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An evolving EU enga Jean Monnet Occasio With the support of the L Migratio Mediterr by Roderick Pace An evolving EU en Jean Monnet Occa Migratio moveme Mediterr scenario by Berta Fernandez Al aging a changing Mediterranean region onal Paper 02/2013 Life Long Learning Programme of the European on in the Centra rranean ngaging a changing Mediterranean regio asional Paper No. 11/2014 on and asylum: Th ent of people in th ranean Region - Fu os and the EU resp lfaro (Intra-ACP Migration Facility, Brussels) 1 n n Union al on he he uture ponse

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Page 1: Migration and asylum: The Migration in the Central movement of …aei.pitt.edu/57586/1/JM_Occasional_Paper_no._11-_Berta... · 2014. 11. 18. · Migration in the Central Mediterranean

1

An evolving EU engaging a changing Mediterranean region

Jean Monnet Occasional Paper 02/2013

With the support of the Life Long Learning Programme of the European Union

Migration in the CentralMediterraneanby Roderick Pace

An evolving EU engaging a changing Mediterranean region

Jean Monnet Occasional Paper No. 11/2014

Migration and asylum: Themovement of people in theMediterranean Region - Futurescenarios and the EU response

by Berta Fernandez Alfaro (Intra-ACP Migration Facility, Brussels)

1

An evolving EU engaging a changing Mediterranean region

Jean Monnet Occasional Paper 02/2013

With the support of the Life Long Learning Programme of the European Union

Migration in the CentralMediterraneanby Roderick Pace

An evolving EU engaging a changing Mediterranean region

Jean Monnet Occasional Paper No. 11/2014

Migration and asylum: Themovement of people in theMediterranean Region - Futurescenarios and the EU response

by Berta Fernandez Alfaro (Intra-ACP Migration Facility, Brussels)

1

An evolving EU engaging a changing Mediterranean region

Jean Monnet Occasional Paper 02/2013

With the support of the Life Long Learning Programme of the European Union

Migration in the CentralMediterraneanby Roderick Pace

An evolving EU engaging a changing Mediterranean region

Jean Monnet Occasional Paper No. 11/2014

Migration and asylum: Themovement of people in theMediterranean Region - Futurescenarios and the EU response

by Berta Fernandez Alfaro (Intra-ACP Migration Facility, Brussels)

Page 2: Migration and asylum: The Migration in the Central movement of …aei.pitt.edu/57586/1/JM_Occasional_Paper_no._11-_Berta... · 2014. 11. 18. · Migration in the Central Mediterranean

2

Copyright © 2014, Berta Fernandez

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any

means – electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise – without any prior written permission from the Institute for

European Studies, University of Malta.

Publisher: Institute for European Studies, Msida, Malta.

The Institute for European Studies

The Institute for European Studies is a multi-disciplinary teaching and research Institute of the University of Malta offering coursesin European Studies which fully conform to the Bologna guidelines, including an evening diploma, Bachelor degrees, a Masters andPh.D. The Institute also operates a number of Erasmus agreements for staff and student exchanges. Founded in 1992 as the EuropeanDocumentation and Research Centre (EDRC) it acquired the status of a Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence in 2004. The Institute hasalso developed links with various research networks such as the Trans European Policy Studies Association (TEPSA), LISBOAN,two Euro-Mediterranean networks EUROMESCO (the Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission) and FEMISE (ForumEuroméditerranéen des Instituts de Sciences Économiques) as well as the European Association of Development Institutes (EADI).

The research interests of its staff include comparative politics and history of the European Union (EU); EU institutions; EU externalrelations and enlargement; small states in the EU; Malta in the EU; Euro-Mediterranean Relations; Stability and Growth Pact;Economic Governance of the Euro Area; Europe 2020; EU development policies and Climate Change.

Contact Details

Jean Monnet Chair website: http://www.um.edu.mt/europeanstudies/jmceu-med/Institut for European Studies website: http://www.um.edu.mt/europeanstudiesTel: +356 2340 2001 / 2998Address: Institute for European Studies, University of Malta, Tal-Qroqq, Msida MSD2080, Malta.

Submission of PapersPapers are to be submitted to [email protected]. They are not to exceed 6,000 words including footnotes and excluding thebibliography.

CitationBerta Fernandez (2014). ‘Migration and asylum: The movement of people in the Mediterranean Region - Future scenarios and theEU response.’ Jean Monnet Occasional Papers, No.11, Institute for European Studies (Malta).

ADVISORY BOARDChair: Prof Roderick Pace

Prof Fulvio Attina Professor of International Relations and Jean Monnet Chair Ad Personam,Dipartimento di Scienze Politiche e Sociali, Università di Catania, Italy

Prof Stephen Calleya Director, Professor of International Relations, Mediterranean Academy ofDiplomatic Studies, Malta

Dr Marcello Carammia Lecturer, Institute for European Studies, University of MaltaProf Laura C. Ferreira-Pereira Associate Professor of Political Science and International Relations, School of

Social and Political Sciences, Technical University of Lisbon, PortugalProf Aylin Güney Associate Professor and Jean Monnet Chair, Department of International Relations,

Yaşar University, Izmir, TurkeyDr Mark Harwood Lecturer, Institute for European Studies, University of MaltaProf Magnús Árni Magnússon Associate Professor, Bifröst University, IcelandDr Michelle Pace Reader in Politics and International Studies, Department of Political Science and

International Studies (POLSIS), University of BirminghamDr Stelios Stavridis ARAID Researcher University of Zaragoza, SpainDr Susanne Thede Senior Lecturer, Institute for European Studies, University of MaltaProf Baldur Thorhallsson Professor of Political Science and Jean Monnet Chair in European Studies at the

Faculty of Political Science at the University of Iceland

The Jean Monnet Occasional Papers do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute for European Studies but those of the author.This project has been funded with the support from the European Commission. This publication reflects the views only of the author,and the Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein.

2

Copyright © 2014, Berta Fernandez

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any

means – electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise – without any prior written permission from the Institute for

European Studies, University of Malta.

Publisher: Institute for European Studies, Msida, Malta.

The Institute for European Studies

The Institute for European Studies is a multi-disciplinary teaching and research Institute of the University of Malta offering coursesin European Studies which fully conform to the Bologna guidelines, including an evening diploma, Bachelor degrees, a Masters andPh.D. The Institute also operates a number of Erasmus agreements for staff and student exchanges. Founded in 1992 as the EuropeanDocumentation and Research Centre (EDRC) it acquired the status of a Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence in 2004. The Institute hasalso developed links with various research networks such as the Trans European Policy Studies Association (TEPSA), LISBOAN,two Euro-Mediterranean networks EUROMESCO (the Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission) and FEMISE (ForumEuroméditerranéen des Instituts de Sciences Économiques) as well as the European Association of Development Institutes (EADI).

The research interests of its staff include comparative politics and history of the European Union (EU); EU institutions; EU externalrelations and enlargement; small states in the EU; Malta in the EU; Euro-Mediterranean Relations; Stability and Growth Pact;Economic Governance of the Euro Area; Europe 2020; EU development policies and Climate Change.

Contact Details

Jean Monnet Chair website: http://www.um.edu.mt/europeanstudies/jmceu-med/Institut for European Studies website: http://www.um.edu.mt/europeanstudiesTel: +356 2340 2001 / 2998Address: Institute for European Studies, University of Malta, Tal-Qroqq, Msida MSD2080, Malta.

Submission of PapersPapers are to be submitted to [email protected]. They are not to exceed 6,000 words including footnotes and excluding thebibliography.

CitationBerta Fernandez (2014). ‘Migration and asylum: The movement of people in the Mediterranean Region - Future scenarios and theEU response.’ Jean Monnet Occasional Papers, No.11, Institute for European Studies (Malta).

ADVISORY BOARDChair: Prof Roderick Pace

Prof Fulvio Attina Professor of International Relations and Jean Monnet Chair Ad Personam,Dipartimento di Scienze Politiche e Sociali, Università di Catania, Italy

Prof Stephen Calleya Director, Professor of International Relations, Mediterranean Academy ofDiplomatic Studies, Malta

Dr Marcello Carammia Lecturer, Institute for European Studies, University of MaltaProf Laura C. Ferreira-Pereira Associate Professor of Political Science and International Relations, School of

Social and Political Sciences, Technical University of Lisbon, PortugalProf Aylin Güney Associate Professor and Jean Monnet Chair, Department of International Relations,

Yaşar University, Izmir, TurkeyDr Mark Harwood Lecturer, Institute for European Studies, University of MaltaProf Magnús Árni Magnússon Associate Professor, Bifröst University, IcelandDr Michelle Pace Reader in Politics and International Studies, Department of Political Science and

International Studies (POLSIS), University of BirminghamDr Stelios Stavridis ARAID Researcher University of Zaragoza, SpainDr Susanne Thede Senior Lecturer, Institute for European Studies, University of MaltaProf Baldur Thorhallsson Professor of Political Science and Jean Monnet Chair in European Studies at the

Faculty of Political Science at the University of Iceland

The Jean Monnet Occasional Papers do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute for European Studies but those of the author.This project has been funded with the support from the European Commission. This publication reflects the views only of the author,and the Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein.

2

Copyright © 2014, Berta Fernandez

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any

means – electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise – without any prior written permission from the Institute for

European Studies, University of Malta.

Publisher: Institute for European Studies, Msida, Malta.

The Institute for European Studies

The Institute for European Studies is a multi-disciplinary teaching and research Institute of the University of Malta offering coursesin European Studies which fully conform to the Bologna guidelines, including an evening diploma, Bachelor degrees, a Masters andPh.D. The Institute also operates a number of Erasmus agreements for staff and student exchanges. Founded in 1992 as the EuropeanDocumentation and Research Centre (EDRC) it acquired the status of a Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence in 2004. The Institute hasalso developed links with various research networks such as the Trans European Policy Studies Association (TEPSA), LISBOAN,two Euro-Mediterranean networks EUROMESCO (the Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission) and FEMISE (ForumEuroméditerranéen des Instituts de Sciences Économiques) as well as the European Association of Development Institutes (EADI).

The research interests of its staff include comparative politics and history of the European Union (EU); EU institutions; EU externalrelations and enlargement; small states in the EU; Malta in the EU; Euro-Mediterranean Relations; Stability and Growth Pact;Economic Governance of the Euro Area; Europe 2020; EU development policies and Climate Change.

Contact Details

Jean Monnet Chair website: http://www.um.edu.mt/europeanstudies/jmceu-med/Institut for European Studies website: http://www.um.edu.mt/europeanstudiesTel: +356 2340 2001 / 2998Address: Institute for European Studies, University of Malta, Tal-Qroqq, Msida MSD2080, Malta.

Submission of PapersPapers are to be submitted to [email protected]. They are not to exceed 6,000 words including footnotes and excluding thebibliography.

CitationBerta Fernandez (2014). ‘Migration and asylum: The movement of people in the Mediterranean Region - Future scenarios and theEU response.’ Jean Monnet Occasional Papers, No.11, Institute for European Studies (Malta).

ADVISORY BOARDChair: Prof Roderick Pace

Prof Fulvio Attina Professor of International Relations and Jean Monnet Chair Ad Personam,Dipartimento di Scienze Politiche e Sociali, Università di Catania, Italy

Prof Stephen Calleya Director, Professor of International Relations, Mediterranean Academy ofDiplomatic Studies, Malta

Dr Marcello Carammia Lecturer, Institute for European Studies, University of MaltaProf Laura C. Ferreira-Pereira Associate Professor of Political Science and International Relations, School of

Social and Political Sciences, Technical University of Lisbon, PortugalProf Aylin Güney Associate Professor and Jean Monnet Chair, Department of International Relations,

Yaşar University, Izmir, TurkeyDr Mark Harwood Lecturer, Institute for European Studies, University of MaltaProf Magnús Árni Magnússon Associate Professor, Bifröst University, IcelandDr Michelle Pace Reader in Politics and International Studies, Department of Political Science and

International Studies (POLSIS), University of BirminghamDr Stelios Stavridis ARAID Researcher University of Zaragoza, SpainDr Susanne Thede Senior Lecturer, Institute for European Studies, University of MaltaProf Baldur Thorhallsson Professor of Political Science and Jean Monnet Chair in European Studies at the

Faculty of Political Science at the University of Iceland

The Jean Monnet Occasional Papers do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute for European Studies but those of the author.This project has been funded with the support from the European Commission. This publication reflects the views only of the author,and the Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein.

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i

Table of ContentsIntroduction.................................................................................................................................2

Global human mobility and the EU role: a greater coherence and convergence of policies, with

a migrant-centered approach........................................................................................................1

Mobility Partnerships and other instruments in the context of the Global Approach on

Migration and Mobility ...............................................................................................................7

Asylum in the EU and its external dimension ..............................................................................9

Conclusions .............................................................................................................................. 12

Bibliography ............................................................................................................................. 14

i

Table of ContentsIntroduction.................................................................................................................................2

Global human mobility and the EU role: a greater coherence and convergence of policies, with

a migrant-centered approach........................................................................................................1

Mobility Partnerships and other instruments in the context of the Global Approach on

Migration and Mobility ...............................................................................................................7

Asylum in the EU and its external dimension ..............................................................................9

Conclusions .............................................................................................................................. 12

Bibliography ............................................................................................................................. 14

i

Table of ContentsIntroduction.................................................................................................................................2

Global human mobility and the EU role: a greater coherence and convergence of policies, with

a migrant-centered approach........................................................................................................1

Mobility Partnerships and other instruments in the context of the Global Approach on

Migration and Mobility ...............................................................................................................7

Asylum in the EU and its external dimension ..............................................................................9

Conclusions .............................................................................................................................. 12

Bibliography ............................................................................................................................. 14

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2

Migration andasylum: Themovement ofpeople in theMediterraneanRegion - Futurescenarios andthe EU responseby Berta Fernandez Alfaro*

Introduction

In recent years, the global discussion onmigration and asylum has evolved frompolarization of perspectives and mistrust, toimproving partnerships and fosteringcooperation between countries and regions.The paradigm has shifted from control andsecurity exclusively to an increasedawareness of the ramifications of migrationin development and labour markets, theincreasing demographic gap,1 and the

*Migration and Development Expert for theIntra-ACP Migration Facility, an EU fundedproject, which aims at supporting 12 ACPpilot countries to mainstream migration intodevelopment, focusing on South-South flows.1 The world’s population reached 7.2 billionpeople (2013), of which 60 per cent lived inAsia, 15 per cent in Africa, 10 per cent in

dangers of exclusion faced by migrantworkers (regular or irregular). EasternEurope will suffer the biggest populationdecline in the coming years, and Nigeria’spopulation will reach one billion by 2100. InEurope, the work replacement ratio will betwo pensioners for one active worker. It hasbecome clear that these facts cannot beignored and that there is a need for greaterconvergence of policies (migration/mobility,fundamental rights, and economic growth),with a migrant-centred approach.2.

The assumption that Europe will remain ageopolitical and economic hub that attractsimmigrants at all skill levels might not holdwater in the long run. The evolvingdemographic and economic changes havemade it evident that the competitiveness ofthe EU (Europe 2020 Strategy) is also atstake, particularly if an adaptable workforcewith the necessary skills is not secured inview of shortfalls in skill levels and becauseof serious labour mismatches. Therefore, itis the right moment to develop morestrategic and long-term migration policiesthat take into account the evolving positionof Europe and its neighbours in the world.By the same token, labour market strategiesthat meet needs and promote integration ofregular migrants are still a pending task forthe Member States (MS) in terms of the freemovement of people, but also in relationwith neighbouring and partner countries.

Europe, 9 per cent in Latin America and theCaribbean, 5 per cent in Northern America, and1 per cent in Oceania. Eastern Europe will sufferthe biggest population decline in the comingyears, and Nigeria’s population will reach onebillion by 2100.2 Intra-ACP Migration Facility, Brussels, 2014.

2

Migration andasylum: Themovement ofpeople in theMediterraneanRegion - Futurescenarios andthe EU responseby Berta Fernandez Alfaro*

Introduction

In recent years, the global discussion onmigration and asylum has evolved frompolarization of perspectives and mistrust, toimproving partnerships and fosteringcooperation between countries and regions.The paradigm has shifted from control andsecurity exclusively to an increasedawareness of the ramifications of migrationin development and labour markets, theincreasing demographic gap,1 and the

*Migration and Development Expert for theIntra-ACP Migration Facility, an EU fundedproject, which aims at supporting 12 ACPpilot countries to mainstream migration intodevelopment, focusing on South-South flows.1 The world’s population reached 7.2 billionpeople (2013), of which 60 per cent lived inAsia, 15 per cent in Africa, 10 per cent in

dangers of exclusion faced by migrantworkers (regular or irregular). EasternEurope will suffer the biggest populationdecline in the coming years, and Nigeria’spopulation will reach one billion by 2100. InEurope, the work replacement ratio will betwo pensioners for one active worker. It hasbecome clear that these facts cannot beignored and that there is a need for greaterconvergence of policies (migration/mobility,fundamental rights, and economic growth),with a migrant-centred approach.2.

The assumption that Europe will remain ageopolitical and economic hub that attractsimmigrants at all skill levels might not holdwater in the long run. The evolvingdemographic and economic changes havemade it evident that the competitiveness ofthe EU (Europe 2020 Strategy) is also atstake, particularly if an adaptable workforcewith the necessary skills is not secured inview of shortfalls in skill levels and becauseof serious labour mismatches. Therefore, itis the right moment to develop morestrategic and long-term migration policiesthat take into account the evolving positionof Europe and its neighbours in the world.By the same token, labour market strategiesthat meet needs and promote integration ofregular migrants are still a pending task forthe Member States (MS) in terms of the freemovement of people, but also in relationwith neighbouring and partner countries.

Europe, 9 per cent in Latin America and theCaribbean, 5 per cent in Northern America, and1 per cent in Oceania. Eastern Europe will sufferthe biggest population decline in the comingyears, and Nigeria’s population will reach onebillion by 2100.2 Intra-ACP Migration Facility, Brussels, 2014.

2

Migration andasylum: Themovement ofpeople in theMediterraneanRegion - Futurescenarios andthe EU responseby Berta Fernandez Alfaro*

Introduction

In recent years, the global discussion onmigration and asylum has evolved frompolarization of perspectives and mistrust, toimproving partnerships and fosteringcooperation between countries and regions.The paradigm has shifted from control andsecurity exclusively to an increasedawareness of the ramifications of migrationin development and labour markets, theincreasing demographic gap,1 and the

*Migration and Development Expert for theIntra-ACP Migration Facility, an EU fundedproject, which aims at supporting 12 ACPpilot countries to mainstream migration intodevelopment, focusing on South-South flows.1 The world’s population reached 7.2 billionpeople (2013), of which 60 per cent lived inAsia, 15 per cent in Africa, 10 per cent in

dangers of exclusion faced by migrantworkers (regular or irregular). EasternEurope will suffer the biggest populationdecline in the coming years, and Nigeria’spopulation will reach one billion by 2100. InEurope, the work replacement ratio will betwo pensioners for one active worker. It hasbecome clear that these facts cannot beignored and that there is a need for greaterconvergence of policies (migration/mobility,fundamental rights, and economic growth),with a migrant-centred approach.2.

The assumption that Europe will remain ageopolitical and economic hub that attractsimmigrants at all skill levels might not holdwater in the long run. The evolvingdemographic and economic changes havemade it evident that the competitiveness ofthe EU (Europe 2020 Strategy) is also atstake, particularly if an adaptable workforcewith the necessary skills is not secured inview of shortfalls in skill levels and becauseof serious labour mismatches. Therefore, itis the right moment to develop morestrategic and long-term migration policiesthat take into account the evolving positionof Europe and its neighbours in the world.By the same token, labour market strategiesthat meet needs and promote integration ofregular migrants are still a pending task forthe Member States (MS) in terms of the freemovement of people, but also in relationwith neighbouring and partner countries.

Europe, 9 per cent in Latin America and theCaribbean, 5 per cent in Northern America, and1 per cent in Oceania. Eastern Europe will sufferthe biggest population decline in the comingyears, and Nigeria’s population will reach onebillion by 2100.2 Intra-ACP Migration Facility, Brussels, 2014.

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1

Global human mobility and the EU role: agreater coherence and convergence ofpolicies, with a migrant-centered approach

The link between migration and developmententered the political debate only ten years agoeven though it had been addressed in academicliterature a long time before that. In the absenceof global governance of migration, this linkattracted immense attention at the internationallevel and created momentum for the first HighLevel Dialogue on Migration and Development(HLD) under the auspices of the United Nationsin 2006,3and subsequently the Global Forum onMigration and Development (GFMD).4

3

http://www.un.org/en/ga/68/meetings/migration/about.shtml4 The GFMD is one of the most prominentinternational platforms available for States to discussmigration and development. The GFMD seeks tofoster an informal exchange of experience amongstates as well as to strengthen cooperation betweenStates and other stakeholders (internationalorganizations, civil society, and private sector) in thedomain of migration and development on a voluntarybasis. More specifically, the added-value of theGFMD consists in its focus on the inter-linkagesbetween migration and development, the fact that itsparticipating States represent all regions of the world,and in its targeted efforts to serve as a catalyst forconcrete bilateral and multilateral projects.Conceived as a process unfolding outside the UN, theForum was born on the initiative of the then UNSecretary General Kofi Annan in the follow-up to the2006 “High-level Dialogue on Migration andDevelopment“, in which the findings of the report ofthe “Global Commission on International Migration”were discussed. The GFMD is underpinned by asupporting framework composed of four differentbodies. The Chair-in-Office is responsible for thepreparatory process and the actual conduct of theForum. The Chair receives guidance and supportfrom the Troika of past, present, and future Chairs.The Steering Group, comprising 35 States, providesstrategic and political support to the GFMD. Finally,the “Friends of the Forum”, open to all UN MemberStates, ensures that all States keep pace with the

The recent GFMD, under the Swedish Chair(14-16 May, 2014) focused on how to “unlockthe potential of migration for inclusivedevelopment”.5 Protection against abuses,diaspora engagement, and honouring migrants’contribution are key elements of a discussionthat has evolved. On the road to strengthening abottom-up multilateral system with an agendafor action, it has become clearer that policychoices have to be well informed and evidence-based if migration is to be leveraged fordevelopment. This states-led forum hasfacilitated their creation of a commonunderstanding and a framework where they cancontinuously discuss migration issues andexchange best practices.

Since its creation in 2007, three EU MS(Belgium in 2007, Greece in 2009 and Swedenin 2014) and one member of the Union’s singlemarket (Switzerland in 2011)6 have hosted theForum. On July 1, 2014, a Mediterranean andEU candidate country, Turkey, will take over theChairmanship of the GFMD from Sweden for aperiod of 18 months (until December 2015)7.Traditionally a transit and source country formigration, in the past years Turkey has become

GFMD process. UN agencies and associatedinternational organizations enjoy the possibility ofobtaining observer status in this body.5 GFMD 2013-2014 Concept Paper, 30 April 2013,www.gfmd.org.6 The relations between Switzerland and theEuropean Union (EU) are based on a series ofbilateral treaties whereby the Swiss Confederationhas adopted various provisions of EU law in order toparticipate in the Union’s single market. In February2014, the Swiss voted in a referendum to introducequotas for all migrants wishing to enter Switzerland.Such a quota system would, if implemented, violatethe agreement between Switzerland and the EU onthe free movement of persons, and require therenegotiation of the various bilateral agreements ifthey are to remain in force.7 http://www.gfmd.org/meetings/turkey2014-2015#sthash.Rcex2Yup.dpuf.

1

Global human mobility and the EU role: agreater coherence and convergence ofpolicies, with a migrant-centered approach

The link between migration and developmententered the political debate only ten years agoeven though it had been addressed in academicliterature a long time before that. In the absenceof global governance of migration, this linkattracted immense attention at the internationallevel and created momentum for the first HighLevel Dialogue on Migration and Development(HLD) under the auspices of the United Nationsin 2006,3and subsequently the Global Forum onMigration and Development (GFMD).4

3

http://www.un.org/en/ga/68/meetings/migration/about.shtml4 The GFMD is one of the most prominentinternational platforms available for States to discussmigration and development. The GFMD seeks tofoster an informal exchange of experience amongstates as well as to strengthen cooperation betweenStates and other stakeholders (internationalorganizations, civil society, and private sector) in thedomain of migration and development on a voluntarybasis. More specifically, the added-value of theGFMD consists in its focus on the inter-linkagesbetween migration and development, the fact that itsparticipating States represent all regions of the world,and in its targeted efforts to serve as a catalyst forconcrete bilateral and multilateral projects.Conceived as a process unfolding outside the UN, theForum was born on the initiative of the then UNSecretary General Kofi Annan in the follow-up to the2006 “High-level Dialogue on Migration andDevelopment“, in which the findings of the report ofthe “Global Commission on International Migration”were discussed. The GFMD is underpinned by asupporting framework composed of four differentbodies. The Chair-in-Office is responsible for thepreparatory process and the actual conduct of theForum. The Chair receives guidance and supportfrom the Troika of past, present, and future Chairs.The Steering Group, comprising 35 States, providesstrategic and political support to the GFMD. Finally,the “Friends of the Forum”, open to all UN MemberStates, ensures that all States keep pace with the

The recent GFMD, under the Swedish Chair(14-16 May, 2014) focused on how to “unlockthe potential of migration for inclusivedevelopment”.5 Protection against abuses,diaspora engagement, and honouring migrants’contribution are key elements of a discussionthat has evolved. On the road to strengthening abottom-up multilateral system with an agendafor action, it has become clearer that policychoices have to be well informed and evidence-based if migration is to be leveraged fordevelopment. This states-led forum hasfacilitated their creation of a commonunderstanding and a framework where they cancontinuously discuss migration issues andexchange best practices.

Since its creation in 2007, three EU MS(Belgium in 2007, Greece in 2009 and Swedenin 2014) and one member of the Union’s singlemarket (Switzerland in 2011)6 have hosted theForum. On July 1, 2014, a Mediterranean andEU candidate country, Turkey, will take over theChairmanship of the GFMD from Sweden for aperiod of 18 months (until December 2015)7.Traditionally a transit and source country formigration, in the past years Turkey has become

GFMD process. UN agencies and associatedinternational organizations enjoy the possibility ofobtaining observer status in this body.5 GFMD 2013-2014 Concept Paper, 30 April 2013,www.gfmd.org.6 The relations between Switzerland and theEuropean Union (EU) are based on a series ofbilateral treaties whereby the Swiss Confederationhas adopted various provisions of EU law in order toparticipate in the Union’s single market. In February2014, the Swiss voted in a referendum to introducequotas for all migrants wishing to enter Switzerland.Such a quota system would, if implemented, violatethe agreement between Switzerland and the EU onthe free movement of persons, and require therenegotiation of the various bilateral agreements ifthey are to remain in force.7 http://www.gfmd.org/meetings/turkey2014-2015#sthash.Rcex2Yup.dpuf.

1

Global human mobility and the EU role: agreater coherence and convergence ofpolicies, with a migrant-centered approach

The link between migration and developmententered the political debate only ten years agoeven though it had been addressed in academicliterature a long time before that. In the absenceof global governance of migration, this linkattracted immense attention at the internationallevel and created momentum for the first HighLevel Dialogue on Migration and Development(HLD) under the auspices of the United Nationsin 2006,3and subsequently the Global Forum onMigration and Development (GFMD).4

3

http://www.un.org/en/ga/68/meetings/migration/about.shtml4 The GFMD is one of the most prominentinternational platforms available for States to discussmigration and development. The GFMD seeks tofoster an informal exchange of experience amongstates as well as to strengthen cooperation betweenStates and other stakeholders (internationalorganizations, civil society, and private sector) in thedomain of migration and development on a voluntarybasis. More specifically, the added-value of theGFMD consists in its focus on the inter-linkagesbetween migration and development, the fact that itsparticipating States represent all regions of the world,and in its targeted efforts to serve as a catalyst forconcrete bilateral and multilateral projects.Conceived as a process unfolding outside the UN, theForum was born on the initiative of the then UNSecretary General Kofi Annan in the follow-up to the2006 “High-level Dialogue on Migration andDevelopment“, in which the findings of the report ofthe “Global Commission on International Migration”were discussed. The GFMD is underpinned by asupporting framework composed of four differentbodies. The Chair-in-Office is responsible for thepreparatory process and the actual conduct of theForum. The Chair receives guidance and supportfrom the Troika of past, present, and future Chairs.The Steering Group, comprising 35 States, providesstrategic and political support to the GFMD. Finally,the “Friends of the Forum”, open to all UN MemberStates, ensures that all States keep pace with the

The recent GFMD, under the Swedish Chair(14-16 May, 2014) focused on how to “unlockthe potential of migration for inclusivedevelopment”.5 Protection against abuses,diaspora engagement, and honouring migrants’contribution are key elements of a discussionthat has evolved. On the road to strengthening abottom-up multilateral system with an agendafor action, it has become clearer that policychoices have to be well informed and evidence-based if migration is to be leveraged fordevelopment. This states-led forum hasfacilitated their creation of a commonunderstanding and a framework where they cancontinuously discuss migration issues andexchange best practices.

Since its creation in 2007, three EU MS(Belgium in 2007, Greece in 2009 and Swedenin 2014) and one member of the Union’s singlemarket (Switzerland in 2011)6 have hosted theForum. On July 1, 2014, a Mediterranean andEU candidate country, Turkey, will take over theChairmanship of the GFMD from Sweden for aperiod of 18 months (until December 2015)7.Traditionally a transit and source country formigration, in the past years Turkey has become

GFMD process. UN agencies and associatedinternational organizations enjoy the possibility ofobtaining observer status in this body.5 GFMD 2013-2014 Concept Paper, 30 April 2013,www.gfmd.org.6 The relations between Switzerland and theEuropean Union (EU) are based on a series ofbilateral treaties whereby the Swiss Confederationhas adopted various provisions of EU law in order toparticipate in the Union’s single market. In February2014, the Swiss voted in a referendum to introducequotas for all migrants wishing to enter Switzerland.Such a quota system would, if implemented, violatethe agreement between Switzerland and the EU onthe free movement of persons, and require therenegotiation of the various bilateral agreements ifthey are to remain in force.7 http://www.gfmd.org/meetings/turkey2014-2015#sthash.Rcex2Yup.dpuf.

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2

an attractive destination country due to itseconomic growth and social development.

One main focus within the GFMD has been onpromoting policy coherence between migrationand development, with a view to mainstreamingmigration into development policy anddevelopment into migration policy. On the onehand, these discussions have concernedinstitutional issues such as finding the rightstructures and lines of communication withingovernments and beyond in relation to otherstakeholders (including the involvement of civilsociety). On the other hand, they have focusedon policy. Recommendations have includedformulating national policy and action plans onhow to promote the synergies between migrationand development. Efforts have includedmainstreaming migration into activities toachieve the Millennium Development Goals(MDGs),8 or other development initiatives, withthe ultimate goal of including migration inbroader national development planningprocesses, in the formulation of countrystrategies for bilateral development cooperationas well as in sectorial planning.

The GFMD has a parallel civil society forum,which is gaining momentum in promoting thehuman rights of migrants, and giving a strongervoice to migrants and diaspora. During theGFMD in Stockholm a new migration anddevelopment civil society network (“MADE”)9

was launched with a five-year action plan, whichadvocates:

Safe labour migration and reform of the

8 When reference is made to the MDGs, specialrecognition must be made to migrants as agents ofdevelopment, epitomizing the freedom to genuinelystrive to achieve the kind of life they aspire to forthemselves and their families. By moving fromcountries with a low human development index(HDI) to a higher HDI country, migrants experience a15-fold increase in income; a doubling in educationenrollment rate; and a 16-fold reduction in childmortality.9 www.madenetwork.org

migrant worker recruitment industry.; Migrants and diaspora as entrepreneurs,

social investors, and policy advocatesand partners , for human development incountries of origin, heritage anddestination;

Rights-based global governance ofmigration and development andensuring that migration and migrants’positive potential contribution todevelopment is recognized and upheldin the post-2015 agenda;

Protection of migrant rights, en routeand in countries of destination.

Recently, the issue of South-South migrationand development policies was discussed in-depth in the GFMD process. The focus was onmost recent data reflecting the full range ofhuman mobility in the South-South context,including related drivers of such migration;harnessing the development potential of labourmobility among countries, governance capacitygaps, and environment-induced migration. Anumber of policy guidance tools have beendeveloped, including tools for mainstreamingmigration into development planning; arepository of migration profiles as well as ahandbook on engaging the diaspora fordevelopment. In order to promote the inclusionof migration in the Post-2015 DevelopmentAgenda, the GFMD has pointed to the need ofindicators to measure and monitor the concreteeffects of migration on specific developmentoutcomes (e.g. current MDGs).10 In this context,migration is considered as an “enabler” ofdevelopment in countries of origin, mainly dueto the weight of remittances in GDP, but alsobecause of its catalytic role for improvingmigrants’ skills, thus empowering them as activemembers of their own diaspora.

10 Thematic Recollection from the GFMD 2007-2012, GMFD (2013).

2

an attractive destination country due to itseconomic growth and social development.

One main focus within the GFMD has been onpromoting policy coherence between migrationand development, with a view to mainstreamingmigration into development policy anddevelopment into migration policy. On the onehand, these discussions have concernedinstitutional issues such as finding the rightstructures and lines of communication withingovernments and beyond in relation to otherstakeholders (including the involvement of civilsociety). On the other hand, they have focusedon policy. Recommendations have includedformulating national policy and action plans onhow to promote the synergies between migrationand development. Efforts have includedmainstreaming migration into activities toachieve the Millennium Development Goals(MDGs),8 or other development initiatives, withthe ultimate goal of including migration inbroader national development planningprocesses, in the formulation of countrystrategies for bilateral development cooperationas well as in sectorial planning.

The GFMD has a parallel civil society forum,which is gaining momentum in promoting thehuman rights of migrants, and giving a strongervoice to migrants and diaspora. During theGFMD in Stockholm a new migration anddevelopment civil society network (“MADE”)9

was launched with a five-year action plan, whichadvocates:

Safe labour migration and reform of the

8 When reference is made to the MDGs, specialrecognition must be made to migrants as agents ofdevelopment, epitomizing the freedom to genuinelystrive to achieve the kind of life they aspire to forthemselves and their families. By moving fromcountries with a low human development index(HDI) to a higher HDI country, migrants experience a15-fold increase in income; a doubling in educationenrollment rate; and a 16-fold reduction in childmortality.9 www.madenetwork.org

migrant worker recruitment industry.; Migrants and diaspora as entrepreneurs,

social investors, and policy advocatesand partners , for human development incountries of origin, heritage anddestination;

Rights-based global governance ofmigration and development andensuring that migration and migrants’positive potential contribution todevelopment is recognized and upheldin the post-2015 agenda;

Protection of migrant rights, en routeand in countries of destination.

Recently, the issue of South-South migrationand development policies was discussed in-depth in the GFMD process. The focus was onmost recent data reflecting the full range ofhuman mobility in the South-South context,including related drivers of such migration;harnessing the development potential of labourmobility among countries, governance capacitygaps, and environment-induced migration. Anumber of policy guidance tools have beendeveloped, including tools for mainstreamingmigration into development planning; arepository of migration profiles as well as ahandbook on engaging the diaspora fordevelopment. In order to promote the inclusionof migration in the Post-2015 DevelopmentAgenda, the GFMD has pointed to the need ofindicators to measure and monitor the concreteeffects of migration on specific developmentoutcomes (e.g. current MDGs).10 In this context,migration is considered as an “enabler” ofdevelopment in countries of origin, mainly dueto the weight of remittances in GDP, but alsobecause of its catalytic role for improvingmigrants’ skills, thus empowering them as activemembers of their own diaspora.

10 Thematic Recollection from the GFMD 2007-2012, GMFD (2013).

2

an attractive destination country due to itseconomic growth and social development.

One main focus within the GFMD has been onpromoting policy coherence between migrationand development, with a view to mainstreamingmigration into development policy anddevelopment into migration policy. On the onehand, these discussions have concernedinstitutional issues such as finding the rightstructures and lines of communication withingovernments and beyond in relation to otherstakeholders (including the involvement of civilsociety). On the other hand, they have focusedon policy. Recommendations have includedformulating national policy and action plans onhow to promote the synergies between migrationand development. Efforts have includedmainstreaming migration into activities toachieve the Millennium Development Goals(MDGs),8 or other development initiatives, withthe ultimate goal of including migration inbroader national development planningprocesses, in the formulation of countrystrategies for bilateral development cooperationas well as in sectorial planning.

The GFMD has a parallel civil society forum,which is gaining momentum in promoting thehuman rights of migrants, and giving a strongervoice to migrants and diaspora. During theGFMD in Stockholm a new migration anddevelopment civil society network (“MADE”)9

was launched with a five-year action plan, whichadvocates:

Safe labour migration and reform of the

8 When reference is made to the MDGs, specialrecognition must be made to migrants as agents ofdevelopment, epitomizing the freedom to genuinelystrive to achieve the kind of life they aspire to forthemselves and their families. By moving fromcountries with a low human development index(HDI) to a higher HDI country, migrants experience a15-fold increase in income; a doubling in educationenrollment rate; and a 16-fold reduction in childmortality.9 www.madenetwork.org

migrant worker recruitment industry.; Migrants and diaspora as entrepreneurs,

social investors, and policy advocatesand partners , for human development incountries of origin, heritage anddestination;

Rights-based global governance ofmigration and development andensuring that migration and migrants’positive potential contribution todevelopment is recognized and upheldin the post-2015 agenda;

Protection of migrant rights, en routeand in countries of destination.

Recently, the issue of South-South migrationand development policies was discussed in-depth in the GFMD process. The focus was onmost recent data reflecting the full range ofhuman mobility in the South-South context,including related drivers of such migration;harnessing the development potential of labourmobility among countries, governance capacitygaps, and environment-induced migration. Anumber of policy guidance tools have beendeveloped, including tools for mainstreamingmigration into development planning; arepository of migration profiles as well as ahandbook on engaging the diaspora fordevelopment. In order to promote the inclusionof migration in the Post-2015 DevelopmentAgenda, the GFMD has pointed to the need ofindicators to measure and monitor the concreteeffects of migration on specific developmentoutcomes (e.g. current MDGs).10 In this context,migration is considered as an “enabler” ofdevelopment in countries of origin, mainly dueto the weight of remittances in GDP, but alsobecause of its catalytic role for improvingmigrants’ skills, thus empowering them as activemembers of their own diaspora.

10 Thematic Recollection from the GFMD 2007-2012, GMFD (2013).

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In the Southern Mediterranean region, there areseveral countries that are actively discussing thisissue on a national level. Algeria is analysing thetopic of “participatory monitoring foraccountability”; Jordan and Tunisia are lookinginto how to improve “partnerships with civilsociety”; Turkey is thinking of new ways to“engage with the private sector”; and Morocco isfocusing on “culture and development”.

Source: The World We Want, UNDG 2014

This approach of working together on issues thatenjoy consensus has proven beneficial forbuilding trust and moving the agenda forwardnot only in the framework of the GFMD, butalso in the HLD.Among the issues that attracted interest inpractical collaboration during the HLD11 were:

Portability of benefits accrued bymigrants while working abroad;

Reining in abusive recruitment practicesby establishing a voluntary set ofground-rules for internationalrecruitment (IRIS)12;

11 Newland Kathleen (2013).

12 The International Recruitment Integrity System

Strengthening protection for migrantdomestic workers;

Involving diasporas more deeply indevelopment work;

Creating an agreed framework forprotecting and assisting migrants caughtup in crises;

Creating a place for migration in thepost-2015 Development Agenda.

The EU is playing quite an active role in theGFMD, as it did in the HLD ofNovember 2013,by contributing financially on a regular basis andworking with MS to speak with one voice,increasing the effectiveness of its external actionand developing a shared vision that includes thebroader term of “mobility”. In addition to thedelivery of EU statements at the GFMD annual

(IRIS) is an international voluntary “ethicalrecruitment” framework that benefits all stakeholdersin the labour migration process. IRIS will provide aplatform for addressing unfair recruitment and bridgeinternational regulatory gaps governing labourrecruitment in countries of origin and destination.IRIS aims to create a public-private alliance of like-minded governments, employers, recruiters and otherpartners committed to ethical recruitment. It willdevelop a voluntary accreditation framework so thatits members can be recognized as bona fide fairrecruiters and distinguish themselves fromunscrupulous intermediaries. Accreditation will bebased on adherence to common principles for ethicalrecruitment and a code of conduct which willinclude: a) No fee charging to job seekers, b) Noretention of workers’ passports or identitydocuments, and c) A requirement for transparency intheir labour supply chain. Job seekers will have betterinformation regarding ethical recruitment through aninformation portal and publicly available roster ofaccredited IRIS members internationally. IRIS willadminister a complaints and referral mechanism toassist victims of unethical or illegal recruiters to filegrievances with the appropriate authorities. For moreinformation: http://iris.iom.int

3

In the Southern Mediterranean region, there areseveral countries that are actively discussing thisissue on a national level. Algeria is analysing thetopic of “participatory monitoring foraccountability”; Jordan and Tunisia are lookinginto how to improve “partnerships with civilsociety”; Turkey is thinking of new ways to“engage with the private sector”; and Morocco isfocusing on “culture and development”.

Source: The World We Want, UNDG 2014

This approach of working together on issues thatenjoy consensus has proven beneficial forbuilding trust and moving the agenda forwardnot only in the framework of the GFMD, butalso in the HLD.Among the issues that attracted interest inpractical collaboration during the HLD11 were:

Portability of benefits accrued bymigrants while working abroad;

Reining in abusive recruitment practicesby establishing a voluntary set ofground-rules for internationalrecruitment (IRIS)12;

11 Newland Kathleen (2013).

12 The International Recruitment Integrity System

Strengthening protection for migrantdomestic workers;

Involving diasporas more deeply indevelopment work;

Creating an agreed framework forprotecting and assisting migrants caughtup in crises;

Creating a place for migration in thepost-2015 Development Agenda.

The EU is playing quite an active role in theGFMD, as it did in the HLD ofNovember 2013,by contributing financially on a regular basis andworking with MS to speak with one voice,increasing the effectiveness of its external actionand developing a shared vision that includes thebroader term of “mobility”. In addition to thedelivery of EU statements at the GFMD annual

(IRIS) is an international voluntary “ethicalrecruitment” framework that benefits all stakeholdersin the labour migration process. IRIS will provide aplatform for addressing unfair recruitment and bridgeinternational regulatory gaps governing labourrecruitment in countries of origin and destination.IRIS aims to create a public-private alliance of like-minded governments, employers, recruiters and otherpartners committed to ethical recruitment. It willdevelop a voluntary accreditation framework so thatits members can be recognized as bona fide fairrecruiters and distinguish themselves fromunscrupulous intermediaries. Accreditation will bebased on adherence to common principles for ethicalrecruitment and a code of conduct which willinclude: a) No fee charging to job seekers, b) Noretention of workers’ passports or identitydocuments, and c) A requirement for transparency intheir labour supply chain. Job seekers will have betterinformation regarding ethical recruitment through aninformation portal and publicly available roster ofaccredited IRIS members internationally. IRIS willadminister a complaints and referral mechanism toassist victims of unethical or illegal recruiters to filegrievances with the appropriate authorities. For moreinformation: http://iris.iom.int

3

In the Southern Mediterranean region, there areseveral countries that are actively discussing thisissue on a national level. Algeria is analysing thetopic of “participatory monitoring foraccountability”; Jordan and Tunisia are lookinginto how to improve “partnerships with civilsociety”; Turkey is thinking of new ways to“engage with the private sector”; and Morocco isfocusing on “culture and development”.

Source: The World We Want, UNDG 2014

This approach of working together on issues thatenjoy consensus has proven beneficial forbuilding trust and moving the agenda forwardnot only in the framework of the GFMD, butalso in the HLD.Among the issues that attracted interest inpractical collaboration during the HLD11 were:

Portability of benefits accrued bymigrants while working abroad;

Reining in abusive recruitment practicesby establishing a voluntary set ofground-rules for internationalrecruitment (IRIS)12;

11 Newland Kathleen (2013).

12 The International Recruitment Integrity System

Strengthening protection for migrantdomestic workers;

Involving diasporas more deeply indevelopment work;

Creating an agreed framework forprotecting and assisting migrants caughtup in crises;

Creating a place for migration in thepost-2015 Development Agenda.

The EU is playing quite an active role in theGFMD, as it did in the HLD ofNovember 2013,by contributing financially on a regular basis andworking with MS to speak with one voice,increasing the effectiveness of its external actionand developing a shared vision that includes thebroader term of “mobility”. In addition to thedelivery of EU statements at the GFMD annual

(IRIS) is an international voluntary “ethicalrecruitment” framework that benefits all stakeholdersin the labour migration process. IRIS will provide aplatform for addressing unfair recruitment and bridgeinternational regulatory gaps governing labourrecruitment in countries of origin and destination.IRIS aims to create a public-private alliance of like-minded governments, employers, recruiters and otherpartners committed to ethical recruitment. It willdevelop a voluntary accreditation framework so thatits members can be recognized as bona fide fairrecruiters and distinguish themselves fromunscrupulous intermediaries. Accreditation will bebased on adherence to common principles for ethicalrecruitment and a code of conduct which willinclude: a) No fee charging to job seekers, b) Noretention of workers’ passports or identitydocuments, and c) A requirement for transparency intheir labour supply chain. Job seekers will have betterinformation regarding ethical recruitment through aninformation portal and publicly available roster ofaccredited IRIS members internationally. IRIS willadminister a complaints and referral mechanism toassist victims of unethical or illegal recruiters to filegrievances with the appropriate authorities. For moreinformation: http://iris.iom.int

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4

meetings, its thematic contributions focusednotably on labour mobility (2007 in Belgium),the role of diaspora organisations fordevelopment (2008 in the Philippines), thepromotion of the concept of national MigrationProfiles as a basis for evidence-based migrationpolicy (2009 in Greece), circular migration andthe promotion of new forms of globalpartnerships, including mobility partnerships(2010 in Mexico) and addressing irregularmigration through coherent migration anddevelopment strategies (2011 in Switzerland).13

The link between migration and development ispresent in numerous official EU documents,such as the European Pact on Migration andAsylum, the European NeighbourhoodInstrument, the Cotonou Agreement, the JointAfrica-EU Strategy (and the so-called ThematicPartnership on Migration, Mobility andEmployment), and most importantly, the GlobalApproach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM).

The EU’s vision has been expressed at theGAMM (2011), as the “overarching frameworkof the EU’s external migration and asylumpolicy” that helps the EU and its MS to focus onconcrete and operational results. Two examplesof those results are the facilitation ofinternational labour mobility, and the inclusionof migration in the post-2015 developmentagenda. During the GFMD in Stockholm, thenewly developed Migration and DevelopmentPolicy and Practice Database will be launched,which includes numerous EU MS examples.

The Commission believes that “the GAMMshould be truly global. Dialogue and cooperationon migration issues should be pursued across theglobe with all interested and relevant partners

13http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un_geneva/eu_un_geneva/migration_asylum/gfmd/index_en.htm

based on their and the EU’s respectivepriorities”.14 One could argue that this statementarises from the realization that the world hasbecome an irremediably interdependent space.Political change and instability; climate change,better transport and communications; gaps inliving and working conditions; a populationdeficit (or bonus);15 the role of diaspora indevelopment and business creation; andincreased labour shortages in formal andinformal markets are some of the factorsinfluencing migration flows. It is in this lightthat the EC recognized that Home Affairs issuesneeded to be embedded in the EU’s overallexternal policy and vice versa16, in an effort tointroduce some consistency and coherence, butmost importantly, to anticipate future policyneeds and steer the EU boat towards safershores. In order for the freedom of movement towork properly, be credible, and build uponcitizens’ trust, the EC stresses that Europeaninternal security is intrinsically linked to the EU

14 Communication from the Commission COM(2011)743 final, 18.11.2011.15 “The United Nations Population Division hasdramatically revised its projections for what willhappen in the next 90 years. The populations of mostrich countries will shrink and age (with a fewimportant exceptions), poorer countries will expandrapidly and, maybe most significant of all, Africa willsee a population explosion nearly unprecedented inhuman history. (…) the world of 2100 will look verydifferent than today’s, with implications foreveryone. It will be a place where today's dominant,developed economies will be increasingly focused onsupporting the elderly, where the least developedcountries are transformed by population booms andwhere Africa, for better or worse, is more importantthan ever.” Excerpt from the article “The amazing,surprising, Africa-driven future of the Earth, in 9charts”, by Max Fisher, Washington Post blogs, 16July 2013.16 Communication from the Commission COM(2014) 154 final, 11.3.2014.

4

meetings, its thematic contributions focusednotably on labour mobility (2007 in Belgium),the role of diaspora organisations fordevelopment (2008 in the Philippines), thepromotion of the concept of national MigrationProfiles as a basis for evidence-based migrationpolicy (2009 in Greece), circular migration andthe promotion of new forms of globalpartnerships, including mobility partnerships(2010 in Mexico) and addressing irregularmigration through coherent migration anddevelopment strategies (2011 in Switzerland).13

The link between migration and development ispresent in numerous official EU documents,such as the European Pact on Migration andAsylum, the European NeighbourhoodInstrument, the Cotonou Agreement, the JointAfrica-EU Strategy (and the so-called ThematicPartnership on Migration, Mobility andEmployment), and most importantly, the GlobalApproach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM).

The EU’s vision has been expressed at theGAMM (2011), as the “overarching frameworkof the EU’s external migration and asylumpolicy” that helps the EU and its MS to focus onconcrete and operational results. Two examplesof those results are the facilitation ofinternational labour mobility, and the inclusionof migration in the post-2015 developmentagenda. During the GFMD in Stockholm, thenewly developed Migration and DevelopmentPolicy and Practice Database will be launched,which includes numerous EU MS examples.

The Commission believes that “the GAMMshould be truly global. Dialogue and cooperationon migration issues should be pursued across theglobe with all interested and relevant partners

13http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un_geneva/eu_un_geneva/migration_asylum/gfmd/index_en.htm

based on their and the EU’s respectivepriorities”.14 One could argue that this statementarises from the realization that the world hasbecome an irremediably interdependent space.Political change and instability; climate change,better transport and communications; gaps inliving and working conditions; a populationdeficit (or bonus);15 the role of diaspora indevelopment and business creation; andincreased labour shortages in formal andinformal markets are some of the factorsinfluencing migration flows. It is in this lightthat the EC recognized that Home Affairs issuesneeded to be embedded in the EU’s overallexternal policy and vice versa16, in an effort tointroduce some consistency and coherence, butmost importantly, to anticipate future policyneeds and steer the EU boat towards safershores. In order for the freedom of movement towork properly, be credible, and build uponcitizens’ trust, the EC stresses that Europeaninternal security is intrinsically linked to the EU

14 Communication from the Commission COM(2011)743 final, 18.11.2011.15 “The United Nations Population Division hasdramatically revised its projections for what willhappen in the next 90 years. The populations of mostrich countries will shrink and age (with a fewimportant exceptions), poorer countries will expandrapidly and, maybe most significant of all, Africa willsee a population explosion nearly unprecedented inhuman history. (…) the world of 2100 will look verydifferent than today’s, with implications foreveryone. It will be a place where today's dominant,developed economies will be increasingly focused onsupporting the elderly, where the least developedcountries are transformed by population booms andwhere Africa, for better or worse, is more importantthan ever.” Excerpt from the article “The amazing,surprising, Africa-driven future of the Earth, in 9charts”, by Max Fisher, Washington Post blogs, 16July 2013.16 Communication from the Commission COM(2014) 154 final, 11.3.2014.

4

meetings, its thematic contributions focusednotably on labour mobility (2007 in Belgium),the role of diaspora organisations fordevelopment (2008 in the Philippines), thepromotion of the concept of national MigrationProfiles as a basis for evidence-based migrationpolicy (2009 in Greece), circular migration andthe promotion of new forms of globalpartnerships, including mobility partnerships(2010 in Mexico) and addressing irregularmigration through coherent migration anddevelopment strategies (2011 in Switzerland).13

The link between migration and development ispresent in numerous official EU documents,such as the European Pact on Migration andAsylum, the European NeighbourhoodInstrument, the Cotonou Agreement, the JointAfrica-EU Strategy (and the so-called ThematicPartnership on Migration, Mobility andEmployment), and most importantly, the GlobalApproach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM).

The EU’s vision has been expressed at theGAMM (2011), as the “overarching frameworkof the EU’s external migration and asylumpolicy” that helps the EU and its MS to focus onconcrete and operational results. Two examplesof those results are the facilitation ofinternational labour mobility, and the inclusionof migration in the post-2015 developmentagenda. During the GFMD in Stockholm, thenewly developed Migration and DevelopmentPolicy and Practice Database will be launched,which includes numerous EU MS examples.

The Commission believes that “the GAMMshould be truly global. Dialogue and cooperationon migration issues should be pursued across theglobe with all interested and relevant partners

13http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un_geneva/eu_un_geneva/migration_asylum/gfmd/index_en.htm

based on their and the EU’s respectivepriorities”.14 One could argue that this statementarises from the realization that the world hasbecome an irremediably interdependent space.Political change and instability; climate change,better transport and communications; gaps inliving and working conditions; a populationdeficit (or bonus);15 the role of diaspora indevelopment and business creation; andincreased labour shortages in formal andinformal markets are some of the factorsinfluencing migration flows. It is in this lightthat the EC recognized that Home Affairs issuesneeded to be embedded in the EU’s overallexternal policy and vice versa16, in an effort tointroduce some consistency and coherence, butmost importantly, to anticipate future policyneeds and steer the EU boat towards safershores. In order for the freedom of movement towork properly, be credible, and build uponcitizens’ trust, the EC stresses that Europeaninternal security is intrinsically linked to the EU

14 Communication from the Commission COM(2011)743 final, 18.11.2011.15 “The United Nations Population Division hasdramatically revised its projections for what willhappen in the next 90 years. The populations of mostrich countries will shrink and age (with a fewimportant exceptions), poorer countries will expandrapidly and, maybe most significant of all, Africa willsee a population explosion nearly unprecedented inhuman history. (…) the world of 2100 will look verydifferent than today’s, with implications foreveryone. It will be a place where today's dominant,developed economies will be increasingly focused onsupporting the elderly, where the least developedcountries are transformed by population booms andwhere Africa, for better or worse, is more importantthan ever.” Excerpt from the article “The amazing,surprising, Africa-driven future of the Earth, in 9charts”, by Max Fisher, Washington Post blogs, 16July 2013.16 Communication from the Commission COM(2014) 154 final, 11.3.2014.

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borders, and dependent on stronger cooperationand partnership with third countries.

At the same time, the GAMM takes a “migrant-centred approach” in the sense that “humanrights of migrants are a crosscutting dimensionof relevance to all four pillars of GAMM”.17 Forthe first time, it is clearly acknowledged that therelevance and sustainability of policies dependon their capacity to respond to the aspirationsand problems of migrants, who are seen not as aburden but as contributors to the labour market,possessing an entrepreneurial spirit of sorts.

In the wake of the HLD, Sir Peter D.Sutherland18 underlined that “the internationalcommunity is slowly leaving behind outmodednotions about human mobility to accept therestless and inventive nature of the human spirit.The current patchwork system of internationalmobility just does not work, since it empowersthe wrong people (traffickers, abusive employersand officials, etc.), undermines the human andlabour rights of migrants, depletes public trust ineffectiveness of the government, andundermines our ability to design policies toachieve development goals. That is why it isbeing revised, to catch up with theadvancements in the domain of movement ofcapital, goods and information”.19

Internationally, progress has been made on thenormative front with the entry into force of theUN Convention on Transnational OrganizedCrime and its supplementary Protocols onSmuggling and Trafficking (2000), the UNConvention on the protection of the humanrights of migrant workers and their families

17 Ibid.18 Special Representative of the UN SecretaryGeneral on Migration and Development.19 Migration (#3-2013), UN Chronicle.

(2003) and the ILO (International LabourOrganziation) Domestic Workers Convention(C.189). Only Germany and Italy have ratifiedC.189, and not all MS have ratified the 2000Convention and its supplementary Protocols,probably because a new EU Directive ontrafficking (2011) was in the making.20 As majordestination countries, most EU MS have notratified the 2003 UN Convention, whichregulates issues such as detention, massdeportations, etc. for regular and irregularmigrants. It is also worth noting that the numberof countries that ratified the second Conventionbut have not yet reported to date is quite high.21

However, the EU relies on the Charter ofFundamental Rights in ensuring the fulfillmentof international human rights obligations. TheCharter is binding on the EU institutions whenadopting and implementing legislation, as wellas on the MS when they act within the scope ofthe EU law, and it also incorporates “Europeanvalues”.22. In the international arena, themonitoring bodies of the other internationalHuman Rights Treaties23 ask States to report onhuman rights of migrants in relation to thoseinstruments, facilitating the task of gatheringinformation on human rights abuses. In thiscontext, Commissioner Malmström24 highlighted

20 Directive of the European Parliament and of theCouncil 2011/36/EU of 5 April 2011.21 “Preliminary Statement on the Report of the HighCommissioner for Human Rights on Strengtheningthe United Nations Human Rights Treaty BodySystem”, Committee on the Protection of the HumanRights of Migrant Workers and their Families,Seventeenth Session, 10-14 September 2012.22 COM (2014) 154 final, 11.3.2014.23 Convention against Torture and other Cruel,Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment(CAT), International Covenants on Civil and PoliticalRights/Economic, Social and Cultural Rights(ICCPR, ICESC), Convention on the Rights of theChild (CRC), International Convention on theElimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination(CERD), and Convention on the Elimination ofDiscrimination Against Women (CEDAW).24 Malmström, Cecilia, 2013.

5

borders, and dependent on stronger cooperationand partnership with third countries.

At the same time, the GAMM takes a “migrant-centred approach” in the sense that “humanrights of migrants are a crosscutting dimensionof relevance to all four pillars of GAMM”.17 Forthe first time, it is clearly acknowledged that therelevance and sustainability of policies dependon their capacity to respond to the aspirationsand problems of migrants, who are seen not as aburden but as contributors to the labour market,possessing an entrepreneurial spirit of sorts.

In the wake of the HLD, Sir Peter D.Sutherland18 underlined that “the internationalcommunity is slowly leaving behind outmodednotions about human mobility to accept therestless and inventive nature of the human spirit.The current patchwork system of internationalmobility just does not work, since it empowersthe wrong people (traffickers, abusive employersand officials, etc.), undermines the human andlabour rights of migrants, depletes public trust ineffectiveness of the government, andundermines our ability to design policies toachieve development goals. That is why it isbeing revised, to catch up with theadvancements in the domain of movement ofcapital, goods and information”.19

Internationally, progress has been made on thenormative front with the entry into force of theUN Convention on Transnational OrganizedCrime and its supplementary Protocols onSmuggling and Trafficking (2000), the UNConvention on the protection of the humanrights of migrant workers and their families

17 Ibid.18 Special Representative of the UN SecretaryGeneral on Migration and Development.19 Migration (#3-2013), UN Chronicle.

(2003) and the ILO (International LabourOrganziation) Domestic Workers Convention(C.189). Only Germany and Italy have ratifiedC.189, and not all MS have ratified the 2000Convention and its supplementary Protocols,probably because a new EU Directive ontrafficking (2011) was in the making.20 As majordestination countries, most EU MS have notratified the 2003 UN Convention, whichregulates issues such as detention, massdeportations, etc. for regular and irregularmigrants. It is also worth noting that the numberof countries that ratified the second Conventionbut have not yet reported to date is quite high.21

However, the EU relies on the Charter ofFundamental Rights in ensuring the fulfillmentof international human rights obligations. TheCharter is binding on the EU institutions whenadopting and implementing legislation, as wellas on the MS when they act within the scope ofthe EU law, and it also incorporates “Europeanvalues”.22. In the international arena, themonitoring bodies of the other internationalHuman Rights Treaties23 ask States to report onhuman rights of migrants in relation to thoseinstruments, facilitating the task of gatheringinformation on human rights abuses. In thiscontext, Commissioner Malmström24 highlighted

20 Directive of the European Parliament and of theCouncil 2011/36/EU of 5 April 2011.21 “Preliminary Statement on the Report of the HighCommissioner for Human Rights on Strengtheningthe United Nations Human Rights Treaty BodySystem”, Committee on the Protection of the HumanRights of Migrant Workers and their Families,Seventeenth Session, 10-14 September 2012.22 COM (2014) 154 final, 11.3.2014.23 Convention against Torture and other Cruel,Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment(CAT), International Covenants on Civil and PoliticalRights/Economic, Social and Cultural Rights(ICCPR, ICESC), Convention on the Rights of theChild (CRC), International Convention on theElimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination(CERD), and Convention on the Elimination ofDiscrimination Against Women (CEDAW).24 Malmström, Cecilia, 2013.

5

borders, and dependent on stronger cooperationand partnership with third countries.

At the same time, the GAMM takes a “migrant-centred approach” in the sense that “humanrights of migrants are a crosscutting dimensionof relevance to all four pillars of GAMM”.17 Forthe first time, it is clearly acknowledged that therelevance and sustainability of policies dependon their capacity to respond to the aspirationsand problems of migrants, who are seen not as aburden but as contributors to the labour market,possessing an entrepreneurial spirit of sorts.

In the wake of the HLD, Sir Peter D.Sutherland18 underlined that “the internationalcommunity is slowly leaving behind outmodednotions about human mobility to accept therestless and inventive nature of the human spirit.The current patchwork system of internationalmobility just does not work, since it empowersthe wrong people (traffickers, abusive employersand officials, etc.), undermines the human andlabour rights of migrants, depletes public trust ineffectiveness of the government, andundermines our ability to design policies toachieve development goals. That is why it isbeing revised, to catch up with theadvancements in the domain of movement ofcapital, goods and information”.19

Internationally, progress has been made on thenormative front with the entry into force of theUN Convention on Transnational OrganizedCrime and its supplementary Protocols onSmuggling and Trafficking (2000), the UNConvention on the protection of the humanrights of migrant workers and their families

17 Ibid.18 Special Representative of the UN SecretaryGeneral on Migration and Development.19 Migration (#3-2013), UN Chronicle.

(2003) and the ILO (International LabourOrganziation) Domestic Workers Convention(C.189). Only Germany and Italy have ratifiedC.189, and not all MS have ratified the 2000Convention and its supplementary Protocols,probably because a new EU Directive ontrafficking (2011) was in the making.20 As majordestination countries, most EU MS have notratified the 2003 UN Convention, whichregulates issues such as detention, massdeportations, etc. for regular and irregularmigrants. It is also worth noting that the numberof countries that ratified the second Conventionbut have not yet reported to date is quite high.21

However, the EU relies on the Charter ofFundamental Rights in ensuring the fulfillmentof international human rights obligations. TheCharter is binding on the EU institutions whenadopting and implementing legislation, as wellas on the MS when they act within the scope ofthe EU law, and it also incorporates “Europeanvalues”.22. In the international arena, themonitoring bodies of the other internationalHuman Rights Treaties23 ask States to report onhuman rights of migrants in relation to thoseinstruments, facilitating the task of gatheringinformation on human rights abuses. In thiscontext, Commissioner Malmström24 highlighted

20 Directive of the European Parliament and of theCouncil 2011/36/EU of 5 April 2011.21 “Preliminary Statement on the Report of the HighCommissioner for Human Rights on Strengtheningthe United Nations Human Rights Treaty BodySystem”, Committee on the Protection of the HumanRights of Migrant Workers and their Families,Seventeenth Session, 10-14 September 2012.22 COM (2014) 154 final, 11.3.2014.23 Convention against Torture and other Cruel,Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment(CAT), International Covenants on Civil and PoliticalRights/Economic, Social and Cultural Rights(ICCPR, ICESC), Convention on the Rights of theChild (CRC), International Convention on theElimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination(CERD), and Convention on the Elimination ofDiscrimination Against Women (CEDAW).24 Malmström, Cecilia, 2013.

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6

the need to uphold and ensure theimplementation of relevant international humanrights instruments, since it benefits allstakeholders involved (migrants, home society,and society in which migrants live and work).

The UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights ofMigrants, François Crépeau, has repeatedlywarned about the dangers of criminalisingirregular migrants. After the October 2013Lampedusa tragedy, he urged all EU MS to“urgently adopt a new approach to migrationthat places the rights of migrants at theforefront”, by prioritising a “new human rightsframework in the development of their migrationpolicies”.25

More recently, the Fundamental RightsAgency’s (FRA) paper “The Criminalisation ofIrregular Migrants”26 recommended thatMember States treat irregular migrants, whoseasylum applications have been refused,according to the safeguards contained in the

25 United Nations Press Release (2013).26 http://fra.europa.eu/en/news/2014/fra-paper-criminalisation-irregular-migrants. This paper looksat the impact of such measures on fundamental rights,such as the right to liberty and security of a person,human dignity, the right to life, right to an effectiveremedy, and access to social rights, such as housing.Other recommendations are: a) To promote access tojustice, migrants who have become victims ofexploitation and abuse (gender- based violence) needto have a residence permit that is not dependent onthe perpetrator; b) Anyone giving humanitarianassistance such as rescue at sea or providinghumanitarian services such as food, shelter, medicalcare or legal advice to migrants in an irregularsituation should not have to risk punishment forfacilitating irregular entry or stay; c) Rentingaccommodation to irregular migrants without theintention of preventing the migrant’s removal shouldnot be considered facilitation of stay.

Return Directive:27:

In specific cases, and when less coercivemeasures are not sufficient, Member States maydetain a third-country national during the returnprocedure if s/he risks fleeing oravoids/obstructs the preparation of the return orremoval process. Detentions are ordered inwriting by administrative or judicial authoritiesand must be reviewed regularly. The detentionperiod must be as short as possible and notmore than six months. Only in particularcircumstances, when the removal of a third-country national might exceed the time limit set,may Member States prolong detention up to amaximum of 12 months. Specialised detentionfacilities are to be used for the purpose;however, if this is not feasible, Member Statesmay use prison accommodation with separatequarters for the third-country nationals.

Bearing this rights-based approach in mind, theGAMM does not seem to convincingly deliverthe ‘migrant-centeredness’ discourse in practicaltools. The weight that some pillars have overothers and the quid pro quo nature of MobilityPartnerships (MPs) is a matter of concern forcivil society,28 and other observers,29 but also forthe EU, which has identified the need for morebalance by including more actions with regard to“legal migration, human rights and refugeeprotection”.30 In particular, the implementationof readmission agreements should be scrutinizedto make sure that human rights of migrants werenot violated in transit and origin countries.

27 Directive 2008/115/EC.28 Marie Martin, (2012).29 “The contours of the EU’s external dimensions ofmigration policy continue to be primarily insecurity,(im)mobility and conditionality driven.” in SergioCarrera, Joanna Parkin, and Leonhard den Hertog,(2013).30 COM(2014) 96 final, 21.02.2014.

6

the need to uphold and ensure theimplementation of relevant international humanrights instruments, since it benefits allstakeholders involved (migrants, home society,and society in which migrants live and work).

The UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights ofMigrants, François Crépeau, has repeatedlywarned about the dangers of criminalisingirregular migrants. After the October 2013Lampedusa tragedy, he urged all EU MS to“urgently adopt a new approach to migrationthat places the rights of migrants at theforefront”, by prioritising a “new human rightsframework in the development of their migrationpolicies”.25

More recently, the Fundamental RightsAgency’s (FRA) paper “The Criminalisation ofIrregular Migrants”26 recommended thatMember States treat irregular migrants, whoseasylum applications have been refused,according to the safeguards contained in the

25 United Nations Press Release (2013).26 http://fra.europa.eu/en/news/2014/fra-paper-criminalisation-irregular-migrants. This paper looksat the impact of such measures on fundamental rights,such as the right to liberty and security of a person,human dignity, the right to life, right to an effectiveremedy, and access to social rights, such as housing.Other recommendations are: a) To promote access tojustice, migrants who have become victims ofexploitation and abuse (gender- based violence) needto have a residence permit that is not dependent onthe perpetrator; b) Anyone giving humanitarianassistance such as rescue at sea or providinghumanitarian services such as food, shelter, medicalcare or legal advice to migrants in an irregularsituation should not have to risk punishment forfacilitating irregular entry or stay; c) Rentingaccommodation to irregular migrants without theintention of preventing the migrant’s removal shouldnot be considered facilitation of stay.

Return Directive:27:

In specific cases, and when less coercivemeasures are not sufficient, Member States maydetain a third-country national during the returnprocedure if s/he risks fleeing oravoids/obstructs the preparation of the return orremoval process. Detentions are ordered inwriting by administrative or judicial authoritiesand must be reviewed regularly. The detentionperiod must be as short as possible and notmore than six months. Only in particularcircumstances, when the removal of a third-country national might exceed the time limit set,may Member States prolong detention up to amaximum of 12 months. Specialised detentionfacilities are to be used for the purpose;however, if this is not feasible, Member Statesmay use prison accommodation with separatequarters for the third-country nationals.

Bearing this rights-based approach in mind, theGAMM does not seem to convincingly deliverthe ‘migrant-centeredness’ discourse in practicaltools. The weight that some pillars have overothers and the quid pro quo nature of MobilityPartnerships (MPs) is a matter of concern forcivil society,28 and other observers,29 but also forthe EU, which has identified the need for morebalance by including more actions with regard to“legal migration, human rights and refugeeprotection”.30 In particular, the implementationof readmission agreements should be scrutinizedto make sure that human rights of migrants werenot violated in transit and origin countries.

27 Directive 2008/115/EC.28 Marie Martin, (2012).29 “The contours of the EU’s external dimensions ofmigration policy continue to be primarily insecurity,(im)mobility and conditionality driven.” in SergioCarrera, Joanna Parkin, and Leonhard den Hertog,(2013).30 COM(2014) 96 final, 21.02.2014.

6

the need to uphold and ensure theimplementation of relevant international humanrights instruments, since it benefits allstakeholders involved (migrants, home society,and society in which migrants live and work).

The UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights ofMigrants, François Crépeau, has repeatedlywarned about the dangers of criminalisingirregular migrants. After the October 2013Lampedusa tragedy, he urged all EU MS to“urgently adopt a new approach to migrationthat places the rights of migrants at theforefront”, by prioritising a “new human rightsframework in the development of their migrationpolicies”.25

More recently, the Fundamental RightsAgency’s (FRA) paper “The Criminalisation ofIrregular Migrants”26 recommended thatMember States treat irregular migrants, whoseasylum applications have been refused,according to the safeguards contained in the

25 United Nations Press Release (2013).26 http://fra.europa.eu/en/news/2014/fra-paper-criminalisation-irregular-migrants. This paper looksat the impact of such measures on fundamental rights,such as the right to liberty and security of a person,human dignity, the right to life, right to an effectiveremedy, and access to social rights, such as housing.Other recommendations are: a) To promote access tojustice, migrants who have become victims ofexploitation and abuse (gender- based violence) needto have a residence permit that is not dependent onthe perpetrator; b) Anyone giving humanitarianassistance such as rescue at sea or providinghumanitarian services such as food, shelter, medicalcare or legal advice to migrants in an irregularsituation should not have to risk punishment forfacilitating irregular entry or stay; c) Rentingaccommodation to irregular migrants without theintention of preventing the migrant’s removal shouldnot be considered facilitation of stay.

Return Directive:27:

In specific cases, and when less coercivemeasures are not sufficient, Member States maydetain a third-country national during the returnprocedure if s/he risks fleeing oravoids/obstructs the preparation of the return orremoval process. Detentions are ordered inwriting by administrative or judicial authoritiesand must be reviewed regularly. The detentionperiod must be as short as possible and notmore than six months. Only in particularcircumstances, when the removal of a third-country national might exceed the time limit set,may Member States prolong detention up to amaximum of 12 months. Specialised detentionfacilities are to be used for the purpose;however, if this is not feasible, Member Statesmay use prison accommodation with separatequarters for the third-country nationals.

Bearing this rights-based approach in mind, theGAMM does not seem to convincingly deliverthe ‘migrant-centeredness’ discourse in practicaltools. The weight that some pillars have overothers and the quid pro quo nature of MobilityPartnerships (MPs) is a matter of concern forcivil society,28 and other observers,29 but also forthe EU, which has identified the need for morebalance by including more actions with regard to“legal migration, human rights and refugeeprotection”.30 In particular, the implementationof readmission agreements should be scrutinizedto make sure that human rights of migrants werenot violated in transit and origin countries.

27 Directive 2008/115/EC.28 Marie Martin, (2012).29 “The contours of the EU’s external dimensions ofmigration policy continue to be primarily insecurity,(im)mobility and conditionality driven.” in SergioCarrera, Joanna Parkin, and Leonhard den Hertog,(2013).30 COM(2014) 96 final, 21.02.2014.

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7

The recent adoption of the Seasonal WorkersDirective by the European Parliament31 is itsfirst legal migration dossier since the LisbonTreaty,32 and is a great step forward in not onlyachieving consensus among MEPs on a “highlypolitical and sensitive issue”, but also inproviding third country nationals with betterworking and living conditions and ultimatelydefending their labour rights and avoiding socialdumping. Migrant workers in the Southern MSwill mainly benefit from this new Directive,which will be transposed into nationallegislation within two and a half years time.

Operational tools that ensure legal, ethical, fairand effective labour matching of EU employerswith third country workers (whether living inEU or abroad) would be the perfect complementto the EU legislative framework.33 The EUImmigration Portal and the MS EmploymentOffices are a good source of information forwould be migrants, but mostly useful for mid-and highly skilled migrants.

Mobility Partnerships and other instrumentsin the context of the Global Approach onMigration and Mobility.

The evolving demographic and economicchanges have made it evident that thecompetitiveness of the EU (Europe 2020Strategy) is also at stake, particularly if anadaptable workforce with the necessary skills isnot secured in view of shortfalls in skill levelsand serious labour mismatches. Therefore,labour market strategies for meeting needs andpromoting integration of regular migrants is still

31 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/content/20140203IPR34619/html/More-rights-and-better-working-conditions-for-non-EU-seasonal-workers32 The Treaty entered into force December 1, 2009,giving the EP more say in the decision-makingprocess.33 Vid. International Recruitment Integrity System(IRIS), http://iris.iom.int.

a pending task for the MS both in terms of thefree movement of people, and also in relationwith neighbouring and partner countries.

Until now, the MS have resisted EC attempts toharmonise specific aspects of their migrationpolicies, mainly labour migration which remainstheir competence. Clearly, the economic crisisplayed against any opening of legal channels formigrant workers, and favoured more rigid borderand security controls. The conditions for thirdcountry nationals to enter and reside in the EU,promotion of migrant integration, the fightagainst “illegal” migration, and the conclusionof readmission agreements with third countriesare the few competences that had been ceded tothe EU.

In this sense, the GAMM is an attempt atmigration policy harmonisation. It is a relativelycomprehensive framework for external action onmigration, that allows the EU and its MemberStates to be engaged in regional and bilateraldialogues on migration management with abroad range of (neighbouring or historicallytied) countries and regions, once sharedpriorities have been agreed upon.34.

The GAMM is implemented through: a) severalpolitical instruments, such as the bilateral andregional policy dialogues35 and action plansrelated to the enlargement countries,36 Easternpartnership countries,37 Southern Mediterranean

34 Ibid. cit.35 The Prague Process, the Budapest Process, and theEastern Partnership Panel on Migration and Asylumtowards the East; the Africa-EU Partnership onMigration, Mobility and Employment, and the RabatProcess in the South; as well as the EU-CELACStructured and Comprehensive Dialogue onMigration and the ACP-EU Migration Dialogue.36 Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the formerYugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro andSerbia, Kosovo, and Turkey.37 Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, andAzerbaijan.

7

The recent adoption of the Seasonal WorkersDirective by the European Parliament31 is itsfirst legal migration dossier since the LisbonTreaty,32 and is a great step forward in not onlyachieving consensus among MEPs on a “highlypolitical and sensitive issue”, but also inproviding third country nationals with betterworking and living conditions and ultimatelydefending their labour rights and avoiding socialdumping. Migrant workers in the Southern MSwill mainly benefit from this new Directive,which will be transposed into nationallegislation within two and a half years time.

Operational tools that ensure legal, ethical, fairand effective labour matching of EU employerswith third country workers (whether living inEU or abroad) would be the perfect complementto the EU legislative framework.33 The EUImmigration Portal and the MS EmploymentOffices are a good source of information forwould be migrants, but mostly useful for mid-and highly skilled migrants.

Mobility Partnerships and other instrumentsin the context of the Global Approach onMigration and Mobility.

The evolving demographic and economicchanges have made it evident that thecompetitiveness of the EU (Europe 2020Strategy) is also at stake, particularly if anadaptable workforce with the necessary skills isnot secured in view of shortfalls in skill levelsand serious labour mismatches. Therefore,labour market strategies for meeting needs andpromoting integration of regular migrants is still

31 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/content/20140203IPR34619/html/More-rights-and-better-working-conditions-for-non-EU-seasonal-workers32 The Treaty entered into force December 1, 2009,giving the EP more say in the decision-makingprocess.33 Vid. International Recruitment Integrity System(IRIS), http://iris.iom.int.

a pending task for the MS both in terms of thefree movement of people, and also in relationwith neighbouring and partner countries.

Until now, the MS have resisted EC attempts toharmonise specific aspects of their migrationpolicies, mainly labour migration which remainstheir competence. Clearly, the economic crisisplayed against any opening of legal channels formigrant workers, and favoured more rigid borderand security controls. The conditions for thirdcountry nationals to enter and reside in the EU,promotion of migrant integration, the fightagainst “illegal” migration, and the conclusionof readmission agreements with third countriesare the few competences that had been ceded tothe EU.

In this sense, the GAMM is an attempt atmigration policy harmonisation. It is a relativelycomprehensive framework for external action onmigration, that allows the EU and its MemberStates to be engaged in regional and bilateraldialogues on migration management with abroad range of (neighbouring or historicallytied) countries and regions, once sharedpriorities have been agreed upon.34.

The GAMM is implemented through: a) severalpolitical instruments, such as the bilateral andregional policy dialogues35 and action plansrelated to the enlargement countries,36 Easternpartnership countries,37 Southern Mediterranean

34 Ibid. cit.35 The Prague Process, the Budapest Process, and theEastern Partnership Panel on Migration and Asylumtowards the East; the Africa-EU Partnership onMigration, Mobility and Employment, and the RabatProcess in the South; as well as the EU-CELACStructured and Comprehensive Dialogue onMigration and the ACP-EU Migration Dialogue.36 Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the formerYugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro andSerbia, Kosovo, and Turkey.37 Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, andAzerbaijan.

7

The recent adoption of the Seasonal WorkersDirective by the European Parliament31 is itsfirst legal migration dossier since the LisbonTreaty,32 and is a great step forward in not onlyachieving consensus among MEPs on a “highlypolitical and sensitive issue”, but also inproviding third country nationals with betterworking and living conditions and ultimatelydefending their labour rights and avoiding socialdumping. Migrant workers in the Southern MSwill mainly benefit from this new Directive,which will be transposed into nationallegislation within two and a half years time.

Operational tools that ensure legal, ethical, fairand effective labour matching of EU employerswith third country workers (whether living inEU or abroad) would be the perfect complementto the EU legislative framework.33 The EUImmigration Portal and the MS EmploymentOffices are a good source of information forwould be migrants, but mostly useful for mid-and highly skilled migrants.

Mobility Partnerships and other instrumentsin the context of the Global Approach onMigration and Mobility.

The evolving demographic and economicchanges have made it evident that thecompetitiveness of the EU (Europe 2020Strategy) is also at stake, particularly if anadaptable workforce with the necessary skills isnot secured in view of shortfalls in skill levelsand serious labour mismatches. Therefore,labour market strategies for meeting needs andpromoting integration of regular migrants is still

31 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/content/20140203IPR34619/html/More-rights-and-better-working-conditions-for-non-EU-seasonal-workers32 The Treaty entered into force December 1, 2009,giving the EP more say in the decision-makingprocess.33 Vid. International Recruitment Integrity System(IRIS), http://iris.iom.int.

a pending task for the MS both in terms of thefree movement of people, and also in relationwith neighbouring and partner countries.

Until now, the MS have resisted EC attempts toharmonise specific aspects of their migrationpolicies, mainly labour migration which remainstheir competence. Clearly, the economic crisisplayed against any opening of legal channels formigrant workers, and favoured more rigid borderand security controls. The conditions for thirdcountry nationals to enter and reside in the EU,promotion of migrant integration, the fightagainst “illegal” migration, and the conclusionof readmission agreements with third countriesare the few competences that had been ceded tothe EU.

In this sense, the GAMM is an attempt atmigration policy harmonisation. It is a relativelycomprehensive framework for external action onmigration, that allows the EU and its MemberStates to be engaged in regional and bilateraldialogues on migration management with abroad range of (neighbouring or historicallytied) countries and regions, once sharedpriorities have been agreed upon.34.

The GAMM is implemented through: a) severalpolitical instruments, such as the bilateral andregional policy dialogues35 and action plansrelated to the enlargement countries,36 Easternpartnership countries,37 Southern Mediterranean

34 Ibid. cit.35 The Prague Process, the Budapest Process, and theEastern Partnership Panel on Migration and Asylumtowards the East; the Africa-EU Partnership onMigration, Mobility and Employment, and the RabatProcess in the South; as well as the EU-CELACStructured and Comprehensive Dialogue onMigration and the ACP-EU Migration Dialogue.36 Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the formerYugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro andSerbia, Kosovo, and Turkey.37 Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, andAzerbaijan.

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8

countries,38 Sub-Saharan countries,39 Asiancountries,40 and other countries;41 b) legalinstruments, such as visa facilitation andreadmission agreements; and c) operationalsupport and capacity-building via EU agencies(Frontex, EASO and ETF), technical assistancefacilities (MIEUX and TAIEX), and programmesupport (civil society, migrant associations, andIOs). Traditionally, these regional dialogueshave supported improved communication andcapacity building activities. However, thereseems to be a certain fatigue in several regionaldialogues, given the lack of engagement by theMS, which indicates the need to be moretargeted and focused on – jointly identified –added value initiatives.

In its cooperation with third countries,particularly with the European Neighbourhood,in the areas of migration and asylum, the EU hasbeen using specific instruments (“toolbox”) suchas Mobility Partnerships (MPs), and CommonAgendas on Migration and Mobility (CAMMs),Migration Profiles, Visa Facilitation andLiberalization, Readmission Agreements, andRegional Development and ProtectionProgrammes.

In order to strengthen the SouthernMediterranean partnership, the EU isspecifically promoting the following threemeasures:

a) Improve the recognition of skills andeducational levels;

38 Structured Dialogues on Migration, Mobility andSecurity have been launched with Tunisia, Morocco,and Jordan.39 Progress has been made with Cape Verde, Nigeriaand South Africa. A Regional Protection Program isbeing implemented in the Horn of Africa. Ghana hasa CAMM and ECOWAS received financial supportfor the effective implementation of the FreeMovement Protocols.40 China, India, Vietnam and Indonesia.41 United States and Russia.

b) Offer a dynamic mobility policy(including visas): liberalized provisionof services, enhanced exchanges ofstudents and researchers, and intensifiedcontacts (civil society, businessmen,journalists, human rights organizations);

c) Structured dialogue on migration,mobility and security, with mobilitypartnerships conditioned by readmissionagreements.

8

countries,38 Sub-Saharan countries,39 Asiancountries,40 and other countries;41 b) legalinstruments, such as visa facilitation andreadmission agreements; and c) operationalsupport and capacity-building via EU agencies(Frontex, EASO and ETF), technical assistancefacilities (MIEUX and TAIEX), and programmesupport (civil society, migrant associations, andIOs). Traditionally, these regional dialogueshave supported improved communication andcapacity building activities. However, thereseems to be a certain fatigue in several regionaldialogues, given the lack of engagement by theMS, which indicates the need to be moretargeted and focused on – jointly identified –added value initiatives.

In its cooperation with third countries,particularly with the European Neighbourhood,in the areas of migration and asylum, the EU hasbeen using specific instruments (“toolbox”) suchas Mobility Partnerships (MPs), and CommonAgendas on Migration and Mobility (CAMMs),Migration Profiles, Visa Facilitation andLiberalization, Readmission Agreements, andRegional Development and ProtectionProgrammes.

In order to strengthen the SouthernMediterranean partnership, the EU isspecifically promoting the following threemeasures:

a) Improve the recognition of skills andeducational levels;

38 Structured Dialogues on Migration, Mobility andSecurity have been launched with Tunisia, Morocco,and Jordan.39 Progress has been made with Cape Verde, Nigeriaand South Africa. A Regional Protection Program isbeing implemented in the Horn of Africa. Ghana hasa CAMM and ECOWAS received financial supportfor the effective implementation of the FreeMovement Protocols.40 China, India, Vietnam and Indonesia.41 United States and Russia.

b) Offer a dynamic mobility policy(including visas): liberalized provisionof services, enhanced exchanges ofstudents and researchers, and intensifiedcontacts (civil society, businessmen,journalists, human rights organizations);

c) Structured dialogue on migration,mobility and security, with mobilitypartnerships conditioned by readmissionagreements.

2

ANNEX I

– Mobility Partnerships –

Concluded Discussionspending

To consider for2014

To consider oncecircumstances

permit

Algeria X

Egypt X

Libya X

Morocco X

Tunisia X

Jordan X

Lebanon X

Syria X

Armenia X

Azerbaijan X

Belarus X

Georgia X

Moldova X

Ukraine X

Cape Verde X

The following candidate MP countries could be considered:

Algeria: In the context of the ongoing negotiations on a new European Neighbourhood PolicyAction Plan, Algeria has expressed its interest to start a dialogue on Migration, Mobility andSecurity, in view of possibly eventually entering into structured cooperation with the EU inthe area of migration. Depending on Algeria's willingness to open negotiations with the EUon a readmission agreement, such framework could be a MP.

Ukraine: Cooperation on migration and mobility with this country is already particularlyadvanced, including in the context of the EU-Ukraine visa dialogue, and from its part Ukrainehas not yet expressed an interest in establishing a MP with the EU. However, this option maybe considered in the coming months, depending on the developments in the country.

Belarus: Despite the complex political relations between the EU and Belarus due to i.a.human rights issues, areas of cooperation do exist and could form the basis for a futuredialogue, e.g. trafficking in human beings, border management and asylum. Furthermore,

8

countries,38 Sub-Saharan countries,39 Asiancountries,40 and other countries;41 b) legalinstruments, such as visa facilitation andreadmission agreements; and c) operationalsupport and capacity-building via EU agencies(Frontex, EASO and ETF), technical assistancefacilities (MIEUX and TAIEX), and programmesupport (civil society, migrant associations, andIOs). Traditionally, these regional dialogueshave supported improved communication andcapacity building activities. However, thereseems to be a certain fatigue in several regionaldialogues, given the lack of engagement by theMS, which indicates the need to be moretargeted and focused on – jointly identified –added value initiatives.

In its cooperation with third countries,particularly with the European Neighbourhood,in the areas of migration and asylum, the EU hasbeen using specific instruments (“toolbox”) suchas Mobility Partnerships (MPs), and CommonAgendas on Migration and Mobility (CAMMs),Migration Profiles, Visa Facilitation andLiberalization, Readmission Agreements, andRegional Development and ProtectionProgrammes.

In order to strengthen the SouthernMediterranean partnership, the EU isspecifically promoting the following threemeasures:

a) Improve the recognition of skills andeducational levels;

38 Structured Dialogues on Migration, Mobility andSecurity have been launched with Tunisia, Morocco,and Jordan.39 Progress has been made with Cape Verde, Nigeriaand South Africa. A Regional Protection Program isbeing implemented in the Horn of Africa. Ghana hasa CAMM and ECOWAS received financial supportfor the effective implementation of the FreeMovement Protocols.40 China, India, Vietnam and Indonesia.41 United States and Russia.

b) Offer a dynamic mobility policy(including visas): liberalized provisionof services, enhanced exchanges ofstudents and researchers, and intensifiedcontacts (civil society, businessmen,journalists, human rights organizations);

c) Structured dialogue on migration,mobility and security, with mobilitypartnerships conditioned by readmissionagreements.

2

ANNEX I

– Mobility Partnerships –

Concluded Discussionspending

To consider for2014

To consider oncecircumstances

permit

Algeria X

Egypt X

Libya X

Morocco X

Tunisia X

Jordan X

Lebanon X

Syria X

Armenia X

Azerbaijan X

Belarus X

Georgia X

Moldova X

Ukraine X

Cape Verde X

The following candidate MP countries could be considered:

Algeria: In the context of the ongoing negotiations on a new European Neighbourhood PolicyAction Plan, Algeria has expressed its interest to start a dialogue on Migration, Mobility andSecurity, in view of possibly eventually entering into structured cooperation with the EU inthe area of migration. Depending on Algeria's willingness to open negotiations with the EUon a readmission agreement, such framework could be a MP.

Ukraine: Cooperation on migration and mobility with this country is already particularlyadvanced, including in the context of the EU-Ukraine visa dialogue, and from its part Ukrainehas not yet expressed an interest in establishing a MP with the EU. However, this option maybe considered in the coming months, depending on the developments in the country.

Belarus: Despite the complex political relations between the EU and Belarus due to i.a.human rights issues, areas of cooperation do exist and could form the basis for a futuredialogue, e.g. trafficking in human beings, border management and asylum. Furthermore,

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9

Source: Annexes to the Report from the Commission to theEP, the Council, the European Economic and SocialCommittee, and the Committee of the Regions – Report onthe implementation of the GAMM 2012-2013

The GAMM relies on “genuine partnership withthird countries, based on mutual trust and sharedinterests”.42 In the eyes of the SouthernMediterranean countries, though, in the shortand medium term Mobility Partnerships offerfew commitments by the EU and the signatoryMS, and limited channels for legal migrationand mobility. In other words, it is a vehicle to“get the Europeans what they want” viareadmission agreements.

GAMM’s non-binding and flexible nature hasmostly translated into little engagement andoften-timid financial contributions from the MSin the GAMM cooperation frameworks, such asMobility Partnerships. This calls for the roles ofEU actors (EU agencies, EC, and EuropeanExternal Action Service) and MS to be moreclearly defined and for tangible engagement.Furthermore, it requires taking distance fromsecurity-oriented approaches that tend tocriminalize migrants, as well as ‘walking thetalk’ of the European values “prevention,protection, and solidarity”,43 Only in this way,can GAMM be implemented coherently andhonestly, and thereby pave the way for a futurecommon migration and asylum policy for theEU and its neighboUrs.

Asylum in the EU and its external dimension

Five different routes across the Mediterraneanpersist as the main gateways for irregularmigrants and asylum seekers to enter EU. Thenumbers of crossings differ over time. They are

42 Ibid.

43 President Herman Van Rompuy, Brussels, 25October 2013 EUCO 214/13, PRESSE 444 PR PCE192.

influenced by EU border management responsesas a pull44 or stopping factor, the securitysituation in the transit countries and the availablemeans to cross EU borders (and theMediterranean Sea).

In Q3 2013, there were “42,618 detections ofillegal border crossings at the external EUborders”, a 93% increase compared with thesame quarter in 2012 and a 72% increasecompared to the previous quarter (Q2 2013).This is the highest increase recorded at anysingle quarter since 2008.45 The EU maritimeborders were used even more than at any stageof the Arab Spring in 2011 with the biggestincrease taking place within the Italian seaborder. Although this increase is not allattributed to asylum seekers (the number ofasylum seekers in EU total was also the highestsince 2008), it underscores that in the mixedflows, many persons become asylum seekersonce in the EU.

When GAMM was renewed in November 2011,the EU took an important step in bringing itsasylum policy and practice to a new level whendealing with asylum issues in its externaldimension. For the first time, protection hadbecome a priority and was specifically expressedthat way in one of GAMM’s four main pillars:

strengthening international protectionsystems and the external dimension ofasylum

This meant that the EU’s asylum policy linkwith its foreign and development cooperationpolicies (where considerable funding wasalready being globally used on asylum andrefugee situations) became explicitly stronger.At the same time, the European Asylum Support

44 “Mare Nostrum saved 20,000 migrants in 6months”. European External Policy Advisors,www.eepa.be, 24 April 2014.45 FRONTEX Fran Quarterly Report Q3 of 2013.(2014)

9

Source: Annexes to the Report from the Commission to theEP, the Council, the European Economic and SocialCommittee, and the Committee of the Regions – Report onthe implementation of the GAMM 2012-2013

The GAMM relies on “genuine partnership withthird countries, based on mutual trust and sharedinterests”.42 In the eyes of the SouthernMediterranean countries, though, in the shortand medium term Mobility Partnerships offerfew commitments by the EU and the signatoryMS, and limited channels for legal migrationand mobility. In other words, it is a vehicle to“get the Europeans what they want” viareadmission agreements.

GAMM’s non-binding and flexible nature hasmostly translated into little engagement andoften-timid financial contributions from the MSin the GAMM cooperation frameworks, such asMobility Partnerships. This calls for the roles ofEU actors (EU agencies, EC, and EuropeanExternal Action Service) and MS to be moreclearly defined and for tangible engagement.Furthermore, it requires taking distance fromsecurity-oriented approaches that tend tocriminalize migrants, as well as ‘walking thetalk’ of the European values “prevention,protection, and solidarity”,43 Only in this way,can GAMM be implemented coherently andhonestly, and thereby pave the way for a futurecommon migration and asylum policy for theEU and its neighboUrs.

Asylum in the EU and its external dimension

Five different routes across the Mediterraneanpersist as the main gateways for irregularmigrants and asylum seekers to enter EU. Thenumbers of crossings differ over time. They are

42 Ibid.

43 President Herman Van Rompuy, Brussels, 25October 2013 EUCO 214/13, PRESSE 444 PR PCE192.

influenced by EU border management responsesas a pull44 or stopping factor, the securitysituation in the transit countries and the availablemeans to cross EU borders (and theMediterranean Sea).

In Q3 2013, there were “42,618 detections ofillegal border crossings at the external EUborders”, a 93% increase compared with thesame quarter in 2012 and a 72% increasecompared to the previous quarter (Q2 2013).This is the highest increase recorded at anysingle quarter since 2008.45 The EU maritimeborders were used even more than at any stageof the Arab Spring in 2011 with the biggestincrease taking place within the Italian seaborder. Although this increase is not allattributed to asylum seekers (the number ofasylum seekers in EU total was also the highestsince 2008), it underscores that in the mixedflows, many persons become asylum seekersonce in the EU.

When GAMM was renewed in November 2011,the EU took an important step in bringing itsasylum policy and practice to a new level whendealing with asylum issues in its externaldimension. For the first time, protection hadbecome a priority and was specifically expressedthat way in one of GAMM’s four main pillars:

strengthening international protectionsystems and the external dimension ofasylum

This meant that the EU’s asylum policy linkwith its foreign and development cooperationpolicies (where considerable funding wasalready being globally used on asylum andrefugee situations) became explicitly stronger.At the same time, the European Asylum Support

44 “Mare Nostrum saved 20,000 migrants in 6months”. European External Policy Advisors,www.eepa.be, 24 April 2014.45 FRONTEX Fran Quarterly Report Q3 of 2013.(2014)

9

Source: Annexes to the Report from the Commission to theEP, the Council, the European Economic and SocialCommittee, and the Committee of the Regions – Report onthe implementation of the GAMM 2012-2013

The GAMM relies on “genuine partnership withthird countries, based on mutual trust and sharedinterests”.42 In the eyes of the SouthernMediterranean countries, though, in the shortand medium term Mobility Partnerships offerfew commitments by the EU and the signatoryMS, and limited channels for legal migrationand mobility. In other words, it is a vehicle to“get the Europeans what they want” viareadmission agreements.

GAMM’s non-binding and flexible nature hasmostly translated into little engagement andoften-timid financial contributions from the MSin the GAMM cooperation frameworks, such asMobility Partnerships. This calls for the roles ofEU actors (EU agencies, EC, and EuropeanExternal Action Service) and MS to be moreclearly defined and for tangible engagement.Furthermore, it requires taking distance fromsecurity-oriented approaches that tend tocriminalize migrants, as well as ‘walking thetalk’ of the European values “prevention,protection, and solidarity”,43 Only in this way,can GAMM be implemented coherently andhonestly, and thereby pave the way for a futurecommon migration and asylum policy for theEU and its neighboUrs.

Asylum in the EU and its external dimension

Five different routes across the Mediterraneanpersist as the main gateways for irregularmigrants and asylum seekers to enter EU. Thenumbers of crossings differ over time. They are

42 Ibid.

43 President Herman Van Rompuy, Brussels, 25October 2013 EUCO 214/13, PRESSE 444 PR PCE192.

influenced by EU border management responsesas a pull44 or stopping factor, the securitysituation in the transit countries and the availablemeans to cross EU borders (and theMediterranean Sea).

In Q3 2013, there were “42,618 detections ofillegal border crossings at the external EUborders”, a 93% increase compared with thesame quarter in 2012 and a 72% increasecompared to the previous quarter (Q2 2013).This is the highest increase recorded at anysingle quarter since 2008.45 The EU maritimeborders were used even more than at any stageof the Arab Spring in 2011 with the biggestincrease taking place within the Italian seaborder. Although this increase is not allattributed to asylum seekers (the number ofasylum seekers in EU total was also the highestsince 2008), it underscores that in the mixedflows, many persons become asylum seekersonce in the EU.

When GAMM was renewed in November 2011,the EU took an important step in bringing itsasylum policy and practice to a new level whendealing with asylum issues in its externaldimension. For the first time, protection hadbecome a priority and was specifically expressedthat way in one of GAMM’s four main pillars:

strengthening international protectionsystems and the external dimension ofasylum

This meant that the EU’s asylum policy linkwith its foreign and development cooperationpolicies (where considerable funding wasalready being globally used on asylum andrefugee situations) became explicitly stronger.At the same time, the European Asylum Support

44 “Mare Nostrum saved 20,000 migrants in 6months”. European External Policy Advisors,www.eepa.be, 24 April 2014.45 FRONTEX Fran Quarterly Report Q3 of 2013.(2014)

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10

Office46 (EASO) had just become operationaland the EU legislators had foreseen that the newagency was to play a role in the externaldimension of asylum issues:

“[EASO] …may cooperate with competentauthorities of third countries in technicalmatters, in particular with a view to promotingand assisting capacity building in the thirdcountries' own asylum and reception systemsand implementing regional protectionprogrammes, and other actions relevant todurable solutions.”47

In other words, the EU was walking the talk ofthe revised GAMM, by letting EASO respond toasylum flows in and from the Mediterranean.48

While this was settling into place, the EC, theParliament and the Council were puttingtogether the “Asylum Package”, i.e. the recastlegal framework for the Common EuropeanAsylum System, which needs to be fullytransposed by MS.

In light of the migratory flows stemming fromthe “Arab Spring”,49 the Member States reactedin the Justice and Home Affairs Council byadding new features to the heated negotiationson the Dublin Regulation. In their meeting of 8March 2012,50 they concluded that the CommonEuropean Asylum System (CEAS) should bebased on solidarity, which then again wouldbuild on responsibility sharing and mutual trust.In striving towards a common approach to thepresent situation, they came up with aMechanism for Early Warning Preparedness andCrisis Management within the Dublin System.

46 Regulation (EU) No 439/2010.47 EASO Regulation, Article 7.48 EASO’s External Action Strategy was adopted inNovember 2013.49 Oxford Dictionary “A series of antigovernmentuprisings in various countries in North Africa and theMiddle East, beginning in Tunisia in December2010.”50 Council conclusions (2012).

Although in its conclusions it focused on howthe EU must react to the flows coming fromneighbouring countries, the Justice and HomeAffairs Council still kept in mind that the CEAScannot exist in isolation:

“Affirming that a Common European AsylumSystem with high protection standards combinedwith fair and effective procedures capable ofpreventing abuse presupposes effective bordermanagement, well functioning returnarrangements and cooperation with thirdcountries inter alia to address the root causesleading to mixed migration flows to the Union”(Emphasis added)

The negotiations on the Asylum Packageresulted in a legislative framework, which allcould live with and which covers in theirentirety most aspects of the reality of theAsylum and Reception systems in the MemberStates.

However, while MS are translating legislationinto practical implementation, the flows acrossthe Mediterranean (and other routes) do not stop.Italy is one of the Member States which is mostaffected by the flows across the Mediterraneanat the moment. In the first months of 2014 theflows have been dramatically higher than thecorresponding period last year.51

After a boat sank off the Italian islandLampedusa on 3 October 2013 causing the lossof more than 300 persons, both the EU and Italyreacted promptly to the specific incident and tothe need to deal with such crossings in theregion. Italy then launched the Sea Operation

51 Agence France-Presse. theguardian.com,Wednesday 9 April 2014 15.16 BST “Italy says4,000 immigrants have reached its shores by boat inthe past two days – the highest number since it begana naval operation to handle the influx after twoshipwrecks last year. "The landings are non-stop andthe emergency is increasingly glaring," the interiorminister, Angelino Alfano, said.”

10

Office46 (EASO) had just become operationaland the EU legislators had foreseen that the newagency was to play a role in the externaldimension of asylum issues:

“[EASO] …may cooperate with competentauthorities of third countries in technicalmatters, in particular with a view to promotingand assisting capacity building in the thirdcountries' own asylum and reception systemsand implementing regional protectionprogrammes, and other actions relevant todurable solutions.”47

In other words, the EU was walking the talk ofthe revised GAMM, by letting EASO respond toasylum flows in and from the Mediterranean.48

While this was settling into place, the EC, theParliament and the Council were puttingtogether the “Asylum Package”, i.e. the recastlegal framework for the Common EuropeanAsylum System, which needs to be fullytransposed by MS.

In light of the migratory flows stemming fromthe “Arab Spring”,49 the Member States reactedin the Justice and Home Affairs Council byadding new features to the heated negotiationson the Dublin Regulation. In their meeting of 8March 2012,50 they concluded that the CommonEuropean Asylum System (CEAS) should bebased on solidarity, which then again wouldbuild on responsibility sharing and mutual trust.In striving towards a common approach to thepresent situation, they came up with aMechanism for Early Warning Preparedness andCrisis Management within the Dublin System.

46 Regulation (EU) No 439/2010.47 EASO Regulation, Article 7.48 EASO’s External Action Strategy was adopted inNovember 2013.49 Oxford Dictionary “A series of antigovernmentuprisings in various countries in North Africa and theMiddle East, beginning in Tunisia in December2010.”50 Council conclusions (2012).

Although in its conclusions it focused on howthe EU must react to the flows coming fromneighbouring countries, the Justice and HomeAffairs Council still kept in mind that the CEAScannot exist in isolation:

“Affirming that a Common European AsylumSystem with high protection standards combinedwith fair and effective procedures capable ofpreventing abuse presupposes effective bordermanagement, well functioning returnarrangements and cooperation with thirdcountries inter alia to address the root causesleading to mixed migration flows to the Union”(Emphasis added)

The negotiations on the Asylum Packageresulted in a legislative framework, which allcould live with and which covers in theirentirety most aspects of the reality of theAsylum and Reception systems in the MemberStates.

However, while MS are translating legislationinto practical implementation, the flows acrossthe Mediterranean (and other routes) do not stop.Italy is one of the Member States which is mostaffected by the flows across the Mediterraneanat the moment. In the first months of 2014 theflows have been dramatically higher than thecorresponding period last year.51

After a boat sank off the Italian islandLampedusa on 3 October 2013 causing the lossof more than 300 persons, both the EU and Italyreacted promptly to the specific incident and tothe need to deal with such crossings in theregion. Italy then launched the Sea Operation

51 Agence France-Presse. theguardian.com,Wednesday 9 April 2014 15.16 BST “Italy says4,000 immigrants have reached its shores by boat inthe past two days – the highest number since it begana naval operation to handle the influx after twoshipwrecks last year. "The landings are non-stop andthe emergency is increasingly glaring," the interiorminister, Angelino Alfano, said.”

10

Office46 (EASO) had just become operationaland the EU legislators had foreseen that the newagency was to play a role in the externaldimension of asylum issues:

“[EASO] …may cooperate with competentauthorities of third countries in technicalmatters, in particular with a view to promotingand assisting capacity building in the thirdcountries' own asylum and reception systemsand implementing regional protectionprogrammes, and other actions relevant todurable solutions.”47

In other words, the EU was walking the talk ofthe revised GAMM, by letting EASO respond toasylum flows in and from the Mediterranean.48

While this was settling into place, the EC, theParliament and the Council were puttingtogether the “Asylum Package”, i.e. the recastlegal framework for the Common EuropeanAsylum System, which needs to be fullytransposed by MS.

In light of the migratory flows stemming fromthe “Arab Spring”,49 the Member States reactedin the Justice and Home Affairs Council byadding new features to the heated negotiationson the Dublin Regulation. In their meeting of 8March 2012,50 they concluded that the CommonEuropean Asylum System (CEAS) should bebased on solidarity, which then again wouldbuild on responsibility sharing and mutual trust.In striving towards a common approach to thepresent situation, they came up with aMechanism for Early Warning Preparedness andCrisis Management within the Dublin System.

46 Regulation (EU) No 439/2010.47 EASO Regulation, Article 7.48 EASO’s External Action Strategy was adopted inNovember 2013.49 Oxford Dictionary “A series of antigovernmentuprisings in various countries in North Africa and theMiddle East, beginning in Tunisia in December2010.”50 Council conclusions (2012).

Although in its conclusions it focused on howthe EU must react to the flows coming fromneighbouring countries, the Justice and HomeAffairs Council still kept in mind that the CEAScannot exist in isolation:

“Affirming that a Common European AsylumSystem with high protection standards combinedwith fair and effective procedures capable ofpreventing abuse presupposes effective bordermanagement, well functioning returnarrangements and cooperation with thirdcountries inter alia to address the root causesleading to mixed migration flows to the Union”(Emphasis added)

The negotiations on the Asylum Packageresulted in a legislative framework, which allcould live with and which covers in theirentirety most aspects of the reality of theAsylum and Reception systems in the MemberStates.

However, while MS are translating legislationinto practical implementation, the flows acrossthe Mediterranean (and other routes) do not stop.Italy is one of the Member States which is mostaffected by the flows across the Mediterraneanat the moment. In the first months of 2014 theflows have been dramatically higher than thecorresponding period last year.51

After a boat sank off the Italian islandLampedusa on 3 October 2013 causing the lossof more than 300 persons, both the EU and Italyreacted promptly to the specific incident and tothe need to deal with such crossings in theregion. Italy then launched the Sea Operation

51 Agence France-Presse. theguardian.com,Wednesday 9 April 2014 15.16 BST “Italy says4,000 immigrants have reached its shores by boat inthe past two days – the highest number since it begana naval operation to handle the influx after twoshipwrecks last year. "The landings are non-stop andthe emergency is increasingly glaring," the interiorminister, Angelino Alfano, said.”

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11

“Mare Nostrum” to tackle the flows and theoperation was characterized as a ''humanitarianoperation'' to ''save human lives'', as well as a''security'' one.52.

Additionally, immediately after the Justice andHome Affairs Council of 7-8 October 2013, theEU set up the “Task Force Mediterranean” underthe lead of the Commission. On the 24-25October 2013, the European Council invited theTask Force Mediterranean, also involving MS,the EEAS and a number of EU Agencies, toidentify priority actions for a more efficientshort-term use of European policies and tools.As early as the beginning of December 2013, theTask Force had identified five main areas ofaction, which would be actively pursued:

– Actions in cooperation with thirdcountries;– Regional protection, resettlement andreinforced legal avenues for migration toEurope;– Stepping up the fight against trafficking,smuggling and organized crime;– Reinforced border surveillance

contributing to enhancing the maritimesituational picture and to the protection ofand the saving of lives of migrants in theMediterranean;

– Assistance and solidarity with memberstates dealing with high migrationpressure.

The Task Force developed a plan and the fiveareas are broken down into 38 action points withdifferent actors leading their implementation,some short term, other medium and long term.53

Some actions are very specific, e.g. theCommission set aside funding (including

52 (ANSAmed) – Rome, October 15, 2013- Italy haslaunched Operation Mare Nostrum to tackle theimmigration emergency. It will be a ''humanitarianoperation'' to ''save human lives'', Defense MinisterMario Mauro said, as well as a ''security'' one.53 COM(2013) 869 Final, 4.12.2013.

emergency funding) of up to €30m in support ofItaly, including for border surveillanceoperations under the Frontex mandate. Otheractions touch upon very broad issues, e.g.“Political dialogue and diplomatic initiatives,including joint demarches, should be developedusing in a coordinated manner all the incentivesand leverages available at the EU and MemberStates' level, so as to enhance the capacity of theEU to successfully reach the objectives of theGlobal Approach to Migration and Mobility…”.

The Task Force Action point one, “Actions incooperation with third countries”54, directlymakes reference to GAMM as a dialogue andcooperation with all third countries and points atMobility Partnerships as a way of enhancing thiscooperation, specifically with the SouthernMediterranean neighbors.

The first country from the Mediterranean regionto sign a Mobility Partnership was Morocco.Since it had already been signed on 7 June 2013,the Task Force aims to continue theimplementation of the cooperation initiativeswithin that framework. In terms of internationalprotection, the objective of the MP relates to thecompliance with duly ratified internationalinstruments concerning the protection ofrefugees. This objective is expressed via supportto strengthen the Moroccan legislative andinstitutional framework, and to promote thecapacity of the Moroccan authorities to deal withthe challenge. In addition, there is a detailedannex of activities in which specific projects aredescribed, and which will be supported by MS,EU, EASO55 and UNHCR.

A mobility partnership with Tunisia had longbeen underway, but the politically volatile

54 Ibid. Specific actions in transit countries. Point 1.1.55 One such specific example is the project‘Promoting the participation of Jordan in the work ofEASO as well as the participation of Tunisia andMorocco in the work of EASO and Frontex’.

11

“Mare Nostrum” to tackle the flows and theoperation was characterized as a ''humanitarianoperation'' to ''save human lives'', as well as a''security'' one.52.

Additionally, immediately after the Justice andHome Affairs Council of 7-8 October 2013, theEU set up the “Task Force Mediterranean” underthe lead of the Commission. On the 24-25October 2013, the European Council invited theTask Force Mediterranean, also involving MS,the EEAS and a number of EU Agencies, toidentify priority actions for a more efficientshort-term use of European policies and tools.As early as the beginning of December 2013, theTask Force had identified five main areas ofaction, which would be actively pursued:

– Actions in cooperation with thirdcountries;– Regional protection, resettlement andreinforced legal avenues for migration toEurope;– Stepping up the fight against trafficking,smuggling and organized crime;– Reinforced border surveillance

contributing to enhancing the maritimesituational picture and to the protection ofand the saving of lives of migrants in theMediterranean;

– Assistance and solidarity with memberstates dealing with high migrationpressure.

The Task Force developed a plan and the fiveareas are broken down into 38 action points withdifferent actors leading their implementation,some short term, other medium and long term.53

Some actions are very specific, e.g. theCommission set aside funding (including

52 (ANSAmed) – Rome, October 15, 2013- Italy haslaunched Operation Mare Nostrum to tackle theimmigration emergency. It will be a ''humanitarianoperation'' to ''save human lives'', Defense MinisterMario Mauro said, as well as a ''security'' one.53 COM(2013) 869 Final, 4.12.2013.

emergency funding) of up to €30m in support ofItaly, including for border surveillanceoperations under the Frontex mandate. Otheractions touch upon very broad issues, e.g.“Political dialogue and diplomatic initiatives,including joint demarches, should be developedusing in a coordinated manner all the incentivesand leverages available at the EU and MemberStates' level, so as to enhance the capacity of theEU to successfully reach the objectives of theGlobal Approach to Migration and Mobility…”.

The Task Force Action point one, “Actions incooperation with third countries”54, directlymakes reference to GAMM as a dialogue andcooperation with all third countries and points atMobility Partnerships as a way of enhancing thiscooperation, specifically with the SouthernMediterranean neighbors.

The first country from the Mediterranean regionto sign a Mobility Partnership was Morocco.Since it had already been signed on 7 June 2013,the Task Force aims to continue theimplementation of the cooperation initiativeswithin that framework. In terms of internationalprotection, the objective of the MP relates to thecompliance with duly ratified internationalinstruments concerning the protection ofrefugees. This objective is expressed via supportto strengthen the Moroccan legislative andinstitutional framework, and to promote thecapacity of the Moroccan authorities to deal withthe challenge. In addition, there is a detailedannex of activities in which specific projects aredescribed, and which will be supported by MS,EU, EASO55 and UNHCR.

A mobility partnership with Tunisia had longbeen underway, but the politically volatile

54 Ibid. Specific actions in transit countries. Point 1.1.55 One such specific example is the project‘Promoting the participation of Jordan in the work ofEASO as well as the participation of Tunisia andMorocco in the work of EASO and Frontex’.

11

“Mare Nostrum” to tackle the flows and theoperation was characterized as a ''humanitarianoperation'' to ''save human lives'', as well as a''security'' one.52.

Additionally, immediately after the Justice andHome Affairs Council of 7-8 October 2013, theEU set up the “Task Force Mediterranean” underthe lead of the Commission. On the 24-25October 2013, the European Council invited theTask Force Mediterranean, also involving MS,the EEAS and a number of EU Agencies, toidentify priority actions for a more efficientshort-term use of European policies and tools.As early as the beginning of December 2013, theTask Force had identified five main areas ofaction, which would be actively pursued:

– Actions in cooperation with thirdcountries;– Regional protection, resettlement andreinforced legal avenues for migration toEurope;– Stepping up the fight against trafficking,smuggling and organized crime;– Reinforced border surveillance

contributing to enhancing the maritimesituational picture and to the protection ofand the saving of lives of migrants in theMediterranean;

– Assistance and solidarity with memberstates dealing with high migrationpressure.

The Task Force developed a plan and the fiveareas are broken down into 38 action points withdifferent actors leading their implementation,some short term, other medium and long term.53

Some actions are very specific, e.g. theCommission set aside funding (including

52 (ANSAmed) – Rome, October 15, 2013- Italy haslaunched Operation Mare Nostrum to tackle theimmigration emergency. It will be a ''humanitarianoperation'' to ''save human lives'', Defense MinisterMario Mauro said, as well as a ''security'' one.53 COM(2013) 869 Final, 4.12.2013.

emergency funding) of up to €30m in support ofItaly, including for border surveillanceoperations under the Frontex mandate. Otheractions touch upon very broad issues, e.g.“Political dialogue and diplomatic initiatives,including joint demarches, should be developedusing in a coordinated manner all the incentivesand leverages available at the EU and MemberStates' level, so as to enhance the capacity of theEU to successfully reach the objectives of theGlobal Approach to Migration and Mobility…”.

The Task Force Action point one, “Actions incooperation with third countries”54, directlymakes reference to GAMM as a dialogue andcooperation with all third countries and points atMobility Partnerships as a way of enhancing thiscooperation, specifically with the SouthernMediterranean neighbors.

The first country from the Mediterranean regionto sign a Mobility Partnership was Morocco.Since it had already been signed on 7 June 2013,the Task Force aims to continue theimplementation of the cooperation initiativeswithin that framework. In terms of internationalprotection, the objective of the MP relates to thecompliance with duly ratified internationalinstruments concerning the protection ofrefugees. This objective is expressed via supportto strengthen the Moroccan legislative andinstitutional framework, and to promote thecapacity of the Moroccan authorities to deal withthe challenge. In addition, there is a detailedannex of activities in which specific projects aredescribed, and which will be supported by MS,EU, EASO55 and UNHCR.

A mobility partnership with Tunisia had longbeen underway, but the politically volatile

54 Ibid. Specific actions in transit countries. Point 1.1.55 One such specific example is the project‘Promoting the participation of Jordan in the work ofEASO as well as the participation of Tunisia andMorocco in the work of EASO and Frontex’.

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12

situation in the country dragged on the process.Logically, the Task Force urged the Commissionand Member States to “sign and startimplementing the recently concluded MobilityPartnership (MP) with Tunisia.”56 One can onlyguess that this statement played a key role inpromoting its signature on 3rd March 2014, withtalks still ongoing regarding the details of theinitiatives to be included in the annex.

It was the EU’s intention to establish furthermobility partnerships with neighbouringcountries in the Mediterranean,57 includingJordan given its strategic importance for otherMediterranean countries (Egypt, Syria andLebanon). Even though the Task Force per se isnot the driving force behind that objective, itprovided new focus and impetus for the EU andMember States to do so.

Regional Protection Programs (RPPs) have beenestablished in the Horn of Africa, and the Northof Africa (Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt), andanother one is being finalized in response to theSyrian crisis. Here again, a heavier commitmentof MS vis-à-vis resettlement would be in order,according to the Mediterranean Task Force.

Conclusions

Migration is now firmly at the top of the EU’spolitical agenda. In 2005 the response of theEuropean Commission (EC) to this challengewas the introduction of the Global Approach toMigration and Mobility (GAMM), anoverarching strategic framework of the EUexternal migration policy - revised in 2011 toinclude international protection and the externaldimension of asylum, as well as the concept of

56 Com (2013) 869 final, Brussels, 4.12.2013.57 COM(2013) 869 Final, 4.12.2013. “The launchingof new Dialogues on migration, mobility and securitywith additional Southern Mediterranean countries,notably with Egypt, Libya, Algeria and Lebanon isalso a priority.”

“mobility”. The GAMM is implemented throughseveral instruments (political, legal, andoperational support and capacity-building), andrelies on genuine partnership with thirdcountries, based on mutual trust and sharedinterests.

However, its non-binding and flexible nature hasmostly translated into little engagement, often-timid financial contributions from the MS in theGAMM cooperation frameworks, such asMobility Partnerships, and a great deal offrustration among the involved partner countries.This calls for the roles of EU actors (EUagencies, EC, and European External ActionService) and MS to be more clearly defined andfor tangible engagement. Only in this way canGAMM be implemented coherently andhonestly, and thereby pave the way for a futurecommon migration and asylum policy for theEU and its neighbors.

In order to be sustainable, future migration andasylum policy has to be evidence based asopposed to reliance on outmoded notions. Also,it should focus on promoting ethical recruitment,legal and safe employment of migrants (decentwork), and improved integration measures.Briefly, benefits to third countries in relation tomobility should not be conditioned to co-operation on border controls and migration flowmonitoring, but rather to the respect for thehuman rights of migrants. Finally, it has to payparticular attention to the needs and context ofits partners, if the intended objective is to buildlong-term relations and to promote a genuinetwo-way dialogue.

As a big bureaucratic and political animal, theEU is slow by nature in agreeing to commonsolutions and adapting to reality (e.g. StockholmProgramme). The new EU Funds on Asylum,Migration, and Integration (2014-2020, 3.1billion Euro) and the Internal Security Funds(2014-2020, 3.7 billion Euro) are new financialvehicles to tackle the issue, but at the same time

12

situation in the country dragged on the process.Logically, the Task Force urged the Commissionand Member States to “sign and startimplementing the recently concluded MobilityPartnership (MP) with Tunisia.”56 One can onlyguess that this statement played a key role inpromoting its signature on 3rd March 2014, withtalks still ongoing regarding the details of theinitiatives to be included in the annex.

It was the EU’s intention to establish furthermobility partnerships with neighbouringcountries in the Mediterranean,57 includingJordan given its strategic importance for otherMediterranean countries (Egypt, Syria andLebanon). Even though the Task Force per se isnot the driving force behind that objective, itprovided new focus and impetus for the EU andMember States to do so.

Regional Protection Programs (RPPs) have beenestablished in the Horn of Africa, and the Northof Africa (Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt), andanother one is being finalized in response to theSyrian crisis. Here again, a heavier commitmentof MS vis-à-vis resettlement would be in order,according to the Mediterranean Task Force.

Conclusions

Migration is now firmly at the top of the EU’spolitical agenda. In 2005 the response of theEuropean Commission (EC) to this challengewas the introduction of the Global Approach toMigration and Mobility (GAMM), anoverarching strategic framework of the EUexternal migration policy - revised in 2011 toinclude international protection and the externaldimension of asylum, as well as the concept of

56 Com (2013) 869 final, Brussels, 4.12.2013.57 COM(2013) 869 Final, 4.12.2013. “The launchingof new Dialogues on migration, mobility and securitywith additional Southern Mediterranean countries,notably with Egypt, Libya, Algeria and Lebanon isalso a priority.”

“mobility”. The GAMM is implemented throughseveral instruments (political, legal, andoperational support and capacity-building), andrelies on genuine partnership with thirdcountries, based on mutual trust and sharedinterests.

However, its non-binding and flexible nature hasmostly translated into little engagement, often-timid financial contributions from the MS in theGAMM cooperation frameworks, such asMobility Partnerships, and a great deal offrustration among the involved partner countries.This calls for the roles of EU actors (EUagencies, EC, and European External ActionService) and MS to be more clearly defined andfor tangible engagement. Only in this way canGAMM be implemented coherently andhonestly, and thereby pave the way for a futurecommon migration and asylum policy for theEU and its neighbors.

In order to be sustainable, future migration andasylum policy has to be evidence based asopposed to reliance on outmoded notions. Also,it should focus on promoting ethical recruitment,legal and safe employment of migrants (decentwork), and improved integration measures.Briefly, benefits to third countries in relation tomobility should not be conditioned to co-operation on border controls and migration flowmonitoring, but rather to the respect for thehuman rights of migrants. Finally, it has to payparticular attention to the needs and context ofits partners, if the intended objective is to buildlong-term relations and to promote a genuinetwo-way dialogue.

As a big bureaucratic and political animal, theEU is slow by nature in agreeing to commonsolutions and adapting to reality (e.g. StockholmProgramme). The new EU Funds on Asylum,Migration, and Integration (2014-2020, 3.1billion Euro) and the Internal Security Funds(2014-2020, 3.7 billion Euro) are new financialvehicles to tackle the issue, but at the same time

12

situation in the country dragged on the process.Logically, the Task Force urged the Commissionand Member States to “sign and startimplementing the recently concluded MobilityPartnership (MP) with Tunisia.”56 One can onlyguess that this statement played a key role inpromoting its signature on 3rd March 2014, withtalks still ongoing regarding the details of theinitiatives to be included in the annex.

It was the EU’s intention to establish furthermobility partnerships with neighbouringcountries in the Mediterranean,57 includingJordan given its strategic importance for otherMediterranean countries (Egypt, Syria andLebanon). Even though the Task Force per se isnot the driving force behind that objective, itprovided new focus and impetus for the EU andMember States to do so.

Regional Protection Programs (RPPs) have beenestablished in the Horn of Africa, and the Northof Africa (Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt), andanother one is being finalized in response to theSyrian crisis. Here again, a heavier commitmentof MS vis-à-vis resettlement would be in order,according to the Mediterranean Task Force.

Conclusions

Migration is now firmly at the top of the EU’spolitical agenda. In 2005 the response of theEuropean Commission (EC) to this challengewas the introduction of the Global Approach toMigration and Mobility (GAMM), anoverarching strategic framework of the EUexternal migration policy - revised in 2011 toinclude international protection and the externaldimension of asylum, as well as the concept of

56 Com (2013) 869 final, Brussels, 4.12.2013.57 COM(2013) 869 Final, 4.12.2013. “The launchingof new Dialogues on migration, mobility and securitywith additional Southern Mediterranean countries,notably with Egypt, Libya, Algeria and Lebanon isalso a priority.”

“mobility”. The GAMM is implemented throughseveral instruments (political, legal, andoperational support and capacity-building), andrelies on genuine partnership with thirdcountries, based on mutual trust and sharedinterests.

However, its non-binding and flexible nature hasmostly translated into little engagement, often-timid financial contributions from the MS in theGAMM cooperation frameworks, such asMobility Partnerships, and a great deal offrustration among the involved partner countries.This calls for the roles of EU actors (EUagencies, EC, and European External ActionService) and MS to be more clearly defined andfor tangible engagement. Only in this way canGAMM be implemented coherently andhonestly, and thereby pave the way for a futurecommon migration and asylum policy for theEU and its neighbors.

In order to be sustainable, future migration andasylum policy has to be evidence based asopposed to reliance on outmoded notions. Also,it should focus on promoting ethical recruitment,legal and safe employment of migrants (decentwork), and improved integration measures.Briefly, benefits to third countries in relation tomobility should not be conditioned to co-operation on border controls and migration flowmonitoring, but rather to the respect for thehuman rights of migrants. Finally, it has to payparticular attention to the needs and context ofits partners, if the intended objective is to buildlong-term relations and to promote a genuinetwo-way dialogue.

As a big bureaucratic and political animal, theEU is slow by nature in agreeing to commonsolutions and adapting to reality (e.g. StockholmProgramme). The new EU Funds on Asylum,Migration, and Integration (2014-2020, 3.1billion Euro) and the Internal Security Funds(2014-2020, 3.7 billion Euro) are new financialvehicles to tackle the issue, but at the same time

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13

they confirm that the main emphasis is still onsecurity.

However, if European leaders want to keepEurope’s competitive advantage and socialstandards for the coming generation, the time ismore than ripe to reshape a bold and creativevision and policy for the migration and asylumportfolio that takes into consideration relevantpolicies (economic, employment, education,skills, external issues, etc.), and demographicchanges.

13

they confirm that the main emphasis is still onsecurity.

However, if European leaders want to keepEurope’s competitive advantage and socialstandards for the coming generation, the time ismore than ripe to reshape a bold and creativevision and policy for the migration and asylumportfolio that takes into consideration relevantpolicies (economic, employment, education,skills, external issues, etc.), and demographicchanges.

13

they confirm that the main emphasis is still onsecurity.

However, if European leaders want to keepEurope’s competitive advantage and socialstandards for the coming generation, the time ismore than ripe to reshape a bold and creativevision and policy for the migration and asylumportfolio that takes into consideration relevantpolicies (economic, employment, education,skills, external issues, etc.), and demographicchanges.

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14

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Carrera, Sergio,Parkin Joanna, and Den Hertog Leonhard (2013). Policy Paper 74. EU MigrationPolicy after the Arab Spring: the Pitfalls of Home Affairs Diplomacy.

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic andSocial Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Communication on migration. COM(2011) 248Final.

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the EuropeanEconomic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – The Global Approach toMigration and Mobility, 18.11.2011 COM(2011) 743 Final.

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council (2010). AnnualReport on Immigration and Asylum (2010). COM(2011) 291 Final.

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the EuropeanEconomic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions – An open and secure Europe:making it happen, Brussels, 11.3.2014 COM(2014) 154 Final.

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on The Work OfThe Task Force Mediterranean, Brussels, 4.12.2013, COM(2013) 869 Final.

Council of the EU (2013). Joint declaration establishing a Mobility Partnership between the Kingdomof Morocco and the European Union and its Member States. Brussels, 3 June 2013 (05.06) (OR.fr)6139/13ADD 1 REV 3.

Council of the EU (2012). Council conclusions on a Common Framework for genuine and practicalsolidarity towards Member States facing particular pressures on their asylum systems, includingthrough mixed migration flows. 3151st Justice and Home Affairs Council meeting.

European Parliament (2008). Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Councilof 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegallystaying third-country nationals.

European Parliament (2010). Regulation (EU) No 439/2010 of the European Parliament and of theCouncil of 19 May 2010 establishing a European Asylum Support Office.

European Parliament (2011). Resolution of 5 April 2011 on migration flows arising from instability:scope and role of EU foreign policy (2010/2269(INI)).

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Bibliography

Boubakri, Hassan (2013). Migration Policy Centre. Revolution and International Migration inTunisia. Research Report 2013/04.

Carrera, Sergio,Parkin Joanna, and Den Hertog Leonhard (2013). Policy Paper 74. EU MigrationPolicy after the Arab Spring: the Pitfalls of Home Affairs Diplomacy.

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic andSocial Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Communication on migration. COM(2011) 248Final.

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the EuropeanEconomic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – The Global Approach toMigration and Mobility, 18.11.2011 COM(2011) 743 Final.

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council (2010). AnnualReport on Immigration and Asylum (2010). COM(2011) 291 Final.

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the EuropeanEconomic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions – An open and secure Europe:making it happen, Brussels, 11.3.2014 COM(2014) 154 Final.

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on The Work OfThe Task Force Mediterranean, Brussels, 4.12.2013, COM(2013) 869 Final.

Council of the EU (2013). Joint declaration establishing a Mobility Partnership between the Kingdomof Morocco and the European Union and its Member States. Brussels, 3 June 2013 (05.06) (OR.fr)6139/13ADD 1 REV 3.

Council of the EU (2012). Council conclusions on a Common Framework for genuine and practicalsolidarity towards Member States facing particular pressures on their asylum systems, includingthrough mixed migration flows. 3151st Justice and Home Affairs Council meeting.

European Parliament (2008). Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Councilof 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegallystaying third-country nationals.

European Parliament (2010). Regulation (EU) No 439/2010 of the European Parliament and of theCouncil of 19 May 2010 establishing a European Asylum Support Office.

European Parliament (2011). Resolution of 5 April 2011 on migration flows arising from instability:scope and role of EU foreign policy (2010/2269(INI)).

14

Bibliography

Boubakri, Hassan (2013). Migration Policy Centre. Revolution and International Migration inTunisia. Research Report 2013/04.

Carrera, Sergio,Parkin Joanna, and Den Hertog Leonhard (2013). Policy Paper 74. EU MigrationPolicy after the Arab Spring: the Pitfalls of Home Affairs Diplomacy.

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic andSocial Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Communication on migration. COM(2011) 248Final.

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the EuropeanEconomic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – The Global Approach toMigration and Mobility, 18.11.2011 COM(2011) 743 Final.

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council (2010). AnnualReport on Immigration and Asylum (2010). COM(2011) 291 Final.

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the EuropeanEconomic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions – An open and secure Europe:making it happen, Brussels, 11.3.2014 COM(2014) 154 Final.

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on The Work OfThe Task Force Mediterranean, Brussels, 4.12.2013, COM(2013) 869 Final.

Council of the EU (2013). Joint declaration establishing a Mobility Partnership between the Kingdomof Morocco and the European Union and its Member States. Brussels, 3 June 2013 (05.06) (OR.fr)6139/13ADD 1 REV 3.

Council of the EU (2012). Council conclusions on a Common Framework for genuine and practicalsolidarity towards Member States facing particular pressures on their asylum systems, includingthrough mixed migration flows. 3151st Justice and Home Affairs Council meeting.

European Parliament (2008). Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Councilof 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegallystaying third-country nationals.

European Parliament (2010). Regulation (EU) No 439/2010 of the European Parliament and of theCouncil of 19 May 2010 establishing a European Asylum Support Office.

European Parliament (2011). Resolution of 5 April 2011 on migration flows arising from instability:scope and role of EU foreign policy (2010/2269(INI)).

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2

European Parliament (2011). Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 2011/36/EU of5 April 2011 on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims, andreplacing Council Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA, OJ L 101/1, 15 April 2001.

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Fundamental Rights Agency (2014). Criminalisation of migrants in an irregular situation and ofpersons engaging with them.

GFMD (2013). Thematic Recollection from the GFMD 2007-2012: Input to the High-level Dialogueon International Migration and Development.

GFMD (2013). Concept Paper. Unlocking the potential for migration for inclusive development.

Intra-ACP Migration Facility (2014). Activities Implemented by the Project Management Unit, anoverview from 2009 to 2014”.

Malmström, Cecilia (2013). Statement by EU Commissioner Malmström - United Nations High-levelDialogue on International Migration and Development.

Martin, Marie (2012). Statewatch. Analysis – The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility: thestate of play.

Newland, Kathleen (2013). Migration Policy Institute. The High-Level Dialogue: Sizing upOutcomes, Implications, and Future Forms of Engagement on Migration and Development.

Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic andSocial Committee and the Committee of the Regions – Report on the implementation of the GlobalApproach on Migration and Mobility 2012-2013. Brussels, 21 February 2014, COM(2014) 96 final.

United Nations (2012). Committee on the Protection of the Human Rights of Migrant Workers andtheir Families. Preliminary Statement on the Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights onStrengthening the United Nations Human Rights Treaty Body System, Seventeenth Session, 10-14September 2012.

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United Nations (2013). Press Release: Lampedusa boat tragedy: UN expert restates call on EU statesto prioritise migrants’ human rights.

2

European Parliament (2011). Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 2011/36/EU of5 April 2011 on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims, andreplacing Council Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA, OJ L 101/1, 15 April 2001.

FRONTEX (2014). Fran Quarterly Report (Q3 of 2013). Trimestral reports on illegal crossings of EUexternal borders. Warsaw.

Fundamental Rights Agency (2014). Criminalisation of migrants in an irregular situation and ofpersons engaging with them.

GFMD (2013). Thematic Recollection from the GFMD 2007-2012: Input to the High-level Dialogueon International Migration and Development.

GFMD (2013). Concept Paper. Unlocking the potential for migration for inclusive development.

Intra-ACP Migration Facility (2014). Activities Implemented by the Project Management Unit, anoverview from 2009 to 2014”.

Malmström, Cecilia (2013). Statement by EU Commissioner Malmström - United Nations High-levelDialogue on International Migration and Development.

Martin, Marie (2012). Statewatch. Analysis – The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility: thestate of play.

Newland, Kathleen (2013). Migration Policy Institute. The High-Level Dialogue: Sizing upOutcomes, Implications, and Future Forms of Engagement on Migration and Development.

Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic andSocial Committee and the Committee of the Regions – Report on the implementation of the GlobalApproach on Migration and Mobility 2012-2013. Brussels, 21 February 2014, COM(2014) 96 final.

United Nations (2012). Committee on the Protection of the Human Rights of Migrant Workers andtheir Families. Preliminary Statement on the Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights onStrengthening the United Nations Human Rights Treaty Body System, Seventeenth Session, 10-14September 2012.

United Nations (2013). UN Chronicle (#3). Migration.

United Nations (2013). Press Release: Lampedusa boat tragedy: UN expert restates call on EU statesto prioritise migrants’ human rights.

2

European Parliament (2011). Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 2011/36/EU of5 April 2011 on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims, andreplacing Council Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA, OJ L 101/1, 15 April 2001.

FRONTEX (2014). Fran Quarterly Report (Q3 of 2013). Trimestral reports on illegal crossings of EUexternal borders. Warsaw.

Fundamental Rights Agency (2014). Criminalisation of migrants in an irregular situation and ofpersons engaging with them.

GFMD (2013). Thematic Recollection from the GFMD 2007-2012: Input to the High-level Dialogueon International Migration and Development.

GFMD (2013). Concept Paper. Unlocking the potential for migration for inclusive development.

Intra-ACP Migration Facility (2014). Activities Implemented by the Project Management Unit, anoverview from 2009 to 2014”.

Malmström, Cecilia (2013). Statement by EU Commissioner Malmström - United Nations High-levelDialogue on International Migration and Development.

Martin, Marie (2012). Statewatch. Analysis – The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility: thestate of play.

Newland, Kathleen (2013). Migration Policy Institute. The High-Level Dialogue: Sizing upOutcomes, Implications, and Future Forms of Engagement on Migration and Development.

Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic andSocial Committee and the Committee of the Regions – Report on the implementation of the GlobalApproach on Migration and Mobility 2012-2013. Brussels, 21 February 2014, COM(2014) 96 final.

United Nations (2012). Committee on the Protection of the Human Rights of Migrant Workers andtheir Families. Preliminary Statement on the Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights onStrengthening the United Nations Human Rights Treaty Body System, Seventeenth Session, 10-14September 2012.

United Nations (2013). UN Chronicle (#3). Migration.

United Nations (2013). Press Release: Lampedusa boat tragedy: UN expert restates call on EU statesto prioritise migrants’ human rights.