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included in HVMINT reporting requirements makes "no difference" because ForeignService Officers know what is important to U.S. interests about the country in which theyare stationed and will report accordingly. A significant amount of diplomatic reporting isoriented toward reports that State is required to write, such as human rights reports.(U) The Chief of Mission may redirect reporting, as diplomacy moves very fast. INRrarely formally tasks osts. Instead, INR is a conduit for requests from analysts in the Ie,but these requests are usually to justify analysts' rice-bowls.

Regarding the requirements process more generally, "the way the world really worksand the formal mechanisms are different." Diplomatic reporting essentially derives fromtargets of opportunity within the context of overall priorities. The number of reportingofficers at a post is very small. The IC is oblivious to that fact. The IC's.requests forreporting boils down to a few junior officers at a post, all of whom have otherresponsibilities such as CODELs.C U ) Over time, reporting has been degraded because it is not needed by State'sWashington headquarters - for the State/Washington to do its job, it can rely ontelephone calls to embassies, and State/Washington tends to micromanage its posts'activities.(U) Diplomatic reporting has ancillary benefit to the Ie. Reporting was deemphasized bythe dynamics of the 1990s and the competing demands on the IC. We used to care onlywhether a country was with us or the USSR and what needed to be done to sway thatcountry to our side. Now, there is an enormous range of interests faced by U.S.diplomacy, and the presence is "everywhere" throughout the globe. Yet thedownsizing of the Foreign Service has hampered State's capacity for reporting. In the19905, the Ie decided not to do a lot of things, which meant that the IC relied more ondiplomatic reporting - but at the same time, State was shifting away from diplomaticreporting. Open source grew in importance, but FBIS shrank. He recounted aconversation in which DCI Deutch referred to State's legions of linguists - which Fingardoes not see existing, particularly on low-density languages. In sum: we are still livingthe consequences of decisions made in the early 1990s.(U) RELATIONS WITH THE RESt OF THE Ie

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I..... ..1(3) State reports via official channelse w hatever is im portan t from those em ails . fN R does not u se em ail to se t requ irem en ts and

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(U ) T he main p ro bl em w i th in fo rma t io n -s h ar in g g e n er al ly is th a t the is su e of s ha rin gcertain information too often has to get raised to very senior levels and becomes a'political' issue. Asked who has authority in the Ie to decide rules on information-sharing and force cultural change, he responded that "there is no easy answer." There isORCON, and regarding SIGINT CIA is concerned that releasing SIGINT willcompromise HUMINT. Finally, there is the basic cultural and historical issue that Stategenerally wants to reveal more information concerning sources and methods while therest of the Ie is more conservative - it is an "ever-present tension." The process forassessing releasability needs to be streamlined. State needs the process to work becauseState often needs the information very quickly; other information-sharing issues, such asregarding military issues, is on a longer time-fuse and is not hampered by a longerdecisiorunaking process on releasability.(U) Most of the U.S. Government's intelligence apparatus (NFIP, TIARA, etc.) isoriented toward support for the military - which is what it was intended to do - and on15-20 countries, plus counterterrorism, countemarcotics, and counterproliferation.However, State is concerned with so much more - ]70 countries and many differentdimensions that have not made it into the NIPF. State is basically like a flea trying tochange the course of an elephant by pulling on its tail - State basically does not even try.(U) State relied a lot on overtly-collected information, FBIS is key and needs to bestrengthened. FBIS also needs to realize that it does not necessarily need as muchlanguage capability as it thinks - for example, much can be learned about Albaniawithout looking at Albanian-language websites.(U) INR.has a big advantage in the Ie ...:.t can rely on the entire Foreign Service. INRhas personal contacts throughout the Foreign Service and uses extensively. The

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g iv e ta skin g s bu t ra th er to solic it th e v iew s of re le van t in div id u als . S ta te is adop tin g a.n ew "sm a rt" com pu te r sys tem w hich w ill m ake em a ils m ore acce ss ib le . .e

(U)When it com es to a ll-sou rc e an a l s is , m uch th e Ie te n d s to ca re abou t in form a tion 's p ed ig re e - u n like IN R.

(U ) T H E C RAFT OF AN ALYSIS(U ) A s to w he th er c ou nte rte rror ism a na lys is re qu ire s skills d iffe re nt from tra dition alan a lys is , cou nte r te rror ism requ ire s an e xtra skill se t an d con ta c ts , bu t th e w orld is s tilld iv id ed g eog ra ph ic ally a nd by c ou ntry . T ra nsn ation al a ctors s til l a ct in g eog ra ph icte rr ain . : It is m uch m ore p rodu c tive to ta ke a n exp e rt on a p la c e , cu ltu re , re lig ion , e tc . an da dd c ou nte rte rror ism to th at p erson 's p ortfo lio v is -a ..v is th e is su es th at th e a na lys tsa lre ad y c ove rs . In e sse nc e, IN R 's p ersp ec tive is th at "e xp ertise c ou nts"... . ,.th e id ea th at-a nan a lys t is a "u tility in fie ld e r" is "lu dic rou s." C en te rs a re n ot th e w av e of th e fu tu re .


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ILater, he-clarified his views, stating that there is alegitimate tendency for analysts who have access to the sources and methodsundergirding reporting from a particular INT to g i ve more credence to that INT. Hedisagreed that there is no true all-source capability in the Ie - he advised againstoverstating his point about analysts giving more credence to information from certainINTs.. .(U) CIA has too many masters - ranging from Congress, to the Commerce Department,to Bill Gertz. INR has only one master: the State Dept.

(U) Good analysts who have broad areas of inquiry are looking at all of the informationbut are essentially approaching that information from the perspective of how to answercertain questions. The key issue is, what is the question that is guiding the analysis?Taskings to collectors are geared to questions as well, which may differ depending uponthe NT. If analysts were allowed to drive collection without the constraint of theoverriding questions that the analysts are required to answer, then the analysts wouldlikely drive the collection system toward finding answers to whimsical questions. O n theother hand, constraining collection to the predetermined questions causes collection tomiss important information that does not answer one of the predetermined questions. TheIC needs to move away somewhat from using predetermined questions to constrainanalysts' ability to drive collection - analysts should be allowed to step back to figure outwhat macro-level questions need to be answered. .(U) The Community Management Staff does episodic surveys of which analysts useinformation from what !NT, and he believes that the results are neither surprising norupsetting. For example, there is no reason to believe that diplomatic reporting' would beuseful concerning counterterrorism.~ Most of the Ie operates under a long time horizon, which is an outgrowth of the ColdWar-era focus on military systems. In contrast, intelligence on economic and diplomaticmatters needs to be very timely because those areas move very quickly; State'sintelligence needs are very tactical in nature. Counterterrorism is somewhere in themiddle between economic/diplomatic issues and military issues. INR does a lot oftactical support - conveying a lot of information orally. INR's papers concentrate onlonger-term issues.

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multip e views. n onna teams are assem e to InC u e individuals from officesthroughout State to get various views on subjects - those individuals are not allowed to'chop' on INR's products but lend valuable insights and perspectives. INR's use ofteams in some ways resembles the use of red teams.(U) INR is a big supporter of the NIC process because INR gets a vote. The NIC is thecenter of analysis. INR is not a "contrarian" but rather fiercely protects its independence.If INR disagrees with another agency's analytic conclusions, INR will voice its dissent inorder to temper the enthusiasm of policymakers in relying on those analytic conclusions.INR never receives pressure from within State to concur with other agencies' analyticconclusions.

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(U) Measuring performance is an inherently difficult process. Informal feedback iscritical, such as emails from conswners as well as the notes of senior officials in themargins' of INR products. INR tries to write its products at the lowest-level of secrecypossible for maximum dissemination. The problem of intelligence is-that it is a freegood, and consumers do not want to voice criticism for fear that criticism will cause themto lose the free good.(U) As for the pathways of information, .intelligence reaching senior State policymakerscircumvents INR via the PDB. CIA is supposed to disseminate information in the StateDepartment only through INR channels. INR'sjob is to make sure that everyoneinvolved in a policy issue at State is working from the same set of intelli ence so that oneolic office does not have an unfair advanta e over another.

(U) Regarding the question of how much INR screens intelligence given to IN ,R by therest of the Ie for dissemination to State officials INR must exercise some' udgment inthis regard because IN annot floodpolicymakers with that m ormation. course, policymakers always think that they aretheir own best analysts, but the reality is that INR does significant screening althoughwill alter its screening based on the desires of a particular State consumer. In otherwords, it is a conscious INR policy to screen intel1igencerather than burying thepolicymakers in raw material.

The A&P used to be a si

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~!:e~,.. . . . . . - - . 0 1 ! ' . . . . , . . - - J h ~ not dual-hatted as.the NIC.Chainnan, whi'~h'mean,~.that most of what he

does is in the "community mode," such as concerning r equ i r emen is . ] ~npFis too skewed toward military issues, namely because "11 of the 13 people in the room"who voted on the NIPF "were from the military." What Lowenthal is doing concerninganalytic priorities . involves the rest of the Ie , not INR .CU ) OVERALL MANAGEMENT ISSUES(U)Each agency in the Ie does a reasonably good job of fulfilling its own duties.However, the Ie needs someone to ask, can't we do more, can't we do better, shouldn'twe ask different questions? When asked who is accountable for the Ie's failure to askthese questions, he replied, "Everyone and no one." In a line chart, the DC I is ultimately.responsible. However, seeking synergy requires having someone' who has that issue highon his list of responsibilities. There is also the problem that there are too many chiefs andnot e n ou g h wo rke r -b e es . The N IC lac ks ind uc em e nts a nd troops.(U) The amount of time and effort that is spent "oiling the machine" is enormous.Congressional QFRs must be answered, budget documents must be submitted, and CMS"exists to call meetings and do the budget" - and has 100 people more than INR. Theenormous effort needed to keep the machine churning rivals the number of peopleemployed by the IC for analysis . (U) Col. Fenner asked who has the power to .create solutions. He responded that it is nota simple question of structure, although he recommended the "nuclear fine adjustmenttool" because ifwe were building the Ie today we would never design the IC the way itcurrently exists. The key issue is cultivating expertise. There used to be expertise onvarious issues in pockets around the IC. However, other agencies have not cultivatedexpertise and instead have shifted toward being flexible. and responsive. Also, there is agenerational change and experts are leaving the Ie. There need to be core groups ofexperts who nurture the next generation of experts, and teams that stick together overtime. Also, analysts need to spent time in different offices such as consumers' in order tounderstand consumers' needs. The IC has programs such as ICAP and tiger teams topromote rotations, but such rotations are not done by design 'in order to culti vate in-depthexpertise on particular issues and to ensure that people will stay in the IC over the longterm. INR used to cherry-pick from the IC, but now that expertise does not exist andinstead INR is trying to grow its analysts internally. Yet like other agencies, INR itselflacks masters to teach the students.C U ) 9 11 1

(U) His portfolio included much of the world but specifically not counterterrorism,counternarcotics, and crime for "various historical reasons." With respect to the andother bombings, if we had been alert to these clues we would have been more suspiciousof what was to come. After the East African embassy bombings, we should have askedwhat is it about those countries that made i t easy for terrorists to operate. Thinking aboutthat question may have led to greater insights into the terrorist threat.SECft~T 7


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CU ) He cautioned against drawing lessons from the attacks that are too rigid.Terrorists are like douds rather than machines - they group and group constantly.Moreover, we impute to terrorists too much cognitive process; it is not that hard to pulloff two simultaneous attacks involving car bombs against civilian targets. However, it isvery difficult to penetrate terrorist groups because the terrorists have such close relationsamong themselves.

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mfr nara- t2- dos- fingar tom- 11-19-03- 00542

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