miage_usaid_final_paper

University of Utah

USAID & Counter-Terrorism

Thomas Hone4-22-2015

USAID & Counter-Terrorism Thomas Hone 1

Abstract:

This paper explores the definition of terrorism, counter-terrorism, how an effective counter-

terrorism policy should be created, how it should be enacted, the history of USAID and its role in

the United States’ counter-terrorism policy. This is done to examine the effectiveness of USAID

in the United States’ counter terrorism policy. To accomplish this USAID’s role in the cases of

Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Jordan, and Egypt will be explored. Once this is complete further

research will be prevented showing the need for USAID and the difficulties in measuring

effectiveness. This will be accompanied by further research and recommendations needed to

fully measure the effectiveness of USAID.


September 11, 2001 changed the global perspective on terrorism. No longer was it a

concept talked about in the abstract or viewed as a developing nation issue. Global terrorism had

arrived in the first world. The new challenge presented was how to combat it. Days after the

Twin Towers were hit, then President Bush stated, “Our war on terror begins with Al Qaeda, but

it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been, found,

stopped, and defeated.” This began the War on Terror. Since then, the United States has been

involved in combat in much of the Middle East, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia, has spent near

1.6 trillion dollars, near 7,000 US soldiers killed in action, and over 50,000 wounded in action.

The outcome has been a weakened Al Qaeda, but not defeated, and has led to the rise of other

terrorist organizations. The military conflict against terrorism could continue, but the outcome

will remain uncertain and is not sustainable. However, this is not the only weapon in the United

States arsenal.

After the fall of communism the United States believed that it would be able to create a

new world order and used USAID to direct and build it. After the attacks on the Twin Towers the

thought arose that USAID could be redirected to fight terrorism through economic and

humanitarian aid. This change in its directive has been a focal point of discord amongst

politicians and citizens as the effectiveness of USAID as a counter-terrorism tool has been

questioned. In order to see whether or not USAID is an effective counter-terrorism tool, the case

studies of USIAD involvement in Iraq, Egypt, Jordan, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, will be

examined. The examination, along with a deeper understanding of what terrorism is, what

counter-terrorism is, how to measure the effectiveness of counter-terrorism, will explored. In

addition, this will be coupled with what USAID is, and how it is used to employ soft counter-


terrorism. An understanding of all this will aid in assessing, the effectiveness of USAID as a

counter-terrorism tool.

Definitions

To begin, in order to understand what constitutes a terrorist organization a definition must

be determined. It has been said that “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.” (1)

Such an idea complicates what constitutes a terrorist organization, as it is situational and

subjective. Examples of this can be seen through history with the most notable being the

Palestinian/Israeli conflict. In this situation groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah are viewed by

Israel and much of the Western World as terrorist organizations, however to the Palestinian

people and others in the Middle East they are freedom fighters seeking to regain their homeland.

The question, then, is how to distinguish, freedom fighter from terrorist? This question has many

answers. According to the United States State Department terrorism is defined as:

“The term “terrorism” means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated

against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually

intended to influence an audience. The term “international terrorism” means terrorism

involving citizens or the territory of more than one country…“the term noncombatant is

interpreted to include, in addition to civilians, military personnel who at the time of the

incident are unarmed and/or not on duty. . . . We also consider as acts of terrorism attacks

on military installations or on armed military personnel when a state of military hostilities

does not exist at the site (Foreign Relations and Intercourse, 2004).”

The FBI has taken a similar approach to defining terrorism.


“The Federal Bureau of Investigation defines terrorism as the unlawful use of force or

violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian

population, or any segment thereof, in the furtherance of political or social objectives

(Terrorism, 2001).”

Each of these approaches focuses on the motives and methods of the organization, and they are

useful in determining whether or not an act committed by a group was an act of terrorism or not.

However, they do little to analyze a group prior to them taking action. The Department of

Defense gets a bit closer in defining a group as terrorist or not. Their definition is:

“The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear,

intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that

are generally political, religious, or ideological ( Department of Defense, 2010).”

This definition examines the goals of organizations and defines them as either terrorist or not,

based upon how the group is trying to achieve their goals. While this is a better definition to

determine what would or would not constitute a terrorist organization, it too has issues. Such as

what is meant by “unlawful violence”? Would such include strikes or riots and would that then

not lead to a definition that was too broad?

The United States government is not the only organization that has attempted to define

what terrorism is and what constitutes as a terrorist organization. Since the 1980’s almost one

hundred definitions have been published by various governments and scholars. However, just as

with the United States government, they too have had issues formulating a definition that was not

too broad or to narrow. An example of one such definition was given by Simonsen and


Spindlove in their book Terrorism Today: The Past, the Players, and the Future. In it they use

this definition of terrorism:

“Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by the

(semi-)clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for the idiosyncratic, criminal, or

political reasons, whereby-in contrast to assassination-the direct targets of violence are

not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally randomly

chosen (targets of opportunity) or selectively (reprehensive symbolic targets) from a

target population, and serve as message generators. Threat-and violence-based

communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperiled) victims, and main

target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of

attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily

sought (2000).

This definition, was attempting to be all inclusive, the length of it and the choice by the authors

to try to include everything cause this definition to be too complex and difficult to work with.

The key to defining terrorism is to have a definition that is straightforward and inclusive, but not

to the point that it is unworkable. As such, for the purpose of this paper the definition provided

by Guiora in his book Global Perspectives on Counter Terrorism, will be used. It defines

terrorism as:

Acts of violence intended to advance a cause-political, social, religious, or economic-

aimed at innocent civilians defined as legitimate targets with the intent to cause physical

harm, including death, and/or conducting psychological warfare against a population

aimed at intimidating it from conducting its daily life in a normal fashion (2011).


This definition combines the motive, method, and goals of an organization while not being too

broad or too narrow, allowing for a complete analysis in order to determine whether or not an

organization or their actions may be categorized as terrorism.

In addition to a working definition of terrorism. A working definition of counter-

terrorism is needed to show how USAID would be an effective tool of it.

There are a number of issues when defining counter terrorism. The first is creating a

definition that can be operationalized. In order to accomplish this the definition must take on the

same characteristics as the definition of terrorism. Meaning that it must be broad enough to cover

all aspects, but narrow enough that it can be of use both as a policy and as an action.

When counter-terrorism is brought up as a topic, it is assumed to be solely a military

option. The United States Army defines counter terrorism as: “Operations that include the

offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism (Department of

Defense, 2014).” Another similar definition can be found by returning to Global Perspectives on

Counter Terrorism. He states that counter terrorism is: “The actions of a state, proactive or

reactive, intended to kill or injure terrorist and/or to cause serious significant damage to the

terrorist’s infrastructure (Guiora, 2011).” In each of these examples a clear definition is given.

However, a counter-terrorism strategy is and must be more than just military strategy. In the

realm of counter-terrorism there are two types of counter-terrorism. These are operational

counter-terrorism and soft counter-terrorism. Operational counter-terrorism is the use of

intelligence, interrogation, and military to prevent and respond to terrorist activities. Soft

counter-terrorism is the building of infrastructure, funds for the training of the security and

police forces, and economic aid. While these two types of counter-terrorism appear to be

opposite of one another a single strategy should be devised in order to have an effective counter-


terrorism strategy. The purpose of this is to ensure that one type of counter-terrorism is not

undoing or competing with the other. In order to create such a strategy three dimensions must be

considered. These are international law, morality, and geopolitics

In the definitions of counter-terrorism stated above, a common weakness among them is

found. The broad definition allows for the use of any and all means to prevent terrorism, this in

itself is an issue. Such a definition suggest that a state should have free reigns when it comes to

preventing terrorism or reacting to a terrorist attack. Such a notion would suggest that all forms

of torture and military responses could be used by states. This is where International law steps in.

International law is a work in progress. Much of what is understood as international law

is upheld by the United Nations and is context on how state actors are supposed to interact with

each other. With state actors being defined as an entity that includes a government with the

ability to govern, protect, and maintain a border. Under international law, as upheld by the

members of the United Nations exists a series of articles that state the procedures to be followed

in regards to conflict. Under Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter states:

“all Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force

against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other

manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations (1945).”

The purpose of this law is to prevent war and/or the threat of war between member states.

However, this does not mean that a nation is unable to defend itself. Article 51 states:

“nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of the individual or

collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations,

until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace


and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense

shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the

authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at

any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international

peace and security (1945).”

The above article articulates that states do have the right to take action to defend themselves and

respond to attacks, and ensures that the response is limited. This is to prevent any further

escalation. This poses two issues to creating a counter-terrorism policy. The first is how a state

can respond to an attack and when a state can take action. This wording has the potential to let

the aggressor have the advantage. In addition, the wording does not specify if preemptive action

may be taken to prevent an attack, nor does it state how to deal with non-state actors. Non-state

are defined as entities that exist outside the government. This type of actor complicates the issue,

as responding to an attack by a non-state actor may result in the violation of a state’s sovereignty.

As such, and additional provision has been added to international law. This states that a state

actor may act if (1) it is in an act in self-defense, (2) that attack on the acting state is substantial

and military, (3) the offending nation is complicit, unwilling, or unable to prevent further attacks,

and (4) the attack is widespread and imminent. Coupled with this, when an attack is carried out

by a state on a non-state actor, such as a terrorist organization, the state must show that all other

options were considered, the response to the state is proportional to the threat/attack, and it must

limit collateral damage (Biggio, 2002). As seen international law is vague and complicated and

yet all the agreed upon rules have to be followed. Constructing an effective counter-terrorism

strategy must include in it the understanding of Article 51 with modern interpretation.


While international law has to be taken into consideration and used in creating and

operating a counter-terrorism strategy, there first must be a guiding principal or foundation on

which to base the strategy. This is morality. It is here that a state must decide if and what types of

interrogation they will use, what constitutes as a legitimate target for killing, whether alternatives

should be employed, and how to handle captives. In addition, considering morality serves as both

a limit in deciding what types of operational counter-terrorism to participate in and a guide for

soft counter-terrorism. As noted, in the definitions of terrorism, it would appear that a state

would have all options available to them in responding to and preventing a terrorist act.

International law tries to prevent this and to a point succeeds. However, international law does

not account for all situations and can be circumvented. The responsibility of constraint lies with

the nation, and those constraints must be the foundation of the strategy and decided beforehand

rather than in the moment.

Lastly, when constructing a strategy or definition of counter-terrorism the ability to

consider geopolitical issues must be built in. Geopolitics is the understanding that states do not

operate in a vacuum. The decision/action of one state will have both positive and negative

consequences. Understanding this and building it into a counter-terrorism strategy allows a state

to avoid serious consequences to actions. An action may be deemed legal and moral, but the

action itself could cause significant blowback due to geopolitical sensitivities that be unwise to

take the action.

To show how each of these principles must be involved in creating an effective counter-

terrorism strategy the US’s counter terrorism strategy will be analyzed and for the purpose of this

paper this is the strategy that will be used, as the focus will be on the effectiveness of USAID,

an organization within the US government, in the counter-terrorism effort.


US Counter-Terrorism Strategy

June of 2011, the White House published the US’s counter terrorism strategy. This

strategy is: 1) to protect the American people, homeland and American interest, 2) Disrupt,

degrade, dismantle, and defeat al-Qa’ida and its affiliates and adherents, 3) prevent terrorist

development, acquisition, and use of weapons of mass destruction, 4) Eliminate safe havens, 5)

Build enduring counter-terrorism partnerships and capabilities, 5) Degrade links between al-

Qa’ida and its affiliates and adherents, 6) Counter al-Qa’ida ideology and its resonance and

diminish the specific drivers of violence that al-Qa’ida exploits, 7) Deprive terrorist of their

enabling means. This list is the final construction of the policy, prior to this list the US lays out

how it constructed this strategy (United States, 2011).

To begin, it states that the foundation of the strategy is built upon core American values.

This includes: 1) a respect for human rights, 2) encouraging governance response, 3) respect for

privacy rights, civil liberties, and civil rights, 4) balancing security with transparency, 5)

upholding the rule of law (United States, 2011). This is the morality portion of the US’s counter-

terrorism strategy or the “why?” portion of it.

Once this foundation is laid, it is easier to explain the “how” portion, and after this has

been covered, it builds upon this foundation by stating the need to create security partnerships.

This comprises understanding geopolitical issues and knowing where the US may be able to

receive help and where it may need to continue to build relationships. The only aspect that is not

clearly spelled out is the role of international law in the US’s counter-terrorism policy. However,

it could be assumed that the US considers this as part of following the rule of law and working

with others. As noted, though, international law is vague and this allows states, like the US, to

use tactics to get around it.


In summary the counter-terrorism strategy of the US is to prevent the future attacks of

terrorist organizations and protect Americans and American interest at home and abroad. This is

accomplished by military engaging terrorist organizations (operational counter-terrorism),

seeking to work with nations (soft counter-terrorism), and to create an atmosphere where a

terrorist organization would be not able to thrive or survive (operational and soft counter-

terrorism).

Measuring terrorism and effectiveness of counter-terrorism strategies

With the definitions of terrorism and counter-terrorism having been explored and

defined, there needs to be a way to measure the effectiveness of counter-terrorism measures. To

measure the effectiveness of counter terrorism the Global Terrorism Index (GTI) for 2012 and

2014 will be used. Through this data and an examination of certain key areas, it will be seen if a

correlation exists between count-terrorism measures and the level of terrorism over a period of

time. The reason why GTI will be used for both data and measuring is in the methodology it uses

and where it gets its data.

GTI uses a variety of variables to measure terrorism levels and the impact of terrorism.

These variables are then used to construct a weighted five year average for each country, which

shows changes of terrorism levels over time, with the lower score being worse and a higher score

being better. The data used by GTI is derived from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). GTD

has collected data on terrorist related activities from over four million news articles and twenty-

five thousand news sources from 1970 to 2013. The data collected contains information on over

125,000 terrorist attacks, includes information with a minimum of forty-five variables for each

case, and up to 120 variables on more recent cases, and is all reviewed and supervised by an

advisory panel of twelve terrorism research experts. This measurement is now accepted as a way


of measuring terrorism levels and is trusted by research, private, and governmental agencies. In

addition the definition of terrorism used by GTD and GTI closely resembles the definition used

for terrorism for the purpose of this paper.

The difficulty will lie in separating operational counter- terrorism effectiveness from soft

counter terrorism effectiveness. For this purpose multiple nations will be examined, ones that

include operational counter-terrorism measures, soft counter-terrorism measures, and a mixture

of the two. This will allow for a comparison of the effectiveness of counter-terrorism measures

and see if the effectiveness varies depending on the type of counter-terrorism employed.

While operational counter-terrorism takes primarily one form, the military aspect, soft

counter-terrorism can be accomplished by various many organizations. These could include both

governmental and non-profit. A major governmental agency that has recently been used to

employ soft counter-terrorism measures is USAID.

History and Creation of USAID

In order to understand why an organization acts in a certain manner it needs to be

understood how the organization came to be and why it came to be. Intervening in foreign affairs

is relatively new to the United States. In its early history the US took steps to avoid entangling

itself in the affairs of others, especially with Europe. The reason behind this was two-fold. The

first is a constitutional issue. Within the Constitution, there was not specific enough language to

convince early members of the legislative and executive branch that legal authority existed for

US to participate in the giving of foreign aid. The second was a precedent set forth by George

Washington. In a letter, President Washington, warned the nation about getting involved in

affairs in Europe. Specifically, he says:


"As avenues to foreign influence in innumerable ways, such attachments are particularly

alarming to the truly enlightened and independent Patriot. How many opportunities do

they afford to tamper with domestic factions, to practise the arts of seduction, to mislead

public opinion, to influence or awe the Public Councils! Such an attachment of a or

weak, towards a great and powerful nation, dooms the former to be the satellite of the

latter... The great rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign nations, is, in extending our

commercial relations, to have with them as little political connexion as possible. So far as

we have already formed engagements, let them be fulfilled with perfect good faith. Here

let us stop (1796)."

Those who followed Washington took this to mean that the United States should remain out of

all affairs in Europe which included not only treaties but also the supply of aid. However, as the

US grew and its economy and trade began to expand the US found itself becoming more and

more involved in the affairs of other states.

Even with this belief and policy the United States still participated in foreign affairs.

However, such actions, for the majority, took place in the Western Hemisphere. It was justified

that it was in the US best interest to work with or intervene in surrounding states for the benefit

of the US. It was not until World War that this policy of intervention expanded fully to areas

outside the Western Hemisphere.

During World War I, a committee known as the Commission for Relief in Belgium

(CRB) was organized to supply Belgium and Northern France with food during German

occupation. The origins of the committee actually started not due to a desire to provide France

and Belgium with aid, but to help Americans trapped in those areas as the war broke out. In an

effort to get them home, a committee was established to provide funds and find ships. By 1918,


120,000 Americans had been returned back to the States. This success showed that the

government could operate successfully outside the borders of the US to achieve a specific goal.

As this was taking place, it was made known to the US ambassadors in Europe that another

problem was on the rise. After the invasion of Belgium and France, by Germany, these nations

were unable to provide the needed amount of food to prevent starvation. To prevent this, the

CRB was given the new task of obtaining supplies to be sent to these areas. It is here where the

first obstacles of foreign aid were realized, how to get the supplies to the area and how to ensure

they reach those who are in need of them? During this time of war, Great Britain had an effective

naval blockade, preventing trade with mainland Europe. In addition, there was a fear that the

food would not reach the people, but instead be taken by the German army and used by them. It

was only after thorough negotiations with both sides, that a deal would be made to allow the food

and other supplies to enter Europe and in the end 5.7 million tons of food was delivered to the

citizens of Belgium and Northern France (Nash, 1988, pg 31, 56-59, 75, 362-365).

While this program was seen as a success, it was not a success welcomed by all. There

was a strong belief in the US that this program pulled the US into World War I. The question of

“why is it the US’s concern” was asked by both citizens and politicians who feared that if the US

continued to participate in programs like the CRB that it would only pull them into more

conflicts in Europe. Instead of worrying about Europe, it was argued, the US should look for

ways to become self-sufficient economically and militarily. Steps were also taken to prevent the

US from aiding European nations by the sending of supplies or through financial means by

passing of Neutrality Acts. These acts prevented the trade of war supplies with any nation, but

specifically aimed at Europe. The idea of isolationism had fully taken hold. Such an idea that the

US should only concern itself with it was made worse by the stock market crash of 1929, in


which all attention was turned homeward. However, as the new conflict began in Europe during

the late 1930s, at the expense of free nations, it was becoming apparent to some in power in the

US that isolationism was not a good long term strategy (Powaski, 1991, pg 58-89).

As the German war machine marched across Europe, it became apparent to the United

States that actions overseas affect the US, whether or not they are involved in them. Trade,

travel, and the safety of its citizens abroad were put in the balance as the war continued and

spread throughout Europe. It was apparent to some, especially those in the executive office of the

United States that something had to be done. But due to the Neutrality Acts action was limited.

President Roosevelt made various pleas to the citizens of the United States and to Congress that

the United States needed to be the "Arsenal of Democracy" and desired the repeal of the

Neutrality Acts to allow for weapons trade with Britain, but Congress would not budge.

(Roosevelt, 1940). With the fall of France, leaving the United Kingdom (UK) as the last free

power fighting Germany the fear began to grow that if the US did not act it would be pulled into

the conflict anyway. To prevent this, the US began supporting the giving of economic and

military aid to the UK. The belief was that if the UK could be given sufficient aid, it would be

able to turn the tide of the war. With this support, President Roosevelt was able to have congress

pass the Lend-Lease Act, allowing the United States to provide its allies in Europe with

munitions and weapons (Weeks, 2004, pg 11-14, 22-38). Such action aided in slowing the

advance of Germany and eventually, due to an attack by the Japanese on a US naval base, the,

US entered World War II, a war that would take an additional five years to finish and would

decimate much of Europe in the process.

As World War II came to an end, it was apparent that the US would no longer be able to

practice the ideology of isolationism, as it emerged from the war as one of two major world


powers. World powers would have to work together to prevent another conflict, and with this

idea in mind the United Nations was created. The purpose of this body was to allow a place for

states to meet and discuss, rather than go to war. The United States, quickly became a prominent

player within the organization.

In addition, new policies were enacted by the US. President Truman, carrying on

President Roosevelt's idea that the United States must be the "Arsenal of Democracy" instituted

international policies that would allow the United States to aid nations in rebuilding, and as the

fear of communism grew in the US, policies were enacted to help states in their fight against

communism. This comprised the Marshall Plan. The sole idea behind this policy was that in

order to prevent further conflict communism must be prevented from spreading by providing

economic and military aid to states. One of the early examples of this new policy is seen in

Turkey and Greece. Each of these states received economic aid to bolster their economy and a

military presence in or near these nations with the promise to aid the government against

communist factions (Harbutt, 2002 pg15-22).

This pattern of giving aid for the benefit of national security would continue through the

Cold War. However, it was not a perfect process, and the US found itself in trouble from time to

time as there was no clear distinction between military and economic aid. Without formal

organization, the disbursal of aid was bogged down by inexperience and a lack of trust from

foreign states, as they saw it as a military or CIA sponsored ploy. In an effort to streamline the

process President Kennedy, along with Congress, passed the Foreign Assistance Act. Under this

act, USAID was created and it formally separated military aid from economic aid (Who we are,

2012).


USAID then became an independent federal agency with the primary purpose and

responsibility of administering nonmilitary foreign aid. Its focus was to develop plans specific

for each nation. To accomplish these goals USAID divides itself into five categories. These

include programs for disaster relief, poverty relief, environmental issues, socioeconomic

development, and United States bilateral interest. While its goals were economic and

humanitarian it still served as a tool to fight against the spread of communism. However, when

the USSR collapsed, the Cold War came to a close, and opened a new chapter for USAID.

During the 1990s USAID was able to rebrand itself as a separate entity from being a tool

of the US military and CIA. It was able to expand its operations that had been ignored due to

their lack of importance during the Cold War. However, their focus remained much the same: aid

states in developing their own economies, provide aid in time of disaster or crisis, and aid in the

transition from developing nation status to developed nation status. During this time, USAID

played a minor role in foreign affairs, however as the ‘90s came to end and with the attacks on

September 11, 2001, its role and purpose would change once more. USAID would be

transformed and integrated into the US’s counter-terrorism strategy.

Their role in the counter-terrorism policy if the US would be in providing soft counter-

terrorism. Specifically focusing on countering Al-Qa’ida ideology and its resonance. While at the

same time diminishing the specific drivers that al-Qa’ida exploits. This would not confined just

to Al-Qa’ida but to other affiliates of Al-Qa’ida as well. In short, this means its goal is to win the

hearts and minds of the people. A pure operational counter-terrorism strategy is only so effective

and at times plays into the hands of terrorist organizations like Al-Qa’ida. Their message to the

Muslim world is that the US is the aggressor seeking to oppress them and destroy their way of

life. Drone strikes, invasions, bombings, especially ones that cause injury to or kill civilians help


aid Al-Qa’ida in its message. However, by improving economic or social conditions USAID can

counter that message. In fighting terrorism, the message put forth is just as, if not more important

as military action.

The Issue

This change in the directive for USAID has raised concern, as the effectiveness of the

agency has been called into question. Some members of Congress have long been critical of the

agency. They claim the money spent on USAID or given to other states through USAID could be

used to solve issues facing the United States, and that USAID is a drain on limited resources.

Since 2009 they have only gained more support. The Great Recession that began in 2009 coupled

with an ever growing national debt has led some in Congress to advocate reigning in USAID, or

even to discontinue it. The reason behind this is not new. Senator Rand Paul has called for an end

to the program, as he believes it is not constitutional and only pulls the US into conflicts. This he

sees as a detriment to the US way of life, has the ability to cause harm to US citizens, and further

hinder the economy (Rand Paul, Issues 2013). He is not alone. Congressman Chaffetz has long

been critical of the agency and has too questioned its purpose. These questions to the purpose

and need of USAID goes back to the founding. As noted already the issues of constitutionality

and the fear of being pulled into conflicts is what kept the US was participating in foreign aid

through much of its history.

These are not the only issues facing USAID. Much of the area where USAID conducts its

projects are military zones and are known for corruption and covert manipulation. An example of

this has been in Afghanistan. Here USAID has a number of projects meant to aid in the

rebuilding of the state, but the projects have had issues with fraud, inability to ensure money, or

that supplies reach their intended destination, and inability to ensure safety of USAID workers or


affiliates. Problems also arise in the design of USAID projects not being tailored to the local

cultures. This was particular noted by Peter Van Buren in his exploration of the United States

attempt to rebuild Iraq. Such issues have only increased as the US has withdrawn most of the

troops from the region.

In addition, there is a rising concern amongst foreign states as to the true nature of

USAID. Some have accused the US of using USAID as a political tool and an extension of it

clandestine efforts. It has long been believed by some nations that USAID is working under the

direction of the CIA and has even been claimed by some that USAID has participated in CIA

operations meant to shore up US interest in regions of South and Central America (Heinz, 1999).

With this, some foreign states have also accused the US of using USAID to secure votes in the

United Nations or other types of foreign support. In the early 1990s, the United States sought a

resolution to use military force against Iraq for its invasion of Iraq. Yemen voted against the

resolution and soon after that vote all work and aid to the nation ended. This was seen as a sign

to others that if they desired aid from the United States they must do as the United States desired

(Lynch, 2006).

This then poses the question, that even with these issues and apparent setbacks whether

USAID is viable, and can it be used as an effective count-terrorism tool. To answer this question,

USAID strategy, involvement and the effectiveness in Iraq, Egypt, Jordan, Pakistan, and

Afghanistan will be examined. The reason why these states have been chosen is that they are key

in the US’s counter-terrorism policy. In addition, each of these states have a range of counter-

terrorism strategies that have been employed by the US. These range from solely soft counter-

terrorism measures to a mix of soft and operational counter-terrorism measures. As noted, this


will allow for a comparison of the effectiveness of counter-terrorism measures to allow the

ability to see if USAID is effective as a counter-terrorism tool.

Cases

Afghanistan:

Afghanistan is located in Central Asia with a population of nearly thirty-one million

people. It has seen has seen numerous conflicts. However, the conquest by the Taliban in the late

1990’s put Afghanistan on a collision path with the US and the Western World. After taking

control of the region the Taliban set up an Islamic government and welcomed groups and

individuals who shared their beliefs. One of these groups was Al-Qa’ida. Al-Qa’ida was allowed

to recruit and train individuals under protection of the Taliban government. It is here where it is

believed that the attacks on September 11, 2001 were planned and where the order to go ahead

with them was given. As consequence the US and its allies attempted to diplomatically force the

Taliban government to expel and turn over the leader of Al-Qa’ida. This was refused and on

October 7, 2001, the United States and its allies invaded Afghanistan with the intention of

rooting out terrorism in the region. Such a conflict has been a lengthy and costly conflict for all

parties involved (CIA, Afghanistan).

Within a short amount of time the Taliban government was toppled and a new

government was put in its place. However, the Taliban continued to resist. In the beginning, it

acted much like an insurgency, but as the conflict continued its tactics changed. According to the

GTI 2013 report less than three percent of attacks carried out by the Taliban targeted a military

target. The majority of attacks were against schools for girls, polling stations, and construction

sites (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2014) . This is not typical of an insurgency. The purpose


of these attacks was to advance a political and religious cause by targeting innocent civilians

with the intent to disrupt daily life. This is the definition of a terrorist organization.

As a result of this the US began to employ operation counter-terrorism measures in

Afghanistan. The result of this and the invasion decimated much of the infrastructure and

economy. As a result the citizens of Afghanistan were forced to take up various means of

employment. These included fighting for the Taliban, spying on Allied troops, and the

raising/selling of opium. This puts a strain not only on Afghan resources, but US resources as

well as it tried to stabilize the state. As this continued, it was soon noted by the United States

that military and operational counter-terrorism measures would not be enough, that a nonmilitary

solution would be needed to combat these issues.

In 2006, the United States, under USAID, launched a program known as the Afghanistan

Infrastructure and Rehabilitation Program. The purpose of this program was to create economic

growth and political stability that had been lost due to the war. Such a program was not only

meant to rebuild the war torn nation, but to show the political leaders and especially the people

of Afghanistan that there were benefits to not supporting enemies to the United States. These

projects included the building of a bridge in the Uruzgan province, building of schools and

providing educational supplies to the schools, and the training of engineers. Each of these

projects aided in achieving specific goals set by USAID, of which were to increase trade, rebuild

infrastructure, provide employment, and to provide education and training (USAID, 2012).

In the Uruzgan province, a bridge was built that linked near seventy thousand Afghan

citizens to trade, health, and educational services. In addition, the labor for construction was

provided by local villages, providing work for those who had lost their ability to provide for

themselves as a result of the war. Another project was connecting and reconnecting roads found


in Northern Afghanistan. Again with this project, USAID sought out input and aid from local

Afghan citizens. Once the road project was completed, USAID, with the help of locals, turned

the building where that had served as a headquarters for the project into a school. This allowed

many children, boys and girls, the opportunity to receive an education, whereas previously this

opportunity was not available to them (USAID, 2012). Along with elementary education,

USAID has been able to build and set up higher education facilities for the training of engineers.

This will allow Afghanistan to ensure they have the ability to further their own growth and

infrastructure.

The overall effectiveness of USAID is a mixed result. By providing individuals with

alternative means of making a living, it did lessen the Taliban’s ability to recruit, but did little

over all to decrease terrorism levels. According to the GTI report of 2013, which measured levels

of terrorism from 2002-2011, Afghanistan ranked third on terrorist incidents by state, and saw an

increase of terrorist related attacks from 2002-2010. However, during 2011 the number of

terrorist attacks began to diminish as the state began to stabilize both politically and

economically. This was in part due to the increase in military and counter-terrorism operations in

2010, and as projects meant to improve economic conditions were beginning to take hold

(Institute for Economics & Peace, 2012). From this it appears that the counter-terrorism

measures being employed by the US, both operational and soft, are working. However, the GTI

2014 report showed that after 2011 terrorist related attacks began to increase and Afghanistan

moved from third to second on the list of terrorist incidents by state (Institute for Economics &

Peace, 2014).

Pakistan:


Pakistan is a neighbor of Afghanistan located in Central Asia and consist of a population

over 180 million people. It was created in 1947 as an independent Islamic nation. Since that time

it has faced conflicts from within its own borders and with its neighbor India. Pakistan also has a

history of dealing and working with terrorist organizations. During the Soviet conflict in

Afghanistan, Pakistan trained, supported, and harbored terrorist organization such as Al-Qaeda,

the Taliban, and the mujahideen. However, these associations have come back to haunt Pakistan

as these organizations have been responsible for terrorist incidents in the region (CIA, Pakistan,

2015).

The main groups conducting terrorist activities are Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. As noted

from Afghanistan the Taliban is already considered a terrorist organization due to its current

strategies. Al-Qaeda is much of the same. Not only have they conducted attacks against the

West, such as September 11, but they have carried out a series of attacks and bombings in

Pakistan in an attempt to force the government to end its relationship with the US and to have the

government enforce and implement Islamic law. These attacks occur against civilians, police,

and religious figures, all in an attempt to advance their cause and disrupt daily life. As such, they

fit the definition of a terrorist group.

In an attempt to help bring stability to this region the US government has worked closely

with Pakistan. Most recently in 2009, Congress passed the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan

Act. While the US has a long history of providing aid to Pakistan, this new act was meant to

reassure Pakistan that the US would be committed to the region long after the drawdown in

Afghanistan. Since its passage the US has delivered over 3.5 billion in aid. These projects range

from education to energy to agriculture (S.1707, 2009-2010).


One such project has focused on agriculture. Due to its strategic location in Central Asia,

Pakistan has a long history of being a central location for trade. In addition, due to its size and

location it has the potential to become an agriculture giant in the world. Working with the

Pakistan government and local villages, USAID set up to train locals in the art of modern

farming, has set a goal to have one million acres of land irrigated, and have a system put in place

to connect small farmers to major agricultural businesses. USAID believes that if they

accomplish this it will increase income and employment for 250,000 farming households,

potential affecting two million Pakistanis. Such a project would provide more opportunities to

many, especially in rural regions where terrorist organizations operate and recruit (USAID,

2013).

In addition, USAID is working with the government of Pakistan to help it regain and

keep the trust of the people. They have supported, through financial and other means, the

government as it addresses various issues affecting communities in Pakistan. The purpose of this

is to get communities to turn to the government for assistance rather than the military or other

organizations for help. This should ensure that the government in Pakistan remains stable, and a

stable government is more likely to hold off attacks from terrorist organizations and prevent

further growth of them within its borders (USAID, 2013).

The overall effectiveness of USAID is once more mixed and difficult to see. By working

closely with the government it appears Pakistan has become a more stable state in that regards,

but in regards to terrorism the outcome is not as bright. In the GTI report of 2013 Pakistan

ranked second in overall terrorist incidents, showing that from 2002-2011 there was a constant

increase of terrorist related incidents (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2012). In the 2014 report

by GTI, the story was the same. While it did move from second to third in terrorist related


instances, the state that jumped it was Afghanistan and during 2012 and 2013 there was still a

constant increase in the number of terrorist related incidents, primarily from the Taliban

(Institute for Economics & Peace, 2012).

Iraq:

Iraq is located in the Middle East with a population just over 36 million people. Iraq has a

long history of conflict within the region and with the West. After the fall of the Ottoman Empire

the state of Iraq (known then as the British Mandate of Mesopotamia) was created and placed

under British control until it gained its independence in 1932. From 1932 to 1958 it operated as

a monarchy until the government was overthrown in a military coup by the Ba’ath Party, at

which point Saddam Hussein took power. Through the 70s and 80s, Iraq enjoyed a relationship

with the United States as Iraq and the US shared a common enemy in the region, Iran. Iraq was

given financial and military support from the US in various skirmishes and open conflict with

Iran. However, as the Cold War came to an end, the US no longer saw Iran as an immediate

threat and the relationship between the US and Iraq began to strain. This relationship then broke

when Iraq invaded and annexed Kuwait (CIA, 2015). The annexation of Kuwait led the United

Nations and the US to intervene with military force and launched a hundred hour ground

campaign against Iraqi forces. Iraq was forced to withdraw from Kuwait and faced continuous

sanctions by the United Nations other Western Nations (CIA, 2015).

Through the remainder of the 90s Saddam faced several uprisings from ethnic Kurds and

Shias, which he was only able to subdue after employing chemical weapons. However with the

use of chemical weapons, Saddam once more became a target of Western governments. Iraq was

ordered to destroy all chemical weapons, which it complied with to varying degrees (CIA, 2015).


After the attacks on September 11, a case was made before Congress and the American

people that Al-Qaeda and Saddam were working together. In addition, the case was made that

the government of Iraq had failed to not only completely destroy its chemical weapon arsenal,

but had started manufacturing of these types of weapons once more. On this pretext a US led

organization invaded Iraq and overthrew Saddam and the Ba’ath government.

While many of the reasons to invade Iraq turned out to be either false or exaggerated the

aftermath of the invasion left a power vacuum with the state. This vacuum was filled with many

different organizations, including Al-Qaeda. As noted Al-Qaeda is considered a terrorist group

and they conducted themselves as such in Iraq after the fall of Saddam in order to pressure the

populace of Iraq to for the US out. However, this backfired on them. As they continued to

increase their attacks on the populace, the populace turned on them and with the help of a surge

in troops Al-Qaeda’s ability to operate diminished.

During and after this time, a civil war erupted in neighboring Syria. The conflict in Syria

led to the rise of a new group known as ISIS. ISIS is a Sunni ethnic Islamic group, whose goal it

is to establish a unified Middle East and a new Caliphate. This group was able to gain training,

resources, and volunteers in its fight against the Syrian government and as the US pull out of Iraq

in 2011, ISIS turned its eyes to Iraq. In the summer of 2013, ISIS swept through Iraq gaining

support from Sunni population in western Iraq who have long felt they had no voice in the Shia

controlled government. By the end of the summer much of Western Iraq was in the hands of

ISIS. At first glance ISIS would appear to be an insurgent or paramilitary group. However,

while they do have that structure in place and operate one, they also use terrorist type activities to

obtain their goals.


As ISIS moved further through Syria and Iraq, they entered towns and villages and began

conducting ethnic cleansing. They would give the populace of these towns the opportunity

convert or die. In addition, they have attempted to intimidate the West by capturing Western

civilians, torturing them and in the end killing them. The purpose of this is to conduct

psychological warfare against Western states in an attempt to show that populace that their

governments are unable to protect them. This they do in hopes of getting citizens of Western

nations to put pressure on their governments to pull out of the area. Such actions fit within the

definition of terrorism. As ISIS continues to operate in Iraq the overall stability of the state

remains in question.

USAID strategy in Iraq has been and currently is an ever changing and evolving strategy.

After the initial invasion in 2003 and thereafter the focus of USAID was to rebuild infrastructure.

Due to the war and years of sanctions, much of Iraq was without basic services like water and

electricity. To accomplish this, USAID worked with organizations like Bechtel to build new

power plants in Northern Iraq and update power plants in Central and Southern Iraq. These

projects not only restored and brought power to the citizens of Iraq, but they also provided

thousands of jobs to Iraqis as locals were contracted to accomplish this task. In addition to

rebuilding of the power grid other projects included restoring and expanding water services, rail,

road, and harbor. Once more with the use of Iraqi labor (USAID, 2006).

Along with the building of infrastructure USAID committed itself to work with the

government of Iraq at all levels. The ability of ISIS to take control of and gain as much support

in Iraq as it has, is due to mistrust between factions of the general public of Iraq and the

government. In an attempt to create trust USAID has worked with the citizens and government

officials in Iraq in providing them training in how to work with others and how to prioritize the


needs of a community. By doing this, USAID is attempting to get the citizens of Iraq to work

with the government rather than organizations like ISIS (USAID, 2006).

The effectiveness of USAID is highly questionable. Since the invasion by the US in

2003, Iraq has suffered the highest rate of terrorist related incidents in the world. In the GTI

report of 2012 it recorded that from 2003-2011 Iraq had over a thousand terrorist incidents that

resulted in near two thousand deaths and near five thousand injuries (Institute for Economics &

Peace, 2012). That number has only grown from 2012 to 2013, as the GTI report of 2014 shows

an additional 1500 incidents, over four thousand more deaths, and ten thousand more injured.

Iraq has become a battleground for ethnic religious groups, each fighting for power and control

(Institute for Economics & Peace, 2014). This shows, by the numbers, that USAID has not been

effective. However, there are other items that can be looked at. These include the building of

schools, hospitals, and restoring of power, all of which has been useful to Iraq and the effects of

which may either have not transferred over yet, or there are underlying issues that need to be

further examined to fully understand what is happening in Iraq.

Jordan:

Jordan is a state bordering Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Israel and has a population of

near seven million people. It gained its independence from the United Kingdom in 1946. Much

of its independent history has been dotted with conflict with other Arab states and Israel.

Recently, Jordan has joined with other Arab nations to launch military strikes within Syria and

Iraq against ISIS (CIA, Jordan, 2015).


Unlike some states within the region, Jordan has few homegrown or international terrorist

groups operating within its borders. This is primarily due to the stability of the government and

the extreme measures they take in order to secure their state. They do face a threat from ISIS

and have been affected by the group. Recently one of their pilots was taken captive by ISIS and

burned alive. ISIS, as noted, is a terrorist organization, and while their actions have brought a

response from the Jordanian government, they do not operate with any sort of organization of

efficiency within Jordan.

The biggest issue facing Jordan at this moment is the influx of refugees from Syria and

Iraq. Due to the invasion of Iraq by the US the continued instability in Iraq and the Syrian civil

war, Jordan has received over 700,000 refugees. This represents a ten percent increase in the

population of Jordan in a very short period of time. With this influx Jordan has been struggling to

provide for the refugees. Many communities near where the refugee camps are located, have

found themselves in short supply of food, water, and shelter as they do not have enough for their

own citizens, let alone refugees. In addition, as resources have become tighter it has led to an

increase in tension between the citizens of Jordan and the refugees, of which has threatened

government stability (UNHCR, 2001).

In an effort to help ease these issues, USAID has implemented plans and goals to work

with and support the Jordanian government and host communities. These projects include the

construction of the Za’atri-Hofa pipeline and pumping station to increase water supply and

sanitation to Northern Jordan, where the majority of refugee camps lie. In addition, they have

built schools in the area and renovated hospitals in order to handle the influx of refugees. USAID

has also stepped in directly to help the refugees by providing the basic necessities of life and

food assistance (USAID, 2014).


The overall efforts in Jordan appear to be more positive than in other areas. The efforts of

USAID have allowed the Jordanian government to remain stable even with the influx of refugees

that drain limited resources. According to the GTI report of 2012 Jordan ranked 86 on the

terrorism index with zero terrorist incidents within its borders, and even though, according to the

GTI report of 2014 Jordan rose to an index level of 70 it still had zero terrorist related incidents

within its own borders as the terrorist group threatening them, ISIS, had only been able to harm

them outside their borders (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2012, Institute for Economics &

Peace, 2014).

Egypt:

Egypt lies at the heart of the Middle East and is one of the most populous states in the

region with over 88 million people. Egypt gained its independence in 1922 and since then its

history has been marked with revolutions, coups, and assassinations. However, even with this

history Egypt has been able to remain a stable state for most of the 20th century into the 21st

century. This stability was threatened in 2011 during what became known as Arab Spring. It was

at this time the long time military leader Mubarak was forced to resign due to protest and a few

months later elections were held. The elections, however brought more discontent. While the

elections themselves were ratified it allowed for members of the Muslim Brotherhood to attain

power.

The Muslim Brotherhood is a known radical Islamic organization that has had ties to

terrorist organizations. This caused Western leaders and certain secular groups in Egypt to fear

that this new government would try to enforce Islamic law. As a result the more liberal and

secular groups walked out of the government and incited protest against it. The elected president,

Mohamed Morsi attempted negotiations with the various secular groups, to work out the


differences, but was rebuffed. The situation deteriorated more when protesters from both sides

clashed in Cairo and surrounding areas. Once again President Morsi called for both sides to come

to the table and talk out their differences, and once again he was rebuffed. Then in June of 2013,

President Morsi was ousted by a military coup and a new interim government was put into place.

In 2014, the military leader who led the coup against President Morsi resigned his commission,

ran for president and was elected (CIA, Egypt, 2015).

Egypt has faced a number of terrorist attacks over the years. These attacks have been

carried out by a variety of organizations, ranging from the Muslim Brotherhood to Hezbollah to

Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad. The majority of these attacks, however, were not aimed at Egypt

or its populace. The main target for most of these groups have been Western tourist, tourist sites

and Israelis in Egypt. Even though the majority of these acts has not been aimed at Egypt, they

still fall under the definition of terrorism as these acts are an attempt to advance a goal, cause

physical and psychological harm, and disrupt daily life.

While September 11, changed the role of USAID, the Arab Spring altered its role in

Egypt even more. Much of the protest in Egypt during this time was about the lack of

employment. As such, since 2011 USAID has focused on building and maintain programs to

bolster Egypt’s economy and job market. USAID has accomplished this by providing job

training for those seeking employment to boost their ability to find a job, with the use of private

and NGOs they have aided in the building and funding of the for low income entrepreneurs to

start up new businesses, increasing employment opportunity (USAID, 2015).

The purpose behind this is to ensure stability within Egypt. As noted the main reason for

the uprising in 2011 was due to a high level of unemployment. By working with Egypt, private

entities, and NGO’s fund and grow businesses in Egypt, USAID is looking to ensure that an


uprising over employment does not take place again. As, as noted, such an uprising lead to a few

years of instability and instability, as seen in Iraq and Syria has the potential to lead to the

creation or growth of terrorist organizations.

The success of USAID in Egypt has been marginally successful. A look at the

unemployment rate of Egypt shows the unemployment rates has been decreasing since 2013

(Trading Economics, 2015). However, the period of unrest and instability in the government did

lead to a rise of terrorist related incidents. In the 2012 GTI report Egypt ranked 27 on the

terrorist index and due to terrorist related incidents as a result of discontent dropped to 13 in the

2014 GTI report (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2012, Institute for Economics & Peace,

2014).

Summary of effectiveness

Each of the cases presented show various levels of terrorism and US operational counter-

terrorism being employed. In addition, each of these cases had a high level of assistance from

USAID. It should also be noted that each of the cases are in the top ten of recipients of USAID

(USAID, 2012). The extensive involvement and resources being used by USAID in each of

these cases should be expected to produce clear results. This, however, is not the case.

In each of the cases the level of terrorism, as reported by the GTI, either did not improve

or worsened. This is seen as troubling, as in 2012 Afghanistan received over 12 million, Iraq

near 2 million, Pakistan, Egypt, and Jordan over 1 million in economic and military assistance.

Even with this amount of money little to no success was seen. This type of results tends to give

credence to those questioning the effectiveness and need of USAID. However, there may be

more to this topic that has yet to be explored and further research may be needed.


Further Research

While the types and number of counter-terrorism policies have increased since September

11, the ability to measure them has not. At this moment there is no generally accepted way to

define effectiveness or to develop a framework to fully measure it. The reason behind this is

when it comes to measuring the effectiveness of counter-terrorism a number of variables can be

considered and each researcher puts an emphasis on different ones. This disagreement on what

should be considered in measuring effectiveness has led to various answers in how effective a

policy may or may not be (Um, Pisoiu, 2011).

The other difficulty is some variables themselves, are difficult to measure. These include

levels of democracies, civil rights, and human rights. The definitions of these variables

differentiate between agencies and researchers. As such, where one researcher may define a

government as low on civil rights another may define them as high on civil rights, thus leading to

two different answers on the same topic (Um, Pisoiu, 2011).

Another issue faced in measuring the effectiveness of counter-terrorism is the ability to

gather reliable data, especially for quantitative studies. Many of the areas being studied are areas

of high violence and political instability making it difficult to obtain reliable or enough data. In

addition, while databases do exist that measure terrorism, they have come under criticism for

how they define terrorism and no one database uses the same definition. The result of this could

cause differing results even on the same area of study.

This is further trouble as researchers are not the only ones that struggle with the ability

and need to measure the effectiveness of counter-terrorism policies. All governmental

organizations must receive funding from the government, this money is given on an assessment


based structure. This means if the organization can show that they are being effective they

receive funding.

Since the attacks on September 11, the Western states have spent billions on counter-

terrorism policies and programs. This spending has been justified by showing and highlighting

the number of terrorists that have been killed or captured, the decline in terrorism related deaths,

and the prevention of further attacks. As such governments have attempted to show that their

efforts are successful and the money spent has been worth the cause. However, using these

variables may not actually show that programs or policies are successful (Spencer, 2006).

The US government is no different, and as noted, questions have risen as to the

effectiveness of some of the programs the US employs to combat terrorism. It is important for

the US government to show that goals are not only being met, but they are actually combating

and preventing terrorism. As such each organization has developed their own methodology to

measure their effectiveness. The issue with this is much the same issue plaguing researchers,

different methodology will yield different results on the same study.

This is even more of an issue with governmental agencies as it is in their best interest to

show those in charge of the budget that they are effective. By reporting they are not succeeding

or being effective they run the risk of budget cuts and/or a discontinuation of their program or

agency. As such governmental agencies may use a methodology and data to show they are

effective when they are not. This has the potential to cost governments millions of dollars of year

on programs that do not work.

In a report to Congress, Raphael Perl, outlines variables that could be implemented into a

methodology to be used to see if a program is effective. He suggests that analysis of the number


of terrorist incidents, attitudes of the populace about their perceptions towards terrorist

organizations and behaviors (specifically the attitudes of the populace where counter-terrorism

measure are being employed), and trends of terrorist organizations, should be used when

addressing the effectiveness of a counter-terrorism program or policy. Each of these variables

allow for a broader view of the situation and to see which types of policies may or may not be

working. In the end, governmental agencies must construct a constant framework to measure

their effectiveness and be held to it. If this is not done there will be no way to know for sure

which programs or policies are truly being effective as each agency will continue to invent their

own methodology to make themselves appear effective (US Cong, 2007).

However, the entire approach by governmental organizations and researchers may not be

correct. At the moment most of the research is conducted in a rationalist manner. Meaning

variables are attempted to be quantified and from their results are shown empirically whether or

a policy/program is effective or not. In doing this they may be leaving out variables that cannot

be quantified, but are still important for overall discussion.

To begin, while a decrease in terrorist incidents could indicate that a policy is working it

could also be that something else is going on. This something else may include terrorist

organizations staying quiet in order to avoid detection, they may be saving resources to conduct a

large scale attack, they may be recruiting new members of they may be trying to lure

governments into a false sense of security.

In addition, it is important to remember that terrorists do not measure success the same

way Western governments may measure success. While the prevention of terrorist attacks and a

decline in the number of deaths related to terrorism may be seen as a success by government and

a failure by terrorist organizations, the terrorist organization may not see it as such. Recalling the


definition of terrorism part of it states “…with the intent to cause physical harm, including death,

and/or conducting psychological warfare against a population aimed at intimidating it from

conducting its daily life in a normal fashion.” Meaning that even when a terrorist attack fails, the

organization itself can still succeed. If the failed attack on an airplane prevents individuals from

flying, the organization has succeeded. If a failed attack on a hotel prevents individuals from

vacationing, the organization has succeeded. Terrorist organizations are just as intelligent as

governments, they know and understand situations, geopolitics, governments and people just as

well, if not more so, than governments understand them (Spencer, 2006).

This only further shows the difficulties in measuring the effectiveness of counter-

terrorism policies/programs. There are certain variables that cannot be measured, but must be

taken into account in order to understand the “who” “what” and “how” of a terrorist

organization. This means that a complete rationalist approach to measuring effectiveness of

counter-terrorism polices/program is ineffective. Instead a combination of the rationalist

approach coupled with an understanding that certain elements cannot be measured, but must be

taken into account.

This does not mean, that a rationalist approach cannot show if a program or policy is

effective. A few studies have been conducted and have produced insights that should be

examined when constructing and measuring counter-terrorism measures. One such theory that

exists in the use of soft counter-terrorism is that if programs are directed at building and

stabilizing a state’s economy, then less violence will occur. The prevailing thought behind this is

that if individuals have jobs they either will not have time to fight or any grievances they may

have had will be taken care of due to being employed.


The theory behind this is an opportunity cost approach. In their paper examining this

topic Berman, Callen, Felter, and Shapiro give the example of an individual choosing between

wage work and insurgency. When making this decision an individual may take into account

more than just income. They can be influenced by commitment to the cause, risk aversion, and

attitudes to violence. Through this thinking they look at the data from Afghanistan, Iraq, and the

Philippines to see if a positive correlation exists between violence and unemployment to prove

the opportunity cost approach (2011).

What they find is surprising. Their findings show no positive correlation between

violence and unemployment. The reasons behind this could be numerous, but two prominent

ones stand out. In an area of high unemployment it is not only the terrorist or insurgent groups

that benefit. Coalition and government forces are also able to buy information from non-

combatants and in areas of high unemployment there is a great demand for income, lowering the

cost of this information allowing Coalition and government forces to outbid terrorist/insurgents

for information. In addition, areas of high terrorist incidents or insurgency levels are prone to a

high degree of military operations. These operations could include the establishing of

checkpoints, building of barriers, and conducting raids. Each of these military operations disrupts

local economies, which could be the cause of unemployment, and in this case a high degree of

military operations usually shows less violence in the area Berman, Callen, Felter, Shapiro,

2011).

In combination with this study, another study was conducted to look at specific programs.

These included developmental programs and their effectiveness. Development programs are

designed to do more than improving human welfare. They are designed to also help local

governments stabilize or remain stable. However, the issue is how to measure this and can such


programs be effective. To answer this question Berman, Felter, Shapiro, and Troland, explore a

group of development assistance programs and violent incidents over the first five years of the

Iraq War (2013).

In looking at Iraq, the issue of why violent incidents occurs must be examined from the

insurgent point of view as well as from the non-combatant point of view. A non-combatant being

an individual who does not belong to a military, government, or terrorist organization. Insurgents

are the ones responsible for the carrying out of attacks, but they rely on non-combatants for

information. The question then is, do economic or social programs limit or prevent this

information from being passed on to insurgents for non-combatants know programs will only

continue if the government controls the area?

To answer this question the writers look at attacks carried out against Coalition troops,

the Iraqi government and the populace by area while looking at the amount of aid being spent in

those areas. They then use this data to create an empirical formula that includes variables on aid

being spent, programs, number of insurgent attacks, and military presence in an area. What they

find is that development on a smaller scale appear to reduce the number of attacks in an area.

Whereas larger projects do not show the same results. It could be that smaller projects are more

directed at specific problem the area is facing, thus allowing for it be more widely seen or felt by

the populace. In addition, the findings also show that a combination of operational counter-

terrorism and small, directed projects of soft counter-terrorism bring the best results in

diminishing violence in an area Berman, Felter, Shapior, Troland, 2013).


Recommendation & Future of USAID

The purpose of counter-terrorism needs to be more than just prevention, but able to get to

the heart of the matter. This means instead of countering the actions of a terrorist organization a

state’s policy must focus on de-radicalization. This type of policy refers to one that addresses the

conditions that cause an individual to join and/or participate in terrorist activities. The conditions

that could cause an individual to choose such a path could be a dissatisfaction with social,

political, legal, educational, or economic issues and a counter-terrorism policy must incorporate

these issues in order to prevent the creation or growth or terrorist organization. This idea goes

straight to the heart of the issue and is directed at an individual level meant to prevent an

individual from joining or persuade an individual into leaving a terrorist organization.

This approach to counter-terrorism is not new. Such policies have been enacted numerous

times and at various levels. After World War II policies were created to dissuade individuals

from continued membership of the Nazi party and as noted Western States have used a mixture

of operational counter-terrorism and soft counter-terrorism measures to varying degrees in the

Middle East. The issue then and now is measuring the effectiveness of soft counter-terrorism

measures. A number of organizations, like USAID and literature exists of the successfulness of

these types of actions, but due to lack of identifiable metrics it is difficult to measure the

effectiveness of the programs (Kronfeld, 2012).

However, this does not mean that these programs do not work or that they should be

employed as a policy. John Horgan and Tore Biorgo, researchers in this field state,

“Terrorism is a phenomenon that manifests itself within specific political and social

contexts. The factors that drive or facilitate disengagement for each group tend to be


context-specific, movement-specific, and time-specific. Each programme [sic] is thus

context-bound, and we ought to be cautious about over-generalizing from individual

successes of failures. The strengths of particular disengagement programmes derive from

their ability to meet the social needs of the ‘clients’ as well as being sensitive to their

specific political and social contexts (Kronefeld, 2012).”

Individuals do not become terrorists for the sake of becoming terrorists. There is a reason, a

cause for this action. There is something about the terrorist organization they agree with, that

makes sense to them and that is what soft counter-terrorism is trying to find and get at.

The human experience and reasons why an individual may or may not participate in

terrorist activities is difficult to quantify, as many variables exist and some variables may not

make sense. This is why difficulty exists in measuring the effectiveness of soft counter-terrorism

measures and USAID as an employer of this type of terrorism. In the end two items need to be

considered.

First, more research needs to be conducted in this field as to the effectiveness of

programs and agencies like USAID. As the lack of a coherent methodology and definitions has

led to a lack of understanding in how USAID and softer counter-work work or if they work at

all. In order to fix this a comprehensive definition, like the one is this paper must be agreed upon

and used in further research. This will allow for more accurate and reliable data, in which in turn

will allow for better measurement. Once a definition has been agreed upon what can be measured

must be used in combination with what cannot be measured. Such an approach will allow a fuller

picture of the issue to appear and allow for more effective analysis of the issue and the potential

solution to the issue.


Lastly, it needs to be remembered that as much as government and researchers try, not

everything is quantifiable or measurable. There will have to be an element of faith and

understanding that while the full picture may not be ever fully understood of how or why USAID

works, it is still needed. Organizations that have the ability to deliver and implement soft

counter-terrorism strategies will be needed if the world desires to fully combat and eradicate

terrorism. For the issues of terrorism are complex and are caused by more than just a belief. In

the end Admiral Michael Mullen summed it up best as to why organizations such as USAID

must continue to exist and operate, he said, “we can’t kill our way to victory.”


Addendum A (Answer to comments & Questions)

There is more research that needs to be done on the effectiveness of USAID. I contacted and spoke to other researchers, some off the record, and they admitted that the measurements in place in order to quantify the effectiveness of USAID fall short. These discussions also noted that due to the lack of oversight of USAID it is hard to tell if the numbers being provided are the full story. However, each source noted that most of the issues facing USAID are organizational and oversight and they believe if these were to be fixed, it could reach its full potential.

In addition, there are many variables that affect a nation’s status. This includes US foreign policy, US intelligence, local governments, known state actors, and unknown state actors. In Iraq, ISIS took both Iraq and the US completely by surprise (though the rebels and Kurds in Syria did warn the US) and while USAID had been able to accomplish some of its goals, through the measurement tools provided, it would appear they failed. Yet, can they be blamed? Or was it the failure of the US by pulling out US troops ahead of schedule (even with the Iraqi government warning them that they would not be able to secure their border), or the failure of not acting in Syria that helped lead to the rise of ISIS, or Iraq’s own governmental failures?

USAID does have a questionable history and in writing this paper there were many directions that I could have taken it, but due to constraints I chose to only mention the possible military and CIA connection and not delve into it. Historically, they played a role and could still be playing a role, but finding reliable information on it is difficult. There are some who try to make the connection, but the information they have is vague and most of the time not corroborated, according to my research.

When it comes to terrorism and combating it, there is no good answer. Military leaders admit that there has to be another approach other than a military option. NGOs try to fill that role, but without oversight, they are either ineffective or cause more harm. It will be interesting to see the long term effects of USAID in these nations. In conclusion a new framework needs to be developed to see how effective USAID is.


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miage_usaid_final_paper

Documents

global terrorism

definition of terrorism

effectiveness of counter

effectiveness of usaid

soft counter

history of usaid

united states arsenal

measuring effectiveness