4d

Topic Facts Issue Held

1. Abuan v. People

2. People v. Tira

3. Ramirez v. Dir. Of Lands

4. Rep. v. Hon. Vera

5. People v. Torres

6. Ramos v. Dir. Of Lands

constructive possession

7. Rep. v. IAC

8. Bogo Medellin v. CA

9. Cequene v. Bolante

10. Ong v. Republic

Petitioner Charles Ong in behalf of his brothers filed for an application of Registration of Title over Lot 15911.Ong alleged that his brothers and him are the co-owners of the land, which they purchase from the spouses Tony Bautista and Alicia Villamil. And they and their predecessor in interest have been in Open, peaceful, and continuous possession of the lot in the concept of owners for more than 30 years.Only respondent Republic of the Phil represented by the OSG, opposed the application for registration.Respondents contend that:Neither the applicants nor their predecessor in interest have been in open continuous exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the lot since June 12, 1945 or earlier.The trial court favored petitioner Ong and declared the land in the name of the applicant. Respondent appealed before the Court of Appeals and the appellate court reversed the trial court’s ruling.

WON petitioner together with his brothers have registrable ownership over the real property subject matter?

The SC held in this case that although there is no question that the land has been declared as alienable and disposable. Possession alone is not sufficient to acquire title to alienable lands of the public domain because the law requires possession and occupation. Taken together with the words open, continuous, exclusive and notorious the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify his possession must not be a mere fiction.Actual possession of a land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such nature as a party would naturally exercises over his own property.Petitioners admitted that after they bought the said lot neither of them actually occupied the lot. No improvements were made thereon and the most that they did was just to visit on several occasions.The burden of proof in land registration cases rest on the applicant who must show CLEAR/POSITIVE/CONVINCING evidence that his alleged possession and occupation of the land is of the nature and duration required by law.Unfortunately, petitioner’s evidence do not constitute the “well-nigh incontrovertible” evidence necessary in cases of this nature.

11. Escritor v. IAC Petitioner Escritor registered a parcel of land and was able WON petitioners Escritor No. As Art 534 of the Civil Code explicitly provides, " One who

to secure a title over it.Respondent Acuna, filed a petition for review of the adjudication of the lot to Escritor contending that it was obtained by claimant Escritor through fraud and misrepresentation.After 13yrs,the trial court rendered a decision in favor of Acuna ordering petitioners Escritor to vacate the land.

After 4 yrs, respondent Acuna filed a complaint for recovery of damages against petitioners for the coconut fruits benefitted by the latter unlawfully for thirteen years.

be liable for damages succeeds by hereditary title shall not suffer the consequences of the wrongful possession of the decedent, if it is shown that he was aware of the flaws afffecting it;"

The reason for this article is that bad faith is personal and instransmissible. Its effects must, therefore, be suffered only by the person who acted in bad faith; his heir should not be saddled or burdened with such consequences.

Under Art 527 of the Civil Code, " good faith is always presumed, and upon him who alleges bad faith on the part of the possessor rest the burden of proof. If no evidence is presented proving bad faith, like in this case, the presumption is good faith remains"

A view of the record, however, does not indicate the existence of any such fraud (of Escritor's predecessors to Acuna ). It was respondent Acuna failed to prove fraud and bad faith on the part of petitioners.

We sustain the trial court's finding that petitioners were possessors in good faith and should, therefore, not be held liable for damages.

Art. 526 of the Civil Code provides that " he is deemed a possessor in good faith who is not aware that there exist in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.

12. Roman Catholic Church v. Familiar

13. Mun. Of Moncada v. Cajuigan

The municipality Moncada and defendant entered into a contract of lease whereby the plaintiff leased to defendant certain fishponds situated within the jurisdiction of the municipality for term embracing July 1, 1908 to June 30, 1909, for which the defendant agreed to pay a rental of P3,710. By virtue of this lease, defendant took possession of the fishponds and forthwith began placing therein nets, corrals and other accessories necessary for the conduct of a fishery. The lessee failed to pay the rentals on time, but he was allowed extensions. Defendant was later forcibly evicted from the fishponds by plaintiff. This action was brought to collect damages for the breach by the defendant of the contract of lease. Defendant in turn asks for damages for the forcible ejectment.

The lease failed to comply with the provisions of the contract of lease. The lessor had thereafter a right to have the contract rescinded. If the plaintiff had gone to court and prayed for a rescission of the contract, he could have no doubt obtained not only this relief but also a judgment for the amount of the rents during the time the lessee occupied the premises, together with penalties, interest, costs, and for the forfeiture of deposits. The plaintiff did not, however, apply to the courts for this redress, but attempted to rescind the contract itself by forcibly ejecting the lessee, who has in peaceable and quiet possession. The lessee, on the other hand, did not obtain nor seek a re-entry to the premises. Consequently, the plaintiff must be held responsible in damages for its illegal acts in forcibly ejecting the lessee, but such damages must be limited to the simple trespass. Thus, defendant is entitled to recover for all the necessary and natural consequences of the plaintiff’s illegal act,

which in this case, according to the proof, amounts to P210, this being the value of the corrals, etc. placed upon the leased premises by the lessee and appropriated by the plaintiff.

14. Rockville Excel Int'l v. Oligario Culla

15. Heirs of Arzadon- Crisologo v. Ranon

The case involved a parcel of unregistered residential lot in a barangay up north originally declared for tax purposes in the name of Paeng. On May 2, 1936, Paeng sold the land to a childless couple, Tomas and Matilde who built their conjugal home thereon. Residing with the couple in said house was Tomas’ sister Tina. Since the couple died without any issue, the siblings of Tomas, Tina and Tibo acquired successional rights over the property.

But Tina and Tibo did not take any action to have the said property adjudicated in their favor. When Tibo also died without any known heir the property was left solely in favor of Tina who had two daughters Lina and Maura. Even with the death of Tina, Lina and Maura did not take any concrete action in exercising their successional rights over the property, although Bernie, the son of Maura, continued to live in the property.

Sometime in 1947, the spouses Tino and Pinang also started staying in the property according to Bernie himself. Then in 1962, Tino declared the subject property in his name for taxation purposes. Thus the tax declaration which was still in the name of Tomas was cancelled and a new tax declaration was issued in the name of Tino who paid the corresponding taxes thereon. In subsequent years, upon the death of Tino, Pinang declared the same in her name for taxation purposes and paid the corresponding taxes thereon. In 1977, Pinang even mortgaged the property with the PNB. It was only by this time or on August 31, 1977 when Lina finally executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim and Notice of Ownership and made known to others their supposed successional rights over the property. Except for this adverse claim nothing has been done by Lina or Maura or their children.

Was the MCTC correct? No. The notice of adverse claim filed by Lina in 1977 is nothing more than a notice of claim which did not effectively interrupt or toll the running of the prescriptive period. Under the Civil Code (Article 1123) the interruption that tolls the running of the period is the filing of the complaint or civil action against the possessor and his receipt of the judicial summons. Moreover even with the receipt of the judicial summons, the running of the period of prescription is not interrupted if the summons is void for lack of legal solemnities; if the plaintiff should desist or allow the proceedings to lapse ; or if the possessor should be absolved from the complaint (Article 1124).

Hence the Notice of Adverse claim cannot take the place of judicial summons which produces the civil interruption provided by law because there remains, as yet, a necessity for judicial determination of its validity in a civil action filed for that purpose. In this case, no action was in fact filed by Lina and Maura or their heirs against Pinang and her children. As a consequence no judicial summons was received by Pinang or her heirs.

Nothing was done by the heirs of Lina and Maura from the time their predecessors in interest died. It was only in 1977 when they attempted to call the attention of Pinang and her children which did not even operate as an interruption on the latter’s possession. From 1962 to the time they filed the complaint before the MCTC in 1995 and until the present time, Pinang and her children occupied the property without interruption in the concept of an owner thereby acquiring ownership via extraordinary acquisitive prescription. Plainly the heirs of Lina and Maura slept on their rights. The law comes to the succor only of the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights.

Pinang and her children on the other hand continued to stay in the house until 1985 when fire gutted the property and they had to transfer to Manila. Even then they continued to exercise acts of dominion over the property by visiting and looking after it and paying the taxes thereon. Later on, one of Pinang’s daughter learned that a tax declaration was already issued in the name of still another person who apparently bought the property from the heirs of Lina and Maura.

Hence on October 18, 1995, Pinang and her children filed an action against the new owner. They claimed they owned the property since 1962. They asked the Municipal Trial Court (MCTC) to remove the cloud of doubt over their title and ownership. It was only in this case that the heirs of Lina and Maura and her son Bernie finally intervened and finally asserted their ownership over the property against Pinang and her children.

After trial, the MCTC ruled in favor of the heirs of Lina and Maura. The court said that the adverse possession by Pinang and her children which started in 1962 did not ripen into ownership because it was interrupted in 1977 due to the filing of the adverse claim. Such possession from 1962 to 1977 could not ripen into ownership because it was in bad faith which requires possession of 30 years.

16. Castillo v. Francisco

17. Dizon v. Suntay The owner of a diamond ring entrusted same to Clarita Sison for the latter to sell upon promise of a commission. Instead of selling, Clarita pledged the ring with a pawnshop. As aoon as he learned of the pledge, the owner tried to get back the ring from the pawnshop owner, but the latter refused.

Can the owner successfully get back ring? If so, does thw owner have to pay the pawnshop owner the amount borrowed by Clarita?

Under Art. 559 of the Civil Code, the owner can successfully get back the ring, and he does not have to reimburse the pawnshop owner the money lent to Clarita. This is because the ring owner had been unlawfully deprived of the same, and this right to recover cannot be defeated even if the pawnshop had acquired possession of the ring in good faith.

18. Wee v. Republic

Respondent FelicidadMardo was granted a registered Free Patent No. (IV-2) 15284, dated April 26, 1979, covering the Lot No. 8348, situated in Putting Kahoy, Silang, Cavite. On

Whether Petitioner is entitled to the subject property.

Court of Appeals decision is sustained. CIVIL LAW: registration of title Based on the legal paramaters, applicants for registration of title under Section 14(1) must sufficiently establish: (1) that the subject land forms

February 1, 1993, respondent allegedly conveyed to petitioner Josephine Wee, through a Deed of Absolute Sale a portion of the said lot known as Lot No. 8348-B, for a consideration of P250,000.00 which was fully paid. Respondent however refused to vacate and turnover the subject property claiming that the alleged sale was falsified. Petitioner file an Application for Original Registration of a parcel of land claiming that she is the owner of said unregistered land by virtue of a deed of absolute sale. Respondent filed a Motion to dismiss the application alleging that the land described in the application was different from the land being claimed for titling. The motion was however, denied. A motion for reconsideration and second urgent motion for reconsideration were subsequently filed by respondent, but both were denied by the RTC. Upon presentation of evidence by the parties, the RTC granted the application of the petitioner. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the RTC, hence, respondent appealed to the CA. The CA held, among others, that petitioner was not able to comply with the requirement of possession and occupation under Section 14 (1) of P.D. No. 1529. Her admission that the subject lot was not physically turned over to her due to some objections and oppositions to her title suggested that she was not exercising any acts of dominion over the subject property, an essential element in the requirement and occupation contemplated under Section 14 (1) of P.D. No. 1529. Hence, this petition.

part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; (2) that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same; and (3) that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Republic v. Manimtim, G.R. No. 169599, March 16, 2011 The CA denied the application on the issue of open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land. It was of the view that she could not have complied with the requirement of possession and occupation under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 considering that she admitted that it was not physically turned over to her. A more important consideration, however, is that the subject land is already registered under OCT No. OP-1840 (Patent No. 042118-03-6111) of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite, under the name of respondent Felicidad Mardo. The Petition is DENIED

19. Galvez v. CA

20. Yu v. Pacleb Baltazar Pacleb and his late first wife Angelita Chan are registered owners of an 18,000-square meter parcel of land in Barrio Langcaan,Dasmariñas,Cavite, covered by TCT No. T-118375 (Langcaan Property).On Feb. 27, 1992, Spouses Baltazar Pacleb and Angelita Chan sold the property to Rebecca del Rosario. On May 7, 1992, the lot was thereafter sold to Ruperto Javier. On Nov. 10, 1992, a Contract to Sell was entered into between Javier and Spouses Yu wherein petitioner spouses agreed to pay JavierP200,000 as partial payment and P400,000 to be paid upon execution of the contract, and Javier undertook

Whether or not petitioner spouses are innocent purchasers for value and in good faith.

Petitioner spouses are not innocent purchasers for value, and they are not in good faith. Several facts should have put petitioner spouses on inquiry as to the alleged rights of their vendor, Javier, over the Langcaan property. First, the property remains to be registered in the name of respondent despite the 2 Deeds of Absolute Sale from respondent to Del Rosariothen from the latter to Javier, and both deeds were not even annotated in the title of the subject property.Second, the 2 deeds of absolute sale were executed only 2 months apart containing identical provisions. Third, the fact that the Langcaan Property is in the possession of Ramon, son of the registered owners, this should have made petitioner spouses suspicious as to the veracity

to deliver possession of the Langcaan Property and to sign a deed of absolute sale within 30 days from execution of contract. All the aforementioned sales were not registered. In 1993, spouses Yu filed a complaint with the RTC for specific performance and damages against Javier, contending that Javierre presented to them that the Langcaan Property was not tenanted, but after they already paid P200,000 as initial payment and entered into the agreement of sale on Sept. 11, 1992, they discovered that it was tenanted by Ramon Pacleb, son of Baltazar Pacleb. Subsequently, spouses Yu demanded for the cancellation of the agreement and for the return of their initial payment. On March 10, 1995, spouses Yu, Ramon, and the latter’s wife executed a “Kusangloob na Pagsasauli ng Lupang Sakahan at Pagpapahayag ng Pagtalikod sa Karapatan, where spouses Yu paid Ramon P500,000 in exchange for the waiver of his tenancy rights over the subject property. But on Oct. 12, 1995, Baltazar Pacleb filed a complaint for annulment of the deed of sale to Javier, alleging that the deed of sale executed between him and his late first wife Angelita was spurious as their signatures were forgeries. Meanwhile, on Nov. 23, 1995, spouses Yu filed an action for forcible entry against respondent with the MTC alleging that they had prior physical possession of the Langcaan Property through their trustee Ramon until the latter was ousted by respondent in Sept. 1995. MTC ruled in favor of spouses Yu, affirmed by the RTC, but set aside by CA. His first action for annulment of deed of sale having been dismissed, respondent filed action for removal of cloud from title on May 29, 1996, contending that the deed of sale between him and his late first wife and Rebecca del Rosario could not have been executed on Feb. 27, 1992, because on said date, he was residing in the U.S. and his late first wife died 20 years ago. During pendency of the case, respondent died, succeeded by his surviving spouse and representatives of children with his first wife. RTC held that spouses Yu are purchasers in good faith, but on appeal, CA reversed and set aside lower court’s decision and ordered for the cancellation of the annotation in favor of spouses Yu on the TCT of Langcaan Property.

of the alleged title of their vendor, Javier. Petitioner spouses could have easily verified the true status of the subject property from Ramon’s wife, since the latter is their relative.The law protects to a greater degree a purchaser who buys from the registered owner himself.Corollarily, it requires a higher degree of prudence from one who buys from a person who is not the registered owner, although the land object of the transaction is registered.While one who buys from the registered owner does not need to look behind the certificate of title,one who buys from one who is not the registered owner is expected to examine not only the certificate of title but all factual circumstances necessary for him to determine if there are any flaws in the title of the transferor, or in his capacity to transfer the land.Therefore, petitioner spouses cannot be considered as innocent purchasers in good faith, and respondent has a better right over the Langcaan Property as the true owner thereof

21. Green Acres v. Cabral

Property - Quieting of title

Victoria Cabral was the original owner of a parcel of land in Barangay Pandayan, Meycauayan, Bulacan. The land was placed under the coverage of PD No. 27, and on March 23, 1993, three Emancipation Patents were issued to the Spouses Moraga.

Cabral then filed a complaint before the PARAD seeking the cancellation of the Emancipation Patents issued to the Spouses Moraga on the grounds that these were obtained through fraud and that the land is not suitable for rice and corn production and has long been classified as residential, commercial, industrial and nonagricultural land by the Zoning Administrator of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board. The PARAD rendered a decision denying the petition for cancellation of the Emancipation Patents and dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. Cabral appealed the decision to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).

While the appeal was pending, the Spouses Moraga subdivided and thereafter sold the subject lots to Filcon Ready Mixed Inc.

Green Acres then purchased lots from Filcon and among those purchased were the lots in question. The titles were free from any annotations, liens, notices, claims or encumbrances, except for an already cancelled annotation of a real estate mortgage in favor of PCI Bank. That being said Green Acres went ahead and used the land by building warehouses on it.

A few years later Cabral’s appeal was resolved by the DARAB and ordered the cancellation of the titles of the Spouses and Filcon for having been acquired illegally.

Green Acres found out about the DARAB decision and informed Filcon, Filcon then assured Green Acres that it is coordinating with its predecessor, the Spouses Moraga, to make sure that Green Acres’ interest over the property is protected.

Green Acres then sought to quiet its title and alleged that it

1. WON the January 17, 2001 DARAB decision(cancellation of the titles of the Spouses Moraga and Filcon) may be enforced against Green Acres(Writ of Execution)?

2. WON the DARAB Decision in favor of Cabral constitutes a cloud on Green Acres’ title over the subject properties?

1. NO! That decision was for a case between Cabral and the Spouses Moraga and Filcon. The fact that Green Acres was not a party to the case makes it clear that Green Acres could not be subject to a writ of execution stemming from that decision because Green Acres was a buyer in Good faith. If that were to be allowed it would be tantamount to trampling of ones constitutional right to due process. So, hell no.

The Supreme Court stated as follows:

“The principle that a person cannot be prejudiced by a ruling rendered in an action or proceeding in which he was not made a party conforms to the constitutional guarantee of due process of law.”

“It is beyond dispute that Green Acres was not made a party in the DARAB case. Consequently, the January 17, 2001 DARAB decision cannot bind Green Acres.”

“ No one shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by any judgment rendered by the court.”

“a writ of execution can be issued only against a party and not against one who did not have his day in court.”

2. Yes, the SC ruled in favor of GA’s arguments that there was indeed a cloud on the properties that makes it imperative in the interest of GA’s to file for Quieting of Title.

GA argued that the DARAB decision is among those enumerated in Article 476.

“Art. 476. .... by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title...”

The Supreme Court stated and i quote;

“Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud upon, doubt, or uncertainty affecting title to real property...

...In such action, the competent court is tasked to determine the

is a purchaser in good faith and for value, claiming that it had no notice or knowledge of any adverse claim, lien, or encumbrance on the properties. Green Acres claimed that the DARAB decision casts a cloud on its titles.

In the meantime the decision of the DARAB became final and executory which the prompted Cabral to file with the PARAD a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution against Green Acres. On January 25, 2006, the PARAD issued a Resolution denying the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution for lack of merit.

respective rights of the complainant and the other claimants, not only to place things in their proper places, and make the claimant, who has no rights to said immovable, respect and not disturb the one so entitled, but also for the benefit of both, so that whoever has the right will see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he can thereafter fearlessly introduce any desired improvements, as well as use, and even abuse the property.”

Noteworthy tidbits in the SC rulings (merely additional details about the case):

For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur:

1.) The plaintiff or complainant has a legal or equitable title or interest in the real property subject of the action; and

* There is no dispute as to the first requisite since Green Acres has legal title over the subject properties.

2.) The deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting a cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.

* A cloud on title consists of (1) any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding; (2) which is apparently valid or effective; (3) but is in truth and in fact

invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable; and (4) may be prejudicial to the title sought to be quieted.

* This Court holds that the DARAB decision in favor of Cabral satisfies all four elements of a cloud on title.

* As Green Acres correctly points out, the DARAB decision, a final one at that, is both an "instrument" and a "record." Black’s Law Dictionary defines an instrument as a document or writing which gives formal expression to a legal act or agreement, for the purpose of creating, securing, modifying or terminating a right. A record, on the other hand, is defined as a written account of some act, court proceeding, transaction or instrument drawn up under authority of law, by a proper officer, and designed to remain as a memorial or permanent evidence

of the matters to which it relates. It is likewise a "claim" which is defined as a cause of action or a demand for money or property since Cabral is asserting her right over the subject lots. More importantly, it is a "proceeding" which is defined as a regular and orderly progress in form of law including all possible steps in an action from its commencement to the execution of judgment and may refer not only to a complete remedy but also to a mere procedural step that is part of a larger action or special proceeding

* the DARAB decision is apparently valid and effective. It is a final decision that has not been reversed, vacated or nullified. It is likewise apparently effective and may be prejudicial to Green Acres’ titles since it orders the cancellation of the titles of the Spouses Moraga and Filcon all from which Green Acres derived its titles.

22. Acre v. Yuttiki Sofronio Acre, Jr. Married Evangeline Yuttikki while his prior marriage with Beatriz Acre was still subsisting. Sofronio and Evangeline acquired properties where one parcel of land was registered in the name of Evangeline Yuttikki, married to Sofronio Acre Jr. The other parcel of land was registered in the name of Evangeline Yuttiki, married to Sofronio Acre, and Nellie Y. Del Mar, married to Jose del Mar.Sofronio died after more than 24 years of union with Evangeline.

The Acres filed a complaint for reconveyance and recovery of properties and/or partition with damages. They alleged that Sofronio alone acquired the subject properties with his fund.

The trial court dismissed the complaint. The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Whether or not Evangeline is the owner of the contested properties.

Yes. Evangeline is the exclusive owner of the contested properties.

The property regime of Evangeline and Sofronio falls under the Article 148 of the Family Code, considering that their marriage is bigamous. Under Art 148, properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. If there is no contribution from either or both of the spouses, there can be no co-ownership.

The Acres failed to present any evidence to establish that Sofronio made an actual contribution in acquiring the contested properties. Clearly, co-ownership does not exist here.

The certificate of title on its face show that the one property were exclusively owned by Evangeline, and the other was co-owned by her with her sister. The rule is well-settled that the words "married to" preceding Sofronio Acre, Jr are merely descriptive of the civil status of Evangeline.

23. Spouses Cruz v. Spouses Cruz

Sometime in 1999, Petitioner Spouses purchased a parcel of land from a relative. The property was situated in Pulong Yantok, Angat, Bulacan. They paid real estate taxes but never occupied the property. Petitioners sold portions to third parties. Petitioners discovered sometime in 2000 that Respondents were occupying a section of the land. Petitioners offered to sell the land to them. Since they could not agree on the price, Petitioners demanded that

Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.

No; RTC did not have jurisdiction over the case. It is axiomatic that jurisdiction is determined solely by the allegations in the complaint and not by evidence adduced during trial. One cannot advert to anything not set forth in the complaint. In this case, the complaint alleged that the Petitioners tolerated the occupation of the Respondents and filed the case with the RTC in less than 1 year from the demand to vacate. When the case was filed in 2001, Congress had already approved Republic Act No. 7691 which expanded the MTC’s jurisdiction to

Respondents vacate the land. Petitioners filed a case for recovery of possession of the land in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan in 2001. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss claiming, that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case as it should have been filed in the MTC since it was a summary action for ejectment under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. RTC denied the motion to dismiss and eventually decided in favor of Petitioners. On appeal, the CA ruled in favor of Respondents and dismissed the complaint. It held that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the action for recovery of possession because petitioners had been dispossessed of the property for less than a year. It held that the complaint was one for unlawful detainer which should have been filed in the MTC.

include other actions involving title to or possession of real property (accion publiciana and reinvindicatoria) where the assessed value of the property does not exceed P20,000 (or P50,000, for actions filed in Metro Manila). The complaint did not contain any allegations as to the value of the property. Thus, the Court could not determine where jurisdiction lies.

24. Villegas Bernardo v. Villegas

Respondents alleged in the Complaint that their father, Eusebio Villegas, is the registered owner of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 46891 with; that petitioner, by stealth and in the guise of merely grazing his cattle, surreptitiously entered into possession of a portion of respondents’ land; that petitioner conspired and confederated with Gaza and Francisco by illegally constructing their own houses on the subject land; that the issue of possession was brought to the barangay for conciliation but no settlement was reached by the parties; and that petitioner, Gaza and Francisco had forcibly, unlawfully and unjustly possessed and continue to possess the subject property and had refused to vacate the same.

In his Answer, petitioner denied taking possession of any portion of the property of respondents.

The trial court rendered judgment in favor of respondents and ordered petitioner, Gaza and Francisco to vacate the subject land and to pay jointly and severally respondents the amount of P30,000.00 as attorney’s fees and the cost of suit. The trial court held that the suit, being an accion publiciana, falls within its jurisdiction. It found that the houses of petitioner and Gaza were inside the titled property of respondents. The trial court noted that petitioner

WON the trial court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action for failure of respondents to allege the assessed value of the property involved in their complaint. WO the respondents owned the subject property.

Ruling: With respect to the argument that being indispensable parties, all of the heirs of Eusebio Villegas should have been impleaded as parties, the appellate court disagreed and invoked Article 487 of the Civil Code, which provides that any one of the co-owners may bring an action for ejectment. The appellate court construed said provision to cover all kinds of actions for recovery of possession.

The appellate court sustained the trial court’s finding that the portions of the land occupied by petitioner and Gaza are owned by respondents. The appellate court likewise ruled that respondents could not be guilty of laches considering that Estelito Villegas, upon seeing for the first time in 1996 that petitioner was already building his house on the premises, verbally asked him to discontinue the construction.

Under Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, the plenary action of accion publiciana must be brought before the regional trial courts. With the modifications introduced by Republic Act No. 769114 in 1994, the jurisdiction of the regional trial courts was limited to real actions where the assessed value exceeds P20,000.00, and P50,000.00 where the action is filed in Metro Manila

Significantly, the Technical Report on Verification Survey by Engineer Robert C. Pangyarihan, which was attached to and formed part of the records, contained a tax declaration indicating that the subject property has an assessed value of P110,220.00. It is basic that the tax

failed to present any title or tax declaration to prove ownership or possessory right.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court.

declaration indicating the assessed value of the property enjoys the presumption of regularity as it has been issued by the proper government agency. Under Republic Act No. 7691, the RTC in fact has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action.

25. BF Citiland v. Otake

26. Cabral v. Prov. Adjudicator

27. Heirs of Juanita Padilla v. Dominador Magdua

co ownership Petitioners alleged that Ricardo, through misrepresentation, had the land transferred in his name without the consent and knowledge of his co-heirs. Juanita, the mother of the heirs had allegedly executed a notarized Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property (Affidavit) in favor of Ricardo on 4 June 1966 making him the sole owner of the land. (2) The land was subsequently sold by Ricardo's daughters, Josephine Bahia and Virginia Bahia-Abas, to respondent Dominador Magdua (Dominador). RTC: The case was filed only in 2001 or more than 30 years since the Affidavit was executed in 1966. The RTC explained that while the right of an heir to his inheritance is imprescriptible, yet when one of the co-heirs appropriates the property as his own to the exclusion of all other heirs, then prescription can set in. The RTC added that since prescription had set in to question the transfer of the land under the Affidavit, it would seem logical that no action could also be taken against the deed of sale executed by Ricardo's daughters in favor of Domi

The main issue is whether the present action is already barred by prescription.

art 494 no prescription shall run against co owner.

No, it has not prescribed. Since possession of co-owners is like that of a trustee, in order that a co-owner's possession may be deemed adverse to the cestui que trust or other co-owners, the following requisites must concur: (1) that he has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust or other co-owners, (2) that such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust or other co-owners, and (3) that the evidence thereon must be clear and convincing. In the present case, all three requisites have been met. After Juanita's death in 1989, petitioners sought for the partition of their mother's land. The heirs, including Ricardo, were notified about the plan. Ricardo, through a letter dated 5 June 1998, notified petitioners, as his co-heirs, that he adjudicated the land solely for himself. Accordingly, Ricardo's interest in the land had now become adverse to the claim of his co-heirs after repudiating their claim of entitlement to the land. In Generosa v. Prangan-Valera, we held that in order that title may prescribe in favor of one of the co-owners, it must be clearly shown that he had repudiated the claims of the others, and that they were apprised of his claim of adverse and exclusive ownership, before the prescriptive period begins to run. However, in the present case, the prescriptive period began to run only from 5 June 1998, the date petitioners received notice of Ricardo's repudiation of their claims to the land. Since petitioners filed an action for recovery of ownership and possession, partition and damages with the RTC on 26 October 2001, only a mere three years had lapsed. This three-year period falls short of the 10-year or 30-year acquisitive prescription period required by law in order to be entitled to claim legal ownership over the land. Thus, Dominador cannot invoke acquisitive prescription. In sum, we find that the Affidavit, as the principal evidence relied upon by the RTC to dismiss the case on the

ground of prescription, insufficiently established Dominador's rightful claim of ownership to the land. Thus, we direct the RTC to try the case on the merits to determine who among the parties are legally entitled to the land.

28. Heirs of Figuracion v. Emilia Figuracion- Gerilla

co ownership The Petitioners, heirs of Figuracion claim that the whole lot is solely owned by Hilaria and Felipa Figuracion by virtue of the title they acquired under their name.

The respondent, Emilila Figuracion-Gerilla, who had a Deed of Quitclaim, has built a house over the 1/2 portion of the disputed land.

Now the petitioners argued that respondent Emilia has no valid claim of ownership because the Deed of Quitclaim executed in her favor by Agripina was in fact a Deed of Donation that contained no acceptance and thus void. Futhermore, they argue that the instrument is not registered in the ROD.

In 1994, Hilaria attempted to demolish Emilia's house, prompting her to file a case for the partition of the lot, annulment of the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Carolina, Deed of Absolute Sale and the TCT of Hilaria and Felipa, reconveyance of the 1/2 portion, quieting of title and damages.

WON Emilia had a right to demand for partition

Yes, respondent Emilia can compel the partition of the lot.

The first stage in an action for partition is the settlement of the issue of ownership.It is a given fact that Agripina and carolina are the 2 legal heirs of the late Eulalio Figuracion. As such heirs, they became co-owners of the disputed land.

The heirs' contention is solely base on technicalities on the validity of the Deed of Quitclaim. The Affidavit of Self-Adjudication which Carolina executed is void for one cannot adjudicate an entire property he was not the sole owner of. And the sale of the lot of Carlolina to Hilaria and Felipa will only affect her share in the co-ownership, in accordance with Art. 493 of the Civil Code.

Since co-ownership was successfully established by Emilia, she can therefore demand for a partition under Art 494 of the Civil Code.

Furthermore, the contention of the petitioners (heirs of Figuracion) that Emilia is barred by prescription is untenable. It is stated under Art. 494 of the Civil Code that " No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs as long as she expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.

29. Fuentes v. Conrado Roca

On, Oct 11, 1982, Tarciano Roca bought a 358-square meter lot in Zambales from his mother. Six years later in 1988, Tarciano offered to sell the lot to the petitioners Fuentes spouses through the help of Atty. Plagata who would prepare the documents and requirements to complete the sale. In the agreement between Tarciano and Fuentes spouses there will be a Php 60,000 down payment and Php 140,000 will be paid upon the removal of Tarciano of certain structures on the land and after the consent of the estranged wife of Tarciano, Rosario, would be attained. Atty. Plagata thus went about to complete such tasks and claimed that he went to Manila to get the signature of Rosario but notarized the document at

1. Whether or not Rosario’s signature on the document of consent to her husband Tarciano’s sale of their conjugal land to the Fuentes spouses was forged;

2. Whether or not the Rocas’ action for the declaration of nullity of that sale to the spouses

1. The SC ruled that there was forgery due to the difference in the signatures of Rosario in the document giving consent and another document executed at the same time period. The SC noted that the CA was correct in ruling that the heavy handwriting in the document which stated consent was completely different from the sample signature. There was no evidence provided to explain why there was such difference in the handwriting.

2. Although Tarciano and Rosario was married during the 1950 civil code, the sale was done in 1989, after the effectivity of the Family Code. The Family Code applies to Conjugal Partnerships already established at the enactment of the Family Code. The sale of conjugal property done by Tarciano without the consent of Rosario is completely

Zamboanga . The deed of sale was executed January 11, 1989. As time passed, Tarciano and Rosario died while the Fuentes spouses and possession and control over the lot. Eight years later in 1997, the children of Tarciano and Rosario filed a case to annul the sale and reconvey the property on the ground that the sale was void since the consent of Rosario was not attained and that Rosarios’ signature was a mere forgery. The Fuentes spouses claim that the action has prescribed since an action to annul a sale on the ground of fraud is 4 years from discovery.

The RTC ruled in favor of the Fuentes spouses ruling that there was no forgery, that the testimony of Atty. Plagata who witnessed the signing of Rosario must be given weight, and that the action has already prescribed.

On the other hand, the CA reversed the ruling of the CA stating that the action has not prescribed since the applicable law is the 1950 Civil Code which provided that the sale of Conjugal Property without the consent of the other spouse is voidable and the action must be brought within 10 years. Given that the transaction was in 1989 and the action was brought in 1997 hence it was well within the prescriptive period.

already prescribed; and

3. Whether or not only Rosario, the wife whose consent was not had, could bring the action to annul that sale.

void under Art 124 of the family code. With that, it is a given fact that assailing a void contract never prescribes. On the argument that the action has already prescribed based on the discovery of the fraud, that prescriptive period applied to the Fuentes spouses since it was them who should have assailed such contract due to the fraud but they failed to do so. On the other hand, the action to assail a sale based on no consent given by the other spouse does not prescribe since it is a void contract.

3. It is argued by the Spouses Fuentes that it is only the spouse, Rosario, who can file such a case to assail the validity of the sale but given that Rosario was already dead no one could bring the action anymore. The SC ruled that such position is wrong since as stated above, that sale was void from the beginning. Consequently, the land remained the property of Tarciano and Rosario despite that sale. When the two died, they passed on the ownership of the property to their heirs, namely, the Rocas. As lawful owners, the Rocas had the right, under Article 429 of the Civil Code, to exclude any person from its enjoyment and disposal.

30. Eland Phil v Garcia, Fajardo, Heirs of Malabanan

Respondents filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title with Writ of Preliminary Injunction with the RTC against Eland Philippines, Inc. claiming ownership in fee simple title, of a parcel of land by occupation and possession. Respondents stated that they were not aware of any person or entity that had a legal or equitable interest or claim on the lot until they requested that the lot be declared for tax purposes. They found out that a decree of ownership has been issued to Eland without being notified of the registration case, they claimed the presence of misrepresentation amounting to actual or extrinsic fraud and so entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction in order to restrain or enjoin petitioner, its privies, agents, representatives, and all other persons acting on its behalf, to refrain from committing acts of dispossession on the subject lot. Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss claiming that there’s no cause of action and were not entitled to the

WON a summary judgment is proper in an action for quieting of title and is applicable to the present case. WON the RTC has jurisdiction to cancel petitioner's original certificate of title (OCT) in an action to quiet title

Any action can be the subject of a summary judgment with the sole exception of actions for annulment of marriage or declaration of its nullity or for legal separation. This Court finds that the grant of summary judgment was not proper. A summary judgment is permitted only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and a moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment is proper if, while the pleadings on their face appear to raise issues, the affidavits, depositions, and admissions presented by the moving party show that such issues are not genuine. It must be remembered that the non-existence of a genuine issue is the determining factor in granting a motion for summary judgment, and the movant has the burden of proving such nonexistence. The trial court found no genuine issue as to any material fact that would necessitate conducting a full-blown trial. However, a careful study of the case shows otherwise. By granting the summary judgment, the trial court has in effect annulled its former ruling based on a claim of possession and ownership of the same land for more than thirty years without the benefit of a full-blown trial. The

issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Said motion was denied ruling that the allegations in the complaint established a cause of action and enjoined petitioner Eland to file its answer to the complaint. Motion for Reconsideration was also denied. Meanwhile, respondents filed a Motion to Declare Eland in Default. The trial court issued an Order declaring the petitioner in default and allowed respondents to present evidence ex parte. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on the trial court's denial of its motion to dismiss and in declaring it in default. The trial court denied the former and granted the latter. The trial court also admitted petitioner's Answer Ad Cautelam. Respondents countered by filing a Motion to Expunge Eland's Answer from the Records and filed a Motion to Set Presentation of Evidence Ex Parte which was granted. Petitioner filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings since it had filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, asking for the nullification of the Order of the trial court and for the affirmation of its earlier Order denying petitioner's Motion to Dismiss. The petition for certiorari was subsequently denied, hence, the trial court ruled that the reception of evidence already presented by the respondents remained as part of the records of the case, and that the petitioner had the right to cross-examine the witness and to comment on the documentary exhibits already presented. Consequently, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied by the trial court in an Omnibus Order. The trial court’s resolution favored respondents, declaring them as the absolute owners and rightful possessors of the subject lot, subject to the rights of occupancy of the farm workers on the one-third area thereof; that the judgment in land registration in favor of Eland be set aside & decree of registration is null and void. Thus, the Original Transfer Certificate of Title is ordered to be canceled, as well as tax declaration covering the subject lot.

fact that the respondents seek to nullify the original certificate of title issued to the petitioner on the claim that the former were in possession of the same land for a number of years, is already a clear indicium that a genuine issue of a material fact exists. This, together with the failure of the respondents to show that there were no genuine issues involved, should have been enough for the trial court to give the motion for summary judgment, filed by respondents, scant consideration. Trial courts have limited authority to render summary judgments and may do so only when there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact. Verily, for an action to quiet title to prosper, two (2) indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy. Anent the propriety of the filing of an action for the quieting of title, the indefeasibility and incontrovertibility of the decree of registration come into question. Under Sec. 32 of P.D. No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree: Section 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for value. The decree of registration shall not be reopened or revised by reason of absence, minority, or other disability of any person adversely affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments, subject, however, to the right of any person, including the government and the branches thereof, deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by such adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud, to file in the proper Court of First Instance a petition for reopening and review of the decree of registration not later than one year from and after the date of the entry of such decree of registration, but in no case shall such petition be entertained by the court where an innocent purchaser for value has acquired the land or an interest therein, whose rights may be prejudiced. Whenever the phrase "innocent purchaser for value" or an equivalent phrase occurs in this Decree, it shall be deemed to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value.

31. HEMEDES vs CA

The disagreement involves a question of ownership over an unregistered parcel of land. The late Jose Hemedes originally owned the land, father of Maxima Hemedes and Enrique D. Hemedes. On March 22, 1947 Jose Hemedes executed a document entitled “Donation Inter Vivos With

Whether or not the conveyance by Justa Kausapin in favour of Enrique D. Hemedes transferred ownership

The Supreme Court held that petitioner R & B Insurance’s assertion of ownership over the property in dispute, as evidenced by TCT No. 41985, subject to the usufructuary rights of Justa Kausapin, which encumbrance has been properly annotated upon the said certificate of title.

Resolutory Conditions” whereby he conveyed ownership over the subject land, together with all its improvements, in favor of his third wife, Justa Kausapin. Maxima Hemedes, through her counsel, filed an application for registration and confirmation of title over the subject unregistered land. Subsequently, an Original Certificate of Title (OCT) was issued in the name of Maxima Hemedes married to Raul Rodriguez by the Registry of Deeds of Laguna on June 8, 1962, with the annotation that “Justa Kausapin shall have the usufructuary rights over the parcel of land herein described during her lifetime or widowhood.” However, Enrique D. Hemedes subsequently sold the property to Dominium Realty and Construction Corporation (Dominium). Justa Kausapin also executed and affidavit confirming the conveyance of the subject property in favor of Enrique D. Hemedes as embodied in the “Kasunduan” dated May 27, 1971, and at the same time denying the conveyance made to Maxima Hemedes.A complaint was filed by Enrique D. Hemedes for the annullment of the TCT issued in favor of R&B Insurance and/or the reconveyance to Dominium of the subject property. Specifically, the complaint alleged that Dominium has become the absolute owner of the subject property by virtue of the February 28, 1979 deed of sale executed by Enrique D. Hemedes, who in turn obtained ownership of the land from Justa Kausapin, as evidenced by the “Kasunduan”. The Plaintiffs contend that Justa Kausapin never transferred the land to Maxima Hemedes and that Enrique D. Hemedes had no knowledge of the registration proceedings initiated by Maxima Hemedes.The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs Dominium and Enrique D. Hemedes. Both R&B Insurance and Maxima Hemedes appealed from the trial court’s decision. The Court of Appeals affirmed the assailed decision in toto. Hence, this petition.

over the subject land? The finding of the public respondent’s that the “Deed of Conveyance of Unregistered Real Property By Reversion” executed by Justa Kausapin in favor of Maxima Hemedes is false and not supported by the factual findings in this case. It is grounded upon the mere denial of the same by Justa Kausapin.A party to a contract cannot just evade compliance with his contractual obligations by the simple expedient of denying the execution of such contract. If, after a perfect and binding contract has been executed between the parties, it occurs to one of them to allege some defect therein as a reason for annulling it, the alleged defect must be conclusively proven, since the validity and fulfilment of contracts cannot be left to the will of one of the contracting parties. In upholding the deed of conveyance in favor of Maxima Hemedes, the Court must concomitantly rule that Enrique D. Hemedes and his transferee, Dominium, did not acquire any rights over the subject property.Justa Kausapin sought to transfer to her stepson exactly what she had earlier transferred to Maxima Hemedes – the ownership of the subject property pursuant to the first condition stipulated in the deed of donation executed by her husband. Thus, the donation in favor of Enrique D. Hemedes is null and void for the purported object thereof did not exist at the time of the transfer, having already been transferred to his sister. Similarly, the sale of the subject property by Enrique D. Hemedes to Dominium is also a nullity for the latter cannot acquire more rights than its predecessor-in-interest and is definitely not an innocent purchaser for value since Enrique D. Hemedes did not present any certificate of title upon which it relied.

32. Secuya v. Vda. Before the grant of her application for private sale of Lot 1. Whether or not the (1) NO. It was an express trust. Trust is the right to the beneficial

De Selma 5679, a friar land, the beautiful Maxima Caballero executed a document entitled "Agreement of Partition," wherein she stipulated to transfer one-third (1/3) of the lot to and accepted by Paciencia Sabellano, her aunt. When the application was approved, Maxima failed to transfer the agreed portion to Paciencia who took possession thereof. Paciencia thereafter sold the same to Dalmacio Secuya. When Paciencia died, her only heir, Ramon Sabellano, executed a private document, "Deed of Confirmation of Sale," confirming the sale between Paciencia and Dalmacio. The document was, however, lost. Meanwhile, Maxima sold the entire lot to Silverio Aro, husband of Cesaria Caballero. Upon Silverio's death, the lot was transferred to Cesaria from whom respondent bought the lot. Respondent was assured that petitioners who were occupying a portion of the land were tenants. A clean title to the whole lot was transferred to respondent. Petitioners, heirs of Dalmacio Secuya, filed an action for quieting of title on the ground that respondent's title is a cloud on their title as owners and possessors of the property subject of litigation. They claimed that they had been occupying the property for forty-seven years though they did not pay the land taxes. The trial court rendered judgment against respondent. It was affirmed, on appeal, by the Court of Appeals.

Agreement is one of partition2. Whether or not there was a repudiation of the Express Trust

enjoyment of property, the legal title to which is vested in another. It is a fiduciary relationship that obliges the trustee to deal with the property for the benefit of the beneficiary. Trust relations between parties may either be express or implied. An express trust is created by the intention of the trustor or of the parties. An implied trust comes into being by operation of law. The present Agreement of Partition involves an express trust. Under Article 1444 of the Civil Code, "[n]o particular words are required for the creation of an express trust, it being sufficient that a trust is clearly intended." That Maxima Caballero bound herself to give one third of Lot No. 5629 to Paciencia Sabellona upon the approval of the former's application is clear from the terms of the Agreement. Likewise, it is evident that Paciencia acquiesced to the covenant and is thus bound to fulfill her obligation therein. As a result of the Agreement, Maxima Caballero held the portion specified therein as belonging to Paciencia Sabellona when the application was eventually approved and a sale certificate was issued in her name. Thus, she should have transferred the same to the latter, but she never did so during her lifetime. Instead, her heirs sold the entire Lot No. 5679 to Silvestre Aro in 1955.

(2)YES. While no time limit is imposed for the enforcement of rights under express trusts, prescription may, however, bar a beneficiary's action for recovery, if a repudiation of the trust is proven by clear and convincing evidence and made known to the beneficiary. There was a repudiation of the express trust when the heirs of Maxima Caballero failed to deliver or transfer the property to Paciencia Sabellona, and instead sold the same to a third person not privy to the Agreement. In the memorandum of incumbrances of TCT No. 3087, issued in the name of Maxima, there was no notation of the Agreement between her and Paciencia. Equally important, the Agreement was not registered; thus, it could not bind third persons. Neither was there any allegation that Silvestre Aro, who purchased the property from Maxima's heirs, knew of it. Consequently, the subsequent sales transactions involving the land in dispute and the titles covering it must be upheld, in the absence of proof that the said transactions were fraudulent and irregular.

33. NHA v CA, Bulacan Garden Corp

34 Sps Apostol v

CA, Sps Chua

35 Heirs Torbela v Sps Rosario, Banco Fil Savings

36 Communities Cagayan Inc v Sps Arsenio, Nanol

37 Galvez, Tam, Tycoon Properties v CA

38 Saberon v Ventanilla

39 Iglesia ni Cristo v Hrs of Enrique Santos

40 Republic v Leyco