The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 5 | Issue 8 | Article ID 2493 | Aug 01, 2007

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Micronesia and the Postwar Remaking of the Asia Pacific: "AnAmerican Lake"

Kimie Hara

Micronesia and the Postwar Remaking ofthe Asia Pacific: “An American Lake”

Kimie HARA

The post-war Asia-Pacific witnessed manyconflicts involving major regional players.These include the divided Korean Peninsula,the Cross-Taiwan Strait problem, and thesovereignty disputes over the SouthernKuriles/“Northern Territories”, and theTokdo/Takeshima, Diaoyu/Senkaku, andSpratly/Nansha islands. These and others, suchas the ongoing Okinawa problem, emblematicof the large US military presence in the region,and the US-imposed outcomes in Micronesia,all share an important common foundation inthe post-war disposition of Japan, notably the1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty. Preparedand signed by multiple countries under USinitiative, this treaty largely framed the post-war political and security order in the region,and with its associated security arrangements,laid the foundation for the regional Cold Warstructure, namely the “San Francisco System”.

My recent book, Cold War Frontiers in the Asia-Pacific, from which the present article draws,examines the history and contemporaryimplications of the “San Francisco System”with particular attention to frontier andunresolved territorial problems that are amongits important legacies. Drawing on extensivearchival research as well as contemporarydocumentary analysis, it uncovers key linksbetween regional problems in the Asia-Pacificand their underlying association with Japan,and explores clues for their resolution within

the multilateral context in which theyoriginated. The work’s contents illustrate itsrange and scope.

Introduction: Rethinking the "Cold War" in theAsia-Pacific. (1) Korea: The Divided Peninsulaand the Tokdo/Takeshima Dispute. (2)Formosa: The Cross-Taiwan Strait Problem. (3)The Kurile Islands: The "Northern Territories"Dispute. (4) Micronesia: "An American Lake".(5) Antarctica. (6) The Spratlys and theParacels: The South China Sea Dispute. (7) TheRyukyus: Okinawa and the Senkaku/DiaoyuDispute. Conclusion

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Cold War Frontiers in the Asia-Pacific: DividedTerritories in the San Francisco System

Micronesia: “An American Lake”

(d) Japan renounces all right, title and claim inconnection with the League of NationsMandate System, and accepts the action of theUnited Nations Security Council of April 2,1947, extending the trusteeship system to thePacific Islands formerly under mandate toJapan.[1]

The territories disposed in Article 2 (d) of theSan Francisco Peace Treaty were the PacificIslands formerly under League of Nationsmandate to Japan, commonly known asMicronesia. On April 12, 1947, the UnitedNations Security Council decided to create theTrust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI) by

placing them under its strategic trust, with theUSA as the administrative authority. The TTPIwas one of eleven trusteeships established bythe UN after the Second World War, but theonly one designated a “strategic area”. Japan,not a member of the UN at that time, acceptedthe decision in the Treaty.

Trusteeship is a transitional arrangementpreceding self-government, not a finaldisposition of territorial sovereignty. In thissense, the Peace Treaty left an “unsolvedproblem” with Micronesia, as with the otherterritories disposed of in it. However, the“problem” of sovereignty was settled in the1990s. In 1994, with the independence of Palauthe last, all UN trust territories disappearedfrom the globe. These islands are currentlythree sovereign states --- the Federated Statesof Micronesia (FSM), the Republic of MarshallIslands (RMI) and Republic of Palau (ROP) ---and a US territory, the Commonwealth of theNorthern Mariana Islands (CNMI).

However, some problems remain over thestatus of these islands. The FSM, RMI and ROPjoined the UN, thus becoming members of theinternational community. However, they arealso in a status of “Free Association” with theUSA, their former administrative authority.Under Free Association they are deemedsovereign, but the USA is granted particularpowers in defense and security in return foreconomic assistance. Thus, according to GarySmith, “while ‘sovereign’, they are less thanindependent.”[2] In addition, the CNMI, a USterritory, has neither control over its 200nautical-mile Exclusive Economic Zone, norrepresentation in Congress.

Micronesia encompasses over 2,000 islands,fewer than 100 of which are inhabited, spreadacross an ocean area from 1º to 20º N. latitudeand from 130º to 170º E. longitude coveringsome 3,000,000 sq. miles (7.7 million sq.km).,larger than the US mainland. The land area,however, totals only 687 square miles (1760 sq.

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km), less than half the area of Rhode Island,the smallest state in the USA.[3] Since theSpanish proclaimed sovereignty over theMarianas in 1564, they have known fourforeign rulers, Spain, Germany, Japan and theUSA, the last two under the generalsupervision of the League of Nations andUnited Nations respectively.

Treatment of Micronesia in the Peace Treaty isbased on “the action of the United NationsSecurity Council of April 2, 1947”. Therefore,this article focuses on the events leading up tothe 1947 UN action. [Unless specified, e.g., as“Federated States of Micronesia (FSM)”, theterms “Micronesia”, “Japanese MandatedIslands” and “Trust Territories of the PacificIslands (TPPI)” here indicate the samegeographical area.]

FROM YALTA BLUEPRINT TO SANFRANCISCO SYSTEM: THE COLD WARAND MICRONESIA

Micronesia in the Yalta Blueprint - UNTrusteeship

Micronesia’s sovereignty did not belong toJapan, which received a League of Nationsmandate over these former Germanpossessions under the 1919 Treaty of

Versail les. The December 1943 CairoDeclaration implicitly referred to Micronesia instipulating that “Japan shall be stripped of allthe islands in the Pacific which she has seizedor occupied since the beginning of the FirstWorld War in 1914.”

American occupation of the islands wascomplete before the Yalta Conference ofFebruary 1945. Beginning with invasion of theMarshalls, it was completed by a sweepthrough the northern Marianas by mid-1944.[4]Among agreements made at Yalta, relevant tothe post-war disposition of these islands, werethose on the UN and post-war trusteeship.

The UN was established in 1945 as successorto the League of Nations, with the objective ofrestoring international order after the SecondWorld War. The name “United Nations” wascoined by President Roosevelt in 1941 todescribe the countries fighting against the Axis,and was first used officially in January 1942,when 26 states joined in a Declaration,pledging to continue their joint war effort, andnot make peace separately. The need for aninternational organization to replace theLeague of Nations was first stated officially bythe USA, UK, USSR, and China in their Moscow

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Declaration of October 1943. At the DumbartonOaks Conference of August-October 1944,those four drafted proposals for a charter forthe new organization, and at the YaltaConference in February 1945, substantialagreements were made to estab l i shinternational trusteeship under the UN.

At Yalta, the three leaders agreed on a draftUN Charter, which included the basicprovisions of the trusteeship system.[5] Theyagreed that territorial trusteeship would applyonly to: (1) existing League of Nationsmandates, (2) territory to be detached from theenemy as a result of war, (3) any other territorythat might voluntarily be placed undertrusteeship.[6] They also agreed that unlike themandate system, all trust territories wouldhave a clearly recognized right to eventual self-determination, but that in some cases theadministering authority would have the right tofortify its territory, a power denied under theLeague, for international peace and security.[7]

It should be noted that the UN is theorganization created by the Allied Powers intheir post-war planning. It was the “UnitedNations” of the victorious Allies, and itsmechanism was tinged in various ways with astrong power principle. For example, theoriginal membership was limited to the Alliedcountries, five of them were given veto powerin the Security Council, and former enemies,members of the Axis powers, receiveddiscriminatory status. The trusteeship systemwas created in this context.[8] Various wartimeprinciples were unconditionally applied to theenemies, but applied very flexibly, or not at all,to the Allied Powers. For example the principleo f s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f p e o p l e s ,enthusiastically promoted by the USA, was notapplied to all colonies. Category (3), asmentioned above, implicitly acknowledged theEuropean all ies’ interests, i .e. , theircolonialisms’ continuation.

Micronesia in the San Francisco System:

Strategic Trust

In August 1945, nuclear weapons ended thewar with Japan unexpectedly early, and theirdevelopment dramatically changed the natureof post-war international relations, i.e., theybecame a major factor defining the Cold War.On August 17,1945, by General Order No. 1,the Japanese-Mandated islands along withBonin and other Pacific Islands were placedunder the Commander-in-Chief, US PacificFleet. In 1946 the USA began to use Bikini andEniwetok atolls in the Marshall Islands fornuclear tests.[9]

Prior to the Japanese surrender, the UNfounding conference was held in San Franciscoin April 1945. As agreed at Yalta, all the statesthat had adhered to the 1942 declaration andhad declared war on Germany or Japan byMarch 1, 1945, were invited to the conference,which was co-hosted by the US, UK, Russia andChina.[10] The USA submitted a draft of thetrusteeship system in the UN Charter thatincluded a definition of “strategic trust”.[11]The Charter was signed on June 26, and cameinto effect on October 24.

On February 26, 1947, the USA submitted tothe UN Security Council a trusteeship proposal,which designated the Japanese MandatedIslands an area of strategic trust, with the USAas administering authority. On April 2, theSecurity Council unanimously adopted theproposal, with a few modifications.[12] Japan,not then a UN member, renounced its right tothese islands and accepted the trusteeshipagreement in the Peace Treaty in 1951.

“Strategic trust” differed from othertrusteesh ips , in that i t a l lowed theadministering authority to fortify and close anyparts of the strategic area for “securityreasons.” The trusteeship agreement could notbe altered or terminated without theadminis ter ing author i ty ’s consent .Furthermore, the strategic area was the

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responsibility of the Security Council, wherethe USA had the power of veto.[13] The USAtherefore gained exclusive control of theseislands for as long as it wanted. Together withits bases in Okinawa, also placed under UScontrol in the 1951 Peace Treaty, the USAobtained formal acquiescence to its controlover the Pacific north of the Equator fromHawaii to Asia. In other words, the PeaceTreaty laid the foundation for designating theNorth Pacific “an American Lake”.

When and how did the idea of strategic trustcome about? Why was only the TTPI designateda strategic area? Why was only the dispositionof Micronesia decided without waiting for theJapanese Peace Treaty? Why did the otherpowers, especially the USSR, accede to thearrangement? This examines the post-wardisposition of Micronesia with the territorialarrangements of the San Francisco PeaceTreaty at the center of analysis.

THE “UNRESOLVED PROBLEM”:DISPOSITION OF MICRONESIA IN THEPEACE TREATY

Early US Studies– behind the YaltaBlueprint

In the series of US studies on the post-warJapanese territorial dispositions dating from1942, all State Department Far East specialistswere guided by the Atlantic Charter principleof “no territorial aggrandizement” – territoriesshould not be acquired by force, and those soacquired should be taken away. While theislands of Micronesia were under Japaneseadministration, they were not under Japanesesovereignty, and unlike the far-flung empirespanning East and Southeast Asia, they werenot directly acquired by Japanese force of arms.

T-Documents:

Among the wartime State Department studies

was a series of T-documents on the post-wardisposition of Micronesia, prepared by theDivision of Special Research and discussed inthe Territorial Subcommittee in 1943. They areT-328 “Japan’s Mandated Islands: Descriptionand History” dated May 27,[14] T-345 “Japan’sMandated Islands: Legal Problems” dated July8,[15] T-365 “Japan’s Mandated Islands: TheMandate Under Japanese Administration”dated August 9,[16] T-367 “Japan’s MandatedIslands: Has Japan Violated Mandated Charterand the Convention of 1922?”[17], and T-370“Japan’s Mandated Islands: The Maintenanceand Use of Commercial Aircraft” both datedSeptember 1.[18]

As the numbers and titles of these recordssuggest, Japanese administration of Micronesiawas examined in detail from various angles inState Department. It was consideredappropriate to deprive Japan of control of itsmandated islands after the war. As the title ofT-367 suggests, it was strongly based on thepoint “Has Japan Violated Mandated Charterand the Convention of 1922?”[19] The reportconcluded:

In summary, Japan violated the MandateCharter and the United States Convention of1922 by erecting fortifications and buildingnaval bases on the islands; the United StatesConvention, by infringing the rights of theAmerican missionaries, and by refusing topermit certain American citizens to visit theislands and United States naval vessels to enterthe open ports of the mandate; and apparentlythe Mandate Charter by failure to meet itsobligations to the natives.[20]

For the disposition of these islands, T-345suggested:

For every reason, practical, ethicaland possibly even legal, it mayseem advisable to the UnitedStates and others of the United

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Nations to deal with Japan’smandated islands by means of anew multilateral treaty or treaties,which while respecting theprinciple of trusteeship embodiedin the Treaty of Versailles woulddispose of these is lands inaccordance with their own bestjudgment. These treaties maycreate a new system of trusteeshipfor various dependent areasincluding these islands. Suchtreaties will doubtless be signed atleast by the principal UnitedNations and possibly at thedemand of the victorious powersby the defeated states as well. Thecoming post-war settlement inshort may be regarded, ethicallya n d p o s s i b l y l e g a l l y , a ssuperseding the settlement of1919.[21]

These documents suggest that by the time ofthe Cairo Declaration there was already ablueprint for placing Micronesia underinternational trusteeship. While StateDepartment envisaged trusteeship, there was,however, no consensus in the US Governmentas a whole regarding these islands’ precisepost-war political status.

The US Military and Micronesia: JCS 183Series

Unlike State Department, the militaryadvocated US acquisition of Micronesia.Although the USA had become a strongadvocate of such principles as “no territorialaggrandizement” or “self-determination ofpeoples” during the Second World War, it, too,was an imperial power that had expanded itsterritories to and in the Pacific in the late 19thcentury.[22] The main reason for the military’sclaim to Micronesia was defense from Japan.Historically, the US military had seen Japan as

a threat since the late 19th century, and itsfears intensified especially after Japan gainedcontrol of Micronesia and fortified it. Duringthe Second World War, US forces sufferedsevere losses from Japan’s effective use ofthese islands as strategic bases. The USArecognized Micronesia’s strategic value onceagain from the experience of this war. [23]

At the end of 1942, in response to a request byPresident Roosevelt, the newly created JointChiefs of Staff (JCS) undertook studies on thefuture position of post-war bases in the Pacific,the JCS183 series “Air Routes Across thePacific and Air Facilities for InternationalPolice Force”.[24] As the title indicates,Roosevelt envisaged the bases as part of a UScontribution to an “International Police Force”.While an international organization was hopedfor, and the US, UK, Russia and China wereexpected to assume world-wide responsibilitiesfor security, the military did not haveconfidence in future international cooperation.The study warned that i f “a workableinternational organization cannot beestablished or …such an organization, onceestablished …break(s) down again due tosubsequent divergence of national policies,”then, “Consideration of our own nationaldefense and the security of the WesternHemisphere and of our position in the Far Eastmust, therefore, dominate our military policyduring and after the war. Adequate bases,owned or controlled by the United States, areessential to properly implement this policy andtheir acquisition and development must beconsidered as among our primary waraims.”[25] The study argued that bases shouldbe maintained in the area between Hawaii andthe Philippines, including Japanese-MandatedIslands and Bonin as “essential to our nationalde fense or for the protec t ion o f USinterest.”[26]

Just as Japan saw Micronesia as one of the mostimportant regions for its national defense, theUS military in the course of the Pacific War

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came to regard it as a strategically focal area.After capturing Micronesia’s main islands, theUSA dispatched B-29s from Tinian to attackJapanese positions one after another. Fillingthe gaps between US territories across thePacific, i.e., the US mainland – Hawaii – Wake –Guam, if under US control, these islands wouldprovide ideal unsinkable US aircraft carriers inregard to Asia. However, if under enemycontrol, they would expose US Pacificterritories to a significant threat.[27] As thecost in lives and money mounted in the courseof the war, not only the military but alsoCongress and the public supported theiracquisition. A Gallup poll in May 1944 showedthat 69 percent of respondents supported somesort of permanent US control over the islandsafter their conquest, whereas only 17 centopposed it.[28] Roosevelt neverthelessintended to discuss the subject of trusteeship atthe Dumbarton Oaks Conference in September1944. However, it did not do so, due to strongopposition by the Army and Navy.[29] The USAwas moving quietly but definitively toward theformation of a global network of bases thatwould become pivotal to the hegemonicstrategy of the postwar era.

CAC-Document:

Against this background, CAC-335 “Japan:United States: Disposition of the MandatedIslands”[30] was prepared in December 1944 -January 1945 in State Department. Thedocument presented several possibilities forthe post-war status of these islands, which inaccordance with the Cairo Declaration were tobe taken from Japan. It provided detailedanalysis, centering around (1) internationaltrusteeship with the USA as the administeringauthority, and (2) transfer to the USA in fullsovereignty, and recommended the first.

CAC-335 stated:

- S u c h a c o u r s e w o u l d b e

consistent with the theory ofinternational organizat ionsupported by the United States,which calls for collective security“by their own [member’s] action”,and for national administration ofnon-self-governing territoriesplaced under internationaltrusteeship.- As these islands are already aninternational trust, a change froma trust status would be harmful tothe whole concept of trusteeshipand international organization. TheMandated Islands clearly cannotbe treated as conquered enemyterritory nor the rights in them ofthe Principal Allied and AssociatedPowers and of the League ofNations disregarded.- This solution is therefore the onlyo n e w h i c h w i l l o b t a i n i ncombination the two objectiveswhich are essential in connectionwith the disposition of the islands:United States control of vitalsecurity bases and the recognitionof international authority over theMandated Islands.[31]

The following rationales were added.

- International authority over theislands will strengthen and add tothe prestige of the projectedinternational organization whichthe United States is seeking toestablish.- American public opinion, asjudged by polls and surveys,strongly favors “permanentcontrol” by the United States ofthe Japanese Mandated Islandsand wishes the United States to“keep these islands after the war”:

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a majority apparently wish thiscontrol to be exercised under someform of international authority.[32]

However, it also recognized the negativeaspects of this solution.

- This suggested arrangement ism o r e c o m p l i c a t e d t h a nunrestricted United Statessovereignty and involves thepossibility of jurisdictional frictionwith the international organization.- There is some question whetherthe United States will be able toobtain complete control of thebases under this plan.[33]

As for US sovereignty, which the JCS preferredas important for US security, it mentionedarguments that

- they should be assigned to theUnited States without internationalsupervision.- United States sovereignty overthese islands would not necessarilyinterfere with an internationalsecurity system.[34]

However, various considerations were raisedagainst this solution.

- Annexation would be widelyregarded as inconsistent with theprovision in the Atlantic Chartera g a i n s t “ t e r r i t o r i a laggrandizement” and of theprovision in the Cairo Declarationagainst “territorial expansion”.- Among peoples in the Far Eastannexation of islands in the south

and west Pacific might create anapprehension that American policyis embarking on an imperialisticcourse toward the Far East, andconsequently might weaken thetraditional confidence of thesepeoples in the United States.- Annexation might be widelyregarded as inconsistent with theprinciple of trusteeship which theAmerican Government may wish toadvocate, and make it difficult forthe United States to urge uponother states acceptance ofinternational supervision overdependent areas in which theyclaim a special interest.- It might force the United Statesto pay a substantial price forsovereignty: the necessity ofacquiescing in objectionabledemands of other states.[35]

Behind the Establishment of the UNTrusteeship System

The US military was not content with thetrusteeship proposal, as it did not necessarilyguarantee exclusive US control overMicronesia. In February 1945, at Yalta, themilitary again requested that discussion oftrusteeship for Micronesia be avoided.Secretary of War Stimson asked that there beno open mention of the matter until “thenecessity of … acquisition by the United Statesis established and recognized”. He argued

Acquisition of them by the UnitedStates does not represent anat tempt at co lonizat ion orexploitation. Instead, it is merelythe acquisition by the UnitedStates of the necessary bases forthe defense of the Pacific for thefuture world. To serve such a

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purpose, they must belong to theUnited States with absolute powerto rule and fortify them…[36]

Roosevelt nevertheless raised the subject atYalta, but in general terms, without focusingattention on Micronesia.[37]

Strategic Trust:

Established at the end of 1944, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) beganfully to function as a central policy-makingorganization on Japanese issues at thebeginning of 1945. In formulating policies onthe Japanese Mandates, attention focused onmeans of altering the trusteeship provisions inthe draft UN Charter to fit Micronesia’speculiar qualities and to satisfy the US plan tobuild bases. In other words, it tried to pursuethe policy of non-annexation insisted on byState Department, but at the same time to meetthe military’s strategic objectives. Whatresulted was the concept of “strategic trust”,which had a number of distinguishingcharacterist ics. First , i t al lowed theadministering power to fortify the territory andclose parts of it at will for security purposes.There had been no concept of designatingstrategic areas in the League of Nations’mandate system, which prohibited military use.The conclusion of T-367 may be recalled. Thus,this innovation would enable the USA to dolegally what Japan had done illegally. Second,the “states directly concerned” should havefinal authority to change the status of thestrategic trust. Final ly, unlike othertrusteeships, affairs concerning a strategictrust would be dealt with in the SecurityCouncil, where the USA would have vetopower.[38]

The draft of the trusteeship system submittedto the UN founding conference in April 1945included description of strategic trust, butspecified only the machinery and principles of

trusteeship for inclusion in the UN Charter,[39]in conformity with a memorandum presentedon April 18, 1945 by the Secretaries of State,War and Navy to Truman, who had just becomePresident. It stated:

It is not proposed at San Franciscoto determine the placing of anyparticular territory under atrusteeship system. All that will bedis¬cussed there will be thepossible machinery of such asystem.[40]

Truman approved this, and sent it to the USDelegation as a directive.[41] Adopted on April26 and coming into effect on October 24 1945,the UN Charter provided in Chapter XIdeclarations regarding non-self-governingterritories (Articles 73 and 74), in Chapter XIIthe international trusteeship system (Articles75-85) and in Chapter XIII the trusteeshipcouncil (Articles 86-91). Pertinent extracts fromarticles bearing on the disposition of theJapanese Mandated Islands are:

(Article 77)1. The trusteeship system shallapply only to such territories in thefollowing categories as may beplaced thereunder by means oftrusteeship arrangements: (a)terr i tor ies now held undermandate; (b) territories which maybe detached from enemy states asa result of this war; and (c)territories voluntarily placed underthe system by states responsiblefor their administration.2 . I t would be a mat ter forsubsequent agreement as to whichterritories would be brought undera trusteeship system and uponwhat terms.

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(Article 79)The terms of trusteeship for eachterritory to be placed under thetrusteeship system, including anyalteration or amendment, shall beagreed upon by the states directlyconcerned , i nc lud ing themandatory powers in the case ofterritories held under mandate bya Member of the United Nations,and shall be approved as providedfor in Article 83 and 85.

(Article 82)There may be designated, in anytrusteeship agreement, a strategicarea or areas which may includepart or all of the trust territory towhich the agreement applies,without prejudice to any specialagreement or agreements madeunder Article 43.[42]

(Article 83)1. All functions of the UnitedNations relating to strategic areas,including the approval of the termsof the trusteeship agreements andof their alteration or amendment,shall be exercised by the SecurityCouncil. …

(Article 84)I t sha l l be the du ty o f t headministering authority to ensurethat the trust territory shall play itspart in the maintenance ofinternational peace and security.To this end the administeringauthor i ty may make use o fvolunteer forces, facilities, andassistance from the trust territoryin carrying out the obligationstowards the Security Councilundertaken in this regard by theadministering authority, as well asf o r l o c a l d e f e n s e a n d t h e

maintenance of law and orderwithin the trust territory.

(Article 85).The functions of the UnitedNations with regard to trusteeshipagreements for all areas notdesignated as strategic, includingthe approval of the terms of thetrusteeship agreements and oftheir alteration or amendment,shall be exercised by the GeneralAssembly…[43]

In a letter dated June 23, 1945 to the Secretaryof State, the Secretaries of War and Navystated that

The Joint Chiefs of Staff … are ofthe opinion that the military andstrategic implications of this draft[United Nations] Charter as awhole are in accord with themilitary interests of the UnitedStates.[44]

It should be noted that there was as yet nogovernmental consensus on specific methods oftrusteeship application, including areadesignation. As discussed in the next section,the military was then considering strategictrust not for Micronesia, but for different areasin the Pacific such as Okinawa and Iwo Jima.Therefore, under such circumstances, and alsoto provide room for interpretation, theprovisions of the trusteeship system wereconfined to general references in the UNCharter.

Micronesia as a testing ground

During the first meeting of the UN GeneralAssembly, held in London in January – February1946, UK, Australia, Belgium and New Zealand

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announced their intention to put theirmandated territories under trusteeship, and sodid France shortly thereafter. The USSRinitially opposed renewal of Italy’s mandate toadminister Somaliland, but it was eventuallyapproved. Only the USA and South Africa didnot follow suit.[45] In fact Secretary of StateByrnes cabled Washington for permission todiscuss the former Japanese mandates on thisoccasion. However, the military, specificallyNavy Secretary Forrestal, persuaded Trumanto refuse.[46]

One of the definite causes of US (in)actionbecame clear in the same month. On January24, 1946, half a year after the atomic bomb testin New Mexico, the USA announced that it waspreparing to test atomic bombs at Bikini atoll inthe Marshalls.[47] Two days before thisannouncement, the Joint Chiefs of Staffinformed the Secretary of State that theyconsidered it essential to US national defensethat the USA have strategic control (1) of theJapanese mandated Islands, by assumption offull US sovereignty, and (2) of Nansei Shoto,Nanpo Shoto and Marcus Island, throughtrusteeship agreements designating thoseislands as strategic areas.[48]

On May 24, 1946, JCS presented study reportJCS1619/1, which repeated the above views inrespect of the Japanese Mandated Islands andthe Nansei – Nanpo Shoto area,[49] but forMarcus Island proposed assumption of USsovereignty. The report stated that “securityrequirements of the (Nansei - Nanpo Shoto)area might be satisfied by establishment oftrusteeship with the USA as administeringauthority, in which Okinawa and adjacent smallislands and Iwo Jima are designated as astrategic area.”[50]

The JCS report further argued “Acquisition offull sovereignty by the United States wouldprevent possible efforts, during processing oftrusteeship agreements through the UnitedNations, to weaken U.S. strategic control by

dividing the area into more than onetrusteeship or by preventing designation of theentire Japanese Mandated area as a strategicarea.”[51] Expecting Soviet opposition, JCS wasextremely skeptical about the prospects forobtaining exclusive US trusteeship over theJapanese Mandates. “Even though a strategictrusteeship over the entire area wereguaranteed to the United States,” it argued“there is no certainty that the requiredexclusive U.S. control could not later bejeopardized through elimination of the vetopower in the Security Council, followed bymodification of the terms of trusteeship in amanner contrary to U.S. interests.”[52]Furthermore, it drew attention to “thepossibility that, as a result of some crisis orimpasse, the United States might be forced intoa compromise, for reasons of expediency, whichwould nullify exclusive U.S. control of thearea.”[53]

The report also attempted to justify USannexation of Micronesia by linking it to Sovietterritorial gains in Europe and the cession ofthe Kuriles specified in the Yalta Agreement,made public early that year.[54] It stated:

It is believed that the USSR is theonly power which might object,solely for ideological reasons, tothe sovereignty over thesemandates passing to the UnitedStates. Such Soviet position in thisregard should be open to seriousquestion, since the USSR has infact assumed sovereignty overLatvia, Estonia, Lithuania, andEastern Poland, although withoutUS recognition, and apparentlyp r o p o s e s t o a s s u m e f u l lsovereignty over the Kuriles.[55]

In addition,

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Our interest in the Kuriles, inrespect to trusteeships in thePacific, is the implication of theprecedent which would be set bythe USSR in the assumption of fullnational sovereignty by any stateover areas to be detached from thesovereignty of Japan.[56]

Linkage between Micronesia and the Kurileswas discussed also in the context of thetrusteeship alternative.

In event the Kurile Islands are proposed fortrusteeship, the USSR should be designated assole administering authority in implementationof the Yalta Agreement. There are at present noindications that either Karafuto or Formosa willbe offered for trusteeship.[57]

Truman’s statements of intent

Before the end of the war, Truman madeseveral announcements that appear related tothe future of these islands. These were releasedwhile the State Department and the militarystill held divergent views, and thus theexpressions were unspecific. Nevertheless, heindicated that some arrangement would bemade to secure US bases using trusteeship orsome UN framework. For example, on August6, 1945, after the atomic bomb was dropped inHiroshima but before the USSR entered thewar against Japan, he stated in a broadcastreporting on the Potsdam Conference:

…though the United States wantsno territory or profit or selfishadvantage out of this war, we aregoing to maintain the militarybases necessary for the completeprotection of our interests and ofworld peace. Bases which ourmilitary experts deem to beessential for our protection and

w h i c h a r e n o t n o w i n o u rpossession, we will acquire. Wewill acquire them by arrangementsconsistent with the United NationsCharter.[58]

On January 15, 1946, in a press conferenceshortly after the opening of the GeneralAssembly in London, Truman spoke aboutMicronesia.

The United States would insist that it be soletrustee of enemy Pacific Islands conquered byour forces and considered vital to this country’ssecurity. Other former enemy islands now heldby us but not considered vital to this countrywi l l be placed under United Nat ionsOrganization Trusteeship, to be ruled by agroup of countries named by the UnitedNations Organization.[59]

Considering the USA’s historical involvement inestablishing the UN, and the need to maintainconsistency in US policy, outright annexationwas impossible.

SWNCC 59 Series

From June through July 1946, in order tohammer out a unified US government policy,SWNCC59/1 “Policy concerning trusteeshipand other methods of disposition of theMandated and other outlying and minor islandsformerly controlled by Japan” and its revisedversion, SWNCC59/2, were drafted anddiscussed. State Department prepared thebasic drafts, in which US policy was formulatedwithin the context of the UN Charter. TheState-War-Navy Coordinating Committeeinformally approved SWNCC59/2 on July 15,1946, and on the same day appointed an ad hoccommittee with H. Borton as the steeringmember. From August through September,while the JCS retained the position that theUSA should obtain sovereignty of Micronesia,the ad hoc Committee developed a draft

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trusteeship agreement.[60] Combining StateDepartment’s draft of August 8 and JCS’counter-draft of August 24, the SWNCCcompleted a draft trusteeship agreement texton September 19. It had the followingdistinguishing features.

(a) It designated the whole area asstrategic;(b) It specified that the goal shouldb e s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t , n o tindependence, thus announcing inadvance that independence wasnot an objective;(c) It provided, however, for fulluse of the Trusteeship Council oneconomic and social mattersoutside of any closed areas;(d) It restricted any possible fiscal,administrative or customs union toa union “with other territoriesunder United States jurisdiction”instead of wi th “adjacent”territories, as the original Statedraft; proposed; and(e) It provided that the agreementcould not be “terminated” withoutthe consen t o f t he Un i t edStates.[61]

State Department persistently tried toformulate a trusteeship policy consistent withoverall US policy. Yet it did not necessarilydeny the future annexation of Micronesia onwhich the military insisted. After severalmonths o f indec i s ion fo l lowing theestablishment of the UN, the US governmentmoved to make known its intention to placethese islands under trusteeship rather thanannex them. If the trusteeship proposal wasrejected, the USA would hold on to them as ade facto matter.[62] There was no need forhaste to make the final decision on devolution.A memorandum requesting comments on thisdraft trusteeship proposal, sent from the

SWNCC to the JCS, stated,

It is not intended that the submission by theState-War-Navy Coordinating Committee orconsideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of thisdraft agreement shall prejudice the ultimatedecision as to whether the strategic controldesired by the United States over formerJapanese-held islands is to be accomplishedthrough sovereignty or through United Nationstrusteeship.[63]

John Foster Dul les was then the USrepresentative on the Fourth (Trusteeship)Committee in the UN General Assembly. InOctober, he urged the Government’s topdecision-makers, including the President, “tomake an authoritative and definite statement ofUS intention with regard to the JapaneseMandated Islands” at the next GeneralAssembly meeting. He told Secretary Forrestalthat “from an over-all standpoint the UnitedStates needed to demonstrate to the rest of theworld its capacity to act decisively in relation tointernational affairs”. He explained that anumber of countries doubted whether the USAhad that capacity, and whether it was safe forthem to associate themselves with the USA.The differences of opinion within the USGovernment over disposition of the JapaneseMandated Islands were already well known,and the indecision, if prolonged, could weakenthe US position in the world. Thus, “while somedecision was of first importance, irrespective ofwhat the decision was”, he thought it importantthat the decision be for strategic trusteeshiprather than annexation.[64] Dulles gave similarexplanations to military leaders such asAdmirals Nimitz and Sherman, whileemphasizing that he thought it “entirelypossible” and “proper to get” the military rightsthe Navy felt indispensable.[65]

On October 22, Truman brought theSecretaries of State, War and Navy together todiscuss submission of the trusteeshipagreement. He told them that the UN would

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first stipulate the form of a contract ontrusteeships, and the USA would then offer theislands formerly under Japanese mandate fortrusteeship under that form.[66] The militarywas apprehensive of this procedure. NavySecretary Forrestal expressed the fear that“once negot iat ions were under way,subordinate officials of the State Department orsome delegate to the United Nations mightcompromise and accept an arrangement thatwould jeopardize proper maintenance of thebases.”[67] In response, Byrnes assured himthat only changes approved by the President orSecretary of State would be accepted.[68] OnNovember 6, 1946, Truman announced that“The United States is prepared to place undertrusteeship with itself as the administeringauthority, the Japanese mandated islands andany Japanese Islands for which it assumesresponsibilities as a result of the Second WorldWar”.[69]

Toward an American Lake: Reactions ofConcerned States and US Reactions

From October to December 1946 the UNGeneral Assembly was held in New York, andsome of the pending trusteeship proposalswere put up for approval, in the hope that theU N T r u s t e e s h i p C o u n c i l c o u l d b eestablished.[70] On November 7 Dullescommunicated to the Fourth (Trusteeship)Committee Truman’s statement of the previousday. Copies of the draft agreement weretransmitted for information to the SecurityCouncil’s other members (Australia, Brazil,China, Egypt, France, Mexico, Netherlands,Poland, USSR and UK) and to New Zealand andthe Philippines, and were later transmitted tothe newly-elected Security Council members,Belgium, Colombia, and Syria.

Negotiations with the USSR

Soviet opposition was expected. Alger Hiss,Director of the Office of Special PoliticalAffairs, recorded the anxieties Dulles expressed

by telephone on the day before the US policywas officially announced.

He [Dulles] feels that the Russians are planninga campaign of obstruction to the proposedagreements. They have indicated they willemphasize the need for provisions lookingtoward early independence which would beunacceptable to the mandatory powers. If theRussians have a veto right they would then beable to prevent the establishment of thetrusteeship system. Mr. Dulles said that he wasinclined to feel that although the establishmentof the trusteeship system is important, thatestablishment is really of less substantiveimportance than is the propaganda issue whichthe Russians are raising about what states arereally the defenders of the dependent peoples.He said that once the trusteeship agreementswere approved there will be relatively little ofsubstance which the Trusteeship Council willitself accomplish and, as in the case of themandate system, the administering powers willbe responsible in fact for what goes on in theirterritories. … He indicated that he was anxiousthat we not get in a position of appearing torush through the Assembly against Russianopposition agreements which are satisfactoryto colonial powers. He said he thought theRussians would try to class us with the colonialpowers.[71]

As expected, the Soviet media reportedTruman’s policy announcement of November 6.On November 11 Pravda (Special Tasscorrespondent in New York Dispatch) wrote:

The unusually broad scope of theAmerican plans likewise arousessurprise, as they include not onlyPacific islands under Japanesemandate but also any otherJapanese island US desires topossess. At same time variouscomments are aroused by USA’sattempt to make a considerable

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part of the Pacific Ocean with vastnumber of islands its strategiczone, which may be connectedwith plans for preparing a futurewar…[72]

Quoting the New York Herald Tribune ofNovember 7, Pravda also wrote that the USproposal was intended to turn the PacificOcean into an “American lake” from SanFrancisco to the Philippines.[73] Red Fleet onNovember 19 carried an article “The USA andthe Japanese mandated islands”, quoting a USmilitary official, and criticizing the US plan as“US imperialist aspirations, and far fromconstituting interests of defense”.[74]

As stated earlier, the UN Charter requires eachtrusteeship agreement to be acceptable to the“states directly concerned” and for suchagreements for strategic areas to be approvedby the Security Council. How to handle thesepoints was the critical key to approval of theUS proposal. Dulles tactfully took the positionthat the definition of “states directlyconcerned” should not be determined until theTrusteeship Council was established.[75] As thecountry in possession of the islands, and topursue its own strategic interests, the USA hadto become the only state “directly concerned”.[76] However, it was better not to deal withthis until the setting was ready and deals made.

The USSR was not necessarily against UStrusteeship of Micronesia, but the terms oftrusteeship had to be acceptable to it, and itdid not favor the USA’s suggested procedure.During the General Assembly and Council ofForeign Ministers meetings in New York,behind-the-scenes negotiations were held, atwhich the USSR repeatedly tried to have theUSA agree that the Security Council’s fivepermanent members be regarded as “statesdirectly concerned” in all trusteeshipagreements.Dulles noted that in an unofficial meeting on

November 28, Gromyko and Novikov

intimated that the Soviet Union was notparticularly interested in being considered a“state directly concerned” so far as the Africanmandated territory was concerned, but thatthey stood absolutely on the proposition thatthey were a “state directly concerned” in so faras related to enemy territory, specifically theItalian colonies, any Japanese islands and theJapanese mandated islands. …It was their viewthat under the Charter there was no right tofortify for national purposes. … the only rightwas for international peace and security andthat the only body which could administerinternational peace and security was theSecurity Council. … The concrete result of theirtheory was that the United States would nothave the right to maintain bases in trustedPacific Islands except as might be specificallyauthorized in each case by the SecurityCouncil, i.e., by Russia, and subject to itssupervision and inspection.[77]

The US counter-argument was that

trusteeship would make it easier tomove toward internationaliza¬tionof military establishments if andwhen the Security Council actuallydemonstrated that it could berelied upon to maintain the peace.However, that had not yet beendemonstrated and until it wasdemonstrated we [USA] wouldwant in the Pacific Islands thesame rights that the Soviet Unionwould presumably exercise in suchislands as the Kuriles Islands. Wesaid that the Soviet Union hadshown no disposition to accept forthe Kuriles Islands the regimewhich it was seeking to impose onus as regards Pacific islands whichm i g h t c o m e u n d e r o u radministration.[78]

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This was the argument linking Micronesia withthe Kuriles discussed earlier (in the above JCSstudies). The Soviet riposte was an effort todifferentiate the cases.

They [USSR] said that this wasdifferent because it had beenagreed between the United Statesand the Soviet Union that thelatter could annex the Kuriles [sic]Islands.

The US side replied.

We [USA] said that that was aninformal agreement which had notyet been ratified by peace treatyand that other nations than theUnited States were concerned inthis matter, notably China.[79]

Needless to say, “China” here is the ROC. Therecord continues,

I [Dulles] said … that the UnitedStates would not agree to a doublestandard under which the SovietUnion did not subject to SecurityCouncil control areas in itspossession which it deemed vital;whereas the United States, as tocomparable areas in its possession,would be subject to control andinspection by the Soviet Union.Messrs. Gromyko and Novikova f f i rmed s t rong ly tha t , i fnecessary, the Soviet would fightthe issue through to the floor ofthe Assembly, and they expressedconfidence that they could defeata p p r o v a l o f t r u s t e e s h i pagreements with provision for

bases, etc.[84]

The USSR, however, then appeared toreconsider. A note of December 7 stated

The Sov ie t Government i sprepared to take into account theinterests of the United States ofAmerica in connection with thisquestion, but at the same time itconsiders it necessary to expressits view that the question oftrusteeship over the islandsformerly under Japanese mandate,as well as over any Japaneseislands, must be considered by theAl l ied Powers in the peacesettlement in regard to Japan…[81]

This appears to suggest that the USSRintended to make a deal over Micronesia andthe Kuriles in the peace treaty settlement. OnDecember 13, 1946 the General Assemblyapproved the first trusteeship agreements, foreight non-strategic former League of Nationsmandates,[82] and on December 14 adopted aresolution on organization of the TrusteeshipCouncil.[83]

In just over two months the Soviet positionchanged again. On February 20, 1947 Molotovinformed Byrnes that the USSR intended tosupport the US proposal at the SecurityCouncil, without waiting for the Peace Treaty.

The Soviet Government has carefullyconsidered your note of the 13th [12] ofFebruary of this year and has arrived at theconclusion that it is not worthwhile to postponethe question about the former mandatedislands of Japan and that the decision of thisquestion comes within the competency of theSecurity Council.

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As regards the substance of the question, theSoviet Government deems that it would beentirely fair to transfer to the trusteeship of theUnited States the former mandated islands ofJapan, and the Soviet Government takes intoaccount, that the armed might of the USAplayed a decisive role in the matter of victoryover Japan and that in the war with Japan theUSA bore incomparably greater sacrifices thanthe other allied governments.[84]

The author could not obtain Byrnes’ “note ofthe 13th [12] of February replying to Molotov.However, available information appears tosuggest three reasons for the Soviet change ofattitude. (1) The USA limited the area oftrusteeship application to Micronesia, (2) TheJapanese Peace Treaty was expected to beconcluded in the near future, and (3) A dealover the Kuriles.

For the area of trusteeship application, as seenin the next section, Byrnes sent a note to theBritish Ambassador on the same day as his noteto Molotov (February 12). In it the USAjust i f ied i ts trusteeship proposal bydifferentiating Micronesia, a League of Nationsmandate, from the other enemy territories. Therevised US draft excluded the Nansei-NanpoShoto, such as Bonin, Okinawa and Iwo Jima,originally included in the trusteeship area (asdenounced in the November 11 Pravda article).The USA stated that it was “proposing theagreement in full compliance with thetrusteeship provisions of the Charter and wasacting on the recommendation of the GeneralAssembly of February 1946 which invitedstates administering former mandatedterritories to submit trusteeship proposals.”[85]

After the Paris Peace Conference of July -October 1946, peace treaties were signed withItaly, Hungary, Romania and Finland onFebruary 10, 1947, i.e., ten days before thisSoviet note. Thus, it was widely expected that aJapanese peace treaty would be next, andwould feature at the Foreign Ministers’

Conference to be held in March-April inMoscow.[86]

Finally, the Soviet attitude was apparentlylargely based on a deal over the Kuriles. Thiswas discussed not only among the twocountries’ UN representatives (e.g., Dulles,Gromyko and Novikov etc.), but also at theirForeign Ministerial meetings. The record of theDecember 9 meeting shows that Byrnesrepeatedly said he would communicate with“Mr. Dulles” before getting back to Molotov,who urged US acceptance of the Sovietposition.[87]

Byrnes clearly indicated in his Memoirs thatthe Soviet change of attitude was because oflinkage with the Kuriles.

Mr. Molotov asked me to agreethat the five permanent membersof the Security Council should beregarded as “states directlyconcerned” in all cases. … Such adefinition of “states directlyconcerned,” I replied, was a matterof Charter interpretation withinthe United Nations itself, andshould not be the subject of abilateral arrangement between ourtwo governments. I then addedthat I would bear his position inmind when considering theultimate disposition of the KurileIslands and the southern half ofSakhalin. This brought a very quickresponse. The Soviet Union, hesaid, did not contemplate atrusteeship arrangement for theKuriles or Sakhalin; these mattershad been settled at Yalta. I pointedout to him that Mr. Roosevelt hadsaid repeatedly at Yalta thatterritory could be ceded only at thepeace conference and he hadagreed only to support the Soviet

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Union’s claim at the conference.While it could be assumed that wewould stand by Mr. Roosevelt’spromise, I continued, we certainlywould want to know, by the time ofthe peace conference, what theSoviet Union’s at¬titude would betoward our proposal for placing theJapanese-mandated islands underour trusteeship. Mr. Molotovquickly grasped the implication ofthis remark.[88]

The Security Council later voted on the UStrusteeship agreement. The USSR did not useits veto, and the issue was resolved smoothly inaccordance with US intentions. Byrnes alsowrote,

I was delighted, but not surprised,t o s e e t h a t t h e S o v i e trepresentative voted in favor of ourproposal.[89]

UK and Australia

The USSR was not the only country to display anegative attitude to the US trusteeship policy.Western Allies such as UK and Australia had noobjection to US control of Micronesia itself, andhad since wartime even favored US annexationof these islands.[90] However, they respondednegatively to the US proposal, arguing, as didthe USSR, that it was premature, and shouldwait for the Japanese peace treaty.

On January 21, 1947 British Ambassador LordInverchapel sent a memorandum to theSecretary of State. It stated that the BritishGovernment “regard the action of the UnitedStates Government as a declaration of intentionwhich cannot take effect in advance of thePeace Treaty with Japan and consider that itwould be premature at this stage to place

proposals formally before the SecurityCouncil.”[91] In particular, from the Britishpoint of view such US action “would be open tothe serious practical objection that it wouldconfuse the issue about trusteeship for theformer Italian Colonies.”[92]

On the same day (January 21), AustralianAmbassador Makin also sent a memorandum tothe Secretary of State. It stated,

In the view of the AustralianGovernment, the ultimate solutionof the ques¬tion of the Japanesemandated islands lies in theirbeing controlled by the UnitedStates. At the same time theAustralian Government does notregard this as an isolated questionbut as an integral part of acomprehensive settlement for theentire Pacific ocean area. Toisolate the question of mandatedislands from the settlement withJapan as a whole is, in the opinionof my Government, an approachalmost untenable both politicallyand juridically.

With the fullest desire, therefore,to support the ultimate objective ofthe United States, the AustralianGovernment regards both thetiming and the procedure aserroneous, and believes that thecourse proposed by the UnitedStates will have the effect ofadding to the diff iculties ofachieving their objective.[93]…..The United States Governmentrecently undertook… to supportthe claim of Australia to be aprincipal party in the negotiationof the Japanese settlement. In viewof this the Australian Governmentfinds it difficult to understand the

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approach made by the UnitedStates Government on the questionof the mandated islands, whichappears to disregard Australia’svital interest in the disposal of theterritories concerned.[94]

In its reply of February 12 the USA defendedits position.

The United States Government hasno desire to contribute to anyconfusion of the issue about theItalian colonies. It does not see anyobvious or direct connectionbetween the two cate¬gories ofterritories in question. Althoughthe territories in both categoriesare under military occupation, thestatus of the former JapaneseMandated Islands, having been formany years under an internationalmandate and never having beenunder the sovereignty of Japan,appears to be entirely differentfrom that of the Italian colonies inthese respects.[95]

After the United States’ formally submitted itsdraft trusteeship agreement to the SecurityCouncil on February 26, Australia proposedthat the Security Council’s decision be finallyconfirmed at the Japanese peace conference,and that states not members of the SecurityCouncil that participated in that war shouldhave an opportunity to discuss the terms oftrusteeship.[96] Following this, New Zealandand India asked to be allowed to participate indiscussion.[97] At last, after the discussionswere broadened to include representatives ofCanada, India, the Netherlands and thePhi l ipp ines , Austra l ia wi thdrew i tsobjections.[98]

On April 2, 1947 the Security Councilunanimously approved the US draft agreementwith only a few minor amendments.[99] ElevenUN trust territories were then created, ten ofthem former League of Nations mandates. Theonly change in the administrative authorityfrom the pre-Second World War period, was informer Japanese-mandated Micronesia.[100]

Micronesia in the Peace Treaty Drafting

In October 1946, when the General Assemblymet in New York, the Peace Treaty Board,established in the Far Eastern Department ofState Department, began post-war drafting of apeace treaty. Since the US decision toannounce its trusteeship agreement plan hadbeen taken around the same time, it appearsthat both the trusteeship agreement and theJapanese peace treaty were expected to beconcluded in the near future. Soviet acceptanceof the US trusteeship plan also apparentlyhinged on expectation of an imminent JapanesePeace Treaty, including a deal over the Kuriles.However, it took four years and five monthsfrom adoption of the trusteeship agreement(April 1947) to conclusion of the JapanesePeace Treaty (September 1951).

In the disposition of Micronesia, the variouspeace treaty drafts prepared in StateDepartment from March 1947 focused mainlyon Japanese renunciation. The dissolution ofthe League of Nations had not of itselfterminated the Japanese administration, and itwas therefore considered that the Peace Treatymust include Japan’s formal renunciation of herinterest in, title to, or right to administer theislands. These drafts also attempted to extendthe UN resolution formula to the otherterritories, i.e., Nansei – Nanpo Shoto such asOkinawa and Bonin Islands, and the Britishdrafts prepared in 1951 also focused onJapanese renunciation of Micronesia. The US-UK joint draft prepared in May 1951 becamethe Peace Treaty text cited at the beginning ofthis Chapter.

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AFTER SAN FRANCISCO: THE END OFTRUSTEESHIP

From signature of the trusteeship agreementuntil 1951, the islands of Micronesia wereplaced under civilian administration by the USDepartment of the Interior, except for most ofthe Marianas, which were soon returned to theN a v y , a n d r e m a i n e d u n d e r N a v a ladministration until 1961.[101] Some parts ofthe Marshalls also remained a closed areaunder Naval administration, and continued tobe used for nuclear testing. The NorthernMarianas, except Rota, were also closed, foruse as a CIA training ground for guerillas to belanded in China.[102] However, in the wholeTrust Territories of Pacific Islands (TTPI)consisting of more than 2000 islands, thenumber used for such military-related activitieswas very small, and there was no specific planfor using the others. For the USA, the greatestsignificance of the trusteeship was probablythat it prevented enemies from using theseislands’ strategic potential.[103] The generalpublic, including Americans, were not allowedto visit the islands, and inhabitants’ traveloverseas was also restricted.[104]

Yoshida Shigeru signs the San Francisco treaty

as John Foster Dulles (left), Dean Acheson andStyles Bridges, the ranking minority member ofthe Senate Armed Forces Committee, look on

US policy toward the TTPI changed radically inthe 1960s. The Kennedy administrationintroduced the Peace Corps, and extendedmany US federal programs, especially in healthand education, to the TTPI. Planning for theterritory’s future political status alsobegan.[105] The major factor inducing thischange in US policy was the independencemovement of various UN trust territories thatwas developing then.[106] In 1965, theCongress of Micronesia was formed. Made upof representatives of the original six districts ofTTPI (the Marshall Islands, Palau, Ponape,Truk, Yap, Saipan), it served for over a decadeas the main agency of local self-government. In1967 it established a Joint Committee onFuture Political Status (JCFPS), which in 1969issued a report recommending the TTPI’sfuture status be that of a sovereign state.Following this report, the USA entered intoformal negotiations to end the trusteeship anddetermine the islands’ future political status.By 1975, with the independence of Papua New-Guinea, the other ten trusteeships created afterthe Second World War were all terminated.However, it took another fifteen years toterminate the TTPI.

Flag of the Trust Territories of the PacificIslands

As mentioned earlier, the goal of a trusteeshipwas self-government, not necessarily

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independence. The critical decision to moveMicronesia “into a permanent relationship withthe US within our [US] political framework”was approved by President Kennedy andadopted in his National Security ActionMemorandum No. 145 of 18 April 1962.[107]He appointed a commission under AnthonySolomon to prepare a plan to promoteAmericanization.[108] A major goal of theSolomon Plan (1964) was “for a huge infusionof money and procedure to bind Micronesia toUSA and, when that had been achieved, to offera choice (through a plebiscite) of independenceor permanent affiliation with USA, which theplanners were confident would give USApermanent control of Micronesia as it wantedfor US strategic reasons.”[109] The SolomonPlan was not formally adopted, but many of itsproposals were implemented.

At the time when negotiations to terminate theTTPI began, the USA was facing a big turningpoint in its post-war world strategy involving aradical transformation in the Asia-Pacificregional international structure. In July 1969US President Nixon announced the change inUS Asian strategy that became known as the“Nixon doctrine”. The new US policies includedwithdrawal from Vietnam, reduction of USmilitary bases in Asia, and increases in the self-defense effort of each country allied with theUSA.[110] In addition, after return of the BoninIslands to Japan in 1968, reversion of Okinawawas expected in the near future. There was noguarantee that the USA could freely continue touse its forward bases in Japan and thePhil ippines indefinitely. In addition,technological advances in weapons such asmissiles could facilitate withdrawal of majorforward defense l ines as far back asMicronesia.[111] Thus the new US Asia policyincreased Micronesia’s strategic importance.

During the early stages of the statusnegotiations, the US government intended tokeep all six districts of the TTPI together as asingle entity, as did the UN. But, the TTPI

declined the offer of US territorial status. TheUSA then offered “commonwealth” status,similar to that of Puerto Rico. Under increasingpressure to release the TTPI, and also with theprimary interest in it as a strategic fall-backarea, US administrators, especially in themilitary, acted to bond the Northern MarianaIslands more closely to the USA by offeringmore jobs and money, higher pay, betterschools with more qualified teachers, betterhospitals, roads and other facilities. If theMarianas chose independence, they would losethese extra privileges.[112]

Thus the Marianas were encouraged to breakaway from the rest of Micronesia and joinGuam as a US territory. As Crocombe wrote,“(a)lthough this was not US official policy – atleast not acknowledged as such – it is whathappened.”[113] In 1975, after a plebiscite, theMarianas separated from the other TTPIdistricts, to establish a Commonwealth of theNorthern Marianas Islands (CNMI) in politicalunion with the USA.[114] The US military’sgoal of annexing Micronesia was finallyrealized in the CNMI, but by the inhabitants’choice. As a result, the CNMI became the USforward base and defense line of the USterritories in the Pacific.[115]

Negotiations with the remaining TTPI districtstook almost a decade longer. In 1978 theyvoted on a Constitution. Yap, Turk, Ponape andthe new Kosrae TTPI districts ratified aConstitution, forming the Federated States ofMicronesia (FSM). The Marshall Islands andPalau ratified separate constitutions in 1979and 1981 respectively, breaking away from theFSM, gaining self-government, and choosingfree association with the USA for their futurepolitical status.

The Compact of Free Association defines thebasic relationship between the USA and theseassociated states.[116] It recognizes anAssociated State as sovereign, self-governingwith the capacity to conduct foreign affairs

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consistent with the terms of the Compact. Itsets the nature and amount of US economicassistance, and places full authority andresponsibility for security and defense matterswith the USA. Associated States are expectedto refrain from actions that the US governmentsees as “incompatible with its authority andresponsibility for security and defense”, andare therefore obliged to consult the USgovernment in conducting their foreignaffairs.[117] So if an Associated State engagesin foreign policy moves viewed by the USA as“incompatible” with its defense responsibilities,it would be subject to potentially heavyeconomic penalties. These provisions are non-reciprocal; the Associated State has no say overUS foreign or defense affairs.[118] In the wordsof Richard Herr, Free Association is themechanism for “re-invention of the nineteenth-century concept of the ‘protected states’.”[119]The Micronesian states had to negotiate withthe USA from a weak position, having grownheavily dependent on US assistance.

The governments of the FSM and the Republicof Marshall Islands (RMI) signed the Compactof Free Association in 1982, and it came intoforce in 1986. A major subsidiary agreement ofthe Compact with the Marshall Islands allowscontinued use for up to thirty years of the USArmy missile test range at Kwajalein atoll.Although post-TTPI arrangements were made,the trusteeship was not terminated until 1990.By Art ic le 83 of the UN Charter , thetrusteeship status of a strategic area can bealtered only by UN Security Council resolution.Denouncing the Free Association system as“new colonial rule”, not to mention theCommonwealth arrangement with theMarianas, the USSR regularly vetoed thetrusteeship termination resolution.[120]

Kwajalein atoll test range

However, the dramatic changes in Sovietforeign policy in the late 1980s brought the endof trusteeship in Micronesia. On December 23,1990, one year after the “end of the Cold War”declaration at the US-USSR Malta summit, theFSM, RMI and CNMI officially ended theirtrusteeship by Security Council resolution, andon 9 August 1991 the FSM and RMI joined theUN.[121]

Palau’s government signed the Compact ofFree Association with the USA in 1986.However, Palau’s Constitution, whichprecluded nuclear activity, and US policy ofneither confirming nor denying its use ofnuclear-armed vessels, meant that it could nottake effect until approved by the Palauanpeople in 1994. The USA wanted access for itsmilitary – nuclear or otherwise - but theConstitution mandated seventy-five percentvoter approval to override the nuclearban,[122] and seven plebiscites failed to makethe change. In the meantime, the USA keptpressuring the Palauans to change their mindsby various means, including withholdingfunds.[123] After the sixth plebiscite, the

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Constitution was amended, reducing thenuclear ban waiver requirement to a simplemajority. On November 9, 1993, in the eighthplebiscite, sixty-eight percent of those votingapproved the Compact.[124] On October 1,1994, with Palau moving to Free Associationwith the USA, all UN trust territoriesdisappeared.

The US “post-Cold War” security policymaintains strong focus on the Pacific region,and the Compact continues to provide astrategic insurance as well as valuableresources for it, particularly in the area ofmissile defense testing and development. Manyeconomic provisions, including federal financialand program assistance, as well as the defenseprovisions, expired on the Compact’s fifteenthanniversary for the FSM and RMI (2001), butrenegotiation resulted in new twenty-yearagreements in 2003. For the ROP, US economicassistance expires in fifteen years (2009), andits defense responsibility in fifty years (2044).The Compact itself has no expiration date, thusFree Association continues, unless both partiesagree to end it. The “American Lake” thuscontinues even after the end of trusteeship inMicronesia.

SUMMARY

US Government interest in the Pacific Islandshas always been predominantly military andstrategic. The idea of placing Micronesia underUN trusteeship with military bases existed inthe Yalta blueprint. However, those bases wereto be part of a US contr ibut ion to an“International Police Force” anticipatinginternational cooperation, including with theUSSR. For Micronesia, the foundation of theSan Francisco System was laid in April 1947 byaction of the UN Security Council, with Sovietconsent. The concept of strategic trusteeshipdeveloped in embryonic form in the era ofconventional warfare, but the atomic bomb,ironically first dispatched from Micronesia,introduced a new era.[125] To satisfy both

s t ra teg ic in teres ts and d ip lomat icrequirements, US pol icy on post-warMicronesia was formulated so as to alter theUN Charter’s trusteeship provisions.Negotiating astutely in the UN, the USAsecured exclusive control of Micronesia. JohnFoster Dulles, who was involved in the keynegotiations, later played the central role indrafting the Japanese Peace Treaty.

As mentioned earlier, trusteeship is atransitional arrangement, and not a finaldisposition of territorial sovereignty. No expirydate was specified for the TTPI, i.e., the USAgained indefinite control of the islands. TheTTPI was an “unresolved problem” created bythe Cold War. Following the end of the US-USSR Cold War, the TTPI came to an end in theearly 1990s. As far as the Micronesian Islandsare concerned, the “unresolved problem” ofsovereignty was settled. Their continuingpeculiar status, however, is a remnant of theCold War, developed during the 1960s and1970s, when the Asia-Pacific region wasexperiencing a structural transformation. TheMicronesian economies remain heavilydependent on US funding today. In defense andsecurity affairs, Micronesia is part of USterritories. A contemporary implication of theSan Francisco System is thus still observed inMicronesia’s status.

This article originated as chapter 4 of Cold WarFrontiers in the Asia-Pacific: DividedTerritories in the San Francisco System (Oxfordand New York, Routledge, 2007), and isreproduced here by kind permission of thepublisher. It appears here with a newintroduction in a slightly edited form. Posted atJapan Focus on August 10, 2007.

See the related article by Kimie Hara, Cold WarFrontiers in the Asia-Pacific: The TroublingLegacy of the San Francisco Treaty.

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Notes

1. Conference for the Conclusion and Signatureof the Treaty of Peace with Japan, SanFrancisco, California, September 4-8, 1951,Record of Proceedings, p.314.2. Gary Smith, Micronesia; Decolonisation andUS Military Interests in the Trust Territory ofthe Pacific Islands, Peace Research Centre,Research School of Pacific Studies, AustralianNational University, 1991, p.2.3. Ibid.; Current Notes, No.23, 1952, p.40;Donald F. McHenry, Micronesia: TrustBetrayed, Altruism vs Self Interest in AmericanForeign Policy, New York and Washington:Carnegie Endowment For International Peace,1975, p.6; Carl Heine, Micronesia at theCrossroads, A Reappraisal of the MicronesianPolitical Dilemma, Honolulu: An East-WestCenter Book, The University Press of Hawaii,1974, p.3.4. Ron Crocombe, The Pacific Islands and theUSA, Rarotonga and Suva: Institute of PacificStudies, University of the South Pacific, andHonolulu: Pacific Islands DevelopmentProgram, East-West Center, 1995, p.xxv;Harold F. Nufer, Micronesia under AmericanRule: An Evaluat ion of the StrategicTrusteeship (1947-77), Hicksville, New York:Exposition Press, 1978, p.26.5. Roger W. Gale, The Americanization ofMicronesia: A Study of the Consolidation ofU.S. Rule in the Pacific, Washington DC:University Press of America, 1979, p.53.6. FRUS: The Conferences at Malta and Yalta1945, p.859. This later became Article 77 of theUN Charter adopted on October 24 that year. I7. Gale, op.cit., p.53.8. Ibid.9. Between 1946 and 1958, at least sixty-sixnuclear tests were conducted at Bikini andEniwetok atolls. [Peter Hayes, Lyuba Zarskyand Walden Bello, American Lake, NuclearPeril in the Pacific, Harmondsworth, England:Penguin, 1986, p. 72; Kobayashi Izumi, Americagokuhi bunsho to shintaku tochi no shuen –soromon hokoku, mikuroneshia no dokuritsu

(US Confidential paper and Termination of theU.N. Trusteeship – Solomon Report ,Independence of Micronesia), Tokyo: Toshindo,1994, p.13-4.]10. US President F. D. Roosevelt, an earnestpromoter of the UN, d ied before theconference, and was replaced by Truman.11. Gale, op.cit., p.60.12. FRUS 1947, Vol. I, pp.258-78; Nufer,op.cit., p28.13. Stanley DeSmith, Microstates andMicronesia, New York: New York UniversityPress, 1970, p.132; Gale, ibid., p.63.14. RG59, Records of Harley A. Notter,1939-45, Records of the Advisory Committee onPost-War Foreign Policy 1942-45, box 63, NA.15. Ibid., box 64.16. Ibid.17. Ibid.18. Ibid.19. On February 11,1922, Japan and USAsigned a convention, by which Japan grantedthe USA and its nationals equality with Japan incable rights, pledged that “no military or navalbases shall be established or fortificationserected in the territory” promised to send theUSA a duplicate of its annual report to theCouncil of the League of Nations, etc. (T-328,pp.8-9, ibid.)20. T-367, p.14, ibid.21. T-345, ibid.22. For example, in 1898, the US military tookover Guam in the Spanish-American War, andannexed Hawaii. It also attempted to acquireother Spanish colonies in Micronesia, but wasbeaten to it by Germany. Wake Island wasannexed as a US cable station. In 1899 the USAacquired Eastern Samoa (American Samoa).23. Glen Alcalay, “Pacific Island Responses toU.S. and French Hegemony”, Arif Dirlik ed.,What is in a Rim: Critical Perspectives on thePacific Region Idea, 2nd Edition, Boulder,Colo.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.,1998, p.310.24. For a discussion of JCS 183, see Robert D.Eldridge, “Okinawa in U.S. Postwar StrategicPlanning, 1942-46”, Kobe daigaku daigakuin

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hogaku kenkyu-kai, Rokkodai ronshu, hogakuseijigaku-hen, Vol. 45, No.3, March 1999a, pp.64-71; Gabe Masaaki, “Bei togo sanbo honbu niokeru okinawa hoyu no kento, kettei katei –1943 nen kara 1946 nen –”, Keio gijukudaigaku hogakubunai hogaku kenkyu-kai,Hogaku kenkyu, Vol. 69, No.7, July 1996, pp.84-87.25. “JCS 183/6, Air Routes Across the Pacificand Air Facilities for International Police Force:Air Bases Required for use of an InternationalMilitary Force (April 10, 1943),” cited inEldridge, op.cit., 1999a, p.68.26. Ibid., p. 70.27. Kobayashi, op.cit., 12.28. New York Times, March 29 and April 3,1945; Gale, op.cit., p.52.29. Gale, ibid., p.53; FRUS 1945, Vol. I,General: The United Nations, p.311-312.30. “Japan: United States: Disposition of theMandated Islands (CAD-335, preliminary,January 26, 1945)”, RG59, Records of Harley A.Notter, 1939-45, Records relating toMiscellaneous Policy Committees 1940-45, box116, NA.31. Ibid.32. Ibid.33. Ibid.34. Ibid.35. Ibid. This recommendation of internationaltrusteeship was approved at the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East ofState Department held on January 25, 1945,before the Yalta Conference, in StateDepartment. (RG59, Records of Harley A.Notter, 1939-45, Records relating toMiscellaneous Policy Committees 1940-45, box119, NA.)36. FRUS 1945: The Conference at Malta andYalta, pp.78-81.37. Gale, op.cit., p.53.38. Dorothy Richard, United States NavalAdministration of the Trust Territory of thePacific Islands, Washington: GovernmentPrinting Office, 1957, v.3, p.13; Gale, op.cit.,pp.54-55.39. FRUS: The Conferences at Malta and Yalta

1945, p.859.40. “Memorandum by the Secretaries of State,War, and Navy to President Truman,Washington, April 18, 1945”, FRUS 1945, Vol.I, pp.350-351.41. Text of this draft (the 16th draft of USproposals for trusteeship made since thebeginning of interdepartmental considerationearly in 1945) was adopted by the USdelegation at its nineteenth meeting on April26. After clearance by telegraph with the Warand Navy Departments copies were transmittedto the Acting Secretary of State by tele¬gramon April 27, and to President Truman inmemorandum of May 1.42. (Article 43) “1. All Members of the UnitedNations, in order to contribute to themaintenance of international peace andsecurity, undertake to make available to theSecurity Council, on its call and in accordancewith a special agreement or agreements, armedforces, assistance, and facilities, includingrights of passage, necessary for the purpose ofmaintaining international peace and security.;2. Such agreement or agreements shall governthe numbers and types of forces, their degreeof readiness and general location, and thenature of the facilities and assistance to beprovided.; 3. The agreement or agreementsshall be negotiated as soon as possible on theinitiative of the Security Council. They shall beconcluded between the Security Council andMembers or between the Security Council andgrounds of Members and shall be subject toratification by the signatory states inaccordance with their respective constitutionalprocess.”43. The Charter of the United Nations,Scranton, Pennsylvania: The Haddon Craftmen,1945, pp.196-199. Underlined by author.44. Scholarly Resources, Inc., MicroformPublication: U.S. State-War-Navy CoordinatingCommittee, Policy Files, 1944-1947, MicrofilmRoll No.8, NA.45. The UK placed Tanganyika, the Cameroonsand Togoland under trusteeship. So didAustralia for New Guinea, Belgium for Ruanda-

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Urundi, and New Zealand for Western Samoa.Nauru became a trust territory jointlyadministered by the UK, Australia and NewZealand. France agreed to place its portions ofTogoland and the Cameroons under trusteeshipas well. Somaliland was an Italian trustterritory.46. Walter Millis (ed.), James Forrestal, TheForrestal Diaries, New York: Viking Press,1951, p.216, p.130-131; Gale, op.cit., p. 56.47. Gale, ibid., p.56-58. Kobayashi, p.14.48. (JCS570/5-SWNCC249/1) JCS1619/1, p.23;SWNCC 59/2, p.49, Microfilm LM54 Roll 8, NA.[“Nansei Shoto” is the chain of islands locatedsouth-west of the Japanese main islands,stretching between Kyushu and Taiwan.“Nanpo Shoto” is another chain of islandslocated south of mainland Japan, and north ofMicronesia.49. JCS1619/1, p.11, ibid.50. JCS1619/1, p.11, op.cit..51. The Report continues, "In view of theUSSR’s proposal that she be given a unilateraltrusteeship over Tripolitania, it is extremelydoubtful that the United States would besuccessful in obtaining an exclusive trusteeshipover the Japanese Mandates. The USSR, in allprobabil ity, wil l be granted, at most,participation in any trusteeship establishedover Tripolitania, and may be denied any statusother than that of an interested party. With thisas a precedent, she would strongly oppose anydecision to grant an exclusive trusteeship overthe Japanese Mandates to the United States."(JCS1619/1, p.25-26, Appendix “B”; SWNCC59/2, pp.51-52, Appendix “B”. Microfilm LM54Roll 8, NA.)52. Ibid.53. Ibid.54. Ibid..55. JCS1619/1, p.15, Appendix “A”, ibid.56. JCS1619/1, p.19, Appendix “A”, ibid.57. JCS1619/1, p.29, Appendix “B”, ibid.58. Ibid.59. SWNCC59/2, p.48, JCS1619/1, p.22, ibid.60. A. J. McFarland, Colonel, US Army,Secretary in a memorandum addressed to

SWNCC on 11 July 1946 wrote “A carefulconsideration of these proposals (contained inSWNCC59/1 and SWNCC 59/2) does notchange the view of Joint Chiefs of Staff as tothe necessity for obtaining United Statessovereignty over the Japanese MandatedIslands, nor their view as to the necessity forobtaining sole trusteeship in the Ryukyus.”SM-6245, SWNCC 59/3, p.63, Enclosure,Microfilm LM54 Roll 8, NA.61. FRUS 1946, Vol. I, p.624.62. Ibid., p. 568, p.683 (footnote 62), p.686.63. Ibid., p.628.64. Ibid., p.637.65. Ibid., p.637.66. Ibid., pp.659-660.67. James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly,London: William Heinemann,1947, pp.219-221.68. Ibid.; The Forrestal Diaries, op.cit.,pp.213-214; FRUS 1946, Vol. I, pp.659-660.69. FRUS 1946, Vol. I, p.674.70. Ibid., pp.219-221.71. FRUS 1946, Vol.I, p.669.72. Ibid., pp.679-680.73. Ibid.74. Ibid., p.682.75. United Nations, Official Records of theGeneral Assembly, First Session, Second Part,Fourth Committee, Part I, p.76.; FRUS 1946,Vol. I, pp.675-6. (Editorial Note)76. Earlier on August 20, the followinginstruction was sent from State Department(Acting Secretary of State) to the Charge inAustralia (Minter). "You may state it is yourpersonal assumption that US Govt intends toplace these islands under trusteeship. Youshould further inform Australians that, reJapanese Mandated Islands and any otherJapanese territories which US may administerunder trusteeship, we prefer the ‘states directlyconcerned’ be kept to absolute minimum. Infact, we would prefer to submit draftagreements to General Assembly or SecurityCouncil as sole ‘state directly concerned’ afterconsulta¬tion with all interested states."(FRUS 1946, Vol. I, p.617.)77. FRUS 1946, Vol. I, pp.690 – 691.

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78. Ibid., p. 691.79. FRUS 1946, Vol. I, p.691.80. Ibid., pp.691-2.81. Ibid., p.710.82. Western Samoa, Tanganyika, Rwanda-Urundi, The Cameroons under BritishAdministration, the Cameroons under FrenchAdministration, Togoland under BritishAdministration, Togoland under FrenchAdministration, and New Guinea.83. FRUS 1946, Vol. I, p.709.84. FRUS 1947, Vol. I., pp.264-5.85. Department of State Bulletin, May 4, 1947,p.786.86. Hosoya Chihiro, Sanfuranshisuko kowa enomichi, Tokyo: Chuokoron-sha, pp.9-10.87. FRUS 1946, Vol. I, pp.705-7.88. Byrnes, op.cit., pp.219-221.89. Ibid., p.221.90. CAC335, January 26, 1945, op.cit.;Frederick. S. Dunn, Peace-Making andSettlement with Japan, Princeton, N.J.:Princeton University Press, 1963, p.25.91. FRUS 1947, Vol.I., pp.259-60.92. Ibid.93. FRUS 1947, Vol. I, p.260.94. Ibid., p.261.95. Ibid., p.262.96. Department of State Bulletin, May 4, 1947,p.787.97. Ibid.98. FRUS 1947, Vol. I, p.273, 278,99. FRUS 1947, Vol. I, p.275.100. Kobayashi, op.cit., p.11.101. McHenry, op.cit., p.10. (Following captureof the islands from Japan and continuing untilsignature of the trusteeship agreement of 1947,the US Navy was responsible for administrationof Micronesia.)102. Crocombe, op.cit., p.xxv, p.31-2;Kobayashi, op.cit., pp. 13-14. The Islands werereopened following UN pressure in 1962.103. Kobayashi, op.cit., 15.104. Ibid.105. McHenry, op.cit., p.10.

106. Yazaki Yukio, Mikuroneshia shintaku tochino kenkyu, Tokyo: Ochanomizu-shobo, 1999,p.201.107. Crocombe, op.cit., p.28.108. Ibid. The first exposure of the SolomonReport was undertaken by the Friends ofMicronesia, and entitled The Solomon Report;America’s Ruthless Blueprint for theAssimilation of Micronesia (1971). Excerpts arereprinted in Appendix 1, Donald McHenry,Micronesia: Trust Betrayed: Altruism versusSelf-Interest in American Foreign Policy, NewYork: Carnegie Endowment for Peace, 1975.109. Crocombe, op.cit., p.29.110. Kobayashi, op.cit., p.31.111. Ibid., p.132.112. McHenry, op.cit., p.13; Crocombe, op.cit.,p.31.113. Crocombe, ibid..114. Yazaki, op.cit., p. 201.115. Ibid., p. 344-345.116. For text of the Compact of FreeAssociation, see “Public Law 99-239 – Jan. 14,1986”, United States Statues at Large,containing the laws and concurrent resolutionsenacted during the first session of the ninety-ninth congress of the United States of America,1985, and Proclamations, Vol. 99, Part 2,Washington: United States GovernmentPrinting Office, 1987, pp.1800-1841.117. Ibid., p.1822.118. Crocombe, op.cit., pp. 274-275.119. Richard Herr, “Restructuring foreign anddefence policy: the Pacific Islands”, in AnthonyMcGrew and Christopher Brook eds., Asia-Pacific in the New World Order, London:Routledge, 1998, p.212.120. Crocombe, op.cit., p.158.121. Ibid., p.164, pp.274-275122. Ibid. p.34.123. Ibid..124. United States Department of the Interior,Office of Insular Affairs, OIA Homepage, "AReport on the State of Islands, Chapter 6:Republic of Palau".125. McHenry, op.cit., p.3.