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METAPHYSICS AND MANAGEMENT: Understanding how Eastern Philosophical Assumptions shape Conceptions of Self,
Action and Performance
Robert Chia Department of Management
School of Business and Economics University of Exeter
Streetham Court Rennes Drive
Exeter EX4 4PU
November 2000
Working Paper
Please do not quote without author's permission
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Abstract Interest in so-called Asian-styled Management and Japanese Management techniques and practices, so much written and talked about in the eighties and early nineties, has somewhat abated. Western management thought appears to have moved on to other preoccupations. What remains relatively unacknowledged and hence unexamined however is the metaphysical gulf separating Eastern and Western forms of thought and their consequences for managerial action and performance. This paper examines two contrasting traditions of knowledge-creation - 'empiricism' and 'rationalism' - and attempts to show how a reworking of our understanding of empiricism will enable us to grasp the significantly different metaphysical orientation driving notions of self, action, profit and performance in the Eastern mindset. Although there are clearly substantial differences within the sub-categories that make up the 'East', it can be shown that the common tenet that unites them is an unequivocal rejection of the competency of logic, language and utterance for determining the dominant mode of man's being. Such a metaphysical orientation perpetuates a deep sense of lack and 'incompleteness' within the Eastern psyche and fuels the underlying ontological restlessness that some have labelled Asian or Confucian Dynamism. It is argued here that this dynamism is nothing more than a manifestation of the obsession with the perfecting of action and performance in all arenas of Oriental life.
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Introduction ‘The idea of “being” is the Archimedean point of Western thought…the whole tradition of Western civilisation have turned around this point. All is different in Eastern thought…The central notion from which Oriental…belief as well as philosophical thought have been developed is the idea of “nothingness”’
(Y. Takeuchi, 1959: 292)
Rapid and revolutionary changes in the political, social and technological landscapes are
transforming the rules of competition for businesses around the world. This trend signals
the necessity for developing new theoretical frameworks and practical understandings of
the strategic priorities, decisional imperatives and modes of management operating in
diverse geographical locations throughout the world, and in particular within the
emerging economies of the Asia-Pacific. Whilst America and Western Europe have
registered impressive economic revivals over the last few years it is clear that such
continued strengthening of the Western economies is increasingly dependent upon other
global trading partners such as Japan, China and the Asia Pacific countries. Despite the
recent so-called 'Asian Crisis', a number of Pacific Rim economies such as Korea,
Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand have emerged much strengthened and expecting to
register significant growths in the forthcoming years. In addition, Japan, whilst still
languishing in a recessionary mode, nevertheless remains a key player in the global
arena. These, together with the immense potential of China as an economic superpower
this century, necessitates an urgent conceptual reassessement of the underlying cultural
forces shaping managerial attitudes and mindsets towards self, action, profits and
performance in the East. Although there are clearly substantial differences within the sub-
categories that make up the 'East', it will be shown that the common tenet that unites them
is an unequivocal rejection of the competency of logic, language and utterance for
determining the mode of man's being. Such a pervasive metaphysical orientation
perpetuates a deep sense of lack and 'incompleteness' within the Eastern psyche and fuels
the ontological restlessness that some have chosen to label Asian or Confucian
dynamism. We argue there that this so-called dynamism is nothing more than an overt
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manifestation of a deeper existential obsession with the perfecting of action and
performance in all arenas of Eastern life beginning especially with the arts. In all such
activities, the ultimate aim is to achieve that moment of pure and spontaneous Zen-like
encounter with reality where form, boundaries, identities and distinctions are totally
dissolved in a singular and uninterrupted field of performative action. This existential
urge to attain 'the form of the formless, and hear the sound of the soundless' (Shimomura,
in Nishida: A Study of Good, 1960: 211) lies at the heart of Eastern culture. It is this
deeply-rooted cultural tradition which distinguishes the East from the West. Such a
contrasting metaphysical orientation can only be fully appreciated by a systematic
excavation of the underlying philosophical assumptions shaping Eastern and Western
mindsets.
Much of the contemporary management literature, however, is distinctly driven
by Western (particularly Anglo-Saxon) metaphysical attitudes that elevates form, order,
stability, rational-logical thought, clarity of end-goals, short-termism, and the
advancement of self-interest as the sine qua non of business. This metaphysical
orientation has served the West well, accounting for its unprecedented and impressive
economic and technological progress over the last two centuries in particular. As a result,
the West, and in particular the United States, have tended to define, legitimise and dictate
the conceptual frameworks and the theoretical agenda for analysing and identifying the
underlying reasons for technological, ideological, economic and social progress for the
rest of the world. The undeniable material successes associated with the underlying
principles of Western modernity has inevitably spurred the ever-more intense pursuit of
what Dallmayr (1996) calls ‘one-world formulas’; the chronic obsession with a ‘global
blue-print’ and the universalistic principles associated with it for bringing about
economic, social and technological as well as ideological transformations. It is against the
shadow of this still-unshakeable belief in ‘Western supremacy’, especially in its more
subtle and implicit ideational forms, that the current dominance of Western management
concepts and theories can be better understood.
This dominance of Western ideals and ideas is such that even contemporary
attempts to define and resurrect ‘Asian-styled’ management characteristics, priorities and
practices are often couched within the familiar conceptual categories of Western
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discourse and the epistemological priorities associated with them. An inevitable 'dilution'
thus occurs in this process of conceptual translation. Thus, ‘Confucian Ethics’ substitutes
for ‘Protestant Ethics’ as the crucial causal feature underlying the rise of Asian
capitalism, the rationalistic language of ‘Strategy’, ‘Organizational Structure’ and
‘Human Resource Management’ are uncritically used as convenient conceptual templates
for interpreting Japanese and East Asian approaches to dealing with economic exchanges,
working arrangements and employment relationships, and Asian ‘collectivism’ is
contrasted with Western ‘individualism’ as one of the key causal differences influencing
the preferred operating modes of management. Such comparisons may be superficially
helpful in crudely stereotyping the attributes and orientations of non-Western business
priorities and practices, but they are essentially Occidentally-inspired conceptual
templates through which other cultural traditions, such as the Eastern economies, are
made to ‘speak’ in terms understandable to the West (Said, 1978). Often though, they do
not begin to address the genuinely deep and fundamental differences that exist and persist
between East and West (Heidegger, 1971; Needham, 1962; Nishitani, 1982, Dallmayr,
1996) and their real consequences for managerial attitudes and priorities. The
appropriation of Japanese manufacturing techniques and their decontextualised
translation into American-inspired populist terms such as ‘Just-in-Time’ and ‘Total
Quality Management’, is one example of how foreign and unfamiliar practices, inspired
by a long tradition of artistic perfection, are forcibly inserted into the dominant language
of Western managerial discourse and repackaged to meet the largely Western penchant
for novelty. Whilst, it cannot be denied that some of these popularised, surface-causal
explanations, formulated within a vastly contrasting metaphysical tradition, may still find
some resonance with local lived experiences, it is argued here that such forms of analyses
lack the necessary reflexive awareness to really show out the critical differences. They do
not reach at the heart of the basic differences between ‘East’ and ‘West’, which, we
maintain, are essentially ontological in character. It is argued here that, only by
excavating the intellectual roots of these deeply sedimented metaphysical orientations
will we begin to fully appreciate how the Eastern (and in particular the Chinese and
Japanese) metaphysical attitudes differ from the largely Greek-inspired tradition of
Western logic and rationality. This obviously has wide ranging ramifications for our
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understanding of the strategic orientations, business priorities and practices in Asian
businesses.
This essay begins by firstly charting out the dominant metaphysical traditions
shaping western thought. An attempt is then made to contrast this with the eastern
metaphysical tradition. Cultural attitudes towards self, action profit and performance are
then carefully examined. This then leads to an explanation of eastern managerial attitudes
and mindsets including the phenomenon of 'Asian Dynamism'. The paper ends with some
reflections on general economics and capitalism and attempts to show how a revised
understanding of the latter can help bring about a more balanced attitude towards
efficiency, profit and performance.
Dominant Intellectual Traditions in Western Thought
Aristotle's description of knowledge assumes that the world lends itself to the grasp of language, it has a logical or discursive character, a systematic structure. Knowledge becomes, on this view, a linguistic matter, and not a matter of sensation. To know is to define, and definition occurs insofar as any one of a series of general classifications is applied to the "what" of a thing thereby rendering the "what" or "this" of a thing a "this somewhat" (Carter, 1990: 21).
Western thought and theory-building are based upon two types of philosophic thinking
which the American philosopher William James (1909/96) identified as 'empiricism' and
'rationalism'. Empiricism, in its broadest sense, is the habit of explaining universalities
from the particulars of experience whilst rationalism is the tendency to explain particulars
in terms of universalistic and idealised categories. Knowledge is thus created either by
extrapolating from concrete experience or derived from the logical verification of
immutable laws and principles. The romantic Coleridge is often quoted as saying that
everyone is born either a platonist or an aristotelian. By aristotelian he meant the
empiricist tendency to rely on personal experience and observation whilst the platonist is
a rationalist who relies on logic and reason to arrive at truth. Rationalists are the men of
abstract principles empiricists are the men of facts. For James, however, the theoretic
knowledge derived from rationalism is a knowledge about things as distinguished from a
'living or sympathetic acquaintance with them' (1909/96: 249). Rational thought deals
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solely with symbols and concepts and is unable to penetrate the thickness and depth of
reality. On the other hand the empiricists repeatedly fail to provide an adequate account
of the perceived regularities of nature. Conventional empiricism fails because it denies
the reality of hidden universal causes and is therefore unable to account for why things
appear as they do. Because of this inadequacy, rationalism is believed to be a superior
mode of knowing since it is able to provide for the seeming regularity of events by
postulating immutable causal agencies external and transcendent to the observed
phenomenon under investigation.
In the intervening one hundred years or so since James first made his
observations, Western thought has undergone a series of metaphysical transformations.
Positivism, which naively relied upon the kind of conventional empiricism that James
was critical off, has been since tempered with rationalistic properties. The result is a
dominant empirico-deductive tradition that combines empirical observation with
rationalistic deductions. This is the kind of realism that now readily acknowledges the
existence of underlying and very often unseeable causal mechanisms (Keat and Urry,
1975). Realism has, in recent times, become the dominant orthodoxy in place of
Positivism. Putnam (1981), Harré (1986) and Bhaskar (1978, 1989), amongst others are,
in varying degree, advocates of this kind of 'critical realism' which does not stop at only
observable phenomena but boldly postulate the existence of an unseen and unseeable
reality. Yet for all their interpretative differences all three emphasise the reality of
universalistic and enduring entities and causal mechanisms existing independently of
thought. It would be fair to say that this metaphysical orientation also underpins much of
contemporary Western management theorising.
Yet, this unique realist combination of empirical and rationalistic tendencies
represents only one among a range of other epistemological possibilities. Such a realist
way of adjusting for the inadequacies of empiricism brings in unnecessary and
unaccountable factors which only further detaches us from the primacy of our lived
experiences. Realism starts by identifying a thing with a ready-made concept or symbol
and then rapidly proceeds towards a precise definition. In this way, portions of our lived
experiences are force-fitted into pre-existent conceptual templates. As a convention this
practice is initially a harmless and convenient way of dealing with the seemingly
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intractable nature of lived experience. However, the real misuse takes place when, in
using such definitions and concepts unreflectively, we begin to deny the very properties
with which the things sensibly presented themselves to us in the first place. 'Concepts
first employed to make things intelligible, are clung to even when they make them
unintelligible' (James, 1909/96: 219). A useful practice first becomes a method, then a
habit and finally a dogmatic tyranny that eventually defeats the end it was originally used
for. Whitehead (1929) called this tendency the 'fallacy of misplaced concreteness'.
Instead of adopting a rationally-modified empiricism because of the apparent
inadequacies of empiricism, it may be better, therefore, to revise the realist critique by
assuming that the flux of experience itself contains an immanent logic and rationality that
has hitherto been overlooked:
'May not the flux of sensible experience itself contain a rationality that has been overlooked, so that the real remedy would consist in harking back to it more intelligently, and not in advancing in the opposite direction away from it…to the pseudo-rationality of the supposed absolute point of view. I myself believe that this is the real way to keep rationality in the world, and that traditional rationalism has been facing in the wrong direction' (James, 1909/96: 73).
This turn towards experience and away from abstract representations marks a genuine
alternative to realism. It is a world-view that resonates deeply with Eastern thought. As
the Japanese philosopher Masao Abe puts it 'It is a transcendence or, better, trans-
decendence towards rather than away from lived experience' (Abe, in Nishida, 1990:
xvii). This uncompromising insistence on a return to the purity and primacy of lived
experience is what has been called ‘radical empiricism’(James, 1912/96).
Radical empiricism is a world-view that is predicated upon the idea of a pure and
unmediated experience as its necessary starting point. Pure experience is that ‘instant
field of the present’: a plain ‘unqualified actuality, or existence, a simple that’ (James,
1912/96: 4) out of which consciousness and then knowing emerges. To know, in its most
rich and basic sense, therefore, is to experience – directly, immediately and purely. Such
an intuitive knowing must not be confused with intellectualised knowledge that we
acquire of things. It is a knowing prior to the creation of the subject/object distinction. In
this pristine state, there is no separation of knower and known. Separation of knower and
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known only occurs when a given “bit” is abstracted from the flow of experience and
retrospectively considered in the context of other categories. This form of radical
empiricism is vastly different from the orthodox empiricism previously discussed.
Contemporary realism, on the other hand, unreflectively reduces experience to a
succession of stable, distinct, substantive elements – ideas, images, percepts, sensations –
elements that can be held before the attention and introspectively examined. This
punctuate, discontinuous view of experience overlooks and falsifies immense tracts of
our inner life and is completely at odds with the 'dynamic, flowing, stream-like quality of
consciousness' (James, in Taylor and Wozniak 1996: xi-xii). For James, as for Eastern
thought, real live experience is undifferentiated and indiscriminate. And it is out of this
‘aboriginal sensible muchness’ that attention carves out and conception names:
‘in the sky “constellations”, on earth “beach”, “sea”, “cliff”, “bushes”, “grass”. Out of time we cut “days” and “nights”, “summers” and “winters”. We say what each part of the sensible continuum is, and all these abstracted whats are concepts’ (James, 1948: 50).
This insistence on a return to the primacy of the immediate flux of life as the starting
point of human consciousness provides us with an alternative metaphysical foundation or
Weltanschauung for understanding Eastern attitudes towards knowledge and knowledge-
creation.
Contrasting East-West Metaphysical Attitudes
'the Western mind cannot help but think that all reality has been done away with when all “being” (form, substance) has been negated; but the East has found that the removal of the immediate and overpowering face of reality is but a necessary condition for what is really real to appear’ (van Bragt, 1982: xxv-xxvi) The belief that Eastern, and in particular Chinese thinking, is distinctly different from the
Western mind-set has led to much serious comparative studies and thoughtful
conjecturing by some of the most outstanding East-West scholars of our time (Needham,
1962; Chang, 1963; Nishitani, 1982; Graham, 1989). Needham (1962), for instance,
argues that for the Greek-inspired Western world-view, ‘what mattered was an ideal
world of static form which remained when the world of crude reality was dissolved
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away’. For the Chinese on the other hand, ‘the real world was dynamic and ultimate, an
organism made of an infinity of organisms, a rhythm harmonising an infinity of lesser
rhythms’ (Needham, 1962: 292n). In the former case, it has led to the Aristotelian-
inspired belief that signs and symbols are eminently suited to the task of describing
reality since ultimate reality is assumed to be fixed, permanent and unchanging. For this
Aristotelian tradition, to know a thing is to be able to name it and to give it an identity by
locating it in a pre-established system of classification. The Aristotelian method of
knowing thus entails the breaking down, fixing and locating of all experienced
phenomena into discrete manageable parts so much so that only the fixed within the flow
of lived experience and the universal in the particular are accorded legitimate knowledge
status. Such a world-view inevitably privileges end-states or outcomes rather than
process, literal, precise meanings rather than metaphorical allusions, the analytical
breaking-up and decontextualising of experienced phenomenon rather than its
wholesome, deeply contextual, encounter, the use of rational causal explanation as the
sine que non of intellectual analysis rather than a reliance on the immediate and dynamic
intuition of things.
In contrast the tradition of Eastern thought has always remained sceptical or
suspicious of the capacity of rational analysis in particular and language in general to
adequately capture the deeper aspects of the human condition. This is one of the critical
observations that the sinologist A. C. Graham made in his study of Chinese thought and
practice: ‘reason is for questions of means; for your ends in life listen to aphorism,
examples, parable and poetry’ (Graham, 1989: 7). The awareness of the incompetence of
language and analysis in the important matters of life is deeply entrenched in the
collective psyche of the East. As Nishitani Keiji, a leading contemporary Japanese
philosopher puts it, there is a deep-seated ‘awareness of the incompetence of utterance as
the mode of man’s being in regard to that which should remain unspoken, and the insight
that utterance and human thinking can return to and rest in its own nature only when that
awareness of incompetence is truly gained, have been, I think, common tenets throughout
Indian Brahaminism, Chinese Taoism and Japanese Shinto’ (Nishitani, 1981: 31). In
consequence the Eastern mind has opted to privilege as more fundamental and profound
that which lies beyond the ordinary grasp of language and logic and which is only
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approachable through a complex, spiralling form of paradoxical utterances that contain
‘infinitely suggestive nuances of feeling-tone’ (King, in Nishitani, 1982: x). They merely
allude to an ultimate reality beyond the realms of intellection. For the Eastern mind,
ultimate reality is essentially ‘nameless’ or ‘unnamable’. Thus, in place of the insistence
on straight-line clarity and distinctiveness in logical argumentation, the Eastern mind
prefers to ‘circumnavigate an issue, tossing out subtle hints that permit only a careful
listener to surmise where the unspoken core of the question lies’ (van Bragt, in Nishitani's
Religion and Nothingness, 1982: xl). Communication of thought is often indirect,
suggestive, and symbolic rather than descriptive and precise. Here, the emphasis does not
lie in grasping the meaning of individual distinct notes or words. Instead the relentless
combinations, variations and recombinations involved in the thematic build-up, work to
awaken our hitherto dormant sensitivities to the implicit master-theme that lies beyond
the individual instanciations. As the eminent Buddhist monk Kao-seng Chuan puts it:
‘Symbols are to express ideas. When ideas have been understood, symbols should be forgotten. Words are to interpret thoughts. When thoughts have been absorbed, words stop…Only those who can take the fish and forget the net are worthy to seek the truth’ (Kao-seng Chuan, in Chang, 1963: 43).
In matters of deep comprehension one must be able to grasp the absolute, not by words,
but by an unmediated act of intuition. Such an intuition involves a primitive penetration
into the heart of things and can only be achieved in a state of pure unself-conscious
experiencing in which the boundaries between knower and known, subject and object,
actor and action have been completely dissolved. It is the attainment of this primordial
flux and emptiness or nothingness that provides the epistemological grounding for
Eastern thought. As will become apparent in the following pages, the ‘nothingness’ of
which Eastern scholars are fond of alluding to is not a nothingness relative to the fullness
of being, but a positive, fecund and pro-generative emptiness in which something and
nothing, subject and object emerges. This is entirely different from the ‘negative’ form of
nothingness, a nihilistic mood that would result from the insistence on remaining silent or
a refusal to engage. Heidegger’s (1971) ‘conversations’ with a Japanese friend
revealingly shows the metaphysical ‘gulf’ separating Eastern and Western attitudes
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towards emptiness and nothingness when the Japanese expressed amazement at Western
reactions to Heidegger’s work. ‘We marvel to this day how the Europeans could lapse
into interpreting as nihilistic the nothingness of which you speak…To us, emptiness is the
loftiest name’ (Heidegger, 1971: 20). Yet, this state of ‘absolute nothingness’ (What
Nishitani, 1982 calls ‘sunyatã’) cannot be reached through premature abandonment.
Instead it is attainable only through the long and endless struggles and ‘companionship’
with both language and silence. Neither language nor silence can express the full richness
of the real. We are therefore pushed beyond both language and silence. Words are taken
lightly and only as ‘surface pointers which must not be thought to exhaust the depths of
the actual experiences encountered. At best, they lead to beneath the surface “hows” to
the deeper causes and regularities of things and events, which only the keenest and most
experienced observer will have noticed….it probes beneath the surface of appearances’
(Carter, 1990: 19). It is this relentless and unceasing emphasis on encountering and
engaging with an unseen and unseeable ‘other’ which marks the Eastern mode of thought
from the West.
These crucial observations help us to realise that the Eastern mind, quite
unconsciously in most instances, privileges concrete pre-conceptual experience over
abstract universalised concepts, ceaseless change over permanence and fixity, process
over substance/outcome, chaos over cosmos, formlessness over form, and nothingness or
emptiness over being. The Asian mind, immersed in over five millennium of this Eastern
tradition, is therefore compelled to seek that primordial seat of being: that field of
absolute nothingness or sûnyatâ beyond words in which the self is able to encounter itself
and hence attain its ultimate realisation. It is therefore, no surprise that Eastern thought
places little value on symbols, names and categories in comprehending reality. The
inherent built-in distrust with the adequacy of language and the intellect in the East has
led to the emphasis in Taoism to teach ‘without words’ and to transmit through
‘nonexplanation’(Chang, 1963: 42). Such a claim is hugely problematic for the Western
mind.
While Western thought seek the ultimate fullness of 'form', ‘being’, ‘presence’,
‘perfection’, ‘mastery’, ‘distinctiveness’ and ‘control’ and hence orients itself towards
completion, Chinese thought in particular, and Eastern thought in general find solace in
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absolute emptiness, stillness, silence, nothingness, undifferentiatedness and formlessness.
In brief, the Western mind cannot but help thinking that all reality has been done away
with when ‘being’ (i.e., form, substance, certainty, order etc.) has been negated. The East,
however, has found that the removal of the immediate and overpowering (superficial)
face of reality is a necessary pre-condition for what is really real to appear. Such
contrasting attitudes inevitably shape perceptions of self, action, productivity and
performance.
The Metaphysical Roots of Asian Dynamism
'all being is a self-unfolding of the eternal, formless nothingness; all finite forms are shadows of the formless' (Nishida, 1958: xi)
In his seminal work An Inquiry into the Good, Nishida Kitaro, arguably the foremost
modern Eastern philosopher, sought to develop a unique philosophical system
synthesizing both Eastern and Western forms of logic and understanding. Nishida began
by stating that: 'I wanted to explain all things on the basis of pure experience as the sole
reality. At first I read such thinkers as Ernst Mach, but this did not satisfy me. Over time I
came to realise that it is not that experience exists because there is an individual, but that
an individual exists because there is experience. I thus arrived at the idea that experience
is more fundamental than individual differences' (Nishida, 1990: xiv). For Nishida, most
attempts to theorise the idea of pure experience is predicated upon the assumption that
experience is individual and hence conforms to the categories of time, space and
causality. Such an assumption, however, does not truly reflect our direct experience for it
has already added a dogmatic idea of the individual to the question of experience. In its
real form experience is not such that first the self exists and then it experiences something
as an object. Rather the self itself is realised in the act of experiencing. True pure
experience is therefore ‘trans-individual’ rather than a property of individuals. This
Nishidean formulation of pure experience harbours three essential characteristics. Firstly,
Pure experience is realized prior to subject/object distinctions. Secondly, pure experience
is active and constructive not passive and static as is generally understood in ordinary
empiricism. Such experience grasped from within is systematically self-developing and
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self-unfolding - the self in ceaseless construction and reconstruction. Thirdly, in pure
experience, knowledge, feeling and volition remain undifferentiated. Ultimate reality is
not merely registered cognitively but also felt emotionally and volitionally. These three
propositions provide the necessary philosophical grounding for understanding the kind of
intuitive metaphysics that underpins the Eastern system of knowledge-creation.
Nishida identifies three concentric fields of awareness or Basho in this logic of
pure experience (which he calls Absolute Nothingness). Firstly, there is the Basho of
Being. In this Basho ordinary empirical judgements are made unreflectively. For instance
we may make an observation that 'this table is brown'. Such a statement seems to express
pure objectivity. In this instance, the observer is so neutralized that he/she does not even
enter into the judgement. These are statements of what "is" and what "is not" typical of
Aristotelian logic. However, as Nishida points out to neutralize the role of the observer in
this way is to say something about the observer - that its role can be ignored. This is
actually an odd judgement to make, since what is really being said is 'I see a brown table
and since what I see is real and external to my self, I can ignore any reference to myself'.
Nishida therefore concludes that this Basho of Being, within which empirical judgements
are made, itself stands implicitly within a wider field of judgement about the role of the
self. Since empirical judgements of the form advocated by Aristotle treat the self as
nothing, this wider and more encompassing Basho must be one in which the self cannot
be denied. Nishida calls this second Basho the Basho of Relative Nothingness.
From the standpoint of this Basho of Relative Nothingness the self is very much
something. In fact the very thing that ordinary empiricism ignores. This insight, when
taken literally, becomes the basis for idealism and subjectivism where the self is given
exaggerated prominence. According to Nishitani Keji (1982) Sartre's 'nothingness' (in
Being and Nothingness) is one example of this form of subjectivism which remains 'glued
to the ego' so that 'nothingness' even if it initially appears to be a negation of Being in fact
makes itself present as 'an object of consciousness in representative form' (Nishitani,
1982: 33). Sartre’s ‘nothingness’, is immanent to the ego. It is what Buddhism and Zen
repudiates as the ‘emptiness perversely clung to’ (Nishitani, 1982: 33). It is a nothingness
conceptualised within the Basho of Relative Nothingness. For Nishida, the mistake of the
idealists is that they tend to think of the self or ‘I’ as 'something' that is 'substance-like',
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an 'agent'. According to Nishida, however, the ‘I’ that makes the judgement "I see a
brown table…." is not a thing or an agent but an action or acting intuition. This acting
intuition is never objectifiable because it is always at the background of consciousness. It
is the ground of the self as ‘no-self’which sees but itself cannot be seen. Therefore, the
idealistic Basho of Relative Nothingness is itself encompassed by a third and ultimate
Basho, the Basho of Absolute Nothingness. This is the ultimate ground on which all
judgements, including distinctions such as truth, beauty, and the good are grounded. It is
the ‘place, the openness, the emptiness in which all particular occurrences are to be
found, and yet is known only through their very occurrence’ (Carter, 1990: 45). This deep
acting intuition, or ‘no-self’ forever eludes our conceptual grasp yet is somehow known
or revealed as that background ‘lining’ of everything known and knowable. Nishida
likens it to the hidden lining of a kimono that serves to keep form and shape yet itself
remains unseen. Within this field of Absolute Nothingness where the self is a ‘no-self’
ultimate realty is intuitionally grasped as a unified moment in the here-and-now. It is that
moment of the sublime in which actor and the acted-upon achieves a pure spontaneous
productivity where creativity and vision, subject and object are fused as a unifying instant
that overcomes time, space, individuality and performance. This is what is vividly
encapsulated in what has come to be hailed as the 'greatest goal ever' scored by Carlos
Alberto in the 1970 world cup final.
Reconceptualising Self, Action, and Performance
Late in the game, after a period of sustain midfield possession against their Italian
opposition, Rivelino releases Jairzinho on the left wing: he beats Facchetti at right back
and plays a square ball to Pele who is strolling about in an imperious fashion outside the
Italian eighteen yard box. Pele traps the ball and, at walking pace, rolls it into empty
space towards the corner flag. Suddenly, the Brazilian right-back comes hurtling into
view connecting with perfect timing the ball which rockets into the back of the Italian
net. Brazil 4, Italy 1. This exquisite moment of timeless poetry has been captured and
replayed millions of time all over the world. It is a defining moment that transformed
football into 'the beautiful game'. Pele's pass, in the words of Eric Cantona, the celebrated
and notorious French poet-philosopher of soccer, was a 'poem'. Pele rolls the ball
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seemingly to nowhere into an empty space with no receiver in sight. But by doing so, 'in
slicing across empty space the pass anticipates and creates, out of nothing, a move of
exquisite precision' (Botting and Wilson, 2000: 2). For Cantona, such an element of
poetic genius exemplifies the qualities of the truly great footballer: 'to create the moment
to step out of time. To create space from nothing. To be truly spontaneous'. The
footballer-poet is thus both a 'surrealist and realist, a magician and a scientist' (Cantona,
quoted in Blackler and Donaldson, 1997: 155). Pele's pass is an act of pure spontaneous
productivity: an immaculate form of commerce where beauty is efficiency at that singular
instance of performance. It is this singular moment that is striven for in those
interminable hours of practice involving the obsessive perfecting of action. Such an
obsession for perfection provides the real driving force behind the kind of trans-
individual creativity and enterprise pervading virtually all facets of Eastern life including
especially the arts.
In his introduction to Eugene Herrigel's Zen and the Art of Archery, D. T. Suzuki
writes: 'One of the most significant features we notice in all the arts as they are studied in
Japan and probably also in other Far Eastern countries, is that they are not intended for
utilitarian purposes only or for purely aesthetic enjoyment, but are meant to train the
mind…to bring it into contact with the ultimate reality' (Suzuki, in Herrigel, 1953/85: 5).
To be a master of any art, one has to transcend technique and arrive at that level of pure
experience so that the art becomes an 'artless art' embedded in the unconscious field of
absolute nothingness. Thus, in the case of archery, for example, the archer and the target
are no longer two opposing objects, but are one reality. 'Bow, arrow, goal and the ego, all
melt into one another, so that I can no longer separate them. And even the need to
separate has gone. For as soon as I take the bow and shoot, everything becomes so clear
and straightforward and so ridiculously simple' (Herrigel, 1985: 86). As the Zen Master
advised Herrigel, it is not 'I' the archer that shoots, rather 'it' shoots!!!. The 'it' signifies the
trans-individuality of pure performance. This example in Zen archery exemplifies the
underlying principle embodied in Pele's pass. It illustrates the underlying motivation
which fuels the relentless discipline and training involved in perfecting the arts and in
seeking to attain that moment of absolute emptiness when 'Even the thought of emptiness
is no longer there' and from whence 'comes the most wonderous unfoldment of doing'
17
(Takuan, in Herrigel, 1953/85: 101). For the Eastern world, attainment of that moment of
absolute emptiness which conjoins us with a fecund and pro-generative reality constitutes
the ultimate aim of any and all human activity.
This same obsession for attaining perfection in the arts is captured in Chuang
Tzu's vivid description of the master butcher.
'A good cook changes his knife once a year - because he cuts. A mediocre cook changes his knife once a month - because he hacks. I've had this knife of mine for nineteen years and I've cut up thousands of oxen with it…What I care about is the Way which goes beyond skill. When I first began cutting up oxen, all I could see was the ox itself. After three years I no longer saw the whole ox. And now - now I go at it by spirit and don't look with my eyes. Perception and understanding have come to a stop and spirit moves where it wants' (The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, trans. Burton Watson, 1968: 51).
Such aspirations to achieve that moment of unconscious perfection where the self looses
itself in archery, swordsmanship, calligraphy, origami, the tea-pouring ceremony, and
even in such an apparently mundane activity as cutting up oxen exemplifies the
traditional Eastern orientation towards action, productivity and performance. It accounts
for the kind of ontological restlessness and entrepreneurialism that that some have
labelled 'Asian Dynamism'.
Eastern Capitalism: Postmodern Exchange, Efficiency and Enterprise
Business productivity and performance are generally based upon the basic principle of
economic exchange. According to this dominant scheme of things goods and services are
produced with a view to achieving an exchange value that is determined by its reception
in the market. The market provides a kind of 'allocative efficiency' for the product or
service being provided. Such a restricted form of economic exchange, however, does not
exhaust the possibilities for explaining production and performance. Production and
performance are also governed by the existential need for expression and self-
transformation. For instance, in art, drama, musical performances, and even in sports as
we have seen, there are at times a level of productivity and performance achieved that
goes far beyond that determinable by any form of economic exchange in that what is
given or displayed far exceeds what is expected. It is not just the goal that results, but the
18
exquisiteness of Pele's pass. There is a lavishness and extravagance offered that cannot be
strictly explained by the economic theory of exchange. This excess and abundance is an
aspect that has been analysed in some depth by the French philosopher Jacques Derrida.
In 'Economimesis' Derrida (1981) examines Kant's Third Critique and locates
products of artistic achievements as exemplifying values that exceeds all valuation but
that nonetheless provides the baseless basis for all judgemental discourse. In other words,
the artistic principle operates from an originary indeterminate field of absolute
nothingness out of which all subsequent forms of judgement emanate: a fecund emptiness
that grounds all forms of exchange and valuation. Thus poetry and art, as unifying acts of
intuition, are special forms of production that do 'not enter into the economic circle of
commerce' (Derrida, 1981: 9). These are gifts that constitute a 'pure productivity of the
inexchangeable' (ibid). Derrida's emphasis on artistic activity as a kind of 'pure
productivity' not yet defined by exchange and from which value and judgement spring
forth resonates deeply with the kind of pure performance sought in Eastern arts. It
accounts for those rare moments of performance and achievement, such as Pele's pass, in
which something entirely new and novel is created and which thereby redefines the entire
domain of activities that more authentically underpins the otherwise banal rhetoric of
'excellence' in managerial performance: a seemingly 'miraculous' corporate turnaround
achieved against overwhelming odds; new product innovations such as the 'sony
walkman' and 'post-it' in which dreams and ideas predominate and becomes almost an
obsession and hence are more important and exciting than their commercial success;
inspired performances by otherwise 'mediocre employees'; and critical breakthroughs in
terms of novel forms of collaboration and achievement such as the Volvo Kalmar project.
As Jean-Joseph Goux (1997) writes in 'General Economics and Postmodern Capitalism':
'it is precisely at the moment when the entrepreneur must think himself into the model of the most advanced artistic genius, at the moment when the avant-gardist strategy of innovation at any price (my emphasis) becomes the paradigm of dominant economic practice, that the artistic avant-garde necessarily looses its difference, its marginality, its deviance value…it becomes more difficult for the poet to distinguish himself from the grocer, more difficult for the surrealist to differentiate himself from the dishevelled manager' (Jean-Joseph Goux, 1997: 206-207).
19
Goux's claim remind us that the capitalist entrepreneur, the committed employee, the
socially-responsible employer who revels in providing innovative product and services or
in creating the necessary conditions for authenticity and fulfillment at work, can, in many
ways, be viewed as much an artistic genius as the poet or the surrealist. This surprising
insight hinges on a radical re-reading of the real function of capitalist enterprise.
In a landmark publication entitled Wealth and Poverty, George Gilder attempted
to demonstrate the ethical value of capitalism by giving it a theology which showed that
contemporary capitalism is no less animated by the spirit of the 'gift' than the primitive
tribes studied by Marcel Mauss. For Gilder, the current popular notion of a self-
interested, parsimonious capitalism, motivated only by the attainment of material self-
gain is one-sided and erroneous. Instead, at the origin of capitalism is a more elaborate
form of potlatch - the primitive practice of giving without expectation. The would-be
capitalist (including the aspiring football star) invests to supply goods and services
without ever being sure if he/she will achieve any return. This movement, says Gilder, is
no less than that in potlatch where the essence of the gift is not so much about the
absence of all expectations of a counter-gift but an intrinsic uncertainty concerning the
return. 'Like gifts, capitalist investments are made without a predetermined return'
(Gilder, 1981: 30). Thus contrary to commonly held notions, 'The unending offerings of
entrepreneurs, investing jobs, accumulating inventories - all long before any return is
received, all without any assurance that the enterprise will not fail - constitutes a pattern
of giving that dwarfs in extent and in essential generosity any primitive rite of exchange'
(ibid). For Gilder, it is precisely because capitalism is grounded in this irrational attitude
of 'giving without prior assurance', and of giving more than is expected that it is superior
to all other regulatory forms of society. Such is the true nature of capitalism which
consists not so much of 'individualised self-interest' but in the risk and chance associated
with any venture. The capitalist must supply first and then hope to obtain a profit only
later. Guilder's postmodern legitimization of capitalism thus postulates a continuity with
the rituals of primitive societies. Capitalism, thus is viewed not in terms of a secular
rationalist mentality, but in terms of an 'indeterminable, undecideable play', and therein
lies its grandeur, its profound ontological truth, and its harmony with the mysteries of
things. The capitalist entrepreneur is thus cast as a noble and glorious 'gambler' who
20
'sacrifices in order to "supply" with always an uncertain result: wealth or bankruptcy'
(Goux, 1998: 204). This is a business attitude that resonates deeply with the Oriental
cultural attitude. It lies at the heart of some of the most admired and successful Eastern
corporations including especially Sony, Singapore Airlines and Matsushita.
Eastern management practice, despite much recent interest has remained an
enigma in much of the West. There have been numerous attempts to trace the roots of this
difference. Our foray into the philosophical domain has attempted to show the
overwhelming Eastern emphasis on the urge to attain an unspeakable 'pure experience'
from where the development of an 'artless art' or 'acting intuition' becomes attainable.
This ceaseless search for the 'form of the formless and the sound of the soundless' is what
undergirds otherwise trivialised and rationalized terms such as 'tacit knowledge', 'Asian
Dynamism', 'Confucian Ethics', 'Strategic Pragmatism', 'Kaizen' (which essentially means
'ceaseless self-criticism'), 'ringi', 'kuki', 'continuous improvement', 'Total Quality' and
'Just-in-Time' and many more. Such manifestations cannot be properly understood
without a deep appreciation of the underlying metaphysical orientations that shape the
cultural attitudes of the East. The overriding philosophical assumption is that unless our
structures of understanding are rooted in the primordial richness of pure, concrete living
experience we will be easily distracted from our business focus which is rooted in a
collective sense of responsibility towards social order and towards enhancing society at
large. It was this belief that prompted Konosake Matsushita, the founder of the giant
Matsushita Corporation to mastermind a unique management development programme
involving 100 bright young Japanese hand-picked by himself to lead Japan into the
twenty-first century.
The unique feature of this management development programme involved the
participants spending extensive periods in a retreat high up in the mountains where these
young men and women spent inordinate amounts of time perfecting the tea-pouring
ceremony and observing the graceful movements of carps so as to help them develop a
keen sensitivity and awareness to the subtle relationships between form and formlessness,
being and nothingness and to strive to achieve that perfect, timeless moment of pure
experience. The emphasis is on cultivating a deep sensitivity to the abundant wealth of
the tacit and the unsayable yet nonetheless potent forces underlying social relationships
21
which has been elsewhere called 'x-efficiency' (Wada, 1997) as opposed to the 'restricted'
allocative efficiency that is generally meant when the term efficiency is used. Allocative
efficiency, as we have seen, denotes the form of rational calculation that underpins
established forms of economic exchange where a 'zero-sum' assumption is generally
maintained. X-efficiency, on the other hand, is that which, not unlike the practice of
potlatch in primitive tribes, alludes to the possibility of giving more than is expected: a
certain expression of productive extravagance, of the kind of spontaneous productivity
and performance exemplified by Pele’s pass, that cannot be accounted for in economic
exchange theories. X-efficiency is a kind of uncalculating 'immaculate commerce' which
grounds all forms of human productivity, exchange and communication and joins them to
our most basic human aspirations. It is what Derrida means by a pure 'productivity of the
inexchangeable', a form of commerce best exemplified by the spirit of the ‘gift’.
Ceaseless Innovation at All Costs
It is by now common knowledge that the level of customer service available in Asian
countries such as Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan especially far exceeds what one
expects to find in most countries in the Western world. This is not just a question of
cheap labour1. Rather it is more about the extreme competitiveness and prevailing
entrepreneurialism embedded in the collective psyche of Asian countries. As many
business travellers to the Asia Pacific will know, a full suit can be tailored and made
ready in a matter of four hours, films processed within the hour. Taxis cost a fraction of
what they are in Europe and the United States even though the cost of vehicles in
Singapore, for example, is more than double that in most parts of the Western world. The
underlying answer for this remarkable level of service performance is simply a tradition
which hinges on an ontological principle totally neutered and obscured by the idea of
'continuous improvement'. Continuous improvement in its more authentic sense is
fundamentally predicated upon the rejection of an ultimate end-point or perfect state of
being. The Western privileging of 'being', 'fullness' and 'completeness' means that
improvement can only be construed as a means and not as an end in itself. For the
1 As a matter of record, the GDP of Singapore and Hong Kong for 1999 in particular far exceeded that of many European countries including especially Britain, France and Spain.
22
Oriental mind, however, the search for absolute nothingness, for completion of this
deeply sensed primordial lack, provides the existential impetus for ceaseless innovation
and entreprenurialism. It is this ontological restlessness which underpins a cultural
attitude best exemplified by the Sony corporation.
The Sony corporation emerged out of the rubble and chaos of Japan at the end of
the second world war with Masaru Ibuka, the founder of Sony, vaguely deciding that they
had to 'do something that no other company had ever done before'. From these
inauspicious beginnings sprang one of the world's most innovative companies with
worldwide sales in excess of US$50 billion, but more importantly, globally admired for
their record of creativity and innovation. Sony corporation's philosophy revolves around
some rather remarkable statements of intent which runs contrary to the priorities of most
other large corporations. Like that espoused by Matsushita, profit for Sony, like in the
practice of potlatch, is viewed as an uncertain 'counter-gift' that cannot be pre-determined
when a new product or service is first offered. It is not a rational target to be aspired
towards. Instead, what is emphasised is the need for offering 'lavishly': for a certain kind
of extravagance towards its community. This corporate philosophy is clearly articulated
in Sony's principles of practice. For instance, in its 'Management Policies' one of the
basic principles made explicit is that 'We shall eliminate any untoward profit-seeking,
shall constantly emphasize activities of real substance, and shall not seek expansion of
size for the sake of size' (Sony Corporation Manual). Employees who join Sony are
encouraged to 'do something truly creative…If something is wrong, I'm the man who
should be accused. As CEO it's my job to take on the critics from the outside' (Akio
Morita, CEO and Chairman of Sony). This reflects an ethos and passion handed down by
its founder Ibuka who is reported to have said 'There is nothing more pitiable than a man
who can't or doesn't dream. Dreams give direction and purpose to life without which life
would be mere drudgery'. Such statements may seem unexceptional if not coupled to a
more fundamental emphasis which resonates with the idea that 'beauty is efficiency' and
with the need for creating the equivalent of 'Pele's pass'. These are the thoughts of Dr
Nobutshu Kihara, head of research at Sony. 'In my engineering intuition, something
interesting comes to mind….I don't worry about marketing figures….Most companies
make profit the first priority. Sony's primary misison is to produce something new,
23
unique, and innovative for the enhancement of people's lives'. This ceaseless striving for
a pure 'inexchangeable productivity' as the basis for business operations is what accounts
for the remarkable achievements of Sony over the years: pocket radios, Sony Betamax,
the Trinitron, the Walkman and the Mavica camera, to name just a few.
It is this deeply imbibed spirit of spontaneous creativity and innovation honed by
a relentless disciplining mentality and grounded upon an unwavering commitment to
attaining that level of performance where efficiency is beauty, which provides the most
convincing explanation for how these Japanese and other Eastern corporations such as
Singapore Airlines continue to dominate the world in their respective fields of operation.
Instead of trivialising these rich cultural traditions by glossing over their external
manifestations, management practitioners and scholars would do well to cultivate a
deeper appreciation of how such metaphysical imperatives have come to shape and direct
the Japanese and more generally Eastern management attitudes and priorities which are
also occasionally to be found, albeit in increasing degrees of rarity, within the Western
world of management.
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