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Message Order Effects in Persuasion: AnAttitude Strength Perspective

CURTIS P. HAUGTVEDTDUANE T. WEGENER*

Contemporary research on attitude change processes is reviewed for Implicationsregarding the relative influence of successive opposing messages on final judgments.Based on this review, extent of message relevant elaboration Is offered as a mod-erator of primacy versus recency effects in prior research- Support for this view isderived from the ability to explain the results of previous studies and from twoexperiments in which message presentation order and personal relevance of thetopic are manipulated in a factorial design. We find that situations that foster highlevels of message elaboration lead to greater influence of an initial message on finaljudgments (a primacy effect) whereas situations that foster low levels of messagerelevant elaboration lead to greater influence of a second message on final Judgments(a recency effect).

T he overriding goal of much consumer research overthe past 20 years has been to gain an understanding

of how persuasion variables interact in the developmentof attitudes toward brands, services, and persons. Be-sides sharing the goal of understanding when a partic-ular combination of variables will lead to the greatestamount of persuasion, most consumer research hasemployed a single-message methodology. That is, inmost studies, participants read or listen to a single per-suasive message supporting one product or side of anissue. In the most common multimessage paradigm,individuals are exposed to several messages supportingthe same product or side of an issue (e.g., Gorn andGoldberg 1980; McCullough and Ostrom 1974). Al-though such studies provide important informationabout the factors involved in persuasion settings, thesesingle-message, single-side methods cannot addressquestions about some very real consumer situations:those in which a consumer faces contradictory messagesfrom different sources on a single topic, product, orservice.

*Curtis P. Haugtvedt is assistant professor of marketing and DuaneT- Wegener is a doctoral student in the Department of Psychology.Ohio Stale LIniversity, Columbus, OH 43210. Portions of Ihis researchwere presented in a symposium at the Centennial Meeting of theAmerican Psychological Association. August 1992. Washington, DC.The authors ihank symposium participants Arie Kruglanski. RobertLana, and Norman Miller lor their helpful comments on this work.This work also benefiled from comments provided by Timothy Brock,Frank Kardes, Thomas Ostrom. Richard Petty. Wendy Warren, DavidW\ Schumann, and Stephen Smith. Finally, the authors thank thereviewers and the editor for their helpful comments and suggestions.Conduct of this research was facilitated by an Ohio State UniversityCollege of Business Seed Grant awarded to C.P.H. and an NIMHTraineeship T32 MH 19728 to D.T.W,

Consider, for example, an individual exposed to themass media during the week of February 6, 1989. Bychance, he or she might have first encountered infor-mation provided by consumer groups that a chemicalused on apples and other fruits was unsafe and shouldbe banned. Soon afterward, he or she might have en-countered a message by other sources arguing thatchemical treatments to apples and other produce werequite safe and were necessary to insure the continuedavailability of insect- and disease-free fruits (see Evans1989; Roberts 1989). Another person might have en-countered the messages in exactly the opposite order.Sometimes, sources of messages might even have somecontrol over whether their message is heard before orafter their opponents. For instance, a company mightknow that a competing company has purchased adver-tising time in a given time slot (e.g., on television orradio). If so, that company can decide to purchase ad-vertising for their product either before or after thecompetitor. One important question about such situ-ations is the extent to which presentation order of con-flicting messages influences the position adopted by theconsumer. That is, although people might encounterthe information in one order rather than the other (ei-ther because of the strategy of the marketer or simplyby chance), the order in which that information is pre-sented might lead people to be more supportive of oneside of the issue or the other.

Two effects of order have received attention (e.g.,Hovland, Campbell, and Brock 1957). If people whoencounter two opposing messages form judgments moreconsistent with the first message, a primacy effect hasoccurred. If the judgment is more consistent with thesecond (opposing) message, however, a recency effecX ispresent. To the extent that simple order of presentation

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can affect a consumer's final judgments or preferences.,it would be especially important to understand condi-tions under which primacy versus recency effects arelikely to occur.

THE EXISTING LITERATUREAlthough consumer researchers have investigated is-

sues such as effects of order of presentation of pricinginformation (Gray 1992; Monroe 1992) and productattribute presentation (Kardes and Herr 1990; see alsoMcGuire 1957), no consumer research has focused onthe effects of opposing message order. Effects of messageorder have been demonstrated in a variety of persuasionsettings, however. In this work, strong evidence existsfor the occurrence of both primacy and recency effects.,although the conditions fostering each effect and themechanisms underlying each outcome have not beenestablished,'

In the earliest research in the area, Lund (1925) pre-sented subjects with a written communication eithersupporting or opposing implementation of protectivetariffs and then presented subjects with a communica-tion on the other side of the issue. Lund observed a"disproportionate influence of the first discussion(message) in determining subjects' final position" (p.187). The data, he suggested, supported what he calleda "law of primacy in persuasion" (see also Knower1936). Some years later, Hovland and Mandell (1957)conducted a series of studies in the primacy-recencyparadigm. One study using the tariff topic showed asignificant primacy effect and another using the topicof atomic submarines showed a significant recency effect(see also Cromwell 1950). Based on these findings,Hovland and Mandell (1957) concluded that they coulddiscern no universal law of either primacy or recency.Summarizing the work on message order, Hovland(1957) stated that studies using well-known issues onwhich subjects had a great dea! of prior knowledgewould have a difficult time in producing any kind ofattitude change, but hypothesized that "the nearer onecomes to achieving primacy in the sense of the firstpresentation of unfamiliar material, the more one isapt to obtain primacy effects" (p. 139).

Lana conducted a series of studies that investigatedHovland's (1957) ideas. Unexpectedly, Lana (1961)found primacy effects under conditions of high famil-iarity and recency effects under conditions of low fa-miliarity with an issue. In research interpreted as con-sistent with his 1961 findings, Lana (1963b) found asignificant primacy effect for a high-controversy issue(nuclear weapons), but not for a low-controversy issue

' Historically, research on order effects proceeded along two lines.One line of research focused on whether the first or second of twoopposing messages would have a greater persuasive effect (e.g., Hov-land and Mandell 1957). A second line of research focused on posi-tioning of arguments within a single persuasive message (e.g., McGuire1957). The present research focuses on the former rather than latterline of research.

(Picasso). Finally, Lana (1963a) found that subjects whoreponed high interest in a topic exhibited a significantprimacy effect, whereas subjects who reported havinglow interest exhibited a significant recency effect. Al-though his results conflicted with Hovland's (1957) po-sition, Lana presented no framework within which toorganize his research. Lana hoped that similarities be-tween the findings from other studies and his findingscould be used as a basis for empirical generalizations.That is, he considered his studies as "building a bodyof empirical information . . . about which a theory ofcommunication might be developed" (Lana 1963a,p. 164).

Other researchers at the time echoed Lana's (1963a)acknowledgment that no theoretical position hadproven capable of organizing the literature on messageorder effects (e.g.. Rosnow and Robinson 1967). Per-haps because of the lack of an organizing theoreticalframework, research on the influences of two opposingcommunications faded from view in the mid-1960s(Rosnow 1966). Some studies had obtained primacyeffects; others using different message topics had ob-tained primacy, recency, or null effects in various con-ditions. An additional complicating factor was that lev-els of the factors under investigation had beenconfounded with message topic (e.g., controversy) orwere identified through subject self-report (e.g., self-rated interest in the topic) rather than experimentalmanipulation. Thus, one is left unsure whether pastmessage order effects were even due to the conceptualfactors noted by the researchers at the time.

While most of the above studies were guided by agoal of understanding conditions under which primacyeffects might be expected. Miller and Campbell (1959)focused on understanding conditions under which re-cency effects were most likely to appear.^ Drawing onthe Ebbinghaus (1913) forgetting curve. Miller andCampbell hypothesized that recency effects would bedue to differential memory for the message arguments(i.e., the arguments ofthe message presented immedi-ately preceding the attitude judgment should be morelikely to come to mind than the arguments presentedearlier, especially when some time separated the twomessagejj). In examining this issue. Miller and Camp-bell's (1959) research used a simulated court trial andincluded a condition in which messages were presented

During this period, a number of additional explanations of someprimacy effects were also proposed. For example, primacy was hy-pothesized to occur because of proactive inhibition (e.g.. Hovland1951). decreased attention to later information (e.g.. Anderson 1965),greater criticality toward the second message (e.g.. Hovland et al.1957; Lund 1925). or change of meaning of the second message (e.g.,Insko 1967). Most of the studies from which these explanations werederived, however, do not fit the criteria for the studies reviewed inthis article—thai is. two opposing messages from two different sourcespresented close in time. In addition, these explanations did not addresswhen a particular process would or would not be likely to occur norwere any of these perspectives able to organize the literature on mes-sage order effects (see Eagly and Chaiken [ 1993] and Lana [ 1964] forreviews). . . .

MESSAGE ORDER EFFECTS IN PERSUASION 207

close in time and attitude measurement occurred im-mediately and another condition in which the messagepresentations were separated by one week and attitudemeasurement occurred immediately after the secondmessage. In support of their hypothesis, a recency effectwas obtained when messages were separated by oneweek and attitude measurement immediately followedthe second message. Interestingly, in the condition sim-ilar to the studies reviewed earlier {i.e., messages pre-sented close in time with immediate attitude measure-ment following the second message). Miller andCampbell found no differences as a result of messagepresentation order. Unfortunately, the proposed me-diator of order effects (i.e., memory for message argu-ments) did not predict final attitudes of participants (r= -.10, NS across all conditions). This lack of corre-lation between memory and opinion has also been rep-licated by Insko (1964).

Thus, although a variety of perspectives have beenused to account for particular message order effectstudies, no one framework has appeared capable of pre-dicting when the various results of message order arelikely to occur (McGuire 1966). If one links the variablesstudied in the message order literature with contem-porary work on attitude strength, however, consistentpredictions concerning order effects can be made. '"

AN ATTITUDE STRENGTHEXPLANATION OF THE EXISTING

LITERATURE

One potentially useful way to conceptualize researchon message order is as a test of attitude strength—op-erationalized here as the degree of attitude resistancein the face of attack.' That is, if a first message is suc-cessful in changing the attitude ofthe message recipient(or in creating an attitude if none exists prior to thefirst message), the amount of change in response to thesecond message is an index ofthe strength ofthe attitudefollowing the first message (see Haugtvedt and Petty1992).* Our attitude strength perspective is derived fromthe Elaboration Likelihood Model's (Petty and Ca-cioppo 1986) explicit recognition ofthe role of elabo-

'Allhough there are other potential consequences of attitudestrength (e.g.. attitude persistence or prediction of behavior from at-titudes; see Petty. Haugtvedt. and Smith 1994), resistance appearsmost pertinent to Ihe study of message order in thai opposing messagesconstitute a direct attack on one's attitude following an initial message.

*We use the term "resistance" to refer lo the amount of attitudechange evidenced in the face of an attack (i.e., high resistance refersto liule change in face of an attack, whereas low resistance refers tomuch change; see McGuire 1964). Importantly, we do not take thisterm to involve any necessary assumptions regarding the processleading to attitude change. For example, one could have an attitudethat is highly resistant because the person ignores subsequent infor-mation (perhaps because the person thinks s/he already has enoughinformation on the topic and has high confidence in the opinion) orbecause the person actively counterargues claims that are against hisor her current attitude.

ration in creating strong attitudes (see Haugtvedt andPetty 1992; Petty et al. 1994). Thoughtful scrutiny(elaboration) of an initial message likely includes greaterintegration of new information with existing knowledgestructures (Petty and Cacioppo 1986; see also Craik andLockhart 1972) and/or allows for more personal trans-formations of information into the underlying beliefstructure (or schema) for an attitude object (Greenwald1968). The process of elaboration may also allow newinformation and feelings to come into contact withmore points of existing information, enhancing thelikelihood that the idiosyncratic elaborations and in-formation supporting the attitude will become moreavailable and accessible (see Haugtvedt and Petty 1992;Petty and Cacioppo 1986). To the extent that supportivecognitive responses and other pieces of information areavailable from prior elaboration, knowledge structuressupportive of one's attitude may then be used in scru-tinizing information relevant to the well-formed opin-ion. The use of supportive information in processingan opposing message should then lead to resistance toattitude change in face ofthe attack. This is what seemedto occur in the Haugtvedt and Petty (1992) resistancestudy when subjects high in need for cognition (andthus most likely to scrutinize message content; Ca-cioppo and Petty 1982) were found to counterargue aweak attacking message to a greater extent than subjectslow in need for cognition. Importantly, any variablethat increases the amount of elaboration in the for-mation or change of an attitude should lead to similarincreases in attitude strength, which can manifest itselfas increased resistance to change in the face of attack(Haugtvedt and Petty 1992; Petty and Cacioppo 1986).

One might conceptualize primacy effects as involvinghigh levels of attitude strength (and thus resistance tochange) for attitudes formed or changed during the firstmessage and recency as involving low levels of attitudestrength and resistance. If so, then primacy effectsshould be most likely when motivation and ability toelaborate the initial message are high. That is, whenfacing an attack, people will likely defend the strongposition developed from processing the first message.

On the other hand, recency effects should be mostlikely when motivation and ability to elaborate the ini-tial message are low (when low levels of processing ofthe first message may result in a relatively weak atti-tude). This might allow processes that involve the sec-ond message to have an impact—for example, recalland useof recently presented information as a basis fora final attitude. That is, although memory for message

'Unfortunately, although existing attitude resistance studies sup-port the view that high levels of elaboration of an inilial message leadto greater resistance (less change in the face of an attack), these studiescannot directly address the role of resistance in message order effects.This is because resistance studies have employed only a single messageorder, with an attack message that is weaker than the initial message.Because message order experiments use pro and con messages thatare of equal strength, the message order paradigm constitutes a strongtest of attitudes strength/resistance notions.


arguments has not proven to be a general explanationof all order effects (see earlier discussion of Insko [1964];Miller and Campbell [ 1959]), recent research has foundthat memory for message arguments should play a rolein attitude change processes primarily in low-elabora-tion settings (when recency effects appear most likelyto occur). For example, the correlation between the fa-vorability of postmessage attitude (measured immedi-ately after message presentation) and the amount ofinformation recalled is generally higher under condi-tions that encourage low rather than high elaborationof message content (Mackie and Asuncion [1990]; forsimilar results see Haugtvedt and Petty [1992]). Thegenerally accepted explanation is that participants op-erating under low-elaboration conditions had not fullyformed an opinion until the attitudinai inquiry whereashigh-elaboration participants had evaluated the messagecontent and formed their opinion on-line (e.g., see Has-tie and Park [1986], and Lichtenstein and Srull [1985,1987], regarding on-line vs. memory-based impressionformation). Thus, if recency effects occur when elabo-ration is low, one reason for this might be reliance onmessage content when formulating a response to theattitudinai inquiry. If so, memory for message content(especially memory for recently presented material[Wyer and Srull 1980], that is, arguments in the secondmessage) should be positively related to attitudes forsubjects low in elaboration likelihood. There should belittle or no relation between memory for recently pre-sented arguments and final attitude for subjects underhigh-elaboration conditions.

By categorizing past studies of message order ac-cording to variables that influence the extent of messageprocessing, patterns of findings consistent with an at-titude strength perspective are revealed. For example,confound with message topic and self-selection of sub-jects notwithstanding, it appears that high levels of topicfamiliarity, controversy, and interest were generally as-sociated with primacy effects. That is, topics for whichsubjects were either made knowledgeable (e.g.. vivisec-tion; Lana 1961) or topics that were likely to be familiarand controversial (e.g., protective tariffs [Hovland andMandell 1957; Lund 1925]; prohibition [Knower 1936];nuclear weapons [Lana 1963b]) produced primacy ef-fects. Similarly, subjects who reported high interest ina topic showed primacy effects (Lana i963a). Recencyeffects, on the other hand, appeared more likely whenindividuals knew little about the topic (Lana 1961) orshowed little interest in the topic (Lana 1963a).

Results of contemporary research suggest that vari-ables like familiarity, controversy, or interest are likelyto influence the extent of message elaboration. For ex-ample, research has shown that messages are processedmore thoroughly when participants have high priorknowledge as opposed to low prior knowledge (e.g.,Wood, Kallgren, and Priesler 1985). When topics aremade more interesting or involving (controversial),messages are also processed more thoroughly than whenthe topics are made less interesting or involving (e.g.,

Petty and Cacioppo 1979; Petty, Cacioppo, and Schu-mann 1983). It appears then, that, when organized byfactors that have been found to influence message elab-oration, the existing literature can be viewed as consis-tent with an attitude strength perspective on messageorder effects.

The ability to conceptually organize the studies re-viewed here provides initial support for our perspective.Importantly, this theoretical position has not been pre-viously offered as a way to organize the literature onopposing persuasive messages from distinct sources.Support for our conceptualization, however, is basedon effects observed across studies and on assumptionsmade about the effects of variables present in the studies.Stronger support for our conceptualization could beobtained through manipulation of variables known toinfluence the amount of elaborative processing givento the messages and through the examination of datathat measure possible processes underlying effects ofmessage order.

For instance, manipulations that influence the extentof elaboration given to message content should also in-fluence recipients' cognitive responses to the message(e.g.. Petty and Cacioppo 1979). Thus, if primacy effectsare due to effortful evaluation of an initial message,then message order should not only influence final at-titude but should also influence measures of cognitiveresponses. If recency effects generally occur when elab-oration likelihood is low, then message order shouldnot have much influence on cognitive responses. In ad-dition, if high-elaboration subjects are using the infor-mational base supporting their attitude consistent withthe first message when they evaluate the second message,then cognitive responses of these people might show alarger number of direct counterarguments towardstatements in the second message than low-elaborationsubjects (i.e., direct questioning or refutation of the va-lidity of arguments in the second message should behigher for high- than for low-elaboration subjects).Thus, our processing/attitude strength perspective leadsto the following hypotheses about attitudes followingthe presentation of two conflicting messages:

Hla: Under conditions fostering high messageelaboration, final attitudes will show primacyeffects (more favorable attitudes following apro/con than a con/pro message sequence).

Hlb: Under conditions fostering low messageelaboration, final attitudes will show recencyeffects (more favorable attitudes following acon/pro than a pro/con message sequence).

A number of auxiliary predictions are also made.

H2a: Message sequence will influence cognitiveresponses more under conditions fosteringhigh rather than low message elaboration.That is, pro/con message order will lead tomore favorable cognitive responses than con/pro message order to a greater extent under


high- as opposed to low-elaboration condi-tions.

II2b: Message recipients are more likely tocounterargue the second message underhigh- as opposed to low-elaboration condi-tions.

H2c: Final attitudes under low-elaboration con-ditions will be positively associated with re-call of second message arguments to a greaterextent than final attitudes under high-elab-oration conditions.

EXPERIMENT 1

For our first experiment examining message ordereffects we directly manipulated likelihood of elaboration(via personal relevance of the message topic; see Pettyand Cacioppo 1979) along with message order. In orderto do this, we chose a topic that has been commonlyemployed in initial persuasion research and for whichmanipulations of level of processing are well established;the topic of instituting senior comprehensive exams asa graduation requirement (see Petty and Cacioppo 1986;Petty, Cacioppo, and Goldman 1981). We manipulatedmessage order and issue relevance in a 2 (message order;pro/con, con/pro) X 2 (relevance; high, low) factorialdesign. Subjects were first exposed to a message con-taining either pro or con arguments on the exam issue.Students were then presented with a second messagethat always argued in the opposite direction of the first.The topic was introduced as either being considered atthe students' university for implementation the nextyear (high personal relevance) or being considered at adistant university for some time in the future (low per-sonal relevance).

MethodSubjects and Design. Fifty undergraduate students

participated for extra credit in their introductory mar-keting course. Subjects were run in one classroom ses-sion. A random ordering of experimental packets as-signed students to the 2 (message order; pro/con, con/pro) X 2 (personal relevance; high, low) between-sub-jects design.

Procedure, An introductory sheet informed stu-dents that they would be reading excerpts from variouspublications and that, after reading the articles, theywould be asked to evaluate each on a variety of dimen-sions, including writing style, use of grammar, and easeof reading. Students were presented with two opposingmessages on the issue of instituting senior comprehen-sive exams as a prerequisite for graduation from college.The pro and con senior comprehensive exam messageswere developed from messages used in past research(e.g.. Petty et al. 1981). Pretests showed that the proand con messages presented individually were equallystrong (i.e., produced approximately the same propor-

tion of thoughts in support of the advocated positionwhen pretest subjects were explicitly instructed to thinkcarefully about the arguments contained in the mes-sages; see Petty and Cacioppo 1986). The pro messagecontained five strong arguments in support of seniorcomprehensive exams and the con message containedfive strong arguments against the exams. The messageswere equal in length (approximately 420 words each).*

Independent Variables. Half the subjects receivedmessages in a pro/con order and half in a con/pro order.An introductory statement at the top of the page im-mediately preceding the first message informed half ofthe subjects that the institution of comprehensive examswas being discussed by the new president of their uni-versity for possible implementation beginning the fol-lowing spring (high personal relevance). The other halfof the subjects were informed that senior comprehensiveexams were being considered at a distant university forpossible implementation beginning the spring of twoschool years in the future (low personal relevance).

Dependent Measures. Following the two messages,subjects completed measures assessing their attitudestoward the implementation of the exams. Attitudes weremeasured on four 11-point semantic differential scalesassessing how bad/good, foolish/wise, harmful/benefi-cial., and negative/positive the students believed insti-tution of the exams would be. Subjects were also askedif instituting the exams would be helpful on a scale from1 ^ "not very helpful" to 11 = "very helpful." Threequestions assessed the perceived relevance of the examissue on scales anchored at I = "not very important tome." "not personally relevant," and "will not affectme" and 11 = "very important to me," "personallyrelevant," and "will affect me," respectively.

Cognitive Responses. Subjects next encounteredprinted instructions directing them to turn to the nextpage. Subjects were instructed to write down all of thethoughts they could recall going through their mind atthe time they read the first message about senior com-prehensive exams; seven double-spaced lines were pro-vided, and subjects were asked to take no more thantwo minutes for the task (though the actual time takenwas not monitored). On the middle of the same page,subjects were instructed to perform the same thoughtlisting for the second message.

Recall. Instructions on the bottom third of the pageasked subjects to write down all of the arguments they

''For example, strong pro exam arguments included that {a) studentsgraduating from schools with comprehensive exams were more likelyto be accepted into very good graduate schools, (h) students frominstitutions with comprehensive exams find better jobs, and (c) startingsalaries of students who had taken comprehensive exams were $2,000-$3,000 higher than those of students who had not taken the exams.Strong arguments anainst the exams ineluded that {a) capturing thebenefits of a four-year program on a single standardized exam wouldbe difficult, (h) the expectation of having to take such an exam maystop some students from entering college, and (c) taking an exam atthe end of each course should be sufficient.


could recall that were presented in favor of and opposedto the institution ofsenior comprehensive exams. Whenall subjects had finished the packet, they returned thematerials and were thoroughly debriefed and thankedfor their participation.

ResultsRelevance Manipulation Check. A composite mea-

sure of perceived personal relevance was constructedby averaging responses to the three perceived personalrelevance questions (a ^ .89). This composite was sub-mitted to a 2 (message order) X 2 (personal relevance)ANOVA. There was only a main effect for personal rel-evance, F(l,46) = 4.38, p < .04, whereby students inthe low personal relevance condition viewed the examissue as less relevant {X =5.51) than students in thehigh-relevance condition (X = 7.36).

Attitudes. A composite measure of attitude wasconstructed by averaging the responses to the four se-mantic differentials along with the question asking sub-jects how helpful the exams would be {a = .97). Thiscomposite measure was submitted to a 2 (message order)X 2 (personal relevance) ANOVA. The analysis revealedonly the predicted message order X personal relevanceinteraction, F{ 1,46) - 8.89, p < .004; see Figure 1. Thatis, subjects told that the exams were being consideredby their university for the following year (high personalrelevance) were more favorable toward the exams afterreceiving the pro/con message order {X = 6.01) thanafter receiving the con/pro order (X = 3.95; F(\A6)= 4.58, p < .02). We thus find support for HypothesisJa. In contrast, subjects who were told that the examswere being considered by a distant university for twoyears in the future (low personal relevance) were lessfavorable toward the exams after receiving the pro/conmessage order (A" = 3.49) than after receiving the con/pro order {X = 5.58; F(IA6) = 4.33, p < .025).' Wethus find support for Hypothesis lb.

Cognitive Responses. Cognitive response measureswere included in an attempt to discern patterns ofthoughts that might characterize message order effects.Thoughts were categorized as favorable, unfavorable,or neutral with regard to the exam topic by two judgesunaware of subjects' relevance condition. In addition,if thoughts in response to the second message werejudged to be explicitly attacking the validity of an ar-gument in the message, these thoughts were classifiedas direct counterarguments. The judges agreed on over80 percent of the thoughts; disagreements were resolvedby discussion.

The favorability of thoughts toward the institutionofsenior comprehensive exams was indexed by dividing

' Because we have strong a priori expectations regarding when pri-macy as opposed to recency effects should occur, probability levelsfor the simple effects of message order within relevance conditionsare one-tailed for both studies. This is the case for cognitive responsesand counterarguments as well.

FIGURE 1

FINAL ATTITUDE AS A FUNCTION OF PERSONAL RELEVANCEAND MESSAGE ORDER: EXPERIMENT 1

Attitude (11 = Pro)

5.0

3.0

Low High

Level of Relevance

the number of thoughts favorable to the exams by thetotal number of thoughts generated (collapsed acrossboth messages). Whereas favorability of thoughts wasno different for low-relevance subjects receiving the pro/con and con/pro message orders {X ^ .180 and .182,respectively), there was a tendency in the high-relevanceconditions for message order to affect thoughts in theexpected direction. That is, high-relevance subjects whoreceived the pro/con order reported proportionallymore favorable thoughts toward senior comprehensiveexams {X ^ .246) than high-relevance subjects who re-ceived the con/pro order {X = .165). Unfortunately,neither the interaction nor the simple effects approachedstatistical significance.**

The second potential indicator of active processesfostered by high personal relevance fared a bit better.That is, subjects in the high-relevance condition pro-duced a higher number of direct counterarguments ofinformation in the second message {X = .65) than sub-jects in the low-relevance condition {X = .33; F{IA6)= 2.05. p < .08; supportive of Hypothesis 2b). Consis-tent with the use of strong arguments in our pro andcon messages, there was no difference in counterarguing

"Although we clearly expected differences in counterarguing of thesecond message (see Hypothesis 2b), we did not have any firm ex-pectations regarding favorable evaluations of the content of the secondmessage. That is, although we would expect relatively few supportarguments in response to the second message for high-reievance par-ticipants, this does not necessitate any difference in support argumentsbetween high- and low-relevance conditions. This is because we donot expect low-relevance participants to actively process messagecontent and thus do not expect them to generate many support ar-guments. Indeed, the mean number of favorable thoughts generatedin response to the secojid message did not dilfer for subjects in high-(X ^ 1,19) and low- {X = 1.46) relevance conditions.


of the first message by high- versus low-relevance sub-jects.'

Argument Recall. No main eifects or interactionswere observed on the number of arguments recalled.On average, participants in the low-relevance conditionrecalled an average of 2.97 arguments in favor of theexams and 2.54 arguments against the exams. Partici-pants in the high-relevance conditions recalled an av-erage of 2.81 arguments in favor of the exams and 2.90arguments against the exams. Within each relevancecondition, there was no effect of order on recall.

Relationship of Recall and Attitude, Research onthe relationship of verbatim recall and judgment hasconsistently shown that, when individuals engage in lit-tle on-line evaluation, the correlation between recalland attitude is significant and positive {Haugtvedt andPetty 1992; Mackie and Asuncion 1990). Based on ourconceptualization ofthe processes underlying recencyeffects and previous work on recall-judgments relation-ships, in Hypothesis 2c we hypothesized that final at-titudes under low-elaboration conditions would be pos-itively associated with recall of second messagearguments to a greater extent than final attitudes underhigh-elaboration conditions. To test this hypothesis, re-call of the second message was correlated with finaljudgments after collapsing across levels of message pre-sentation order. The number of arguments recalledagainst the exams was coded as a negative number (toensure that reliance on argument recall is indexed by apositive recall-attitude correlation).

Favorability of attitudes under low-relevance con-ditions was positively related to argument recall {r - .48,/? < .01), whereas final judgments under high-relevanceconditions were not significantly related to final judg-ments (r = - .33, p < .10). If anything, it appears thatgreater recall of second message arguments under high-relevance conditions is negatively correlated with finaljudgments—consistent with the greater tendency ofhigh-relevance subjects to counterargue the secondmessage. Such processes would make the information

'Using different indices ofthe favorability of cognitive responsesand olcounterargumentation showed similar patterns of results. Thatis. the number of favorable cognitive responses tends to he greaterfollowing pro/con as opposed lo con/pro message order (A's = 1.79and .75. respectively) for high-relevance participants. For low-rele-vance participants, there is little difierence in the number of favorablecognitive thoughts in response to pro/con versus con/pro messageorders (As - .92 and .82. respectively). The number of valencedthoughts generated during (he thought-listing period tended to begreater under high- (A' = 4.85) as opposed to low- (X = 3.87) elabo-ration conditions. Also, the percentage of message-related thoughtsin response to the second message that were direct counterargumentstended to be higher for high- as opposed to low-relevance subjects{Xs = 23 percent and 17 percent, respectively). None ofthe patternsreached significance. However, consistent with the idea that final at-titudes would be based more on elaborations of initial message contentunder high- than under low-relevance conditions, the number of fa-vorable ihiiughts generated in response to the first message correlatedsignificantly with attitude under high- (r = .501. p < .01) but notunder low-relevance conditions (r ^ .086, NS).

memorable, but the fact that it was successfullycounterargued would lead to its negative relationshipwith the final judgment. Consistent with this possibility,when a partial correlation between attitude and recallwas computed (controlling for counterarguments to thesecond message), the negative correlation becomesnonsignificant (r = - .05, NS), and the positive corre-lation in the low-relevance condition remains un-changed and significant. We thus find support for Hy-pothesis 2c.

Discussion

Results of experiment 1 provide the first direct evi-dence in support ofthe attitude strength interpretationof past research on message order effects in persuasion.A manipulation of participant motivation determinedwhether the first or second message had a greater impacton attitudes. When personal relevance ofthe messagetopic was high (i.e.. motivation to process was high), asignificant primacy effect was obtained. When relevanceofthe message topic was low (i.e., motivation to processwas low), a significant recency effect was obtained.There was also a nonsignificant tendency for messageorder to influence thought content more under high-than under low-relevance conditions. Unfortunately,conditions in this study were not particularly conduciveto adequate collection of cognitive responses. For in-stance, because subjects were all seated in a large class-room and were likely finishing at different times, sub-jects who finished early may have distracted subjectswho were still reporting their cognitive responses. Inaddition, the small number of subjects in the currentstudy made it less likely that differences could be found.

Although the senior exam message has proven to bean extremely useful topic in persuasion research, therearea number ofimportant differences between this topicand more typical consumer-relevant messages. One ofthese differences is the fact that the message topic isfairly unique, and students may not have given muchthought to the topic prior to the experimental study.Thus, it is somewhat similar to a new product intro-duction. Because of this, the comprehensive exam issuemight be one that is particularly sensitive to manipu-lations of personal relevance.

In order to insure that these results are not only ob-tained with topics that might be characterized as lowin familiarity, we conducted a second experiment usinga topic more familiar to our subjects: nuclear power.Because there are a number of nuclear power plants inthe subjects' home state and because both pro- and an-tinuclear power positions have received attention in thelocal and national press (e.g., Columbus Dispatch1990a, 1990b) and in advertisements (Greenwald 1991).and because order effects have been hypothesized to bemore likely for unfamiliar topics (Hovland 1957), useofthe nuclear power topic was seen as a relatively strongtest of our hypotheses.


EXPERIMENT 2Undergraduate marketing students were first exposed

to a message presenting either pro or eon argumentsand then encountered a second message that always ar-gued in the opposite direction. In order to provide amore controlled environment for experiment 2, partic-ipation took place in individual cubicles, providing vi-sual and acoustical isolation.

MethodSubjects and Design. One hundred thirty-seven in-

troductory marketing students participated in the ex-periment for extra course credit. Subjects were run ingroups of two to four. Each subject was randomly as-signed to the 2 (message order: pro/con, con/pro) X 2(personal relevance: high, low) between-subjects design.

Messages. Pro and con versions of the nuclearpower messages were developed by combining argu-ments generated by marketing students with informa-tion from the popular press (e.g.. Time), Subsequentpretests with additional subjects who received only thepro or con message showed that the pro and con mes-sages were equally strong (that is, thinking about thematerial in the messages produced similar numbers ofthoughts in support ofthe advocated positions). Thepro message contained seven strong arguments in sup-port of nuclear power plants, and the con message con-tained seven strong arguments against nuclear powerplants. '*' The pro and con nuclear power messages con-tained approximately 300 words each.

Procedure. Students were seated in private cubiclescontaining an Apple Macintosh Ilsi computer and 13-inch color monitor. All instructions, messages, and de-pendent measures were presented using the applicationsoftware HyperCard. An introductory screen informedstudents that they would be reading excerpts from var-ious publications and that, after reading a series of ar-ticles, they would be asked to evaluate each on a varietyof dimensions, including writing style, use of grammar,and ease of reading. They were asked to read the ex-cerpts as they would any newspaper or magazine article.Subjects first read a message on the topic of recycling;the next two messages regarded nuclear power plants.

All dependent measures were presented after subjectshad read all three messages.

Independent Variables. Half of the subjects receivedthe nuclear power messages in the pro/con order andhalf in the con/pro order. Prior to each message, subjectswere informed ofthe upcoming topic; for the recyclingmessage and the first nuclear power message subjectswere given background information. For example, theywere informed that the first message was on the topieof recycling—"a topic of current interest in many partsof the country." Low personal relevance ofthe nuclearenergy topic was created by informing half of the sub-jects that recently released Federal Energy Programdocuments proposed that new nuclear power plants bebuilt in distant states (i.e., Texas, Arizona, and NewMexico). In the high-relevance condition, the subjects'own and nearby states (i.e.. Ohio, Michigan, and Penn-sylvania) were listed instead. This manipulation wasvalidated in a pretest with students from the samecourse." Students in the pretest were ineligible for thefinal study.

Dependent Measures. The first few questions fo-cused on recycling. The remainder ofthe questions wereattitude questions regarding the nuclear power issue.Questions were answered by clicking the "mouse" in-side a long narrow box (approximately 5 inches by .25inch) at the bottom ofthe computer screen. Scales wereanchored by descriptions typed below the box at eachend. Although the box was not labeled with numericalvalues, the computer recorded each response as havingoccurred within one of 11 equally spaced sections ofthe box. Thus, each response was assigned a scale valueby the computer.

Each ofthe attitude questions began with the state-ment "In general, I think building more nuclear powerplants is. . ." Four semantic differentials were formedwith the anchors bad/good, unwise/wise, harmful/ben-eficial, and negative/positive. After the computer-basedquestionnaire, an experimenter handed each subject asheet containing cognitive response and recail protocols.The thought-listing and recall instructions were iden-tical to those used in experiment 1. After subjects com-pleted the dependent measures, they were debriefed,thanked, and dismissed.

Pro arguments included («) nuclear plants would replace fossilfuel plants that produce carbon dioxide, thus lessening the greenhouseeffect, (h) nuclear plants are prevalent in other countries, such asFrance, which produces 70 percent of its energy from nuclear plants.(t) U.S. nuclear plants have operated for 20 years without seriousincidents, and (d) current standards for safety are very high. Argu-ments against additional nuclear plants included: (a) problems withthe technology and the lack of safe disposal of wastes make nuclearan unwise choice, (h) there is no guarantee that a disposal site willremain unchanged or that groundwater will not be contaminated, (t)the current safety tolerances, though they sound impressive, are onlyarbitrary, and (d) nuclear proponents often fail to consider an alter-native to continually increasing power supplies—the wise use andconservation of existing resources.

"Subjects in this pretest were given information aboul the nuclearpower topic that was identical to that presented to subjects in thestudy to follow. Immediately following receipt of this information,subjects were asked to what extent they believed that the issue ofbuilding more nuclear power plants could affect them personally,was important to them personally, and was relevant to them pwrson-ally, on scales anchored at 1 = "not at all," "nol at all important,"and "not at all relevant" and 5 = "very much," "very Important,"and "very relevant," respectively. These items were combined to forma relevance index {a - .87), Subjects exposed to the high-relevancemanipulation felt the issue was more relevant to them (A' = 4,20)than subjects exposed to the low-relevance manipulation (X - 3.24);f{1.57) = 24.27. p< .0001.


ResultsAttitudes. A composite measure of attitude was

constructed by averaging responses to the four attitudeitems (o = .94). The attitude index was submitted to a2 (message order) X 2 (personal relevance) ANOVA.Replicating experiment I, the only significant effect wasthe predicted message order X personal relevance in-teraction, F(I,I33) - 6.36, p < .001; see Figure 2. Asexpected, subjects in the high-relevance condition ex-posed to the pro/con message order were significantlymore favorable toward nuclear power {X ^ 7.94) thanwere high-relevance subjects exposed to the con/promessage order ( ^= 5.96; f( 1,133)= 12.21,/?< .001).Also as expected, subjects exposed to the messages underconditions of low relevance were less favorable towardnuclear power after receiving the pro/con message order(X = 5.80) than after receiving the con/pro messageorder (;P= 7.11; F(1.133) = 5.49,/J < .01).

Cognitive Responses. As in experiment 1, thoughtswere categorized as favorable, unfavorable, or neutralwith regard to the nuclear power topic by two judgesunaware of subjects" relevance conditions. Also,thoughts that were judged to be explicitly attacking thevalidity of an argument in the second message wereclassified as direct counterarguments. The judges agreedon over 86 percent of the cases. Disagreements wereresolved by discussion.

The favorability of thoughts toward nuclear powerplants was indexed by dividing the total number ofthoughts favorable to the issue by the total number ofthoughts (collapsed across both messages). The patternof thought favorability was nearly identical to that ofexperiment 1. The only overall effect on favorability ofthoughts was a message order X personal relevance in-teraction. F(1,133) ^ 4.01, p < .05. The proportion offavorable thoughts for subjects receiving the pro/con(X = .22) and the con/pro message orders {X = .254)was nearly identical for the low-relevance conditions(F < I). In contrast, high-relevance subjects in the pro/con order condition were significantly more favorabletoward nuclear power (X = .332) than high-relevancesubjects in the con/pro order condition {X = .209;/•'(K133)= 5.03,/7<.02).'-

In addition, analyses of the extent to which subjectsargued against statements in the second message showedonly the predicted effect of personal relevance, F( 1.133)= 6.18, />< .007. That is. regardless of order, subjectsin the high-relevance condition exhibited a highernumber of explicit counterarguments to information inthe second message (X = .418) than did subjects in thelow-relevance condition (A" - .114). Consistent with the

' As in experiment 1. we did not have any firm expectations re-garding favorable evaluations of the content of the second message(see n. 8 above). Similar to experiment 1. the mean number of fa-vorable thoughts generated in response to the second message didnot differ for subjects in high-(.^= 1.15) and low-(.^= 1.34) relevanceconditions.

FIGURE 2

FINAL ATTITUDE AS A FUNCTION OF PERSONAL RELEVANCEAND MESSAGE ORDER: EXPERIMENT 2

Attitude (Pro = 11)

a

Pro/Con

Con/Pro

Low High

Level of Relevance

use of strong arguments in our pro and con messages,there was no difference in counterarguing of the firstmessage by high- versus low-relevance participants.'^

Argument Recall No main effects or interactionswere observed on the number of arguments recalled.Participants in the low-relevance condition recalled anaverage of 1.93 arguments in favor of nuclear powerand 1.65 arguments against nuclear power. Participantsin the high-relevance conditions recalled an average of1.96 arguments in favor of nuclear power and 1.53 ar-

'^Using different indices of the favorability of cognitive responsesand ofcounlerargumentation showed similar patterns of results andstatistical significance. That is. the number of favorable cognitiveresponses were greater following pro/con as opposed to con/pro mes-sage order (.Y = 2.67 and 1.47, respectively) for high-relevance par-ticipants. For low-relevance participants, there is little difference inthe number of favorable cognitive thoughts in response to pro/conversus con/pro message orders (.Vs = 1.94 and 1.66. respectively).The percentage of message-related thoughts in response to the secondmessage that were direct counterarguments were higher tor high- asopposed to low-relevance subjects {As = 13.2 percent and 4.67 percent,respectively). As in experiment I. consistent with the idea that finalattitudes would be based more on elaborations of initial messagecontent under high- than under low-relevance conditions, the numberof favorable thoughts generated in response to ihe first message cor-related significantly under high- (r = .40. p < .001) but not underlow-relevance conditions (r = -.007, NS). High-relevance subjectsalso tended to generate a greater number of valenced thoughts {X= 4.38) than low-relevance subjects {X = 3.81). although this wasnot significant. To the extent that the manipulation of message orderinfluences not only attitudes but also cognitive responses, however,a thoughtful process becomes a more plausible mediator of thoseorder effects. This would be the case regardless of the total numberof valenced thoughts generated in a thought-listing protocol (see Pettyand Cacioppo 11986. pp. 38-39] for a more thorough discussion ofinferences regarding use of thought-listings as assessments of amountof message processing).


guments against nuclear power. Within each relevancecondition, there was no effect of order on recall.

Relationship of Argument Recall and Attitude.Correlations between favorability of attitudes and thenumber of arguments recalled from the second messagewere computed. Replicating experiment I, under con-ditions of low relevance, recall of second message ar-guments was positively related to final attitudes (r = .34,p < .004). In contrast, a negative correlation was ob-served in the high-relevance condition (r = -.29, p <.02). As in experiment 1, this might be the case becausesubjects in the high-relevance conditions engaged incounterargumentation of the second message. Consis-tent with this possibility, when a partial correlation be-tween attitude and recall was computed (controlling forcounterarguments of the second message), the negativecorrelation becomes nonsignificant (r = - . 19, NS) andthe positive correlation in the low-relevance conditionremains unchanged and significant.

DiscussionThe results of experiment 2 provided strong conver-

gent support for our hypothesized explanation of paststudies of message order effects. Replicating experimentI, we found a significant primacy effect when messagerecipients encountered the materials under conditionsof high personal relevance and a significant recency ef-fect when message recipients encountered the materialsunder conditions of low personal relevance.

In addition, results provided convergent evidence re-garding the nature of processes that led to primacy andrecency effects in our experiments. In both experiments,message order tended to influence the favorability ofcognitive responses only for subjects who read the ma-terials under conditions of high personal relevance. Inaddition, high-relevance subjects tended to counter-argue the second message more than low-relevancesubjects in both studies. This difference in counterar-guing did not occur in response to the first message,however, suggesting that counterarguments were elic-ited in defense of relatively strong attitudes. Finally, inboth experiments, the number of arguments recalledfrom the second message was positively related to thepositivity of the final attitude for subjects in low-elab-oration conditions, but not for subjects in high-elabo-ration conditions. Thus, support for each of the formalhypotheses was obtained.

GENERAL DISCUSSIONReviews of the message order literature (e.g., Rosnow

1966; Rosnow and Robinson 1967; our introductionsection) have noted that past studies often did not haveclear a priori predictions. In addition, most past studiesfinding order effects confounded either subject or topicfactors with the conceptual factors of interest (e.g., clas-sifying topic interest through participant self-report, orvarying controversy through presentation of different

topics) and typically did not find primacy and recencyeffects in the same study. A coherent picture of the mes-sage order literature emerged when past order effectswere considered within an attitude strength framework,however. By relating conditions in past studies of mes-sage order to recent work on message processing in per-suasion, we found that past message order effects couldbe usefully organized by our model. Importantly, twonew experiments in which message recipients' moti-vation to elaborate message content was directly ma-nipulated supported our views.

When participants were motivated to elaborate onmessage content, primacy effects occurred. When par-ticipants were unmotivated, recency effects occurred.Thus, we found and replicated primacy and recencyeffects when participants were randomly assigned tohigh- versus low-elaboration conditions. In addition toproviding a theoretical position that appears capable oforganizing past studies on opposing messages presentedclose in time, results of the present studies also provideempirical support for the attitude strength perspective'sa priori predictions of when first messages or secondmessages should have the most impact.

Future ResearchPersistence of Order Effects. Although the research

reported here is an important first step in understandingeffects of message order, additional research can helpus better understand the processes underlying these ef-fects. For example, because strong attitudes are morelikely to be the result of effortful as opposed to non-effortful processing of topic-relevant information(Haugtvedt and Petty 1992; Petty et al. 1994), messageorder effects that occur via effortful means should tendto be more persistent than order effects that are rela-tively noneffortful. Thus, from the current perspective,primacy effects due to effortful processing of early in-formation (and counterarguing of later information)should tend to persist longer than recency effects whichresult from noneffortful reliance on the number of ar-guments that come easily to mind on a topic. An im-portant next step in order effects research, therefore,will be examination of the temporal persistence of at-titudes formed or changed under various message orderconditions.

Different Processes Leading to Order Effects. Futureresearch should also address conditions under whicheffortful as opposed to noneffortful processes may beresponsible for primacy and recency effects. Althoughwe have argued that primacy effects in current and pastmessage order studies are likely the result of high levelsof message elaboration, we do not mean to imply thatother (yet unexplored) factors might not also affect theexistence of message order effects and the types of pro-cesses that might be responsible for those effects. Forexample, some conditions (such as those that foster"epistemic freezing"; Kruglanski and Freund 1983)may exist where noneffortful processes could result in


primacy. Thus, if opposing messages were presentedunder specific conditions such as time pressure (Mayse-less and Kruglanski 1987) or were given to individualswho score high in dispositional "need for closure"(Webster and Kruglanski 1992), primacy effects due toignorance of later information might occur. Thus, someeffects of message order may be due to factors otherthan attitude strength per se.

In such a case, however, the attitude strength per-spective guided by the Elaboration Likelihood Model(Petty and Cacioppo 1986) would predict that the pri-macy effect brought about by ignoring later informationshould decay faster than primacy effects brought aboutby a high level of elaboration. Similarly, there may beconditions under which recency effects could be madeto endure. For instance, the low-elaboration subjects inour studies could be induced to evaluate the argumentsthey recall. If these subjects engage in effortful evalu-ation of these arguments, then the observed recencyeffect might persist to a relatively high degree. If thesesubjects were disrupted from doing such evaluation ofrecalled arguments, however, the recency effects wouldlikely not persist. Thus, another important goal of futureresearch should be to delineate the conditions underwhich effortful versus noneffortful processes are morelikely and to explore the differential consequences ofthese processes.

Such research may offer unique insights into the cre-ation of especially durable attitudes through the stra-tegic use of variables used to increase processing of ini-tial and counterpersuasive messages. Such processingmay serve to strengthen and reinvigorate existing atti-tudes (see Haugtvedt, Leavitt, and Schneier 1993). Fu-ture research might also profitably apply alternativemanipulations and classifications of motivation to pro-cess information such as individual versus group re-sponsibility for message evaluation (Petty et al. 1977).self-referencing of message content (Burnkrant andUnnava 1989), and identifying message recipients asbeing high versus low in need for cognition (Haugtvedt.Petty, and Cacioppo 1992). In addition, while we suggestthat an understanding of the extent of elaboration maybe a useful way to gain understanding of some messageorder effects, it is important to note that, for practicaland theoretical reasons, the influence of various indi-vidual persuasion factors should be systematically ex-plored in future research. That is, understanding thatelaboration plays an important role does not obviatethe usefulness or importance of identifying a wide rangeof factors and processes.

Order Effects in Two-sided Advertising Settings.Another direction for future research is to understandthe extent to which the processes identified in the cur-rent studies relate to processes operating in commonadvertising contexts. For example, consumer research-ers have investigated the effectiveness of one-sided ver-sus two-sided advertisements in attempts to understandwhen a particular format would be most effective (e.g..

Etgar and Goodwin 1982; Pechmann 1992; Swinyard1981). In this research, two-sided ads have been shownto be more effective to the extent that the "negative"(i.e., con-product) information allows one to perceivethe product as having more of the "positive" attribute(i.e., pro-product) qualities (according to "correla-tional" inferences; see Pechmann 1992) and to the ex-tent that the two-sided nature of the ad increases per-ceptions of source credibility (Pechmann 1992).Although this research has not varied the order of proversus con information, the processes found to underlieprimacy versus recency effects in message order mightalso operate in two-sided ads. That is, if conditions en-courage high levels of elaboration of the ad, enhancedcounterargumentation of information late in the ad maylead to more favorable views of the product when theinformation is presented in a pro/con rather than a con/pro order. If conditions encourage low levels of elabo-ration, however, then information presented late in thead might influence product attitudes through memory-based processes that encourage recency effects (i.e.,more favorable product views following a con/prorather than a pro/con order).

One potentially major difference between the pro andcon information in the two-sided ads, studied by Pech-mann (1992) and others, and the opposing messagesused in message order research, is that the opposingmessages are from different sources. A two-sided adtypically contains information from a single source.Therefore, if two distinct sources of opposing infor-mation are necessary for the primacy/recency effectswe observed, then these effects may not operate in thesame way for two-sided advertising appeals.

Even if two distinct sources of information are nec-essary for the order effects observed in the current re-search, advertisers might be able to create ads that ben-efit from both sets of processes (i.e., processes associatedwith two-sided ad effectiveness [Pechmann 1992] andprocesses associated with primacy/recency effects ofopposing messages). For example, an advertiser mightutilize different persons (e.g., two different perspectivesprovided in a "person on the street" scenario) in orderto make information that forms the two sides of an adappear to be from distinct message sources. By doingthis, the advertiser might capitalize on primacy pro-cesses that enhance perceptions of the product (e.g., ifthe ad is presented in a way that encourages high levelsof initial elaboration, increased counterarguing of theopposing information might maximize favorability ofproduct perceptions). If the advertiser were then to re-veal that both sets of information were sponsored bythe same company at the end of the ad (i.e., at the endof the "negative" information), enhanced perceptionsof source credibility (i.e., the "correspondent infer-ences" studied by Pechmann [1992]) may further en-hance the effectiveness of the two-sided ad.

LimitationsIt is important to point out some limiting conditions

for the kind of phenomena described in the present ar-


tide. First, our perspective suggests that effects of mes-sage order are most likely when some attitude changecan be achieved from the exposure to the respectivepersuasive messages, Thus, for issues on which individ-uals hold extremely strong initial attitudes (and thus,for which attitude change is unhkely). message ordermay not aflFect final judgment. The fact that we foundchanges for an issue that has received considerable me-dia attention (i.e., nuclear power) suggests that messageorder effects can occur for a variety of issues that peopleface in their daily lives.

Second, in our research, attitudes and process datawere collected only after exposure to both messages.Although collection of attitude data and/or process dataimmediately after exposure to an initial message wouldbe interesting and useful, experiences described in re-lated research suggest that collection of such data ar-tificially increases the level of elaboration beyond whatwould naturally occur (see Haugtvedt and Petty 1992),making it very difficult to test the influence of" the in-tended processing manipulation alone. Thus, a potentiallimitation of our current research is a lack of measureson the availability of information supportive ofthe at-titude after exposure to the initial message alone. Achallenge for future research, therefore, will be the de-velopment of methods to obtain these measures withoutartificially influencing the nature ofthe attitude. Froma practical perspective., however, it should also be notedthat assessment of attitudes or thoughts only after ex-posure to both messages is not an atypical consumersituation. That is, if both pro and con information isavailable, consumers may often encounter both kindsof information before being asked to give their opinionor make a choice.

Finally., in the current research, cognitive responseswere collected in the order in which the messages werepresented. Because our overall indices of cognitive re-sponses were collapsed across messages, this should nothave markedly influenced those results. Even so, futureresearch might benefit from having participants listthoughts without having them attempt to decide whichmessage engendered each thought.

Importantly, our predictions may not hold in everysetting involving opposing messages from two differentsources. For example, political candidates may oftenwant to have the last word in a debate. We suspect thatone ofthe reasons for this is that they can adapt theircomments to fit what has occurred during the debate.That is, they can remind potential voters of theirstrengths and of their opponent's weaknesses. In ad-dition, speaking last keeps one's opponent from beingable to rebut what one says during that portion ofthedebate. Sometimes, however, one cannot engage in on-line change ofthe text of one's message to directly rebutan opponent's statements (e.g., if the text must becanned ahead of time—as is the case in print, radio, ortelevision advertising). In such cases candidates mightwant audiences that are highly involved to think care-fully and form thoughtful opinions based on a presen-

tation of their views before rather than after the viewsof their opponents (consistent with the attitude strengthperspective). Of course, if candidates view the electorateas largely unable or unmotivated to process the infor-mation in their speeches, then our perspective wouldalso predict that they would want to present their viewslast in a debate.

Importance of Multiple-Message ResearchThis line of research may also have important im-

plications for marketing practitioners, public relationsfirms, and even courtroom lawyers. That marketers mayhave control over the sequence in which consumers areexposed to information is a fact that is recently beingrecognized. For example, companies might make spe-cial efforts to purchase display space in exhibition hallsthat is likely to be seen before competitors' space if theyanticipate high-elaboration conditions. Publicationslike Advertising Age often contain discussions abouthow one firm hopes to attract consumers by being thefirst to introduce new products, attributes, or features.Knowledge of future competitor actions is also becom-ing more common. Research and theory such as thatoutlined in the present article could be used to helpmarketers decide how to best allocate their resourcesunder certain conditions—or even when it may be im-portant to create certain kinds of conditions prior toother actions. For example, if a firm anticipates attacksfrom competitors or the media, it can focus on attemptsto get consumers to think extensively about the strongarguments in support of their position before the attackappears.

Even if exposure sequence is beyond the immediatecontrol ofthe marketer, the amount and kind of pro-cessing a consumer can be induced to engage in maybe under the control ofthe marketer in many instances.This may mean raising the involvement ofthe consumerat the time of message exposure or using other tech-niques that increase message elaboration. It may alsomean increasing the amount of time a consumer is ex-posed to a message or is given to "consolidate" theirattitudes after exposure to the message (e.g., the use of"reflection time," as in Haugtvedt and Strathman11990]).

ConclusionIn a recent comment on the message order effect lit-

erature, Eagly and Chaiken (1993, p. 300) stated:"Given the complexity ofthe two-opposing-messagesparadigm, and the numerous variables and processesthat have been shown to influence persuasion in a stan-dard one-message paradigm, a firm understanding oforder effects in persuasion seems unlikely in the nearfuture." Although many questions remain surroundingmessage order effects, the research and perspectives of-fered in this article provide a first step in organizingand understanding this important area of research. We


hope that the current work also encourages marketersand psychologists to explore multiple message contextsand the relative durability of attitudes formed orchanged through such exposures. Although this researchpresents unique challenges,, attempts to increase un-derstanding of these contexts may lead to importanttheoretical and practical advances.

[Received November 1992. Revised September 1993.]

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