METAETHICSOXFORDBIBLIOGRAPHIESONLINERESEARCHGUIDE

AlexMillerUniversityofBirmingham

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TABLEOFCONTENTSIntroductionGeneralOverviewsTextbooksandAnthologiesSurveysReferenceWorksandOnlineResourcesMooreandtheOpenQuestionArgumentIntuitionismandNon-NaturalismExpressivismEmotivismPrescriptivismQuasi-RealismNorm-ExpressivismMinimalismandExpressivismObjectionsandAlternativestoExpressivism

ErrorTheoryandMoralFictionalismErrorTheoryMoralFictionalism

ResponseDependenceConstructivismNon-ReductiveNaturalism(CornellRealism)MoralTwinEarth

ReductiveNaturalistRealismRailton’sReductiveNaturalismAnalyticMoralFunctionalism

ContemporaryNon-NaturalismWigginsandMcDowellMoralParticularism

MoralPsychologyInternalismandExternalismRationalismandAnti-RationalismTheHumeanTheoryofMotivation

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INTRODUCTION

Metaethics can be described as the philosophical study of the nature of moraljudgment. It is concernedwith such questions as: Domoral judgments expressbeliefsorratherdesiresandinclinations?Aremoraljudgmentsapttobeassessedintermsoftruthandfalsity?Domoralsentenceshavefactualmeaning?Areanymoraljudgmentstrueoraretheysystematicallyanduniformlyfalse?Istheresucha thing as moral knowledge? Are moral judgments less objective than, say,judgmentsabouttheshapesandsizesofmiddle-sizedphysicalobjects?Isthereanecessary connection between moral judgments and motivation? Are moralrequirementsrequirementsofreason?Domoraljudgmentshaveanaturalornon-naturalsubjectmatter?

Ausefulwayofstartingonmetaethicsistodistinguishbetweenrealistandnon-realistviewsofmorality.Moralrealistsholdthatmoraljudgmentsexpressbeliefs,andthatsomeofthosebeliefsaretrueinvirtueofmind-independentmoralfacts.Oppositiontomoral realismcantakeanumberof forms.Expressivistsdenythatmoral judgments express beliefs, claiming instead that they express non truth-assessable mental states such as desires or inclinations. Error theorists andfictionalists claim that moral judgments are systematically false. Response-dependenceviewsofmoraljudgmentsallowthatmoraljudgmentsexpressbeliefsand thatat leastsomeof themare true,buthold that theyare true invirtueofmind-dependent moral facts. Moral realism itself comes in many varieties:reductionist, non-reductionist, naturalist, non-naturalist, internalist, externalist,analytic,andsynthetic.

GENERALOVERVIEWS

Overviewsofmetaethics areoften found in larger referenceworksabout ethics.Thevolumeslistedinthissectioncontainabroadrangeofhigh-levelintroductoryessaysbykeyresearchers inmetaethics.Singer1991 isanoverviewofethics indifferentculturesandhistoricalsettingsbeforemovingintotheoriesandpracticalapplications.LaFollette2000hasasectiononmetaethicsthatincludesessaysonrelativism, naturalism, moral intuition, and objections to ethics. Copp 2007devotesthefirsthalfofthebooktoissuessurroundingmetaethics.Skorupski2010devotesasectiontotheseissuesaswell,includingerrortheoryandfictionalism.

‣Copp, David, ed. The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2007.The first half contains twelve essays on metaethical themes by Blackburn,Railton, Sturgeon, Dancy and others, as well as an introductory essay by theeditor.

‣LaFollette,Hugh,ed.TheBlackwellGuidetoEthicalTheory.Oxford:Blackwell,2000.Thefirsthalfcontainseightusefulintroductorychaptersonmetaethicalthemes.

‣Singer,Peter,ed.ACompaniontoEthics.Oxford:Blackwell,1991.Part4containsseveralveryusefulchaptersonmetaethicalthemesby leadingmetaethicistssuchasDancy,Smith,andHare.

‣Skorupski, John, ed. The Routledge Companion to Ethics. London:Routledge,2010.Part2containsseveralessaysonsomecentraltopicsinmetaethics.

TEXTBOOKSANDANTHOLOGIES

McNaughton 1988, Darwall 1997, andMiller 2003 are the best available surveytexts,whileSmith1994canserveasone.Theseriousstudentwouldgetasoundgrounding by reading one or more of these, supplemented by readings fromDarwall, et al. 1997, Fisher and Kirchin 2006, and/or Shafer-Landau and Cuneo2006.Dreier2006isprobablythemostadvancedofthevolumes.

‣Darwall, Stephen. Philosophical Ethics: An Historical andContemporaryIntroduction.Boulder,CO:Westview,1997.The first half is a very useful introduction to metaethical themes, while thesecond half looks at historical philosophers such as Kant, Aristotle, Mill, andNietzsche.

‣Darwall, Stephen, Allan Gibbard, and Peter Railton, eds. MoralDiscourse and Practice: Some Philosophical Approaches. New York:OxfordUniversityPress,1997.A selection of twenty-three high-level papers and chapters from 20th-centurymetaethics.Containsmanyofthepapersreferredtointhisbibliography.

‣Dreier, James, ed.Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory. Malden,MA:Blackwell,2006.Containsfivepairsofarticles(generallytakingdistinctperspectives)onreasonandmotivation,andmoralfactsandexplanations.

‣Fisher, Andrew, and Simon Kirchin, eds. Arguing about Metaethics.London:Routledge,2006.

A comprehensive collection of key papers and chapters in recentmetaethics.Also contains excellent editorial introductions to each of the main themescoveredbytheselections.

‣McNaughton,David.MoralVision:An Introduction toEthics. Oxford:Blackwell,1988.Agoodintroduction,writtenfromaparticularistandnon-naturalistperspective.

‣Miller, Alexander. An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics.Cambridge,UK:Polity,2003.Acriticaloverviewofmetaethics from1903onwards,withchaptersonMoore,Ayer, Blackburn, Gibbard, response-dependence, Mackie, reductive and non-reductivenaturalism,andthenon-naturalismofMcDowellandWiggins.

‣Shafer-Landau,Russ,andTerenceCuneo,eds.FoundationsofEthics:AnAnthology.Malden,MA:Blackwell,2006.Acomprehensiveselectionofkeytextsfrom20th-centurymetaethics,togetherwithusefulintroductorycommentaryfromtheeditors.

‣Smith,Michael.TheMoralProblem.Oxford:Blackwell,1994.Aninfluentialmonograph,soclearlywrittenthat itcouldserveasahigh-levelintroductiontomuchofthearea.

SURVEYS

Included here are survey articles general enough to cover broad areas ofmetaethicalterrain.Darwall,etal.1992andSmith1998takeoffintheirownwaysfromMoore 1993 (cited under Moore and the Open Question Argument), whileLittle 1994a, Little 1994b, Railton 1996, and Sayre-McCord 1986 structure theiroverviews around moral realism. Wright 1996 comes at metaethics from thegeneralrealismversusantirealismdebate.

‣Darwall, Stephen, Allan Gibbard, and Peter Railton. “Toward Fin deSiècle Ethics: Some Trends.” Philosophical Review 101 (1992): 115–189.DOI:10.2307/2185045Amagisterial survey covering the period 1903 to 1992, co-authored by threephilosopherswithquitedivergentmetaethicalviews.

‣Little,Margaret. “Moral Realism I: Naturalism.”Philosophical Books35(1994a):145–153.DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0149.1994.tb02417.xAconcisebutveryhelpfulsurveyofwork inthe(predominantlyUS)naturalistrealisttradition.

‣Little, Margaret. “Moral Realism II: Non-Naturalism.” PhilosophicalBooks35(1994b):225–233.DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0149.1994.tb02885.xA concise but very helpful survey ofwork in the (predominantly British) non-naturalistrealisttradition.

‣Railton, Peter “Moral Realism: Problems and Prospects.” In MoralKnowledge? New Readings in Moral Epistemology. Edited by WalterSinnott-Armstrong and Mark Timmons, 49–81. New York: OxfordUniversityPress,1996.Containsanextremelyuseful“progressivetaxonomyofrealism”togetherwithaniceflowchart.

‣Sayre-McCord,Geoffrey.“TheManyMoralRealisms.”SouthernJournalofPhilosophy24(1986):1–22.Ausefuloverviewbutwithasomewhatunrefinedconceptionofmoralrealism.

‣Smith, Michael. “Ethics and the A Priori: A Modern Parable.”PhilosophicalStudies92(1998):149–174.DOI:10.1023/A:1017132222454Ahilarioussurveyofsomemainmetaethicalconcerns,setaroundalunchtimediscussionbetweenasalad-eatingcognitivist(“Cog”)andafish-and-chip-eatingnon-cognitivist(“Noncog”).

‣Wright, Crispin. “Truth in Ethics.” InTruth in Ethics. Edited by BradHooker,1–18.Oxford:Blackwell,1996.Arefinedsurveythatexploresthepossibilityofnon-expressivistandnon-error-theoreticformsofoppositiontomoralrealism.

REFERENCEWORKSANDONLINERESOURCES

Onlineresourcesgenerallyareofunevenquality,butthetwolistedhere(PEASoupand Ethics Etc.) can be recommended. TheOxford Studies inMetaethics series

(Schafer-Landau2006)hasrapidlyestablisheditselfasoneoftheleadingregularpublicationsspecializinginmetaethics.TheStanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophyisacomprehensiveresourceforallareaswithinthefield.Lenman’sBibliographyofMetaethicsisausefultool,listingsourcesalphabeticallybyauthor.

‣ABibliographyofMetaethicsURL:(http://www.lenmanethicsbibliography.group.shef.ac.uk/Bib.htm).AusefulandextensivebibliographymaintainedbySheffieldphilosopherJamesLenman.

‣EthicsEtcURL:(http://ethics-etc.com/about/).Features useful posts on metaethics within a forum for contemporaryphilosophicalissuesinethics.

‣PEASoupURL:(http://peasoup.typepad.com/peasoup/).Founded in 2004, this blog includes a section dedicated to metaethics, withpostsfrommanyleadingmetaethicists.

‣Schafer-Landau, Russ, ed. Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2006.Published annually, each volume contains high quality cutting-edge work onmetaethics.

‣Zalta,EdwardN.,ed.StanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophyURL:(http://plato.stanford.edu/).Stanford,CA:StanfordUniversity.Containsmanygenerallyexcellententriesonmetaethicalissuesandthemes.

MOOREANDTHEOPENQUESTIONARGUMENT

Inmanyways,Moore1993(originallypublishedin1903)canberegardedasthefoundational document of 20th century and contemporary metaethics. Moore’s“openquestion”argumentpurportedtoshowthat“good”couldnotbeconceptuallyequivalenttoanypredicate—suchas“maximizeshappiness”—referringtoanaturalproperty,sothatmoraljudgmentscouldnotbeviewedasexpressingbeliefsabouttheinstantiationofnaturalfacts.Theargumentwashugelyinfluentialinthe20thcentury,initiallypushingphilosophersinthedirectionofnon-naturalism(theviewthatmoral judgmentsexpressbeliefsaboutnon-natural facts)oremotivism(the

viewthatmoraljudgmentsexpressemotionsorfeelingsratherthanbeliefs).Theargumentgradually fell intodisrepute, but it continues toexert an influenceoncontemporary metaethics, with philosophers now viewing it not as aspiring torefute naturalism but rather to highlight features of moral judgment thatnaturalismmustaccommodate(Snare1975,Baldwin1993,Darwall,etal.1992).

‣Baldwin,Thomas.G.E.Moore:SelectedWritings.London:Routledge,1993.Chapter3surveysthefortunesoftheopenquestionargumentandattemptstosalvageaversionoftheargumentlessambitiousthanMoore’s.

‣Darwall, Steven, Allan Gibbard, and Peter Railton. “Toward Fin deSiècle Ethics: Some Trends.” Philosophical Review 101 (1992): 115–189.DOI:10.2307/2185045Section1providesausefulsummaryofhowMoore’sargumentinfluenced20th-century metaethics, and there is an attempt to salvage a version of theargumentthatpurportsonlytoposeachallengefornaturalism.

‣Frankena,W.K.“TheNaturalisticFallacy.”Mind48(1939):464–477.A classic paper containing a rich and many-layered critique of Moore’s openquestionargument.ReprintedinFisherandKirchin2006(citedunderTextbooksandAnthologies),pp.47–58.

‣Horgan, Terry, and Mark Timmons, eds. Metaethics after Moore.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2006.Sixteen papers, many by leading metaethicists, exploring Moore’s impact on20th-centuryandcontemporarymetaethics.

‣Moore, G. E. Principia Ethica. Rev. ed. Edited by Thomas Baldwin.Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,1993.The opening chapter, “The Subject-Matter of Ethics,” contains the classicstatement of the open question argument. Baldwin’s editorial introductioncontainssomeveryusefulcommentary.

‣Smith,Michael.TheMoralProblem.Oxford:Blackwell,1994.Chapter 2 contains a concise summary of standard objections to the openquestionargument.

‣Snare,Frank.“TheOpenQuestionasLinguisticTest.”Ratio17(1975):122–129.

A very useful discussion suggesting that the open question argument can beusedtotestnaturalistaccountsofthemeaningofmoralexpressions.ReprintedinFisherandKirchin2006(citedunderTextbooksandAnthologies),pp.59–65.

‣Wellman,ChristopherH.,ed.“CentenarySymposiumonG.E.Moore’sPrincipiaEthica.”Specialissue,Ethics113(2003).A special issue of Ethics containing papers by several leading contemporaryphilosophers.

INTUITIONISMANDNON-NATURALISM

Inthewakeofthe(apparent)refutationofethicalnaturalisminMoore’sPrincipiaEthica, philosophers such as Prichard and Ross (see Dancy 1991) embraced“intuitionism,” a view that in general could be described as holding that “basicmoral judgments and basic moral principles are justified by the noninferentialdeliverances of a rational intuitive faculty” (Audi 1996), a faculty capable ofyieldingaccesstonon-naturalmoralfacts.Theview,accusedbyitsdetractorsofmetaphysical and epistemological bankruptcy, fell into disrepute and wasovertakenbyexpressivistviewsstartingwithemotivism.Non-naturalismeventuallyreturnedtothephilosophicalmainstreaminthefinalquarterofthe20thcenturywiththeworkofWiggins,McDowell,andDancy.

‣Audi,Robert.“Intuitionism,Pluralism,andtheFoundationsofEthics.”InMoralKnowledge?NewReadings inMoralEpistemology.EditedbyWalter Sinnott-Armstrong and Mark Timmons, 101–136. New York:OxfordUniversityPress,1996.An attempt by a distinguished epistemologist to show that intuitionism is amoreseriousmetaethicalcontenderthanisusuallythought.

‣Dancy, Jonathan.“Intuitionism.” InACompanion toEthics.EditedbyPeterSinger,411–420.Oxford:Blackwell,1991.Ashortsurvey,placingthenon-naturalisticintuitionismofPrichardandRossinthecontextofmetaethicsinthelastquarterofthe20thcentury.

‣Ridge,Michael.“MoralNon-NaturalismURL: (http://www.seop.leeds.ac.uk/entries/moral-non-naturalism/).” InStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edited by Edward N. Zalta.Stanford,CA:StanfordUniversity,2008.Anexcellentsurvey,startingwithacritiqueofMoore.

‣Smith,Michael.TheMoralProblem.Oxford:Blackwell,1994.Section 2.4 argues that non-naturalistic intuitionism fails because it cannotaccountfortheapriorisupervenienceofthemoralonthenatural.

‣Stratton-Lake, Philip., ed. Ethical Intuitionism: Re-evaluations.Oxford:Clarendon,2002.A number of leading metaethicists examine whether intuitionism can addanythinggenuineandsubstantialtoourunderstandingofmorality.

‣Warnock, G. J. Contemporary Moral Philosophy. London: Macmillan,1967.Containsastandardcritiqueofnon-naturalism.

EXPRESSIVISM

Onewayofavoidingboththechallengeposedtonaturalismbytheopen-questionargumentaswellasthemetaphysicalandepistemologicalextravagancesofnon-naturalisminvolvesdenyingthatmoralsentencesareinthebusinessofpurportingto represent facts. There are various forms, including emotivism, prescriptivism,quasi-realism,andnorm-expressivism.

EmotivismEmotivism is the view that moral judgments express emotions, feelings, orsentiments,andare thusnotassessable in termsof truthand falsity.Ayer1946contains a polemical statement of the view as part of a statement of logicalpositivism.AccordingtoAyer,moraldisagreementsconsistinclashesofinclinationandarethus,atbottom,notrationallyresolvable.Stevenson1966andStevenson1944provideamorecarefulandpedestriandefenseof theview.Kivy1980andKivy 1992 compare emotivism about moral judgment with emotivism aboutaesthetic judgment, while Miller 1998 argues that an extension of the logicalpositivists’ verification principle pushes emotivism in the direction of moralnihilism.

‣Ayer, Alfred J. Language, Truth and Logic. 2d ed. London: Gollancz,1946.Chapter6,“ACritiqueofEthicsandTheology,”isaclassicandconcisestatementofemotivism.The long introduction to the1946secondeditioncontains someimportantqualifications.

‣Kivy,Peter.“AFailureofAestheticEmotivism.”PhilosophicalStudies38(1980):351–365.DOI:10.1007/BF00419335Oneoftwounjustlyneglectedpapersarguingthatemotivismislessplausibleintheaestheticcasethaninthemoralcase.

‣Kivy, Peter. “Oh Boy! You Too! Aesthetic Emotivism Rexamined.” InThePhilosophyofA.J.Ayer.EditedbyLewisEdwinHahn,309–328.LaSalle,IL:OpenCourt,1992.Along with Kivy 1980, this paper usefully brings out crucial aspects of theemotivistviewofthefunctionofmoraljudgment.

‣Miller, Alexander. “Emotivism and the Verification Principle.”ProceedingsoftheAristotelianSociety98(1998):103–124.DOI:10.1111/1467-9264.00027Argues that an extended version of the verification principle that originallymotivatedemotivismcanbeusedtoundermineit.

‣Stevenson,C.L.EthicsandLanguage.NewHaven,CT:YaleUniversityPress,1944.AnextendedtreatmentofthethemesdiscussedinStevenson1966.

‣Stevenson,C.L.“TheEmotiveMeaningofEthicalTerms.”ReprintedinLogicalPositivism.EditedbyA.J.Ayer,264–281.NewYork:FreePress,1966.Originallypublished inMind in1937, thispaper setsouta formofemotivismsubtlerthanthatofAyer1946.

PrescriptivismPrescriptivismisaformofexpressivismaccordingtowhichmoralclaimsexpressprescriptions or imperatives. The principle defender of the viewwas R.M. Hare(Hare2003a,Hare2003b,Hare1981).Hare’sprescriptivism—unlikeemotivism—attempts to show that ethical arguments canbeunderpinnedby reason.Geach1960 and Geach 1965 raise a difficulty for expressivist views—includingprescriptivism—that contemporary expressivists such as Blackburn and Gibbardhaveexpendedmuchenergyinattemptingtosolve.(SeealsoQuasi-RealismandNorm-Expressivism.)

‣Geach, Peter. “Ascriptivism.” Philosophical Review 69 (1960): 221–225.

DOI:10.2307/2183506UsuallyreadalongsideGeach1965,thispaperattemptstorefuteascriptivism.

‣Geach,Peter.“Assertion.”PhilosophicalReview74(1965):449–465.DOI:10.2307/2183123Along with Geach 1960, this paper argues that expressivist views of moralexpressionscannotaccount for theuseofmoral sentenceswithin “unassertedcontexts”suchastheantecedentsofconditions.The“Frege-Geachproblem,”asithasbecomeknown,hasprovedtobeathorninthesideforexpressivistviewsgenerally.

‣Hare, R. M.Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method, and Point. Oxford:Clarendon,1981.Usesadistinctionbetweentwolevelsofmoralthinkingtodevelop,interalia,autilitarianethicthatcohereswithprescriptivism.

‣Hare, R. M. “Universal Prescriptivism.” In A Companion to Ethics.EditedbyPeterSinger,451–463.Oxford:Blackwell,1991.AshortandaccessibleversionofHare’sviewsonprescriptivismandcompetitoraccountsofthemeaningsofmoralclaims.

‣Hare,R.M.SortingOutEthics.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2000.Includes a taxonomy of metaethical views including naturalism, intuitionism,andemotivism.

‣Hare,R.M.TheLanguageofMorals.Oxford:Clarendon,2003a.Hare’sfirstextendedtreatmentofprescriptivismandthelocusclassicusfortheview.

‣Hare, R. M. Freedom and Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press,2003b.Builds on Hare 2003a, extending it to account for various kinds of moralreasoning.

Quasi-RealismQuasi-realism is a position developed by Simon Blackburn (Blackburn 1984,Blackburn 1993, Blackburn 1998) from the 1970s onwards that attempts toexplainmoraljudgmentusingonlymaterialscongenialtoprojectivism(thatmoraljudgments are expressions of sentiments towards natural—non-moral—states of

affairsandproperties).Inparticular,quasi-realismarguesthataprojectivistviewofmoraljudgmentcanlegitimatefeaturesofmoralpracticenormallyheldtorequiremoral realism. Hale 1993 questions Blackburn’s approaches to the Frege-Geachproblem (also surveyed in Kölbel 2002). McDowell 1981 and McDowell 1998criticizeBlackburnfromarealistperspective,whileWright1988arguesthatquasi-realismisnotaplausiblevehicleforoppositiontomoralrealism.

‣Blackburn,Simon.SpreadingtheWord:GroundingsinthePhilosophyofLanguage.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1984.Chapters5and6presentanddefendquasi-realism.

‣Blackburn,Simon.EssaysinQuasi-Realism.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1993.AcollectionofBlackburn’scentralarticlesonquasi-realism.

‣Blackburn, Simon.Ruling Passions. Oxford: Oxford University Press,1998.Blackburn’s latest book-length defense of his metaethical views. Develops aform of “commitment-theoretic semantics” as a solution to the Frege-Geachproblem.

‣Hale, Bob. “Can There Be a Logic of Attitudes?” In Reality,Representation, and Projection. Edited by John Haldane and CrispinWright,337–363.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1993.A detailed critique of Blackburn’s various attempts to solve the Frege-Geachproblem.

‣Kölbel,Max.TruthwithoutObjectivity.London:Routledge,2002.Chapter4isasuperblyclearcommentaryontheFrege-Geachproblem.

‣McDowell, John. “Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following.” InWittgenstein: To Follow a Rule. Edited by Steven H. Holtzmann andChristopher M. Leich, 141–162. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,1981.Argues that quasi-realism presupposes a view of conceptual competenceundermined byWittgenstein’s rule-following considerations. Blackburn has anextendedreplyinthesamevolume.

‣McDowell,John.“ProjectivismandTruthinEthics.”ReprintedinMind,ValueandReality.EditedbyJohnMcDowell,151–166.Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress1998.

One of McDowell’smost clearly written papers. Argues that the Quasi-Realistcannot explain moral judgment as the expression of sentiment. Reprinted inFisherandKirchin2006(citedunderTextbooksandAnthologies),pp.489–502.

‣Wright, Crispin. “Realism, Antirealism, Irrealism, Quasi-Realism.”MidwestStudiesinPhilosophy12(1988):25–49.Ageneralsurveyofthedebatesbetweenrealistsandtheiropponentscontaininginteraliaacritiqueofquasi-realism.

Norm-ExpressivismAllanGibbard(independently)developsaviewthatinmanywaysisaclosecousinof Blackburn’s quasi-realism. Gibbard, like Blackburn, attempts to explain andjustifythe“realist-seeming”featuresofourmoralpracticegivenonlymaterialsthatwouldbeacceptabletoanaturalist.AccordingtoGibbard1990,moraljudgmentscanbeviewedasexpressingacceptanceofnormsgoverningthepermissibilityoffeelingslikeguiltandimpartialanger,whileGibbard2003developsthenotionof“plan-laden thoughts” as a vehicle for an expressivist account of normativejudgment. Blackburn 1992, Horwich 1993, Wedgewood 1997, and D’Arms andJacobson1994providecriticalcommentaryfromarangeofdifferentperspectives.

‣Blackburn, Simon. “Gibbard on Normative Logic.” Philosophy andPhenomenologicalResearch52(1992):947–952.DOI:10.2307/2107920A brief but very insightful critique of Gibbard from a philosopher verysympatheticwithhisoverallaims.

‣D’Arms,Justin,andDanielJacobson.“Expressivism,Morality,andtheEmotions.”Ethics104(1994):739–763.DOI:10.1086/293653A critical discussion focussing on the role that sentiments such as guilt andangerplaywithinGibbard’snorm-expressivism.

‣Gibbard, Allan.Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of NormativeJudgment.Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1990.Abook-lengthdevelopmentofnorm-expressivism.Chapter5offersanovelandingenioussolutionoftheFrege-Geachproblem.

‣Gibbard, Allan. Thinking How to Live. Cambridge, MA: HarvardUniversityPress,2003.Following on from Gibbard 1990, this book develops a sophisticated form of

expressivism according to which evaluative judgments express what Gibbardcalls“planningstates.”

‣Horwich, Paul. “Gibbard’s Theory of Norms.” Philosophy and PublicAffairs22(1993):67–78.A useful discussion that should be read in conjunction with the works citedunderMinimalismandExpressivism.

‣Wedgewood,Ralph.“Non-Cognitivism,Truth,andLogic.”PhilosophicalStudies86(1997):73–91.DOI:10.1023/A:1017968816286Very clear exposition and commentary, usefully brings out points of contrastbetweenGibbard’snorm-expressivismandBlackburn’squasi-realism.

MinimalismandExpressivismIf minimalism about the predicate “true” is the view that it does not refer to asubstantial property but is merely a linguistic device for making indirect orcompendiousendorsementsofassertions,doesitundermineexpressivistviewsofmoraljudgmentorisitratheraviewthattheexpressivistcanusetojustifyhisorher claim to capture features of moral discourse that seemingly require moralrealism? Smith 1994a, Smith 1994b, Jackson, et al. 1994, and Blackburn 1998argue that minimalism is consistent with expressivism, while Divers and Miller1994,DiversandMiller1995,Horwich1994,andWright1998defendtheopposingviewthatminimalismunderminesexpressivism.

‣Blackburn, Simon. “Wittgenstein, Wright, Rorty, and Minimalism.”Mind107(1998):157–181.IncludescriticismoftheuseofminimalismmadebyauthorssuchasWright.

‣Divers, John, and Alexander Miller. “Why Expressivists about ValueShouldNotLoveMinimalismaboutTruth.”Analysis54(1994):12–19.DOI:10.2307/3328097AdirectresponsetoSmith1994a.Reprinted inFisherandKirchin2006(citedunderTextbooksandAnthologies),pp.443–442.ThispapercanusefullybereadinconjunctionwiththediscussionofexpressivisminWright1996(citedunderSurveys).

‣Divers, John, and Alexander Miller. “Platitudes and Attitudes: AMinimalistConceptionofBelief.”Analysis55(1995):37–44.DOI:10.2307/3328618

AreplytoSmith1994bandJackson,etal.1994.Arguesthatminimalismabouttruth-aptitudenaturallygeneratesaminimalistconceptionofbelief.

‣Dreier,James.“Meta-ethicsandtheProblemofCreepingMinimalism.”PhilosophicalPerspectives18(2006):23–44.Agooddiscussionofhowthe issueaboutminimalismthreatenstounderminethe standard metaethical distinction between moral realism and views thatopposeit.

‣Horwich,Paul.“TheEssenceofExpressivism.”Analysis54(1994):19–21.DOI:10.2307/3328098Horwicharguesthathisownbrandofminimalismmotivatesthereformulationofexpressivismas traditionallyunderstood.Thispapercanusefullyberead inconjunctionwithHorwich1993(citedunderNorm-Expressivism).

‣Jackson, Frank, Graham Oppy, and Michael Smith. “Minimalism andTruthAptness.”Mind103(1994):287–302.DOI:10.1093/mind/103.411.287Moreargumentalong the linesofSmith1994b. Includesagooddiscussionofthe difference betweenminimalism about truth andminimalism about truth-aptitude.

‣Smith, Michael. “Why Expressivists about Value Should LoveMinimalismaboutTruth.”Analysis54(1994a):1–11.DOI:10.2307/3328096Awonderfullyclearargumentthatexpressivistscanembraceratherthanshunminimalism.Reprinted in Fisher andKirchin2006 (citedunder TextbooksandAnthologies),pp.423–433.

‣Smith,Michael.“Minimalism,Truth-Aptitude,andBelief.”Analysis54(1994b):21–26.DOI:10.2307/3328099A reply toDivers andMiller 1994 andHorwich 1994, exploiting platitudinouslinksbetweenthenotionsoftruth-aptitudeandbelief.

‣Wright, Crispin. “Comrades against Quietism: Reply to SimonBlackburnonTruthandObjectivity.”Mind107(1998):183–203.DOI:10.1093/mind/107.425.183A reply to Blackburn 1998 that includes some discussion about the issue ofminimalismandexpressivism.

ObjectionsandAlternativestoExpressivismJacksonandPettit1998,Cuneo2006,Dorr2002,andSmith2001alldevelopnovelobjections to expressivism, while Ridge 2006 and Horgan and Timmons 2006proposenovelwaysofdevelopingexpressivism.

‣Cuneo, Terence. “Saying What We Mean: An Argument againstExpressivism.”InOxfordStudiesinMetaethics.Vol.1.EditedbyRussSchafer-Landau,35–71.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2006.Arguesagainstexpressivismonthegroundsthatitis“unabletoaccommodateproperlytheillocutionaryactintentions”orordinarymoralagents.

‣Dorr, Cian. “Non-cognitivism andWishful Thinking.”Noûs 36 (2002):97–103.Arguesthatexpressivistsmustholdthatitisirrationaltoinfertheconclusionofamoralmodusponensargumentfromitspremises.

‣Horgan,Terry,andMarkTimmons.“MoralitywithoutMoralFacts.”InContemporaryDebatesinMoralTheory.EditedbyJamesDreier,220–238.Oxford:Blackwell,2006.OneofaseriesofrecentpapersinwhichHorganandTimmonsargueinfavorof“cognitivist expressivism,” a view on which moral judgments express “non-descriptivebeliefs.”

‣Jackson, Frank, and Philip Pettit. “A Problem for Expressivism.”Analysis58(1998):239–251.DOI:10.1111/1467-8284.00128Argues that expressivism must inevitably collapse into a form of subjectivistcognitivism.

‣Ridge, Michael. “Ecumenical Expressivism: Finessing Frege.” Ethics116(2006):302–366.DOI:10.1086/498462Develops a form of “ecumenical expressivism,” according to which moralutterances express both beliefs and desires, and seeks to avoid thereby theFrege-Geachproblem.

‣Schroeder,Mark.“HybridExpressivism:VirtuesandVices.”Ethics119(2009):257–309.DOI:10.1086/597019Astate-of-the-artsurveyofviewsinthebroadstyleofRidge2006.

‣Smith, Michael. “Some Not-Much-Discussed Problems for Non-CognitivisminEthics.”Ratio14(2001):93–115.DOI:10.1111/1467-9329.00149Suggests that theopen-questionargument, traditionally usedbyexpressivistsagainsttheirrealistopponents,mightbeadaptedtoattackexpressivismitself.

ERRORTHEORYANDMORALFICTIONALISM

Both types of view attempt to avoid the Frege-Geach problem by rejectingexpressivismandembracingafactualistsemanticsformoraldiscourse.However,theyalsoattempttoavoidtheneedtopostulatetheexistenceofmoral factsbydenyingthatmoralstatementsaretrue.

ErrorTheoryWhileexpressivismclaimsthatmoraljudgmentsdon’texpressbeliefsandthusfailto be truth-apt, error-theories view moral judgments as expressing beliefs andmoral sentences as genuinely descriptive. However, they avoid commitment tomoralfacts—andtheattendantmetaphysicalandepistemologicalobligations—bysuggesting that all positive, atomic moral judgments and statements aresystematicallyanduniformlyfalse.Theclassicstatementoftheerror-theoryinthemoralcasecanbefoundinMackie1977.McDowell1985,Blackburn1985,Brink1984, Wright 1992, and Smith 1993 all offer critiques of Mackie, while GarnerdefendsMackieagainstnaturalisticmoralrealism.

‣Blackburn, Simon. “Errors and the Phenomenology of Value.” InMorality and Objectivity: A Tribute to J. L. Mackie. Edited by TedHonderich,1–22.London:RoutledgeandKeganPaul,1985.RespondstoMcDowell1985regardingJ.L.Mackie.

‣Brink, David O. “Moral Realism and the Sceptical Arguments fromDisagreementandQueerness.”Australasian JournalofPhilosophy 62(1984):112–225.Argues that a naturalistic, externalist view of moral judgment can deflectMackie’s arguments for the error theory. Reprinted in Fisher andKirchin 2006(citedunderTextbooksandAnthologies),pp.80–95.

‣Garner,RichardT.“OntheGenuineQueernessofMoralPropertiesandFacts.”AustralasianJournalofPhilosophy68(1990):137–146.DOI:10.1080/00048409012344161

Argues that Brink’s externalist moral realism fails to deal adequately withMackie’s arguments for the error theory. Reprinted in Fisher andKirchin 2006(citedunderTextbooksandAnthologies),pp.96–106.

‣Mackie, J.D.Ethics: InventingRightandWrong.NewYork:Penguin,1977.The classic source of arguments—such as the “argument from queerness”—infavorofanerrortheoryofmoraljudgment.

‣McDowell, John. “Values and Secondary Qualities.” In Morality andObjectivity: A Tribute to J. L.Mackie. Edited by TedHonderich, 110–129.London:RoutledgeandKeganPaul,1985.Offers a difficult but rewarding exchange of views with Blackburn 1985 onMackie’serror-theory,fromrealistandexpressivistperspectivesrespectively.

‣Smith,Michael.“ObjectivityandMoralRealism:OntheSignificanceofthePhenomenologyofMoralExperience.” InReality,Representation,andProjection. Editedby JohnHaldaneandCrispinWright, 235–255.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1993.A sophisticated but wonderfully clear discussion of Mackie’s error theory andMcDowell’s response in McDowell 1985. The paper by John Campbell (andSmith’s reply) in the same volume are worth a look for those interested inexploringpointsofcontactbetweenmetaethicsandthephilosophyofcolor.

‣Wright, Crispin. Truth and Objectivity. Cambridge, MA: HarvardUniversityPress,1992.Chapter 1 contains an argument that error theories do not offer a plausiblevehicleforoppositiontomoralrealism.

MoralFictionalismMoral fictionalism challenges the idea that factualism (the view that moralsentencesaredescriptive)necessarilygoesalongwithcognitivism(theviewthatmoral judgments express beliefs). Fictionalists propose forms of non-cognitivistfactualism aboutmoral practice, according towhichmoral claimshavegenuinetruth-conditionalcontentbutarenotused toexpressbeliefs that thosecontentsare true (compare with the cognitivist non-factualism proposed by Horgan andTimmons(seeHorganandTimmons2006,citedunderObjectionsandAlternativesto Expressivism). By retaining the idea that moral sentences are factual, thefictionalistattemptstoavoidtheFrege-Geachproblemthatcausessuchdifficultyforexpressivism,but,byavoidingtheideathatmoralclaimsexpresstruebeliefs,attemptstosteerclearofcommitmenttomoralfacts.Moralfictionalismcomesin

twomainvarieties:hermeneuticordescriptivefictionalism(Kalderon2005a)andrevolutionaryorrevisionaryfictionalism(Joyce2001).

‣Eklund,Matti.“FictionalismURL:(http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/fictionalism/).” InStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edited by Edward N. Zalta.Stanford,CA:StanfordUniversity,2007.Ausefulsurveyoffictionalismingeneralwithanextensivebibliography.

‣Hussain, Nadeem J. Z. “The Return of Moral Fictionalism.”PhilosophicalPerspectives18(2004):149–187.Anattempttodeflatesomeofthepretensionsofmoralfictionalism.

‣Joyce, Richard. The Myth of Morality. Cambridge, UK: CambridgeUniversityPress,2001.Developsaformofrevolutionarymoralfictionalism,aformoffictionalismthatrecommendsareformofouractualmoralpractice.

‣Kalderon,MarkEli.MoralFictionalism.Oxford:Clarendon,2005a.Anoutlineof a formofhermeneuticmoral fictionalism,a formof fictionalismthatpurportstobedescriptiveofourordinarymoralpractice.

‣Kalderon, Mark Eli. Fictionalism in Metaphysics. Oxford: Clarendon,2005b.An excellent collection of articles on fictionalism, including an exchangebetweenSimonBlackburnandDavidLewisonwhetherquasi-realismshouldbeviewedasaformoffictionalism.

‣Nolan, Daniel, Greg Restall, and CarolineWest. “Moral Fictionalismversus theRest.”Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2005): 307–330.DOI:10.1080/00048400500191917Adefenseofarevisionaryformofmoralfictionalism.

‣Stanley, Jason. “Hermeneutic Fictionalism.” Midwest Studies inPhilosophy25(2001):36–71.DOI:10.1111/1475-4975.00039Arguesthathermeneuticfictionalismisnotaviablestrategyinontology.

‣Yablo, Stephen. “Go Figure: A Path through Fictionalism.”MidwestStudiesinPhilosophy25(2001):72–102.DOI:10.1111/1475-4975.00040Anexchangebetweentwoleadingphilosophersinvestigatingtheprosandconsoffictionalism.

RESPONSEDEPENDENCE

Expressivistsstandardlydenythatmoral judgmentsexpressbeliefsorthatmoralsentences have truth-conditions. Those who hold response-dependent views ofmorality retain the idea that moral judgments express beliefs or that moralsentences have truth-conditions, but claim that the beliefs expressed by moraljudgments are beliefs about properties or states of affairs that in some way orotherimplicatehumanjudgments,sentiments,or—generally—responses:inotherwords,thatthetruth-conditionsofmoralsentencesconstitutivelyimplicatehumanjudgments, sentiments, or responses.McDowell 1985andWiggins1987explorethe idea from a non-naturalist perspective, and the view that they propose iscloselyscrutinizedinWright1988.Johnston1989ispartofasymposiumthatlooksat the idea of response-dependence from the perspective of the Australian-Americanphilosophicalaxis.TheappendixtoChapter3ofWright1992isessentialreading for anyone wishing to get a grip on the idea of response-dependencegenerally,whileBlackburn1993providesacriticalandsearchingexaminationofthe notion. Railton 1998 and Smith 1998 look at response-dependence fromdifferentrealisticandbroadlynaturalisticperspectives.

‣Blackburn, Simon. “Circles, Finks, Smells, and Biconditionals.”PhilosophicalPerspectives7(1993):259–279.DOI:10.2307/2214125Acharacteristicallyengagingandperceptiveattemptatdemolishingresponse-dependencefromtheviewpointofaleadingexpressivist.

‣Johnston,Mark.“DispositionalTheoriesofValue.”ProceedingsoftheAristotelianSocietysupp.63(1989):139–174.Part of an important symposium in which Johnston and others offer differentviewsofresponse-dependencealongtheMelbourne-Canberra-Princetonaxis.

‣McDowell, John. “Values and Secondary Qualities.” In Morality andObjectivity: A Tribute to J. L.Mackie. Edited by TedHonderich, 110–129.London:RoutledgeandKeganPaul,1985.A very difficult paper but regarded as one of the seminal texts for the

contemporarydiscussionofresponse-dependence.

‣Railton,Peter.“Red,Bitter,Good.”EuropeanReviewofPhilosophy3(1998):67–84.Acritiqueofresponse-dependencefromaleadingnaturalistrealist.

‣Smith,Michael.“Response-DependencewithoutReduction.”EuropeanReviewofPhilosophy3(1998):85–108.Anattempttousethenotionofresponse-dependenceintheserviceofarealistandbroadlynaturalisticviewofmorals.

‣Wiggins, David. “A Sensible Subjectivism?” InNeeds, Values, Truth:EssaysinthePhilosophyofValue.ByDavidWiggins,185–214.Oxford:Blackwell,1987.ArguesforapositionsimilartothatinMcDowell1985.

‣Wright,Crispin.“MoralValues,Projection,andSecondaryQualities.”ProceedingsoftheAristotelianSocietysupp.62(1988):1–26.Ademandingbutpreciseandrewardingdiscussion,arguingagainstresponse-dependentaccountsofmorals.

‣Wright, Crispin. Truth and Objectivity. Cambridge, MA: HarvardUniversityPress,1992.Theappendix toChapter3 is a state-of-the-art surveyof response-dependenceandtheassociatedliterature.

CONSTRUCTIVISM

The main contemporary arguments in favor of “Kantian constructivism” can befoundinKorsgaard1996a,Korsgaard1996b,Korsgaard2008,andKorsgaard2009.Korsgaardarguesthatifwedidn’tvalueourhumanitywewouldnotbecapableofrationalaction,andtriestousethisallegedfacttogenerateanaccountofmoralobligationthatprovidesasatisfyingmetaethicalpositionsuperiortothestandardrealist and non-realist alternatives. It is controversial whether Korsgaard is evenarguingforagenuinelymetaethicalview;seeHussainandShah2006.Enoch2006usefully places Korsgaard’s view in the context of similar views that attempt togroundnormativityinclaimsaboutwhatisconstitutiveofaction.

‣Enoch, David. “Agency, Schmagency: Why Normativity Won’t Come

FromWhatIsConstitutiveofAction.”PhilosophicalReview115(2006):169–197.DOI:10.1215/00318108-115-2-169Arguesthatnormativitycannotbegroundedinwhat isconstitutiveofagency,andincludescriticaldiscussionofKorsgaardasanexampleofaphilosopherwhoholdssuchaview.

‣Hussain, Nadeem, and Nishi Shah. “Misunderstanding Metaethics:Korsgaard’s Rejection of Realism.” In Oxford Studies in Metaethics.Vol. 1. Edited by Russ Schafer-Landau, 265–294. Oxford: OxfordUniversityPress,2006.Argues that Korsgaard has failed to provide an alternative to moral realismbecauseshefailstodistinguishbetweennormativejudgmentsandmetaethicalinterpretationsofmoraljudgment.HussainandShahhavepapersinthesameveininpreparation.

‣Korsgaard, Christine M. Creating the Kingdom of Ends. Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,1996a.AcollectionofarticlesmainlyontheKantianbackgroundtoKorsgaard’sviews.

‣Korsgaard,ChristineM.TheSourcesofNormativity.Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,1996b.In the firsthalfof thebookKorsgaardworks towardsher favoredview fromahistoricalperspective.ThesecondhalfcontainscriticalrepliesbyCohen,Geuss,Nagel,andWilliams,withcounter-repliesfromKorsgaardherself.

‣Korsgaard, Christine M. The Constitution of Agency: Essays onPractical Reason and Moral Psychology. Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress,2008.Collects together a number of Korsgaard’s previously published papers,particularlynoteworthyamongthembeing“RealismandConstructivismin20thCenturyMoralPhilosophy.”

‣Korsgaard, Christine M. Self-Constitution, Agency, Identity, andIntegrity.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2009.Korsgaard’smost recentextendedexpositionofherviews,basedonher2002LockeLecturesatOxford.

NON-REDUCTIVENATURALISM(CORNELLREALISM)

Non-reductive naturalism (NRN) is a form ofmoral realism (often called CornellRealism because many of its leading protagonists are or were associated withCornell University). Non-reductive naturalists hold thatmoral propertiesmake agenuine and ineliminable contribution to the best explanation of experience (inparticular,ofmoralbelief)andassuchcountasirreduciblebutnatural.Sturgeon1985isakeypaperintheNRNtradition;agoodwayintotheviewistoseeitasareply to the skeptical challenge (according to whichmoral properties and factsneverexplainanything)developedintheopeningchaptersofHarman1977.TherestofthesourcesmentionedhereallcontributeonewayoranothertothedebateinitiatedbyHarmanandSturgeon:Boyd1988,Nelson2006,Sturgeon1986a,andSturgeon1986bargueinfavorofNRN,whileHarman1986andLeiter2001offercritiques. Dworkin 1996 questions Harman’s framework for evaluating moralrealism.

‣Boyd, Richard N. “How to Be a Moral Realist.” In Essays on MoralRealism. Edited by Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, 181–228. Ithaca, NY:CornellUniversityPress,1988.Themostdetailedworking-outofasemanticsforNRN.

‣Dworkin, Ronald. “Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe It.”PhilosophyandPublicAffairs25(1996):87–139.DOI:10.1111/j.1088-4963.1996.tb00036.xArgues that Harman’s claim that the test of the objectivity of morals is thecapacityofmoralfactstofigureinempiricalexplanationsismisconceived.

‣Harman, Gilbert.The Nature of Morality: An Introduction to Ethics.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1977.Chapters 1 and 2 are the locus classicus for the view that moral “facts” and“properties”areexplanatorilyinefficacious.

‣Harman, Gilbert. “Moral Explanations of Natural Facts: Can MoralClaims Be Tested against Moral Reality?” Southern Journal ofPhilosophy24(1986):57–68.AreplytoSturgeon1985.

‣Leiter,Brian.“MoralFactsandBestExplanations.”SocialPhilosophyandPolicy18(2001):79–101.DOI:10.1017/S0265052500002910A withering critique of the NRN idea that moral facts have a genuine andindispensableexplanatoryrole.

‣Nelson, Mark T. “Moral Realism and Program Explanation.”AustralasianJournalofPhilosophy84(2006):417–428.DOI:10.1080/00048400600895946Argues that the Jackson-Pettitnotionof “programexplanation” canaidNRN inreplyingtothechallengeofHarman1977.

‣Sturgeon, Nicholas. “Moral Explanations.” In Morality, Reason, andTruth. Edited byDavid Copp andDavid Zimmerman, 49–78. RowmanandAllanheld,1985.Thelocusclassicusfortheviewthatmoralfactsandpropertiesareexplanatorilyefficacious.

‣Sturgeon,Nicholas.“HarmanonMoralExplanationsofNaturalFacts.”SouthernJournalofPhilosophy24(1986a):69–78.AreplytoHarman1986,whichcritiquesSturgeon1985.

‣Sturgeon, Nicholas. “What Difference Does It Make Whether MoralRealismIsTrue?”SouthernJournalofPhilosophy24(1986b):115–142.FurtherdevelopmentoftheNRNviewdefendedinSturgeon1985.

MoralTwinEarthNRNaspirestoaformofcognitivistrealismwithanumberofattractivefeatures.Sinceitisnaturalist,itavoidsMackie-style“argumentsfromqueerness,”butsinceit eschews the idea that moral expressions are synonymous with naturalisticexpressions,itavoidswhateverversionoftheopenquestionargumentsurvivesthestandardcriticisms.Inaseriesofpapers(HorganandTimmons1990,HorganandTimmons1992a,HorganandTimmons1992b,HorganandTimmons2000)TerenceHorganandMarkTimmonshaveargued that this aspiration cannotbe satisfied.Copp2000andvanRoojen2006offercritiquesofthemoraltwin-earthargument.

‣Copp,David. “Milk,Honey, and theGood Life onMoral Twin Earth.”Synthese124(2000):113–137.DOI:10.1023/A:1005278727197Anattempttodeflatethemoraltwinearthargument.

‣Horgan, Terence, and Mark Timmons. “New Wave Moral RealismMeetsMoralTwinEarth.”JournalofPhilosophicalResearch16(1990):447–465.This paper argues that if—asNRNhopes—the semantics ofmoral expressionscan be modeled on the standard Kripke-Putnam semantics for natural kind

terms,the“twinearth”thoughtexperimentdevisedbyPutnamfornaturalkindtermsshouldyieldthesameresultsformoralterms.Bydescribingamoraltwin-earthscenario, thepaperargues that in fact thenaturalkindcase is radicallydifferentfromthemoralcase.

‣Horgan,Terence,andMarkTimmons.“TroublesonMoralTwinEarth:MoralQueernessRevived.”Synthese92(1992a):221–260.DOI:10.1007/BF00414300Takes the argument of Horgan and Timmons 1990 further, by arguing that aformoftheargumentfromqueernesssurvivestohauntNRN.

‣Horgan,Terence,andMarkTimmons.“Troubles forNewWaveMoralSemantics: The ‘Open-Question Argument’ Revived.” PhilosophicalPapers21(1992b):153–175.Takes the argument of Horgan and Timmons 1990 further, by arguing that aformoftheopenquestionargumentsurvivestohauntNRN.

‣Horgan, Terrence, and Mark Timmons. “Copping Out on Moral TwinEarth.”Synthese124(2000):139–152.DOI:10.1023/A:1005234212937AresponsetoCopp2000.

‣Sayre-McCord,Geoffrey.“‘Good’onTwin-Earth.”PhilosophicalIssues8(1997):267–292.DOI:10.2307/1523011Offersacritiqueofthetwin-earthargument.

‣vanRoojen,Mark.“KnowingEnoughtoDisagree:ANewResponsetotheMoralTwinEarthArgument.”InOxfordStudiesinMetaethics.Vol.1.EditedbyRussSchafer-Landau,161–194.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2006.Attempts to develop a semantics for a realist view capable of deflecting themoraltwinearthargument.

REDUCTIVENATURALISTREALISM

Reductivenaturalistrealismattemptstoreducemoralpropertiestoothernaturalproperties (e.g. rightness might be reduced to conduciveness to human well-being). Itcomes in twomainvarieties,synthetic (inwhichnoappeal ismadeto

analytic equivalence between moral and other naturalistic terminology) andanalytic (in which there is an appeal to a claimed analytic equivalence. TheforemostcontemporaryreductionistnaturalistisPeterRailton,whiletheforemostproponentsoftheanalyticvarietyofnaturalistreductionismareFrankJacksonandPhilipPettit.

Railton’sReductiveNaturalismRailtonproposesatwo-stepreductiveaccountofmoralrightness.First,thenotionofanagent’swell-beingisidentifiedwithwhattheagentwoulddesiretodesireifhe were in conditions of full factual information and perfect instrumentalrationality. Second, moral rightness is identified with what is instrumentallyrational “from a social point of view.” The identities are delivered courtesy of a“reformingdefinition,” inessenceanempiricalhypothesis that is justifiedon thebasisofenablingexplanationsoftherelevantphenomena.Theproposedreductionis thussynthetic innature.SeeRailton1986a,Railton1986b,Railton1989,andRailton 2003. Brandt 1979 is useful background, while Wiggins 1992, Wiggins1993,andSobel1994offerstimulatingcritiques.

‣Brandt,RichardB.ATheoryoftheGoodandRight.NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1979.The early chapters develop the notion of “reforming definition” utilized byRailton.

‣Railton, Peter. “Moral Realism.” Philosophical Review 95 (1986a):163–207.DOI:10.2307/2185589ThecanonicalstatementofRailton’snaturalistreductiverealism.

‣Railton,Peter.“FactsandValues.”PhilosophicalTopics14(1986b):5–31.FurtherelaborationoftheviewproposedinRailton1986a.

‣Railton,Peter.“NaturalismandPrescriptivity.”SocialPhilosophyandPolicy7(1989):151–174.DOI:10.1017/S0265052500001060Further elaboration of Railton’s view, with the emphasis on its externalistaccountofthenormativityofmoraljudgment.

‣Railton,Peter.Facts,Values,andNorms:EssaystowardsaMoralityofConsequence.Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,2003.

CollectstogetherRailton’smostimportantcontributionstometaethics(andalsonormativeethics).

‣Sobel, David. “Full-Information Accounts of Well-Being.” Ethics 104(1994):784–810.DOI:10.1086/293655Anilluminatingcritiqueofreductiveaccountsofwell-being,Railton’sincluded.Avery useful paper for metaethicists unfamiliar with the debates in normativeethicsabouttheconstitutionofwell-being.

‣Wiggins,David.“AyeronMoralityandFeeling:FromSubjectivismtoEmotivismandBackAgain.”InThePhilosophyofA.J.Ayer.EditedbyLewisE.Hahn,633–660.LaSalle,IL:OpenCourt,1992.Argues that even synthetic naturalism is susceptible to a sophisticateddescendentofMoore’sopen-questionargument.

‣Wiggins, David. “A Neglected Position?” In Reality, Representation,andProjection. Editedby JohnHaldaneandCrispinWright, 329–338.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1993.Partofanimportantfour-papersymposiuminwhichRailtonandWigginsbattleitout.

AnalyticMoralFunctionalismJacksonandPettitattemptareductiveaccountofmoralpropertiesthatproceedsby applying the method of conceptual analysis invented by Frank Ramsey andadoptedbyDavidLewis in theserviceofa reductiveaccountof themental (seeLewis 1972). See Jackson1992, Jackson1998, and Jackson and Pettit 1995. Forcriticism see Smith 1994, Zangwill 2000, and Horgan and Timmons 2009.McFarlandandMiller1998triestodeflectSmith1994.

‣Horgan, Terry, and Mark Timmons. “Analytic Moral FunctionalismMeetsMoralTwin-Earth.” InMinds, Ethics, andConditionals: ThemesfromthePhilosophyofFrankJackson.EditedbyIanRavenscroft,221–236.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2009.Horgan and Timmons attempt to adapt their well-known “moral twin-earth”argument (previously used against synthetic naturalism) against Jackson’sanalyticfunctionalism.ThereisareplybyJacksoninthesamevolume.

‣Jackson, Frank. “Critical Notice of SusanHurley’sNatural Reasons.”AustralasianJournalofPhilosophy70(1992):475–488.

Containsabasicstatementof theanalytic functionalistapproach inthemoralcase. Reprinted in Fisher and Kirchin 2006 (cited under Textbooks andAnthologies),pp.200–214.

‣Jackson,Frank.FromMetaphysicstoEthics:ADefenceofConceptualAnalysis.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1998.ThemostsustainedexpositionofJackson’sapproachtoconceptualanalysisanditsapplicationtothemoralcase.

‣Jackson, Frank, and Philip Pettit. “Moral Functionalism and MoralMotivation.”PhilosophicalQuarterly45(1995):20–40.DOI:10.2307/2219846Anattempttoarticulateaninternalistviewofmoral judgmentandmotivationthatcanserveasacomponentofanalyticfunctionalism.

‣Lewis, David. “Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications.”AustralasianJournalofPhilosophy50(1972):249–258.An accessible account of how the method of conceptual analysis utilized byJacksonappliesinthecaseofpsychologicalproperties.

‣McFarland, Duncan, and Alexander Miller. “Response-Dependencewithout Reduction?” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (1998):407–425.DOI:10.1080/00048409812348531Attempts to reply to Smith’s “permutation problem” on behalf of analyticfunctionalism.

‣Smith,Michael.TheMoralProblem.Oxford:Blackwell,1994.Chapter2arguesthatanalyticfunctionalistaccountsofmoraltermsarevitiatedbywhatSmithtermsthe“PermutationProblem.”

‣Zangwill, Nick. “Against Analytic Moral Functionalism.” Ratio 13(2000):275–286.DOI:10.1111/1467-9329.00127Argues that the analytic functionalist has problems accommodating certainsortsofmoraldisagreement.

CONTEMPORARYNON-NATURALISM

Contemporarynon-naturalistsrejectbothexpressivismandnaturalistrealism,butarguethatnon-naturalistcognitivismneedn’tfallpreytotheworriesthatbesetthenon-naturalistintuitionismproposedbyMooreandhisfollowersintheearly20thcentury. Themaindefendersof contemporarynon-naturalismare JohnMcDowellandDavidWiggins(butseealsoSchafer-Landau2003).

WigginsandMcDowellDavidWigginsandJohnMcDowellarethefoundingfathersofcontemporaryBritishnon-naturalist realism, basing their work on a range of philosophers, includingAristotleandWittgenstein;seeWiggins1987,Wiggins1991,andMcDowell1998.Wright1992,Arrington1989,Lang2001,andSosa2001offercritiquesofvaryingstrengthandspecificity.

‣Arrington,RobertL.Rationalism,RealismandRelativism.Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversityPress,1989.Chapter4containsagooddiscussionofnon-naturalistrealism.

‣Lang, Gerald. “The Rule-Following Considerations and Metaethics;SomeFalseMoves.”EuropeanJournalofPhilosophy9(2001):190–209.DOI:10.1111/1468-0378.00135Aclearandinsightfuldiscussionoftheroleoftherule-followingconsiderationsinargumentsformetaethicalrealism.

‣McDowell, John.Mind, Value, and Reality. Cambridge, MA: HarvardUniversityPress1998.Collects most of McDowell’s important papers on metaethics. See especially“Values and Secondary Qualities,” “Virtue and Reason,” “Non-Cognitivism andRule-Following,”“TwoSortsofNaturalism,”and“ProjectivismandTruthinEthics.”

‣Schafer-Landau, Russ. Moral Realism: A Defence. Oxford: OxfordUniversityPress,2003.A rare example of a North American philosopher arguing in favor of non-naturalistrealism.

‣Sosa, David. “Pathetic Ethics.” In Objectivity in Law and Morals.EditedbyBrianLeiter,287–329.Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,2001.Anextendedcritiqueofmodernnon-naturalism.ReprintedinFisherandKirchin2006(citedunderTextbooksandAnthologies),pp.241–284.

‣Wiggins, David. “A Sensible Subjectivism.” In Needs, Values, Truth:EssaysinthePhilosophyofValue.ByDavidWiggins,185–214.Oxford:Blackwell,1987.Apaper arguing that subjectivity canbe implicated in the truth-conditions ofnormativestatementswithout realismnecessarilybeing impugned.ShouldbereadinconjunctionwithMcDowell1985(citedunderErrorTheory)andWright1988(citedunderResponseDependence).

‣Wiggins,David.“MoralCognitivism,MoralRelativismandMotivatingMoralBeliefs.”ProceedingsoftheAristotelianSociety91(1991):61–85.AbriefintroductiontoWiggins’snon-naturalistandanti-Humeanmetaethic.

‣Wright, Crispin. Truth and Objectivity. Cambridge, MA: HarvardUniversityPress,1992.Chapter5containsacritiqueofWiggins’snotionof“vindicatoryexplanation.”

MoralParticularismMoralparticularismistheviewthattherationalityofmoralthoughtandtalkdoesnotdependontheexistenceofmoralprinciples.Itisoftenassociatedwithethicalnon-naturalism (in particular McDowell’s papers “Virtue and Reason” and “Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following”; see McDowell 1998, cited in Wiggins andMcDowell) and is opposed by moral generalism. The foremost contemporaryexponent of moral particularism is Jonathan Dancy (Dancy 2004, Dancy 2009).HookerandLittle2000offersa representative collectionof articlesboth forandagainstparticularism.

‣Dancy,Jonathan.EthicswithoutPrinciples.Oxford:Clarendon,2004.Dancy’s latest and most sustained exposition and defense of moralparticularism,whichheattemptstojustifyonthebasisofaviewofreasonsthathecalls“reasons-holism.”

‣Dancy,Jonathan.“MoralParticularismURL: (http://www.seop.leeds.ac.uk/entries/moral-particularism/).” InStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edited by Edward N. Zalta.Stanford,CA:StanfordUniversity,2009.Probablythebestintroductorysurveyonmoralparticularismandgeneralism.

‣Hooker, Brad, and Margaret O. Little, eds. Moral Particularism.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2000.

A high-level collection consisting of twelve original articles by leadingcontributorstotheparticularism-generalismdebate.

‣Lance,MarkN.,MatjazPotrc,andVojkoStrahovik,eds.ChallengingMoralParticularism.London:Routledge,2007.Acollectionoftwelvepapersbyleadingprotagonistsinthemoralparticularismdebate,includingHooker,Dancy,McNaughton,Bakhurst,andothers.

‣McKeever,Sean,andMichaelRidge.PrincipledEthics.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2006.DOI:10.1093/0199290652.001.0001Adetaileddefenseofaformofmoralgeneralism.

MORALPSYCHOLOGY

“Moralpsychology”canbetakentoconcernissuesaboutmoralmotivation,reasonsto actmorally, and thenature of the relationship betweenmoral judgment andmotivation.Foreaseofpresentationitcanbebrokendownintothree(interrelated)areas.AnaccessibleaccountofhowissuesinmoralpsychologypotentiallyimpactondebatesbetweenmoralrealistsandtheiropponentscanbefoundinChapter1ofSmith1994.

InternalismandExternalismInternalists(sometimescalled“motivationalinternalists”)typicallyholdthatthereisanecessary,conceptual,andapriorirelationshipbetweenmoraljudgmentandmotivationtoact.Forexample,intheworksmentionedhere,Smitharguesthatitisaconceptualaprioritruththatapracticallyrationalagentwhomakesamoraljudgmentwillbemotivatedtoactaccordingly.Stratton-Lake1999andDreier2000developobjectionstoSmith’sargument,andDancy1995attemptstoundermineSmith’swhole conception of the internalist-externalist debate,while Brink 1989andZangwill 2003 develop externalist alternatives. (Note that “internalism” and“externalism”donotmeanthesameinmetaethicsastheymeaninepistemologyorthephilosophyofmind.)

‣Brink, David O. Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics.Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,1989.An extended defense of a naturalist and externalist view of morals. Forinternalismandexternalism,seeChapter3inparticular.

‣Dancy,Jonathan.“WhyThereIsReallyNoSuchThingastheTheoryofMotivation.”ProceedingsoftheAristotelianSociety95(1995):1–18.An attempt to undermine Smith’s conception of debates between internalismandexternalism.

‣Dreier,James.“DispositionsandFetishes:ExternalistModelsofMoralMotivation.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2000):619–638.DOI:10.2307/2653615AttemptstoshowthatanexternalistcandeflecttheaccusationinSmith1994andSmith1996athatexternalismmustviewmorallyvirtuousagentsas“moralfetishists.” Reprinted in Fisher and Kirchin 2006 (cited under Textbooks andAnthologies),pp.547–566.

‣Smith,Michael.TheMoralProblem.Oxford:Blackwell,1994.The first half of Chapter3 contains an extremely useful taxonomy of differentformsandstrengthsof internalismtogetherwithawidelydiscussedargumentinfavorofinternalism.

‣Smith, Michael. “The Argument for Internalism: A Reply to Miller.”Analysis56(1996a):175–183.DOI:10.1111/j.0003-2638.1996.00175.xContainssomeveryhelpfulclarificationoftheargumentforinternalisminSmith1994.

‣Smith, Michael. “Internalism’s Wheel.” In Truth in Ethics. Edited byBradHooker,69–94.Oxford:Blackwell,1996b.A very useful narrative that traces the development of internalism inmodernmetaethics.

‣Stratton-Lake, Philip. “Why Externalism Is Not a Problem forIntuitionists.”Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (1999): 77–90.DOI:10.1111/1467-9264.00046ContainsaninterestingresponsetotheargumentforinternalisminSmith1994.

‣Zangwill,Nick.“ExternalistMoralMotivation.”AmericanPhilosophicalQuarterly40(2003):143–154.Expoundsanddefendsaformofmotivationalexternalism.

RationalismandAnti-RationalismRationalists (as defined in Smith 1994) hold that our concept of a moralrequirement isaconceptofa rational requirement,so thatmoral factsare factsaboutreasonsforaction.Smithargues infavorofrationalism,andsuggeststhatrationalism entails a form ofmotivational internalism. Foot 2002 is a canonicalsourceforanti-rationalism,whileRailton1986defendsaformofanti-rationalism.Morgan2006providesanexcellentintroductiontothedebate.

‣Foot,Philippa.“MoralityasaSystemofHypotheticalImperatives.”InVirtues andVices andOther Essays inMoral Philosophy. By PhilippaFoot,157–173.Oxford:Clarendon,2002.Aclassictextintheanti-rationalisttradition.Firstpublishedin1978.

‣Morgan, Seiriol. “Naturalism and Normativity.” Philosophy andPhenomenologicalResearch72(2006):319–345.DOI:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2006.tb00563.xArguesthatanti-rationalistnaturalismdoesnotprovideaplausibleaccountofthenormativityofmorals.

‣Railton,Peter.“MoralRealism.”PhilosophicalReview95(1986):163–207.DOI:10.2307/2185589Section5defendsaformofanti-rationalism.

‣Smith,Michael.TheMoralProblem.Oxford:Blackwell,1994.ThesecondhalfofChapter3buildsontheargumentofthefirsthalftodefendaformofrationalism.

TheHumeanTheoryofMotivationTheHumeanTheoryofMotivationistheviewthatmotivationisalwaysamatterofhavingbothmeans-endbeliefsanddesires,wheretheseare “distinctexistences”(in the sense that for any pair consisting of a belief and a desire, it is at leastpossibletohaveonewithouttheother).ForagoodaccountofhowtheHumeanTheory of Motivation together with the internalist-externalist debate impacts oncentralmetaethicalissues,seeChapter1ofSmith1994(citedinRationalismandAnti-Rationalism).FordefensesofHumeanism,seeSmith1987andSmith1988.ForAnti-Humeanism,seeMcDowell1998,Platts1979,andLittle1997.

‣Little, Margaret O. “Virtue as Knowledge: Objections from thePhilosophyofMind.”Noûs31(1997):59–77.

Arguesthatmetaethicalpositions thatviewvirtueasakindofknowledgeareuntouchedbytheconsiderationsabouttherespective“directionsoffit”ofbeliefsanddesiresstandardlyadvertedtobydefendersofHumeanism.

‣McDowell, John.Mind, Value, and Reality. Cambridge, MA: HarvardUniversityPress,1998.The essays “Virtue and Reason” and “Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following”containcanonicalstatementsoftheanti-Humeanview.

‣Miller,Alex.AnIntroductiontoContemporaryMetaethics.Cambridge,UK:Polity,2003.Section10.4developsacritiqueofSmith’sargumentforHumeanism.

‣Pettit, Philip. “Humeans, Anti-Humeans, and Motivation.” Mind 96(1987):530–533.Argues that Smith 1987 fails to highlight the central issue at stake betweenHumeanismandanti-Humeanismandfailstosettlethedebatebetweenthem.Reprinted inFisherandKirchin2006(citedunderTextbooksandAnthologies),pp.602–605.

‣Platts, Mark.Ways of Meaning: An Introduction to a Philosophy ofLanguage.London:RoutledgeandKeganPaul,1979.Chapter 10, “Moral Reality,” contains a very useful discussion of the non-naturalist realist approach to morality and how it bears on issues aboutmotivation.

‣Smith,Michael.“TheHumeanTheoryofMotivation.”Mind96(1987):36–61.AcloselyarguedpaperindefenseoftheHumeanTheory.Arevisedversionofthepaper appears as Chapter4 of Smith 1994 (cited under Textbooks andAnthologies).Reprinted inFisherandKirchin2006(citedunderTextbooksandAnthologies),pp.575–601.

‣Smith,Michael.“OnHumeans,Anti-Humeans,andMotivation:AReplytoPettit.”Mind97(1988):589–595.AnattemptedreplytoPettit1987.ReprintedinFisherandKirchin2006(citedunderTextbooksandAnthologies),pp.606–614.

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