mid-term evaluation of the edf-financed conservation and management of indigenous...

EUROPEAN COMMISSION

DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR DEVELOPMENTEAST AND SOUTHERN AFRICA

Mid-term Evaluation of the EDF-financed

Conservation and Management of IndigenousForests (COMIFOR) Project

Kenya

Project No. 7 ACP KE 009

F I N A L R E P O R T

H. Forster, W. Schindele, J. L. Kiyiapi

October, 1997

AFCO AGRIFOR Consult - 2 -

COMIFOR Project Evaluation: Final Report

EUROPEAN COMMISSION

DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR DEVELOPMENTEAST AND SOUTHERN AFRICA

Conservation and Management of Indigenous Forests (COMIFOR)

Kenya

Project No. 7 ACP KE 009

Final Report on the Mid-Term Evaluation

October, 1997

Appraisers: Hubert FORSTER, Forestry Consultant, AGRIFOR, team leader ofthe evaluation team and technically responsible for natural forestmanagement planning, forestry participatory approaches, forest leg-islation, and forest institutional building;

Werner SCHINDELE, Forestry Consultant, AGRIFOR, responsiblefor aerial photography, vegetation and inventory mapping, naturalforest management planning, and forestry participatory approaches;

Dr. James L. KIYIAPI, Forestry Research Scientist, Consultant andLecturer, Moi University, engaged by AGRIFOR, responsible for for-estry participatory approaches, management of revenue-generatingforest activities, indigenous forest control of extraction, and foresteducation and training.

This evaluation is financed by the European Commission. It does not necessarily re-flect the opinion of the Government of Kenya nor that of the European Commission.



List of abbreviations and exchange rates

AiA Appropriation in AidAMKO Association of Mt. Kenya OperatorsASAL Arid and Semi Arid LandASFMT Arabuko Sokoke Forest Management TeamAWF African Wildlife Foundation (American NGO, also active as consulting

company)AWP Annual Work PlanBMZ German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and DevelopmentBx Brusselscbm cubic meterCCF Chief Conservator of Forests, chief executive of the Forest DepartmentCEAU Conservation Education and Awareness Unit of MoU Forest Protection

and Conservation BaseChap. ChapterCOMIFOR Conservation and Management of Indigenous Forests of KenyaCP CounterpartDept. DepartmentDev. DevelopmentDFO District Forest OfficerDHV Dutch Consulting Company providing Technical Assistance for the COMI-

FOR ProjectEC European CommissionECU European Currency UnitEDF European Development FundEU European UnionFAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United NationsFCPB Forest Conservation and Protection Base at NyeriFD Forestry DepartmentFESD Forestry Extension Services DivisionFI Forest InventoryFINNIDA Finnish International Development AgencyFR. Forest ReserveGDP Gross Domestic ProductGEF Global Environment FacilityGoK Government of KenyaGovt. GovernmentGTZ Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit GmbH (German

Agency for Technical Cooperation)HQ Head QuartersICRAF International Center for Research in AgroforestryIFAD International Fund for ASAL DevelopmentIMF International Monetary FundInaReMaC Integrated Natural Resource Management and Conservation Project

(BMZ/GTZ)IUCN International Union for the Conservation of NatureJICA Japanese International Cooperation AgencyK£ Kenyan pound (= 20 KSh)KEFRI Kenyan Forest Research InstituteKENGO Kenya Energy and Environment OrganizationKFD Kenyan Forest DepartmentKFDP Kenya Forest Development Project



KFFP Kenya-Finland Forestry ProgramKFMP Kenya Forestry Master PlanKIFCON Kenya Indigenous Forest Conservation ProgramKSh Kenyan ShillingKWS Kenyan Wildlife ServiceM+E Monitoring and Evaluationm/m man-monthsMENR Ministry of Environment and Natural ResourcesMgt. Managementmio. MillionMoC Memorandum of CollaborationMoF Ministry of FinanceMoPW Ministry of Public WorksMoU Memorandum of UnderstandingMtK Mount KenyaNAO National Authorizing OfficerNES National Environment SecretariatNGO Non-Governmental OrganizationNIP National Indicative ProgramNMK National Museums of KenyaNP, NR National Park, National ReserveNTFPs Non-Timber Forest ProductsNTZ Nyayo Tea ZoneODA Overseas Development Administration, now Department for International

DevelopmentPC Provincial CommissionerPCM Project Cycle ManagementPEM Participatory Extension MethodsPFO Provincial Forest OfficerPM Project ManagerPO Plan of OperationPPM Project Planning MatrixPRA Participatory Rural AppraisalPrCo Project CoordinatorPS Permanent SecretaryPSC Project Steering CommitteePSFM Promotion of Sustainable Forest Management Project (assisted by GTZ)PSP Permanent Sample PlotRAD Regional Assistant Director(ate) of KWSRRA Rapid Rural AppraisalSIDA Swedish International Development AgencyTA Technical AssistanceToR Terms of ReferenceToT Training of TrainersUK United KingdomUNDP United Nations Development ProgramWB World BankZOPP Target Oriented Project Planning

Exchange rates in September 19971 ECU = 66 KSh

100 KSh = 1.33 ECU

1 K£ = 20 KSh



Table of contents

List of abbreviations and exchange rates.............................................................................. 3

Preamble............................................................................................................................... 8

1. Summary......................................................................................................................... 10

2. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 16

2.1 History of the Project ................................................................................................ 16

2.2 Project context of Mt. Kenya Forest Reserve............................................................ 212.2.1 Historical background ..................................................................................... 212.2.2 Illegal commercial logging............................................................................... 222.2.3 Banghi farm encroachment............................................................................. 222.2.4 High local demand on forest products ............................................................ 232.2.5 Plantations, Shamba farms and excisions ...................................................... 232.2.6 Animal damage............................................................................................... 232.2.7 Forest fires...................................................................................................... 242.2.8 Forest management and production potential................................................. 24

3. Project preparation and design ....................................................................................... 26

3.1 Original project planning ........................................................................................... 263.1.1 Financial Agreement ....................................................................................... 263.1.2 Project planning according to the ToR of the TA contract............................... 293.1.3 Planned Technical Assistance (TA) ................................................................ 29

3.2 Revision of the project planning................................................................................ 303.2.1 The logical framework workshop of Nov. 1995 ............................................... 303.2.2 The Inception Reports..................................................................................... 313.2.3 Further planning procedures........................................................................... 34

3.2.3.1 Mt. Kenya Forest Reserve ....................................................................... 353.2.3.2 Mangrove component .............................................................................. 36

3.2.4 Compatibility of the Project Planning with the actual Forest Policy ................. 37

3.3 Project design........................................................................................................... 37

4. Relevance of the project ................................................................................................. 38

4.1 Mt. Kenya Forest Reserve ........................................................................................ 384.1.1 Problem description concerning Mt. Kenya Forest Reserve ........................... 384.1.2 Relevance of the COMIFOR Project concerning Mt. Kenya Forest Re-

serve............................................................................................................... 40

4.2 Relevance of the COMIFOR Project concerning Lamu mangroves .......................... 43

5. Project execution............................................................................................................. 44

5.1 Deployment of TA personnel .................................................................................... 44

5.2 The imprest account ................................................................................................. 48

5.3 Financial support to PFOs, DFOs and FCPB............................................................ 48

5.4 Contributions by the FD ............................................................................................ 49

5.5 Contributions by third parties .................................................................................... 50

5.6 Project budget and accounting ................................................................................. 50

6. Efficiency of the project ................................................................................................... 54

6.1 Comparison "Planning and achievements" according to the Financial Agree-ment ......................................................................................................................... 546.1.1 Planned Result 1: Planning and management capacity of the "Natural

Forest Management Division" of the KFD strengthened. ................................ 54



6.1.2 Planned Result 2: Management plan for Mt. Kenya developed and im-plementation initiated...................................................................................... 60

6.1.2.1 Outline forest management and conservation plan for Mt. Kenyaformulated ............................................................................................... 61

6.1.2.2 Comprehensive management plans for pilot areas formulated................ 656.1.3 Planned Result 3: Extension system developed and participative actions

in sustained management of natural resources in the forests and sur-rounding areas promoted................................................................................ 68

6.1.3.1 Participatory Natural Forest Management................................................ 686.1.3.2 Extension and Support of Agroforestry Activities in Buffer Zone ............. 69

6.1.4 Planned Result 4: FD, other governmental as well as non-governmentalinstitutions involved with natural forests trained in country. ............................ 70

6.1.5 Planned Result 5: Management plan for mangroves at Lamu District de-veloped and implementation initiated.............................................................. 73

6.2 Comparison "Planning and achievements" according to the ToR of the TA ............. 746.2.1 Program Coordinator (Article 5.1 of the ToR, Annex A) .................................. 746.2.2 Forestry Training Expert (Article 5.2 of the ToR, Annex A) ............................. 796.2.3 Mangrove Expert (Article 5.3 of the ToR, Annex A) ........................................ 826.2.4 Summary concerning ToR of the TA............................................................... 83

6.3 Comparison "Planning and achievements" according to the project's own plan-ning .......................................................................................................................... 85

7. Analysis of effectiveness................................................................................................. 96

8. Impact analysis................................................................................................................ 99

9. Sustainability/Replicability ............................................................................................. 100

9.1 Sustainability aspects ............................................................................................. 100

9.2 Replicability aspects ............................................................................................... 101

10. Conclusions................................................................................................................. 103

11. Recommendations for the Reorientation of the Project............................................... 106

11.1 Immediate actions................................................................................................. 106

11.2 Concept and methodology of the reoriented Project............................................. 10711.2.1 General project concept.............................................................................. 10711.2.2 Some explanations and justifications.......................................................... 108

11.2.2.1 Forest Conservation and Management Unit (FCMU) ........................... 10811.2.2.2 Integration of plantations ..................................................................... 10911.2.2.3 Plantation/Shamba System.................................................................. 11011.2.2.4 Participatory Forest Management Concept.......................................... 111

11.3 Overall goal, project purpose, outputs and activities............................................. 111

11.4 Conformity with the Kenya Forestry Master Plan.................................................. 116

11.5 Important assumptions.......................................................................................... 117

11.6 Cooperation with other projects, institutions, NGOs and donors........................... 117

11.7 Contributions......................................................................................................... 11811.7.1 EC contributions.......................................................................................... 118

11.7.1.1 Description of contributions.................................................................. 11811.7.1.2 Cost estimate of EC contributions........................................................ 119

11.7.2 Kenyan contributions .................................................................................. 12011.7.3 Other contributions...................................................................................... 120

12. Lessons learned.......................................................................................................... 121



Annexes (in a separate Volume)

1 Logical framework matrices1.1 Reconstructed PPM according to the Financial Agreement1.2 Reconstructed PPM according to the ToR of the TA Contract1.3 Reconstructed PPM according to the Project's own Planning1.4 Proposed PPM for the continuation of the COMIFOR Project2 Maps of the project areas3 Terms of Reference of the Evaluation Mission4 Comments of the consultant on the ToR of the Evaluation Mission5 Methodology applied for the study6 List of persons, institutions and communities consulted7 Literature and documentation consulted8 Brief curricula vitae of the evaluators8.1 Brief curriculum vitae of Hubert Forster8.2 Brief curriculum vitae of Werner Schindele8.3 Brief curriculum vitae of Dr. J. Kiyiapi9 Work and journey report of the evaluation team

10 Unit prices for forest staff, works, material and equipment11 Workshop Report12 Summary of Final evaluation Report for European Commission and for OECD/DAC

Evaluation Summary13 The Forestry Sector and its relevant frame conditions14 General context of the project area: Mt. Kenya Forest Reserve15 General context of the project area: Lamu mangroves16 Deployment of FD personnel17 Project Steering Committee18 Day and night allowances



Preamble

The Project for Conservation and Management of Indigenous Forests "COMIFOR" wasplanned as a component to the comprehensive Forest Development Project being financedby WB, ODA, Swiss Development Corporation, Finnida and the Government of Kenya.

The COMIFOR Project is based on the Financial Agreement No. 5087/KE, signed on No-vember 19, 1992 between the Commission of the European Union (formerly Commission ofthe European Communities) and the Government of the Republic of Kenya. By exchange ofletters between the Ministry of Finance and the European Commission the Mt. Kenya ForestReserve covering 200,000 ha and the mangrove forests in Lamu District covering 33,000 hawere determined as project intervention areas.

The Agreement provides assistance to GoK in order to strengthen the Forest Department,and to design and implement forest management plans for the primary forests and the sur-rounding areas taking into account a population participatory approach. Particularly it wasplanned to strengthen the planning and management capacity of the FD, to develop andimplement forest management plans for Mt. Kenya Forest Reserve and mangroves atLamu, to develop the extension system, to promote participative actions in sustained man-agement of natural resources, and to train FD, governmental as well as non-governmentalorganizations involved with the conservation of natural forests. Beneficiaries of the projectshould be the population adjacent to the forests with particular emphasis placed to enhancethe role of women and to benefit the country as a whole.

COMIFOR began with the deployment of the provided TA experts in November 1994. Themid-term evaluation was carried out in September and October 1997 by an evaluation teamcomprising Hubert Forster, Forestry Consultant and head of the evaluation team, WernerSchindele, Forestry Consultant, and Dr. James Kiyiapi, University Lecturer and Forest Re-search Scientist. The evaluators were engaged by the Consulting Company "AGRIFORConsult" which was commissioned by the European Union to organize and conduct theevaluation.

The objectives of the evaluation mission were to assess and analyze the project preparationand design, the relevance of the project, the project implementation, the sustainability of theproject, and to elaborate recommendations for the further execution of the project. Theproject evaluation has been carried out according to the ToR of the mission and the generalevaluation format of EC. Additional to the project evaluation special attention was paid tothe analysis of the forestry sector. The evaluation team studied relevant documents, inter-viewed involved persons, like project and FD staff, representatives of the donor, concernedministries, projects, relevant organizations, forest adjacent communities and interested usergroups, assisted at relevant workshops and meetings, conducted field visits of the Mt.Kenya Forest Reserve as well as of Lamu Mangrove Forest, and organized a reorientationworkshop. The evaluation of the achievements of COMIFOR are mainly based on the Fi-nancial Agreement, the ToR of the TA and a work plan that the project has established it-self.Due to an insufficient project planning which was never really improved, administrativeproblems during the first year of project execution mainly concerning the non-availability offunds, and a weak Technical Assistance COMIFOR did not achieve the planned projectpurpose. Even important results/outputs could not be realized because COMIFOR and theTA gave priority to less important activities, like data collection, and neglected the importantones, especially the initiation of the involvement of local communities for forest manage-ment and conservation. Most of COMIFOR's activities were not carried out in a target ori-ented way respecting the planned outputs and the intended project purpose. Additionalproblems were caused by the heavy bureaucracy of the FD as Project Executing Agencyand unfavorable political frame conditions. Generally it can be stated that COMIFOR wasrather ineffective. The local population so far has not benefited from the project execution,



and no significant contribution has been made to reach the overall goal, the conservationand protection of indigenous forest resources in Kenya.

Mt. Kenya and the mangroves at Lamu belong to the most precious ecosystems of Kenyaand East Africa because of their unique biodiversity and their very important protectionfunctions. Their conservation and protection is not only of national but of worldwide interest.The intention of contributing to the conservation of these ecosystems was absolutely right,and it is strongly recommended to continue the support. In order to make the project moreeffective it is advised to concentrate on Mt. Kenya Forest Reserve. The new project conceptshould be based on three components: the elaboration of adequate technologies of forestconservation, the involvement of the forest adjacent population in forest management andconservation by sharing responsibility and benefits, and the strengthening of the self-helpcapacity of the local population. To achieve these results it will be necessary to elaboratean overall concept and strategy, to set up an efficient Management Unit which can actautonomously to a large extent, and to train the involved peoples, administrators of the Unitas well as community members.



1. SummarySubject of evaluation

The present mid-term evaluation concerns the Project for Conservation and Management ofIndigenous Forests in Kenya "COMIFOR" which is supported by the Commission of theEuropean Union.

COMIFOR was planned as a component to the Kenya Forest Development Project (KFDP)being financed by World Bank (WB), Overseas Development Administration (ODA), SwissDevelopment Corporation, Finnish Development Agency (Finnida) and the Government ofKenya (GoK). COMIFOR was especially designed as a complementary component to the"Kenya Indigenous Forest Conservation Programme" (KIFCON) supported by ODA/UK.

The COMIFOR Project is based on the Financial Agreement No. 5087/KE, signed on No-vember 19, 1992 between the Commission of the European Union and the Government ofthe Republic of Kenya. The agreement provides assistance to GoK to strengthen the ForestDepartment (FD), and to design and implement management plans in primary forests. Byexchange of letters between the Ministry of Finance and the European Commission theproject area was defined as Mt. Kenya Forest Reserve covering 200,000 ha and the man-grove forests in Lamu District covering 33,000 ha.

COMIFOR began with the deployment of the provided TA experts in November 1994. It wasplanned for a period of four years (1994 to 1998). The mid-term evaluation took place inSeptember / October 1997, i.e. three years after the start of the Technical Assistance (TA).

Objectives of the evaluation

The objectives of the evaluation mission were to assess and analyze the project preparationand design, the relevance of the project, the project implementation, the sustainability of theproject, and to elaborate recommendations for the further implementation of the project.

Methodology of the evaluation

The mid-term evaluation was carried out in September and October 1997 by an evaluationteam comprising Hubert Forster, Forestry Consultant and Head of the evaluation team,Werner Schindele, Forestry Consultant, and Dr. James Kiyiapi, Forest Research Scientist.The evaluators were engaged by the Consulting Company "AGRIFOR Consult" which wascommissioned by the European Commission to organize and conduct the evaluation.

The project evaluation has been carried out according to the ToR of the mission and thegeneral evaluation format of EC. Additional to the project evaluation special attention waspaid to the analysis of the forestry sector. The evaluation team studied relevant documents,interviewed involved persons, like project and FD staff, representatives of the EC and otherdonors, concerned Ministries, projects, relevant organizations, forest adjacent communitiesand interested user groups, assisted at relevant workshops and meetings, conducted fieldvisits of the Mt. Kenya Forest Reserve as well as of Lamu Mangrove Forest, and organizeda reorientation workshop.

The evaluation of the achievements of COMIFOR are mainly based on the FinancialAgreement, the ToR of the TA and a work plan that the project has established itself.

The Forestry Sector

Mt. Kenya region comprises about 180,000 ha of indigenous forests which makes about15% of Kenya's total indigenous forests. It is one of the most important ecological zones inthe whole country. Its main importance results from the fact that three big rivers which are ofvital interest to the majority of Kenya's population originate from Mt. Kenya. Many of theexisting ecosystems there are unique in the world.



The Forest Department has the official mandate to manage the forests of Kenya, includingForest Reserves. It belongs to the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources MENR.Although already recently restructured through a general civil service retrenchment programin which approximately 5,000 employees left the Department, the Forest Department stillcomprises nationwide a staff of approximately 10,000 persons. In the Headquarters of theForest Department in Nairobi (Karura) there are 62 graduate forestry officers and about 120support staff.

Nearly 90% of the FD's budget are used for staff wages, thus too little funds are left for op-erations. The capacity of the FD as well as the motivation of its staff can be described aslow. Socio-economic problems become more and more important compared to forest tech-nical problems. The classic forestry training of the staff is not apt to compete with the actualproblems. The bureaucracy of FD is quite heavy and thus does not allow the necessaryflexibility to prevent and solve the various problems. FD is specially lacking planning andmanagement capacities. Up-to-date management information systems are not existingwithin FD. A sound study of reorganization and restructuring seems to be urgently requiredso that FD is put in a position to treat tomorrow's problems. On the commercial plantationsthe study of the restructuring of the FD has been already done by PriceWaterhouse.

A new Forestry Master Plan 1995 to 2020 has been developed which contains importantelements to improve the Forestry Sector. It is proposed that the FD concentrates on forestpolicy matters and forest regulations whereas the practical management of the forests,plantations and indigenous forests, shall be taken over by private or communal bodies. Aprofit-oriented management of the plantations shall contribute to finance the conservation ofindigenous forests. Forest industries in rural areas shall be promoted. Innovative forms offorest management shall be promoted including the participation of forest adjacent popula-tions.

Before the content of the Kenya Forestry Master Plan can be put to practice it has to be of-ficially accepted as new Kenyan Forest Policy by Parliament. Based on the new ForestPolicy a new Forest Legislation will be required. A draft of the new Forest Bill is alreadyelaborated and discussed. It contains some success promising regulations like the possibil-ity of introducing community and private forests (Article 8. and 9.), the State Forest Lease-holds (Article 14) and the participation of communities in conserving state forests (Article22.).

To combine the efforts for forest conservation and development, FD and KWS have signeda "Memorandum of Understanding" in 1991 which provides joint forest management activi-ties. The MoU was not formed to create a separate institution but to optimize utilization ofresources of the two departments. KWS and FD have assigned representatives (MoU Co-ordinators) and set up a joint MoU Secretariat in order to enhance the implementation of theMoU. This Secretariat has no official status, no budget (except for the MoU Coordinator ofKWS), no responsibility and no deciding power. Even the position of the MoU representa-tives within KWS and FD is weak. Without support of projects the MoU Secretary could notexist and joint KWS/FD activities in the sense of the MoU could not be carried out. MoU, asit presents itself at the moment, is not more than the expression of a goodwill of the formerHeads of KWS and FD.

The forestry legislation and policy situation is not very clear at the moment. The new ForestPolicy has already been initiated by passing the new Forestry Master Plan but still the oldone is in force. Some forested areas are double gazetted under different Acts. There is averbal declaration of the President concerning the responsibility of indigenous forest man-agement which has not yet been officially enforced by changing the necessary laws andregulations. The drafts of the new Forest Policy and new Forest Bill are elaborated but notyet in force. It is very important to clarify and regulate the forest situation in order to get asound and unequivocal basis for an improved forest management in future.



Project Planning

The existing official project documents - Financial Agreement, ToR of TA Contract, AnnualWork Plans - cannot be regarded as real planning documents. They are partly inconsistentand thus constitute an inadequate basis for project implementation. Most of the past andpresent problems are due to the fact that there was no proper project planning using one ofthe well-tried planning methods.

The weakness of the original project planning should have been immediately recognized bythe project team, especially by the TAs and the backstopping consulting companies, and itshould have been the first project activity to develop a logical and consistent project plan-ning including a Plan of Operations. This planning adjustment was even more indispensableas KIFCON, an important partner of COMIFOR, withdrew its former commitment andstopped its activities.

Although several attempts have been made, there is neither a detailed problem analysis nora consistent project planning and concept up to date defining the target, the strategy (whatto do) and the methods (how to do it). The consequences are that the project was not man-aged in a target oriented way. It seems that COMIFOR is financing a multitude of differentactivities without considering their relevance and a long term perspective to reach the proj-ect purpose.

Project execution

All three planned experts started their assignment at the same time in November 1994. Atthat time there was no project structure yet, and no funds were available. This led to a con-siderable loss in the efficiency of the three experts as they had no means to render theirservices. The operational funds were only accessible one year after the beginning of the TAcomponent. Equipment arrived months after the TA experts. Half a year after the TA startedthe responsibility of the TA component was shifted from Techniplan to DHV. The ProjectCoordinator changed four times during the first three years. Backstopping services from TAcompanies are not visible, though they are separately paid (no reports!). The TAs did nei-ther elaborate an acceptable project concept nor a plan of operations. Accordingly the proj-ect was confusingly executed. Short term experts were not organized for the real importantissues. The planned cooperation with KIFCON was not possible due to its termination inJune 1994.

The FD assigned the Project Manager in May 1993. A small project structure has been setup beside the Natural Forest Management Division. GoK pays the wages of FD staff as-signed to the project. A Project Steering Committee was set up but it did not meet regularly.Its competence is too restricted. It can make only recommendations though it consists ofhigh ranking officers and donor representatives. GoK did not allocate substantial opera-tional funds for project operations and for per diem and allowances of FD staff. These werepaid by the project. The FD and TA staff is obviously lacking competence in participatoryforest management planning.

Efficiency

Planned output 1: Planning and management capacity of the "Natural Forest ManagementDivision" of the FD strengthened.

The project interpreted this output mainly as supply of material and equipment. Thereforevarious equipment and material for transport, surveying, mapping, camping, boundary de-marcation, office work, etc. was provided, but this was not done in a target oriented way.Some of the bought equipment was not needed for the project purpose or is even uselessto the FD. COMIFOR financed nearly 100% of the project's running expenses, althoughGoK agreed to own contributions. Even in the future it is unlikely that the GoK is economi-cally able to significantly contribute to the operation costs of such projects. The manage-



ment and planning capacities of the FD were not strengthened, as it was planned. The proj-ect measures were not appropriate to slow down the forest depletion process.

Planned output 2: Management plan for Mt. Kenya developed and implementation initi-ated.

No overall management planning concept and implementation strategy exists. Some activi-ties were carried out to obtain basic information about the project region, but the way ofexecution is uncoordinated without taking into account their relationship, linkages and timelyorder. The local people have not been adequately involved so far neither in the planningprocess nor in the implementation of field activities. Most of the techniques applied formanagement planning have considerable weaknesses from the technical point of view(weak TA). The socio-economic study cannot be judged as it was not completed at the timeof evaluation.

Planned output 3: Extension system developed and participative actions in sustainedmanagement of natural resources in the forests and surrounding areaspromoted.

Only initial contacts have been made by COMIFOR with some community groups, but itmade no serious attempt to elaborate participatory approaches. A technical adviser for theparticipatory aspects was not provided for in TA contract but the Project could have madeuse of local expertise and use available man-months for short term experts. Up to now thelocal population has not been brought on board as partners in forest conservation andmanagement. Existing extension methodologies were not utilized by the project. Initial con-tacts with community groups reveal a considerable potential for participatory forest man-agement.

Planned output 4: FD, other governmental as well as non-governmental institutions in-volved with natural forests are trained in the country.

The training needs assessment was partly carried out for FD staff but not for communitymembers. No training program has been developed except for mangrove training. Trainingcourses at Lamu and in Mt. Kenya region were organized in tree species identification,ecology, legislation, MoU, and biodiversity. FD staff attended short courses and was trainedin special technical aspects, like photo interpretation, GIS, etc. Local expertise of educa-tional and training institutions and already existing training material were not adequatelyutilized. ToR for TA were very clear and yet these questions have not been adequately ad-dressed.

Planned output 5: Management plan for mangroves at Lamu District developed and im-plementation initiated.

The mangrove expert arrived too early at the project when no working means and fundswere available. Information on past mangrove management and research in Kenya wascompiled. Aerial photos of Lamu mangroves were purchased, the interpretation started butwas never completed. A draft concept for Lamu mangrove management and conservationwas developed taking into consideration the aspect of community participation, but theelaboration of a management plan has not been initiated. About 3 ha of degraded man-grove were rehabilitated together with school children and the local population applying lowinput approach. The ToR of the mangrove adviser are regarded as too ambitious in relationto the planned TA period of one year only.



Effectiveness and impact

Planned project purpose: "Kenya's FD strengthened, and design and implementation ofmanagement plans in primary forests and surrounding areas assisted taking into account apopulation participation."

The set objectives have not been reached so far. The FD was neither strengthened in a tar-get oriented nor in a sustainable way. The collection of basic data is too time consuming,too expensive and not even target oriented. Forest management planning procedures andinvolvement of local population are not yet initiated. Forest management activities did notyet start. The Project is far from achieving its intended purpose.

Overall goal: "Conservation and protection of indigenous forest resources, including thepreservation of bio-diversity enhanced."

Up to date the COMIFOR Project had no significant impact on the overall goal.

Beneficiaries: "Population adjacent to the forests with particular emphasis placed to en-hance the role of women and to benefit the country as a whole."

Up to date only the FD took profit from the project execution. The planned beneficiarieshave had no benefit yet.

Sustainability

The whole system of forest management and conservation followed by the project still de-pends largely on a permanent flow of external funds to finance the equipment and operat-ing costs of the Forest Department. Project attempts to initiate and develop a participatoryforest management and conservation approach by involving the local communities are notsufficient. The planning of the project considered some important elements of sustainabilitybut during project implementation they were not sufficiently applied in practice. More atten-tion should be paid to sustainability aspects in future.

Recommendations

The present way of executing the COMIFOR Project is not suitable to achieve substantialcontributions to the conservation and management of Mt. Kenya Forest Reserve. At the endof the Project Evaluation an exemplary Project Planning was elaborated in a participatoryway which can serve as a basis for the further proceeding. Many stakeholders were in-volved in the workshop and the outcome of the workshop was accepted by the participantsfor further detailed development.

The proposed Overall Goal, Project Purpose and planned Outputs are:

Overall goal: Welfare of the Kenyan population enhanced through natural re-sources management and conservation of Mt. Kenya Forest Re-serve.

Project purpose(1998 - 2008):

Mt. Kenya Forest Reserve conserved by a participatory, integratedand sustainable management of indigenous forests and planta-tions and their associated biodiversity.

Interim project pur-pose (1998 - 2001):

Replicable model of participatory, integrated and sustainable forestmanagement for the indigenous forests and plantations of Mt.Kenya Forest Reserve elaborated and tested.



Output 1: Participatory forest management concept for indigenous forestsand plantations jointly elaborated.

Output 2: Silviculture systems compatible to multiple use forest managementdeveloped and promoted.

Output 3: FCMU/Mt. Kenya field staff is qualified to communicate with forestadjacent communities and to support them in planning and imple-menting forestry and forest related measures.

Output 4: Integrated forest management involving local communities testedin 2 to 3 pilot areas.

Output 5: Self-help capacity of local population strengthened.

Output 6: An autonomous, decentralized unit for the management of Mt.Kenya Forest Reserve (FCMU/Mt. Kenya) is set up and efficientlymanaged.

In order to obtain as soon as possible an optimal project impact, the following actions areproposed:

• Stop all ongoing project activities and suspend funding until a new project framework hasbeen established and agreed.

• Terminate the contract with DHV.

• EU and GoK shall agree upon a new project framework. Funds to be made available di-rectly to the project. Proposal to be elaborated by an independent consultant as soon aspossible.

• Regard the jointly elaborated PPM as basic project planning document.

• Elaborate ToRs for the engagement of a specialized Consulting Company or/and an in-ternational NGO and proceed tender for its engagement as soon as possible:

◊ Select with utmost care the TA long term experts for "Participatory Forest Planningand Management" and "Community Participation and Extension".

◊ Engage as soon as possible a short term expert to elaborate a sound "General forestmanagement concept for the Mt. Kenya Forest Reserve" which shall serve as basisfor the preparation and execution of the project.

• Until an autonomous forest management structure of Mt. Kenya Forest Reserve is setup, the project shall be executed in an autonomous way, supervised by MoU Secretariatinvolving FD and KWS. Details about the autonomy status have to be particularly speci-fied at the beginning of the new project phase.

• Organize a planning workshop to elaborate a detailed Plan of Operation.



2. Introduction

2.1 History of the Project

Project preparation

The COMIFOR Project was designed as a component of the comprehensive Kenya For-estry Development Project (KFDP) being financed by WB/IDA, ODA/UK, Swiss Develop-ment Corporation, Finnida and the Government of Kenya. KFDP started in 1987. The con-tributions to KFDP were planned as follows:

• KIFCON/ODA: Natural Forest Management (1991)

• IDA/WB: Plantations

• Swiss Dev. Extension

• COMIFOR/EU: Supplement to KIFCON/ODA for 10 forest areas.

According to the PM, Mr. Muniu, the formulation of the Financial Agreement for COMIFORwas done in 1991/1992 by a member of the EC Delegation supported by KEFRI. The con-tent of the Financial Agreement was more or less defined by the overall Kenya Forest De-velopment Project. According to the previous verbal arrangements between the partners,the purpose of the COMIFOR Project was defined as "to strengthen Kenya's Forest De-partment and to assist in design and implementation of management plans in ten primaryforests and surrounding areas taking into account a population participatory approach".

The Financial Agreement No. 5087/KE concerning the project "Conservation and Manage-ment of Indigenous Forests" was signed on November 19, 1992. The Project number is 7ACP KE 009. It is financed by the 7th European Development Fund.

In 1993 the change of the planned project intervention area was discussed. The originallyagreed number of 10 sites was reduced to two sites (Mt. Kenya and Lamu). Additionally, thetender documents for the selection of a consulting company for the TA component wereprepared and launched in 1993.

The offers for the TA were received in January 1994. The evaluation of the offers and theselection of the consulting company took more than half a year.

Project implementation

The CCF appointed Mr M. J. W. Muniu, Assistant Conservator of Forests and at the time ofnomination Head of the Engineering Division, as Manager of the COMIFOR Project in May1993. According to the "Special Conditions" of the Financial Agreement (Article 3.6 of An-nex 2) the Head of the Natural Forest Management Division, Mr. Mbengei, was nominatedNational Director of the Project. He is also a member of the Project Steering Committee, theplanning team as well as of the Mt. Kenya management task force. Already in 1993 theother counterparts for the COMIFOR Project have been appointed: B. M. Kivyatu for themangrove component (he is still working with the project), B. W. Ndiithi for the training com-ponent and I. K. Nyakangi for silviculture.

By exchange of letters in 1993 and 1994 the project intervention sites were reduced fromoriginally 10 forests to only two Forest Reserves, that are Mt. Kenya and Lamu mangroves.The total area covered by the project assistance increased from previously 150,000 ha toapproximately 230,000 ha (Mt. Kenya: ~ 200,000 ha and Lamu: ~ 33,000 ha).

The contract with Techniplan was concluded in October 1994, and the three experts pro-vided for in TA contract arrived in November 1994 almost at the same time. By then therewere no working means available: no transport, no offices, no equipment, no material, noteven operational funds! Consequently the output of the experts and their contributions toachieving the project purpose was insignificant for almost one year. Even the TA compa-nies, Techniplan and DHV, were not able to organize the needed working and transport



materials in time. At that point in time it would have been advisable to send back the trainingand the mangrove experts until the project structure was prepared and acceptable workingconditions were given.

In April 1995 the first Inception Report was submitted but it could neither serve as an opera-tion plan for the project nor as annual work plan. This was one of the reasons why the op-erational funds could not be released. The other reason was that the EU and the GoKregulations concerning the administration of the project funds were not compatible. EU pro-posed a project account for which the Project Manager and the Project Coordinator arejointly authorized. GoK regulations, however, do not allow Kenyan civil servants to keepsuch a project bank account. Therefore it was decided that the consultant company has torun an "imprest account" for the operational funds of the project. A provision for this con-struction (project imprest account run by the consultant company) was already provided inthe TA contract (Annex A: ToR, chap. 4). The corresponding Addendum No. 1 to the TAcontract was concluded between May 11 and August 2, 1995 and the imprest account wasopened at ABN AMRO Bank, Nyerere Road, Nairobi, in August 1995, account no.1.65.75.016, at the name of DHV Consultants BV ARD, Ref.: Imprest Account. This accountwas first credited on October 30, 1995. It was only from this moment onwards, i.e. almostone year after the arrival of the three TA experts, that the project disposed of operationalfunds.

The equipment and material was ordered by the FD according to an indicative list figuring inthe Financial Agreement (Art. 3.2) not considering the fact that the Financial Agreementwas already elaborated in 1991/1992 under different preconditions where COMIFOR wassupposed to support 10 different forest sites. Some equipment and material could be pur-chased in 1995. This was mainly done through supply contracts formally approved by GoKand EC and paid directly by EC Delegation (called "direct supply" by COMIFOR project). InMay/June 1995 12 Landrovers Defender, 3 lorries and 6 tractors with trailers arrived at CO-MIFOR Project. Not all of the delivered equipment was needed by the project. Some of thetransport means were given to FD staff and stations outside the project area.

In July 1995 the EU adviser to the National Authorizing Officer assisted COMIFOR Projectto set up a first Annual Work Plan for the budget year 1995/1996 (July 1995 to June 1996).

In May 1995, approximately half a year after the start of the TA component, the first ProjectCoordinator, G. van Melle, resigned, and according to the Memorandum elaborated byTechniplan it was pushed by EC Delegation to transfer the TA contract to DHV Consultants.The DHV training expert, J. Nieuwenhuis, took over the role of the interim Project Coordi-nator. In September 1995 DHV sent another interim Project Coordinator, Mr. Bech, who wassupposed to elaborate a proper project planning. He was part time supported by an Envi-ronmental Economist, Mr. I. Campbell. Though a logical framework workshop was held inNovember 1995, the project planning proposed by the COMIFOR Project and DHV Con-sultants was never satisfactory as it did not respect the intended project purpose as statedin the Financial Agreement and repeatedly expressed by the donor. This was why even thesecond and the third Inception Reports (November and December 1995) were not ac-cepted.

By the end of 1995 the responsible Technical Officer of the EU/HQ, Mr Huaux, visited theproject. After his visit he proposed the execution of a "Mid-term evaluation" of the COMI-FOR Project as foreseen in the Financial Agreement (Annex 2, Article 5.2). Mr. Uwe Wer-blow, Head of Division within EC, asked the EC Delegation in his letter dated 22 March1996 to take the necessary steps so that the evaluation planned for early 1997 could startas soon as possible. The reason why the evaluation was delayed for another one and a halfyears may be due to a request of the Project Coordinator. With its letter of July 10, 1996 theProject Coordinator, W. van Ijssel, asked the EC Delegation to organize the planned projectevaluation not before April 1997 because "the project needs some breathing space to getthings moving, especially also on the new community participation plans". Another reason



for the time delay of the evaluation may be the long lasting procedure to organize thisevaluation. It took almost one year from the elaboration of the ToR to the execution.

The evaluation of the COMIFOR Project was then scheduled for the second half of 1997. Ittook place in September 1997 in Kenya. The edition of the evaluation report was done inOctober 1997. The Project Coordinator, W. van Ijssel, unfortunately left Kenya before theend of the mid-term evaluation on September 19, 1997 following his decision by end of July1997 to leave the project. If, in spite of the resignation of W. van Ijssel just one year beforethe end of this project, the contract with the consulting company DHV would be kept, an-other Project Coordinator, the fifth one within three years (!), would have to be accepted.DHV proposed a certain Mr. Sean White who is specialized in plantation management andtherefore not really qualified for this position. Before continuing the project a sound projectorganization and implementation concept should be elaborated as basis for further deci-sions.

In December 1995 a revised version of the Inception Report was submitted by the project.Even this version was not fully accepted by EC as it still foresaw a continuation of the man-grove component which was neither agreed by the Ministry of Finance (see letter datedFebruary 16, 1996) nor by the donor. Additionally the conclusions drawn in this InceptionReport ("What is proposed" and "What cannot be done"; page VII) do not reflect the projectpurpose as formulated in the Financial Agreement. The revised Inception Report states thatCOMIFOR Project cannot deal with "pioneering of new, community-based participatory ap-proaches" and "providing sufficient training and capacity building for community participa-tory approaches", but exactly these points were regarded as the main outputs of the project!

Therefore, the EC Delegation explained the actual situation in a detailed letter from March15, 1996 to the Directorate General for Development. It recommended to concentrate theproject on Mt. Kenya and not to continue the support of the mangrove component in Lamu,and it expressed its dissatisfaction about the planned non-implementation of the communityparticipation component by COMIFOR and its TA. The Head of the Division DG VIII/E/6 an-swered on March 22, 1996 to the EC Delegation that giving up the implementation of themanagement plans and the realization of the forest conservation and protection programwith the participation of the local communities was not acceptable as these issues formedthe foundations of the project. The Directorate General for Development requested the ECDelegation to organize a mid-term evaluation as quickly as possible.

After the reaction of EU/HQ, EC Delegation wrote to the PS/MoF with copies to PS/MENRand PM/COMIFOR and explained very clearly that priority should be given to Mt. KenyaForest Reserve and that its indigenous forests can never be managed without the participa-tion of the local population. The Delegate also stated in his letter that the creation of a fa-vorable forest policy and legislation are indispensable prerequisites for a successful projectimplementation.

After this letter the project elaborated a "Project Revision" paper as annex to the Decemberversion of the Inception Report on April 30, 1996 which contains proposals for the introduc-tion of community participation. This paper shows that neither the COMIFOR Project nor theTA disposed of the necessary knowledge on how to build the cooperation with local com-munities for joint forest management.

Together with the "Project Revision" paper the TA introduced the Addendum No. 2 to theTA contract asking for an augmentation of the TA component. The consultant company re-quested one additional long term expert in social forestry for 15 m/m, short term experts foranother 4 m/m and the carrying out of a socio-economic survey. Bearing in mind that theCOMIFOR Project did not use its already present capacity to initiate and develop the par-ticipatory forest management component, the decision of the donor to decline this request(Addendum No. 2) can be understood.

With its letter of July 10, 1996 the Project Coordinator, W. van Ijssel, asked the EC Delega-tion to organize the planned project evaluation not before April 1997 because "the project



needs some breathing space to get things moving, especially also on the new communityparticipation plans". Unfortunately, COMIFOR Project did not move very much since 1996,neither in this nor in another direction.

In August 1996 the training expert, J. Nieuwenhuis, left the project after the termination ofhis 20 m/m contract.

The evaluation of the COMIFOR Project was scheduled for the second half of 1997. It tookplace in September 1997 in Kenya. The edition of the evaluation report was done in Octo-ber 1997. During the mid-term evaluation the Project Coordinator, W. van Ijssel, resignedand left Kenya on September 19, 1997. If, in spite of the resignation of W. van Ijssel justone year before the end of this project, the contract with the consulting company DHV willbe kept, another Project Coordinator, the fifth one within three years (!), will have to be ac-cepted. DHV proposed a certain Mr. Sean White who is specialized in plantation manage-ment and therefore not really qualified for this position.

In August 1996 the training expert, J. Nieuwenhuis, left the project after the termination ofhis 20 m/m contract.

Planned cooperation with KIFCON

One important partner of the COMIFOR Project, the KIFCON Program financed by ODA,started in 1991. Its first preparatory phase was designed for three years and should last un-til June 1994. Originally a second phase of KIFCON was planned but it turned out quiteclearly in April 1994 that KIFCON would not be continued after June 1994. The reasons forthis early termination of KIFCON are mainly of political nature and have nothing to do withthe COMIFOR Project.

The discussions of cooperation between EU and ODA started in 1989/1990. According toDr. Peter Wass, Head of the KIFCON Program, it was verbally agreed between the two do-nor agencies that ODA should concentrate on "management of indigenous forests" whileEU supports "institutional strengthening". At that time, Mr van Helden, responsible TA at theEC Delegation in Nairobi, strongly supported the COMIFOR project idea.

KIFCON was to develop a methodology for natural forest management in three pilot areas,that are Mau, Kakamega and Arabuko Sokoke Forest Reserves. COMIFOR should then im-plement the developed concept in 10 further Forest Reserves, especially by strengtheningthe FD. On the other hand it was not foreseeable at the time the COMIFOR Project was de-signed (in 1991/1992), what KIFCON could achieve within its first phase (1991 to 1994). SoCOMIFOR could never rely at 100 % on KIFCON's output. And COMIFOR Project was sup-posed to start already in 1993 when the results of KIFCON could not yet have been ex-pected. Therefore, one of COMIFOR's task was also "to assist in design of managementplans" (Annex 2, Article 1).

Whenever the weak progress of COMIFOR Project was discussed, the Project itself as wellas the consulting company DHV used as excuse the missing input from the KIFCON Pro-gram arising from its early termination. On the other hand the Permanent Secretary ofMENR stated in his letter of 19th April, 1994 "that COMIFOR will not be affected by the clo-sure of KIFCON". Unfortunately a chance to adjust and improve the project planning ofCOMIFOR was missed in this way. After two major changes, the change of the project areaand the termination of KIFCON, COMIFOR Project should have been properly replanned toavoid any confusion and to guarantee a smooth project implementation. This replanningshould have been done latest at the very beginning of the TA in cooperation between theTA experts and the FD counterparts and with the assistance of the consultant companiesTechniplan and DHV.



Project area

Originally it was agreed to assist the Kenya FD in design and implementation of manage-ment plans in ten (10) primary forests. The PM explained in his letter of 6th September1993 that it was difficult to pinpoint, apart from Lamu mangroves, nine (9) separate forestsmaking up the area of 150,000 ha. Therefore he proposed to select only one (1) forest, thatis Mt. Kenya Forest Reserve with a total area of approximately 200,000 ha. The mangrovesin Lamu District were considered according to the project document.

The EC Delegation supported the view of the PM in its letter to the Directorate General forDevelopment from September 23, 1993. In October 18, 1993 the Directorate General forDevelopment replies agreeing to the selection of only two project areas, that are Mt. KenyaForest Reserve and mangroves of Lamu District.

The official application to reduce the project area to two Forest Reserves is expressed inthe letter of the Permanent Secretary of MoF dated 17th December, 1993. The officialagreement of the EU to this modification of the Financial Agreement was expressed in itsletter of April 28, 1994.

It has been certainly a wise decision to concentrate on two project areas only. Otherwisethe project's assistance would have been too much dispersed including the risk of being in-efficient at the end.

Technical Assistance

The tender procedure to select a qualified Consulting Company was started by end of 1993.Submission date of the bids was early 1994. The evaluation of the offers took quite a while.Finally the consultant company TECHNIPLAN SPA, a limited liability company under Italianlaw, residing in Rome, via Guido d'Arezzo 14, was selected for the provision of TechnicalAssistance to the COMIFOR Project. The contract between Techniplan and MENR wassigned on October 27, 1994.

On October 28, 1994 Techniplan concluded a subcontract with the Dutch consulting com-pany DHV Consultants BV, a limited liability company under Dutch law, concerning the pro-vision of the services of its training expert, Mr. Johan Nieuwenhuis, to carry out the projectcomponent related to the forestry training.

In November 1994 all three experts provided in the TA contract started their assignment inKenya almost at the same time. The training expert, J. Nieuwenhuis (DHV), arrived on No-vember 8, 1994, the mangrove expert, Martin S. Johnson (Techniplan), on November 15,1994 and the project coordinator, van Melle (Techniplan), on November 21, 1994.

The decision of sending all three experts right from the very beginning to the project and forwhich the two consultant companies Techniplan and DHV could be held responsible, wasquite unusual and not success promising at all, as there were no means yet to enable theexperts to carry out their work. Indeed, at the arrival of the three experts there were notransport facilities, no offices, no working material and even no funds to pay for the project'soperation costs. This situation lasted for several months.

The first Inception Report was introduced in April 1995 but it was not accepted by EC andNAO as a project planning document.

In April 1995 the first Project Coordinator, G. van Melle from Techniplan, accused his com-pany of being unreliable and unable to render the required backstopping services. He re-signed in May 1995.

Indeed all participants, the EU as donor, the MENR as responsible authority and the COMI-FOR Project itself, were unsatisfied by the backstopping services rendered by Techniplan. Itwas believed that Techniplan would not improve its services in future. Therefore, Mr. vander Goot, responsible adviser at the EC Delegation in Nairobi, convinced the managing di-rector of Techniplan, Mr. Moriondo, to transfer the contract to DHV so that the project could



continue without break. Otherwise EU would have insisted on terminating the contract withTechniplan a situation that would have caused a long break to the project because a newTA consulting company would have to be engaged by going through international tenderingprocedures.

In order not to lose credit with the EU, Mr. Moriondo agreed to this procedure under thecondition that the mangrove expert, M. S. Johnson, (5 remaining man-months) and twoman-months for short term experts (aerial photo interpretation) remained with Techniplan. Acorresponding "Assignment Agreement" was prepared and signed between Techniplan andDHV on May 11, 1995.

After the transfer of the TA contract from Techniplan to DHV the training expert, J. Nieu-wenhuis, took over the project coordination function for the interim period from May toSeptember 11, 1995. On September 12, 1995 N. J. Bech arrived at the COMIFOR Projectas Interim Project Coordinator. Together with I. Campbell, a resource economist fromPANAFCON (a 100% daughter company of DHV in Kenya), Mr. Bech tried to set up aproper planning of the COMIFOR Project. They organized a logical framework workshop onNovember 21 and 22, 1995 during which a PPM for COMIFOR was elaborated. However,this was a rather useless exercise because the new project planning has already been fixedbefore by Bech and Campbell. Of course, they could have changed the premature planningaccording to the outputs of the planning workshop, but this was not done. Reasons for thisomission were not given by the project. The revision of the project operation planning aslaid down in the Inception Report of November 1995 was not acceptable to EC as it con-tained 47 additional man-months for TA experts and asked for an increase of the projectbudget of about 15%.

The interim Project Coordinator, N. J. Bech, left Kenya on December 2, 1995. The overlap-ping period with his successor, the long term Project Coordinator W. van Ijssel, lasted foronly 7 days as van Ijssel arrived on November 25, 1995. The timely planning of the work-shop was certainly not ideal as it was organized at the end of the planning process and yetthe future Project Coordinator, W. van Ijssel, could not participate.

2.2 Project context of Mt. Kenya Forest Reserve

2.2.1 Historical background

The forests of Mt. Kenya have been subject to heavy logging since decades (selective log-ging started already in the early 1900). Large tracts of Ocotea (Camphor) forests were de-stroyed long before colonial times by Kikuyu, Meru and Embu settlements, and by the Il-purko and Illaikipiak Maasai (BUSSMANN, 1996). In colonial times, and even more so sinceKenya became independent, especially the camphor forest were heavily exploited. In 1994,approximately 150 commercial enterprises were extracting raw timber from Mt. Kenya For-est. The sawmills on the western side of the forest deal almost exclusively with exotic timberfrom plantations which are the main source for the locally required construction wood. Onthe eastern side the proportion of pit sawyers and (illegal) users of indigenous wood ismuch higher (KIFCON, 1994).

The FD policy up to mid 1980 was the conversion of indigenous forests into fast growingexotic timber plantations which was supported by World Bank. Forest exploitation of indige-nous forests was not really managed. Selective logging was carried out based on cuttingdiameter limits and demarcation of the cutting coupes in suitable areas. With the formationof the Mt. Kenya Pitsawyer Association the exploitation and utilization of Mt. Kenya indige-nous forest came out of control which was one reason for the presidential ban on the ex-ploitation of indigenous forests in 1986. Up to then, Mt. Kenya forest was the main sourceof indigenous timber which was (and still is) transported to numerous urban centers, for ex-



ample, Nakuru, Nanyuki, Meru, Embu, Moyale, Mandera, Mombasa, and Malindi, althoughthe largest market was/is Nairobi. The demand for indigenous hardwood especially camphoris still very high as there are no alternative timbers on the market. Today illegal exploitationof camphor and other valuable hardwoods is the major cause of forest depletion in Mt.Kenya Forest Reserve.

2.2.2 Illegal commercial logging

The remaining camphor forests of Mt. Kenya are seriously endangered by illegal (and legal)felling which is a highly profit business. As already mentioned, the camphor wood is themost favored construction and furniture wood and it is still sold for very high prices on theurban market despite of the logging ban on indigenous forests. On the other hand, the finesfor illegal cutting are incredibly low (fixed at 3000 KSh in the Forestry Act) compared to theprofit margin and does not have any preventive effect at all. There is also still some legalextraction of camphor wood going on based on license fees from the 1970s (timber forwhich licenses have been issued before the ban in 1986 can still be legally extracted),which makes it also difficult to control illegal logging. The Forestry Department has neitherthe means nor the political will to stop the illegal exploitation and even if illegal loggers arecaught there is lack of law enforcement by the police and the courts. On the other hand thepersons who implement the illegal logging are usually jobless or landless farmers which areengaged by "syndicates". To punish them does not change much as they are easily re-placed by others. This makes it also difficult for the local population to engage themselvesin forest protection and patrolling because of social relationship.

The illegal and uncontrolled exploitation of camphor is carried out in a disastrous, the pre-cious camphor wood wasting and camphor trees eradicating way. Not even basic and evi-dent ecological, silvicultural and economic knowledge is respected. It has incredible nega-tive effects on the ecosystem. Giant camphor trees are felled even on steep slopes causingsevere erosion. As most of the huge stems are too large to be removed via the accesstracks only a minor portion of the tree is used by cutting off the most valuable parts of thetree and leaving the bulk of the unused material in the forest. Also, within the more accessi-ble areas all the camphor trees are felled leaving no seed trees for future regeneration be-hind. The camphor trees have generally large crowns and when felled the forest is consid-erably opened. As a consequence, the vegetation cover changes to secondary forests,dominated by less valuable Macaranga kilimandscharica in lower and medium altitudes andNeoboutonia macrocalyx in the higher altitudes.

The Ocotea forest ecosystem of Mt. Kenya is heavily endangered and it will not survive un-less immediate action is taken.

2.2.3 Banghi farm encroachment

The cultivation of marihuana (Bhangi) is another serious threat to the forests on the south-eastern slopes of Mt. Kenya. From the air, numerous marihuana shambas of all sizes canbe seen. These shambas were established deep in the forests by slash and burn activities.Like the illegal logging of camphor, it is a high profitable business which is carried out bysyndicates even with the involvement of high officials. Most of the shambas are protectedby heavily armed men which makes it quite dangerous to the low paid forester to do any-thing against it.



2.2.4 High local demand on forest products

Due to the high population density adjacent to Mt. Kenya Forest Reserve the demand onforest products is very high and even increases with growing population density. Forestutilization is done based on licenses which are issued for timber (from plantations only),NTFPs, bee keeping, cattle browsing, land rent fees for annual cultivation, etc. For examplein the financial year 1996/97 a total of about 20.3 mio. KSh revenue was collected by theFD of which 11.8 mio. KSh came from timber royalties and 8.5 mio. from NTFPs and otheruses (Source: FD Revenue Office). The exploitation of NTFPs is not well managed whichleads to an overuse of the accessible forest areas. Especially in the west, overgrazing is aproblem for the natural regeneration of indigenous species.

The submontane and montane cedar forests are also heavily affected by illegal logging fortimber, especially for fence poles, since durable, termite-resistant cedarwood is most suit-able for this purpose.

2.2.5 Plantations, Shamba farms and excisions

In the past many of the original Cedar forests were converted into plantations of fast grow-ing softwoods and today about 20,500 ha of such plantations exist mainly in the northwestof Mt. Kenya Forest Reserve. The conversion of indigenous forests into plantations stoppedin 1986 when conservation of indigenous forest became a main policy of the FD.

Timber plantations were established by applying the Shamba system. This system was initi-ated during the pre-independent era. It is similar to the Taungya system and allows thefarmer to cultivate crops for a period of 3 to 4 years after clearing of the land which is aimedat tending the young tree seedlings. However, due to administrative complications associ-ated the Shamba system was banned in 1988. In late 1993 it was reintroduced around Mt.Kenya by presidential decree which opened areas for temporary farming activities (non-resident cultivation), after clearfelling of some plantations in the Naro Moru and Sirimon re-gion. As a consequence, shambas are now extending almost to Naro Moru Gate of Mt.Kenya National Park, and the remaining forests are subject to extreme pressure fromsquatters felling more trees for timber and firewood, and burning indigenous forest areas toprovide arable land (BUSSMANN, 1996). As mentioned earlier, in the northwest many peo-ple depend on their shamba farms in the forest. To remove them from the forest would cre-ate a lot of social conflicts and it is doubtful that there will be political will to do that.

The allocation of Shamba farms to farmers should be improved giving all interested farmersfrom a particular area the same chance of getting the timely limited and restricted farmingrights. The Shamba farms have to properly supervised in order to avoid the not permittedextension of the farms and to guarantee the careful treatment of the forest plants during thefarming period.

2.2.6 Animal damage

The comparatively high population of elephants causes considerable damage in the soft-wood plantations mainly by peeling off the bark. The forest adjacent communities evensuffer much more under elephant damage. Elephants come at night and destroy their fieldsand even feed on the stored crops. It is common practice by the farmers to protect theirshambas in the forest and their fields by chasing away the elephants, which is sometimesquite dangerous. Some communities have even started to dig again elephant moats (a ditchof about 1 m depth and 1.50 m width which elephants do not pass) which is supported byKWS.



The huge game population, especially of buffaloes, contributes much to the destruction ofthe Cedar forests by feeding on seedlings and young trees. Browsing damage was fre-quently observed and especially in the dry season, the forest floor is partly bare of vegeta-tion as every herb or bush is eaten and trampled by game. The same applies for Hageniaforests, where additionally debarking of trees by elephants as well as frequent chafingdamage on the bark was observed.

2.2.7 Forest fires

Forest fires occur more and more frequently in the dry northwest of Mt. Kenya. The maincause of fire is said to be carelessness of beekeepers when smoking their beehives, butthere might be also other reasons like careless land clearing (shamba farms) or even willfulfires. As the vegetation has also changed to more drought sensitive and easily combustiblesecondary forests the fire risk as well as the fire damage have became much higher. Thisyear at the beginning of October a huge forest fire destroyed about 800 ha in the northwestof Mt. Kenya. At present, the forest stations do neither have the means nor the knowledgeto prevent and to fight forest fires effectively. It was interesting to hear complaints from thelocal people that their help becomes invaluable when it comes to fire fighting and yet inother respects are regarded as forest destroyers by FD.

2.2.8 Forest management and production potential

As mentioned earlier, Mt. Kenya Forest Reserve has been exploited since several decades.The silvicultural system applied for exploitation of indigenous trees was a selective cuttingsystem based on a cutting diameter limit and allocation of annual coupes. Managementplans were only developed for the establishment and management of plantations. Todayforest management with the objective of timber production is restricted to plantations whichare the only source of legally produced construction wood in the region. With the signing ofthe MoU, FD and KWS are now jointly responsible for management of Mt. Kenya ForestReserve, but FD is still responsible for extraction of forest produce. The present system ofmanagement consists of the FD issuing licenses for timber exploitation within plantationsand the utilization of NTFPs in the indigenous forests.

KIFCON conducted a forest inventory of Mt. Kenya Forest Reserve in 1992/93 and pub-lished the results in an inventory report in 1994. Based on 1991 aerial photographs avegetation cover map was produced which is available in digital format at the FD. However,due to the early termination of KIFCON, neither an outline management plan nor detailedforest management plans were developed. KIFCON (1994) calculated the potential pro-jected yields as follows:

Summary of projected yields (m3/year) for Mt. Kenya Forest Reserve

Produce Closed CanopyForest

Other ForestAssociations

Total

Sawlogs 44,700 30,500 75,200Fuelwood 81,100 56,000 137,100Poles (small) 15,900 11,400 27,300Poles (large) 5,300 3,100 8,400Total 147,000 101,000 248,000

It is assumed that other forest associations (e.g. bamboo, shrub etc.) cannot be economi-cally exploited. Also no reduction factor for inoperable areas was applied. WASS (1995) es-



timated the total yield of Mt. Kenya at 122,900 m3/year of which 36,200 m3/year is timber,59,500 m3/year is fuelwood and 27,200 m3/year are poles.

Mt. Kenya Forest Reserve would still have a high potential for domestic and commercialtimber production - even from the indigenous forests - if sustainable forest managementsystems would be introduced. Without a strong and committed forest management unit andpeoples participation, the Mt. Kenya Forest Reserve cannot be conserved in future.



3. Project preparation and design

3.1 Original project planning

The original project idea is basically contained in two official documents:

a) the Financial Agreement signed on November 19, 1992

b) the ToR of the TA (Annex A to the TA contract).

Unfortunately the COMIFOR Project was not systematically planned using one of the well-tried planning methods, like "logical framework" or ZOPP. A systematic planning shouldstart with the execution of a detailed problem and stakeholder analysis. Based on the prob-lem tree a hierarchy of objectives is developed. During the project planning exercise it willbe precisely defined

• what shall be achieved by the project execution (project purpose)

• to which overall goal the project shall contribute,

• which outputs of the project are needed to obtain the requested project purpose, and

• which activities will have to be carried out by the project to achieve the required outputs.

Most of the past and present problems could have been avoided by planning COMIFORProject in a target oriented way. The lack of a proper project planning led to a series ofconfusions and contradictions and left ample space for everybody's own interpretation ofthe project's main purpose and the concept through which the project purpose was to beachieved.

The weakness of the original project planning should have been immediately recognized bythe project team, especially by the TAs and the backstopping consultant companies (Tech-niplan and DHV). It should have been the first project activity to organize a workshop withrepresentatives from all relevant institutions and target groups, and to develop a logical andconsistent project planning, i.e. to jointly elaborate a PPM containing overall goal, projectpurpose, outputs/results and activities. Objectively verifiable indicators, the sources of veri-fication and important assumptions should have been clearly defined.

This planning adjustment would have been absolutely necessary, and it was even more in-dispensable as KIFCON withdrew its former commitment and stopped its activities. At thatstage the frame conditions of the project had significantly changed which should have led toa reorientation of the project's concept and a proper new project planning. But instead ofdoing this, the Permanent Secretary of MENR wrote to the EC Delegation that "I wish toconfirm that COMIFOR will not be affected by the closure of KIFCON" (letter CONF.203VOL.II/(29) of 19th April 1994).

3.1.1 Financial Agreement

As already mentioned, the Financial Agreement does not provide an evident project plan-ning, stating clearly the project purpose, the requested outputs and the needed inputs. ThisAgreement has to be analyzed in detail, and together with a variety of other information(letters from EC Delegation and EU/HQ, discussions, meetings, etc.) it can be quite clearlyinterpreted.

When reading the Financial Agreement one gets the impression that strengthening of theFD should be the most important part of the COMIFOR Project. The strengthening aspect isrepeated several times. The first phrase of the Financial Agreement, Annex 2, starts with"The purpose of the project is to strengthen Kenya's Forest Department ...".

This means that COMIFOR was originally designed as an institutional building project.There is no problem with this construction, but there is still the question: In which sense and



direction should the FD be strengthened? Strengthening can hardly be done in a generalway, it must be target oriented. Only by stating that the FD should be strengthened, the ba-sic questions "for what purpose" and "how to achieve it" are not yet answered. It means,strengthening is not an end in itself, but has to contribute to reach a certain target.

First of all, the basic questions "what is the project purpose?" and "how can it be achieved?"should have been put forward, discussed and clearly answered. Only by answering thesequestions could an adequate working methodology and strategy have been elaborated.

In the second paragraph of the Financial Agreement it is stated: "The main goals (of theproject) are to improve KFD's capacity to achieve sustained management of Kenya's in-digenous forests ...". Is a main goal higher than a project purpose? Anyhow, it becomesquite clear that the strengthening of the FD is regarded as a means to reach at sustainedmanagement of indigenous forests.

In the first paragraph the Financial Agreement states that the project should "assist in de-sign and implementation of management plans ... taking into account a population partici-patory approach". This is a very important hint for finding out the originally intended meth-odology and strategy: the local population should be involved, and if this is the case, themethodology and strategy are more or less given and there is not much space left for de-viation.

The assumption that the COMIFOR Project was conceived as a participatory forest man-agement project is supported by the fact that the Financial Agreement states clearly thebeneficiaries of the project: "the population adjacent to the forests with particular emphasisplaced on enhancing the role of women and to benefit the country as a whole". Furthermorethe Financial Agreement mentions in chap. 4.3 "The local population will be fully involved inthe planning and implementation of management plans". And it mentions under chap. 4.5"Risks and uncertainties": "underestimation of the importance of the population participatoryapproach".

The importance of a participatory approach becomes even more evident when reading theletter of the Head of the EC Delegation from April 11, 1996, addressed to the PS/MoF andcopied to PS/MENR and COMIFOR project where it is stated that "indigenous forests cannever be managed without the participation of the local population".

When properly analyzing the Financial Agreement one will find the following reconstructedproject planning matrix:

Overall objective:Conservation and protection of indigenous forest resources, including the preservation ofbio-diversity are enhanced.

Project purpose:Kenya's FD of the MENR strengthened, and design and implementation of managementplans in primary forests and surrounding areas assisted taking into account a populationparticipation. (Source: Financial Agreement, chap. I)

Result 1:Planning and management capacity of the "Natural Forest Management Division" of theKFD strengthened.• rehabilitate and construct conservation posts (30) and station buildings (3)• rehabilitate forest feeder roads (80 km) to facilitate planning and management of imple-

mentation activities• provision of equipment and material for transport, surveying, mapping, camping and

boundary demarcation (12 Pick-ups, 3 lorries, 6 tractors, 3 boats including spare parts)• finance part of the running expenses of the project.



Result 2:Management plan for Mt. Kenya developed and implementation initiated.• demarcate boundaries• planting on boundaries• initiate reforestation and enrichment planting of denuded and degraded parts of forest

reserves• fully involve local population in the planning and implementation of management plans• promote community development activities outside the forests using existing extension

services and NGOs, specifically geared towards the need of women

Result 3:Extension system developed and participative actions in sustained management of naturalresources in the forests and surrounding areas promoted.• introduce agroforestry activities in the buffer zones• involve appropriate NGOs

Result 4:FD, other governmental as well as non-governmental institutions involved with natural for-ests trained in country.• develop a special training program in conservation and management• develop a special training program in aspects of population participative approaches• support the selective training of staff and conservation guards

Result 5:Management plan for mangroves at Lamu District developed and implementation initiated.• interpret aerial photos• collect data• train staff in mangrove management• initiate reforestation and enrichment planting of denuded and degraded parts of forest

reserves• fully involve local population in the planning and implementation of management plans

Beneficiaries:Population adjacent to the forests with particular emphasis placed to enhance the role ofwomen and to benefit the country as a whole.

Responsible project implementing agency:KFD through its Natural Forest Management Division. The KFD is responsible for mainte-nance of buildings and feeder roads.

Risks and uncertainties:• delay in project implementation due to weak absorption and implementation capacity of

KFD• inability of the KFD to allocate sufficient complementary funds• underestimation of the importance of the population participatory approach

As there was no clear project planning document, the project should have analyzed theavailable official documents to find out and reconstruct the originally meant project ideaand, on that basis, it should have organized a workshop with representatives from all rele-vant institutions and target groups to develop a complete and consistent project planning.



3.1.2 Project planning according to the ToR of the TA contract

When analyzing the ToR of the TA contract (Annex A), a similar Project Planning Matrix tothe aforementioned one can be deducted:

Overall objective:Contribution to the conservation and sustainable use of indigenous forests of Kenya. (seeToR of TA, chap. 2 "Programme objectives")

Project purpose:Conservation and sustained use of forests around Mt. Kenya and mangrove forests in LamuDistrict (see ToR of TA, chap. 2)

Result 1:Kenya Forestry Department strengthened.

Result 2:KFD assisted in initiating the implementation of management plans for Mt. Kenya.

Result 3:In country training provided to the FD, other governmental and non-governmental institu-tions.

Result 4:System of extension and participative actions of the population in the sustained manage-ment of natural resources in the forests and surrounding areas developed and promoted.

Result 5:KFD assisted in initiating the implementation of management plans for mangroves in LamuDistrict.

The project planning laid down in the ToR of the TA contract is quite similar to the one de-ducted from the Financial Agreement. Also in this document the emphasis on communityparticipation can be recognized (result 4).

3.1.3 Planned Technical Assistance (TA)

Unfortunately the project purpose does not perfectly correspond with the ToR of the re-quested TA experts. If community participation and the participative elaboration of forestmanagement plans is one of the main results which the project should achieve then TA ex-perts should have been provided accordingly.

From the analysis of relevant documents as stated above (Financial Agreement and ToR ofTA contract) the corner pillars of the COMIFOR project can be fixed: Conservation andsustainable management of forests by involving the local population.

As the FD does not yet dispose of the necessary know-how and the means for the plan-ning, organization and execution of such a program, it is necessary

• to train FD and other staff at various levels in

◊ communicating with the local population

◊ creating awareness concerning natural resources conservation among the localpopulation

◊ understanding important elements of a participatory approach



◊ supporting self-help approaches of the local population

◊ elaborating forest management plans in a participatory way

◊ implementing forest management plans in a participatory way

• to assist the FD in elaborating forest management plans in close cooperation with theforest adjacent population

• to assist the FD in implementing the forest management plans in close cooperation withthe forest adjacent population

• to strengthen the planning and implementation capacity of the FD.

If these aforementioned tasks are regarded as main elements of the forest developmentproject COMIFOR then quite specific ToR for the TA experts can be elaborated. Generally itcan be stated that at least two experts are required:

• one long-term expert in forest management planning and implementation who could alsoact as project coordinator at the same time, and

• one long-term expert in community participation who is mainly training FD staff and otherpersonnel in this field

All other required technical input, such as forest inventory, mapping, zonation, etc., could becontributed by local institutions (KEFRI, NMK, Universities, etc.) or local or internationalshort term consultants.

On the contrary, the ToR of the Project Coordinator are found to be much too weak (prepa-ration of annual work plans, prepare annual progress reports, prepare tender documents, li-aise with other institutions, coordinate activities). To mention "assistance in preparing prog-ress reports" without defining the necessary technical assistance means to put "the plowbefore the horse". Furthermore, the FD is sufficiently qualified to prepare tender documents.This kind of assistance is not urgently needed. It is not worth mentioning it as it should be amatter of course that a Project Coordinator assists a Project in administrative matters. TheToR of the Project Coordinator are too administration oriented and neglect the most impor-tant TA aspects.

3.2 Revision of the project planning

3.2.1 The logical framework workshop of Nov. 1995

At the request of the EU, a "logical framework" workshop was organized by the COMIFORproject on 21 and 22 November, 1995 in order to develop a reasonable and feasible projectplanning taking into account

• the original overall goal and project purpose as stated in the financial agreement of No-vember 1992; and

• the changed frame conditions of the COMIFOR project after the termination of the KIF-CON project.

As an outcome of this workshop, a proper project planning was expected in the form of aPPM containing overall goal, project purpose, results/outputs and activities including objec-tively verifiable indicators, the source of verification and important assumptions. This PPMwas meant to serve as basis for the elaboration of an Operation Plan for the project as wellas for the establishments of the Annual Working Plans. Furthermore, the workshop and thenew PPM should serve for the elaboration of the requested Inception Report.

This workshop which was titled "logical framework workshop" cannot be regarded as such.The time provided for this workshop (only two days) was very short to elaborate a profoundproject planning considering the fact that the participants were not experienced neither in



participatory approaches of forest management nor in planning techniques (Project CycleManagement). The result was a quite unclear Project Planning Matrix which does not reflectbasic planning principles and regulations.

Generally it can be stated that the phrasing of the PPM is not target oriented and thus againunclear. Some results have nothing to do with the project. Results and means are some-times confused. Many given assumptions cannot be accepted in the planning logistics, andmany "objectively verifiable indicators" cannot be taken as such.

Some important fields are missing, as e.g.:

• A concept for community participation in conserving and managing Mt. Kenya Forest Re-serve developed.

• Appropriate silviculture methods developed/adopted and promoted.

• Self help capacity of local population strengthened.

This shows also the tendency of the present project towards strengthening of the FD and itsadministration rather than to initiate participatory approaches.

It is quite strange that the results of this workshop were not considered for the elaborationof the revised project planning (see also chap. 3.2.2)! The project revision was alreadycompleted before the workshop started. But the outcome of this quick and obviously notvery seriously taken workshop could not have contributed considerably to improve the proj-ect planning. The normal procedure is to carry out a workshop at the beginning of a projectplanning procedure and then to base the whole project planning on the outputs of the work-shop. Otherwise a workshop would be only a farce. But what was the reason to organizeand conduct the workshop if the jointly elaborated results were not considered? Was it onlyto satisfy the donor?

3.2.2 The Inception Reports

Inception Report of April 1995:

The first Inception Report is a respectable presentation of the actual situation of the COMI-FOR Project. It contains some acceptable ideas about a long term strategy and possibleCOMIFOR activities. But this Inception Report cannot be regarded as a comprehensiveproject planning document because the required details (envisaged outputs and activitiesincluding quantity, quality, location and time) are missing. Annual Work Plans cannot di-rectly be derived from this Report.

Inception Report of November 1995:

The second Inception Report presented in November 1995 contains a project revision whichshould have been based on the results of the logical framework workshop of November 21and 22, 1995. The whole justification of carrying out a logical framework workshop was toimprove the project planning. But how can a Report which is edited in November respectthe outputs of a workshop that was carried out towards end of November?

In fact, the results of the workshop are only attached to the Inception Report as chapter 8.,and in the Executive Summary and in chap. 8.4 on page 41 (the chapter 8.4 is mistakenlynumbered 7.4) it is mentioned that "the revised project fits perfectly well within the PPM".This is no surprise if the project revision follows the workshop outputs, but it is astonishing ifthe workshop is carried out after the project revision has been elaborated.

It is very obvious that the project revision has been elaborated before the carrying out of theworkshop. The results of the workshop are not at all reflected in the project revision. Thisshows a simple comparison between the Project Planning Matrix as developed during the



workshop (Tab. 8.1 on page 39) and the "Objectives of the revised COMIFOR Project"(chap. 5.1 on page 19).

The November Inception Report does not contain a proper project planning. It containsneither an acceptable or understandable Project Planning Matrix nor the traces of an Op-erational Plan. Chapter 5. "Revised COMIFOR Project" is rather confusing. With this so-called "project revision" no real progress is made compared with the original planning. It israther a set-back.

The biggest lack of this "project revision" is the missing of objectively verifiable indicators.An indicator specifies for all planned outputs (and activities) the quantity, the quality, the lo-cation and the time. Only in this way is a clear definition given of what the project is sup-posed to achieve. Example "Training of field staff" (chap. 5.3.1, Activity 16 a, page 24):There is no indication of how many field staff will be trained, at what level, to get whichknowledge level. It is not indicated who is going to be the trainer for which type of training(TA training expert). It is not specified where the training shall take place. It is only statedthat the training will start in Lamu in February 1996 but this chapter concerns Mt. Kenya(5.3.1). It is not specified how long it will last. An acceptable formulation for planning wouldhave been for instance: 5 forest extension workers within each DFO around Mt. Kenya (to-tally 6 DFOs) trained in PRA by end of 1996. Training to be carried out for 3 weeks in eachDFO by the TA expert with assistance from a local consultant.

The mode of expressing the project planning already shows a certain degree of incompe-tence. Correct technical terms are not used. There is rather a confusing mixture of unde-fined terms, like principal tasks, overall objective of the project, project outline, etc. Is the"overall objective of the project" the same as the "overall goal" or the "project purpose"?What are "principal tasks"? Do they stand for planned "outputs"? The enumeration of activi-ties in chap. 5.3 is quite confusing as the cited activities do not refer to the principal tasks asmentioned in chap. 5.1. To which result/output do the activities contribute?

Considering the facts that an interim Project Coordinator (N. Bech) went to Kenya for morethan ten weeks with the sole task to revise the project planning and that he was supportedby another international expert (I. Campbell) for another 6 weeks, this Inception Report mustbe regarded as an impudence!

Apart from the weak project planning revision, this Inception Report contains numerousstatements which are incorrect or at least disputable. It would go beyond the scope of thisevaluation to enumerate and discuss all doubtful statements. Some assertions were obvi-ously styled in such a way to support and enable the extension of the TA component and tofacilitate some project expenditures. The very low output of the COMIFOR Project is per-manently excused with the early termination of KIFCON, with the change of the project area(10 sites to two sites is indeed an advantage), with the bad performance of Techniplan andwith the lack of operational funds during the first year. In spite of these excuses the evalu-ators gained the impression that the TA experts and the COMIFOR Project staff were notqualified to introduce and carry out a people participatory approach in forest management.

Some examples of wrong or disputable statements are given below:

Location Statement Commentchap. 1 Termination of KIFCON caused

COMIFOR to stand in isolationThere are still a lot of forest proj-ects ongoing with the possibility ofcooperation; outputs of KIFCONcan be used.

chap. 1 Essential inventories which were tobe done by KIFCON, were not car-ried out

KIFCON has carried out a nationaland several regional forest inven-tories, including Mt. Kenya.



chap. 1 Ecological survey of mangroves byFAO/KWS is regarded as not rele-vant for forest management plan-ning.

According to M. Johnson, man-grove consultant, it is relevant butnot sufficient.

chap. 2.6 i) Loss of 5,000 ha of forests peryear.

It gives the wrong impression that5,000 ha are lost at Mt. Kenya.

chap. 2.6 vi) It is essential to give sufficient allo-cations to the field stations in orderto obtain sustainability

This statement ignores the partici-patory approach.

chap. 2.6 vii) New forest policy approved by theCabinet.

This is unfortunately not yet thecase.

chap. 2.7 vi) Community participation in plantingof mangrove trees is difficult.

The contrary was proven in prac-tice by B. Kivyatu, mangrove ex-pert.

Table 4.2 contains a lot of disputable and even wrong statements, e.g.:

• The aerial photos of 1991 procured by KIFCON were precise enough for COMIFOR'sneeds, because four or five year old aerial photos are always acceptable in forestryterms. The vegetation maps drawn by KIFCON based on the 1991 aerial photos and byCOMIFOR based on the 1996 aerial photos are nearly identical. Much work, efforts andmoney could have been saved and used in a more target oriented way if the 1991 aerialphotos would have been accepted.

• According to the information given by P. Wass, Head of KIFCON Project, KIFCONhanded over all documents to the FD at the end of June 1994, but some material waskept. However COMIFOR states that only very scattered documents were handed overby KIFCON to FD but no aerial photos, and it had to buy even some documents fromformer KIFCON staff.

• KIFCON left digitized information of vegetation map at FD.

What is striking is the fact that a bulk of minor forest activities has been proposed but themost essential activities concerning community participation were put last!

The project "planning" as presented in the November Inception Report required an increaseof the initial project budget by 15% (probably because of an expansion of the TA compo-nent for Lamu (19 m/m) and Mt. Kenya (28 m/m). This could not be admitted by the donorand therefore this proposal was rejected, and a new Inception Report had to be produced(December 1995).

Inception Report of December 1995:

To reduce the project costs, the November Inception Report was revised. The extension ofthe TA component concerning Mt. Kenya was withdrawn and accordingly also the plannedproject outputs. The extension of the Lamu component was kept as it was not yet clear ifthis component should be continued or not. Some chapters of the December Inception Re-port are more or less identical with the November version, like the general description of theproject (chap. 2.), the representation of the project progress (chap. 3.), strategic issues(chap. 4.) except chap. 4.3 "Project Revision", logical framework workshop (chap. 8.), andthe annexes.

It is already astonishing that, more than one year after the start of the TA team, another In-ception Report had to be prepared because the former ones were not acceptable.

As the original planning of the project was quite weak and as the frame conditions of theproject had changed considerably since its original conception, an acceptable project plan-ning according to international standards in the forestry sector should have been worked



out and, based on this project planning, a project operation plan should have been elabo-rated.

The donor set the following conditions for the revision of the project planning:

• the project had to remain within the same overall budget (≤ 4.4 mio. ECU);

• the project had to be executed within the same time frame (end in November 1998);

• the original objectives have to be preserved as far as possible; and

• the TA component of the project was not to constitute much more than 25% of the totalproject budget.

These conditions seem to be quite reasonable, termination of KIFCON not withstanding,taking into consideration that

• the project budget is, compared with other projects, quite high, and that not much moneyhad been spent during the first year due to the non-availability of operational funds;

• the remaining project period was three years which is a reasonable time frame to showsubstantial achievements;

• the original project objectives, i.e. the "conservation and sustainable management of theindigenous forests of Mt. Kenya and of the mangroves in Lamu in a community partici-pating approach", were still valid; and

• more than 1.1 mio. ECU were accorded to the TA component which should be sufficientto initiate at least the necessary project activities in the sense of the project purpose, to-gether with the well-staffed FD.

But the project coordinator found that it was necessary to negotiate about a prolongation /extension of the TA component already at that stage without having shown a performancethat corresponds to the costs. As EU stuck to its aforementioned conditions, the projectdetermined two categories of results/activities: a) What is proposed, and b) What cannot bedone.

In category a) you will find all preparatory activities of minor importance, like upgrading offield stations, aerial photography, photo interpretation, mapping, and forest inventory.

In category b) "What cannot be done" there are two very important, project purpose ori-ented results which should have been prioritized:

• pioneering of new, community-based participatory approaches and

• providing sufficient training and capacity building for community participatory ap-proaches.

Why COMIFOR project and the TA of DHV Consults BV have proposed the continuation ofthe project in this way, disregarding completely the donor's requests of introducing a com-munity participation in forest management, is hardly understandable. This reaction influ-enced the further execution of the project in a quite negative way, and even now, two yearslater, the project still sticks to its non-specific, not target oriented project execution.

3.2.3 Further planning procedures

The consulting company DHV Consultants and their Project Coordinator stuck to the opin-ion that the introduction of a community participatory forest management in the project re-gion can only be started if the TA component is considerably expanded. Furthermore, W.van Ijssel held the opinion that the initiation of community participation is only reasonable ifthere is a long term commitment from the donor to support the project.



3.2.3.1 Mt. Kenya Forest Reserve

The second Inception Report presented in November 1995 contained a project revisionwhich required an increase of the initial project budget by 15% (probably because of an ex-pansion of the TA component for Lamu (19 m/m) and Mt. Kenya (28 m/m). This could notbe admitted by the donor and therefore this proposal was rejected, and a new InceptionReport was produced (December 1995).

On April 11, 1996 the EC Delegation wrote a letter to the PS/MoF, with copy to the COMI-FOR Project, about the decision of the EU to concentrate the development efforts on Mt.Kenya. It is stated that "the EDF funds thus saved from Lamu could and should ... be usedto first of all reinforce the component dealing with local community participation and sec-ondly any other activities which need reinforcement following the closure of KIFCON proj-ect."

On the basis of this letter, either COMIFOR Project or the Project Coordinator representingDHV, prepared a paper called "Project Revision", dated April 30, 1996 which is regarded asan Addendum (amendment) to the third Inception Report of December 1995. It contained aproposal to expand the Mt. Kenya component instead of the mangrove component. The po-sition of a social forester was proposed for 15 m/m (long term expert) and additionally fur-ther 4m/m of short term experts were included.

Following a request of the responsible Technical Adviser within EC Delegation, W. van derGoot, the Project Coordinator, W. van Ijssel, produced in July 1996 a "Summary justificationfor an Addendum to the Service Contract FD/EC/16/05/1/1993-94, Technical Assistance tothe COMIFOR Project". The main reasons for the applied TA expansion were: A) The with-drawal of KIFCON. B) Delays in implementation of the COMIFOR Project. C) A conceptualreinforcement of the community participation component.

With a letter of September 6, 1996 addressed to the NAO/MoF, EC Delegation gave in-structions how the proposed ToR for the additional social forestry expert should beamended. In the same letter EC Delegation asked for the preparation of an Addendum tothe TA contract.

The Addendum No. 2 to the TA contract was prepared and submitted to the concernedauthorities. Allegedly it has been signed by the CCF and the MENR. When it was dealt withat the MoF, EU/HQ asked the Delegation in November 1996 to withdraw this AddendumNo. 2 from the "circuit" and to initiate the mid-term evaluation of the Project and the socio-economic study of the pilot areas by an experienced NGO.

There might be two reasons for rejection of this proposal by EU:

• the presented concept for a community participation was not really convincing

• the proposal was quite expensive:

The required budget for the extension of the mangrove component was 296,061 ECU.

The long term expert should have been extended for another 15 m/m. The man-monthrate was increased at 10% to 9,900 ECU per month. Additionally to the man-month rate,DHV asked for the reimbursement of the house rent (1,190 ECU per month), the pay-ment of per diems (890 ECU per month), the payment of a monthly lumpsum for admin-istrative support (!?) (450 ECU per month) and the reimbursement of international andlocal travel costs (on average 730 ECU per month). All payments included, the long termexpert would cost on average 13,160 ECU per month. Quite astonishing is the request ofDHV to be paid extra for "administrative support" as these fees are generally included inthe man-month rate!

Additional short term experts were planned for 4 m/m. The man-month rate for the shortterm experts was also increased at 10%, making now 9,900 ECU per month. DHVwanted to engage local consultants as short term experts as provided in the TA contract



(see Article 5.3 of the addendum). A man-month rate of 9,900 ECU which is also appliedfor an international expert, is extremely high for local consultants.

Summary:

The COMIFOR Project and the TA should have put the highest possible effort to initiatecommunity participation in management of Mt. Kenya Forest Reserve with the givenmeans (experts, FD staff, budget, equipment, time, etc.) instead of loosing much timeand efforts by arguing for a TA expansion.

3.2.3.2 Mangrove component

The ToR of the mangrove expert are clearly too ambitious concerning the given TA period.Taking the initial administrative problems of the COMIFOR Project during the first year intoconsideration, it is obvious that not much could be achieved. Of course, it would have beenbetter - as already stated - to start this component not before the project is well settled. Buteven then, a 10 m/m TA would have been too short to initiate the planned activities and toachieve substantial results.

So far, the request of the consulting company DHV to extend the services of the mangroveexpert can be understood. Already in August 1995 COMIFOR Project prepared a paper for"Proposed Extension of Mangrove Technical Assistance" (Project policy paper no. 2). Simi-lar arguments for an extension of the mangrove component are put down in the "StrategyPaper on the Long Term and Short Term Revised Implementation of COMIFOR" (Projectpolicy paper No. 3, August 1995). There might be two reasons why this application was notagreed to by EU:

• Missing concept

The aforementioned project policy paper no. 2 for "Proposed Extension of MangroveTechnical Assistance" focuses more on technical aspects rather than on conceptualquestions. How and to what extent local population can participate in mangrove man-agement is not sufficiently outlined as generally requested by the donor.

Obviously the convincing arguments for the extension of the mangrove TA componentwere missing, and convincing arguments can only be derived from a sound project plan-ning which leads to the development of a convincing implementation concept. It is simplynot enough to insist that a longer lasting TA component will yield more output. It has tobe clearly proved why a TA is necessary, and it has to be shown what the outputs wouldbe with and without TA component.

• High TA costs

The required budget for the extension of the mangrove component was 289,557 ECU.

The long term expert should have been extended for another 14 m/m. Just 10 month af-ter the project start, the man-month rate was increased at 10% to 9,900 ECU per month.Additionally to the man-month rate, DHV asked for the reimbursement of the house rent(1,200 ECU per month), the payment of per diems (1.735 ECU per month) and the reim-bursement of international and local travel costs (on average 570 ECU per month). Allpayments included, the long term expert would cost on average 13,405 ECU per month.

Additional short term experts were planned for 5 m/m. The man-month rate for the shortterm experts was also increased at 10%, making now 9,900 ECU per month. DHVwanted to engage local consultants as short term experts (as provided in the TA con-tract. A man-month rate of 9,900 ECU which is also applied for an international expert, isextremely high for local consultants.

Additional equipment and running costs totaling up to 52,400 ECU were also required.



Summary:

An extension of the mangrove component would have been desirable, but only with aclear, feasible and success promising concept and at reasonable costs.

3.2.4 Compatibility of the Project Planning with the actual Forest Policy

The intention of the COMIFOR Project to introduce a community participation for forestplanning and management of Forest Reserves was just contrary to the previous ForestPolicy which states in Section 2. "Protection":

"In principle the government's view is that the existence of private rights in the Forest Estatetends to endanger the objects for which the government manages the Estate and suchrights are therefore objectionable. The government's policy is, therefore, firstly to define andlimit any existing rights, secondly to negotiate on a just and reasonable basis the finaleradication of such rights and, thirdly, to allow no new rights to arise."

This means that the introduction of participatory forest management is not foreseen in thestill valid Forest Policy of Kenya. But referring to Article 15 (c) of the still valid Forests Act(1962, 1982) the Minister could have established rules to enable participatory forest man-agement of indigenous forests in the frame of COMIFOR Project.

This point should have been discussed in more detailed before signing the Project Agree-ment, respectively the intention of the donor should have been clearly expressed in the Fi-nancial Agreement. A certain passage should have been included stating that the new andinnovative community participative approach will be allowed in the frame of this COMIFORProject.

3.3 Project design

The COMIFOR Project is integrated in the given structure of the Forestry Department. Theidea of the Project not to create a parallel structure to the FD but to operate through the al-ready existing FD structure by supporting the concerned Divisions and Sections is generallycorrect and commendable.

On the other hand it could have been recognized quite early that the FD and its staff con-sists of rather conservative and traditional oriented foresters who have difficulties in ac-cepting innovations like community participation in forest management. Therefore a certaindistance to the traditional structures would have been necessary in order to be able to initi-ate new methods, concepts, strategies and approaches. It is most likely that an independ-ent Technical Assistance (project) with clear and well defined objectives and competenciescould have been much more innovative and creative than COMIFOR has been. If not tootightly bound to the FD, such a TA might have integrated many other relevant organizations(GOs and NGOs) and participants. From a more independent position, it could have pro-vided the necessary support and assistance to the local population, NGOs and appropriateself-help groups. Of course, such a TA project would not be sustainable itself but it couldcreate sustainable frame conditions within a limited period (several years).



4. Relevance of the project

4.1 Mt. Kenya Forest Reserve

4.1.1 Problem description concerning Mt. Kenya Forest Reserve

It has to be clearly stated that there is no sound and proper Problem Analysis concerningthe possible degradation or even destruction of the forests in the Mt. Kenya Forest Reserve.The original project planning did not base on such a problem analysis which would havebeen indispensable to specifically conceive the project in such a way that the respectiveproblems are solved. Unfortunately, as mentioned, such a problem analysis was not con-ducted, and even later, when the Project tried to specify the project planning by elaboratingInception Reports and Annual Work Plans, thorough reflections about the real problemsand their linkage cannot be found.

In the frame of the present Evaluation it was also not possible to undertake such a ProblemAnalysis, but the evaluators discussed the situation with various stakeholders and set uppossible causes - problems relationships as follows. The single problem hierarchies are de-scribed in separate problem branches named from "A" to "E".

Problem "A":

Depletion of Mt. Kenya forests

⇑

Excisions Encroachments

⇑

High demand for arable land

⇑

High population growth Lack of land outside theFR

Lack of alternative incomesources to agriculture



Problem "B":


⇑

Uncontrolled forest utilization

⇑

High demand on forestproducts

Lacking knowledge of lo-cal population about sus-tainable utilization meth-

ods

Inappropriate forest legis-lation and lack of law en-

forcement

⇑Inefficient extension Partly lack of political will,

partly extremely long du-ration of bureaucratic pro-

cedures

⇑Lacking concepts of peo-ple's participation and in-

sufficiently trained person-nel

⇑Partly lack of political will,partly lack of know-how

Problem "C":


⇑

Unsustainable forest utilization

⇑

Lack of forest management plans

⇑Lack of qualified FDpersonnel for man-agement planning

Lack of planning andmanagement con-

cepts

Lack of technicalknowledge (e.g. sil-

viculture)

Lack of basic infor-mation about the Mt.

Kenya forests



Problem "D":


⇑

Careless use of fire results in forest fires

⇑

Lack of awareness withinlocal population about im-

portance of natural re-sources

Lack of integrating and in-volving the local popula-

tion for forest conservation

Missing direct profit (bene-fit) for the local population

in forest conservation

Problem "E":


⇑

Forest destruction by animals

⇑

Inappropriate concept for long-term and sustainableecosystem management

⇑

International pressure for animal pro-tection (which was justified some

years ago)

National pressure for animal protec-tion because of tourism support

4.1.2 Relevance of the COMIFOR Project concerning Mt. Kenya Forest Reserve

Relevance of the original planning:

The core problem for this project is defined as "Depletion of Mt. Kenya forests". The FD willnot be in the position to protect and manage the forests of Mt. Kenya alone without the ac-tive cooperation and support of the local population. Therefore, the original basic idea un-derlying the COMIFOR Project to conserve the indigenous forests of Mt. Kenya by involvingthe local, forest adjacent population, was and still is the most success promising concept.

Regarding the aforementioned problem branches, the original project planning as derivedfrom the Financial Agreement considers some of the problems to be solved. It addressesespecially the problems mentioned in problem branch "C". With its planned output 1 "Plan-ning and management capacity of the FD strengthened" it intended to solve the forestrycomponent of the problem "Lack of planning and management concepts". Planned output 2"Management plan for Mt. Kenya developed and implementation initiated" should directlysolve the problem "lack of forest management plans". Planned output 4 "FD and other in-stitutions are trained" directly addresses the problems "Lack of qualified FD personnel formanagement planning" and "Lack of technical knowledge". The problem of "Inefficient ex-tension" (problem branch "B") should be treated by planned output 3 "Extension system de-veloped".

Of course, the project planning could not consider all problem aspects. There are differentreasons for this fact:



There are some problems that are beyond the capacity of a forestry project, like the prob-lems mentioned in problem branch "A" ("High population growth", Lack of arable land","Lack of alternative income sources", etc.). It is commendable that EC engages itself tosupport the GoK in solving this kind of problems within the frame of the "Community Devel-opment Program".

The destruction of forests by wild animals (see problem branch "E") has not been ad-dressed properly by the project planning, may be because it is a very delicate issue. Thepopulation of Kenya is still willing to protect wild animals as their existence attracts touristswho bring in a lot of money that can be seen as a compensation for the damage to thefarmlands and the loss of crops that wild animals are causing. If the tourist sector in Kenyadeclines, irrespective of what reason, the attitude of the local population to the protection ofwild animals will probably change. Therefore it is recommended to keep this problem inmind and prepare already in advance, together with the local population, KWS and otherrelevant organizations, some possible, ecologically sound solutions.

The elaboration of a concept for the involvement of the local population was not plannedbecause this subject should have been treated and contributed by KIFCON within KFDP. AsKIFCON terminated prematurely. the project should have adapted its planning accordinglyand take over this task. The omission of this subject was one of the biggest mistakes ofCOMIFOR.

It seems that the project planning did not pay enough attention to the project relevant frameconditions. At the time of project planning it was not clear if the legal and political frameconditions will be changed in time so that the particular planning of COMIFOR could be re-alized in practice. A proposal for the amendment of the forest policy was elaborated by GoKwith assistance from FINNIDA. Undoubtedly, the proposed policy revision as well as COMI-FOR's concept and strategy are very good and solely success promising, yet it was not ob-vious that they would be understood and accepted by the concerned politicians and the FDstaff. Some campaigns and the organization of workshops in order to present and explainthe policy revision and the project planning would have been necessary to gain their ac-ceptance by the concerned officers.

Relevance of the project implementation:

The practical implementation of COMIFOR ignored the necessity of basic planning. It nevertried to establish a problem analysis on which the activities and outputs could have beenoriented. This is already one reason why the project implementation could not be relevant tosolve the existing and gradually changing problems. COMIFOR largely ignored the basicidea of people's participation as expressed in the Financial Agreement, and concentratedtoo much on the assessment of the actual situation (problem branch "C") without defininghow the gained knowledge could be used.

Extremely important subjects, like the elaboration of concepts how to interest and involvethe local population as well as how to manage the forests, indigenous and plantations, in asustainable way, were not treated at all. It must be stated that the project implementationwas not much relevant to solve the problems of forest depletion of Mt. Kenya.

Of course, there are different ways and means of how to make participate the local commu-nities. At the time of COMIFOR's conception (1991 to 1992) it was believed that the ForestDepartment which is the competent and responsible authority for the conservation andmanagement of Forest Reserves, would be the best partner for the implementation of CO-MIFOR's forest conservation idea. Therefore a lot of measures were planned in order tostrengthen and to qualify the Forest Department so that it will be enabled to involve localcommunities and thus to conserve the indigenous forests.



From that point of view the given project purpose and the planned activities can be under-stood:

• Planned output 1: FD strengthened

• Planned output 3: Extension system (at FD level) developed

• Planned output 4: FD staff trained

Obviously there was a certain misunderstanding between the representatives of GoK/FDand the donor about the meaning of forest management by community participation. Thereare only some speculations why the problem was not tackled and the planned conceptnever initiated. It could be that the FD officers did not understand the Project Agreement. Itcould be that the legal basis for community participation was not given. It could be that theFD did not want to try this concept. It could be that the TA was incompetent to advise andsupport the counterpart organization in this direction. A lot of other excuses are mentionedthat are not very reliable, like "the given funds were too low", "the TA component was toosmall", "the given project time period was too short", and "the basic knowledge about theproject area was lacking".

COMIFOR Project worked on all of the aforementioned outputs but not in a target orientedway towards community participation. This means that the FD has never been strengthenedto initiate and implement the project concept. But it is doubtful if the FD would have initiatedand implemented community participation in forest management and conservation even if itwould have been trained and supported accordingly because the responsible FD repre-sentatives do not seem to be convinced of this approach. This may be also due to a weakTA component which should have worked in this direction.

Conclusions:

The high necessity of conserving and managing the indigenous forests of Mt. Kenya in asustainable way is still given. The most promising way of conserving and managing the for-ests of Mt. Kenya is the involvement of the forest adjacent population in a participatory ap-proach. The revised project planning should be based on a sound problem analysis in ordernot to omit any important subject.

As can be seen from problem branch "A" it is useless to fight against "Excisions" and "En-croachments" if no actions are timely parallel undertaken to solve their causes. Income outof forest management could be one possible and attractive alternative for the local popula-tion, especially if the plantations are integrated in the whole management and conservationconcept (see problem branch "A"). The improvement of agroforestry activities and the in-crease of crop production outside the reserve could contribute to lower the problem of "Lackof land". The same applies for the introduction of controlled grazing inside the Forest Re-serve.

Very important seems to be to win politicians and the FD personnel over to the new forestpolicy. Only if the concerned officers understand and accept the new forest policy and theconnected ideas of privatization and people's participation a real success can be expectedon a broader scale.

The organization of the extension has to be studied in more detail. It has to be analyzed if itwould be better to base on the existing extension structure of FD and to support it, or toconcentrate more on the agricultural extension system. Of course, the close cooperationwith KWS is indispensable in either cases. It will not be an easy job to convince the localpopulation of the necessity to engage themselves in forest conservation and management,but it is absolutely necessary. Without the assistance of the population the conservation ofMt. Kenya forests will hardly be possible. Even if the local population accepts the conserva-tion idea, they need to be taught in basic forest management and conservation techniques.



All practical measures of forest conservation and management should be based on propermanagement plans that should be elaborated in close cooperation with the concernedpopulation. The participation of the population should be also won for the assessment ofthe actual forest situation.

The FD is an important partner in forest conservation, especially for the improvement of theforest policy, forest legislation, and forest relevant frame conditions. The FD has a wide-spread administrative structure (offices, stations, etc.) and technically well trained person-nel. The FD has insufficient equipment and funds to operate efficiently. The reputation ofthe FD staff at the local population is weak. The motivation of FD staff is low. FD staff islacking training in the whole range of extension, and communicating and collaborating withpeople. Big efforts will be necessary to change the attitude of the FD staff towards partici-patory approaches.

Before going into forestry technical detail, a sound project concept and implementationstrategy should be worked out. Already at that stage, the local population should be in-volved, especially already existing NGOs (e.g. AMKO) and self-help groups (e.g. KAATA).Of course, it is also indispensable to fully integrate all relevant authorities and organiza-tions, especially FD and KWS as well as international NGOs and other relevant projects.

The Project must look for an appropriate administrative and implementation structure keep-ing in mind that the cooperation with the FD and other authorities, institutions and organiza-tions (e.g. KWS, MoU) is necessary. A proposal in this connection is presented in chapter11. "Recommendations for the Reorientation of the Project".

4.2 Relevance of the COMIFOR Project concerning Lamu mangroves

Unfortunately, a problem analysis concerning the possible degradation of the mangroves inLamu District has never been executed. Even during the evaluation it was not possible toanalyze the given situation and to determine probable degradation problems, as the safetysituation at the coast was rather tight during the project evaluation. This is why the evalua-tion team could spend only one day at Lamu, which is too short for a thorough visit andanalysis of the area.

The relevance of a project is determined by comparing the project's planning, activities andoutputs with the problems to be solved. If there is no problem analysis it is, unfortunately,not possible to make justified statements about the relevance.

As for the mangroves at Lamu it is stated that the actual destruction of the mangroves atLamu is not as serious as for the indigenous forests around Mt. Kenya. "In fact, Lamu man-groves were initially chosen because they were not threatened. A management plan forLamu was to serve as an example for the other (threatened) mangroves." (EC Delegationletter of March 15, 1996)

Generally it can be assumed that the mangroves are threatened with overexploitation astheir wood is highly appreciated. Whether the overexploitation is already given or not, theproblem will arise certainly quite soon. This is why measures should be introduced and im-plemented in time to enable a long-term sustainable use of this valuable resource and toguarantee a more or less undisturbed existence of the ecological inappreciable mangroves.

The activities of the COMIFOR Project were certainly leading in the right direction. Theywere initial steps to find out appropriate ways of conserving and utilizing the mangroves in asustainable way. A concept was elaborated in this matter, which presented only basic ideasof mangrove management, but not yet any convincing strategy of involving the local popu-lation.



5. Project execution

5.1 Deployment of TA personnel

The GoK commissioned the Consulting company Techniplan in October 1994 to providetechnical assistance to the COMIFOR Project. This Technical Assistance consisted mainlyin the provision of three experts:

• Project Coordinator

• Training expert

• Mangrove expert

Techniplan engaged the Project Coordinator and the mangrove expert itself, and subcon-tracted DHV Consultants BV to provide the training expert for the Project.

In the TA contract also 10 m/m for short term experts were planned, thereof 4 m/m forbackstopping services and six m/m for various subjects according to the specific need ofthe project.

As neither GoK nor EC Delegation were satisfied with the services rendered by Techniplan,it was persuaded in May 1995 to hand over the TA contract to DHV. From this period on-ward, DHV also deployed the Project Coordinator. Only the mangrove expert, Mr. M. S.Johnson, remained under Techniplan contract.

The COMIFOR Project and the Project Coordinator of the TA, W. van Ijssel, did not providethe exact deployment data of all experts, although the evaluation mission requested thisinformation several times. Therefore only approximate figures can be stated below. The de-ployment list provided by COMIFOR is shown on next page.

The TA should be asked officially by the GoK and EC Delegation to provide immediately acomplete and detailed statement of the deployment and leave periods of all experts.

Project Coordinator:The position of the Project Coordinator is provided in the TA contract for four years, i.e. for40 m/m of net technical assistance in the country.

The first Project Coordinator was Mr. van Melle from Techniplan. He arrived on November21, 1994 and stayed until May 1995 (exact date of departure unknown, probably May 23,1995).

When Mr. van Melle left the project, the training expert, Mr. J. Nieuwenhuis from DHV, actedas Project Coordinator until the arrival of the interim Project Coordinators, Mr. N. J. Bechfrom DHV and I. Campbell, a private consultant (probably employed by Panafcon). It is notknown if Mr. Nieuwenhuis counted as training expert or as Project Coordinator during thisperiod.

Mr. Bech arrived on September 12, 1995 and stayed until December 2, 1995. It is not clearwhether Mr. Bech worked during this period full time for the COMIFOR Project. The periodfrom September 12 to December 2 makes two months and 21 days whereas only 2.6 man-months, equal to two months and 18 days, were invoiced. Mr. Campbell, an environmentaleconomist who was resident in Kenya at that time, assisted Mr. Bech for three times 14days, making totally 42 days or 1.4 m/m, which corresponds with the respective invoice.

It is not understandable why two interim Project Coordinators were needed. The contribu-tions of Mr. Bech and Campbell cannot be judged separately as they have not producedany separate document. Only the newly produced Inception Report from November 1995was "signed" by Bech and Campbell. The letters from GoK or/and EC Delegation approvingthe assignments of Mr. Bech and Campbell were not shown to the evaluators.



The next Project Coordinator, W. van Ijssel from DHV, arrived on November 25, 1995. Heleft the project for good on September 19, 1997, during the project evaluation following hisdecision by end of July 1997 to leave the project. His effective deployment cannot be cal-culated as his annual leave periods are not known to the evaluators.

The departure during the evaluation mission is an indication of low interest in the COMIFORProject. It is hardly understandable why he could not stay for 1 week longer. His departuremeant that some information which the evaluation mission may have needed was with-drawn. Eventually he could have contributed to the reorientation workshop if he would haveparticipated.

Some weeks before the departure of Mr. van Ijssel DHV proposed Mr. Sean White, a forestconsultant with experience in plantation management, as his successor. The profile of Mr.White does not correspond with the requirements of the COMIFOR Project. Therefore it isadvised to ask for a better suitable expert who has much experience in community partici-pation and in indigenous forest management planning.

Training expert:The training expert, J. Nieuwenhuis from DHV, arrived on November 8, 1994 in Kenya andstayed until August 16, 1996. His effective deployment cannot be calculated by the evalua-tion mission as his annual leave periods are not known to the evaluators. Mr. van Ijssel de-clared that J. Nieuwenhuis assisted the Project for 20 m/m which corresponds with theoriginal planning.

From May to September 1995 Mr. Nieuwenhuis acted as interim Project Coordinator (seealso above).

Mangrove expert:This position was originally planned for one year or 10 m/m of net assistance in the country.

The mangrove expert, Mr. M. S. Johnson, arrived on November 15, 1994. He took someannual leave during the first year of his employment (see COMIFOR list) totaling up to about2 months. He assisted at the logical framework workshop held on November 21 and 22,1995 in Kenya. His services were invoiced for 10 m/m.

Backstopping services:In the TA contract it is agreed that the consulting company will be paid for backstoppingservice up to a period of 4 m/m. Also the reimbursement of international flight costs forbackstopping personnel is provided in the TA contract. This agreement is quite uncommonas backstopping services are normally included in the man-month rate of the experts.

Techniplan presented for its backstopping services the following personnel which is agreedin the TA contract:

• a lawyer as a "Rural Development Specialist" and

• an architect as an "Environmental Specialist"!

The total number of man-months effected by Techniplan experts was not communicated tothe evaluation mission.

DHV Consultants sent Mr. H. van Dijken as backstopping expert. He effected at least thefollowing missions (information given by W. van Ijssel):

• August 1995: 3 days

• November 1995: 9 days

• January and February 1996: 10 days

• June 1996: 10 days



• November 1996: 7 days

• April 1997: 9 days

It is not for sure that this list is complete.

DHV and Techniplan effected backstopping missions totaling up to 2.26 m/m. This meansthat 1.74 m/m are left for backstopping.

It is not known who decides about the carrying out of backstopping missions: Is it the Con-sulting company, the Project, or/and the TA experts or a combination of these participants?Can the Consulting company decide alone about these missions or is the consent of GoKor/and the donor required?

Up to now, there has been no justification (report) of the backstopping missions, neitherreasons why they were initiated at a particular stage of the project, nor about their course,content and output!

Generally, backstopping services can be subdivided into administrative and technical back-up services. By assuring backstopping services the respective Consulting company prom-ises that the know-how and capacity of the Headquarters of the company is made availableto the project in order to assist the project in planning and execution in the best possibleway. As the backstopping services are reimbursed in this case, the clients (GoK and EU)must have expected especially intensive backstopping services.

Especially in the case of COMIFOR good backstopping services would have been needed.Experienced backstopping experts could have contributed a lot at the beginning and duringthe course of the Project to elaborate a sound project planning and to concentrate the proj-ect execution towards the project purpose. Considering the unsatisfactory project executionup to date, it can be stated that the backstopping services were not helpful.

It is recommended to shift the backstopping man-months to short term consultancies if theTA contract will be continued.

Short term experts:In the TA contract a total of six man-months for short term consultancies is agreed. It wasplanned that local short term consultants support the project in treating special fields. Theagreed honorary rate is 9,000 ECU per man-month. The following personnel is nominated inthe TA contract (according to W. van Ijssel):

• Paul Wachiori (retired forest technician) for aerial photo interpretation

• Mrs. T. Kantai, Women in development specialist

• Mr. M. Manundu, Resources economist

• Mrs. Naomi Kipuri, Rural sociologist

• Mr. P. M. Ndikure, Institutional specialist

The following short term consultancies were carried out:

• Paul Wachiori (retired forest technician) for Techniplan: preparation of "A Mt. Kenya For-est Report". Quality: not useful. Short term consultancy of about 0.5 m/m not invoiced.

• Paul Wachiori (retired forest technician) for Techniplan: Training of 6 FD staff in aerialphoto interpretation. Duration: 1.5 m/m between April and September 1996; the days ofhis consultancy are not known, not even to the Project Coordinator. Comment: Themethodology used by Paul Wachiori is far behind modern and adequate technology.

• Paul Wachiori (retired forest technician) for Panafcon (DHV): Research coordinationbetween FD and KEFRI. Duration: 1.25 m/m between April and June 1997; the days ofhis consultancy are not known. Comment: Research was not a priority subject of COMI-



FOR. A short term consultancy in rural sociology and community participation would havebeen much more urgent than research.

• Mrs. Lucy Emerton; independent consultant engaged by Panafcon (DHV): Elaboration ofthe ToR for the socio-economic survey and literature review. Duration: 0.5 m/m withoutexact date of assignment. Comment: The elaboration of the ToR could have been doneby the Project Coordinator. Two weeks for the elaboration of ToR seems to be quitelong.

Totally, 3.25 m/m of short term consultancies have been invoiced so far. Accordingly 2.75m/m are left.

Generally it is noticeable, that a retired forest technician was "sold" by DHV as a short termexpert to GoK and the donor. An outstanding knowledge was certainly not the reason ofpresenting a forest technician as expert in aerial photo interpretation and in research coor-dination - mind you: the same person! The circumstances suggest that the reason for DHVof deploying P. Wachiori as short term expert in various fields may be to maximize its bene-fit margin. EC respectively GoK had to pay 9,000 ECU per month to DHV to get the servicesof Mr. Wachiori. Wachiori's remuneration for these services paid by DHV was said to beonly KSh 2,000 per day which corresponds to 900 ECU per month. The difference, i.e.8,100 ECU per month, would then be the "overheads" of DHV.

The project could have engaged Mr. Wachiori directly as local expert and thus saved moneyand short term man-months for other purposes.

5.2 The imprest account

The non-accessibility of project funds was a major problem during the first year of the proj-ect execution. Obviously, the non-compatibility of GoK and EU regulations led to a stagnat-ing situation.

EU proposed to open a bank account to hold project funds and for which the Project Man-ager and the Project Coordinator have jointly the authorization (double signature system).

According to GoK regulations, civil servants are not supposed to get the authorization overproject bank accounts as the project funds are regarded as public funds. Thus GoK pro-posed that the whole project funds are paid into treasury from where the funds are releasedaccording to GoK regulations.

This proposal was not acceptable to the EU as it would have lost control over the projectfunds in this way.

Finally the two parties, GoK and EU, decided in May 1995 that the project operational fundsshould be handled through the respective consulting company DHV. This possibility is al-ready foreseen in the TA contract (Annex A, Article 4). An Addendum to the TA contractwas drafted and signed by all parties by August 1995. The imprest account was opened byDHV in August 1995 and the first invoice concerning an advanced payment was submitted.The imprest account was credited on October 30, 1995, i.e. one year after the start of theTA component. By that time the TA of the mangrove expert had already ended and 50% ofthe TA of the training expert were already gone!

By analyzing the problem, one gets the impression that no standard solution nor procedurehas been established between GoK and the EC. Otherwise a proper solution could havebeen found immediately.

5.3 Financial support to PFOs, DFOs and FCPB

COMIFOR financially supports the two Provincial Forest Offices (Central and Eastern Prov-inces), six District Forest Offices (Nyeri, Kirinyaga, Embu, Tharaka Nithi, Meru and Nyam-



bene Districts) as well as the Forest Conservation and Protection Base at Nyeri (commonlycalled "Nyeri Base").

The District Forest Offices have received from COMIFOR Project 1 Landrover, 1 tractor and1 trailer each. Three lorries have been provided to the six DFOs so that two DFOs canshare one lorry. One Landrover has been given to the Nyeri Base.

As the aforementioned Forest Offices do not dispose of sufficient allocations to operate thevehicles, tractors and lorries, COMIFOR pays monthly lumpsums to contribute to the opera-tional costs:

• each DFO gets 30,000 KSh per month;

• each PFO gets 20,000 KSh per month;

• the Nyeri Base gets 40,000 KSh per month.

The Forest Offices and the Base provide receipts for their expenditures to justify themonthly allocations.

Additionally to the aforementioned monthly lumpsum payments, COMIFOR pays, from timeto time and when requested, additional amounts to the PFOs, DFOs and Nyeri Base, e.g. topurchase special material or to pay for major repair of vehicles or equipment.

COMIFOR contributed to the initial establishment and equipment of the Nyeri Base oneLandrover, office equipment, furniture, one photocopy machine, and one typewriter.

In this context it should be mentioned that the aforementioned Forest Offices as well asNyeri Base are also responsible for areas outside COMIFOR's Project area. Nyambene hasno share on Mt. Kenya Forest Reserve. The Nyeri Base is responsible for the whole Moun-tain Region including Mt. Kenya and Aberdares. This means that project money is also usedfor FD work outside the project area.

The respective project activities seem to be neither project oriented nor sustainable. Gener-ally there are several questions arising from this project activity:

• Were the implications of the procurement and delivery of the transport means to the de-centralized forest offices considered and respected? What are the justifications of pro-viding these transport means to the forest offices knowing that the FD would not havesufficient funds to run them?

• How is it assured that the project funds are only used for official purposes?

• Are project funds spent elsewhere that could have been better spent for project pur-poses and thus, these non-targeted activities are to the debit of the project success?

5.4 Contributions by the FD

The FD pays the wages of the FD staff that is assigned to the COMIFOR Project. FD makesavailable required office rooms and its organizational and administrative structure (logistics).

Although it is mentioned in the Financial Agreement, Annex 2, Article 3.6, that "Governmentwill include in its budget sufficient allocations to complement EDF contribution in operationalexpenses ...", the GoK has not contributed to cover the operation costs of the project. Norespective provision is made in the FD or any other budget.



5.5 Contributions by third parties

Some other govt. and non-govt. institutions are cooperating with COMIFOR in various fieldsand thus contributing to the COMIFOR activities:

• KIFCON: Although COMIFOR mainly complains about the missing contributions of KIFCON, this huge

project has done quite a lot in the field of COMIFOR's subjects:◊ procurement of an aerial photo coverage of Mt. Kenya (1991);◊ vegetation mapping of Mt. Kenya;◊ carrying out of a forest inventory of Mt. Kenya;◊ carrying out of socio-economic surveys in all eco-zones of Kenya;◊ support of NMK, KEFRI and KWS concerning understanding of and research in biodi-

versity;◊ supporting FD and KWS in managing three pilot Forest Reserves (Kakamega, Mau

and Arabuko Sokoke) introducing the innovative management system of communityparticipation;

◊ technical and financial support to FD/KWS MoU;◊ establishing a NGO network for forest management with special emphasis on com-

munity participation;◊ training of selected staff at all levels of FD, KWS, NMK, and relevant NGOs;◊ support of the Indigenous Forest Training Task Force to review training curricula and

coordinate training with respect to natural forest;◊ production of material for training and public awareness creation, and edition of vid-

eos, pamphlets and newsletters;◊ contribution to general institutional development and coordination of indigenous forest

matters. • KEFRI:

◊ in the field of forest research (e.g. elaboration of volume tables, setting up permanentsample plots, etc.)

◊ place rooms including equipment at the disposal of the project, especially for the car-rying out of workshops, training sessions and seminars

• NMK in the field of biodiversity research • GTZ in the field of cooperation to develop the MoU Secretariat • KWS: Is the most important partner beside the FD. There is a close cooperation in vari-

ous fields, especially in◊ developing MoU Secretariat,◊ developing a "partnership program" between communities and KWS/FD,◊ training of personnel.

• Survey Department of Kenya: Set up of a GIS data base for Mt. Kenya (topographicdata).

5.6 Project budget and accounting

Unfortunately, there is no clear, actual and understandable project budget accounting up todate. Therefore nobody can say precisely how much money is left for the project continua-tion.



The last Project Coordinator, W. van Ijssel, wrote a "Financial Report prepared for Mid-TermEvaluation Mission and Handing Over Project Coordinator". The paper is undated, but it isknown that it was prepared during the evaluation mission. The figures given in this FinancialReport are not unequivocal and understandable.

Imprest account and petty cash:

Annex 2 of this Report contains only examples of the accounting system but not a compre-hensible account statements for different items or item groups from the project beginning upto date. Thus it is impossible to examine the project accounting.

The situation of the Imprest Account is completely unclear to the evaluation mission. Nodetailed information was given about this matter. What is known is only that the ConsultingCompany complains about late settlement of invoices and early reduction of the advancedpayment. The actual situation, amount of advanced payment received and total justified ex-penditure up to date, is not known.

By reading the single expenditures of the Petty Cash of the example given for the month ofMarch it is striking that some designations are unclear and some are doubtful, and thushave to be further examined.

• What does "rep" mean in the context of "rep dfo embu" (and so on for all Districts)?

• Very often only the name of the shop is mentioned and not the item which was bought.Examples: "kim supplies", "iment sisters", "cob trading ent", "njawa business mach", "stu-dio one ltd.", "rainbow enterprises".

• The amount of fuel purchased is sometimes quite doubtful. Landrovers were fueled sev-eral times on one day and with such high amounts of fuel that some explanation is re-quired in order to understand it (e.g. Landrover GKX 734).

• The hiring of casuals should be specified (for what, how long, etc.).

• Payment of daily subsistence allowances "DSA" to various officers should be specified.

• For what reason "accommodation and meals" have been spent from project budget?

• Are the expenditures for "bruce dry cleaners", "meru county hotel", "food stuffs pur-chased", "kivaa three inn" and "full board acc exp" justified?

• What are the differences between "dsa pd", "out of pkt allowances", "out of pkt", "pd vrsofficers", "travelling allowance", and "dsa payments"?

• What are "coordination fees" and "resource fees"?

• Who is "susan" ("pd susan Forest Reserve march 97") and who is "molly" ("pd molly outof pkt")?

• How can negative balances appear for petty cash?

It may be that everything is correct but the book-keeping is neither transparent nor evidentand needs further explanation. The whole accounting system does not seem to be profes-sional although two accountants are permanently engaged at COMIFOR Project only forthis purpose. It is advised that the Project introduces a well-tried and recognized accountingsystem on computer basis with special accounting software (double-entry book-keeping).

As the Project is dealing with big amounts of money and as the book-keeping and account-ancy up to date is not understandable it is recommended to engage a qualified local Com-pany for the execution of an Audit. This Audit should also pay attention to the following is-sues:

• Is the Imprest Account handled properly?

• What are the effective services of the Consulting Companies Techniplan and DHV? TArendered? Material and equipment supplied? Sub-contracts? Operation costs? Justifica-tions?



• Have the tender procedures been correctly applied?

• Some goods seem to be very expensive. Was the selection and purchase of goods andservices justified in relation to the work to be carried out?

• What are the operation costs of the project vehicles? Are they reasonable compared withother projects?

• For payment of allowances: (i) Have the KWS regulations been applied? (ii) Who hasbeen paid and was it justified?

• Are there any double payments for the same good or service? How can double pay-ments be avoided? This concerns particularly "allowances", "fuel", "hiring casuals", etc.(see also aforementioned statements).

• Are the invoices prepared according to the required standard?

• Are the expenses justified from the technical point of view (hotel costs, meals, accom-modation, etc.)?

• Has the purchased material been correctly inventoried (material inventory lists)? Havelosses been recorded?

• What are the control systems of the book-keeping and accountancy as there is no dou-ble book-keeping system?

• What are the recommendations for the further book-keeping?

Project budget accounts:

The aforementioned "Financial Report" of the last Project Coordinator, W. van Ijssel, con-tains two project budget accountancies, one of the EC Delegation, the other of the Project.

Workplan & cost estimate 1995/1996:

Item EC Delegation COMIFOR Pr. DifferenceCommitted 200,000Paid 178,025Estimated total 208,712 104,138 104,574Balance (committed - total) - 8,712

This means that the two accountancies differ at about 100% related to COMIFOR's ac-countancy. Translated into praxis it means, if the Project is right, then ECU 95,862 less arecommitted than stated by EC Delegation.

Workplan & cost estimate 1996/1997:

Item EC Delegation COMIFOR Pr. DifferenceCommitted 543,000Paid 131,107Estimated total 583,611 224,770 358,841Balance (committed - total) - 40,611

This means that the two accountancies differ at about 160% related to COMIFOR's ac-countancy. Translated into praxis it means, if the Project is right, then ECU 318,230 less arecommitted than stated by EC Delegation.

One of the explanations why there is a difference between these two accountancies for1996/1997 may be that the budget for this year was extended up to December 1997.



For the whole project budget accounts the following situation is given by EC Delegation andProject:

Item EC Delegation COMIFOR Pr. DifferenceProject total (I) 4,400,000 4,400,000 0Committed (II) 2,573,787 2,486,014 87,773Available uncommitted (I) - (II) 1,826,213 1,913,986 - 87,773Estimated total payment (III) 1,808,704 1,870,735 - 62,031Estimated committed unpaid (II) - (III) 765,083 615,279 149,804Estimated project balance (I) - (III) 2,591,296 2,529,265 62,031

The two accountancies show approximately similar levels. In terms of accountancy this in-formation is certainly not precise enough and needs to be clarified in order to get reliablefigures for the planning of the project continuation. Anyhow, the commitments have to befurther analyzed and specified. It seems that some of the commitments are not real com-mitments. If the ongoing procurement of some goods (uniforms, radio system, motor bikes)can be stopped, the unpaid commitment will be reduced by about 200,000 ECU. If the TAcontract can be prematurely terminated, the respective commitment will be reduced ac-cordingly.

If this phase of the project will be prematurely terminated as soon as possible, the availableProject balance is estimated to be about ECU 2,200,000. An Audit may clarify the situa-tion and state the correct figures.



6. Efficiency of the projectThe evaluation of the efficiency of a project is normally done by comparing the original proj-ect planning (plan of operation) with the achievements of the project. In this case this com-parison is quite difficult as there is no comprehensive and evident project planning.

Principally there are three different documents on which the project is based:

a) The Financial Agreement signed in November 1992

b) The ToR of the TA contract

c) The Project's own planning as presented in the Annual Work Plan 1996/1997

These three documents from which a project planning can be derived are partly congruentpartly different. In order to make as much as possible a complete evaluation, the project'sactivities were compared with all three planning documents. Some issues appear in all threeplanning documents. Thus a repetition of some points could not be avoided.

6.1 Comparison "Planning and achievements" according to the Financial Agree-ment

As already stated in chap. 2.2, a project planning scheme based on the Financial Agree-ment had to be rebuilt in order to get a relationship for the project evaluation. The "PlannedResults" and "Planned Activities" mentioned in this chapter reflect the original project idea.

6.1.1 Planned Result 1: Planning and management capacity of the "Natural ForestManagement Division" of the KFD strengthened.

This chapter deals only with the intended physical strengthening of the FD. The training as-pect is treated in chapter 6.1.4.

In the Financial Agreement there is no absolutely clear statement what the planner of thisProject had meant. Sometimes the Agreement defines the project purpose as "to strengthenKenya's Forest Department". Then it talks of "management capacity of KFD improved con-cerning forest resources". But in Art. 2.2 "Project specific objectives and results" it is clearlystated that the planning and management capacity of the FD should be strengthened: "Theproject's purpose is to improve the Kenya Forest Department capacity ..., in general throughthe strengthening of its planning and management capacity ...!". Referring to what was ex-plained already in chapter 3.1.1, activities can only be regarded as strengthening if they aretarget oriented. The pure delivery of equipment and material cannot be regarded asstrengthening if it is not clearly defined at the same time for what purpose the equipmentand material should serve. This is why for the reconstruction of the PPM of COMIFOR thestrengthening of the planning and management capacity was regarded as the most likelyinitial idea, and this also in respect of the planned elaboration and implementation of forestmanagement plans.

Unfortunately, the COMIFOR Project had not the same perception as explained above. Theactivities of the Project to "strengthen" the FD consisted in an unreflected purchase and de-livery of equipment and material. The equipment and material was bought according to anindicative list figuring in the Financial Agreement (Art. 3.2) not considering the fact that theFinancial Agreement was already elaborated in 1991/1992 under quite different precondi-tions. At that time COMIFOR was supposed to support 10 different forest sites, and withinKFDP it had particular assignments. After the request and agreement of 1993 to select onlytwo sites (Mt. Kenya and Lamu), the equipment and material list as well as all other origi-nally planned services and goods should have been revised accordingly. This was notdone.



The reality was that the procured equipment and material was not selected in a target ori-ented way, i.e. in the sense of strengthening the FD in its planning and management ca-pacities. The material supply did not at all take into consideration the main element of theproject purpose: the planned involvement of the local population in forest management andconservation!

Additional to the procurement of equipment and material, COMIFOR also financed their op-eration and maintenance costs at nearly 100% although the Financial Agreement foreseesin chap. 3.6 of Annex No. 2 that the "Government will include in its budget sufficient alloca-tions to complement the EDF contribution in operational expenses ...". Up to date GoK hasnot significantly contributed to the financing of the running costs. According to the MoF, theFD has not even calculated the necessary budget for such a contribution and has not madea budget request in this respect. But regarding the present economic situation of Kenya it isdoubtful if the MoF could have significantly increased the budget of the FD in order to fi-nance part of the running expenses of the COMIFOR Project.

It has to be clearly stated that the procurement and delivery of goods constitutes, in certaincases, rather a weakening of the receiver than a strengthening. Generally, this is the casewhen the follow-up costs of the procured goods are so high that the receiver is not able toafford these costs. In the case of COMIFOR the supply of some equipment, especially ofsome vehicles, tractors, lorries and boats, has certainly to be seen as weakening of the FDand not as strengthening of its capacity. Capacity strengthening rather starts with training ofstaff to acquire the required knowledge in management skills, in supporting the respectiveinstitution in improving its management structure towards the management targets, in de-veloping concepts and strategies, and in training specific staff to improve the planning andimplementation of required activities. Equipment and material are only tools to achieve acertain objective, but they do not constitute the strengthening itself.

For the concerned DFOs of Eastern Province a statistic was compiled at the request of theevaluation mission to see the development of forest cases. There is a very strong increaseof forest cases from 1995 (court: 64 + compounded: 4) to 1996 (165 + 124) which corre-sponds to more than 400%. This increase could be an indicator that the support of theDFOs by COMIFOR was efficient. But to state this relation with certainty, the situation anddevelopment of this matter must be analyzed in more detail. It would also be interesting tofind out why there are so huge differences between the single DFOs within the same year.Are some DFOs more active than other ones? Or are there less illegal timber poachers inone District than in another? Or is there more exploitable high quality timber in Tharaka Nithiand Meru? What are the reasons of the probable drop of forest related court cases in1997?

Forest related court cases prosecuted in Law Court and Compounded between 1990and 1997 in PFO Eastern Province (Court + Compounded):

Year Embu Nyam-bene

TharakaNithi

Meru Total

1990 3 + 0 - - 25 + 2 28 +21991 6 + 0 - - 29 + 0 35 + 01992 5 + 0 - 14 + 6 31 + 1 50 + 71993 3 + 0 - 25 + 8 38 + 1 66 + 91994 4 + 0 5 + 0 28+ 0 30 + 0 67 + 01995 3 + 0 9 + 0 13 + 2 39 + 2 64 + 41996 165 + 1241997 (extrapolated from5 (Jan. to May) to 12months)

125 + 60



Beside the procurement of equipment, material and services rehabilitation of forest build-ings and forest roads was envisaged. The aforementioned statements are also applicable inthis matter. More than three years after the original planning (Financial Agreement) and af-ter the change of the frame conditions of the Project, a new concept and strategy for theimprovement of the FD infrastructure should have been worked out taking sustainability as-pects into account. Fortunately, the rehabilitation procedure was postponed, and thus it canbe replanned according to the actual need and demand.

The following goods and services have been supplied:

Item Supplier Price (ECU)Source: TA

Price (ECU)Source: PM

3 Lorries (8 tons) Conrico Overseas 325,745.67 140,906.2512 Land Rovers Conrico Overseas (incl. above) 265,687.206 tractors Holman Brothers 113,956.31 83,343.606 trailers (3 tons) CMC Motors Group 13,034.92 15,000.003 boats Specialized fibreglass 35,371.82 36,609.30computers/printers Olivetti Equitorial 32,679.18 29,000.00camping equipment (55camp sets)

Kenya Tents 30,216.56 36,047.00

1 typewriter SFCE 628.22 718.752 GPS University of Wales 8,020.00 9,468.703 distance measuringequipment

Intech EA 40,550.33 30,046.80

3 theodolites Intech EA 33,425.60 28,546.80New aerial photography ofMt. Kenya

Photomap 37,158.34 42,390.60

Socio-economic survey(AWF)

AWF 60,000.00 60,000.00

Aerial photos of Lamumangroves

Directorate of RemoteSensing (GoK)

1,515.60

Total 730,786.95 779,280.6

It is remarkable that the Project Manager and his CP, the Project Coordinator, give signifi-cantly different price figures for some items. Who is right?The purchase of equipment and material was quite often not target oriented. Some of thepurchased goods are not used within the scope of the project. In some cases the materialprocurement is not justifiable at all. Some of the given prices seem to be exorbitant. In de-tail:

• Three lorries: One lorry each has been given to the PFO "Central Province" at Nyeri for the DFOs of Nyeri

and Kirinyaga, to the PFO "Eastern Province" at Embu for the DFOs of Embu andTharaka Nithi, and to the DFO of Meru to share the lorry with the DFO of Nyambene(does not belong to the project region). The lorries are used for "general transport". Theiroperating costs is paid by the project although the lorries are mainly used by the FD andnot for project purposes. Indeed, the procurement of lorries is not necessary for the in-troduction of participatory forest management. If at all, one lorry would have been suffi-cient for the first phase of the project.



• Twelve Landrovers: In the Financial Agreement the procurement of Pick-ups was planned. Later on Landrovers

Defender were purchased. It is not understandable why all 12 vehicles have been pur-chased at once at the very beginning of the project? Not all of them can be used forproject purposes. The 12 Landrovers have been distributed as follows: 1 for the ProjectManager, 1 for the DFO Lamu, 1 for the DFO Nyeri, 1 for the DFO Kirinyaga, 1 for theDFO Embu, 1 for the DFO Tharaka Nithi, 1 for the DFO Meru, 1 for the DFO Nyambene(outside the project region), 1 for the Nyeri Base (MoU), 1 for the Head of Natural ForestDivision (not integrated in the project), 1 for other officers of FD/HQ (has not necessarilysomething to do with the project), 1 for the "Research group" (FD and KEFRI; should notbe a priority for the project).

The use of the vehicles cannot be controlled by the project. Thus it is uncertain if the vehi-cles are used in the sense of the project purpose, although the project finances 100% oftheir running and maintenance expenses. Only a few vehicles are used for the properproject purpose.

Additionally to these 12 aforementioned Landrovers, further three (3) Landrovers "Discov-ery" were bought by the TA company from the project budget for the use of the three (3)experts (TA component).

• Six tractors with trailers: The tractors including trailers have been distributed to the DFOs around Mt. Kenya: Nyeri,

Kirinyaga, Embu, Tharaka Nithi, Meru and Nyambene (outside project region). The trac-tors/trailers are used for general transport (material, soil, confiscated timber, etc.).

The procurement of six tractors/trailers was not necessary to achieve the planned projectpurpose, i.e. the introduction of participatory forest management. The use of the trac-tors/trailers cannot be controlled by the project. Thus it is uncertain if the tractors/trailersare used in the sense of the project purpose, although the project finances 100% of theirrunning and maintenance expenses.

• Three boats: The boat engines were separately bought from the boat bodies. The boat bodies were lo-

cally made. The PM has stated in his letter of November 9, 1993 that "all patrol boats goto Lamu". "Lamu mangroves cover a very extensive area and require more than one boatfor effective work." But finally, the three boats were not needed in Lamu and thereforehave been given to the coastal DFOs at Lamu, Kilifi and Kwale. Only Lamu belongs tothe project area. The use of the boats could not be controlled by the project. Thus it isuncertain if the boats are used in the sense of the project purpose.

The procurement of boats was probably not necessary as the local and international man-grove experts, Mr. Kivyatu and Mr. Johnson, could use the still existing FD boat at Lamubefore the new boats arrived.

• Computers/printers: According to the statement of the project, two (2) desktop computers, two (2) lap top com-

puters and two (2) printers were procured. One lap top computer is said to be stolen. Thetotal price for these computers/printers was approximately ECU 32.600 and this is exor-bitantly expensive! Even the best quality equipment should not cost more than 5,000ECU per computer and 1,000 ECU per printer, making altogether not more than 22,000ECU. But excellent computers and printers could have been already purchased at a totalamount of 14,000 ECU. Is Olivetti so expensive? This matter should be closely exam-ined.

• Camping equipment: It is not understandable at all why the huge number of 55 camp sets (tents, tables, chairs,

etc.) has been purchased. If at all, the project would need only a few tents for forest in-ventory work. Now the tents are stored at FD/HQ and at Nyeri Base, and whoever from



the FD, KWS or/and MoU needs a camp set can borrow it from the project. This pro-curement can be regarded as a waste of project funds.

• Global Positioning Systems GPS: Two GPS instruments have been purchased. The number is adequate for the project's pur-

pose, but the paid price is extremely high. Two GPS instruments can be easily bought for2,000 ECU or even cheaper. The GPS 45 costed in 1996 about 400 ECU in Germany in-cluding tax. Maybe some additional equipment was purchased together with the GPS in-struments? This matter should be closely examined.

• Distance measuring equipment: Three electronic instruments (ZEISS ELDI 10) were bought at the total price of 40,500 ECU.

This purchase looks cynical in relation to the project purpose (indigenous forest conser-vation with community participation).

A good quality measuring tape costs approximately 50 ECU. What was the reason to buythis exorbitantly expensive equipment? Is there an immense survey task that cannot betackled with traditional distance measuring instruments like a measuring tape? Howmany jobless people could have been employed in measuring tasks for this amount ofmoney?

The selection of these instruments is not imaginable considering the fact that there are highquality distance measuring instruments at much cheaper costs, as e.g. ultra sound in-struments for about 300 ECU. Even the best possible distance measuring instrument, aLaser instrument, costs "only" 8,000 ECU per piece. This matter should be further ex-amined.

• Theodolites: Three theodolites were purchased for a total price of more than 33,000 ECU. About the

same what has been said about the electronic distance measuring instruments appliesalso here.

Theodolites are used in land survey where a very high precision is demanded and only afew millimeters of deviation is allowed (e.g. in urban areas for the survey of plots). Onlyrelative angles can be measured with theodolites which means that they are only usefulif the survey data are given in that format. The requested precision in forestry surveys isquite low compared with pure survey tasks, because it is already very difficult to definethe edge of a forest. A precision of +/- 10 m is normally sufficient, and this demand ismet with a precise compass (price approximately 1,000 ECU) and a measuring tape.

The choice of this technology was certainly not relevant for a Forestry Service in a devel-oping country. One wonders about the number of people within the FD who can use thetheodolites without any further training. This matter should be closely examined.

• New aerial photography of Mt. Kenya region: The acquisition of a new aerial photo coverage of Mt. Kenya was completely unnecessary

as there was already a quite recent aerial photo coverage from 1991 organized and fi-nanced by KIFCON. The forest situation in the Mt. Kenya Forest Reserve does notchange so fast that new aerial photos were needed in order to improve the project plan-ning and implementation. The time difference between the two aerial photo coverages offive years (1991 and 1996) is even so small that the aerial photos cannot be used for areliable comparison of forest changes.

At its closure (June 1994) KIFCON handed over the aerial photos (together with a lot ofother documents) to the Forestry Department. The aerial photos from KIFCON wereknown to the COMIFOR Project. Their existence is already mentioned in the first Incep-tion Report of April 1995. In chapter 7.2 on page 29 the authors state: "Due to the factthat Bussmann has greatly improved the vegetation map of KIFCON, the project will notwaste time on efforts to repeat a reconnaissance inventory based on the 1991 aerialphotos but will make a new set of photos of the area with the same scale." As alreadystated, the decision of ordering a new aerial photo flight was certainly wrong. The "old"



aerial photos would have been good enough to serve as a basis for project planning andimplementation. Many forestry projects have to work without any aerial photos which isalso possible. This wrong decision was quite expensive, and the money could have beenspent much more effectively.

• Socio-economic survey: The socio-economic study cannot be judged as it was not completed at the time of project

evaluation. It was the intention of the Project to procure the following goods additional to the aforemen-tioned ones. The tender procedures have been completed, but the contracts have not beenawarded yet.

Item EstimatedPrice (ECU)

502 sets of uniforms for forest staff 25,80037 motorbikes 28,800100 bicycles 6,000radio-equipment 133,400Total 194,000

The evaluation mission recommended to the GoK and EC Delegation to stop and revise thisprocurement. The following reasons were given:

• The project should be tested on a pilot basis. Therefore, first only goods for the pilot ar-eas should be procured so that the goods (type, quality and quantity) can be tested be-fore bigger quantities are bought. This concerns especially the radio system. Theplanned radio system should be tested on a smaller scale before buying a completeequipment for the whole of Mt. Kenya region at very high costs.

• It has to be discussed with the local population and experienced sociologists if it is a wisedecision to supply uniforms to the FD staff in respect of COMIFOR's purpose of intro-ducing community participation.

• It is doubtful if the procurement of motorbikes is useful and reasonable under thesustainability aspect as the FD cannot afford the running expenses. The planned pur-chase of 37 motor bikes meant for the field staff of the whole Mt. Kenya region should bepostponed until the project is reoriented. Alternative solutions should be considered (e.g.financially support FD staff with cheap credits so that they can buy motorbikes on theirown; use of motorbikes for official duties is reimbursed on a km basis).

Additionally the following material was purchased according to the records of the account-ant section of the COMIFOR Project (values given in KSh):

NO QTY ITEM DESRIPTION POINT OF USE UNIT VALUE TOTAL VALUE1 1 Photocopier Medium PFO Central 212,000.00 212,000.002 1 Roma Desk PFO Central 23,000.00 23,000.003 4 Catalina Chairs PFO Central 2,200.00 8,800.004 1 Cash Box Nyeri Base 8,970.00 8,970.005 2 Water Tanks Nyeri Base 39,500.00 79,000.006 1 Steel Cabinet Nyeri Base 16,100.00 16,100.007 1 Typist Chair Nyeri Base 6,566.00 6,566.008 8 Office chairs Nyeri Base 3,565.00 28,520.009 1 Semi Executive Chair Nyeri Base 7,682.00 7,682.00

10 1 Executive Chair Nyeri Base 14,720.00 14,720.0011 1 Magnifier Glass Survey 975.00 975.00



12 3 Extra accupak Battery Survey 7,599.00 22,797.0013 1 Circuit breaker Survey 15,500.00 15,500.0014 3 Prism Kirin Survey 28,610.00 85,830.0015 3 Prism Holder Survey 4,642.00 13,926.0016 1 Power Stabilizer COMIFOR Training 22,500.00 22,500.0017 1 Elite Projector screen COMIFOR Training 21,000.00 21,000.0018 1 Kodak Ektalite 1000 tray COMIFOR Training 2,500.00 2,500.0019 1 Elite screen with stand COMIFOR Training 23,000.00 23,000.0020 1 Slide Viewer COMIFOR Training 3,500.00 3,500.0021 2 Slide Holder COMIFOR Training 75.00 150.0022 1 Wall mounted white Board COMIFOR Training 16,000.00 16,000.0023 1 Sahara Flipchart COMIFOR Training 17,000.00 17,000.0024 1 Light Box COMIFOR Training 25,000.00 25,000.0025 1 Overhead Projector COMIFOR Training 127,425.00 127,425.0026 1 Cash Box Accounts 1,600.00 1,600.0027 1 Computer gand Accounts 4,800.00 4,800.0028 1 Steel cupboard COMIFOR 12,500.00 37,500.0029 1 Inkjet Printer Accounts 25,800.00 25,800.0030 2 Panasonic telephone COMIFOR 14,959.00 29,918.0031 1 Ethernet card COMIFOR 18,000.00 18,000.0032 7 Axe Comifor- Inventory 380.00 2,660.0033 7 Axe Handle Comifor- Inventory 240.00 1,680.0034 1 Altimeter No. 25 Comifor- Inventory 4,950.00 4,950.0035 1 Computer Comifor- Inventory 132,000.00 132,000.0036 1 Printer Comifor- Inventory 89,000.00 89,000.0037 3 First Aid Kit Comifor- Inventory 3,250.00 9,750.0038 1 Metallic Box Comifor- Inventory 1,800.00 1,800.0039 3 Shovels Comifor- Inventory 170.00 510.0040 3 Measuring tapes Comifor- Inventory 430.00 1,290.0041 5 Mattocks Comifor- Inventory 650.00 3,250.0042 2 Crowbars Comifor- Inventory 875.00 1,720.0043 1 Computer Forest Dept Training 104,500.00 104,500.00

6.1.2 Planned Result 2: Management plan for Mt. Kenya developed and implementa-tion initiated

COMIFOR was originally designed to be "complementary to and to sustain in the results ofthe KIFCON Project" (FA and ToR). One of the main activities of KIFCON was supposed tobe the "design and development of an outline forest management plan" and the "designand development of comprehensive management plans for the three pilot areas" (Mau, Ka-kamega, and Arabuko Sokoke). Based on the management planning concepts developedby KIFCON, COMIFOR was supposed to elaborate a forest management plan for Mt. Kenyaand to initiate its implementation.

Unfortunately KIFCON was closed in 1994 without having prepared neither an outline forestmanagement plan nor comprehensive forest management plans for its pilot areas whichcould have served COMIFOR - as originally planned - as a guideline or model. During thelogical framework workshop held November 1995 in Nairobi, COMIFOR adapted the con-cept of a two level planning approach (outline plan and comprehensive forest managementplan) and specified this as separate results with own activities (see subchapters below). Itis/was COMIFOR's approach in forest resources planning (i) first to collect data then (ii) todo the planning. But it was ignored that, before these two steps can be carried out, a con-cept and methodology, the objectives and the strategy of planning need to be defined aswell as already existing information needs to be analyzed. This was a serious management



mistake which resulted in a poor efficiency of the Project as many management planningactivities were initiated at the same time without taking into account their relevance, theirlinkages and their timely order (e.g. zonation and forest inventory).

Management planning is not only required for Mt. Kenya but also for all the other 6 pilot ar-eas which are covered by the MoU. COMIFOR prepared for this purpose a document in or-der to "harmonize data collection, processing and storage for management planning" whichwas accepted as guideline by the MoU Secretariat and by the other projects.

6.1.2.1 Outline forest management and conservation plan for Mt. Kenya formulated

According to the Inception Report (December 1995) "An out-line forest management andconservation plan will be prepared for Mt. Kenya, focusing on zoning for various uses andconservation purposes, with recommendations on management strategies. This overall planwill not go into details in terms of directly implementable actions, but rather take the form ofa strategy paper or policy recommendation".

Up to now, not much progress has been made in the formulation of this plan, except for thezonation part. Already at the beginning of COMIFOR there was substantial information onthe Mt. Kenya region available. KIFCON carried out a forest inventory in the Mt. Kenya For-est Reserve in 1992/1993 and compiled the results in forest inventory reports (Forest In-ventory Report No. 6 "Mount Kenya and Thungu Hills", and Report No. 9 "Meru"). Addition-ally KIFCON had prepared a GIS-based "vegetation type" map of Mt. Kenya. Both, the re-ports and the map would provide sufficient precise information on the forest resources (e.g.forest strata, standing stock, growth and yield, etc.) for macro-planning purpose. Therefore,the low progress cannot be understood.

KEFRI has prepared in 1995 a socio-economic survey to provide information for the promo-tion of sustainable forest management of Mt. Kenya Forest. IUCN/ODA prepared in 1995 adetailed study on Kenya's indigenous forests which included their status, and providesmanagement and conservation recommendations (WASS, P.; 1995). Together with the rec-ommendations and policies outlined in the Kenya Forestry Master Plan from 1994 and theformulation of the new forest policy (draft 1994) most (if not to say all) of the information re-quired for the preparation of the "Out-line forest management and conservation plan for Mt.Kenya" was already available at the end of 1995!

Survey and Demarcation of Mount Kenya Forest ReserveThis activity has not been specified in the "log frame planning" of COMIFOR as no technicalassistance was required, but it is an activity which is fully financed (except for staff salaries)by the Project. Until September 1997 the expenditures accumulated up to 240,000 KShwhich is about 25% of the total estimated costs.

The survey and demarcation of the forest reserve boundary is carried out by one surveycrew of the Survey Branch of FD and started in May 1997. Until now the boundary withinEmbu and Tharaka Nithi Districts have been re-surveyed and demarcated and this activity iscurrently ongoing in Meru District. Altogether about 25% (87 km) of the total 323 km longreserve boundary have been re-established so far and a total of 608 missing beacons werereplaced by concrete ones.

During the process of re-survey up to now only minor encroachments were detected. Thismeans that in spite of shortage on arable land, the local population has respected the forestreserve boundaries for a period of more than 60 years (Mt. Kenya Forest Reserve wasgazetted in 1932).

The re-establishment of the reserve boundary should have started immediately after fundswere available to COMIFOR in November 1995. It is now questionable whether this activitycan be finalized by the end of the Project.



Commission of new aerial photography of Mt. KenyaThe Project commissioned 471 panchromatic black and white aerial photos from "PhotomapKenya Limited" in March 1996 at a scale of 1.25,000 which have been paid by the EU out ofCOMIFOR budget for total cost of 2.7 mio. KSh.

It was not necessary to commission a new set of aerial photography out of the followingreasons: In 1991 KIFCON commissioned aerial photos from the same company for the Mt.Kenya region. These aerial photos could still have been used. The argument that the infor-mation was outdated (within 5 years) is not valid at all, as the degradation process in Mt.Kenya forest is rather slow and there are hardly any changes in land use. Due to the factthat KIFCON was never handed-over officially, it was said that there was a problem in get-ting access to these aerial photos as the property rights were not clear. Anyhow, later on asexplained by forestry department staff, a set of aerial photos was found "dumped" at the FD(which however was not fully complete), when the new aerial photos were already commis-sioned. In reality, the existence of the aerial photos was known to COMIFOR, and theywould have been available. COMIFOR regarded the 1991 photos as outdated and thereforedid not want to use them, and this was a serious technical and economical mistake (seealso 6.1.1).

For the purpose of zonation on a macro planning level (out-line forest management plan)there was no need to carry out aerial photo interpretation. The GIS-based Vegetation TypeMap of Mt. Kenya which was prepared by KIFCON based on the 1991 aerial photographystill provides sufficient information.

Comprehensive forest management plans should have been elaborated for pilot areaswhere 1991 aerial photos were available.

Another objective of the new aerial photo interpretation (refer to Inception Report) was toestablish a database for environmental monitoring (GIS-based) which however was neithera subject of the Financial Agreement nor of the ToR. Also, for this purpose it would havebeen much more appropriate to use satellite imagery such as SPOT, IRS or Landsat TM inaddition to the 1991 aerial photos. Satellite images provide sufficient information for thispurpose, are compatible with GIS (geo-referenced) and are much more cheaper than a newaerial photography and as such allow much shorter monitoring periods.

The commissioning of new aerial photography was not necessary and the efficiency of up-dated aerial photos in respect of the preparation of the out-line forest management andconservation plan was minor.

Interpret aerial photosFor the interpretation of the aerial photographs the Project engaged a local short term con-sultant for a period of two months with the specific task to interpret about one third of Mt.Kenya and to train the staff of the Survey and Mapping Section of FD in aerial photo inter-pretation on the job. The photo interpretation started May 1996 and it is expected that thefinal maps are completed in October 1997. The whole process took then more than 1.5years! For aerial photo interpretation - both for Lamu and Mt. Kenya - a total amount of215,594 KSh has been provided in form of materials, travel costs for field truthing, etc.

The Project decided to interpret all the 471 aerial photos of Mt. Kenya as detailed as possi-ble and determined landuse codes based on the following 4 "levels": main vegetation type,association, crown closure/maturity, species. Altogether more than 90 different land usetypes were distinguished which resulted in the identification of 2,462 land use polygons!.This resulted in a tremendous work load in interpretation, field verification, geo-referencing,digitizing and data clearing. This detailed interpretation was justified by COMIFOR in orderto collect the necessary data base for an environmental monitoring system which is in factnot required to meet the result.



For the purpose of zonation (out-line forest management and conservation plan) a moresimplified objective oriented land use classification system would have been sufficient andmuch more appropriate. Anyhow, for the purpose of zonation, the land use classes were fi-nally compiled into 10 vegetation types which almost correspond to those identified in thevegetation type map of KIFCON.

Even for the purpose of the elaboration of comprehensive management plans the land useclassification system is by far too detailed and is - due to the lack of a detailed forest man-agement planning concept - not adjusted to the specific needs of planning. This makes itnecessary to carry out another analytical step in order to combine land use classes and togeneralize boundaries in order to define manageable units. This could best be done by ap-plying GIS-techniques, however the knowledge how to do so does not yet exist in the FD. Itwould also have been sufficient for the beginning to analyze the aerial photos of the pilotareas only.

The transformation of the identified land use polygons onto 27 transparency maps at ascale of 1:25,000 has been done applying simple mapping technology. The aerial photoswere never correctly interpreted applying the necessary correction and rectification systems.As consequence, the maps that have been produced on the basis of these aerial photosare not correct concerning its scale. That means that distances, angles and areas cannotbe correctly taken from these maps. This means that these maps cannot be used for thepurpose for which maps are normally produced!

These incorrect transparent landuse maps were then digitized and stored as GIS coverage.Data clearing is still going on. When visiting the Survey and Mapping Unit of the FD it waslearnt that all needed technical equipment (aerial photo interpretation machine "AP 190",computer, software, plotter) for geo-referencing and transformation of aerial photo inter-pretation data directly into the GIS system are available since 1993. However, it neverworked. In 1997, when the digitizing was already completed, COMIFOR financed the repairof the AP 190. It turned out that it was a minor software problem. If COMIFOR would haveinvested in the repair of the AP 190 and in the training of the staff in its application at anearlier stage, real geo-referenced and more accurate landuse data would have been avail-able by now.

COMIFOR provided some basic training to the Survey and Mapping Section of FD. Furthertraining is necessary to adapt actual standard technologies, but this special training taskhas not much to do with COMIFOR's purpose.

Elaborate thematic maps of Mt. KenyaOne of the most important component of the out-line plan is the zonation of Mt. Kenya intofunctional zones. This follows the recommendation made in the Master Plan and by WASS(1995).

Right now, the first draft of the zonation map is available and was presented to the interdis-ciplinary Mt. Kenya Task Force for comments. The zoning was done by a Sub-Task Force ina participatory way involving altogether 642 different stakeholders following the methodol-ogy developed by KIFCON in Kakamega forest.

From the technical point of view some critical comments have to be made on the zonationsystem: The forest area is subdivided into three main zones: Plantation, Protection and,Utilization. The Utilization Zone is further subdivided into: Commercial Use Zone and Sub-sistence Use Zone. The zonation is based on a set of various criteria which take into ac-count topography, present vegetation and social aspects.

The mix of variable (social aspects) with non-variable (topography, partly vegetation) pa-rameters makes it necessary to periodically update the zonation map. It would have beenbetter to work on two layers: 1st layer: zonation based on the non variable parameters, 2ndlayer: zonation based on variable parameters and to overlay them by applying GIS tech-



niques. As such, to update the map would be much more simple. As it stands right now thezonation has been done already, but nobody will know in the future, what have been thecriteria for the identification of a particular Protection Zone. For example, right now thewhole bamboo belt (altogether more than 60.000 ha) has been identified as ProtectionZone. This was justified with the argument, that there is at present no use made of thebamboo. As such it can neither be defined as Utilization Zone nor as Plantation Zone. Es-pecially the bamboo forest might have in future a good potential to be economically used bythe local population on a comparatively low ecological risk. The lack of knowledge or thenon-existence of present use cannot be criteria for the definition of Protection Zones as thiswould hinder future development. Therefore, this zonation is not reasonable.

Another point is that zones may overlap, for example why not allow subsistence use of fire-wood in the Protection Zone or even the Plantation Zone? It would be desirable to have a"Limited Production Zone" where utilization could take place with defined management pre-scriptions.

The present zonation map has been manually prepared based on the vegetation zones de-rived from aerial photo interpretation and based on standard assumptions. As topographicfeatures have not been considered yet and biodiversity surveys have not been carried outso far, the zonation map is just a draft.

The Project assisted the Survey and Mapping Section of FD in setting up a GIS-System.The results of the aerial photo interpretation are already digitized and available as onelayer, however, still some data clearing is necessary. COMIFOR contracted Survey ofKenya to scan all topographic map sheets of Mt. Kenya region for the total cost of 150,000KSh. This is currently in process and will be used as a case study for the training of the staffof Survey of Kenya. To commission Survey of Kenya with this task was an economic andefficient decision.

The zonation map should have been prepared after the biodiversity surveys have been car-ried out, the topographic data were scanned in and available as GIS-layers and after theGIS-system has become fully operational. As it is right now, the whole process of zonationneeds to be done again based on GIS-analysis.

Contribute to biodiversity surveys with NMK (National Museums of Kenya)Biodiversity surveys provide essential information for management planning. The Projecthas prepared ToR for the elaboration of the study and an agreement was signed betweenCOMIFOR and NMK in July 1997. The approach of the Project to cooperate in this matterwith NMK is supported as already NMK and KIFCON cooperated intensively in implement-ing biodiversity surveys, and NMK is right now the most qualified institution for that purposein Kenya. The estimated costs of about 2 mio. KSh for the biodiversity survey of Mt. Kenyawill be fully financed out of the COMIFOR budget .

However, the timing of this survey is too late. As already mentioned, the biodiversity surveyhas to provide essential information for zoning, namely the identification of priority areas forconservation. The whole survey is scheduled to take a full year as two assessments need tobe made: one in the dry season and one in the rainy season. This means that the surveyresults will not be available before the end of the Project. The study should have beenstarted immediately after the operational funds were available. The preparation of the ToRand of the agreement with NMK could have been elaborated even before.

Establish collaborative forest research activities with KEFRIThe objective of COMIFOR's research component is to establish an adequate data envi-ronment for forest management planning. The approach to collaborate in this matter withKEFRI is supported. COMIFOR provides technical assistance to KEFRI and finances rele-vant research work.



So far volume equations and volume tables for 9 tree species common in Mt. Kenya regionwere developed. This will slightly help to increase the efficiency of the forest inventory re-sults as the preciseness of the volume estimate is increased. The research work is com-pleted and the volume tables have been prepared and disseminated to various institutionsand agencies.

The establishment of permanent sample plots is currently ongoing. It is planned to set-up aseries of PSPs in all indigenous forest types within the pilot areas. Up to now PSPs haveonly been established in the Kirinyaga pilot area (4 PSPs out of planed 15). The objective ofthe PSP has been formulated in a very general way, namely collection of information on re-generation, growth and yield and monitoring of forest dynamics and vegetation changes.The selected design has several considerable weaknesses and even statistic deficiencies. Itneeds to be revised otherwise it will not provide any valuable results. The establishment ofPSPs for the sake of growth and yield modeling is of low efficiency and will have only animpact after a long period of time. To set up PSPs for the control and monitoring of changescaused by active forest management would have been more appropriate but would haverequired a different technical approach.

Design and develop an outline of a forest management and conservation plan for Mt.KenyaNot much has been done so far. In addition to the draft zonation map the Project has con-tracted AWF to implement "An economic assessment of Mt. Kenya Forest" which has beenrecently completed (final version of the document was available in September 1997).

Up to now no written concept exists how the out-line forest management and conservationplan should look like, to whom it should be addressed, what should be the content, whatshould be the planning period, etc. This is a serious deficiency which causes a major set-back to the Project as the expert responsible for the technical assistance in this matter hasleft the Project without having exchanged his "ideas" with his successor.

Without a real competent forest resources planning specialist with long-term experience inparticipative approaches it will not be possible for the Project to come up with a sound andrealistic out-line forest management and conservation plan for Mt. Kenya before the end ofthe Project.

Initiate implementation of the outline planNothing done so far; cannot be accomplished till end of the Project.

6.1.2.2 Comprehensive management plans for pilot areas formulated

The Project activities in comprehensive management planning started very late (March1996: aerial photo interpretation, December 1996: forest inventory, June 1997: socio-economic study). The argument of the project that it was not possible to start earlier be-cause funds through the imprest account were only available from November 1995 onwardsis not valid in this context. As altogether 6 months short-term consultancy were available,which are not channeled through the imprest account, the Project could and should haveengaged a forest resources planning expert for at least one month for the elaboration of aparticipatory forest management planning concept. Instead 2 man-months of short termconsultancy were spent on aerial photo interpretation, a comparatively simple component ofthe whole management planning process. Once the imprest account was available theProject started to implement various forest management activities at almost the same timewhich - from the technical point of view - have to be implemented in a timely order: first so-cio-economic study to identify participatory management options, then aerial photo inter-



pretation to map the forest resource according to management potential and finally a forestinventory within manageable areas tailor-made to the specific needs of the stakeholders.

Due to the weakness of the project in overall forest resources planning and due to the lackof an overall concept and strategy the linkages between the "comprehensive forest man-agement plan" and the "outline forest management and conservation plan" are totally un-clear. For example how does the defined zones in the outline plan affect the comprehensiveforest management plan? The zonation - as it is done up to now - is a rather broad macroplanning process and does as such not reflect the priorities and needs of the specific localpopulation.

The unit of sustainability needs to be rather small as the management of Mt. Kenya shouldbe done in a participatory way with the local people as the first beneficiaries. As there areno traditional land ownership boundaries within the park the intention to prepare manage-ment plans on station level (sustainable units) is sound.

According to the Project, the main user of the management plan will be the station forester,not the people. At present, the local population has not been involved at all in the planningprocess and even no concept and strategy exist how to do so. The management planningconcept, as it stands now, is not participatory and as such not in line with the project pur-pose as spelled out in the Financial Agreement and the ToR.

The Project realized that it is beyond it's capacity to develop comprehensive forest man-agement on forest station level (altogether 18) for the whole of Mt. Kenya. This, however,would have made it necessary, that the Project concentrates on the development of plan-ning procedures and management guidelines rather than to prepare just comprehensivemanagement plans for the pilot areas. Furthermore, the staff of the Planning and Develop-ment Division of the FD - which will be in charge of management planning in future - havenot been involved in the "brainstorming process" on the development of a managementplanning concept. This concept, if it exists at all, has not been documented. With the leaveof the TA in September 1997 the Project will have to start again from the beginning with thedevelopment of a forest management planning strategy.

At present the Planning and Development Division of the FD does not have the capacity northe means to elaborate comprehensive forest management plans for the remaining foreststations unless it is considerably supported.

To summarize: not much has been achieved so far in terms of comprehensive forest man-agement planning, and it is unlikely that under the present condition of the Project thespecified result can be achieved.

Identify pilot areasFor the elaboration of comprehensive forest management plans the Project has identifiedtwo pilot areas which should be representative for the two main different ecological, histori-cal and socio-economic conditions on Mt. Kenya. The first pilot area (30,900 ha) is withinKirinyaga District and includes the forest stations Kangaita, Castle and Njukuine. The sec-ond one (64,400 ha) is located in the northwest and includes the forest stations Gathiuru,Nanyuki and Ontulili.

The pilot areas were selected in order to develop models for comprehensive forest man-agement planning. It is therefore not understood why the pilot areas cover each 3 foreststations and why the pilot areas are so large? They cover almost 50% of the whole Mt.Kenya Forest Reserve. The Project admitted, that it is beyond its capacity to develop alto-gether 6 comprehensive management plans and therefore its target is one or two per pilotarea. In this case it would have been much more appropriate to identify 3 representativeforest stations as pilot areas. As it is right now forest inventory and socio-economic surveysare done on the "whole pilot area" covering twice 3 forest stations, which does not coincidewith the planning and management unit which is one forest station. This means that the re-



sults of the studies cannot be specified for the management unit but only for the pilot regioncovering 3 units.

Furthermore, the identification of the pilot areas should have been done after the zonationof Mt. Kenya has been completed in order to ensure, that all zones are adequately repre-sented.

Execute a forest inventory in the pilot areasFor the purpose of comprehensive forest management planning the Project currently carriesout a forest inventory in the pilot areas. Up to now the inventory is completed for Kirinyagapilot area (91 sample plots) and it is going on in the northwest (up to now 15 plots com-pleted). The inventory design is technically sound (stratified random sampling), and besideits main focus on valuable timber trees it includes a variety of other parameters such ashuman impact, site, topography etc. which can be used for further analysis. The inventory isdesigned to provide information on pilot area level with an acceptable standard error of 5%on 95% probability level. However, as the unit for management planning is the forest stationthe inventory needs to be designed in such a way, that it provides reliable information onstation level. The units for management planning and inventory must be the same.

The inventory should have been carried out after the zonation of Mt. Kenya is completed asit does not make sense to implement an timber oriented inventory in the protection zones.Furthermore the forest inventory should be designed and implemented after participatoryforest management planning has been carried out and the forest area has been furthersubdivided into manageable units based on the management objectives of the local people.

So far, the local population has not been involved in the inventory, a complaint which hasbeen raised by the forest adjacent communities during the socio-economic study.

The forest inventory is fully financed out of COMIFOR budget, except for staff salaries. Thetotal amount spend so far is about 1.1 mio. KSh or about 10,000 KSh per sample plot. Thisis very high. In order to reduce the cost, the admittable standard error should be increasedto 10% which is still precise enough for the purpose of management planning. Additionally,the methodology as well as the organization of the field work has to be improved.

At present, there is still a ban on the exploitation of indigenous forests. The question is,whether it makes sense to carry out an inventory which focuses mainly on timber exploita-tion as long as the ban is on? On the other hand, the ban will not be lifted as long as thereis no concept on how to use the indigenous forest in a sustainable manner. For this pur-pose, however, more information on the timber production potential would be required andan inventory is needed. As long as the illegal felling is not under control, it is not recom-mended to provide detailed information where and how much valuable timber (e.g. cam-phor) is available on Mt. Kenya.

Conduct socio-economic survey of pilot areasFor the implementation of a socio-economic survey of the pilot areas COMIFOR contractedthe non-government organization African Wildlife Foundation (AWF). The preliminary draftof the survey report was available end of September 1997 which however does not containannexes. The socio-economic study cannot be judged as it was not completed at the timeof project evaluation.

As can be seen from the draft version, the study provides quite good baseline data on for-est use and its role in the local livelihood systems, provides information on non-forest alter-native sources of subsistence and income and comes up with recommendations on com-munity interface project activities and provides proposals for future socio-economic moni-toring of FD's activities. Altogether 5 communities (3 in Kirinyaga, 2 in Northwest) werestudied in detail.



Design and develop a comprehensive forest management plan for the pilot areasAs for the out-line forest management and conservation plan no written concept exists howthe comprehensive management plan should look like, what should be its content, whatshould be the planning period, how is it linked with other plans (out-line plan, operational orannual work plans), whether it will contain a compartment book and map, how monitoringwill be carried out, to whom it will be addressed (local people or only foresters of forest sta-tions?), etc.

The argument that first data have to be collected before anything can be done is not validand just a further sign of the incompetence of the technical assistance in this matter.

Without a professional forest management planning expert (at least as a short term con-sultant) who develops a sound forest management planning system and prepares the re-quired guidelines, not much will be achieved.

Identify communities and other stakeholder interests in the pilot areasIn this context the socio-economic survey provides a lot of detailed information. But as onlya fraction of the forest adjacent communities were studied it is still questionable whetherthis is valid for the whole of the pilot areas. Other, non-forestry interests of the stakeholdershave been addressed adequately in the study.

Initiate implementation of forest management plansNothing done so far; cannot be accomplished until the end of the Project.

6.1.3 Planned Result 3: Extension system developed and participative actions insustained management of natural resources in the forests and surroundingareas promoted.

6.1.3.1 Participatory Natural Forest Management

In the design and inception report of the project, the local community participation in forestconservation and management (social forestry component) was to play a central role. Up todate, this aspect has suffered the most set back. In fact, no significant movement has asyet been made in this direction. Several reasons are advanced for this, the main ones be-ing:

a) The conceptual and logistical problems suffered by COMIFOR following the changedframework conditions due to termination of KIFCON (see Project Background in chap.2.1).

b) The fact that community / participatory forest management is new to the Kenyan forestsector, and the request for an additional Technical Assistant (TA) was not approved byEU, which meant that there was no long-term perspective for community involvementand joint planning which was part of the ToR for the first proposed socio-economic sur-vey had to be abandoned and ToR redrafted. In other words, the TA implicitly admits inhis Progress Report (COMIFOR Progress Report at the end of Financial Year 1996 / 97)that the socio-economic survey (AWF) was a watered down version of an earlier pro-posed one.

Whereas the first reason is understandable in the context of the project’s overall perform-ance, it is difficult to see the validity of the second one. First, although there is no experi-ence in participatory forest management involving local communities in Kenya, there hasbeen considerable discussions and important initiatives have been made in the last five



years and there are certainly many experts from IUCN, AWF, ICRAF, local NGOs, universi-ties, on the local scene well-versed with local conditions who could have provided much-needed inputs. There are progressive examples of collaborative forest management initia-tives in East Africa, e.g. the IUCN-supported Mt. Elgon Collaborative (Uganda side) and, inthe east, Usambara, Tanzania. A GEF-funded biodiversity project which came to an end in1995, made significant contributions to the issue of local communities’ participation in forestconservation and management. To what extent were these experiences and those of KIF-CON utilized by the project in developing participatory approaches? It would be desirable tohave long-term commitment in terms of financial support for participatory forest manage-ment, but there is a danger in seeing these processes in rigid project time frames - the dy-namic and evolutionary aspects of things are far more important. In other words, a lot morecould still have been accomplished in one year’s time frame. But there is a more funda-mental, philosophical flaw in the whole thinking - if participation of the local population andother stakeholders is to be promoted, then they should have been involved from the begin-ning. How is it that the local people have not been actively involved in project activities tothis point in time and yet they are expected to be active partners? What was the purpose ofthe socio-economic study (including the economic evaluation of Mt. Kenya) if they do notcontribute to joint planning or identification of future options for participatory forest man-agement strategies? Why were organized groups like AMKO not already involved? The TAhad 6 man-months for short-term consultancies that could have been efficiently used if theproject had adopted an objective-oriented approach rather than ad hoc funding of unrelatedactivities. KWS had just conducted a PRA in some communities along the forest line (Kir-inyaga prior to the AWF socio-economic survey: should these not have been linked to-gether? It is a worrying trend as there is a tendency by many projects in the region to com-mission expensive studies which are, in some cases, completely irrelevant, when all thatmay be needed could be cheaply obtained by reviewing existing information and usingvaluable local expertise.

6.1.3.2 Extension and Support of Agroforestry Activities in Buffer Zone

The east and south Mt. Kenya region (e.g. Kirinyaga, Embu and Meru districts) are a modelshowcase for farm forestry. There is nowhere else in Kenya with the same level of on-farmtree biomass. The successful farm / agroforestry activities in the region have been largelydue to farmers’ own efforts and initiatives with support of NGOs and extension servicesfrom the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA). Support from FD Extension Division has been mini-mal in the Mt. Kenya area and COMIFOR has, so far, made no contribution. The ReviewMission had discussions with local people in Upper Katheri Sub-location (north-western sideof Mt. Kenya), in Kirinyaga and in Embu. It was evident that several local groups alreadyexist which are registered with the Department of Social Services which have interests inforest-related activities: starting tree nurseries, forming associations of bee-keepers, devel-opment of ecotourist sites and needing technical support. In one case, the local people ex-pressed disappointment that they had not had the benefit of rural extension services fromFD or any other technical department. Paradoxically, the same local people who, in normalcircumstances, would be viewed as the forest destroyers played an extremely crucial role infighting fires that recently raged through Mt. Kenya forests. It is again difficult to understandwhy there has not been any serious attempt by COMIFOR to support any extension initia-tives. Whilst participatory management of natural forests (especially forest reserves) is anew approach in the country, considerable progress has been made in participatory(farmer-driven) forest extension. The Miti Mingi Mashambani Project, which commenced in1990 and first phase was completed in 1995, jointly funded by GoK and FINNIDA is onegood example. The project was implemented by the Forestry Extension Services Division(FESD) of FD with technical and administrative support from ENSO Forest Development OyLtd. and WIDAGRI Consultants Ltd. Vast experiences were gathered, methodologies de-



veloped and twenty technical reports produced. These experiences have been synthesized,enriched, packaged and published by the Swedish International Development Agency(SIDA): Participatory Planning and Implementation: Experiences with Farmers from Nyan-darua District, Kenya, 1992 - 1995. All this information is available with the Forestry Exten-sion Division of FD. One would have expected COMIFOR to benefit from these experiencesand to make efficient use of the expertise available within the Forestry Extension Division.This suggests lack of coordination at FD. The Miti Mingi Mashambani approach wouldhave provided an interactive and dynamic opportunity through which the relative importanceof on-farm interventions vis-à-vis options in participatory forest reserve management is ob-jectively assessed. Given the level of farm forestry in Mt. Kenya area, it is rational to argueand advocate greater emphasis on addressing forest reserve / local population interface. Aclear strategy should have emerged by now. The total lack of measurable progress in thiskey component raises fundamental questions about the competence of COMIFOR technicalassistants. It cannot be that a Coordinator, charged with responsibility for such a huge proj-ect, is so lacking as to fail to articulate the basic rudiments of a participatory approach.Hopefully, such expensive errors are not repeated in future.

6.1.4 Planned Result 4: FD, other governmental as well as non-governmental insti-tutions involved with natural forests trained in country.

Training Technical AssistanceIn the project design, 20 effective man-months were allocated to the training expert. Thisconsultancy commenced on November 8th, 1994 and the Expert had a considerable part ofhis time rendered ineffective during the first year due to problems of operationalising theproject. Moreover, following the resignation of the first Project Coordinator, the trainer wasreassigned the task of acting Project Coordinator from May to September 1995. The ToRsfor the Training Expert outlined clearly training activities to be undertaken, focusing mainlyon:

◊ training needs’ assessment for FD staff and community-based training;

◊ developing strategy, training curricula for project short courses / workshops and liaisewith educational / training institution for curriculum development assistance;

◊ general support of the training and extension unit of FD head office.

There is no doubt that these training inputs were necessary in the life of the project and aspart of capacity building in the FD. However, the rationality of allocating a vast amount ofproject resources (20 man-months) is questionable.

Extensive forestry training experience and expertise is available in the country and in theregion that could have been tapped to provide training inputs In collaboration with interna-tional organizations funding training in community-based forestry activities such as ICRAF(agroforestry), SIDA (general aspects of land use), JICA (social forestry) and local institu-tions (Moi University’s Department of Forestry and School of Environmental Studies; KWS’sFisheries Training Institute in Naivasha; Londiani Forestry College; Department of NaturalResources at Egerton University) as well as the battery of international and local NGOs op-erating on the local scene, the project could have had at its disposal a wide pool of exper-tise to draw from to undertake different aspects of training (coordinated by the training unitat FD) on short-term consultancy basis. If an external training expert was deemed neces-sary in some instances, a 2 to 4 man-month period spread over the entire project couldhave been more than adequate. For instance, the GEF / UNDP / FAO East African Biodi-versity Project, which ended in 1995, addressed issues of training (short and postgraduatedegree courses) in the region on a broad spectrum of forestry issues related to the wholearea of community participation in forest management and biodiversity conservation. A con-sortium of university lecturers from the three East African forestry institutions (Makerere,



Sokoine and Moi universities) came together to develop a university training manual on so-cio-economics, ethnobotany, institutional issues in collaborative forest management as wellas policy and legislative regimes. This was achieved in a two-week workshop with the sup-port of short-term consultants.

Hiring an external training expert, who spent the first months familiarizing with the FD andsorting out which training institutions do what, when this could have been achieved usinglocal expertise, was an inefficient and completely inappropriate way of using project re-sources. The net result was that, due to project conception problems and bureaucratic de-lays in implementation, the 20 man-months elapsed before the expert was able to carry outmuch of what was specified in his ToRs. With no additional funds to support technical as-sistance to this component, all the training functions of the project were left in the hands ofstaff of the FD who worked so hard but clearly needed technical assistance. He had no planof activity, no training materials. The training expert had not even organized a short trainingof trainers (ToT)!

Training Needs’ AssessmentThe training needs’ assessment was carried out in February / March 1995, focusing on re-view of existing literature on training and training needs’ assessment in FD Head Office andthe project area as well as conducting a training needs’ assessment around Mt. Kenya andLamu, putting emphasis on aspects relating to natural forest management. All aspects ofthe training needs’ assessment (e.g. relating to community participation) were not coveredas outlined in the ToRs. In fact, the needs’ assessment addressed only the traditional disci-plines (inventory, forest ecology and silviculture, etc.). Whilst these aspects are very rele-vant and critical to effective management of indigenous forests, it is quite apparent that,given the relatively new and still-evolving concepts in participative forest management, moststaff at all levels of FD are in dire need of this reorientation. Efforts in this direction wouldhave been well worth the investment. The assessment failed to look at the training needs inother relevant forestry organizations (ToR) and the report (Project Working Paper No.4)gives a very superficial analysis of the forestry and related training programs in the country.Based on the training needs’ assessment, support of the training and extension unit of FD,Forest Guard training and in-service training for other FD staff (up to DFO level) were pro-posed to be implemented by COMIFOR. There was no concept or plan outlining the objec-tives of the training and how the training curriculum would be developed (and by whom) andimplemented. Who was to undergo short courses, to develop what competencies and whoneeded specialized training and where are these offered? These and other questions (ToR)should have been elaborated in a workshop involving relevant stakeholders. Although thereis some reference to contacts with training institutions in the country, there is no evidencethat these were effectively utilized by the project. Non-governmental organizations involvedwith resource management are conspicuously missing in the whole process. This wasclearly a serious omission.

Training Unit in FDAs part of a general training strategy, COMIFOR was to give general support to the TrainingUnit to take a leading role in identifying and catering for training needs of the departmentand coordination of external training support. It was particularly useful to strengthen this unitto avoid duplication and to harmonize the training activities of COMIFOR / KFDP projects.The unit is supposed to be the repository of training data base for the department. As at thetime of the review mission, not much has been achieved by the unit. A computer has beenprovided by COMIFOR but this is yet to be put into use. Data on training records for the en-tire FD, including job descriptions was collected in 1996 by the Training Unit but this has notyet been analyzed! Even basic things such as acquisition and compilation of relevant train-ing materials by the unit, which are easily obtainable from ICRAF, SIDA, training curricula at



Moi University and Londiani Forestry College are not available in the Training Unit. It is pos-sible these documents are in the Department Library, but a list of key materials should beavailable at the unit.

Training on Mangrove Ecology and Species’ IdentificationThis component was carried out between January and February 1996 by the Mangrove Ex-pert (provided for under technical assistance) with the help of a local counterpart. Thetraining was conducted in Lamu and 25 Forest Guards and 8 Foresters and Forest Assis-tants were trained. The training was well received, necessitating subsequent training of 10Game Rangers and two KWS officers by the Mangrove Expert with funding from KWS. Onewould have expected a joint training of staff from these two institutions (FD and KWS),given that the two were already cooperating under a Memorandum of Understanding. Nev-ertheless, this training went on extremely well and appropriate training materials were de-veloped. Project efforts in this regard are to be commended.

Training of FD Field StaffFocused on training of Foresters, Forest Assistants, Forest Guards and Game Rangers inall six districts surrounding Mt. Kenya. A total of 258 field staff in groups of 15 - 20 personswere trained in aspects related to the Forest Act, species’ identification and ecology. Thetraining was conducted by FD staff attached to COMIFOR Project in two days of non-residential training in respective districts. No training material or evaluation report was pro-vided for this training. A phase two of the Mt. Kenya training, encompassing a broaderspectrum of subject areas (Community Participation, Partnership Building, Causes of Con-flicts and Solutions, Basic Forest Ecology and Silviculture, Forest Act and Court Proce-dures, etc.) had also been organized and partially implemented (in Meru District) betweenFebruary and April 1997. The second set of training was jointly conducted by FD and KWSwith a minor external contribution from a university lecturer (Kenyatta University) whotrained on aspects of forest ecology and silviculture. Seventy (70) Forest Guards, 12 GameRangers and 10 Forest Assistants were trained in Meru District (3 days’ training per groupof 16 trainees). The training had to be interrupted as resources were needed for forest in-ventory and mapping. The training is supposed to resume in October to cover the other fivedistricts. No training materials, course objectives or training evaluation are provided - only alist of subject areas. In the absence of a well-elaborated training program (as expected inthe ToR for the Training Expert), one can hardly expect the Training Officer at FD to havedone any better. In the circumstances, his efforts are laudable and his spirited approach tothe project’s success is to be encouraged. At least some positive effect of the training isthat there has been an increase in successful prosecution on illegal forest activities.

Joint KWS Partnership Officers’ / Foresters’ Training: Naivasha Training InstituteAs part of a national retraining program following its restructuring, KWS organized a two-week course for area Partnership Officers from September 1st to 12th, 1997. The training fo-cused on a broad range of issues under the KWS Partnership Program (Community Dy-namics, Gender, Community Mobilization and Extension, Community Capacity Building,etc.). As an afterthought, the Nyeri Base Forest Protection Unit (under FD / KWS MoU) sent22 Foresters from Mt. Kenya forest stations for training with COMIFOR funding one weekafter the course had started. In other words, the forestry group joined the course from Sep-tember 8th to 12th. There is no question that Foresters need to undergo this kind of training.What is disconcerting is the unplanned, ad hoc manner in which this was done. Forestersinterviewed by the review mission were positive about the course but observed that theycould have benefited much more had they not missed half of the course. It is also interest-ing that there was no single resource person with a forestry background when KWS / FD



are aiming at integration. The only conclusion one can draw from this is that either thetraining was not jointly planned or there was never a plan to have the Foresters under thistraining in the first place!

Specialized Training / Short CoursesThe project supported several specialized training of FD Headquarters staff. Four peoplewere trained on ARCINFO / ARCVIEW (July 1996), the Project Manager attended a 2-weeks’ training course on buffer zones in Cameroon and a workshop on Management ofMountain Ecosystems. Basic computer training (spreadsheet and word processing) was of-fered to 8 staff, on-the-job training in photo interpretation to 4 staff members. These spe-cialized training were clearly justified in view of the specialized and technical nature of thetasks to be performed. This training could easily be evaluated against the performance ofthese tasks as discussed elsewhere in this report. The pre-field inventory training should beseen in the same context. The forest inventory training was done in a total of 8 days (4 daysin Kirinyaga District and 4 days in north-west Mt. Kenya area), involving a total of 6 trainers,costing a total of KShs.260,000.00. This could have been done much more cheaply and ef-ficiently in terms of time if the training had been made part of the actual inventory (2 days oftraining on field techniques before the work begins).

Environmental Education ProgramThe Project Work Plan (July to December 1997) proposes an Environment Education Pro-gram which is not yet elaborated through the Conservation Education and Awareness Unit(CEAU) of the FD / KWS Forest Protection and Conservation Base at Nyeri. It is not clear atall what is to be achieved by the proposed Environment Education Program - nor is thereclarity between the work of CEAU and the on-going training of field staff around Mt. Kenya.In absence of a well thought out community participation strategy, this is unlikely to achievemuch. In any event, COMIFOR must link with the National Environment Secretariat (NES) toborrow from its wealth of expertise in public environmental education program.

Unless training is targeted, it can be an exercise in futility as far as achieving the projectpurpose is concerned and no project can afford ad hoc training.

6.1.5 Planned Result 5: Management plan for mangroves at Lamu District devel-oped and implementation initiated.

For Lamu mangrove forest management a well known mangrove specialist, Mr. M. S. John-son was engaged for 1 year who arrived in November 1994. As up to November 1995 nooperational funds were available he could not achieve much. It was a mistake of the con-sultant (Techniplan) to send an expert already at the early beginning to the Project withoutensuring that he has the means to fulfill his ToR. There was no equipment and material untilMay 1995. The boats arrived in June 1995 and the operational funds were only availablefrom November 1995 onwards when this TA component was already closed.

However for the first months COMIFOR could use a boat from the FD. The Project gatheredinteresting information on past mangrove management and research in Kenya and further-more developed a concept for Lamu mangrove management and conservation which wasdocumented in Project working paper no. 3. This concept includes aspects of zonation,community participation and a table of content for the Lamu Mangrove Management Plan.Beside this a proposal for a "proposed extension of Mangrove Technical Assistance" wasprepared (Project policy paper no. 2).

The Project was designed to draw upon the results of the FAO/KWS Ecological Survey ofKenya's Mangroves. In May/June 1996 digitized mangrove type maps were produced which



proved to be very adequate in defining mangrove types in space and area. However, forforest management planning purposes additional information was required.

In August 1996 the Project purchased one set of panchromatic black and white aerial pho-tos from 1991 at a scale of 1:25,000 for a total cost of about 85,000 KSh and started withaerial photo interpretation. However, within the limited time of this component only a part ofthe aerial photos could be analyzed and maps were not prepared. It is an open questionwhy COMIFOR did not purchase the aerial photos at an earlier stage? The costs are mini-mal compared to the costs of the TA.

The Project was quite successful in the development of techniques for artificial regenerationof mangroves (survival rate > 90%) and initiated the rehabilitation of seriously degradedmangrove forests together with school children and the local population applying a low inputparticipatory approach. Altogether ~ 3 ha were planted which are until now regularly moni-tored by Mr. B. Kivyatu, the former counterpart of the Lamu component.

Together with the training specialist of COMIFOR training manuals were developed on"mangrove tree species identification" and "mangrove ecology" which are well elaborated.DFO staff in Lamu (25 Forest Guards and 8 Forest Officers) was trained for two weeks inmangrove ecology, silviculture and tree species identification. The two weeks training con-sisted of 1 week theoretical training and 1 week excursion. In March 1996 a second trainingcourse was held for 10 Game Rangers and 3 Officers from KWS.

The technical assistance in Lamu mangrove management was terminated in December1995 and the Lamu component was administratively closed by a letter of the EC Delegationin April 1996.

The efficiency of the Lamu mangrove management component was low due to bad timingof the TA. The efficiency could have been increased if the TA would have developed moredetailed guidelines on mangrove resource assessment and participatory management plan-ning system.

6.2 Comparison "Planning and achievements" according to the ToR of the TA

The following comparison between "ToR" and "Achievements" has been elaborated in adiscussion with the last Project Coordinator, W. van Ijssel. The stated "achievements" re-flect the opinion of the Project Coordinator whereas the "comments" originate from the viewof the evaluators.

6.2.1 Program Coordinator (Article 5.1 of the ToR, Annex A)

ToR Achievements and commentsThe Programme Coordinator will be headingthe EDF funded team. The period of as-signment will be four years (40 effectiveman-months).

Mr. van Ijssel estimates that about 60 % ofhis time was spent for administration, or-ganization, coordination, and only 40% wentinto technical assistance (forestry). Mainsubjects of TA were ("in order to get amaximum output in the field"): GIS, taskforce strengthening, research coordination,cooperation with NMK, assistance to AWFfor socio-economic survey, help FI to get offthe ground.Comments:The ToR of the PrCo stress too much the



administrative aspects of the project. Itshould be a matter of course for a PrCo toassist a project in administration matters.This task of the PrCo should be mentionedin one statement only and not as detailedas it has been done in this case. This de-tailed enumeration makes the PrCo believethat project administration is his only dutywhich should not be the case.The ToR mention only coordination andplanning. Unfortunately, nothing is men-tioned about technical assistance in termsof forestry, except for the preparation of a"general outline of work for the entire periodof the program including participation of lo-cal population" (see i)). Four different Proj-ect Coordinators, van Melle, Nieuwenhuis(interim), Bech (interim) and van Ijssel, havespent 3 years (30 man-months) by Septem-ber 1997.

i) Identify priority actions on the basis ofthe KIFCON experience, and reflectthese in a general outline of work for theentire period of the program, providingtimings and output targets. The outlineshould include the formulation of practi-cal ways to involve the local population inthe planning and implementation ofmanagement plans and the promotion ofcommunity development activities out-side the forests. This outline is to be pro-duced within three months after the startof the assignment.

This point means "to set up a Plan of Op-eration" and "to develop ways to involve thelocal population".COMIFOR tried to answer this in its first In-ception Report (April 1995). Some concep-tual ideas are laid down in this report, alsoabout community participation, training andextension, but the practical strategy of howto implement these ideas is missing. Thepresentation of the community participationcomponent shows that the concerningknow-how of the Project and the TA islacking.The first Inception Report is not an Opera-tion Plan as such. It could not serve for de-tailed project planning. Funds are releasedon the basis of an Annual Work Plan, andthe Inception Report does not contain anywork plan.The 1st Inception Report was not followedbecause van Melle resigned and the followup was missing; the PM did not fully agreeto this Inception Report and therefore he didnot follow up.Every Inception Report that followed can beregarded as an attempt to present an out-line plan for the Project. Bech later stressedmore on research and strengthening theFD. In April 1996 the project came back to amore community participation oriented ap-proach. The present approach of the projecthas got three legs:a) Getting information of resources for



elaboration of conception of manage-ment

b) Community involvement in resourcemanagement

c) Institutional strengtheningii) Prepare detailed annual work plans and

budgets on the basis of the above out-line, in liaison with the KIFCON team andimplement these. Specify in detail ac-tions and associated costs to ensuretimely design and implementation ofmanagement plans and forestry relatedoperations, including boundary demarca-tion, survey activities, rehabilitationworks, community development andagroforestry extension. Assess their tim-ing, obtain and estimate their quantitativeimpact on pace of implementation.

The liaison with KIFCON was not possiblebecause KICON had been terminated inJune 1994.Annual Progress Reports are written on thebasis of AWPs.1st AWP 1995 - 1996: With the help of Mr.Candotti, Adviser to the NAO, a "Workplanand Cost Estimate for the COMIFOR Project1995 - 1996 was established, taking partsof the first Inception Report and completingit. As project funds can be only released onthe basis of an AWP, it was necessary toestablish an AWP so that the imprest ac-count could be credited. This AWP was re-garded as a provisional one that needs tobe worked out in more detail. But a newAWP for 1995 - 1996 was never workedout.2nd AWP 1996 - 1997: Elaborated in April1996, accepted by PSC in May 1996, intro-duced into the circuit and signed, last by ECDelegation in June 27, 1996.This AWP assumed that the TA componentwould be enlarged with a social forestryspecialist (expert). The TA extension wasagreed by FD/MENR and NAO. But EU andEC Delegation did not agree to this exten-sion. Consequently this AWP could not beimplemented as planned.3rd AWP 1997 - 1998:• May/June 1997 joint planning with

KWS/RAD Mt. Region because the proj-ect wanted a closer cooperation withKWS concerning "Partnership" Programfacing towards community participation;the reason of this much stronger jointplanning was because EC did not agreeto finance an own expert for COMIFORfor the field of social forestry.

• An AWP was only set up for July 1997 toDecember 1997: "Extension of1996/1997 AWP and cost estimate forthe period 7/97 to 12/97. This 1/2 yearAWP is based on the budget which wasnot spent in 1996/1997 financial year;this extended AWP has been approvedby everybody.

• The remaining funds from the 1996/1997



budget are sufficient to finance the proj-ect up to the end of 1997. The reason fornot spending the planned budget of1996/1997 is that the social forestrycomponent was not implemented asoriginally planned (see above).

• Another reason for shifting the estab-lishment of an AWP was that it shouldencompass the results of the projectevaluation.

• There is not yet the AWP (1/2 year) forJan. to June 1998. This one shall beelaborated taking into consideration ofthe findings of the mid-term evaluation.

iii) Assist the FD in preparing annual prog-ress reports

• the project decided to prepare normallyquarterly progress reports; this has beendone regularly except for the first reportwhich was prepared for the period of No-vember 1994 to August 1995; then Sep-tember to December 1995; then quarterlyfor the year 1996; then January to June1997.

• the progress reports are forwarded to themembers of the PSC

• the PM presented a monthly report to theSenior Staff Meeting; this meeting is in-ternal and confidential.

Comments:ToR inadequate.

iv) Prepare tenders and service contractsfor the procurement of goods and serv-ices in accordance with the provisions ofthe Lomé Convention and EDF proce-dures, in full liaison with the Delegation

• services and goods: there are 2 differenttendering procedures: a) MENR leveland b) central level, depending on theestimated amount of the goods to beprocured.

• the FD did not seek for the assistance ofthe PrCo in these matters; these supplycontracts have been handled mostly bythe PM, the MENR and EC Delegationwith little assistance of the PrCo.

• the PrCo states that the tender proce-dures take an awful lot of time; he saidthat he would have lost (!?) so much timeif he had been involved himself in theseadministrative procedures, and at theend he would not speed up things sig-nificantly (example: Oct. 96: tendering;Nov. 96: reception of bits; Feb. 97:evaluation of bits completed by MENRand EC Delegation; July 97: approval byMENR and Central Tender Board; July97: preparation of contract documents byFD; Sept. 97: signature of contractdocuments by CCF, PS/MENR and



PS/Treasury; Sept. 97: endorsement ofEC Delegation expected soon)

• socio-economic survey was not tenderedbut procured under Article 302 of LoméConvention (accelerated procedures);the GoK requests the EC Delegation tomake a contract on their behalf with theservice provider.

Comments:ToR inadequate.The non-involvement of the PrCo in theseadministrative procedures ignores his ToRand shows little commitment.

v) Liaise in issues of implementation andtraining with other governmental andnon-governmental institutions.

Training:• COMIFOR trained staff from KWS (Lamu

and Mt. Kenya) in tree species identifica-tion and ecology

• COMIFOR organized training of KWSstaff in liaison with KEFRI (mensuration),KWS resource persons (biodiversity),MoU resource persons (on MoU Secre-tariat), magistrates (Forests Act andcourt procedures), KWS Wildlife TrainingInstitute at Naivasha (reorientation ofstaff towards partnership; harmonizationof actions).

Comment: Only staff from KWS involved intraining and no other governmental or non-governmental organization! The number oftrained KWS staff is not specified. The con-tribution of COMIFOR and the TA is re-stricted to administrative procedures like or-ganization of transport, payment of re-source persons and alike. Some forest offi-cers involved in the Naivasha KWS trainingwithout any technical involvement of COMI-FOR.Implementation:COMIFOR organized liaison with• KWS in zonation planning, joint patrols of

Forest Reserve, development of partner-ship program, task force MtK, FCP Basein Nyeri;

• KEFRI in development of managementoriented research (volume equations,PSPs)

• NMK in biodiversity surveys, speciesidentification;

• AWF in socio-economic survey and eco-nomic study of Mt. Kenya

• MoU for FCP Nyeri Base, MtK task force,conceptual and practical development ofjoint management and some communal



projects.Comments: The cooperation with KEFRIand NMK has nothing to do with implemen-tation, but only with a frame research pro-gram. AWF is a subcontractor. Their studydeals with evaluation of frame conditionsand not with implementation. Cooperationwith MoU is the same as the cooperationwith KWS.

vi) Coordinate the activities of the EDF TAteam with activities undertaken by allteams by other donors (ODA, Finnida,WB, etc.); in particular, with those con-cerned with conservation, preservationand management of indigenous forestresources as well as strengthening themanagement and planning capabilities ofthe Forest Department.

• ODA withdrew already in July 1994 (endof KIFCON);

• Finnida Master Plan project was com-pleted mid 1994;

• coordination was done with WB on insti-tutional strengthening of the FD/HQ buttechnically WB project was concentratedon industrial plantations, not on conser-vation of indigenous forests;

• coordination with GTZ since Feb. 1997concerning MoU support, and technicallyin conservation of indigenous forests(methodology, approach).

Comment: There are no visible signs of co-ordination with other projects except forMoU support.

vii) Assist the Forest Department to elabo-rate and implement a monitorable actionplan to improve the productivity of GoK'spermanently employed labor force

This task was not understood in relation tothe project purpose, and therefore no actionhas been taken.

6.2.2 Forestry Training Expert (Article 5.2 of the ToR, Annex A)

ToR AchievementsThe period of assignment is two years (20effective man-months), starting from thebeginning of the programme. During this pe-riod the expert will be responsible to theteam leader and this tasks will include:

J. Nieuwenhuis has a M.Sc. in Tropical For-estry; he had five years experience oftraining in Niger and 5 years in Pakistan; hiswork has been hampered by the project; hehad to take over the PrCo position for 4months (May to September.); no operationalfunds were available in the first year; hewas the only DHV man from the very begin-ning; his effective work was done only be-tween January and August 1996 (when heleft).Comment: The planning of his assignment("starting from the beginning of the pro-gram") was not ideal. He should have comelater when the project was fully installed. Sohe lost a lot of efficient work time.



i) The conduct of a full assessment of stafftraining. This should include staff at alllevels in all relevant organizations. Theassessment should take into accountthe recommendations of the KIFCONtraining consultancy report of January1992 and the subsequent follow up re-ports up to August 1993 and be com-pleted within three months of the start ofthe assignment.

He carried out a training needs assessment(see Report no. 4). It is focused on the FD.It took into account KIFCON recommenda-tions. The main training needs were: • tostrengthen the training and extension unit atFD/HQ; • to establish a data base of FDstaff listing his background training, the pre-sent position and the training needs; • de-velopment of an in-service training program• lowest ranks of the FD staff have thehighest need for training.

ii) The conduct of a full assessment ofcommunity based training needs.

Assessment of training needs of communitymembers was not executed.

iii) The development of a system of exten-sion and training for local organizationalsupport for indigenous forest manage-ment taking into due account promotionof community participative actions, in-cluding agroforestry activities to be un-dertaken by the populations in the bufferzone.

ToR was not understandable to the TA. It is"left to the interpretation what is meant bythat". There was no program of participatorymanagement of indigenous forest whatwould match such a training and extensionapproach.Comment: Anyone familiar with participatorymanagement would understand what ismeant by the ToR.

iv) The development of appropriate trainingcurricula for project short courses /workshops.

Report on "Modular approach for in-serviceforestry training (project paper no. 5).Modular means setting up a whole systemof models following the same outline themodule is built up. He developed a system,proposing a series of different training sub-jects. Module layout (title, target group, du-ration, objectives, methods, ...).He compiled a training course for "Man-grove Ecology" and a "Mangrove tree spe-cies identification" based on the conceptprepared by Mr. Kivyatu. Then he startedworking on "Mt. Kenya Ecology" and "Mt.Kenya tree species identification" but didnot complete it. The mangrove ones areworked out in detail including slide series,overhead sheet, preprinted topics. What hedid is more than just for project shortcourses / workshops. The curricula wereonly worked out for forest staff, not forcommunities.Comment: Only training manual for man-grove ecology and tree species identifica-tion was elaborated. What has effectivelybeen done is very little taking into consid-eration the available working time in Kenya,and the already available training materialand institutions. Also KIFCON had alreadyprepared good training curricula! It wasrather useless to elaborate a modular train-ing approach without cooperating with the



concerned local training institutes.It is quite typical for the TA that also thetraining concentrated exclusively on the FDand did not at all consider the communities!

v) The implementation of project training. did practical training in Lamu where hetrained forest guards and game rangers intree species identification and mangroveecology (see above). He tested the modulesthat he had elaborated. He and Kivyatustarted training for MtK in May 1996 butthen he left in Aug. 96.Comment: The training in Lamu was mainlycarried out by Kivyatu and Johnson. It isunclear how he tested the proposed mod-ules. His training input in Mt. Kenya regionis negligible.

vi) Identification of external existing trainingcourses and advise on candidates to besent to these courses.

The project did not fully understand what ismeant by "external" training courses. Arethese training facilities abroad (in other Afri-can countries) or external to the project inKenya (forestry college Londiani, Moi Uni-versity or other courses in Kenya). Notmuch has been done because the pointwas not understood. Mr. Muniu was sent toCameroon on a two weeks training coursein buffer zone management organized byGTZ at the Mt. Cameroon (May 1997).Comment: The formulation is easily under-standable. If not, the problem could havebeen clarified with EC.

vii) Liaison with associated educational andtraining institution and the provision ofcurriculum development assistance.

The liaison was established in the frame-work of the training needs assessment. Thecurriculum development assistance is nolonger relevant because GTZ is assistingForestry College Londiani on this issue, andthe Netherlands is supporting Kenyan Wild-life Training Institute in Naivasha (wetlandsprogram). The elaborated modules formangrove (see above) could be used byLondiani and Naivasha. A copy of eachmodule has been sent there.Comment: Unfortunately the liaison with as-sociated educational and training institu-tions was very weak, even for trainingneeds assessment. Much more could havebeen achieved if the concerned institutionswould have been involved from the very be-ginning.

viii) Liaison with other project staff on staffdevelopment needs. Organization of theproject staff development program.

This task seems to relate to a separateproject structure where quite a lot of projectstaff is working independently from the For-est Department. But this is not the case forCOMIFOR. It always tried to work with a



minimum of project staff and support exist-ing institutional units. This is why no projectstaff development program has been elabo-rated. But approximately 10 project and FDstaff have been trained in basic computerskills (word processing, spread sheets,Windows) through the project. Four peoplehave been trained in ARCINFO andARCVIEW (3 weeks introductory course).The training expert identified the trainingneed for that.Comment: It seems that this ToR was notunderstood either! Together with the staff ofother relevant projects (GTZ, Finnida, WB,etc.) the training expert should have as-sessed the training needs of staff that isworking in the frame of relevant projects,and then he should have contributed to theorganization of respective training pro-grams. Considering the project purpose itseems to be quite clear that the trainingshould have concentrated in the fields ofparticipatory forest management planningand implementation and not in operating acomputer. Nothing substantial has beendone so far.

ix) Facilitating the development of trainingaids / materials and the procurement ofequipment to assist all the above.

Procurement of equipment has been done:slide projector, overhead projector, twoprojector screens, flip chart boards, light ta-bles, etc.Comment: Training aids / materials have notbeen developed except for the mangrovetraining manual.

6.2.3 Mangrove Expert (Article 5.3 of the ToR, Annex A)

ToR AchievementsThe period of assignment is one year (10effective man-months). Under the responsi-bility of the team leader, the tasks of theexpert will include:

He was also severely hampered with thenon availability of material and funds duringthe first year; the operational funds arrivedwhen he left the project.Comment: He should have started his as-signment not before the project is well func-tioning.The ToR seem to be too ambitious for a oneyear assignment.

i) Design of an appropriate managementplan for the Lamu mangrove area, mak-ing use of existing knowledge.

• study of the mangrove history• procurement of aerial photos• start of photo interpretation• collection of general information on man-



grove management• formulation of a concept paper (project

paper no. 3)Comment: No management plan was elabo-rated.

ii) Initiate the implementation of the planwhich will form part of the annual work-plans as prepared by the program coor-dinator.

Plantation of propagules (mangrove seed-ling) together with school children on de-graded area (~ 3 ha).Comment: Only an isolated action as nomanagement plan was produced. The ac-tivity itself was successfully carried out butonly on a small area. It might serve as anindicator that mangroves at Lamu could bemanaged in a participatory way.

iii) During design and implementation, tocooperate with other governmental andnon-governmental institutions involved inmangrove management.

Liaison was initiated with other coastal in-stitutions, like KWS (wetlands program sup-ported by Netherlands), KEMFRI (KenyaMarine and Fishery Research Institute), andFAO (for mangrove ecological survey);Comment: Unfortunately the cooperationdid not lead to the elaboration of a man-agement plan and its implementation.

In August 1995 COMIFOR submitted a proposal to extend the mangrove component in-cluding the TA expert and some equipment and materials for another 14 m/m. This proposalwas not accepted. The proposal kept pending until April 1996. In fact, the componentclosed end of 1995, officially it was terminated in April 1996 by a letter of the EC Delega-tion.

6.2.4 Summary concerning ToR of the TA

Project Coordinator:

The ToR of the Project Coordinator stress too much the administrative aspects of the proj-ect. It should be a matter of course for a PrCo to assist a project in administration matters.The ToR mention only coordination and planning. Unfortunately, nothing is mentioned abouttechnical assistance in terms of forestry, except for the preparation of a "general outline ofwork for the entire period of the program including participation of local population".

Although clearly mentioned in his ToR (i) the Project Coordinators never worked out an ac-ceptable plan of operations including the formulation of practical ways to involve the localpopulation in the planning and implementation of management plans and the promotion ofcommunity development activities outside the forests. The produced Inception Reportscould not serve as operational plans.

Annual work plans were prepared (ii), however some problems arose. The first AWP wasestablished quite late so that the funds were not available in time. The last AWP was onlyprepared for half a year (July to December 1997) so that the experience of the projectevaluation can be considered for the second half year. The Project Coordinator assisted theFD in preparing quarterly progress reports that are forwarded to the PSC. Additionally, thePM prepared monthly reports to the Senior Staff Meeting. The Project Coordinator neverasked for a copy of these reports nor asked for the permission of attending those meetings.

ToR (iv) "Prepare tenders and service contracts for the procurement of goods and services"was not adequately treated by the Project Coordinator. He excused himself by stating that



the FD did not seek his assistance for this kind of work. Besides, he said, he would havelost too much time needed for other subjects.

COMIFOR trained staff from KWS and organized training of FD and KWS staff in liaisonwith KEFRI and NMK. It started a joint planning and project implementation with KWS, es-pecially for the Partnership program of KWS. COMIFOR contributed to revitalize MoU.Other activities were carried out together with KEFRI (research) and NMK. Yet the impres-sion persists that COMIFOR should have done more concerning the ToR (v) "Liaise in is-sues of implementation and training with other institutions".

COMIFOR cooperated with GTZ since Feb. 1997 to support MoU. Except for MoU supportthere are no visible signs of coordinating the project planning and activities with other proj-ects.

The Project Coordinator did not understand, and consequently not treat, the task of "Assistthe FD to elaborate and implement a monitorable action plan" (vii).

Forestry Training Expert:

The planning of his assignment (starting from the beginning of the project) was not ideal. Heshould have come later when the project was fully installed.

He carried out a training needs assessment (i) which is focused on the FD. The assessmentof training needs of community members was not executed (ii). ToR (iii) "The developmentof a system of extension and training for local organizational support for indigenous forestmanagement taking into due account promotion of community participative actions, includ-ing agroforestry activities to be undertaken by the populations in the buffer zone" was nottreated. Only a training manual for mangrove ecology and tree species identification waselaborated. What has effectively been done in the field of "Development of appropriatetraining curricula" (iv) is very little taking into consideration the available working time inKenya, and the already available training material and institutions. It was rather useless toelaborate a modular training approach without cooperating with the concerned local traininginstitutes. It is quite typical for the TA that also the training concentrated exclusively on theFD and did not at all consider the communities!

The training in Lamu was mainly carried out by Mr. Kivyatu and Mr. Johnson. His traininginput in Mt. Kenya region is negligible (v). Externally existing training courses were not iden-tified (vi). The liaison with associated educational and training institutes was very weak,even for training needs assessment (vii). The Training Expert did not liaise with other projectstaff on staff development needs nor on the organization of a staff development program(viii). Nothing substantial has been done so far. Training equipment was procured, buttraining aids/materials have not been developed except for the mangrove component.

Mangrove Expert:

He was severely hampered with the non availability of material and funds during the firstyear. The operational funds arrived when he had to leave the project. Of course, he shouldhave started his assignment not before the project is well functioning.

His ToR are too ambitious for a one year assignment.

A mangrove management concept was drafted, some basic data collected and the drawingof forest maps initiated, but a complete management plan has not been elaborated (i). Ac-cordingly, the plan could not be implemented (ii), but some isolated activities were executed(e.g. replantation). Liaison was initiated with other coastal institutions, like KWS, KEFRI andFAO (iii).



6.3 Comparison "Planning and achievements" according to the project's ownplanning

At the beginning of the evaluation mission a project planning matrix was developed which isbased on a project planning chart which is enclosed in the Annual Work Plan 1996/1997.This AWP has been extended until December 1997. As the AWP was accepted, this projectplanning chart seems to be officially recognized.

In the following part a comparison between original planning (Result/Activity) and achieve-ments is presented. This comparison has been worked out in close cooperation with thePM, Mr. Muniu, and the previous Project Coordinator, W. van Ijssel. If necessary, the state-ments of Mr. Muniu and Mr. van Ijssel are commented.

Planned Result 1:

Capacity of FD for indigenous forest management strengthened.

Planned Activity 1.1 Training of field staffAchievements and comments:

see chap. 6.1.4

Planned Activity 1.2 Rehabilitation of physical infrastructure (road, buildings, etc.)a) Rehabilitate and construct conservation posts (30) and station buildings (3)

Achievements:

• preparation of something like tender documents (as per govt. regulations together withMENR and MoPW)

• COMIFOR invited 10 proposals from architectural firms for a quantity survey of the re-habilitation needs and the supervision of the rehabilitation

• 7 proposals were received and evaluated; the best one was selected• MoPW recommended the best proposal to MENR• MENR requested through the treasury the Delegation to contract this company under

Article 302 "accelerated procedures" for the quantity, survey and supervision contract• procedure lasted until Nov. 1996 and by then the decision of whether rehabilitation

work is reasonable or not was postponed for the time period after the mid-termevaluation

Comments to a):

Instead of initiating a long lasting and expensive inspection procedure of forest stationbuildings, every concerned DFO and Forester could have listed the required rehabilita-tion work for the offices in his district or station. Based on this list, a program could havebeen developed fixing the priority of rehabilitation.

After visiting some of the forest offices and stations around Mt. Kenya, it seems that therehabilitation need is not very high.

b) rehabilitate forest feeder roads (80 km) to facilitate planning and management of im-plementation activities

Achievements:

• roads were inspected involving FD staff• road rehabilitation was not regarded as priority• only 300,000 KSh per Forest Station (19) were budgeted for 1996/1997 as a direct

service contract; work not carried out because direct service contract is a very timeconsuming procedure



• two roads in Nyeri District have been identified in July 1997 for initial implementation• work pending until the end of the mid-term evaluation

Comments to b):

The Project should be aware of the fact that money and time are limited goods. Reha-bilitation of roads should not be done because there is a budget for it, but because thereis a need to use roads. But exactly these reflections are missing!

First of all, there should be a definition which roads are required at what time in whichminimum conditions for whom. Based on this list of infrastructure requirements a justifiedroad rehabilitation and maintenance program can be easily set up. But this was not doneup to now.

Planned Activity 1.3 Training of HQ staffAchievements and comments:

see chap. 6.1.4

Planned Activity 1.4 Contribute to streamline institutional organization of relevantFD units

Achievements:

• Task force "Mt. Kenya" has been "revitalized"• operation of Nyeri Base, including PSU and CEAU, has been initiated together with

GTZ Project• joint planning of Mt. Kenya management with KWS/Mt. Region was initiated• efforts to bring survey unit, forest inventory unit and GIS data base unit under one

roof, have been undertaken• contribution concerning the harmonization of data collection and analysis for indige-

nous forest management (between different donor projects and institutions, like KE-FRI, NMK, KWS, FD)

• GIS under Planning Branch; training, material for GIS laboratory, room renovation, re-pair of stereo plotter, organizational ideas

Comments:

Big words but not much happened. Some points concern the same issue.

Planned Activity 1.5 Contribute to strengthening planning and back-up capacity ofrelevant units at FD/HQ

Achievements:

• capacity building through on-the-job-training• Mt. Kenya as practical case to FD/HQ staff for GIS, aerial photo interpretation, survey• establishment of an inventory task force for MtK, headed by the Head of the FI Unit

Comments:

The stated activities concern mainly data collection and preparation of basic documentsand not the strengthening of planning capacities. The Project and the TA seem to con-fuse "Data collection" with "Planning".



Planned Activity 1.6 Operational support to FDAchievements:

Providing all DFOs around Mt. Kenya, FCP Nyeri Base and PFOs of Central and EasternProvinces with operational funds for the maintenance and running expenses of vehiclesand other expenses (petty cash).

Comments:

Unfortunately, the support was not target oriented in the sense of the project purpose.

Planned Activity 1.7 Supply equipmentAchievements and comments:

For details see chap. 6.1.1

Planned Result 2:

Outline (frame work) forest management and conservation plan for Mt. Kenya (Zona-tion Plan) formulated.

Planned Activity 2.1 Commission of new aerial photography of Mt. KenyaAchievements:

Flown in Feb./March1996 by a Kenyan company "Photomap";

Planned Activity 2.2 Interpret aerial photosAchievements:

• carried out between April and Aug. 1996 with local short term experts while training 6FD staff;

• ground truthing included

Comments:

see chap. 6.1.2.1

Planned Activity 2.3 Elaborate thematic maps of Mt. KenyaAchievements:

• GIS with different thematic layers already done for vegetation cover, drainage system,and contour lines;

• topographic maps (1:50,000) were bought for the stations; boundary of the ForestStations were put into these topographic maps;

• elaboration of vegetation, drainage, contour and infrastructure maps is ongoing; mapsfor about 80 % of the whole project area (MtK) are already elaborated.

• GIS layers still have to be done for FI results, infrastructure, socio-economic data,biodiversity data and others.

Comments:

see chap. 6.1.2.1

Planned Activity 2.4 Contribute to biodiversity surveys with NMK (National Muse-ums of Kenya)

Achievements:

A written proposal (justification, objectives, methodology, budget) about biodiversity sur-vey (flora, mammals, birds, reptiles, insects, wetlands) for Mt. Kenya was elaborated and



forwarded; it is accepted by the govt.; now waiting approval by Delegation; the proposalincludes a budget which has to be provided by COMIFOR; target is to come up withmanagement recommendations for the conservation of biodiversity;

Comments:

see chap. 6.1.2.1

Planned Activity 2.5 Establish collaborative forest research activities with KEFRIAchievements:

• bring FD and KEFRI together to undertake practical and management oriented re-search;

• COMIFOR contributed transport and subsistence allowances for KEFRI and FD staff;• engagement of short term consultant (Paul Wachiori) to bring the 2 organization. FD

and KEFRI together;• supply of material and equipment for FD to be jointly used by KEFRI and FD;• training of field staff on mensuration;• facilitate development of volume tables for 8 different tree species;• facilitate set up of PSP for different forest types; 4 PSP already set up;• meetings are organized when the need arises;

Comments:

see chap. 6.1.2.1

Planned Activity 2.6 Design and develop an outline of a forest management andconservation plan for Mt. Kenya (zonation plan)

Achievements:

• working group under MtK task force established comprising COMIFOR, FD and KWSin March 1997;

• development of an approach towards zonation (methodology for zonation) inMay/June 1997;

• collection of base line information• discussion with stakeholders and community representatives in 19 meetings around

MtK (June/July 1997);• first draft of a zonation plan in Aug./Sept. 1997;• plan for the future: discussion of the zonation with stakeholders and community repre-

sentatives;• contribution of transport and financial support to the zonation team (Mr. Kariuki and

Macharia, and Mr. Managene from KWS);• design and development of outline plan still ongoing (still draft, not yet finalized);

Comments:

As KIFCON had already developed a quite good and acceptable vegetation map for Mt.Kenya it is not understandable why this work takes so long time. An outline plan is ageneral frame plan that should be normally completely developed within half a year.

see also chap. 6.1.2.1

Planned Activity 2.7 Initiate implementation of the outline planAchievements:

Not yet reached that stage because outline plan not yet finalized



Result 3:

Comprehensive management plans for two pilot areas (Kirinyaga and Northwesternpart of MtK) formulated.

Planned Activity 3.1 Identify pilot areasAchievements:

Two pilot areas were identified: Kirinyaga District (3 Forest Stations) and in the north-western side of the mountain 3 forest stations, 2 in Nyeri District and 1 in Meru District;Kirinyaga represents wetter, the other pilot area the dryer part of MtK; Embu too small;Tharaka Nithi a lot of interference.

Comments:

The criteria of selection are not clearly defined. The selected areas are certainly too bigfor pilot areas. The area unit for forest management was not respected when selectingthe pilot areas. This means that the results gained on these pilot areas cannot be usedfor forest management planning and implementation as the pilot areas cover a biggerarea than the management unit. The area of management unit may be significantly dif-ferent from the pilot area. See also chap. 6.1.2.2.

Planned Activity 3.2 Execute a forest inventory of the pilot areas.Achievements:

• field work in Kirinyaga completed; data analysis ongoing; results expected for October1997;

• field work in north-west pilot area started in June 1997; will be completed by end ofthis year;

Comments:

Objectives of the forest inventory have not been defined. Therefore FI concept cannot betarget oriented. FI and the additional information gained are aids to reach the projectpurpose. Execution takes too long time and it is much too expensive. See also chap.6.1.2.2.

Planned Activity 3.3 Conduct socio-economic survey of pilot areas.Achievements:

• ToR elaborated by short term expert Lucy Emerton in Aug. 1996 and improved inMarch 1997;

• AWF commissioned in June 1997; implementation started late June 1997;• early draft report received on 16 September 1997 (during project evaluation)Comments:

See chap. 6.1.2.2.

Planned Activity 3.4 Design and develop a comprehensive forest managementplan for the pilot areas.

Achievements:

Not yet reached that stage.

Comments:

This is regarded as one of the main topics of the project and should have been carriedout with high priority!



Planned Activity 3.5 Identify communities and other stakeholder interests in thepilot areas.

Achievements:

• joint program defined together with KWS Mt. Region (May/June 1997);• introductory meetings between FD and KWS held;• reorientation training of FD and KWS staff towards community integration skills initi-

ated (still ongoing at Naivasha);• two interest groups identified and supported (KAATA + bee-keeping in Kirinyaga);• also the socio-economic study contributes towards this aspect.Comments:

There is no concept up to date of how to identify stakeholder interests! See also chap.6.1.2.2.

Planned Activity 3.6 Initiate implementation of the forest management plans.Achievements:

Not yet reached that stage.

Result 4:

Participatory action plans (refers to communities, interest groups) with selected com-munities established and implementation initiated.These plans should be an integral part of the forest management plan.

Not much progress made because of lack of COMIFOR capacity in the field of communityparticipation. Additional TA was required.

Comment:

It is obvious that the TA experts had no experience in planning and introducing communityparticipation for forest management.

Planned Activity 4.1 Conduct socio-economic survey of pilot areas.Achievements:

AWF was engaged to carry out the study. Draft version of the study was handed over inmid September 1997.

Comments:

The socio-economic study cannot be judged as it was not completed at the time of proj-ect evaluation.

Planned Activity 4.2 Select a number of priority communities.Achievements:

Not yet achieved. They will be selected on the results of the socio-economic survey. Fi-nal report expected for end of September 1997.

Comments:

It is not necessary to carry out a socio-economic survey for the selection of some pilotcommunities.

Planned Activity 4.3 Select community based institutional partners.Achievements:

Not yet executed.



Comments:

Should have been treated since a long time ago. This activity is not difficult at all. Possi-ble partners are churches, self-help groups, like KAATA, and local NGOs, like Mt. KenyaOperators.

Planned Activity 4.4 Conduct participatory appraisal.Achievements:

Not yet executed.

Comments:

Not carried out because of lack of know-how within TA and Project.

Planned Activity 4.5 Assess forest and tree resources management.Achievements:

Not yet executed.

Comments:

Could have been initiated.

Planned Activity 4.6 Design and develop participatory action plans.Achievements:

Not yet executed.

Comments:

This is regarded as one of the main topics of the project and should have been givenhigh priority!

Planned Activity 4.7 Initiate implementation of action plans.Achievements:

Not yet executed.

Result 5:

Environmental education program established.Explication by the Project: Originally it was conceived that an assessment of the existingenvironmental awareness/education is carried out. On the basis of this assessment suitablepartners should be identified who would then elaborate and implement the programs withsupport from COMIFOR. Actually it was not done in this way because the whole programwas first delayed and then the Nyeri Base was found to be the appropriate part-ner/institution (to be developed) in carrying out the conservation, education and awarenessprogram. CEAU was established as a joint institution of FD and KWS under MoU. Becausethe whole approach changed, the following activities have to be modified. Delays also dueto lack of COMIFOR capacity in the field of community participation (additional TA required).

Comment:

If the Project changed its mind and strategy, it should have at least changed and adaptedthe Project planning! The non-execution of this result means that the project did not evenconsider and respect its own planning. Even with the available number of TA experts andProject staff the result could have been treated, at least basically. Some planned activitiescould/should have been executed long time ago. The full time training expert (TA)could/should have assisted in it.



Planned Activity 5.1 Assess existing programs, gaps and priorities.Achievements:

Not yet carried out.

Comments:

This could (should) have been done long time ago.

Planned Activity 5.2 Identify partners and develop strategy and program related toforest conservation.

Achievements:

• CEAU of Nyeri Base has been established (July 1997);• program under development;Comments:

The development of Nyeri Base was initiated only a few weeks ago so that no judgmentcan be made at this stage.Other partners should have been identified since a long time ago.Strategy and programs are not yet developed.

Planned Activity 5.3 Train trainers / teachers.Achievements:


Comments:

This could (should) have been done long time ago with assistance of the training expert(TA).

Planned Activity 5.4 Develop educational materials.Achievements:


Comments:

Where is the contribution of the TA training expert?

Planned Activity 5.5 Initiate implementation of the program.Achievements:


Planned Activity 5.6 Evaluate program.Achievements:


Result 6:

Management plan for Lamu district mangrove resources formulated and implementa-tion initiated.Other then the planned activities as mentioned below have been undertaken which do notfit in the aforementioned categories like establishing liaisons with coastal resource man-agement institutions.



Comment:

All activities carried out by the project are mentioned in one of the results or in chap. 6.2. TAstopped in November 1995. Administratively this component was stopped by a letter of ECDelegation in April 1996.

Planned Activity 6.1 Obtain and interpret aerial photographsAchievements:

Aerial photos were bought in 1995 and the interpretation initiated.

Comments:

Aerial photo interpretation was never completed and no map was produced.

Planned Activity 6.2 Carry out mapping.Achievements:

Interpretation of aerial photos was initiated, but mapping not yet done.

Comments:

Aerial photo interpretation was never completed and no map was produced.

Planned Activity 6.3 Carry out mangrove inventory.Achievements:

Interpretation of aerial photos was initiated, but inventory not carried out.

Comments:

Design and concept for a mangrove inventory could have been developed.

Planned Activity 6.4 Carry out biodiversity assessment.Achievements:

Not executed.

Planned Activity 6.5 Assess mangrove utilization.Achievements:

A historical overview was compiled but the actual mangrove utilization and the problemsarising from this were not analyzed.

Planned Activity 6.6 Develop working relations with communities.Achievements:

Some school children involved in planting mangrove seedlings (propagules).

Comments:

This kind of work should have been systematically introduced and developed.



Planned Activity 6.7 Design of a mangrove management plan.Achievements:

Not done.

Comments:

This planned activity is regarded as the core piece of the whole mangrove componentand therefore it is a big failure that it has not been tackled. There was not enough timefor the Project and the budget allocation came too late.

Planned Activity 6.8 Initiate implementation of the management plan.Achievements:

Not done.

Summary of Chapter 6.3:Considering the fact that there was a long-term training consultant for 20 m/m, the output ofthe training component is not satisfactory. Only a training manual for Lamu mangroves waselaborated. The elaboration of a modular training system is useless as it was not done incooperation with the existing training institutes and thus will not be accepted by them. Thepractical training concentrated too much on FD staff and neglected local communities andother organizations. The rehabilitation and new construction of conservation posts and sta-tion buildings were postponed, forest feeder roads were not yet rehabilitated. By contribut-ing to revitalize the Mt. Kenya task force and to support the Nyeri Base and by initiating jointplanning with KWS COMIFOR contributed to streamline the institutional organization ofsome FD units. The planning and back-up capacity of FD/HQ units were not significantlystrengthened by the project. COMIFOR supplied a lot of equipment, transport means andmaterial to the DFOs and PFOs around Mt. Kenya including operational funds; unfortu-nately this operational support was not oriented towards the project purpose. Importantelements of strengthening the FD for managing indigenous forests are missing (planned re-sult 1).

A new aerial photography was commissioned in Feb. 1996, although actual aerial photos ofthe region were still available. Project funds were hereby wasted. The interpretation of theaerial photos is done properly, but the number of different forest strata is far too high. Theelaboration of thematic maps based on the aerial photos is still ongoing. The applied tech-nology of map production is wrong so that the produced maps are not correct. The projectsubmitted a proposal for carrying out a biodiversity survey, but the use of the project fundsis not yet approved by EC. Collaborative forest research activities with KEFRI have beenestablished. Field staff has been trained on mensuration. Volume tables for 8 different treespecies have been developed. The establishment of PSP is initiated. The design and de-velopment of an outline forest management and conservation plan is still ongoing. A firstdraft version was completed in September 1997. The local population has been involved indefining the zones, yet the work takes too long time. As the outline plan is not yet finalized,the implementation could not yet start. The outline forest management and conservationplan for Mt. Kenya is not yet formulated (planned result 2).

Two pilot areas were identified but the selection was not based on appropriate criteria andthus the pilot areas do not well serve the purpose. The field work of the forest inventory ofone pilot area is completed, the other forest inventory is still ongoing. The objectives of theforest inventory have not been clearly defined. The execution takes too log time and ismuch too expensive. The implementation of a socio-economic survey of pilot areas startedin June 1997 and was not yet completed at the time of project evaluation and thus it cannotbe judged by the evaluation team. A comprehensive forest management plan for the pilot



areas was neither designed nor developed, accordingly it could not be implemented(planned result 3).

Planned Result 4 "Participatory action plans with selected communities established and im-plementation initiated" is not yet tackled.

Except for initiating the cooperation with the Nyeri Base, planned result 5 "Environmentaleducation program established" has not been treated.

The management plan for Lamu mangroves has not been formulated and, accordingly, theimplementation could not yet start as planned in result 6. However, with the little means thatwere available during the first year, the mangrove expert (Mr. Kivyatu) and his adviser (Mr.Johnson) managed to carry out some activities, like aerial photo interpretation (not com-pleted), elaboration of a management concept, training of FD and KWS staff, and the com-pilation of a historical overview of the Lamu mangroves. Some liaisons with coastal re-source management institutions have been established. Three hectares of barren land werereplanted with mangrove seedlings in cooperation with school children.



7. Analysis of effectivenessThis chapter relates to the relationship between the Results of the project and the ProjectPurpose. It gives an assessment of the extent to which the project results have contributedtowards the achievement of the Project Purpose.

According to the Financial Agreement the Project purpose reads as follows:Kenya's FD of the MENR strengthened, and design and implementation of managementplans in primary forests and surrounding areas assisted taking into account a populationparticipation.

Unfortunately, the defined "official project purpose" is in the planning logistics not a realProject Purpose but rather a mean to achieve something, in this case the "contribution tothe conservation of indigenous forests" which could be regarded as the "real project pur-pose".

It can be stated in general that the planned results/outputs are necessary to achieve theplanned project purpose but the COMIFOR Project did not achieve significant parts of theplanned results/outputs and, therefore, the Project did not significantly contribute to achievethe Project Purpose. Three quarter of the planned project period are already gone. It meansthat the Project is nearly at the end of its planned phase. The previous inappropriate projectplanning and implementation makes it rather unlikely that COMIFOR Project will achievesubstantial results until the end of the phase (October 1998) if there are no major changesin its conception, strategy and implementation.

It seems that there has been a lack of communication and understanding between the do-nor and the Forest Department as Project Executing Agency because the given forest pol-icy and forest legislation did not allow the execution of the planned participatory approach inforest management without any special permit of the concerned Ministry. The evaluation ofthe project implementation has shown that the members of the FD did not perceive theProject in the same way as the donor, especially concerning the importance of the commu-nity participation component.

The planners of COMIFOR judged the risks and uncertainties completely right as all of themmaterialized:

• Delay in project implementation due to weak absorption and implementation capacity ofthe FD;

• Insufficient allocation of complementary funds;

• Underestimation of the importance of the population participatory approach to achievesustained management of natural resources.

The contributions of the single planned results to obtain the Project Purpose can be as-sessed as follows:

Result 1:Planning and management capacity of the "Natural Forest Management Division" of theKFD strengthened.

A lot of transport means, equipment and material was purchased from COMIFOR budget forthe Forest Department. According to the understanding of the FD and the TA, the FDneeded the delivered goods and services for its daily routine work.

On the other hand, some of the delivered goods imply high operation costs which the FDcannot afford at the moment. This applies especially for the transport means (4WD vehi-cles, tractors, lorries, boats). Therefore it is doubtful if the pure delivery of these goods canbe regarded as a strengthening process. Additionally, the material was not selected in qual-ity and number to serve for the introduction of a participatory approach of forest conserva-



tion. The procured material was also not selected in such a way that it could serve tostrengthen the "Planning and Management Capacity" as demanded by the Result itself.

The material supply was carried out according to a three years old plan not considering thechanges of frame conditions in between. This is why much more material was deliveredthan really needed for the new project areas (only 2 instead of previously planned 10 ar-eas). The quantity of the purchased goods was so big that other FD branches outside theproject area and outside the project target (conservation of indigenous forests) got alsosome material. The material supply did not at all take into consideration the main element ofthe project purpose: the planned involvement of the local population in forest managementand conservation!

As already mentioned, strengthening can never be an end in itself but has to be target ori-ented. The material delivery of COMIFOR was certainly not target oriented and, therefore,cannot be regarded as a contribution to achieve the real project purpose.

Result 2:Management plans for Mt. Kenya developed and implementation initiated.

Due to the lack of a sound problem analysis it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of for-est management plans in relation to the "conservation and sustainable management of for-ests around Mt. Kenya" (Project Purpose). The plans as such will not change anything.Taking into account the present political and institutional framework conditions it is doubtfulwhether management plans may solve the problem of illegal felling and uncontrolled sub-sistence use. It would have been more effective to concentrate more on the participationand involvement of the forest adjacent communities. To limit the management planning toindigenous forests only is not supported. In case of Mt. Kenya the existing plantations playa major role for the supply of local timber and firewood. The shamba system which is ap-plied in the plantation system especially in the northwest is for many farmers the basis oftheir subsistence. Changes in the plantation system have direct impact on the forest adja-cent communities and on the use of the surrounding indigenous forests. Concerning themanagement of Mt. Kenya Forest Reserve it must be dealt with as one entity. Not to inte-grate the plantations into the management plans will reduce the effectiveness of the overallforest management considerably and will reduce the acceptance by the forest adjacentcommunities.

Result 3:Extension system developed and participative actions in sustained management of naturalresources in the forests and surrounding areas promoted.

In the design of the project, the local community participation in forest conservation andmanagement (social forestry component) was to play a central role. Up to date, this aspecthas suffered the most set back. The Project made no serious attempt to elaborate partici-patory approaches. A technical expert for the participatory aspects was not provided for inTA contract but the Project could have made use of local expertise and use available man-months for short term experts. Up to now the local population has not been brought onboard as partners in forest conservation and management reflecting the non-participationattitude of the FD. Existing extension methodologies are not utilized. The socio-economicstudy cannot be judged as it was not completed at the time of project evaluation.

On the other hand initial contacts with community groups (undertaken by COMIFOR, KWS,KIFCON, NGOs, e.g. AWF and other donors and projects, reveal a considerable potentialfor participatory forest management that must be explored and harnessed.



Result 4:FD, other governmental as well as non-governmental institutions involved with natural for-ests trained in country.

A training needs assessment for staff up to Provincial Forest Officer level was carried outbut left out for the higher echelons of the FD. The training of Forest Guards / Foresters /Game Rangers in Mt. Kenya area was non-target oriented. No training program has beendeveloped except for mangrove training. Local expertise in educational and training institu-tions was not utilized. Also the already existing training material was not adequately utilized(KIFCON, ICRAF, etc.). Training on community participative actions was not targeted at all.An assessment of training needs of community members was not executed. The organiza-tion of joint training of FD/KWS was a useful step in building partnerships, but this has aninsignificant impact if done only at the lowest levels. The training of forest guards, forestersand game rangers on the Forest Act and court procedures had a positive impact (more suc-cessful prosecutions of illegal forest activities).

The ToR for the TA were very clear and yet have not been adequately addressed. Sincetraining was not target oriented considering the planned participatory approach, it cannot beregarded as effective in the sense of contributing to the achievement of the project purpose.

Result 5:Management plan for mangroves at Lamu District developed and implementation initiated.

Information on past mangrove management and research in Kenya was compiled. Aerialphotos covering the Lamu mangroves were purchased but only partly interpreted. A draftconcept for Lamu mangrove management and conservation has been developed, takinginto consideration the aspect of community participation, but more detailed managementguidelines could have been elaborated. Techniques for artificial regeneration of mangroveshave been developed. A design for mangrove inventory was not developed.

It has to be admitted that the ToR of the TA expert were too demanding. The developmentof a management plan for Lamu and the start of its implementation could not be achieved,also due to bad timing of the TA and the late availability of operational funds. This meansthat the Lamu component did also not significantly contribute to achieve the project pur-pose.



8. Impact analysisIn this chapter the overall effects of the project shall be analyzed, especially the contributionof the project purpose to achieve the Overall Goal.

The Overall goal was defined as:

Conservation and protection of indigenous forest resources, including the preservation ofbio-diversity enhanced.

Considering the up to present not satisfying implementation of the COMIFOR Project as ex-plained in the chap. 2., 3., 5., 6. and 7. of this Report, it must be stated that the Project hasnot yet contributed to the achievement of the Overall Goal.

General Development Objectives of the EU:

The Financial Agreement defines Beneficiaries as:Population adjacent to the forests with particular emphasis placed to enhance the role ofwomen and to benefit the country as a whole.

In respect of beneficiaries COMIFOR's achievements are nil. Up to date only the admini-strations, especially the FD, but also MoU, KEFRI, NMK and others were profiting from theproject execution. The project put too much emphasis on the strengthening of the FD(equipment, training, operational funds, etc.). There are only very few initiatives to supportforest adjacent communities. Special attention to enhance the role of women cannot berecognized so far.

COMIFOR is far apart of having contributed or even achieved other general developmentobjectives of the EU, like poverty alleviation, sustainable economic development, sustain-able social development, institutional reforms, or the development of private initiatives. It isrecommended to reorient the Project as proposed in chap. 11.



9. Sustainability/ReplicabilityThis chapter assesses the sustainability/replicability aspects of the COMIFOR Project.

9.1 Sustainability aspects

Sustainability of a project means that the concerned project, after having received an initialfinancial support and technical assistance, is able to efficiently continue the project work inthe planned way without any further substantial external assistance. Based on this criterion,COMIFOR Project, as it has been executed, is not sustainable at all. It could have been asustainable project, if the originally intended project planning would have been followed,especially if the planned community participation approach would have consequently beenintroduced and developed.

Sustainability for the COMIFOR Project can only be achieved, if a project concept is devel-oped and permanently adjusted, that takes into consideration the little means that are mostprobably available to GoK in the long run. A sustainable project concept has to be based onthe realistically expected FD funds and budget, but the past execution of the COMIFORProject depended nearly completely on external funds.

There are generally no objections if a donor financially supports a Project Executing Agencyto improve and complement its equipment including transport means if the recipient is fi-nancially in the position to operate and maintain the newly purchased equipment withoutany substantial and continuous further external support. But if equipment is bought for theProject Executing Agency that implies permanent high operation and maintenance coststhat the Project Executing Agency cannot afford because of budget restraints, then this in-vestment is not reasonable. Such an investment cannot be regarded as a sustainable proj-ect support, and as such it constitutes rather a weakening than a strengthening of the re-cipient.

In the case of COMIFOR and the FD as Project Executing Agency exactly the last men-tioned case happened. COMIFOR Project bought for the FD a big number of vehicles,tractors, lorries and boats that all imply high operation and maintenance costs. As the expe-rience of the project has already shown, the GoK/FD is not in the position to finance theseoperating and maintenance costs. This means that these transport means can be only usedif the COMIFOR project (or another project) financially supports the FD. As soon as the ex-ternal support (Project) stops the transport means cannot be used any more by the FD be-cause it has not got enough funds to pay for the operation and maintenance costs. In fact,even the evaluation team had to provide funds to the FD so that it was able to operate atleast some vehicles for the carrying out of the evaluation mission. Of course, GoK and theFD are far away from the possibility of making the necessary financial arrangements so thatthey can replace the sponsored equipment after the amortization period when it is worn out.

The actual financial situation of the FD is described in Annex 13. It is characterized by thefact that nearly 90% of the FD budget have to be used for the payment of staff wages, andonly 10% of the budget are left to finance operations of the staff. This relation of budget ex-penditures for wages and operations is unbalanced. A relatively big number of FD staff hasgot completely insufficient funds to work properly. This situation cannot be improved in asustainable manner by financing at certain points some investments and operation costsbecause the overall problem, the non reasonable relation between staff and operational ex-penditures, would continue to exist. Such a financing can only be regarded as temporarytreatment of symptoms and not as a solution of the deeper problems.

Taking into consideration the given financial situation of the GoK in general and of the FD inparticular, the only way of sustainably solving the deadlock situation of the FD is to reor-ganize and restructure the Forest Department as proposed in the Kenya Forestry MasterPlan 1995 - 2020 (see also Annex 13.). In chapter 3.1 of KFMP it is stated: "Improving the



efficiency of forest management. The Forest Department will concentrate on policy mat-ters, forest regulation, and monitoring of the performance of the various executing bodies inthe forestry sector. The management of the Forest Estate, both for production and conser-vation, will increasingly be entrusted to private or public enterprises, tree farmers and com-munities."

This political declaration of intent is exactly the proper solution of the given FD problems.The KFMP was edited in 1994 and therefore should have been known to the project exe-cuting responsibles, including Technical Assistance. As requested in the Financial Agree-ment, the COMIFOR Project should have strengthened the planning and managementcapacity of the FD and not the implementation capacity. The execution of the COMIFORProject as it has been done, means counteracting to the intended forest policy. COMIFORcould have taken a lead in implementing the new policy on a restricted scale, which is theproject area.

For the COMIFOR Project it would have been necessary to propose a reduction of the for-est staff within the project area. As compensation of the reduced forestry staff, COMIFORshould have (a) properly qualified and adequately equipped the remaining staff and (b) in-volved the forest adjacent communities to contribute to the conservation and utilization ofthe forests by taking over some responsibility and implementing tasks. Models should havebeen conceived how the communities who engage themselves in forest conservationmeasures can adequately benefit from their commitment. But exactly these steps that wouldhave led to a sustainable forest management structure, were not carried out by COMIFORProject, they were not even initiated.

9.2 Replicability aspects

Replicability means that a successful model or parts of it can be replicated, with some initialfinancial and technical assistance, in other parts of the country or possibly in other countrieswhere similar frame conditions are given.

In the forestry sector it is very difficult, if not impossible, that complete forest managementmodels can be simply transferred to other regions. There are too many factors that influ-ence the forest growth, protection needs and exploitation potential so that individual forestmanagement and conservation systems have to be developed for every new site. But, ofcourse, it is possible to profit from positive and negative experiences made elsewhere. It isnot at all necessary to start the forest conservation and management planning from scratchat every new site.

Therefore, a forest conservation and management system can be regarded as replicable ifmain elements of the system and their linkage are properly known. Before transferring a"model", basic problems should be solved and basic questions be answered, like:

• Which general project concepts are possible?

• Which minimum information is needed of the new project area, especially about the for-est adjacent communities?

• Which are the possible approaches to initiate community participation in forest manage-ment?

• Where do we get the requested information?

• What shall be the role of the Forest Department?

• What is the approximate required number of FD staff?

• Which abilities are required from the FD staff?

• How should the additional training of the FD staff be structured and organized?

• How can the cooperation between FD and the communities be organized?



• Which models of community participation can be regarded as feasible and successpromising?

• Are there feasible proposals for the cooperation of different state and parastatal organi-zations?

• What will be the role of local NGOs?

• Which equipment is needed for the project implementation?

• etc.

During the execution of COMIFOR no innovative forest management concepts were testedthat could yield a certain experience about the possibility and feasibility of different forestconservation and management concepts and approaches. So little has been implementedthat there is nothing to copy. All these aforementioned questions cannot be answered bythe COMIFOR Project. The basis of replicability for COMIFOR is, by far, not given.



10. Conclusions

Overall outcome

So far, COMIFOR had no luck on its side. There were problems and troubles from the verybeginning.

The Financial Agreement was signed in November 1992, but the Project started only twoyears later in November 1994 with the arrival of the three TA experts. In 1993 the projectarea was changed from ten to two project sites, the tender documents for the TA compo-nent were prepared and launched. In 1994 the offers were received and evaluated and thefirst consulting company, Techniplan, selected. In between, the frame conditions of theproject changed significantly.

The performance of the first TA consulting company, Techniplan, to whom the TA contractwas awarded was unsatisfactory and, therefore, Techniplan was asked to hand over thecontract to another consulting company, DHV, which was the previous subcontractor ofTechniplan. The performance of the second consulting company was obviously not muchbetter.

All three planned experts started their assignment at the same time in November 1994. Atthat time there was no project structure yet, and no funds were available. This led to a con-siderable loss in the efficiency of the three experts as they had no means to render theirservices. The operational funds were only accessible one year after the beginning of the TAcomponent. Equipment arrived months after the TA experts. The Project Coordinatorchanged four times during the first three years. Backstopping services from TA companiesare not visible, though backstopping service is separately paid (no reports!). The TAs didneither elaborate an acceptable project concept nor a plan of operations. Accordingly theproject was confusingly executed. Short term experts were not organized for the real im-portant issues. The planned cooperation with KIFCON was not possible due to its termina-tion in June 1994.

The FD assigned the Project Manager in May 1993. A small project structure has been setup beside the Natural Forest Management Division. GoK pays the wages of FD staff as-signed to the project. A Project Steering Committee was set up but it did not meet regularly.Its competence is much too restricted. It can make only recommendations though it consistsof high ranking officers and donor representatives. GoK did not allocate substantial opera-tional funds for project operations and for per diem and allowances of FD staff. These werepaid by the project. The FD and TA staff is obviously lacking competence in participatoryforest management planning.

The project was lacking from the very beginning a sound and consistent project concept.Although a series of Inception Reports were worked out, no appropriate project planningwas elaborated and put to paper. The originally planned project strategy of involving forestadjacent communities for the conservation and management of the indigenous forests wasmore or less ignored by the project and the TA.

In fact, the project, as it was conducted up to present, must be regarded as a failure. Notmuch substantial activities can be cited, and not all activities that have been carried out canbe regarded as successful:

The project interpreted the strengthening of the FD mainly as supply of material and equip-ment. Therefore various equipment and material for transport, surveying, mapping, camp-ing, boundary demarcation, office work, etc. was provided, but this was not done in a targetoriented way. Some of the bought equipment was not needed for the project purpose or iseven useless for the FD. COMIFOR financed nearly 100% of the project's running ex-penses, although GoK agreed to own contributions. The management and planning capaci-ties of the FD were not strengthened, as it was planned. The past project measures did notcontribute to stop the forest degradation.



No overall management planning concept and implementation strategy exists. Some activi-ties are carried out to obtain basic information about the project region, but the way of exe-cution is uncoordinated without taking into account their relationship, linkages and timelyorder. The local people have not been adequately involved so far neither in the planningprocess nor in the implementation of field activities. Most of the techniques applied formanagement planning have considerable weaknesses from the technical point of view(weak TA).

Only initial contacts have been made with some community groups, but the project made noserious attempt to elaborate participatory approaches. A technical expert for the participa-tory aspects was not provided for in TA contract but the Project could have made use of lo-cal expertise and use available man-months for short term experts. Up to now the localpopulation has not been brought on board as partners in forest conservation and manage-ment reflecting the non-participation attitude of the FD. Existing extension methodologieswere not utilized by the project. Initial contacts with community groups reveal a considerablepotential for participatory forest management. The socio-economic study cannot be judgedas it was not completed at the time of project evaluation.

The training needs assessment was partly carried out for FD staff but not for communitymembers. No training program has been developed except for mangrove training. Trainingcourses at Lamu and in Mt. Kenya region were organized in tree species identification,ecology, legislation, MoU, and biodiversity. FD staff attended short courses and was trainedin special technical aspects, like photo interpretation, GIS, etc. Local expertise of educa-tional and training institutions and already existing training material were not adequatelyutilized. ToR for TA were very clear and yet has not been adequately addressed.

Information on past mangrove management and research in Kenya was compiled. Aerialphotos of Lamu mangroves have been purchased and interpretation started, but not com-pleted. A draft concept for Lamu mangrove management and conservation was developedbut the elaboration of a management plan has not been initiated. The ToR of the mangroveexpert are regarded as too ambitious in relation to the planned TA period of one year only.

The set objectives have not been reached so far. The FD was neither strengthened in a tar-get oriented nor in a sustainable way. The collection of basic information about the projectregion is also not target oriented. It is too time consuming and too expensive. Forest man-agement planning procedures and involvement of local population are not yet initiated. For-est management activities have not yet started.

Up to date, only the FD took profit from the project execution. The population adjacent tothe forests, men and women, as planned beneficiaries of the project had no benefit yet.

The little achievements do certainly not justify the high project costs. This applies also forthe TA component which was not efficient and therefore does not justify its costs. Themoney spent for the "strengthening" of the FD could have been partly saved or spent in abetter, more sustainable success promising way.

Three quarters of the initially intended project period (three of four years) are gone. Noteven the simple collection of basic information is completed. The more difficult componentsof the Project are not even initiated, like the elaboration of a community participatory ap-proach. The Project is far from achieving its intended purpose.

Sustainability

The planning of the project considered some important elements of sustainability but theproject execution did not respect these sustainability aspects and, therefore, the projectcannot at all be regarded as sustainable.

The whole system of forest management and conservation followed by the project still de-pends largely on a permanent flow of external funds to finance the equipment and operat-



ing costs of the Forest Department. No significant attempts have been made to initiate anddevelop a participatory forest management and conservation approach by involving the lo-cal communities. Instead of proposing a reorganization and restructuring of the FD accord-ing to the official Kenya Forestry Master Plan (1995 to 2020), the FD was generally suppliedwith a lot of material and equipment. These material delivery meant that the FD could con-tinue to work in its old traditional but not successful way as long as the external funds weresecured. As soon as the external funding will be stopped, the FD will not be able to operateaccording to its legal obligations because the GoK attributions to the FD are largely insuffi-cient.

Only by discharging the FD from implementing and management activities and by involvingthe local communities for the practical work, a sustainable forest management system willbe established. Unfortunately, the COMIFOR Project did not work in this direction.

COMIFOR is far apart of having contributed or even achieved general development objec-tives of the EU, like poverty alleviation, sustainable economic development, sustainable so-cial development, institutional reforms, or the development of private initiatives. It is recom-mended to reorient the Project as proposed in chap. 11.



11. Recommendations for the Reorientation of the ProjectThe Mt. Kenya region is one of the most important ecological zones in the whole country. Itsmain importance results from the fact that three big rivers which are of vital interest to themajority of the population of Kenya originate from Mt. Kenya. Many of the existing ecosys-tems there are unique in the world and merit high efforts to conserve them for future gen-erations. There is a large consensus of all important stakeholders that the forests of Mt.Kenya have to be conserved. In fact there are already many initiatives and efforts of localcommunities and NGOs ongoing to protect these valuable natural resources. These initia-tives as well as the responsible administrations need target oriented support to enable themin protecting the forests and the biodiversity of this area.

11.1 Immediate actions

The present way of executing the COMIFOR Project is not suitable to achieve substantialcontributions to the conservation and management of Mt. Kenya Forest Reserve. At the endof the Project Evaluation an exemplary Project Planning was elaborated in a participatoryway which can serve as a basis for the further proceeding.

It is extremely important for the overall success of the project and to maintain the people'strust in the development efforts of GoK and the donors, not to break the project completelybut to immediately start the required reorganization and restructuring processes. For thesake of a possibly high impact of the project, it is recommended that all project activities willbe carried out in future by an autonomous Forest Conservation and Management Unit of Mt.Kenya that is placed under the legal supervision of FD/KWS/MoU. The project should begoverned by a Project Steering Committee or/and Supervisory Board and annually con-trolled by an Audit. The big advantages of such an autonomous Unit is the higher flexibilityin terms of administration, budgeting, cooperation with local communities and introducinginnovative management systems. Details have to be worked out as soon as possible.

In order to obtain as soon as possible an optimal project impact, the following actions areproposed:

• Stop all ongoing project activities and suspend funding until a new project framework hasbeen established and agreed in order to save the not spent funds for future activities.

• Terminate the contract with DHV.

• EU and GoK shall agree upon a new project framework. Proposal to be elaborated by anindependent consultant as soon as possible taking into due consideration the contribu-tions of Mr. Candotti, EU Adviser to NAO.

• Regard the jointly elaborated PPM as binding project planning document.

• Elaborate ToRs for the engagement of a NGO/Institution/Consortium and proceed tenderfor its engagement as soon as possible:

◊ Select with utmost care the TA long term experts for "Participatory Forest Planningand Management" and "Community Participation and Extension".

◊ Engage as soon as possible a short term expert to elaborate a sound "General forestmanagement concept for the Mt. Kenya Forest Reserve" which shall serve as basisfor the execution of the project.

◊ Engage as soon as possible a short term expert to elaborate important elements of"Participatory forest management for Mt. Kenya Forest Reserve".

• Until an autonomous forest management structure of Mt. Kenya Forest Reserve is setup, the project shall be executed in an autonomous way, supervised by MoU Secretariatinvolving FD and KWS.



• Organize a planning workshop to elaborate a detailed Plan of Operation.

• Transfer as soon as possible the project office to the project region.

It is deemed necessary that a qualified and experienced Forestry Expert as Short Term Ex-pert supports GoK (FD, KWS and MoU) and the donor (EC) in analyzing the given situationin detail (Financial Agreement, contracts, administrative possibilities and constraints, techni-cal demands, etc.), and elaborates detailed proposals for the reorganization and restruc-turing of the project. This project conception has to be done in close cooperation with theNAO and his Adviser.

The contributions of Mr. Candotti "Brief On A Possible New Implementation Framework OfCOMIFOR Project" give already a clear frame of the possible and reasonable new COMI-FOR concept. The most important facts are stated below:

• Given the variety and multiplicity of the actors involved in the sector, and the evolutivenature of the current institutional environment, it is suggested that the project is set upagainst a multi-faceted institutional framework, revolving around KWS, FD and MoU butopen to contributions from decentralized cooperation actors.

• In line with the provisions of the Lomé Convention and the EDF 7 Revised MIP in par-ticular, the restructuring of the project could be channeled through the establishing of anEC-sponsored "framework contract" or "twinning arrangement" between the MoU and aselected NGO/Institution/Consortium, whereby

◊ the role of contracting authority would be delegated to the EC;

◊ project supervision and institutional liaison would be secured through the MoU andassociated multi-faceted steering committee;

◊ the selected Twin-institution would be responsible for the project administration, im-plementation and technical support.

11.2 Concept and methodology of the reoriented Project

11.2.1 General project concept

The future intention should be, supported by the FD and the KWS, to involve the localcommunities in managing and developing the Mt. Kenya Forest Reserve. This new partici-patory forest management strategy can be characterized by the term “sharing of benefitsand responsibilities”. It should be envisaged that the local communities are fully integratedin sustainable forest management. On the other side they should take over responsibilitiesconcerning forest conservation, development and controlled utilization. The annual forestexploitation rate should be defined and fixed in appropriate forest management plans (for-est working plans).

In addition to the introduction of a controlled and legal exploitation and development systemof the Mt. Kenya Forest Reserve, some complementary measures should be considered:

• increase the wood production inside the Forest reserve by promoting natural regenera-tion/enrichment planting and avoiding damage to the existing trees;

• increase of wood production outside the Forest Reserve by supporting private house-holds to raise tree seedlings and to establish woodlots;

• contribute to generate alternative income opportunities for the illegal forest users;• improve silvi-pasture management;• strengthen the self-help capacity of the local population;• strengthen the efficiency of the concerned managers of Mt. Kenya Forest Reserve.



Project area:The whole Mt. Kenya Forest Reserve, including the forest and agroforestry plantations shallbe regarded as Project area. Conservation and management of Mt. Kenya Forest Reserveis closely linked with the people and land use systems outside the Forest Reserve. There-fore, an adequately wide belt around the Forest Reserve should be included into the Projectarea.

Project title:Stressing that it is very important to include the forest and agroforestry plantations for theconservation and protection of the indigenous forests of Mt. Kenya, the project title shouldbe: "Conservation and Management of Mt. Kenya Forest Reserve".

Project duration:The project is designed for a period of another 10 years, from January 1998 to December2007. It shall be carried out in three phases:

Phase I: 1998 to 2001 (4 years)

Phase II: 2002 to 2005 (4 years)

Phase III: 2006 to 2007 (2 years; handing over phase)

The following planning refers to Phase I (1998 - 2001).

Project implementing agency:The FD and the KWS have the official mandate of managing the Mt. Kenya Forest Reserve.However, experience has shown that the FD is hardly operational because of two majorreasons:

• the FD has not got enough operational funds to run its administration properly. Thoughquite substantial revenues were collected from the Mt. Kenya Region, the FD could notcontribute to the running expenses of COMIFOR Project; this situation will probably notchange in the near future;

• long and therefore time consuming administrative procedures prevent an efficient or-ganization, planning and implementation of the urgently required conservation and man-agement measures.

The FD has a bad reputation within the local communities, and it is not flexible enough toquickly change its policy and introduce the urgently needed participatory approach, in orderto get the local communities as partner in forest protection.

In future an independent Forest Conservation and Management Unit of Mt. Kenya ForestReserve (FCMU) shall be established to avoid the dependence of heavy, rather inflexible,time consuming and not operational administrations. Until this Unit is established, the Proj-ect shall be managed by a Consultant of a NGO/Institution/Consortium under the supervi-sion of the MoU Secretariat, but in a rather independent and autonomous way.

11.2.2 Some explanations and justifications

11.2.2.1 Forest Conservation and Management Unit (FCMU)

The actual management of Mt. Kenya Forest Reserve should be carried out in the long runby an independent and autonomous Forest Conservation and Management Unit (FCMU).



This unit can be formed by any type of organization (e.g. cooperative, NGO, private or stateown enterprise) which has to be acknowledged by the state. The management of the ForestReserve should be done based on a Forest Management Agreement between the FCMUand the FD and a Wildlife Agreement with KWS. The Forest Management Agreementshould regulate and specify in detail all forest management activities. It will contain the con-ditions to be fulfilled by the FCMU (e.g. reporting, people participation, revenue distribution,management systems and technologies to be applied, lease rate and royalty payments,etc.) and the commitments and tasks of the FD (e.g. lease period, periodic evaluation, ex-ternal control, etc.). The basic documents attached to the Forest Management Agreementwill be a framework plan in which the strategy and approach of future management will beoutlined in detail. Long-term forest management plans on forest station level elaboratedjointly by the FCMU and the FD in participation with the local people and other involvedstakeholders will prescribe forest management activities in detail and regulate sustainableuse and yield of forest products. The Forest Management Agreement should be a legaldocument or contract between the FCMU and the FD and in case of conflicts which cannotbe solved among both parties, public courts should handle the problem. It is envisaged, thatthe FCMU is controlled by a supervisory board consisting of members of the FD, KWS, localpeople, local administration, local NGOs, international NGOs and - if financially supported -by the donor and others. The management of the Forest Reserve by a FCMU has the ad-vantage that it can operate independently from a public budget and short-term policies andas such management can be carried out more effective. The task of the FD will concentrateon control, law enforcement, supervision and technical assistance. This will reduce the costfor the government, and on the other hand increase the revenues from fees and royalties bymore effective management. By separating the responsibilities of management and lawenforcement, conservation and control will become much more efficient. It is proposed, thatthe already existing infrastructure of the forest stations, including qualified and capablestaff, is taken over by the FCMU. It should be the task of the Project to elaborate the regu-lative, organizational and administrative framework required for the management of Mt.Kenya Forest Reserve by an independent FCMU. During a transition period, managementshould be implemented by an autonomous Project.

11.2.2.2 Integration of plantations

At present all the construction timber required by the local population and the industries (i.e.altogether about 150 sawmills) around Mt. Kenya comes from the about 20,000 ha of plan-tations within the Forest Reserve together with a substantial amount of fence posts, polesand firewood. The livelihood of local farmers depends, especially in the northwest, largelyfrom the shamba system. The plantations within the Forest Reserve are of various sizesand age classes and they are usually of bad quality due to animal damage and lack oftending. The present production rate of the plantations is fairly below its potential due topoor management.

The PriceWaterhouse study proposes to reorganize the management of the plantations inKenya by confining it to a state-owned enterprise or a parastatal organization. Any changein the supply of wood products on the local market from plantations has a direct effect onthe indigenous forests. As the demand on wood remains the same or will even increase, areduction in the timber and wood supply from plantations will be substituted by wood har-vested and collected (legally and illegally) from the surrounding indigenous forests and assuch increase the degradation process in the accessible forest areas. On the other hand anincreased production of the plantations by improved and more intensive plantation man-agement will reduce the already high pressure on the indigenous forests. Furthermore, thereduction of the shamba system (as consequence of the reorganization of the plantationmanagement) would have a direct effect on the local farmers and result in social conflictsand increase the danger of illegal activities.



The reorganization of the management of plantations in Kenya by confining it to a state-owned enterprise or a parastatal organization is definitely a good solution for large planta-tions that are not linked with indigenous forests. However, a separation of the responsibili-ties in the management of plantations and indigenous forests within the same location (i.e.Mt. Kenya Forest Reserve) would create a lot of socio-economic problems and make sus-tainable management of indigenous forests very difficult, because the supply of the localmarket with timber products would be to a large degree out of the hands of the decisionmakers (i.e. FCMU Mt. Kenya). The idea to manage Mt. Kenya Forest Reserve as a wholeincluding plantations by an independent and autonomous FCMU follows the idea of Price-Waterhouse to enable profitability by improving the plantation management. It does notseem to be necessary that all plantations within Kenya are managed by only one company.If profitability, self-reliance and sustainability as well as the development of socio-economicconditions in rural areas are the guiding principles, competent local organizations (compa-nies), communities or/and private persons should be made responsible for the plantationmanagement.

11.2.2.3 Plantation/Shamba System

Without anticipating final solutions that should be developed in a participatory way includingall stakeholders, some basic ideas are developed below to show that possibilities of partici-patory forest management are given.

The management of plantations within the Mt. Kenya Forest Reserve could be done in dif-ferent ways depending on the particular situation of each plantation block. Some plantationscould be managed directly by the FCMU, others may be leased out to local industries basedon management plans and controlled by the FCMU. Another innovative approach would beto further develop the shamba system to a small scale plantation scheme managed fully bythe shamba farmer. For a better understanding, this idea is briefly described below:

The shamba farmer should get the exclusive user right of the plantation and is responsiblefor planting, tending, weeding, thinning, protection from animal damage and harvesting.This user right is linked to particular conditions which have to be fulfilled by the farmer oth-erwise the right will be withdrawn. This conditions will be specified in a plantation manage-ment agreement (which will be a legal document or contract) between the individual farmerand the FCMU. This Agreement will furthermore specify the responsibilities and tasks ofboth parties. It will be the task of the FCMU to provide technical assistance to the farmer, tosupervise and control management (fulfillment of contract conditions), to assist in marketingof plantation products and to collect royalties, production and lease fees. It is estimated thata plantation area of about 3 - 5 ha would be sufficient for a farmer family to produce agri-cultural crops for subsistence use (annual agricultural area 1 acre, production of agriculturalcrops 3 - 4 years on the same area, rotation period of plantation 30 years) and to have afairly good income from the sale of plantation products such as timber, poles, fence postsand firewood. Under the conservative assumption that the average annual increment of aplantation is about 10 cbm per ha (PriceWaterhouse calculated with 20 cbm per ha!), afarmer could harvest about 40 cbm of timber per year once the plantation scheme is set up.Out of these 40 cbm about 30 cbm could be sold as timber. To make it more efficient, theshamba farmers could organize themselves in management groups (cooperatives) in orderto create a minimum annual plantation size and to get minimum annual timber harvestquantities for better sales. It should be the task of the Project to develop and test this sys-tem and to elaborate the legal and administrative framework.

The small scale management of plantations has many positive effects, for instance:

• permanent protection from animal damage as the farmers are permanently engaged inthe same location (they need to protect their crops from animals anyhow);



• increased production of plantation as farmer can implement tending, weeding and thin-ning in off-farming season;

• meet the increased local demand on firewood, fence posts and poles from plantationthinning, as these products will be an intermediate production target of the whole planta-tion scheme; this will reduce the pressure on indigenous forests;

• increased income for the government out of lease fees, production fees and royaltiesthrough increased production.

11.2.2.4 Participatory Forest Management Concept

The participatory forest management concept will be described in detail in the long-termframework plan. The framework plan will be the basic document on which the Forest Man-agement Agreement will be issued. As such it has to describe in detail the strategy and theapproach to be applied in order to manage and conserve Mt. Kenya Forest Reserve in asustainable way. While the details of forest management (e.g. where to produce what andwhen) are dealt with in the individual long-term forest management plans on station level,the participatory forest management concept outlined in the framework plan will answer allrelevant questions (e.g. how to do what and who does it when) on the aspects of: institu-tional development and organization, land classification and zonation, management of in-digenous forests and plantations, community development and it will also include a financialand economic analysis. It will furthermore outline the responsibilities of the differentstakeholders (FCMU, local people, FD, KWS, MoU Secretariat, NGOs etc.) and describeplanning, reporting, monitoring and evaluation, internal and external control, the requiredlegal arrangements, finance and auditing, administration and organization, benefit sharing,etc. The forest management concept should be elaborated in a participative way involvingall relevant stakeholders and representatives of the local communities.

11.3 Overall goal, project purpose, outputs and activities

A realistically achievable project target is that "Mt. Kenya Forest Reserve is conserved by aparticipatory, integrated and sustainable management of indigenous forests and plantationsand their associated biodiversity". By obtaining this target, the project would significantlycontribute to the “Welfare of the Kenyan population enhanced through natural resourcesmanagement and conservation of Mt. Kenya Forest Reserve” which can be regarded as theoverall goal.

The following goal, project purposes, results and activities have been jointly worked outduring a ZOPP workshop held at KEFRI/Muguga between September 22 and 23, 1997, in-volving participants from FD (HQ and field staff), KWS, MoU Secretariat, members of localcommunities, AMKO, KEFRI, NGO (AWF), and other projects (GTZ and KFFP/FINNIDA):

Overall goal:Welfare of the Kenyan population enhanced through natural resources management andconservation of Mt. Kenya Forest Reserve.

Project purpose (1998 - 2008):Mt. Kenya Forest Reserve conserved by a participatory, integrated and sustainable man-agement of indigenous forests and plantations and their associated biodiversity.

Objectively Verifiable Indicators:

• By 2007, interest groups (communities) from more than 50% of the forest adjacent loca-tions and sub-locations of Mt. Kenya Forest Reserve have concluded forest management



agreements with the FCMU and started managing respective parts of Mt. Kenya ForestReserve together with the responsible Forest Conservation and Management Unit(FCMU) according to forest management plans

• No application for excision after the year 2000• At least 10% of all cases of illegal activities within Mt. Kenya Forest Reserve are arrested

by or with assistance from local communities.

Interim project purpose (1998 - 2001):Replicable model of participatory, integrated and sustainable forest management for the in-digenous forests and plantations of Mt. Kenya Forest Reserve elaborated and tested.

Objectively Verifiable Indicators:

• Basic information on appropriate management objectives for the Mt. Kenya Forest Re-serve are available at the end of 2001

• Standard frame agreement for community-based integrated forest management elabo-rated by end 1999

• At least 15 communities express interest in cooperating with the Project concerning par-ticipatory and integrated forest management of Mt. Kenya Forest Reserve by the end2000

Output 1:

Participatory forest management concept for indigenous forests and plantationsjointly elaborated.Objectively Verifiable Indicators:

• Representatives of at least 10 different communities of the pilot areas participate inelaborating a participatory forest management concept

• At least 50% of the location and sub-locations within the pilot areas participate in refiningthe zonation plan

• At least 10 different communities agree to the defined benefit and responsibility sharingsystem, and to the forestry products pricing scheme

• At least 50% of the involved communities consent to sign the elaborated Agreement onjoint forest management

• In more than 80 % of the involved communities at least 20% women are among themembers

• Frame plan drafted and submitted to the concerned authorities for approval• From year 2000 onwards 20 Shamba farmers per year sign agreement concerning

plantation management

Activities:

1.1 Define management principles and objectives for Mt. Kenya Forest Reserve

1.2 Elaborate a frame plan for forest conservation and management of Mt. Kenya region,including refining the zonation plan, institutional aspects, legal framework, economicaspects, control mechanisms, impacts to communities and other sectors, etc.

1.3 Develop an approach of identifying and communicating/negotiating between imple-menting agencies and communities interested in integrated and participatory forestmanagement

1.4 Elaborate small scale plantations schemes to be managed by Shamba farmers (~ 5ha)

1.5 Work out jointly a system of sharing responsibility and benefits between communitiesand the project



1.6 Investigate how to guarantee the integration of women’s interests in the concept, itstesting and implementation

1.7 Work out a price and organization scheme for issuing forest exploitation licenses (tim-ber and non-timber forest products)

1.8 Elaborate model agreements on joint forest management

1.9 Jointly define contents of participatory forest management plans

1.10 Elaborate a methodology for the elaboration of participatory forest management plans

Output 2:

Silviculture systems compatible to multiple use forest management developed andpromoted.Objectively Verifiable Indicators:

• Silvicultural recommendations for different forest types elaborated together with thecommunities up to the end of 2000

• Silvicultural recommendations implemented by communities (women + men) andFCMU/Mt. Kenya on trial basis by 12/2000

• Commonly accepted silvicultural recommendations are integrated in all participatory for-est management plans by 12/2000

Activities:

2.1 Elaborate silvicultural principles for indigenous forests and plantations

2.2 Elaborate silvicultural guidelines for different forest management objectives

2.3 Study and describe naturally occurring forest types and the respective site factors

2.4 Develop/adapt and promote methods of efficient natural and artificial regeneration

2.5 Develop/adapt and promote improved nursery techniques for indigenous tree species

2.6 Initiate the elaboration of growth models and rotation periods for principal tree species

2.7 Set up and monitor experimental plots for silvicultural, ecological and economic as-sessments including biodiversity

Output 3:

FCMU/Mt. Kenya field staff is qualified to communicate with forest adjacent communi-ties and to support them in planning and implementing forestry and forest relatedmeasures.Objectively Verifiable Indicators:

• More than 50% of the relevant FCMU staff trained in participatory extension methods(PEM) until 12/1998

• 100% of the relevant FCMU staff trained in participatory extension methods (PEM) until12/1999

• At least 10 communities within pilot area request for advice and support by extensionstaff until 12/1999

Activities:

3.1 Assess the actual skills and training needs

3.2 Identify existing and additionally needed training facilities and resources

3.3 Improve existing and develop new training programs (including required training mate-rial)



3.4 Select capable staff

3.5 Organize training of selected FCMU staff

3.6 Establish close cooperation links with extension staff from other sectors, especiallyagriculture

3.7 Facilitate FCMU staff to perform their duties

3.8 Monitor and evaluate training programs

Output 4:

Integrated forest management involving local communities tested in 2 to 3 pilot areas.Objectively Verifiable Indicators:

• At least 10 communities within pilot areas established an appropriate structure for jointforest management until 12/1999

• At least 5 communities started managing part of Mt. Kenya Forest Reserve together withFCMU/Mt. Kenya according to forest management plan by 12/2000

• The FCMU/Mt. Kenya is taking into account the interests of relevant groups within thecommunity

• Forest management plans approved• Forest management plans assign precise roles, obligations and benefits to communities

and interest/action groups within the community

Activities:

4.1 Select interested communities within the pilot areas

4.2 Support communities in setting up community based forest development committees

4.3 Jointly define interests of the communities to be involved

4.4 Jointly select an intervention area for each concerned community

4.5 Jointly conduct specific surveys/forest inventories of the selected intervention area inrespect of the community's interest

4.6 Jointly elaborate maps of the intervention areas and the surroundings

4.7 Jointly elaborate forest management plans together with the concerned communities

4.8 Assist and support communities in forest management, including training of commu-nity members

4.9 Jointly monitor and evaluate the implementation

Output 5:

Self-help capacity of local population strengthened.Objectively Verifiable Indicators:

• 10% of the revenue of the self-help groups are invested by end of 2000 in communitydevelopment activities

• Contribution of local population to village development measures increased at 20% bythe end of 2000

• Total number of self-help micro projects and natural resources management activities in-creased at 10% per year

• By the end of this phase, 10 women groups established and engaged in micro projectsand/or general women promotion activities conducted in at least 5 communities



Activities:

5.1 Support efforts of local communities and NGOs in protecting forests of Mt. Kenya

5.2 Identify interest groups and individuals interested in participating in forest conserva-tion

5.3 Assess training needs for relevant groups and individuals (men and women)

5.4 Facilitate project relevant training

5.5 Make information available for women and men in the local language

5.6 Facilitate exchange of experience between communities

5.7 Support problem awareness and solution identification through PRA and follow upmeasures

5.8 Contribute to social and physical infrastructure development and other activities initi-ated by communities

5.9 Facilitate the organization of women’s groups and support them

5.10 Assist in income generating schemes (eco-tourism, bee-keeping, fish ponds, etc.)

Output 6:

An autonomous, decentralized unit for the management of Mt. Kenya Forest Reserve(FCMU/Mt. Kenya) is set up and efficiently managed.Objectively Verifiable Indicators:

• New ToR of Project Steering Committee and proposal for restructuring elaborated andsubmitted by 6/1998

• Statutes and organizational structure of FCMU/Mt. Kenya elaborated and submitted by6/1999

• Registering FCMU/Mt. Kenya by 12/2001, otherwise the support of the donor to the proj-ect may be terminated

• Lease Agreement drafted and submitted for approval by 12/2000

• Supervising Board of FCMU/Mt. Kenya established by 12/2001

• M&E system established by 12/2001

Activities:

6.1 Restructure the Project Steering Committee to improve its efficiency and decisionmaking authority of all administrative and technical matters concerning the manage-ment of Mt. Kenya Forest Reserve

6.2 Draw and sign an Agreement between FD and KWS in establishment of FCMU

6.3 Elaborate an organizational structure of an autonomous Forest Conservation andManagement Unit of Mt. Kenya Forest Reserve (FCMU/Mt. Kenya)

6.4 Elaborate official statutes and articles for FCMU/Mt. Kenya

6.5 Get officially and legally FCMU/Mt. Kenya registered

6.6 Elaborate an Agreement (Lease Agreement) to be signed between FD, KWS andFCMU/Mt. Kenya concerning the integrated and participatory management of Mt.Kenya Forest Reserve

6.7 Set up an efficient autonomous management structure and organization of FCMU/Mt.Kenya

6.8 Install a transparent accounting system

6.9 Support FD and KWS to establish a control system for FCMU forestry activities



6.10 Train management staff of FCMU/Mt. Kenya in management skills

6.11 Provision for operational funds

6.12 Support the establishment of a Supervisory Board of the FCMU/Mt. Kenya with repre-sentatives of KWS, FD, local authorities, FCMU/Mt. Kenya and others

6.13 Support the Supervisory Board in monitoring and evaluating FCMU/Mt. Kenya activi-ties

6.14 Carry out the project activities through MoU Secretariat until the FCMU is set up.

11.4 Conformity with the Kenya Forestry Master Plan

The Project proposal is completely conform with the main elements of the new Kenya For-estry Master Plan 1995 to 2020 which will be soon enforced as official Kenya Forestry Pol-icy. The most relevant statements of the Kenya Forestry Master Plan are cited below:

Excerpt of the Kenya Forestry Master Plan 1995 - 2020:1.2 Forest plantations on public land: Their management should be efficient, self-supporting, profit-oriented and, in the long run, revenue earning, so that they can con-tribute to supporting essential non-profit forest activities, such as forest conservation.

1.3 Indigenous forests, woodlands and bushlands. All gazetted indigenous forests,woodlands, bushlands and mangroves should remain gazetted. They will be managed bystate-approved agencies. The management of indigenous forests should be supported,as much as possible, by revenues generated in such commercial activities as plantationforestry.

Innovative forms of indigenous forest management should be introduced on an experi-mental basis, including particularly those models that empower the rural communities toconserve the indigenous forests on state land and use them in a sustainable way.

1.5 General management principles. In all circumstances, the forest resources will bemanaged in a sustainable manner with due regard to environmental conservation. As-pects of wildlife management should be incorporated into forestry practices by estab-lishing and strengthening appropriate inter-agency linkages.

The desired approach is mainly derived from social and economic considerations, i.e.from the realization of the fact that traditional centralized, state-led forest managementsystems as principal management models have not been successful anywhere in theworld. They must therefore be replaced with economically more efficient, decentralizedinstitutions.

2.3 Rural emphasis. Forest industries located in rural areas should be developedsince they contribute to rural economy. They should be promoted by investment incen-tives.

3.1 Improving the efficiency of forest management. The Forest Department willconcentrate on policy matters, forest regulation, and monitoring of the performance of thevarious executing bodies in the forestry sector. The management of the Forest Estate,both for production and conservation, will increasingly be entrusted to private or publicenterprises, tree farmers and communities.

The medium-term aim is to use the best available means to create an efficient forestryenterprise which is also responsible, directly or through management agreements withother suitable agencies, enterprises, community organizations or individuals, indirectly,for the management of industrial plantations and indigenous forests on public land. As afirst step, the best economic agent, capable of the required investment performance andpublic accountability, which guarantees gradual lessening of the financial burden on thegovernment budget should be established as soon as possible.



While creating a self-supporting management structure which covers the industrial plan-tations and indigenous forests on public land, the government will permanently maintainthe highest forestry authority.

3.3 Funding of non-profit forestry activities. The mandate of the forest managementorganization responsible for commercial plantation forestry will include revenue genera-tion for the funding of such non-profit priority forestry activities as conservation for biodi-versity and watershed management as well as forestry research and education, fromfunds which are generated by profit generating operations.

3.4 NGOs and professional associations. The State will actively encourage and sup-port NGOs undertaking forest related development activities especially on the local level.

4.3 Gender issues. Special attention will be given to the support of women in promo-tion of forest management, training of professional and technical forestry personnel, for-est conservation through participation, and funding of farm forestry. Linkages betweenestablished women's groups and forestry extension should be vigorously promoted.

4.4 Forestry research will be promoted as the basis for sustainable development andmanagement of forest resources.

4.5 Education and training in forestry will be promoted. The mandate of forestry ex-tension will be expanded to cover fully not only the needs of farmers involved in treegrowing but also those of the communities sharing an interest in indigenous forest man-agement, as well as those involved in industrial wood production.

Building-up of awareness of forest conservation, management and utilization issues willbe supported and intensified among the general public, and the teaching of forestry inprimary and secondary schools promoted.

4.7 Ecotourism in indigenous forests is an increasingly important forestry activitywhich should be promoted for the benefit to the local population and the raising revenuefor forest conservation, while minimum environmental damage should be ensured.

11.5 Important assumptions

The following important assumptions have to be met:

• Necessary policy adjustments are adapted.• Other organizations put emphasis on conservation of natural resources in the area.• Political and administrative regulations allow an autonomous management of Mt. Kenya

Forest Reserve.• Administrative regulations allow the establishment of a revolving fund.• The legal framework allows sustainable utilization and management of Mt. Kenya Forest

Reserve involving local community.• Agreements between local communities and authorities regarding natural resources

management will be recognized and respected by all concerned actors.• Trained staff remains available for project implementation.• Stability of project staff is ensured.• Budgetary requirements and equipment are available at required time.

11.6 Cooperation with other projects, institutions, NGOs and donors

The success of the project depends largely on the cooperation with a variety of other do-nors, projects and NGOs. The most important donors/organizations/projects are WB, otherEU funded projects, GTZ, Royal Embassy of the Netherlands, FINNIDA, KEFRI, Universi-



ties, Forestry Training Institutes, NMK, AMKO, AWF, IUCN, East African Wildlife Society,East African Natural History Society and others. It is particularly important to link up withGTZ project supporting MoU Secretariat and FINNIDA strengthening the Planning and De-velopment Division of FD.

11.7 Contributions

The project should be mainly promoted and financed by the contributions of EC and GoK.Considering the nature of this participatory oriented project, it is evident that the cooperationof the local population and relevant NGOs is necessary in order to achieve the plannedProject Purpose.

11.7.1 EC contributions

11.7.1.1 Description of contributions

It is recommended by the Project Evaluation Mission that the European Union makes thefollowing contributions to the implementation of the coming phase of the project:

• Secondment of advisors:

◊ one long-term expert in forest planning and management and at the same time asproject coordinator for up to 4 years

◊ one long-term expert in community participation for up to 4 years◊ international short-term experts to undertake special tasks in well defined subjects

where highly qualified and specialized experience is demanded for up to 10 ex-pert/months

◊ national short term experts, especially in the field of training, for up to 20 ex-pert/months

• Provide local experts

◊ for a total of up to 240 experts/months (5 community development agents for 4 years)

• Supply material and equipment:

◊ transport means and facilities◊ office equipment◊ forestry tools, instruments and material◊ material for training and advisory services◊ communication◊ goods for strengthening of self-help capacities

• Make available funds to contribute to finance:

◊ one project office at Mt. Kenya region◊ the operating and running costs of transport means◊ rent of special machinery◊ the cost of training◊ the printing and distribution of manuals◊ the cost of seminars and workshops◊ local auxiliary personnel (secretary, drivers, etc.)◊ evaluation and audits

Details will be specified in a plan of operations and in annual work plans.



11.7.1.2 Cost estimate of EC contributions

ECU

1. Infrastructure 80,000• Project office 50,000

• Rehabilitation of existing stations 30,000

2. Equipment and material 220,000• Vehicles 50,000

• Motorbikes and bicycles 30,000

• Office equipment and material 20,000

• Forest equipment and material 20,000

• Training equipment 10,000

• Communication 30,000

• Goods for strengthening of self-help capacities 60,000

3. Running costs 540,000• Office running costs including preparation of training

and extension manuals and costs of workshops30,000

• Transport means 120,000

• Rent of special machinery 40,000

• Local personnel and labor 60,000

• Community development agents including women indevelopment adviser

50,000

• Studies and local short term experts 80,000

• Support of self-help capacities 160,000

4. Training of Counterparts (lumpsum) 20,000

5. Technical assistance 1,150,000• Expert for forest planning and management 40 m/m 500,000

• Expert for community participation 40 m/m 500,000

• International short term consultancies 10 m/m 150,000

6. Evaluation (1) and audits (4) 80,000

7. Contingencies 210,000

Grand Total 2,300,000



11.7.2 Kenyan contributions

The Government of the Republic of Kenya shall make the following contributions to the im-plementation of the project::

• KWS and FD shall make available to the project all needed material, equipment, instru-ments, etc., if available within KWS and/or FD;

• adapt existing laws and regulations as necessary for the project implementation;• enable forestry and KWS staff concerned with Mt. Kenya Forest Reserve to cooperate

with the project and the FCMU;• charge FD/KWS/MoU for the supervision of the project until an autonomous body

(FCMU) is set up;• coordinate the project with other agencies of relevance to implementation, in particular

with the local administrations and research institutions;• make available the necessary premises and offices for the project;• ensure all other provisions of contributions required for the implementation of the project

that are not covered by EU contributions.

11.7.3 Other contributions

The smooth carrying out of the planned project does not depend on other contributions thenthose of EC and GoK. However, the contributions of other organizations, like state or para-statal organizations, NGOs, other donors and/or other projects, are welcome if they are aptto promote the project in order to achieve the Project Purpose and the Overall Goal.



12. Lessons learnedThe COMIFOR Project is a good example for the importance of the "Project Cycle Man-agement" procedure which is now standard for all new projects.

The lack of a sound problem analysis elaborated together with all relevant participants, hascreated a lot of problems for the Project. Especially the need for a participatory approachwas never clear understood and supported, neither by the Project itself nor by the imple-menting agency, the Forest Department of Kenya. Together with the lack of a consistentplanning (different formulation of objectives, purpose, results in the Financial Agreement, inthe ToR of the Technical Assistance and in the project's own planning) which gave room fora lot of interpretation, it was and is very difficult for the donor agency to control and steerthe project's activities and to act early enough in order to avoid mismanagement and projectfailure. A proper project planning (logical framework or ZOPP), followed by an operationalplanning which determines the time horizon for the individual activities as well as the re-quired inputs in terms of technical assistance, finance and material, would allow a propercontrol and would make it necessary for the TA to explain and justify properly if the plan canbe fulfilled. Also the conceptual weakness of the project could have been avoided, if projectplanning would have been done properly.

If a project is designed to be complementary to another project (of another donor) or proj-ects, it needs to be clearly determined who does what and when and this needs to be fixedin a Memorandum of Understanding. If one project is terminated early or cannot come upwith its results in time, a reorientation of the project is necessary which has to be done by alogical framework or ZOPP workshop, involving all relevant projects and participants.

In future, more attention should be paid to the selection of the experts. Especially when itcomes to a participatory approach it is necessary, that the selected experts are particularlyqualified and have sufficient professional experience in this field. This refers not so much tothe technical qualification rather than to the conceptual and social capacity of the expert. Itis also important that the timing of the services of the experts is well coordinated.

The strengthening of an institution or an organization should never be regarded and imple-mented as being an end in itself. All support provided should always be in context with theproject purpose, and the effects of the provision of financial support (delivery of materialand the payment of allowances) need to be carefully analyzed before with special consid-eration of its economic impact.

The effectiveness and the efficiency of a project can be considerably increased if the allo-cation of funds is not channeled via the whole bureaucratic procedures. This applies espe-cially for projects with an innovative approach (people's participation), which are not yet fullysupported by the whole government administration. EDF regulations provide some possibili-ties of project sponsoring. In the present case a "framework contract" or the establishmentof a "twinning arrangement" between KWS and FD on the one side and a consulting firm orNGO on the other side, seems to guarantee a smooth project execution (M. Candotti, Advi-sor to the NAO).

mid-term evaluation of the edf-financed conservation and management of indigenous...

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