metamodel for reputation based agents system – case study for electrical distribution scada design

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Presentation of "Metamodel for Reputation Based Agents System – Case Study for Electrical Distribution SCADA Design" at SINCONF 2013 conference, Aksaray, Turkey

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  • 1

    Metamodel for Reputation based Agents System Case Study for Electrical Distribution SCADA Design

    Guy Guemkam, Jonathan Blangenois, Christophe Feltus, Djamel Khadraoui

    Laboratoire dinformatique de Paris 6, France Faculty of Computer Science, University of Namur, Belgium

    Public Research Centre Henri Tudor, Luxembourg-Kirchberg, Luxembourg

    [email protected]

    October 13-16, 2013

  • Table of contents

    2

    Introduction

    ArchiMate

    Policy concept and trust value

    Case study presentation

    Simulations

    Conclusions

    October 2013 SMC IEEE conference

  • Table of contents

    3

    Introduction

    ArchiMate

    Policy concept and trust value

    Case study presentation

    Simulations

    Conclusions

    October 2013 SMC IEEE conference

  • Introduction

    - Critical Infrastructures are essential for the functioning of a

    society and economy

    4 statements:

    - CI are monitored and secured by SCADA systems

    - SCADA are deployed using agents whish are governed by

    policies

    - Agents behave based on their own perception of the evolving

    environment and according the perceived trust

    - SCADA operates at different abstraction levels of the CI

    October 2013 SMC IEEE conference 4

  • Introduction

    Additionally:

    - No integrated approach for designing, managing and

    monitoring SCADA systems policies

    - No consideration of the trust and reputation existing amongst

    the agents

    Our goal:

    Agents modelling framework based on ArchiMate

    Integration of Trust based policy

    October 2013 SMC IEEE conference 5

  • Table of contents

    6

    Introduction

    ArchiMate

    Policy concept and trust value

    Case study presentation

    Simulations

    Conclusions

    October 2013 SMC IEEE conference

  • ArchiMate, the theory

    - Enterprise architecture metamodel

    - 3 abstraction layers (business, application and technical)

    - 3 families of concepts: structural, behavioral, informational

    - ArchiMate core concepts:

    http://pubs.opengroup.org/architecture/archimate2-doc/

    7 October 2013 SMC IEEE conference

  • ArchiMate

    metamodel

    6/16/2014 Presentation Tudor 8

  • Table of contents

    9

    Introduction

    ArchiMate

    Policy concept and trust value

    Policy definition

    ArchiMate specialisation for MAS and with the policy concept

    Policy function of trust

    Case study presentation

    Simulations

    Conclusions

    October 2013 SMC IEEE conference

  • Organizational Policy

    Application Policy

    10 October 2013 SMC IEEE conference

    The set of rules that achieves the organizational strategy

    That governs the execution of behaviours which serve the

    realization of organizational services That are executed by means of processes, which occurs in a specific

    context, symbolized by a configuration of the business object

    The set of rules that achieves the application strategy

    That governs the execution of behaviours that serve the realization of application services

    That are executed by means of applications, which occurs in a

    specific context, symbolized by a configuration of data objects

  • ArchiMate

    metamodel

    for MAS

    Allows defining:

    1. Organizational policy

    2. Application policy

    Policy is defined as a

    behavioral rule which is

    associated to a concept

    from the architecture

    11 October 2013 SMC IEEE conference

    Application policy

    Organisational policy

  • Policy is a function of the trust

    12

    The rules defined by the policy is function of the level of trust that each agent puts in another.

    To derive the level of trustworthiness the agent exploits

    information provided by probes.

    The implementation of trust mechanisms are translated into

    agent through the concept of Policies called Trust Policies.

  • Policy and trust value

    13

    The trust value of a component at an upper level is derived from

    sublevels agents.

    That signifies that, for two given agents A and B, the trust value of agent

    B computed by agents A is calculated using the equation adapted

    from Guemkam et al. as such:

    TAB=ORAB= DRAB+ (1-)(1IRi1B+ 2IRi2B+1IRi3B)

    with 1+2+2=1 and 0

  • Table of contents

    14

    Introduction

    ArchiMate

    Policy concept and trust value

    Case study presentation

    Simulations

    Conclusions

    October 2013 SMC IEEE conference

  • Case Study: Electric power distribution

    The ACE Agents collects, aggregates and analyses network information and confirms alerts are sent to the PIE

    The PIE Agents receives a confirmed alert from the ACE, set the severity level and the extent of the network response (depending on the alert layer). The high

    level alert messages are transferred to the RDP.

    15 Septembre 2013 FARES workshop

  • Example of

    ArchiMate

    Instanciation of the ACE agent

    16

  • Example of

    ArchiMate

    Instantiation of all agents

    17

    Policies

  • Table of contents

    18

    Introduction

    ArchiMate

    Policy concept and trust value

    Case study presentation

    Simulations

    Conclusions

    October 2013 SMC IEEE conference

  • Simulation / Environment

    We have simulated a heterogeneous network of ACE and PIE

    agents running the reputation model.

    The framework used for the test environment has been developed

    in JAVA and simulate MAS network in a graphical environment.

    Each created agent is deployed and is only connected to a central

    supervisor (Composed of an Agent Manager and a Graph

    Supervisor) that gives him the list of his neighbors depending

    of his location on the network with a maximum edge size

    between agents.

    19

  • Simulation Protocole

    The protocol used asks ACE agents to send a message containing

    the collected data from the probe to the nearest PIE every five

    seconds.

    Test environment represents a city of 50x50km with a maximum of

    5 kilometers connection distance between agents.

    Simulations have been running several times during 120 seconds

    with different load of malicious agents, respectively 10%, 50%

    and 90%.

    20

  • Simulation results

    For each load of malicious agents in the network we have collected

    the trust table of the same PIE agent, representing his perception

    of his neighbors ACE

    As the percentage of malicious growth, the threshold evolves

    according to the reputation.

    Depending on the connection amongst the agent, the reputation

    increases, decreases or fluctuates

    21

    Malicious percentage

    10% 50% 90%

    ACE Rep ACE Rep ACE Rep

    A73 0.8 A73 0.75 A73 0.62

    A71 0.86 A71 0.87 A71 0.81

    A80 0.69 A80 0.55 A80 0.15

    A45 0.72 A45 0.98 A45 0.76

    A55 0.91 A55 0.93 A55 0.9

    A56 0.93 A56 0.0 A56 0.36

    A66 0.82 A66 0.85 A66 0.72

    A32 0.8 A32 0.81 A32 0.44

    A35 0.84 A35 0.92 A35 0.99

    A0 0.73 A0 0.71 A0 0.66

  • Table of contents

    22

    Introduction

    ArchiMate

    Policy concept and trust value

    Case study presentation

    Simulations

    Conclusions

    October 2013 SMC IEEE conference

  • Conclusions

    We have elaborated a specialisation of ArchiMate for MAS

    purpose to enrich the agents society collaborations

    An trust based policy has been introduced and described to

    enhance the modelling of the agent evolution in its

    environment

    Finally, we have simulated a heterogeneous network of ACE and

    PIE agents running the reputation model with different load of

    malicious agents.

    As future works, additional validations are expected in the next

    months on larger scale infrastructures. In parallel, a supporting

    tool is being developed.

    23 October 2013 SMC IEEE conference

  • Acknowledgments

    The research described in this paper is funded by the

    CockpitCI research project within the 7th framework

    Programme (FP7) of the European Union (EU) (topic SEC-

    2011.2.5-1 Cyber-attacks against critical infrastructures Capability Project).

  • Thank you for your attention !

    Any questions ?