michale doran - the saudi paradox

8/8/2019 Michale Doran - The Saudi Paradox

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The Saudi ParadoxAuthor(s): Michael Scott DoranSource: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 1 (Jan. - Feb., 2004), pp. 35-51Published by: Council on Foreign RelationsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20033827

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The Saudi ParadoxMichael Scott Do ran

THE DUAL MONARCHYWHEN AN ATTACK on a residential compound inRiyadh killed

17 people and wounded 122 in earlyNovember 2003, U.S. officialsdownplayed the significance of the incident forSaudiArabian politics."We have the utmost faith that the direction chosen for this nationby Crown Prince Abdullah, the political and economic reforms,willnot be swayed by these horrible terrorists,"saidDeputy U.S. Secretaryof State Richard Armitage, inRiyadh for a visit.

But if any such faith existed, itwas quite misplaced. Abdullah'sreforms were already being curtailed, the retrenchment havingbegun in thewake of a similar attack sixmonths earlier.And despitewhat was reported in theAmerican press, an end to the reformswas exactly what the bombers and their ideological supportershoped to accomplish. To understand why this is the case-and whyoneofWashington's taunchestllieshasbeen incubatingmurderousanti-Americanism-one must delve into themurky depths of SaudiArabia'sdomesticpolitics.

The Saudi state is a fragmented entity,divided between the fiefdomsof the royal family.Among the four or fivemost powerful princes,two stand out: Crown Prince Abdullah and his half-brother Prince

Nayef, the interior minister. Relations between these two leadersarevisibly tense. In theUnited States, Abdullah cuts ahigher profile.But at home in Saudi Arabia, Nayef, who controls the secret police,casts a longer and darker shadow. Ever since King Fahd's stroke in

MICHAEL SCOTTDORAN isAssistant Professor ofNear Eastern Studies atPrinceton University andAdjunct Senior Fellow at the Council onForeign Relations.

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Michael ScottDoran1995, the question of succession has been hanging over the entiresystem, but neither prince has enough clout to capture the throne.

Saudi Arabia is in the throes of a crisis.The economy cannot keeppacewith population rowth,thewelfare stateis rapidly eteriorating,and regional and sectarian resentments are rising to the fore. Theseproblems have been exacerbated by an upsurge in radical Islamic activism. Many agree that the Saudi political system must somehowevolve,but aprofoundcultural chizophreniarevents he elite fromagreeing n thespecifics f reform.The Saudimonarchy functionsas the intermediaryetween twodistinctpolitical ommunities:Westernized elitethat ooks oEuropeand the United States asmodels of political development, and a

Wahhabi religious establishment that holds up its interpretation ofIslam'sgolden age as aguide. The clerics consider any plan that givesa voice to non-Wahhabis as idolatrous. Saudi Arabia's two mostpowerful princes have taken opposing sides in this debate:Abdullahtilts toward the liberal reformers and seeks a rapprochement withtheUnited States, whereas Nayef sides with the clerics and takesdirection from an anti-American religious establishment that sharesmany goals with alQaeda.

THE POWER OF TAWHIDTHE TWOCAMPS ivide over a singlequestion:whether the stateshould reduce the power of the religious establishment. On the rightside of the political spectrum, the clerics andNayef take their stand onthe principle of Tawhid, or "monotheism," as defined byMuhammadibnAbd al-Wahhab, the eponymous founder ofWahhabism. In theirview, many peoplewho claim tobemonotheists are actually polytheistsand idolaters.For themost radicalSaudi clerics, these enemies includeChristians, Jews, Shi" ites, and even insufficiently devout SunniMuslims. From the perspective of Tawhid, these groups constitute agrand conspiracy todestroy true Islam.The United States, the "Idol oftheAge," leads the cabal. It attacked Sunni Muslims inAfghanistanand Iraq,both timesmaking common causewith Shi' ites; it supportsthe Jews against the SunniMuslim Palestinians; it promotes Shi' iteinterests in Iraq;and itpresses the Saudi government tode-Wahhabize

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Tawhid ensuresaunique political statusfor theclerics andlegitimizes therepressiveSaudi state.

TheSaudi Paradoxitseducationalurriculum.able televisionndtheInternet, eanwhile,have released a torrent of idolatry.With itspermissive attitude towardsex, itspervasive hristianundertones, nd itssupport orunfetteredfemale reedom, .S. culture orrodes audisociety romwithin.Tawhid is closelyconnectedtojihad,thestruggle-sometimesbyforce of arms, sometimes by sternpersuasion-against idolatry. In the

minds of the clerics, stomping out pagan cultural and political practices at home and supporting war against Americans inAfghanistanand Iraqare two sides of the same coin. Jihad against idolatry, the clericsnever tireof repeating, s eternal,"lasting ntilJudgmentDay,"whentruemonotheism will destroy polytheism once and for all.The doctrine of Tawhid ensures a unique political status for theclerics inSaudi Arabia. After all, they alone have the necessary trainingto detect and root out idolatry so as to safeguard the purity of the realm. Tawhid isthusnot justan intolerant eligious octrinebut also apolitical principle that legitimizesthe repressiveness of the Saudi state. It is no

wonder, therefore, hatNayef, head of thesecret security apparatus, is a strong supporter of Tawhid. Not known personallyas a pious man, Nayef zealously defends

Wahhabi puritanism because he knows on which side his bread isbuttered-as do others with a stake in the repressive status quo.

In foreign policy,Nayef's support forTawhid translates into supportfor jihad, and so it is he-not Abdullah-who presides over the Saudifund for the support of the Palestinian intifada (which the clericsregard sadefensiveihadagainst heonslaughtftheZionist-Crusaderalliance).On the domestic front,Nayef indirectly ontrols thecontroversialommission for thePromotionofVirtue andPreventionof Vice (cpvpv), the religious police. The cpvpv came underwitheringattack inMarch 2002 when itsmen reportedly used batons to beatback schoolgirls as they tried to flee from aburning dormitory. Thegirls, so the story goes, failed to cover themselves in proper Islamicattire before running from the flames, and the religious police thenmindlessly enforced the laws on public decency.More than a dozengirls were trampled to death in the incident. It is impossible to say

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Michael ScottDoranwhether the story is true in all respects,but considerable videnceindicates that the cpvpv did in some manner hamper rescue efforts.

Nayef,however,latly enies hat hereligious olicedid anything rong.THE CALL OF TAQARUB

IFTAWHID s the rightpole of theSaudipoliticalspectrum, hen thedoctrineof Taqarub-rapprochement etweenMuslims and nonMuslims-marks the left.Taqarub romotes the notion of peacefulcoexistencewith nonbelievers. t also seeks to expand the politicalcommunityby legitimizing he political involvement f groups thattheWahhabis consider on-Muslim-Shi ites, secularists,eminists,and so on. In foreign policy, Taqarub downplays the importance ofjihad, allowing Saudis to live in peace with Christian Americans,Jewish Israelis, and even Shi' ite Iranians. In short, Taqarub stands inopposition to the siegementality fostered by Tawhid.

Abdullah clearly associateshimselfwith Taqarub.He has advocatedrelaxingestrictionsnpublicdebate,promoted emocraticeform, ndsupported a reduction in the power of the clerics. Between JanuaryandMay 2003, he presided over anunusually open "nationaldialogue"

with prominent Saudi liberals.Two separate petitions established theessential characterof the discussion: theNational Reform Document,

which offered a roadmap for Saudi democracy, and Partners in theHomeland, a call by the oppressed Shi' ite community for greaterfreedoms. he first ndorseddirectelections,theestablishmentf anindependent judiciary, and an increased public role for women. Itsdrafters also took pains to express respect for Islamic law.The clericswere not mollified, but this affront to their sensibilitieswas asnothingcompared to the Shi' itepetition, which, in their eyes, issued straightfrom the bowels of hell.

The Saudi religious establishment isviscerally and vocally hostile toShi' ism.Although Shi' ites constitute between io and '5percent ofthe population, theydo not enjoy even themost basic rightsof religiousfreedom.Nevertheless, in an unprecedented move, the crown prince

met with their leaders and accepted theirpetition. The controlled Saudipress did not publish the petition or even report on it,but Abdullah'smove sent ripplesof discontent through the Saudi religious classes.



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TheSaudi ParadoxBy floating the "Saudi Plan" forArab-Israeli peace-traveling to

Crawford, Texas, to debate themeasure with President George W.Bush inApril 2003-and accepting the notorious Shi' ite petition,the crown prince has sided resolutelywith the backers of Taqarubagainst the hard-line clerics. To aWestern eye there is no inherentconnection between Abdullah's domestic political reform agenda andhis rapprochement policies toward non-Muslim states and Shi' ite"heretics."n apoliticalculturepolicedbyWahhabis, however,theyare seen to be cut from the same cloth.

THE THREAT OF TAKFIRWHILEABDULLAHassignaledriendshipith theWest, Nayefhasencouraged jihad-to thepoint of offering tacit support for alQaeda.InNovember 2002, for example, he absolved the Saudi hijackers ofresponsibilityor theSeptember ll,2001,terroristttacks. nan interview published openly inSaudiArabia, he stated that alQaeda couldnot possibly have planned an operation of such magnitude. Nayefperceived an Israeli plot instead, arguing that the attacks arousedsomuch hostility toMuslims theymust have been planned by theenemies of Islam. This statement not only endorsed the clerics' paranoid conspiracy theory, but, more important, sent amessage that thesecret police saw no justification for tracking down alQaeda.

The case of the Saudi cleric Ali bin al-Khudayr helps explainNayef's stance.A close associate of alQaeda, al-Khudayr is knownas a leader of the takfiri-jihadi stream of Islamic radicalism-thatis, as someone quick to engage in takfir, the practice of proclaimingfellow Sunnis guilty of apostasy (a crime punishable by death).1AfterSeptember 1i,he issued afatwa advising his followers to rejoice at theattacks.Depicting theUnited States as one of the greatest enemiesthat Islam has ever faced, he chided thosewho hadmisgivings about

'Al-Khudayr's sympathies with alQaeda are apparently reciprocated. Following thecleric's arrest inMay 2003, theLondon-based Saudi dissident Saad al-Faqih reported that

Osama bin Laden had warned the Saudi authorities not to hurt him. Bin Laden, thereport claimed, labeled al-Khudayr "ourmost prominent supporter."Should any harm cometo him, alQaeda's response would be "commensurate with the sheikh's high standing withus ...We will not issue a statement on thematter other than one dripping with blood."

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CORBIS

Twofaces ftheSaudistate: rownPrinceAbdullah...thedeathsof somany innocent ivilians,istinga number fAmerican"crimes"hatjustified he attacks:"killinganddisplacingMuslims,aiding theMuslims' enemies against them, spreadingsecularism,forcefullymposing lasphemy npeoplesandstates,andpersecutingthemujahideen."Al-Khudayrwas eventually rrested yNayef's securityservices,but only after theMay 2003 suicide bombings inRiyadh that killed34 people-when the cleric'sbrand of extremism began to threaten thepolitical statusquo.Until then,he had been allowed to operate freelyandspread isviolentanti-Americanismithout constraint.hy? Becausealongtheway hehelpedterrorizeritics f thereligiousstablishment.ForNayef,Wahhabivigilantismsuseftil nkeepingreformersncheck

Saudi journalistMansur al-Nuqaydan, for example, is an opencriticof the hard-lineclerics.An ex-Islamic extremisthimself,hewent to jail in his youth for rooting out idolatry by firebombing avideo store.The combination f hispersonal ackground,ismasteryofthe clerics'diom,andhis clearandunffinchingupportorTaqarub

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AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS

... andInteriorMinisterPrinceNayefmakeshimparticularlyhreateningothereligiousstablishment.onsequently,heextremists avesingled im out forspecial reatment.Along with some associates, l-Khudayr ccusedal-Nuqaydan fapostasy, ointing to the textof an interviewnwhich the journalistcommittedthe crimesof "secularumanism" nd "scorn orreligion,its rites,and devoutpeople."Particularlyncriminating,laimed theclerics, as al-Nuqaydan'sonvictionhat"weneed an Islamreconciledwith the other, an Islam that does not know hatred for others becauseof their beliefs or their inclinations.We need a new Reformation, abold reinterpretationf the religioustext so thatwe can reconcileourselves with theworld." On the basis of this expression of Taqarubhewas sentencedodeath,with theedictpostedpubliclynal-Khudayr's

Web site. For fivemonths, the authorities did nothing. In a regimewhere openly practicing Shi' ism can land you in jail for years, alKhudayr's eriodof freedomspeaksvolumes. So longas the clericwas limitinghis activities o inciting iolenceagainstAmericansandintimidating eformers, ayef hadno argument ith him.

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Michael ScottDoranAround the same time that al-Khudayr was arrested, on the other

hand, al-Nuqaydan lost his job and soon afterwas barred fromwritingor traveling abroad-a casualty of a parallel crackdown on the reformmovement. ForNayef, whose chief concern is to protect the status quo,thereisnothing puzzling about this juxtaposition.l-Khudayrranafoul of him when bombs targeting the regime started going off, butal-Nuqaydan also represented something of a threat to the Saudi elite.Nayefhimselfdoesnot take vertresponsibilityorthepersecutionf thereformers,but the hand of the secret police is barely hidden from view.

The sequence of events is now familiar. Either without warning orin response to a complaint by a prominent cleric, a critic of the religiousestablishment oses his job.His employerssubsequently efuse tocomment. Islamic extremists then issue a death threat to the unemployed man over the phone or on the Internet. In 1999, for example,an associate of al-Khudayr's issued afatwa against the Saudi novelistTurki al-Hamad, who later signed theNational Reform Document.Partly as a result, al-Hamad received a slew of death threats.He andhis family were also harassed by the cpvpv. The novelist turned to

Abdullah for help, receiving a sympathetic hearing and an offer ofphysicalprotection.By offeringonlybodyguards, owever, bdullahtacitly admitted that he could not control the shadowy parts of thegovernment that belong to his half-brother.

UNCLE TOM FRIEDMANIN THE AFTERMATHof September 1i, informed American opinionconcluded thatOsama bin Laden had attacked "the farenemy"-the

United States-in order to foment revolution against "the nearenemy"-the Saudi regime. Subsequent events have confirmed thatalQaeda does indeeduse thewar with theUnited States as an instrumentagainst itsdomestic enemies. Yet the tacit cooperation between Nayefand al-Khudayr shows that the relationship between alQaeda and theSaudi royal family ismore complex thanmost people seem to think.

To better understand how alQaeda reads Saudi Arabia's politicalmap, one can turn to thework of Yusuf al-Ayyiri, a prolific alQaedapropagandist who died lastJune in a skirmishwith the Saudi securityservices. Just before his death he wrote a revealing book, The Future

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Nayef has encouragedjihad -to the point ofofferingtacitsupportfor alQaeda.

TheSaudi Paradoxoflraq and theArabianPeninsulaAfter theFall ofBaghdad,which gives agood picture of how alQaeda activists perceive theworld around them.

According to al-Ayyiri, theUnited States and Israel are the leadersof aglobalanti-Islamicmovement-"Zio-Crusaderism"-thatseeksthe destruction of true Islam and dominion over theMiddle East.Zio-Crusaderism'smost effectiveweapon is democracy,becausepopular sovereignty separates religion from the state and thereby disembowels Islam, aholistic religion thathas a strong political dimension.In its plot to denatureIslam, al-Ayyiriclaims,Zio-Crusaderismembraces three local allies: secularists, Shi' ites, and laxSunnis (thatis, those who sympathize with the idea ofseparating eligionfromstate).Al Qaeda's"near nemy," n otherwords, is the clusterof forcessupportingTaqarub.The chief difference etweentheways alQaedaand theSaudireligious stablishmentdefine their primary foes is that the formerincludes the Saudi royal family as part ofthe problem whereas the latter does not. This divergence is notinsignificant, but it does not preclude limited or tacit cooperation onsome issues.Although some in theSaudi regime are indeedbin Laden'senemies, others are his de facto allies.Al Qaeda activists sense,moreover, that U.S. plans to separate mosque and state constitute thegreatest immediate threat to their designs and know that the time isnot yet ripe for a broad revolution. So alQaeda's short-term goalis not to topple the regime but to shift Saudi Arabia's domestic balanceof power to the right and punish supporters of Taqarub.The politics surrounding the suicide bombings inRiyadh lastMayshow how the interestsof alQaeda and the Saudi religious establish

ment overlap.Working together, theymanaged to turn a terrorist attackon Americans into a political coup againstAmericanizers. Rightafter the attack, the Saudi authorities called for public assistance incapturing19 suspects,whose names and pictureswere publishedinthepress. In response, al-Khudayr and two like-minded clerics issued astatement claiming that the accusedwere not terroristsbut "pious anddevout" men and "the flower of the mujahideen." The statementclaimed that theSaudi authorities, acting onU.S. orders, were using

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The interestsof alQaeda and the religiousestablishment overlap.

Michael ScottDoranthe suicidebombings as apretext forpersecuting fighterswho had "participated in the jihad against themalevolent Crusaders inAfghanistan"and "distinguished themselveswith courage and heroism in the battlesin the Tora Bora mountains." The clerics called on the population todisobey the regime's request for help and pronounced that any assistance to the police would constitute aid to theUnited States in itswaragainst Islam.The statement urged other Saudi clerics to step forwardandsupport hebeleaguered ujahideen.

Responding to this call, 33 activist clericswho had already formedagroup called the Internal Front Facing the Current Challenges lobbied the government on the basis of a statement that reads like acontract for a new alliance between the

Saudi dynasty and theWahhabi religiousestablishment.he statementorkedwith alKhudayr's basic premise-that the Saudis, indeference to their foreignmasters, had grownhostile to jihad.But itchanged the toneof thediscussion.Whereas al-Khudavr had focused

on the need towage jihad against the Americans, the clerics emphasized the need towage jihad against theAmericanizers-a reference tothe enemy at home.

The statement drew a causal link between themovement for liberalreform and religious extremism. On the one hand, it admitted thatreligious extremism exists in Saudi Arabia and called for it to berestrained.et it alsoblamedextremism n the creepof "reprehensiblepractices"-a euphemism for the growing public legitimacyof theTaqarubeform genda. he Internal rontessentiallyffered bdullaha tradeoff: ifhewould curtail the reformers' activities, then the clerics

would provide Islamic legitimacy for a government crackdown onthe takfiri-jihadis, alQaeda and its fellow travelers.To make these demands more explicit, the Internal Front's leader,Salman al-Awda, posted an additional statement on hisWeb site attacking the aggressively reformist newspaper al-Watan. (The newspaper's name means "thehomeland," but religious conservatives refer toit as "al-Wathan,"meaning "the idol.")According to the statement,the publication's staffwas little better than agents of theAmericans

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REPRINTED BYPERMISSION OFAL-WATAN

"Thoseho issue atwas ndmanfestos ncitingerrorre themselveserrorists."The reformers t al-Watanhad concluded hat the terroristttacksvindicatedthe principleof Taqarub ndmistakenly assumed-like

many in theWest-that the Saudi authorities had no choice but todismantlethose institutions hatpromoteTawbid.Emboldenedbya generalmood of publicoutrage, theybegan to publish articlescriticizing the entireWahhabi edifice.One cartoon in particularenragedthe religiousestablishment.It depicted a suicidebomberwearing a belt of dynamite next to a cleric wearing a belt offatwas.The captionread,"Thosewho issue atwasandmanifestos incitingterrorare themselvesterrorists."

But al-Watan failed to take the frillmeasure of its enemy.Havingagood argumentsone thing; ontrolling he secretpolice is another.One week after thebombing, ajournalist had the temerity to askPrinceNayef if the bombing meant that the cpvpv would be restructured:"Asa Saudi,"Nayef snarled, "youshould be ashamed tobe asking thisquestion."One week later,al-Watan's ditor,JamalKhashoggi,wasfired.He now resides nLondon.

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Michael ScottDoranTHE U.S.-SHI ITE CONSPIRACY

IT ISOFTENCLAIMEDhat the recent rowthof anti-Americanismin theMiddle East has been due toU.S. policies themselves. The factthat the suicide bombing of an American compound in Riyadhturned into a crackdown on Saudi reformers and that the bombingscontinued(evenaftertheannouncement f aU.S. troopwithdrawal),however, houldgive us pause.These eventsstrongly uggest hat thejihad against theUnited States is actually a continuation of domesticpolitics by other means. The Saudi religious classes and al-Qaeda useit to discredit their indigenous enemies, who, given half a chance,

would topple the clerics from power.If Saudi clerics do indeed preach amurderous anti-Americanismbecause they fear their domestic rivals,then certain implications

follow for U.S. foreign policy.Washington cannot afford to ignorewhat Saudis say about each other, because sooner or later the hatredsgenerated at home will be directed toward theUnited States.

This isparticularly true of the Shi"ite question in Saudi politics.Radical Sunni Islamists hate Shi' itesmore than any other group,including Jews and Christians. Al-Qaeda's basic credo minces no

words on the subject: "We believe that the Shi' ite heretics are a sectof idolatry and apostasy, and that they are the most evil creaturesunder the heavens." For its part, the SaudiWahhabi religious establishment expresses similarviews. Thefatwas, sermons, and statementsof established Saudi clerics uniformly denounce Shi' ite belief andpractice. A recentfatwa by Abd al-Rahman al-Barrak, a respectedprofessor at the Imam Muhammad bin Saud Islamic University(which trainsofficial clerics), is a case inpoint. Asked whether itwaspermissible for Sunnis to launch a jihad against Shi' ites, al-Barrakanswered that if the Shi' ites in a Sunni-dominated country insistedon practicing their religion openly, then yes, the Sunni state had nochoice but towage war on them.Al-Barrak's answer, it isworth noting,assumes that the Shi' ites are notMuslims at all.

This sectarian hatred that the clerics preach bears directly on theUnited States. Projecting their domestic struggle onto the externalworld, Saudi hard-liners are now arguing that the Shi' iteminority inSaudiArabia isconspiringwith theUnited States in itswar to destroy



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Recent events stronglysuggest thatjihadagainst theUnitedStates is a continuationof domesticpolitics.

The Saudi ParadoxIslam. Thus al-Ayyiri, the al-Qaeda propagandist, argued that theShi' ites have hatched a long-term plot to-control the countries ofthe Persian Gulf. As part of this conspiracy, the Shi' iteminorities inSunni countriesareinsinuatinghemselvesntopositionsof responsibility so as to function as a fifth column for the enemies of trueIslam. "The danger of the Shi' iteheretics to the region," he states, "isnot less than the danger of the Jews and the Christians."

Many other clericswarn of a Shi" te-U. S. conspiracy.Safar al-Hawali,for example, a prominent clericandmember of the InternalFront, wrotea long and vituperative response to the Shi' ite petition Abdullahaccepted.Al-Hawali characterized the petition as an attempt by theShi'ite minority to tyrannize the Sunni majority. Throughout history,al-Hawali wrote, the Shi"ites have conspired with the foreign enemiesof- the Sunnis: in the thirteenth centurythey alignedwith theMongol invaders;today they conspirewith the Americans. Ifthe Saudi authorities meet the demandsof the Shi itepetitioners, l-Hawali ontinued, one oftwo outcomeswould result:Shi' itegovernment or a secular state.

All thismight sound like the product ofan addled brain, but it is not as detachedfrom political reality as it seems. The Saudi clerics and alQaedabase their political analysis of the Shi'ites on two assumptions:thatWahhabism is true Islam and that itmust have a monopolyover state policy. From this perspective, the various forces promotingTaqarub, both domestic and foreign, are indeed in cahoots to upendthe status quo. The Shi ites offer an alternative notion of Islamiccommunity and history, they tend to cluster in strategically keyregions, they sharebondswith co-religionistsbeyond thebordersof their country, and they have political interests that coincide withthose of Sunni reformers. These attributes would allow the Shi itesto form apowerful political bloc should aparticipatory political systemeveremerge.And offering themevenminor political concessionsnow would be dangerous, the clerics say, since other sects and otherregionalidentitieswould clamor for political representation ndsoon overwhelmthe system.

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Beneath theconspiracy theorylurksa sober struggle overrealpoliticalandeconomic interests.

Michael ScottDoranBeneaththeconspiracyheory,herefore,urks very sober truggleover real political and economic interests.The clerics hope to place

the Shi" ites in a kind of political quarantine, making it all but unthinkable for Sunni reformers inSaudi Arabia to form alliances withthem. The reamsof anti-Shi itematerial on Saudi religiousWeb sitesaremarked by three persistent charges: that the Shi' ites are agents ofIran, allies of theUnited States, and close associates of the Jews.Thelast accusation merits particular attention.

IsaacHasson, aprofessor at theHebrew University inJerusalem,hasidentifiedwhat he calls a "neo-Wahhabi campaign against the Shi' ites,

which aims to demonize them by comparing them to the Jews."TraditionalWahhabi teachings, orexample,include themedieval Sunni myth that itwasactually a Jewish convert to Islam, Abdullahbin Saba,who invented Shi' ism.This meansShi' ism has a kind of Jewish DNA flowingthroughit. New attributesborrowedfrom

modern antisemitism, such as the notion of aJewish plot forworld domination, have beengrafted onto this charge. In theneo-Wahhabicampaign hatHasson has identified, herefore,hi' ism is simultane

ously an offshoot ofJudaism, the natural allyof Zio-Crusaderism, andan inveterate generator of grand plots to destroy Sunni Islam.

The clerics' anti-Shi ite campaign traces, on a communal scale,the same pattern as the threats that al-Khudayr directed against al

Nuqaydan. Just as the radicalclerics pass death sentences on individualreformers, o theSaudi religious stablishment eriodically hreatensthe Shi iteswith genocide.In his refutation f the Shi' ite petition,for example, the cleric Safar al-Hawali warned the Shi"ites about thedangers of overreaching. If theywere actually to succeed in establishing a secular state, he argued, the resultwould be a civil war, and "ifthe [Sunni] majority gets riled, itwill act-a matter that could leadto the complete annihilation of the [Shi' ite]minority." This thinlyveiled threat carriedeven greater significance forhaving been publishedon theWeb site of another cleric and anti-Shi' ite firebrand,Nasiral-Umar, who has urged the government to fire Shi' ites from allpositionsof responsibilityn thecountry. l-Umar has also insisted

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The Saudi Paradoxthat thegovernmentmust find "aquick solution" to the Shi' ites'demographic domination of the eastern province, a proposal that can onlybe described as an incitement to ethnic cleansing.

Rather than shutting such inflammatoryvoices down, PrinceNayeffinds itconvenient tokeep them on the streets:al-Umar runs amosqueas a government employee and operates an attractiveWeb site. Bygiving clerics such as al-Umar privileged platforms from which tospread their doctrines, Nayef gets the best of both worlds. To foreigncritics, he can distance himself from al-Umar'sextremism, claiming thatthe cleric speaks only forhimself; at home, meanwhile, he can reap thebenefit of al-Umar's threats,which strike terrorinto Shi' itehearts.Al-Umar'sbookletpromotingethniccleansing aswritten almosta decade ago, before the notion of aU.S.-Shi'ite conspiracy gainedtraction. The fall of Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq, however,has made him pay closer attention to thisputative relationship.He hasthus returned tohis pet theme of agrand Shi' iteplot but reshaped thestory in light of the new political reality to include a prominent U.S.role. In a lecture he gave lastApril, he depicted theUnited States asthe "nursemaid"of global terrorism. For 30 years, he stated,Washington has been supporting terroraround theworld, something thatwentlargelyunrecognized until thewar in Iraq.The war also demonstratedclearly "the strength of the bond between America and the Shi' iteheretics,"who alliedwith each other in order to destroy the Sunnis.

Any analysis of the causes of anti-Americanism in Saudi Arabiahas to account for people such as al-Umar.Many factors lead him topreach adeep hatred ofAmerica, but three aremost significant: adeeploathing of Shi' ites, an ingrained habit of associating themwith hostileexternalpowers, and fears about the futureposition ofWahhabi clericsin the Saudi political system.No conceivable shift inU.S. policywouldaffect any of the three.

THE IRAQ CONNECTIONLAST YEAR'S suicide bombings inRiyadh forced Prince Nayef tocrack down on extremists inside Saudi Arabia. As a consequence, theSaudi security forces have clashed repeatedlywith militants, arrestinghundreds of activists and confiscating large caches of weapons. In

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Michael ScottDoranWashington, theseoperationshave helped to support he view that

the Saudis have, once again, become our close allies.After receivingawake-up call inMay and a reminder inNovember, so the story goes,the Saudis have come back around to play their role as the strategicpartner of theUnited States.

In lateNovember, this optimistic view was reinforcedwhen Ali alKhudayr recanted n prime-time television.Speaking fromjail, herenounced entirely his radical stance on takfirand jihad. It is impossible to saywhether this about-face was sincere, coerced, or part of apolitical bargain, but the Saudis are treating it as a great victoryagainst extremism. To emphasize the point, they even allowed

Mansur al-Nuqaydan to publish his columns again.Although this iscertainlya positivedevelopment,the rootsof Saudiunrest extendbeyond the contest between these two figures.The thousands of disgruntled young men who looked to al-Khudayr for guidance are stillangry, and the central question ofwhether to reduce the power of theclericsremains ocked ncontroversy.

As the case of Nasir al-Umar demonstrates, the domestic Saudiconffictsthatoriginallygeneratedanti-American eelingarestill inoperation.Moreover, indicationssuggest that, despite the recentcrackdown, alQaeda and the establishment Saudi clerics still share astrong sense of the common enemy.

Consider, for example, a statement thatAbu Abd al-Rahman alNajdi, an alQaeda spokesman, issued in earlyOctober 2003.Whatpreoccupied him was not the Saudi security services' crackdown on alQaeda but the riseof the Shi' ites in Iraq:

We callopenly on our brothers,all themujahideen in Iraq, to kill theSunni clericswho befriend theAmericans, because those clerics areinfidelapostates; nd tokilleverysatanicShi' iteAyatollahwho befriendstheAmericans-first among them the satanicAyatollahMuhammadBahr al-Ulum and those likehim.Likewisewe demand fromtheShi iteyouth thattheyreturn o thebookofGod and theSunnaofMuhammad.Al Qaeda's nightmare scenario is that the Americans and the

Iraqi Shi' iteswill force Riyadh to enact broad reforms and bringthe Saudi Shi' ites into the political community. There is no questionthatmany hard-line Saudi clerics shareprecisely the same fears.Even



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TheSaudi Paradoxbefore theUnited States attackedAfghanistan, Saudi clerics preachedthedoctrine of ajewish-American conspiracy todestroy Islam.Now thatAmerican forces have unshackled the IraqiShi"ites, itwould be naiveto expect those clerics to take amore benign view ofU.S. intentions.

The Saudi religious establishment's views regarding theAmericanShilite conspiracy are not simply an internal Saudi matter. Theylegitimize the daily attacks on American soldiers in Iraq's "Sunni

Triangle," aswell attacks such as the anti-Shi' ite suicide bombing inNajaf lastAugust. The dazed onlookers who crowded around therubblenNajafimmediatelysked hemselvesnequestion:ho did it?"Wahhabis,"criedone group. "Baathists,"cried another. IfWashington

maintains business asusualwith Riyadh, itwill not be long before theIraqiShi' iteswill conclude thattheUnited Statescovertly upportstheWahhabi bombers who blow up their mosques just as theyconcluded, after the events of 1991, that theUnited States supportedSaddam Hussein against them.Nonetheless, changing the situationwill be difficult, becausetheUnited States has limitedmeans ofmuting the anti-Shi' ism andanti-Americanismhat theclerics spouse.GettingRiyadh todivorceitself from radicalWahhabism will be as great a task as getting theSoviet Union to renounce communism. Clearly, there are forces inthe kingdom who would bewilling to support the efforts of a Saudi

Gorbachev, but it is not clearwhen orwhether one will appear.Wahhabism is the foundation of an entire political system, and

everyone with a stake in the status quo can be expected to rally arounditwhen push comes to shove. In Iraq, as odious as the regime ofSaddam Hussein was, it still enjoyed a social base of support in thecenter of the country, and the opponents of the old systemwere-andremain-fragmented and leaderless. n SaudiArabia,Washingtonfaces a similar problem. The United States has no choice but to presshard for democratic reforms. But the very attempt to create amoreliberalpolitical orderwill set off new disputes, which will inevitablygenerate anti-American feelings. Saudi Arabia is in turmoil, andlike it or not-the United States is deeply involved. As Washingtonstruggles to rebuild Iraq itwill thus find, once again, that its closestArab ally is also one of itsmost bitter enemies.@

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michale doran - the saudi paradox

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