thus

known

to

the

publ ic .

Here,

publ ic ly avai lab le

government documents provide

subs tan t ia l ly s imi la r informat ion

as

tha t

se t

fo r th

in

the

Attachment.

For

tha t reason,

the Court

i s

not persuaded

tha t t matters

tha t

these

other

documents

were not

disc losed

by

the

FBI i t s e l f ra the r than

by

other government

agencies , and tha t they would hold

s ign i f i can t

weight for a

potent ia l t a rge t of a nat ional secur i ty

inves t iga t ion

in

ascer ta in ing

whether

the

FBI

would

ga ther

such

informat ion

through

an NSL. The

documents

re fer red

to

were prepared and

publ ished by

various

government div is ions discuss ing the

FBI' s au thor i ty to i s sue NSLs,

the types

of mater ia l s

the

FBI seeks, and how to

draf t NS

reques ts .

Indeed, one of

these

documents i s a pub l i c ly av a i l ab le

Department

of

Jus t ice

Off

i ce of Legal

Education

manual

t ha t

provides a sample at tachment tha t encapsulates much of the

redacted- information

in the Attachment here in dispute .

The

18


19/35

sample attachment included there in would authorize the FBI

to request from a hypothet ical NSL rec ip ien t :

A) The

following

customer or subscr iber account

information

for

each account

reg is te red to

o r

associa ted with [email protected] for the time

per iod [date range] :

1.

subscriber

names, user names, screen names, or o ther

i den t i t i e s ;

2. mail ing

addresses,

addresses,

email

information;

res ident i a l addresses,

addresses, and

other

business

contact

3. loca l and long distance

telephone

connection

records,

or

records of

sess ion

times

and

durat ions ;

4. length

of serv ice including s t a r t date) and

types

of

service ut i l i zed ;

5.

telephone or ins t rument number or o the r subscr iber

number or

iden t i ty

including any temporar i ly

assigned

network address; and

6.

means

and source of

including

any

cred i t

and

b i l l ing

records .

payment for such service

card or bank account

number)

B)

All records and other information re la t ing to the

account s)

and

t ime per iod

in Part A, including:

1.

records

of user ac t iv i ty for any connections made

to

or from the account, including the

date,

time,

length, and

method

of

connect ions,

data

t r ans fe r

volume,

user name,

and

source and

des t ina t ion

Interne t Protocol

address es) ;

2.

telephone

records, including

ca l l e r

iden t i f ica t ion

records, ce l lu l a r

s i t e

and

sec tor information, GPS

data,

and

ce l lu l a r

network ident i fying information

3. non-content

information

associa ted

with

the contents

of any communication

or

f i l e

s tored

by

o r

for the

19


20/35

account(s)

such

as the source and des t ina t ion email

addresses and IP addresses.

4. Correspondence

and notes of records re la ted to the

account(s) .

(Manes Deel.

Ex. L a t 222-23.)

The

information

t h i s

sample attachment

revea ls i s

subs tan t i a l ly s imilar ,

in some ins tances

iden t i ca l ,

to

the

materia l

tha t

the FBI argues should

not be

disc losed

in the

Attachment.

The

Government contends tha t i f the

par t s

of

the Attachment tha t remain sec re t

are disclosed,

potent ia l

t a rge t s

could

change

the i r behavior to

evade

law

enforcement. But

those

t a rge t s

can a l ready

l earn , based on

publ ic ly avai lab le informat ion,

tha t the

FBI

could

obta in

such

information

through NSLs.

The

sample

attachment

indica tes tha t the

FBI can

seek

account

information

re la t ing

to

records

of user

ac t iv i ty

for

any

connect ions

including the

method

of connections,

data

t r ans fe r volume,

user name, and source

and

des t ina t ion In te rne t Protocol

address

(es)

. This i s

subs tan t i a l ly

s imi la r

to

some

of the

redacted categories of the

Attachment a t i ssue

i . e .

DSL account information,

and

Interne t Protocol (IP)

address

assigned

to the account .

Nor would

t

be

a leap

for someone

to

determine

tha t

other redacted categories in

the

Attachment i . e . , websi te

information

reg is te red to

- 20 -


21/35

the

account

and

Uniform

resource

loca tor URL) address

assigned to the

account

-- might

f a l l

in to the categories

iden t i f i ed

in

the

sample at tachment . Likewise,

the

sample

at tachment requests

the length of

serv ice

( including s t a r t

date)

[ re la t ing to an

account]

, which i s subs tan t i a l ly

s imi la r ly to the current ly-redacted category of the [d]a te

the account

opened

or

closed.

Merri l l a l so

points

to

a 2002 l e t t e r from

the

Deputy

Attorney General to Senator Pat r ick Leahy

(the

Leahy

Let ter ) , which

was l a t e r

repr inted as an appendix to a

2003

Senate Report . In tha t l e t t e r , the Deputy Attorney

General s ta tes :

NSLs can be served on In te rne t

Service

Providers to

obta in

information

such

as

subscr iber

name, screen

name or o ther on- l ine names,

records ident i fying

addresses

of e lec t ronic

mail sent

to and

from

the

account ,

records

re la t ing

to

merchandise

orders / shipping informat ion,

and

so

on but not

including message content and/or

subjec t

f i e lds .

(See

Manes Deel. Ex. J ) . Though t h i s

communication

i s now

publ ic

information published

in a Senate Report ,

see

S.

Rep. No.

108-40, 89-90 (2003), the Government nonetheless

seeks

to

prevent

Merri l l

from

disc los ing

tha t

the

Attachment sought

Records

r e l a t i ng

to

merchandise

orders / shipping informat ion for the l a s t 180

days

as well

as Order

forms.

Since

th i s

information

has already been

- 21 -


22/35

subs tan t i a l ly

disc losed in correspondence

by the Jus t i ce

Department to

Congress, as

ind ica ted by the Leahy Let ter ,

the Court i s

not

persuaded

tha t

there i s a subs tan t ia l r i sk

that

disc losure of subs tan t i a l ly the same information in

the

Attachment

would

lead

future

t a rge t s of inves t iga t ions

to

change

the i r behavior to

evade

law

enforcement

to

any

mater ia l ly

grea te r

extent

tha t

they

would

from

the

informat ion they have already

avai lable

in a publ ic ly-

avai lab le Senate Report.

8

Simila r ly ,

the Government

claims

there i s

a good

reason to prevent disc losure

of

the phrase and

re la ted

subscr iber

information in the category

Subscr iber

name

and re la ted

subscr iber

information.

However,

it i s

genera l ly known

tha t the

FBI

can

col lec t subscr iber

information

through

NSLs;

indeed,

subscr iber

information

i s expressly

iden t i f i ed in Section 2709(a)

in grant ing

the

s ta tu tory author i ty

for

the issuance of NSLs.

See

18 U.S.C.

2709 (a)

( A wire

or

e lec t ronic communication serv ice

8

The Court notes tha t

the Leahy

Let te r does

not reveal the 180 day

t ime per iod in which

the FBI

sought order

and shipping informat ion

from

Merr i l l . The Perdue Declarat ion argues t h a t

i

t h i s 180-day per iod

i s

revea led , then

po ten t i a l

t e r ro r i s t s

could manipulate

order s to

avoid

having

those orders f a l l within the 180

day

per iod. (Perdue

Deel.

,

64.) The Court i s not persuaded. A

po ten t i a l t e r ro r i s t

does not

know

when,

i f

ever, the

FBI wil l

i s sue

a re la ted NSL.

The

180-day

per iod

c lea r ly r e la tes to the date Merr i l l

rece ived

the NSL, and it i s hard to

imagine any

person ou ts ide of

the FBI having the

knowledge

about when

an NS

might

be

i ssued,

and changing t he i r behavior as a r e s u l t .

- 22 -


23/35

provider

sha l l

comply with

a

reques t

for

subscr iber

informat ion.

. ) ; see also

Manes Deel. Ex.

I

a t

3-5

Memorandum Opinion

for

the FBI' s

General

Counsel Office

tha t

discusses ,

a t

length, the

term

subscr iber

information ) .

9

Therefore, the

Government has not

provided a

good

reason

to

ju s t i fy

non-disc losure

of

the

word

subscr iber and s imilar i t e ra t i ons of tha t word; Sect ion

2709 and publ ic government documents make

c lear

tha t NSLs

seek

subscr iber

information.

Perhaps

rea l iz ing the

tenuous

connect ion of the

disc losure of such informat ion

in the ins tan t

Attachment to

enumerated harms,

the

Government, during the

course of

br ie f ing

i t s motions,

conceded

tha t non-disc losure

was

no

longer

needed

for c e r t a in

categories

of

records the

FBI

seeks

in

par t i cu la r ,

the

reques t for

In te rne t

serv ice

provider

(ISP), [ a ] l l

e-mai l addresses

associa ted

with

[the] account , and [s] creen names or o ther on- l ine names

assoc ia ted

with the account .

(See

Gov't Mem Attach.) That

the

Government conceded

to

d isc losure of these ca tegor ies

only when, during

the

course of

l i t i ga t ion ,

t was

9

A pub l i c ly -ava i l ab le

March

2007 Report from the Department of

Jus t ice

Off ice of the

Inspector General a l so

ind ica ted

t h a t

the FBI

can

ob ta in

through NSLs [ s ]ubsc r ibe r informat ion

as soc ia ted

with par t i cu l a r

t e lephone numbers o r e-mai l addresses , such as

the

name, address ,

length of se rv ice ,

and

method of

payment. (Manes

Deel.

Ex. K a t 10.)

3


24/35

s ta tu to r i ly required

to

provide the FBI ce r t i f i c a t ion

jus t i fy ing non-disclosure,

lends credence

to

M err i l l s

argument

that ,

for years,

the

non-disclosure requirement

enforced agains t

him

was overly

broad

and

could

not be

supported by a good reason.

111

0 (Compare Merr i l l Deel.

Ex.

C

with

Gov't

Mem

Attach.)

Indeed,

many of the remaining

redact ions

in the

Attachment are even harder

to

ju s t i fy

than the

categories

discussed thus

far .

For example, the Government seeks to

prevent

Merri l l from

disc los ing

tha t

the

Attachment

requested

Subscriber day/evening telephone numbers even

though

the

Government

now

concedes

tha t

the

phrase

telephone number can be

disc losed.

The

Court i s not

persuaded

tha t

there i s

a good reason to

bel ieve

tha t

disc losure

of

the

fac t

that

the

Government

can use

NSLs

to

seek both

day

and

evening

telephone

numbers could resu l t

in

an enumerated

harm, especia l ly i f t

i s already publ ic ly

known tha t the Government

can

use NSLs to

obta in

a

telephone number,

more genera l ly .

10

Also in te res t ing ly ,

the

Perdue

Dec la r a t ion

argues t h a t the ca tegory

of [a]

ny o ther

informat ion

which

[ the

r ec ip ien t ]

cons ider

[s]

to be an

e lec t ron ic communication t r ansac t iona l record should not be disclosed.

(See Perdue

Deel.

70.) However, t h i s ca tegory

was

not redac ted

by

the

Government

in i t s

submissions

o r

even in

the Perdue Declara t ion.

- 24 -


25/35

s another example of the extreme

and

overly broad

charac ter of these

redact ions,

the

Government

apparently

bel ieves

tha t while the publ ic

can

know tha t t seeks

records of an address

and

a telephone number,

there

i s

a

good reason

to

prevent

disc losure

of

the fac t tha t the

Government can seek addresses and telephone numbers.

(See Gov't

Mem

Attach.)

In any event ,

based on the

Government's redact ions alone, a poten t i a l t a rge t

of

an

inves t iga t ion,

even a

dim-wit ted

one,

would

almost

cer ta in ly be

able to determine, simply by running through

the alphabet , tha t telephone numberll

could

only be

telephone numbers. Redactions tha t defy common sense

such as conceal ing

a

s ingle l e t t e r a t

the end of a word

diminish the force of the Government's claim to

good

reason

to

keep

informat ion

under

sea l ,

and undermine

i t s

argument

tha t disc losure

of the current ly-redacted

informat ion in the Attachment

can

be l inked to a

subs tan t ia l r i sk

of

an enumerated harm.

s a

th i rd example,

the Government seeks to prevent

disc losure

of the

phrases re la ted

to

account

and

associated

with the

account for

cer ta in

categories

of

records

sought ,

even

though

the

Government has acknowledged

tha t

there i s no need for non-disclosure

of

the main

5


26/35

informat ion the NS

sought

to

col l ec t

- - i . e . , informat ion

re la ted to an

address

and bi l l ing . The Court i s not

persuaded

tha t

there

i s a good reason

for

non-disc losure of

the fac t

t ha t these reques ts

were keyed

to a

par t i cu l a r

account; obviously, the Government uses NSLs to

obta in

informat ion

re la ted to

a

par t i cu l a r

subscr iber or account .

(See,

~ Manes

Deel.

Ex.

I

a t

5 Memorandum Opinion for

the FBI 's

General

Counsel Office

discuss ing loca l

and

long

dis tance

t o l l

b i l l i ng

records t ha t

could be

a t t r i bu t ed to

a

par t i cu l a r account . )

11

Addi t iona l ly ,

the

Government seeks to

keep

some

informat ion redacted

despi te

publ ic ly

conceding

t ha t those

types

of records

( i . e . , radius

log informat ion, which

i s

cel l - tower

based phone t racking

information)

are

no

longer

sought

through

NSLs.

Yet

the

Government

st ll

argues

tha t

t h i s informat ion

should

remain redacted

because

t

would

reveal techniques tha t

might be

used

a t

some undetermined

time

under

a hypothet ica l pol icy promulgated by a fu ture

adminis t ra t ion . (See

Perdue

Deel.

59.) This reason i s not

a

good

reason; ne i the r i s the l ink between

disc losure

and

11

Similar ly , the pub l i c ly -ava i l ab le March

2007 Report

from the

Department of Jus t ice Off ice o f the Inspector General indicated tha t

e lec t ron ic communication t ransact ional

records inc lude e-mail

addresses associa ted with the

account ; screen names;

and b i l l i ng

records and method of payment.

11

(Manes Deel. Ex. K a t

10.)

- 26 -


27/35

the r i sk of harm subs tan t ia l . Furthermore, as Merri l l

argues, t i s

no secret

tha t the

FBI can access radius

log informat ion, and the other

information

iden t i f i ed in

the

Attachment through means other NSLs. (See Pl.

Mem

a t

19; Pl. Reply Mem

a t

11, 21-22.)

Therefore, the

Court

f inds tha t the

Government has

not

demonstrated a

good

reason to

bel ieve

that potent ia l

t a rge t s of


inves t iga t ions wil l

change

the i r behavior to

evade

detec t ion , or tha t disc losure

of

the Attachment in i t s ent i re ty

would

crea te a subs tan t ia l

r i sk of one

of

the s ta tu to r i ly enumerated harms.

The

Court ' s

rul ing here

i s

cons i s ten t with the

Court ' s

pr i o r decisions re la t ing to the NSL i ssued to Merr i l l .

Firs t , the present

challenge

can be

factual ly

dis t inguished

from

Doe

I I I and

Doe

IV.

In Doe

I I I ,

t h i s

Court found

tha t

the

Government

had

ca r r ied i t s burden

of

showing a good

reason

to keep the

ent i re

NSL

l e t t e r

and

Attachment,

including

the

iden t i ty of

the

rec ip ien t and t a rge t ,

conf ident ia l . In

Doe

IV,

while

the inves t iga t ion

remained

ongoing,

the

Court

found tha t

spec i f ic

information

in

the

Attachment

could

be disclosed: both mater ia l within

the

scope of

information that the

NSL s ta tu te iden t i f ies as

permissible

for the

FBI to obta in through

the use of

NSLs

- 27 -


28/35

and mater ia l t ha t the FBI has publ ic ly acknowledged t

has

previously requested

by

means

of NSLs. See 703 F.

Supp.

2d

a t

316.

Since

then,

the Government's inves t iga t ion has been

closed, and the par t i e s

have reached agreement

t ha t

Merri l l

can

ident i fy

himself as

the

2004 NSL rec ip ien t

and

disc lose

the

i den t i ty

of the t a rge t .

Now unl ike ea r l i e r i t e ra t ions

of th i s l i t iga t ion ,

the

asser ted Government in te re s t in

keeping the

Attachment

conf ident ia l

i s based so le ly on

protec t ing

law

enforcement

sensi t ive information t ha t

i s

relevant to

fu ture

o r poten t i a l


inves t iga t ions . The Government argues that , in Doe IV, the

Court found

such

a ju s t i f i c a t ion to

cons t i tu te

a good

reason.

(Gov' t

Reply

Mem.

a t

8

n.

6.) However, the Court

did

not

make

such

a

broad

statement

there .

In

Doe

IV,

the

Court found t ha t the Government has

demonstrated

a

reasonable l ike l ihood

t ha t

disc losure of

the

Attachment in

i t s ent i re ty could

inform

current

t a rge t s of law

enforcement

inves t iga t ions , including the par t icu la r t a rge t

of the Government's ongoing

inquiry

in

t h i s

act ion,

as

well

as, potent ia l ly ,

fu ture

t a rge t s . 703

F. Supp.

2d

a t

317.

The Government claims

that

the

term

fu ture ta rge ts were

obviously, not the subjec ts

of

an

'ongoing' underlying

28


29/35

inves t iga t ion .

(Gov' t Reply Mem a t 8 n. 6.) On

tha t

point ,

the

Government

assumes

too much.

The

fu ture

t a rge ts re fe r red

to

in

Doe IV

were,

more accurate ly ,

l imi ted to

fu ture

t a rge t s of

tha t

same i nves t iga t ion , which

was

not ye t

c losed

or publ ic ly

known.

12

In any event , as discussed supra, circumstances have

changed

s ince

Merr i l l ' s

rece ip t of the

NSL

the

i nves t iga t ion

has

closed, the

Government

no

longer

prohib i t s

disc losure of

M err i l l' s i den t i t y or the

i nve s t i ga t ion ' s

ta rge t ,

and many, i f not a l l ,

of

the

redacted inves t iga t ive techniques

a t

i ssue here have been

disc losed by

other

government

agencies. Therefore, t

s t r a i ns c redul i ty

tha t

fu ture

t a rge t s

of

other

invest iga t ions would change t he i r behavior

in l i gh t

of

the

current ly-redacted

informat ion,

when

those

t a rge t s

(which,

according to the

Government,

include

sophis t ica ted fore ign

adversar ies , see Perdue Deel. 56)

have access

to much of

12

The Court

i s not

holding

tha t there are no

ci rcumstances

in which the

Government might be able to provide a good reason for non-disclosure ,

even when tha t reason

i s keyed

to author ized i nves t iga t ions

to p ro tec t

against

in te rna t iona l

te r ror ism

o r

clandest ine

in te l l igence

ac t iv i t i e s ,

general ly ,

ra the r than

to

a

par t i cu l a r

ongoing invest iga t ion .

Ins tead,

based on the

fac ts

and submissions before i t , the

Government

has not

sa t i s f i ed i t s burden tha t there i s a good

reason to expect tha t

disc losure here with

these

par t i cu l a r f ac tua l

circumstances

ra i ses

a subs tan t ia l

r i s k tha t any of the s t a tu to r i l y enumerated

harms

would

occur.

29


30/35

th i s same

information

from other

government

div is ions

and

agencies.

Relatedly, the case a t

hand

can

be

dis t inguished from

case law c i t ed by the

Government

(see Gov t Reply

Mem

a t

11-12) for the proposi t ion tha t information

need

only be

disclosed

i f the

spec i f ic

agency

had made an

o f f i c i a l

disc losure of the protec ted information. See, ~ Wilson

v.

CIA,

586 F.3d 171 (2d Cir. 2009). Those

cases

e i the r

involve Freedom of Informat ion

Act ( FOIA )

reques ts of

c la s s i f i ed

government information,

or i ssues

re la ted to

disc losure of c la s s i f i ed information

by

current or former

government

of f ic ia l s

who

were under

a

cont rac tua l

obl iga t ion

to

keep c la s s i f i ed information conf ident ia l . At

issue here, however,

i s

law enforcement sens i t ive mater ia l

not

c la s s i f i ed

information.

The

Government s

j u s t i f i ca t ions

for keeping

the Attachment

conf ident ia l

impl ica te c la s s i f i ed

information contained in the

ex

par te

in camera Perdue

Declarat ion. However,

Merri l l i s not

seeking disc losure of the mater ia l contained there in.

He

seeks

disc losure only of the Attachment,

which

i s

not

c lass i f ied .

Furthermore, the pla in t i f f

here

i s a pr iva te c i t i zen

not

a government o f f i c i a l who had a cont rac tua l obl iga t ion

- 30 -


31/35

to

keep information conf ident ia l . As such,

there are

s ign i f i can t

reasons for t rea t ing the mater ia l

a t

hand

di f fe ren t ly

from c la s s i f i ed

information tha t i s

normally

access ib le only

to

individuals

with secur i ty

clearance .

A

pr iva te

c i t i zen

should be

able

to disc lose information tha t

has already been publ ic ly disc losed

by any government

agency

a t l eas t

once the under lying inves t iga t ion

has

concluded and there i s

no

reason

for the

i den t i t i e s

of the

rec ip ien t and

t a rge t

to remain

secret .

Otherwise, it would

lead

to

the

resu l t tha t c i t i zens who have not received such

an

NS

request can speak about

information tha t

i s

publ ic ly

known

(and

acknowledged

by o ther agencies) ,

but

the

very

individuals who have

received such

NS

reques ts

and are

thus

bes t sui ted to inform

publ ic

discussion on the topic

could

not.

Such

a

resu l t

would

lead

to

unending

secrecy of

act ions taken by

government

off ic ia l s i f pr iva te

c i t i zens

ac tua l ly

affec ted by

publ ic ly

known law enforcement

techniques could not

discuss

them. See Doe

v. Gonzales, 449

F.3d

415, 422 (2d

Cir. 2006)

(Cardamone, J. concurring)

I f the Court were

to

f ind ins tead

tha t

the Government

has met

i t s burden of

showing

a good reason

for non-

disc losure

here ,

could Merri l l ever

overcome

such

a

showing? Under the

Government's

reasoning,

the Court

sees

31


32/35

only

two such

hypothet ical circumstances in

which

Merri l l

could prevai l : a

world

in which

no

th rea t of t e rror i sm

exi s t s , or a

world

in which the FBI, act ing on i t s own

accord

and i t s own

time,

decides to disc lose

the contents

of the Attachment. Such a

r e su l t impl ica tes

ser ious i ssues ,

both with

respect

to

the Fi r s t

Amendment and accountabi l i ty

of the

government

to the people.

13

As

Judge Cardamone warned

in

his concurrence

in Doe v. Gonzales, a ban

on

speech and

a shroud of secrecy in pe rpe tu i ty are an t i the t i ca l to

democratic concepts and do not

f i t

comfortably

with

the

fundamental

r igh t s

guaranteed

American

c i t izens , and such

unending secrecy could

serve as

a cover for poss ib le

of f ic ia l

misconduct

and/or incompetence.

449

F.3d

a t

422.

Because the

Court

f inds tha t

the Government

has not

shown

a

good

reason

for

continued non-disclosure of the

Attachment,

pursuant to Section 3511, the

Court

need

not

(and should

not)

consider

Merr i l l ' s other arguments

tha t

continued non-disclosure here

cons t i tu tes a vio la t ion

of

his

Fi r s t

Amendment r igh t s and tha t the

Government

has

exceeded i t s

s ta tu tory author i ty

for non-disclosure in the

13

Such

unending

secrecy i s a l so a t odds with

Pres ident

Obama' s

2014

remarks,

in

which he d i r ec ted the Attorney

General

to l im i t

the

dura t ion of NSL gag orders . (See

Manes Deel. Ex.

S.)

32


33/35

i n s t a n t case .

4

See Kreisberg v . Heal thBridge

Mgmt.

LLC

732

F.3d

131, 138

(2d Cir . 2013)

( When,

as

here ,

a

case

may be reso lved

on

othe r

grounds ,

cour t s

may

dec l ine

to

reach a

cons t i tu t iona l

ques t ion

to

' avo id

decid ing

co n s t i t u t i o n a l

i s sues

n e e d l e s s l y . ' ) .

I I I . ST Y OF JUDGMENT

As

the

Court d i d in Doe I and Doe

I I ,

in l i g h t o f

the

impl ica t ions o f

i t s

r u l i n g and

the importance of

the

i s sues

involved , the Cour t

w i l l

s tay enforcement o f

ts judgment

pending appeal ,

o r

fo r

the

Government to otherwise pursue

any a l t e rn a t e course of ac t ion , fo r 90 days. The s tay

i s

in tended to give

the

Government

the

oppor tun i ty to move

t h i s

Court ,

o r

the Court

of Appeals

fo r

whatever

appropr ia te r e l i e f

t may

seek to main ta in

the

c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y

of

any

in fo rmat ion

impl ica ted

by

the

Cour t ' s

ru l ing .

For those

same

reasons ,

por t ions

o f

the Cour t ' s

opin ion

those

sec t ions revea l ing the con ten t s

o f

the

Attachment

a re redac ted

in

the

p u b l i c

f i l i n g

o f

t h i s

Decis ion

and

Order , in

order

to

preserve the Government 's

oppor tun i t i e s fo r f u r th e r appe l l a t e review o f t h i s Decis ion

14

As a

r esu l t ,

the Court

need

not reach whether s t r i c t scrut iny appl ies

to

M err i l l ' s claims.

The

Second

Circui t

found

the procedural

safeguards

appl ied

here

are required under

e i t he r

s t r i c t

sc ru t iny

o r

a

l e s s

exact ing scrut iny . See Mukasey, 549 F.3d a t 879,

882.

-

33

-


34/35

and Order

requ i r ing d i sc losure

of the Attachment . In

the

event t h a t t h i s r u l i n g requ i r ing d i sc losure o f the

Attachment i s not a l t e r e d in

the course

o f any f u r th e r

appe l l a t e review,

an

unredac ted

ve rs ion

of t h i s opin ion

w i l l be

f i l e d .

See New York Times Co. v . U.S.

Dep t

o f

J u s t i c e , 752

F.3d

123, 123

n.1

2d

Cir .

2014) .

IV.

ORDER

For

the reasons discussed

above,

it

i s

hereby

ORDERED

t h a t the motion fo r

summary

judgment

Dkt.

No.

16) o f P l a i n t i f f Nicholas Merr i l l i s GRANTED and it

i s

fu r the r

ORDERED t h a t the

motion

to dismiss

the

Complaint o r

fo r

summary judgment Dkt. No. 24) of

the Government

i s

DENIED and it i s

f u r th e r

ORDERED

t h a t

the

Clerk

of

Cour t

sh a l l

f i l e

the

redac ted vers ion of t h i s Decis ion and Order

on

the pub l ic

docket ;

and it i s

f u r th e r

ORDERED t h a t the Clerk of Cour t sh a l l en t e r judgment

accord ing ly bu t s tay enforcement of the judgment pending

any appeal , or , i no appeal i s f i l e d ,

fo r 90

days

from the

da te o f t h i s

Decis ion

and

Order .

34


35/35

The

Clerk of Court i s dire ted to terminate the motion

for

summary

judgment Dkt.

No.

16) and the motion to

dismiss o r

for summary

judgment

Dkt. No.

24),

and

to lose

t h i s case.

SO ORDERED

Dated:

ew York,

ew

York

28

August 2015

35

~

.S .D.J .

merrill v. lynch - order to vacate gag order

Documents