MIGRATIONPOLICYPRACTICE ISSN 2223-5248

ContentsJoint Managing Editors:

• SolonArdittis(Eurasylum)• Frank Laczko (InternationalOrganizationforMigration–

IOM)Editorial Advisers:

• JoannevanSelm(Eurasylum)• Karoline Popp (InternationalOrganizationforMigration

–IOM)Editorial Assistants:

• ValerieHagger(InternationalOrganizationforMigration–IOM)

• TanyaMa.Tiotuyco(InternationalOrganizationforMigration–IOM)

Editorial Committee:• AderantiAdepoju(HumanResourcesDevelopment

Centre,Lagos,Nigeria) • RichardAresBaumgartner(EuropeanAgencyforthe

ManagementofOperationalCooperationattheExternalBordersoftheEuropeanUnion–FRONTEX,Warsaw)

• PeterBosch(EuropeanCommission,Brussels)• JuanCarlosCalleros(InstitutoNacionaldeMigraciòn,

SecretarìadeGobernaciòn,Mexico)• JeffCrisp(UNHCR,Geneva) • AnitaDavis(AustralianDepartmentofImmigrationand

Citizenship,Canberra)• GloriadePascual-Teresa(InternationalLabourOffice–

ILO,Geneva)• HowardDuncan(Metropolis,Ottawa,Canada)• Araceli Azuara Ferreiro (OrganizationofAmericanStates

–OAS,WashingtonD.C.)• BeataGodenzi(SwissAgencyforDevelopmentand

Cooperation,FederalDepartmentofForeignAffairs,Berne)

• Sandra Harder (CitizenshipandImmigrationCanada–CIC,Ottawa)

• ChrisHedges(UnitedKingdomBorderAgency–UKBA,London)

• JenniferMcDonald(Passport,ImmigrationandCitizenshipAgency,MinistryofNationalSecurity,Jamaica)

• IrenaOmelaniuk(GlobalForumforMigrationandDevelopment–GFMD)

• SankarRamasamy(DepartmentofLabour,NewZealand)

• DilipRatha(WorldBank,WashingtonD.C.)• CécileRiallant(EC-UNJointMigrationandDevelopment

Initiative,Brussels)• NandKishoreSingh(MemberoftheIndianParliament,

NewDelhi)• SimonTonelli(CouncilofEurope,Strasbourg) • AdrianavanDooijeweert(DutchAdvisoryCommitteeon

MigrationAffairs–ACVZ,TheHague)• Hania Zlotnik (UNPopulationDivision,Departmentfor

EconomicandSocialAffairs–UNDESA,NewYork)

PublishedjointlybytheInternationalOrganizationforMigration(IOM)andEurasylumLtd.http://www.iom.int/migration-policy-practice

Introduction..............................................................2SolonArdittisandFrankLaczko

TheInternationalDialogueonMigration2012:Managingmigrationincrisissituations.....................................3Karoline Popp

Forcedmigration–changingtrends,newresponses.........................................................5RogerZetter

Managingmigrationincrisissituations:reflectionsandexperiencesonUShumanitarianassistanceandmigrationresponse................................................12CatherineWiesner,JamesBeanandJessicaWardenYutacom

LapolíticademigracionesbrasileñaylamigraciónhaitianaaBrasil..............................15PauloSérgiodeAlmeida

Protectingandassistingcitizensabroad:RepublicofKorea’spolicylandscape....................17LeeYoung-ho

LesenseignementsàtirerdelagestiondelacriselibyenneparlaRépubliqueduTchad...................................19MoussaMahamatDago

AtenciónyreparaciónintegralalasvíctimasdeldesplazamientoforzadoenColombia.............................................22PaulaGaviriaBetancur

Dealingwiththeconsequencesofarticle1FoftheRefugeeConventionintheNetherlands:Acrisisformigrationpolicymakersandexcludedasylumclaimants.......26JokeReijvenandJorisvanWijk

A Bimonthly Review by and for Policymakers Worldwide

Editorial Board

Vol.II,Number5,October-November2012

Disclaimer: The Spanish articles have not been officially edited by IOM and Eurasylum.

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Introduction

Solon Ardittis and Frank Laczko1

Welcome to the seventh issue of Migration Policy Practice,which focuses on policy andoperational responses to migration crises

causedbypoliticalturmoil,conflictornaturaldisasters.

ArticlesinthisissuedrawlargelyfromcontributionstoIOM’songoingInternationalDialogueonMigration(IDM)2012,whichaimstoaimstointegratehumanitarianandmigration perspectives in the search for appropriateresponses to themigration consequences of complexcrises.

This issue of MPP includes eight articles (in English,FrenchandSpanish)writtenmostlybyparticipantsintheIDM2012. This includesseniorrepresentativesof theUSDepartmentofState,theMinistryofForeignAffairsof Chad, the Colombian Government, theMinistry ofForeignAffairsandTradeoftheRepublicofKorea,andtheNationalImmigrationCouncilofBrazil.

1 SolonArdittis isManagingDirectorof EurasylumLtdand FrankLaczko is Head of the Migration Research Division at IOMHeadquartersinGeneva.Theyareco-editorsofMigration Policy Practice.

ThisissueofMPPalsoincludesarticlesbyRogerZetteroftheUniversityofOxford,onchangingtrends inandnewresponsestoforcedmigration;andJokeReijvenandJorisvanWijkofVUUniversityAmsterdam,ondealingwith the consequences of article 1F of the RefugeeConvention.

We hope you enjoy this edition of Migration Policy Practice, and as always, we look forward to yourcomments, suggestions and possible contributions tofutureissuesofthejournal.

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The International Dialogue on Migration 2012: Managing migration in crisis situations Karoline Popp1

The International Dialogue on Migration (IDM)is IOM’s principal forum for migration policydialogue. Created by Member States of IOM

in 2001 on the occasion of the Organization’s fiftiethanniversary,theIDMfulfilsaninstitutionalmandateofIOMtoprovideaforumfortheexchangeofviewsandexperiencesandtopromoteregionalandglobaldebateanddialogueonmigration.

The past decades have witnessed an expansion ofintergovernmentalandotherinitiativestodevelopjointapproachestomigration.TheIDMhasheldapioneeringroleinbringingtogetherallmigrationstakeholders,atagloballevel,forcandiddiscussionsontheopportunitiesandchallengeswhichmigrationpresents.TheDialogueis open to IOM Member and Observer States, aswell as international and civil society organizations,academia,theprivatesectorandmigrantsthemselves.It provides a space to analyse current and emergingissuesinmigrationgovernanceandtoexchangepolicyapproachesandeffectivepractices.

The IDMplacesvalueandemphasisondiversetopics,viewsandactorstoshedlightonmigrationissuesinalltheircomplexity.Overtheyears,theIDMhasaddressedthelinkofmigrationtolabourmarketsanddevelopment,integration and social cohesion, human rights ofmigrants, climate change, and human trafficking, toname a few. The annual overarching themes as wellas the topics for the workshops are chosen by IOMMember and Observer States and therefore reflecttheirprioritiesatagivenmoment. For2012, the IOMmembership selected the theme“Managingmigrationincrisissituations.”

Initsfirstworkshopoftheyear,on24and25April2012,theIDMexploredthetopic“Movingtosafety:migrationconsequences of complex crises.” The workshopintroducedtheconceptof“migrationcrisis”tocapturea contemporary reality in which human mobility is amajor feature of humanitarian crises such as naturaldisasters or conflicts. The concept aims to highlightthe complexity of patterns ofmovement that emergefromcrises:forexample,temporarydisplacementmay

1 Karoline Popp is Migration Policy Officer of the InternationalCooperationandPartnershipsDepartmentatIOMHeadquartersinGeneva.

become protracted initially; internal movements spillacrossborders;andcrisesanddisplacementsituationsgive rise to other forms of migration such as searchfor work, migration to cities, irregular and mixedmovements,traffickingandsmuggling.

Discussions revolved around a number of framingquestions: How do people move in the event of adisaster?What is the relationship betweenmigrationpatterns before, during and after a crisis? Whathappenstothosewhodonotorcannotmoveincrisissituations? What lessons drawn from responses tointernaldisplacementcanbetransferredtocross-borderforced migration, and vice versa? How can migrationmanagementframeworkssupportresponsetocrises?

Workshop participants discussed various types ofmigration crises, including sudden large-scale eventsand slowlyevolving situations,natural andman-madecrises,andtheir internalandcross-borderdimensions.Theyalsopointedoutthattheeffectsofclimatechangealreadygiverisetoforcedmigration,andtopotentiallylargemigrationcrisesinthefuture.Theyacknowledgedtheneedtodevelopnewstrategiestoaddressthenexusbetweencrisesandmobilitytrendsandpatterns.

According to workshop participants, existinghumanitarian and protection mechanisms often donotcoverallvulnerablemobilepopulationsanddonotaddress all the risks, vulnerabilities and human rightsviolations theyexperience in crises. In addition, thosemostneglectedaresometimesunabletomoveduringacrisis,whoremaintrappedindangerouscircumstances.At the same time, delegates emphasized the agency,capacity and resilience of affected communities andcautionedagainstperpetuatingthevictimizationofsuchpopulations.

Participants acknowledged that humanitarian andmigration policies can reinforce each other at allstages of crisis response. For example, participantshighlighteddifferentmigrationmanagementtoolsthatarerelevantinamigrationcrisis:temporaryprotection,expeditedvisaprocedures, specialhumanitarianvisas,stabilization of border areas and humanitarian bordermanagement,referralsystemsforpersonswithspecialprotectionneeds, andabetterutilizationofmigrationandremittancesforpost-crisisrecovery.

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The second workshop in the 2012 series, held on13 and 14 September 2012, was about “Protectingmigrants during times of crisis: immediate responsesandsustainablestrategies.” Itnarrowedthefocustoaspecificpopulationaffectedbycrises,butofteninvisibleto humanitarian response mechanisms: internationalmigrantswhoarecaughtupinacrisisintheirdestinationortransitcountries.Theworkshopaskedinwhatwaysmigrants areparticularly vulnerable in crisis situationsandsoughtto identifygaps inprotectingandassistingthem. In doing so, participants considered both theimmediate and longer-term repercussions whenmigrantsareaffectedbycrises. Manyparticipantsemphasizedthatmigrantsexperiencespecificvulnerabilitieswhentheyarestrandedinacrisissituation–undocumentedmigrantsormigrantdomesticemployeesworkinginisolatedconditionshaveparticulardifficultiesinaccessingassistance.Inthiscontext,italsoemergedthatthelevelofsocialprotectionandrespectfortheirhumanrightsthatmigrantsenjoybeforeacrisiswill directly influence how migrants fare during andafteracrisis.

Destinationandorigincountriesshareresponsibilityformigrantsduringcrisesandneedtofactortheirmigrantpopulationintocontingencyplanningforemergencies.Manycountries,however,acknowledgedthattheylackeventheproperdatatoknowwheretheirmigrantsare,whotheyare,andhowto reach them in theeventofa crisis.Nonetheless, a growingnumber of innovativepracticesexisttorenderhumanitarianassistancemoreaccessibletomigrantsortostrengthenconsularservicesinemergencysituations.

ManyparticipantsreferencedthecrisisinLibyain2011which provoked the sudden return of hundreds ofthousandsofmigrantworkerstotheirhomecountries.Returntothehomecountryissometimesinevitabletoprotectmigrantscaughtincrises,butthisisnotwithout

consequences–forreturneeswhofaceunemploymentanddebt,forfamilieswhohadreliedonasteadystreamof remittances, or for countries that may already bestrugglingwithdevelopmentorsecurityissues.

Each IDMworkshop attracted about 250 participants.Governmental representatives from more than 70countrieswerejoinedbypractitionersfromtheUnitedNationsandnon-governmentalorganizations,aswellasacademic experts.Many called for closer cooperationamong governments, including at regional level, andfor better coordination among international agencies.Numerous participants recognized the central role ofIOMinrespondingtomigrationcrises,especiallywhereinternationalmigrantsarepredominantlyaffected.

The IDM 2012 forms part of a broader institutionalstrategy to highlight migration crises as a growingchallengeforStatesandtheinternationalcommunity;asanissueofglobalimportanceinthedebateonmigrationgovernance; and as an institutional priority for IOM.Inparticular, IOMhasworkedwith itsMemberStatesto enhance coherence between the Organization’shumanitarian programmes and relevant migrationmanagementactivitiesinresolvingmigrationcrises.Theresultant migration crisis operational framework willallow IOMand its partners to better analyse, preparefor and address themultiplemigration dimensions ofcontemporarycrises.

For further information on the IDM and the twoworkshops summarized in this article, please visitwww.iom.int/cms/idm, as well as www.iom.int/cms/idmcomplexcrises and www.iom.int/cms/idmmigrantsincrisis, respectively. Drawing partly fromthe Organization’s operational experience during the2011crisis in Libya, IOMhasalsoproducedanumberofpublicationsrelatedtothethemeoftheIDMin2012,whichyoumayobtainfromtheabovewebsitesorfromhttp://publications.iom.int/bookstore/.

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Forced migration – changing trends, new responses

Roger Zetter1

Introduction

In the contemporary era, the complex nature ofdisasters and conflicts generate an enormouspotential for forcibly displacing large numbers

of people. Worldwide, some 43 million people areeither refugees or internally displaced persons (IDPs)removed by conflict and violence (UNHCR, 2012a;IDMC, 2012). Forced migration, in particular, issymptomatic of humanitarian crises and has manycomplexmanifestations. The conditions, intensity andconfigurationsofforcedmigrationvaryintime,locationandrelationtothecrisisdriversandthedifferentsocio-economic and political contexts. This situation posesnew challenges and demand new responses fromhumanitarianactorsintheirstrategies,tools,capacitiesandorganizationalarchitecture.

This shortpaperprovidesanoverviewof someof thekey thematic issues and challenges – the drivers anddynamics of forcedmigration. It outlines the impactsof these crises and their migration consequences forhumanitarian actors, discussing emerging practices,tools and lessons, and some of the implications fortheorganizationaland institutionalarchitectureof thehumanitarianresponse.

Thematic issues and challenges – drivers and dynamics

The main drivers of forced migration are notfundamentallynew.For themostpart, thedriversareconflictanddisasters,but theyprecipitatenewtrendsanddynamics,differenttypologiesandtrajectories,novelpatternsandprocesses, all ofwhichhave implicationsforhumanitariananddevelopmentalactors.Moreover,major global trends such as population increase,urbanization, environmental and climate change,increasingpovertyandpoliticalrepressionallaccentuatevulnerability, the likelihood of crises developing andthusthepropensityforforcedmigration.

However,caution isneeded inascribingasinglecausethat precipitates forced migration. More usually, a

1 Roger Zetter is Professor Emeritus in Refugee Studies at theRefugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford. This paper isbasedonapresentationoriginallygivenattheIOMInternationalDialogue on Migration Intersessional Workshop, 24–25 April2012,onManagingMigrationinCrisisSituations.

combination of multiple triggers, often deriving fromunpredictable events, drives forced migration. Thisimparts complexity to the contemporary dynamics offorcedmigration.

Whatarethetrends?Fromapotentiallylargeportfolio,four trends are especially pertinent to the presentdiscussion.

Conflict, non-state actors and displacement

Over the last two decades, conflict precipitatinghumanitarian crises and migration, especially internaldisplacement,isincreasinglydrivenbynon-stateactors– for example in Colombia, Somalia, the DemocraticRepublicofCongo,andinsurgencyinIraq.Thissituationhas substantial implications on the mobility patternsof displaced people: the patterns and processes tendto be episodic rather than singlemovement, spatiallydiffusedratherthanunidirectional–oftennotjustonewayandoftenoververylimiteddistances–andfarlesspredictablethaninthepast.Peopledeployarangeofstrategiestodealwithconflictandminimizeriskinordertosustaintheirhouseholdlivelihoods.Insomeinstancesthere is microdisplacement: people move within orbetweenneighborhoods,ortoperi-urbanareasorruralhinterlands or from village to village seeking security.Theymayuseastrategyofdividingupthefamilyacrossdifferentlocations.Insomecases,thesestrategiesbuildto more permanent departure and more significantdistances beyond conflict regions and across nationalborders. But in other cases, the more “localized”strategiesaresustainedoverlongperiodsoftime.

Butmobilityisnottheonlydisruptionanddislocation:even those staying put have been fundamentallyunsettled in terms of their household livelihoods.Somehouseholdsare rendered involuntarily immobilebecausefightingmakesitmoredangeroustomove,orbecausetheylacktheresourcestoleave.Forexample,in Somalia, Al-Shabaab has made extreme efforts toprevent people from leaving areas under its control,indicatingamoreproactivepoliticalattempttocontrolmobility.

Lying behind these dynamics and scenarios are otherimplications–whogoestocamps,whogoestotownsandcities,whogoesback to check thehouseor tendcrops and the repercussions for gender roles andresponsibilities.

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Resurgence of state repression, persecution and political instability

The rise of non-state actors as a key driver of forceddisplacement has not diminished the significance ofclassic conditionsof statepersecutionand fragility, soprevalent in the1970sand the1980s, as still amajorcauseofrefugeesandIDPs.TheArabUprisingsof2010–2012,notablyinLibya,Tunisia,YemenandSyriabroadlyfit this category, exemplifying how state repression,authoritarianregimes,weakgovernanceandthedenialofhumanrightsleadtoviolence,conflictandeventuallylarge-scale population displacementwith hundreds ofthousands of nationals and foreigners fleeing acrossinternational borders. A similar cocktail of outcomessurrounding contested elections in Kenya (2007),Zimbabwe (2008 and subsequently) and Côte d’Ivoire(2011),furtherillustratethesaliencyofstateinstability.However, we should be careful not to homogenizethe phenomenon of the Arab Spring and these otherpopularuprisings,sincetheyreflectdivergenteconomicgrievances,socialdynamicsanddemographics.

Syria has so far followed the classic pattern ofprotracted civil war producing significant numbers ofrefugees, rather than IDPs, currently totaling 120,000registeredbyUNHCRinfourcountries,2butthenumberis significantly higher with over 140,000 in Jordanalone.AlthoughthereisnocivilwarinZimbabwe,theongoinginstabilitytherehasalsoproducedthefamiliarconditions of protracted exile of probably 2 millionZimbabweans,mainlyinSouthAfrica.

Thesetwocountries,however,seemtobetheexceptiontothedistinctiveandnovelmigrationdynamicsandissuesofmigrationandrefugeegovernancethatcharacterizetheothercases.Herethemaincharacteristicshavebeen:theveryshorttimebutintensescaleofthepopulationdisplacement;theprotectionofthirdcountrynationals(TCN),bothregularandirregularmigrantsresidentinthecountriesaffectedbytheuprisingswhowereessentiallybystanderscaughtupinthesedomesticcrises,aswellastheprotectionneedsoftheserefugees;andtheroleofstateactorsandinternationalagencies.

In all these cases, the situation of IDPs remains acontinuingconcernforinternationalactorsthatrequiresaction to secure protection and sustainable solutionsto their displacement. At the same time, migratoryoutcomes of these uprisings expose the dynamics ofsocio-economicunrestandexclusion,whichlinktothedeclining opportunity for migration from the global

2 UNHCR, Demographic Data of Registered Population, Syria Regional Refugee Response Information Sharing Portal.Available from http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php(accessed31July2012).

southtoindustrializedcountries.Thus,situationswhichprecipitateforcedmigrationexposebroaderchallengesofmigrationmanagement and restrictionist strategiesof the EuropeanUnion. This increases vulnerability ofmigrants.

Urbanization and forced displacement

For many decades, humanitarian actors have largelybeengeareduptoassistencampedrefugeepopulations,or to support disaster-affected populations in ruralareas.Buttheurbanizationofforceddisplacementhasdramaticallychangedthispictureinthelastfewyearsinthreeways.

First, andmost importantly,well overhalf theworld’s10.4millionrefugees, the largemajorityofPalestinianrefugees,andatleast13millionconflict-relatedIDPslivein urban areas (UNHCR, 2012a; IDMC, 2011a). Out offearofharassment,detentionandpossiblerefoulement manyurbanrefugeesandIDPsmaybeunregisteredandundocumented. Despite lacking effective protectionandpotentiallyvulnerable,theyareattractedtourbanareasbecauseoftheeconomicopportunitiestorestoreand develop livelihoods, especially in conditions ofprotracted displacement, and better opportunities toaccesssocialfacilities.

Second, over 50 per cent of the world’s populationnowresidesincities,thusincreasingthevolumemoresusceptible to urban crises, notably disasters. This isbecausethemajorityofurbanresidentsliveindenselybuiltinformalsettlementswithlimitedaccesstowaterandsanitation,andinhazardousenvironmentsatriskofflooding,firesandlandslips.

Third, in recent years, urban violence, althoughcomparativelylessvisiblethanotherdrivers,hasbecomeasignificantphenomenonprecipitatingsubstantialintra-andinter-urbanforceddisplacement.Ontheonehand,thisistheconsequenceofrapidurbanization,pressureon scarce resources of land and water exacerbatedby high levels of socio-economic deprivation andimpoverishment.Alongsidepoverty-relatedgeneralizedand indiscriminate violence (including drug cartels,protection rackets, land grabbing, exploitation andsexual and gender-based violence), political conflict,such as post-election violence in Kenya, insurgencyin Iraq,anddecadesof sectarianviolence inNorthernIreland, have been increasingly played out in urbanareas,causingenormouspopulationupheaval.

Slow-onset disasters and population displacement

Thusfar,wehaveconsideredhowthechangingcharacterof violence and conflict produces new patterns andprocesses ofmobility and forcedmigration. Disastersandnaturalhazards,however,alsoremainmajordriversof displacement. Although forced displacement does

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notnecessarilyaccompanydisasters, the tendency forthistohappenisincreasing,forexamplecyclonesAilainBangladeshandNargisinMyanmar,thetsunamisintheIndianOceanin2004andJapanin2011,andprolongeddrought in Somalia in 2011. Almost 15million peopleweredisplacedbydisastersin2011,andover42millionin2010 (anexceptional yearwithflooding inPakistanandtheHaitiearthquake)(IDMC,2011b).

Alongside disasters resulting from cyclones andearthquakes, evidence increasingly links changes inclimate –manifest in greater frequency and intensityof extreme weather events, rising sea levels anddesertification – to migration. Countries such asBangladesh and Viet Nam are especially prone todisplacementresultingfromrisingsealevels,whilstsub-SaharanAfricawillexperienceincreasingdesertification,rendering pastoral livelihoods no longer sustainableandmigration inevitable.The increasingoccurrenceofseverefloodsanddesertificationmaypotentiallypushlargenumbersofpeopleoutofaffectedareas.Thelinksbetween climate change andmigration, however, arecomplicatedandstillpoorlyunderstood.Suchchangesare rarely unique drivers of population displacement.They are one significant determinant, in conjunctionwitheconomic,socialandpoliticalfactors,andusuallylinkedtoexistingvulnerabilities.

Who is a forced migrant?

Clearly,thisbriefanalysisoffourofthemostimportanttrends of population displacement raises the familiarconceptual dichotomy and policy challenge – who isvoluntary and who is a forced migrant. The complexand often overlapping drivers make it as difficult todistinguishanddelineate these twocategories (Zetter,2007).Anintricatewebofcausationdeterminespeople’smigration strategies andmultiple forces are at play –global and regional geopolitics, fragility of domesticgovernance and environmental pressures combineto produce violence, persecution and rights abuseaffecting largenumbers of people. And in the caseofSomaliathesefactorscombinedwiththeenvironmentalchallengeof recurrentdrought in theregion.Togetherwith these structural factors, family situations andhousehold characteristics determine the migrationresponse–direction,timing,destination,frequencyanddemography. As we see in the Arab Spring, strandedmigrants, stateless people, refugees and IDPs (bothnationals and TCNs) were mixed together. In somesenses, they were all forced, directly or indirectly, byviolence and conflict but not according to the classictypologies.

Theseprocessesandpatternsposemajorchallengestohumanitarian and development actors – appropriatetools and responses for different categories anddifferent locations (including the predominance ofurbandestinations),differentprotectionneeds,andthe

differing institutional responsibilities.Thesechallengesarenowconsidered.

Implications for humanitarian and development actors

Regardless of the reasons why people are uprooted,they must all deal with the consequent stresses anddisruption–lossofhomes,jobs,thebreakupoffamiliesandcommunities–andadapttoneworradicallychangedenvironments.Mobilizing socialandcultural resourcesisakeyfactorinre-establishingviablecommunitiesandtorestoreandsustainadequatelevelsofmaterialwell-being.

For humanitarian and development actors, theneeds of communities affected by forced migrationremain broadly constant. But the changing trends indisplacement discussed above, combined with theinevitablyevolvingorganizationalarchitecture,capacityand resources to respond to these demands, posenewchallengeswhicharenowoutlined. Ofthemanypriorities,threearediscussedhere.

Redefining vulnerability: enhancing security and protection

The increasing complexity and unpredictability ofviolence and conflict accentuate vulnerability anddiminish the scope for protection – conditions whichthreatenthesafety,dignityandintegrityofrefugeesandIDPs.Yetitisnotjustconflictwhichcreatesvulnerability,but disruption to livelihoods and destructionof socialinstitutionscausedbyconflict.Atthesametime,inurbanareas,1 in3 residents (or1billionpeopleworldwide)live in slums or marginal informal settlements wherevulnerabilityischronic.

Whatcanbedonetoreducevulnerabilityandenhanceprotection? Promising initiatives are evident but theyneed substantial development if vulnerability is to bereducedandthepracticeofprotectionistobeeffectivelyreframed.

Therights-basedapproachisincreasinglyadvocatedbyhumanitarianagencies.Ratherthantryingtodistinguishamong different categories such as refugees who arepersecuted, those fleeing generalized violence andinsecuritydescribedabove,andthosewhoselivelihoodsare destroyed by drought – all three categories applyin Somalia – a rights-based approach recognizes thisdiversityofneed,evenwherethere isnoclear“legal”entitlement, while allowing targeted support forparticularvulnerablegroups.

It is imperative that humanitarians develop a betterunderstanding of the vulnerabilities of the at-riskpopulations with whom they are concerned in orderto design high-impact assistance strategies. Thismeansdevelopingtoolsthatcanmorepreciselyassess

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who are vulnerable groups, what vulnerabilities theyexperience while bearing in mind that these tend tobemultidimensional, andwhatare the “triggers” thatdistinguish acute from chronic vulnerability. Giventhe multisectoral dimensions of vulnerability and thediversityofactors,asignificantchallengeistoimprovethecoordinationofvulnerabilityandneedsassessmentsinmappingandevaluatingthevulnerabilitiesofdifferentgroups.

Anotheressentialdimensionistorecognizethatrefugeeand IDP communities, as well as those displaced bydisasters,areactiveagentscopingwithvulnerabilityandplayingacrucialroleinprovidingtheirownprotectionneeds (Horst, 2006). Community-based approachesare more appropriate since self-protection and socialprotection tools are based on the communities’ ownunderstandingoftheirprotectionneedsandthescopeoflocalprotectionmechanisms.Inthiscontext,protection,livelihood support and thus the potential to reducevulnerabilityshouldgohandinhandinaddressingtheneeds of forcibly displaced populations. This trilogycalls for policies and strategies that link needs-basedlivelihoodprogrammestoprotection.

Humanitarian architecture – promoting coordination and enhancing partnership

The changing patterns, processes and destinations offorced migration not only demand that humanitarianactors develop new tools, policies and strategies.New ways of organizing, managing and deliveringassistance are also required, which are reshaping thehumanitarianarchitecture. Particularly inurbanareas,where indigenous capacities are far more developedthaninruralareas,humanitarianagenciesnowneedtoworkwithandthroughlocalcommunitygroupsandinpartnershipwithlocalauthoritiesandnewinterlocutorsfrom theprivateandbusiness sector.Wherepossible,thesemulti-stakeholderpartnershipsneedtobebuiltinadvanceofcrisesaspartofpreparedness.

These strategies should recognize that the hostgovernment– at national and local/municipal levels –mustleademergencyhumanitarianreliefandrecoveryplanninganddelivery.Thesepartnershipsshouldbuildlocalownershipandthushelptoovercomethe“parallelresponse” by humanitarian actors, which weakenexisting, indigenous capacities. In this way, country-led humanitarian assistance and recovery planning,coordinationandimplementationcanbestrengthened.For example, in Syria and Jordan, UNHCR and otheragencies have directed funds for relief efforts forIraqi refugees through public authorities and existinginstitutional infrastructure and capacity (PavanellowithHaysom,2012).InJordan,now,theGovernmentisextendingthisapproachtoassistthe140,000refugeesfrom the intensifying Syrian crisis. In Kenya, followingthepost-electionviolenceof2007andledbytheKenya

RedCrossSociety,considerableprogresshasbeenmadein coordinating a multi-agency program of mappingand responding tourbanvulnerability (OCHAandUN-Habitat, forthcoming). These examples illustrate waysinwhichnational agencies,with international supportwhere appropriate, can lead collaborative efforts toassistdisplacedandvulnerablepopulations.

Lying behind these changes in the humanitarianarchitecture is the Inter-Agency Standing Committee’sTransformative Agenda (TA), updating and revisingthe2005HumanitarianResponseReview(HRR)and inparticular the “cluster” approach to coordination. The2005HRRsucceededinreducinggapsinhumanitarianassistanceand improvedprogrammecoordinationanddeliverybyhumanitarianactors(Steetsetal.,2010).Atthetime,aradicalreformulationoftheUnitedNations’humanitarian efforts, and subsequently poor inter-agency performance in Darfur, Pakistan, the Horn ofAfricaandHaiti,precipitatedfurtherreform.

AmongthechallengestheTAmusttacklearethefollowing:theclusterapproachmustbecomelessprocess-orientedandincreaseitsfocusondelivery,outcomesandarea-based programming; rapid deployment of operationalcapacity in major emergencies and coordination,particularly in urban areas, must be enhanced; manyrecipientgovernments,suchasKenyaandEthiopiaandthe Philippines, now have well-established technicalexpertise and structures for managing and deliveringhumanitarianassistanceandthetransformationprocessmust ensure that these capacities are meaningfullytakenintoaccountwithstrategiesandimplementationplansthatfosterpartnershipsfromtheoutset.

Transcending the developmental–humanitarian divide and promoting economic development

Two salient and interrelated factors underscore theneed to transcend the enduring divide betweendevelopmentalandhumanitarianactorsandtopromotelonger-term economic development for displacedcommunitiesandtheirhosts.

First,internationalhumanitarianassistancetorefugeesandIDPsfromtheDevelopmentAssistanceCommitteeof the Organization for Economic Cooperation andDevelopment exceeds USD 8 billion per annum(IFRC, forthcoming) or about 6 per cent of overseasdevelopment assistance. This excludes host countryand NGO expenditure from private sources, whichwould add substantially to the figure. Humanitarianfocus on the social consequences of forcedmigrationsidelines what should be a mainstream concern forthedevelopmentalandeconomiccostsandimpactsofforcedmigrationon thepopulations themselves, theirhosts and for humanitarian actors and internationaldonors. Remarkably, for a global budget of this size,economicanalysisoftheoutcomesofthis“investment”

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andthedevelopmentalpotential,arethemostneglectedelementsofthehumanitarianenterprise.

The second factor is that the majority of the world’sforcibly displaced populations live in protracted exile–more than7million refugees (threequartersof thepopulation under UNHCR’s mandate) and more than13million IDPs (UNHCR, 2012b; IDMC, 2011a). Thethree classic, durable solutions to refugee crises areclearlynotworkingandapositivewaytoaddress thissituationistopromotedevelopmentalresponseswhicharebothmoreeconomicallysustainableandbetterabletoprotectthedignityandintegrityofrefugeesandIDPs.

How might these conditions be tackled? Putsimply, protracted displacement is not primarily ahumanitarian, protection and social challenge but apolitical, developmental and economic one. But anenormoushumanitarianbudgetandthepersistenceofprotracted displacement misconceive these realities.Reframing humanitarian crises as developmentalopportunitieswouldreducetheeconomicimpactsandcosts,contributetoeconomicrecoveryandgrowthfromwhichboththedisplacedandtheirhostswouldbenefit.Indeed, a recent study of Dadaab, Kenya, refugeecampsshowedthatthepositiveimpactintermsoftheeconomicbenefitsofthecampsforthehostcommunitywasUSD14million,about25percentofthepercapitaincomeoftheprovince.Incometothehostcommunityfrom the sale of livestock and milk alone was USD 3million whilemore than 1,200 local people benefitedfrom refugee camp-related employment or trade-relatedwork(GovernmentofKenya,2010).

Of course, the fundamental challenge is to addresspoliticalresistancetolonger-termsettlement,thealmostinevitable product of protracted displacement. Anemergencyorhumanitarianlabelsignalsanunresolvedsituationandtheprospect(albeitincreasinglyunrealistic)thattherefugeesandIDPsareonlytemporaryandthattheywillreturnorberesettled.Yet,despitetherealityof incremental local integrationbyrefugees– inotherwords, autonomous developmental solutions adoptedbytherefugeesthemselves–hostcountriesresistthisprocessinordertoprotectnationalidentity,defendtheircitizenshipnormsandreducetheeconomicburdenthatrefugeesareperceivedtoimpose.

Recognizingthelegalrightsandaspirationsofdisplacedpeoplebyrelaxingconditionsofformalcitizenshipstatusandbyallowingmoremobilitybyrefugeesbothwithinthehostcountryandbackandforthtothecountryoforigin – a well-developed process among Iraqi andSomalirefugees,forexample–wouldgosomewaytodealwiththerealities.Byprovidinggreatercertaintyfortherefugees,thesestrategieswouldalsohelptoprovideeconomic securityand thus thepotential tomaximizethe economic and the developmental contribution oftherefugees.

Humanitarian and development actors cannotthemselvessolve theseessentiallypolitical challenges,although their policies and practices are partlyresponsible for the persistence of the humanitarian-developmentdividewhichunderlies theproblem.Butat anoperational andprogramme level there ismuchthatcanbedonetopromotedevelopmentalaction.

First, there is the need to enhance the links betweenhumanitarian assistance and development/poverty-reduction strategies, not least because both refugeesandtheirhostsfrequentlyexperiencethesamechronicvulnerabilitiesof impoverished livelihoods, inadequatenutritional and health standards and precariousliving conditions. Joint programming would reducetheir common vulnerabilities, diminish the widelyacknowledged tensions caused between refugeeswhoare“privileged”byassistanceandtheirhostsandimprovetransitionfromemergencyconditionstolong-termstability.

Next, programming and multi-year investmentstrategies are needed to encourage economic activityfor the refugees and their hosts, since evidenceincreasingly shows that, under supportive conditions,refugeesaddtotheeconomiccapacityofcountriesandsuchstrategiesthatwouldbelargelybeneficialforthedisplaced communities and their hosts. Of value herearepoliciessuchas:supportingself-buildconstruction;promoting urban and peri-urban agriculture; andbuildingonlocalcapacitiesbyleveraginglocalsuppliersandcontractorsinsteadofcorporateenterprises(IASC,2010;ALNAP,2009).

Athirdarenawheredevelopmentalstrategiesappeartobesuccessfulistherapidgrowthincashandvouchersas an alternative to material support and in-kind aidin emergency situations. Although this appears tochallengethefundamentalpreceptsofaidascharity,theadvantageslieinenablingrefugeeandIDPbeneficiariestoexercisechoiceinmeetingtheirhouseholdneeds,andindirectlyexpandingthelocaleconomyandmarketsbyinjectinglarge-scaleandpredictabledemandwhichwillhavedevelopmentalimpacts.Usedinadiverserangeofsituations–UNRWAinPalestine,UNICEFprogrammingintheDemocraticRepublicofCongo,SavetheChildrenin Dadaab refugee camps to overcome malnutrition,andbyseveralagenciesinSomaliawherehumanitarianaccess is impossible–theevidencesuggeststhatcashandvouchersareavaluableeconomictoolinemergencyandlonger-termdisplacementsituations(DevelopmentInitiatives,2012;HarveyandBailey,2011).

Conclusions

Spacepreventsdiscussionofothercrucialchallengesforhumanitariananddevelopmentactors,forexample:theirroleinsupportingtheresilienceofaffectedcommunitiesand partnering and empowering community-based

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responses; tackling the growing problem of housing,landandpropertyinresettlementorreturnofforciblydisplacedpeople,notablyproblematicinHaiti;andthesituationofIDPs,whichremainsacontinuingconcerntosecureprotectionandsustainablesolutions.

Asacodatothisarticle,however,whatremainsatthecruxofcontemporaryhumanitarianconcernsisthatnarrowlydefinedlegalandnormativecategories(refugee,IDPandthelike)oftendonotcapturethehumanitarianrealitiesoftheconditionsandcircumstancesunderwhichpeoplemoveandwheretheyendup.Aswehaveseen,peopleareforciblydisplacedforacomplexarrayofreasonsandtheir mobility often defies the established categoriesand labels. This calls formore flexible typologies andnormsifhumanitarianneedsandvulnerabilitiesaretobereducedandmorepositivestrategiesthatreflecttheaspirationsofrefugeesandIDPsaretobeadopted.

References

ActiveLearningNetworkforAccountabilityandPerformanceinHumanitarianAction(ALNAP)

2009 Responding to urban disasters: Learning from previous relief and recovery operations. ALNAP,London.Availableonlineat:www.alnap.org/pool/files/alnap-provention-lessons-urban.pdf.

2010 State of the Humanitarian System.ALNAP,London.

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Research Series #31. International OrganizationforMigration(IOM),Geneva.

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PracticeReview11.ODI,London.

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transformations.Refugee Survey Quarterly, Vol.25No.2,pp.6-22.

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Areas. IASC, Geneva. Available online at: www.humanitar ianinfo.org / iasc/downloaddoc.aspx?docId=5803.

2012aTransformative Agenda 2012. IASC, Geneva.Available online at: www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc/pageloader.aspx?page=content-template-default&bd=87.

2012b Operational Guidance for Coordinated Assessments in Humanitarian Crises: Provisional Version. IASC, Geneva. Available online at:www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc/pageloader.a s p x ? p a g e = c o n t e n t - s u b s i d i - c ommon -default&sb=75.

InternalDisplacementMonitoringCentre(IDMC)2011a Global Overview 2011: People internally

displaced by conflict and violence. IDMC,Geneva.Available online at: www.internal-displacement.org/publications/global-overview-2011.

2011bGlobal estimates 2011: People displaced by natural hazard-induced disasters. IDMC,Geneva.Available online at: www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CFA06/(httpPublications)/A018C57177748E8AC1257A22002DF0A8.

2012 Annual global figures. IDMC, Geneva. Availableonline at: www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/%28httpPages%29/10C43F54DA2C34A7C12573A1004EF9FF?OpenDocument&count=1000.

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World Disasters Report.IFRC,Geneva(forthcoming).

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economic and Environmental Impacts of Dadaab Refugee Camps on Host Communities. GovernmentofKenya,Nairobi.Availableonlineat:http://kenya.um.dk/en/~/media/Kenya/Documents/Final%20Report30092010.ashx.

Metcalfe,V.andS.HaysomwithE.Martin2012 Sanctuary in the City: Urban Displacement in

Kabul. HumanitarianPolicyGroup.ODI,London.

Pavanello,S.withS.Haysom2012 Sanctuary in the city? Urban displacement and

vulnerability in Amman. Humanitarian PolicyGroupWorkingPaper.ODI,London.

Steets,J.etal.2010 IASC Cluster Approach Evaluation, 2nd Phase. IASC,

URDandGlobalPublicPolicyInstitute,Geneva.

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in urban areas. UNHCR,Geneva.Availableonlineat:www.unhcr.org/4ab356ab6.pdf.

2012aGlobal Trends 2011: A Year of Crises. UNHCR,Geneva. Available online at: www.unhcr.org/4fd6f87f9.html.

2012bThe State of the World’s Refugees: In Search of Solidarity. Oxford University Press and UNHCR,OxfordandGeneva.

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Urban Multi-Hazard and Multi-Stakeholders’ Preparedness and Response Plan for Kenya.OCHA,Nairobi(forthcoming).

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Zetter,R.2007 More Labels, Fewer Refugees: Making and

Remaking the Refugee Label in an Era ofGlobalisation. Journal of Refugee Studies,Vol.20No.2,pp.172-192.

2009 Protection and the role of legal and normative frameworks. In Migration Environment andClimateChange:AssessingtheEvidence(Laczko,F.andAghazarm,C.,eds).IOM,Geneva,pp.285-441.Available online at: http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/free/migration_and_environment.pdf.

2011 Protecting environmentally displaced people: developing the capacity of legal and normative frameworks, Refugee Studies Centre, reportcommissioned by UNHCR and Governments ofSwitzerlandandNorway.Availableonlineat:www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/pdfs/workshop-conference-research-reports/Zetter-%20EnvDispRep%2015022011.pdf.

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Managing migration in crisis situations: Reflections and experiences on US humanitarian assistance and migration responseCatherine Wiesner, James Bean and Jessica Warden Yutacom1

The United States of America has long played asignificantroleinaddressingmigrationchallengesassociatedwithcomplexemergenciesandnatural

disasters around the world. The US Department ofState’sBureauofPopulation,Refugees,andMigration(PRM) is the lead entity of the Government of theUnited States for policy discussions on the subjectof international migration. Whether responding torefugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs), or othervulnerablemigrantpopulations,weattempttocarefullyidentify and respond to humanitarian needs andprotection concerns for the world’s most vulnerablepopulationsonthemove.

TheUnited States has responded tomany criseswithmigration consequences over the years, includingthe January 2010 earthquake in Haiti and the 2011civil unrest in Libya. The United States’ 2010–2011chairmanship of the Intergovernmental Consultationson Migration, Asylum and Refugees (IGC) broughtcountries together to discuss responses to migrationchallengesinsuchhumanitarianemergencies.

AstheIGCchair,theUnitedStatesselectedthetheme“Humanitarian Responses to Crises with MigrationConsequences.” We wanted to examine the impactof and responses to crises – such as armed conflict,political instability, natural disasters, or pandemics– that spurred significant movements of people,many ofwhom cannot be considered refugees underinternational law, but who nevertheless are oftenhighlyvulnerableandinneedofprotection.OurinitialmotivationforchoosingthisthemewasourexperiencewiththecomplexUSGovernmentinter-agencyresponseto the Haiti earthquake in January 2010. After thesubsequentoutbreakofpoliticalunrestassociatedwith“theArabSpring”andensuingcrisis-inducedpopulationmovements,thatthemeseemedalmostprescient.

AspartofourIGCchairmanship,wepartneredwiththeUSDepartmentofHomelandSecurity(DHS)tosponsoraworkshopinMarch2011thatexaminedthebalancebetweentheneedforagileandcompassionateresponses

1 CatherineWiesner isDeputyAssistantSecretaryofState in theBureauof Population, Refugees andMigration,USDepartmentof State; James Bean and Jessica Warden Yutacom are SeniorProgramOfficers,BureauofPopulation,RefugeesandMigration,USDepartmentofState.

by immigration systemsand theneed topreserve theintegrity of those systems. Among the key themesraised there were the importance of preparednessand pre-established immigration policies that can bequickly implementedassoonasanemergencyoccurs;theestablishmentofmechanismsforquicklyidentifyingindividualsinneedofinternationalprotection;andthecritical value of coordination for both the immediateandlongertermmigrationresponse.

Preparedness

Governments can and should do a great deal beforecrises strike to analysemigration trends andpatterns,in order to anticipate the potential impact of thosecrises onmigrant populations, in particular their owncitizenslivingandworkingabroad.Countriescanstartbyendeavouringtoknowwheretheircitizensareandunderwhat immigrationstatus they typically reside inhost countries. Governments can establish dialoguesinternallyandwithhostgovernmentstoplanforlarge-scaleevacuationsofcitizensincaseofanemergency.

The International Organization for Migration (IOM)hasdonemuch toencourage this typeofcontingencyplanning.Forexample,IOMandtheRepublicofKorearecently signed a Memorandum of Understanding tosupport the evacuation of Korean nationals in futureemergencies worldwide. The United States stronglysupported the establishment of IOM’s MigrationEmergency Response Mechanism and in 2012contributedUSD2.5milliontothatFund,inpartduetoourexperiencesintheLibyacrisis,butalsorecognizingmore generally that the international communityneedsandwantsa rapid responsemechanism.This iswhy we urge all IOMMember States to support thispreparednessmechanism,whichwillensure improvedIOMcapacityforanearlyresponsetofuturemigrationcrises. It is importanttoalsonotethatthisfunddoesnotreplacetheresponsibilitygovernmentshavetotheircitizens. We also encourage the creation of nationalcontingency funds and enhanced consular servicesto help bring migrants home. National contingencyfunds could be public–private initiatives; for example,employment agencies brokering overseas jobs couldprovide funds to return their citizens,oreachcountrycouldmakeacontributiontoIOM’sResponseFund.Wealso urge countries to look at ways to develop surgecapacityforemergencyconsularservicesforitscitizenswhomayendupstrandedoverseas.

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Well-conceived immigration policies and operationaltools can prevent unexpected migration flows asa consequence of crises. From our experiences,particularly in Haiti, we know that clear policies andreliable assistance can help to minimize dangerousmovementsofpeople.

Protection

A strong foundation in protection principles is alsoessential for an effective and humane response tocrisis-inducedmovements,whichoftenincludeasylum-seekers,traffickingvictims,unaccompaniedminors,andother individuals with unique protection needs. Thiswas certainly the case with the massive populationoutflow from Libya in 2011, where the Governmentof Tunisia worked with IOM, UNHCR, UNICEF andotherstoprovidespecialprotectiontounaccompaniedmigrantminors.Anypolicyandoperationalresponsetosimilarmovementsinthefutureshouldincluderobustprocedures to identify and address protection needssuch as improving methods to identify and provideemergencyassistancetothemostvulnerablemigrants.

Coordination

Finally, coordination on many fronts is critical for aneffective migration response. Coordination withingovernments is necessary to develop effective plansand rapid interventions for evacuations and otherfacilitatedmovement,andtoensureadequatecapacitytoreceiveandreintegratereturningmigrants.Effectiveinternational coordination is also necessary, bothto prevent secondary humanitarian crises causedby increased migration and to encourage long-termregional coordination to establish improved responsecapacityandcontingencyplanning.

TheUnitedStateshasbeenhighly involvedwithmanycrises where our response reflected these principles.The2010Haitiearthquakeandthe2011Libyaconflictaretworecentexamplesthatillustratethesepoints.

Haiti

After the 2010 Haiti earthquake, the United States’immediate concern was to help save lives, provideemergency consular assistance to US citizens andaddresscriticalhumanitarianneeds.Butwewerealsoconcernedthattheearthquakecouldtriggerlarge-scaleirregularmigration, and that large numbers of peoplemighttaketotheseaunderhazardousconditions,withthepotentialforgreatlossoflife.Thelatterconcernwasgroundedinhistoricalexperience.

Eventsinthe1990sledtonearly40,000HaitiansbeingpickedupatseabytheUSCoastGuardandbroughttoGuantanamoBayNavalStation.SomewereparoledintotheUnitedStatesandmanywerereturnedtoHaitiafter

beingscreenedforprotectionconcerns.Sincethen,wehave developed a number of mechanisms and policytoolstorespondhumanelyandquicklytosimilarcrises,including establishing intra-government contingencyplanning and coordination groups; conducting annualinter-agency military and civilian exercises for massmigration response; and employing an improvedframework for providing emergency immigrationbenefits such as temporary protected status andhumanitarianparole. In2010,theUSGovernmentimplementedanumberofprogrammaticandpolicyresponsesthatbenefitedfromthelessonslearnedinthe1990sandthepreparednessactivitiesdeveloped since. Initially, the large-scaleUSandinternationalhumanitarianresponsetothePort-au-Princeareafornearly2million IDPsdiscouragedmassmigrationasearthquakevictimsquicklybeganreceivingfood,water and sanitation services inplace. Wealsosupported United Nations and IOM humanitarianactivitiesontheHaiti–DominicanRepublicborderwherethousandsofHaitianssoughtmedicalcare.Finally,theUnitedStatesbolsteredeffortstodiscouragelarge-scalemaritimemigration by strengthening theGovernmentof Haiti’s capacity to receive would-be migrants whowerepickedup inunsafe vessels and returnedby theHaitianandUSCoastGuards.PRMaloneprovidedUSD14.2millioninfundingtoaddressmigrationchallengesassociatedwiththeearthquake.

In addition to this humanitarian assistance, theDepartmentofHomelandSecurity’sUSCitizenshipandImmigration Services also provided immigration relieftoHaitians. Some51,000Haitians received temporaryprotectedstatusallowingthemtostayandworkintheUnited States. Many Haitians in need of emergencymedicalcarewereallowedintotheUnitedStatesunderhumanitarianparole, and visa issuancewasexpeditedfor immediate familymembers of US citizens or legalpermanentresidentsfromHaiti.

Libya

AstheLibyacrisisunfolded in2011, itquicklybecameapparent to the international community that largenumbers of third-country nationals who had beenworkingandlivingtherewereingreatperil.Somewerestranded inside Libya and required urgent evacuationassistance from IOMand the InternationalCommitteeoftheRedCross(ICRC).OthersmanagedtocrossintoTunisia and Egypt where they required immediatehumanitarianassistanceaswellasrepatriationservices.ThanksingreatparttoIOM,UNHCR,andneighbouringgovernments,excellentcoordinationandquickactionswere successful in addressing immediate relief needsof more than 1 million people fleeing Libya andrepatriating some 300,000 migrant workers to theirhomecountries.Manybelieve thismassefforthelpedtoavertacatastrophichumanitariancrisisintheborder

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areas–andperhapsalsotoavoidasecondarywaveofirregular migration. To support these efforts, the USGovernmentprovidedUSD92million inhumanitarianassistance in fiscal year 2011, of which PRM fundingaccounted forUSD60million,primarily forprotectionand humanitarian response activities conducted byIOM,UNHCR,andICRC.

Many countries responded admirably to the Libyacrisis; international coordination and cooperationwas outstanding if not always easy. The internationalcommunity rallied to provide significant funding andlogistical support for evacuations, and a number ofcountries enhanced consular services to provideemergency assistance for replacing necessarypaperwork to help their citizens return home. FortheUSGovernment,thewholeendeavorwasasoundendorsement for the international humanitarianarchitecture in which we have invested, while alsopointing to some clear areas for further developmentof policies andpractices including improvingmethodsfor identifying and providing emergency assistance tovulnerablemigrants.

Conclusion

Allofthethemesmentionedabovearechallengingwhenaddressingafast-movinghumanitariancrisis,especiallygiven the need to also be aware of potential securitythreatsandpoliticalconsequencesofmasspopulationmovements. Weshouldnotviewtheresponsetothemigrationdynamicsand impacts independentlyof thehumanitarian response. Natural disasters and politicalcrises often trigger significant displacement andmigration,andweneed tobecollectivelyprepared tousealldiplomatic,programmaticandimmigrationtoolsat hand to respond in a more integrated manner topeopleonthemoveinanemergency.Theinternationalcommunityhasamajorroletoplay inmigrationcrisisresponse, and in order to respond effectively needsactivecooperationandparticipationbefore,during,andafteracrisis.

Anunfoldinghumanitariancrisis inSyria isonceagaincreatinganimperativefortheinternationalcommunitytomeettheneedsofhundredsofthousandsofpeopleaffectedbyandfleeingarmedconflictandviolence.TheUnitedStatesisworkingwithourinternationalpartnerstoensurethatweincorporatethelessonslearnedfromprevious crises, such as Haiti and Libya, as we assistthoseseekingsafety.

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La política de migraciones brasileña y la migración haitiana a Brasil Paulo Sérgio de Almeida1

Brasil – contexto de la migración internacional

Brasilestradicionalmenteunpaísde inmigración.Desde el inicio del siglo XX ha recibido más decuatro millones de inmigrantes, principalmente

de Europa y también de Japón; estas cifras no tomanencuenta,losquellegaronenelperiodocolonialnilamigración forzada de africanos que se prolongó hastafinalesdelsigloXIX.

Sinembargo,desdemediadosde1980,cuandolacrisisdeladeudaexternagolpeóalpaíshubounincrementoenlaemigración.Enel2007,elMinisteriodeRelacionesExteriores estimó en tres millones de personas eltamañodelascomunidadesbrasileñasenelexterior.

Estemovimientohadisminuidodesdeel2008,graciasaunacombinacióndeunperíododefuertedesarrolloeconómicoysocialenBrasil yel comienzode lacrisisfinancieraqueafectóavariospaísesdondeseradicaronbrasileños. Esto llevó, por primera vez, a un procesode retorno de brasileños. Además, la mejor situacióneconómica en Brasil en comparación con la crisisexistenteenmuchospaíses,despuésdevariosaños,hacontribuidoalrecienteaumentodelainmigración.

Las políticasmigratorias enBrasil están basadas en elrespeto integral de los derechos fundamentales delos migrantes, independientemente de su situaciónmigratoria.Sinembargo,enlosúltimosaños,elcentrodelapolíticabrasileñaconrespectoalamigración,hasidodeveralosmigrantescomosujetosconderechosmientras que la visión de los años 70 y 80, centrabala política de inmigración en el tema de la seguridadnacional.

Situación en Haití

Comosesabe,Haití,elpaísmáspobredelasAméricas,sufrió un sismo de granmagnitud en enero de 2010,matandomásde200.000personasydejandoamásdeunmillóndesalojadas.

Enelmomentodelterremoto,BrasilteníaunimportanterolenHaití,yaquecoordinabalamisiónenviadaporlasNacionesUnidas(MINUSTAH)conelfindeestabilizarelpaís.

1 PauloSérgiodeAlmeidaesPresidentedelConsejoNacionaldeInmigración,Brasil.

Brasil nohabía tenidomigracióndehaitianoshastaelmomento. Sin embargo, después del sismo, una olamigratoriaempezódesdeHaitíhaciaBrasil.

Nuestrasuposiciónesqueelcontactoconlosmilitaresy civiles brasileños además del estrechamiento delintercambio cultural entre los países ha permitidointensificar los lazos entre Brasil y Haití y contribuidoaque loshaitianos identificaranaBrasil comopaísdedestino.

Refugio e inmigración

Inicialmente, los haitianos llegaron por vía aérea aEcuadoryaPerú.Despuéshicieronellargoviajeatravésde laselvaamazónicahacia lasciudadesbrasileñasdeTabatinga,enelestadodeAmazonas,yAssisBrasil,enelestadodeAcre.

Estos migrantes llegaron a Brasil sin visa de entrada,presentándoseestratégicamentecomorefugiados,paraasíregularizarsuestadíaenterritoriobrasileño.

Tomando en cuenta la situación específica de loshaitianos, el gobierno de Brasil buscó examinar susituaciónapartirdedosórganoscolegiados:elComitéNacional para los Refugiados (CONARE), para quereconocieraeldel statusde refugiado, ,y ,elConsejoNacional de Inmigración (CNIg) para la concesión devisadosespecialesderesidenciaalosinmigrantes.

Aunque el caso haitiano no entraba dentro de loestablecido en la Convención de la Organización delas NacionesUnidas de 1951 sobre el estatuto de losRefugiados(ratificadaporBrasil),nosepodíadecirquela migración haitiana en el post-terremoto fuera unatípicamigracióneconómica.

Lamayoríadelosinmigranteshaitianostuvieronpérdidasespecíficasenel terremoto:yaseasucasa,sufamilia,susmediosdevida,laescuelaendondeestudiaban,etc.Conelpaísparalizado,muchosdecidieronemigrar.

ElGobiernodeBrasiltratóestasituacióncomoespecial,y la solución encontrada fue la remisión de casos departedeCONAREalCNIgparasuanálisiscomo“situaciónhumanitaria”.

ElCNIgesunórganocolectivoquetienepormandatolaconstruccióndelapolíticabrasileñadeinmigraciónpormediodeldiálogosocial.Enélactúannueveministerios,cinco centrales sindicales, cinco confederaciones

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empresariales y un representante de la comunidadcientífica, ademásdeórganosde la sociedad civil queobran junto a los inmigrantes. Después de un largodebate en busca de un consenso, el CNIg consideróque la situación de los haitianos debía ser tratadacomoatenciónhumanitariaydecidióconcedervisadosespecialesparaellos.

Crisis en la frontera – Exploración – Tráfico de inmigrantes

Denoviembrede2010aoctubrede2011, el flujodehaitianos se mantuvo relativamente constante. Sinembargo, entre finales de 2011 y principios de 2012,hubounaumentoexponencialenlallegadadehaitianos.Enenerode2012,habíaalrededorde2.000haitianosenlaspequeñas ciudades fronterizasdeBrasil esperandopoderregistrarsecomosolicitantesderefugio.Hubouncolapsoenlacapacidaddeacogimientoalosinmigrantesenestasciudades:nohabíanialojamiento,comida,niatenciónmédicasuficienteparatodos.

Porotrolado,comenzaronallegarinformacionessobrelaexistenciaderedesdeintermediarios(coyotes)quecobraban a los haitianos para venir a Brasil. Tambiénhubo reportesde robos, agresiones y violencia contralasmujereshaitianaspracticadasporestoscoyotes.

Interrupción de los flujos migratorios en la frontera

Enenerode2012,elpanoramaerael siguiente:a)uncolapso en los sistemas de acogida organizados en lasciudadesfronterizasporlapresenciamasivadehaitianos,b)denunciasdeviolenciayabusoylaexistenciaderedesdecoyotesenlafrontera,c)ladistorsióndelInstitutodelrefugio,quefuelaformautilizadaparallegaraBrasil,yd)laexposicióndeloshaitianosaunlargoypenosoviajeatravésdelaselvaamazónica,sometiéndolosagrandesriesgos.

Sin embargo, Brasil consideraba que la demandade inmigración de los haitianos era una realidad, yaque estaban tratando de sobrevivir fuera de un Haitídevastado.

Teniendo en cuenta estas cuestiones, el Gobiernodecidiódesestimularelflujodehaitianospor fronteraterrestre.Sinembargo,decidiócrearuncanalespecialdemigración,unavisaespecialderesidenciaotorgadadirectamente en la Embajada de Brasil en PuertoPríncipe.

Despuésdeestasmedidasytambiénporlacooperacióncon el Gobierno de Perú, desde febrero de 2012, losregistrosdehaitianosreciénllegadosporlafrontera con esepaíshandisminuidoconsiderablemente.

Creación de visa humanitaria

El 12 de enero de 2012, el CNIg decidió crear unavisa especial para los haitianos, nombrada “Visa

Humanitaria”.Estavisapuedeseremitidaaloshaitianosque viven enHaití y no tienen antecedentes penales.Nohayrequisitosrespectoa latitulaciónacadémicaoprofesional,o laexistenciade uncontratode trabajoprevio.Lavisaesválidaporcincoaños,despuésdeloscualesloshaitianostendránquedemostrarquetienenmediosdesubsistenciaenBrasil.

Estavisahumanitariaselimitaa1.200familiashaitianasalaño.Hastael15demayo,pocomásde235familiashabíansolicitadoyobtenidolavisa.

Junto con la creación de la visa humanitaria, el CNIgtambiéndecidió conceder la residenciaenBrasil a loscercade5.500haitianosqueingresaronporlafronteraterrestrehastael12deenero2012.

Empleo en Brasil

Losdatosmuestranquemásdel90%de loshaitianosquehanllegadoaBrasilestántrabajando.

La situación actual en Brasil es de pleno empleo endiversasáreasdelmercadodetrabajo.Porlotanto,loshaitianostuvieronunacálidaacogidaenvariasciudadesbrasileñas.

Losdatos,sinembargo,indicanqueelperfileducativodeloshaitianosquellegaronaBrasilessuperioralamediadelapoblaciónhaitiana.El60%tieneporlomenosunaescuela secundaria incompleta. Esto significa que losque llegaron son los que tuvieronmás oportunidadesincluyendo la capacidad para recaudar dinero parapagarelviajeaBrasil.

Consideraciones finales

ElcasodeloshaitianosenBrasilcontieneunaseriedecuestionesquesonimportantesdilemasexperimentadospor varios países que tratan con el fenómeno de lamigracióninternacional,comoelcontroldefronteras,lamigracióneconómica,lapolíticaderefugiados,lapolíticadeinmigración,laluchacontralatratadepersonasyeltráfico demigrantes, la construcción de esquemas deacogida,integracióneinclusiónenelmercadolaboral.

Además,elestudiodelcasodeHaití incorporanuevosdesafíosentérminosdelconocimientodelamigracióninternacional, como son los temas de los migrantesambientalesylosdesplazadoscausadosporlasgrandestragedias.

El enfoque brasileño buscó tratar el problema de lamigraciónhaitianaconunavisiónabiertaydesdeunaperspectivadesolidaridadhumanitaria.Lacreacióndeun nuevo canal de migración especialmente para loshaitianos mantuvo por un lado una actitud solidariacon el pueblo de Haití, y por otro lado, desalentó lamigración indocumentadaydetuvoel tráfico ilícitodemigrantes.

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Protecting and assisting citizens abroad: Republic of Korea’s policy landscape Lee Young-ho1

Theworldappearstobegrowingmoredangerousby theday.Aside fromman-madedisasterssuchas terrorismandwar,natural calamities seemto

beoccurringatalargerscale.YetmoreKoreanscontinueto venture overseas, with 7million living abroad and13million travellingeachyear. Thisarticlewill discussthe Republic of Korea’s basic crisis response system,preparednessmeasures and other crisis managementmechanisms,withaparticularviewtoassistingKoreannationalsaffectedbycrisesinothercountries.

The Korean crisis response system

AssistanceandoutreachtoKoreannationalsabroadhasbecome an increasingly important aspect of theworkoftheGovernmentoftheRepublicofKorea.AspartoftheMinistryof ForeignAffairs andTrade, adivision isdedicatedtoOverseasKoreanNationalsProtectionandCrisisManagement.

The Ministry has placed emphasis on making itsconsular system more effective and accessible forKoreansfacedwithcrisesanddifficultieswhileabroad.Asanexampleofoneoftheservices,Koreandiplomaticmissionsestablishcontractswithselectedlocallawyersthrough the Legal Advisory Assistance programme toprovideKoreansinvolvedinincidentswithinformationand advice on the local legal system. Diplomatic andconsular missions are also charged with ensuring thewelfare, protection and safety of detained Koreansabroad,includingthroughregularvisitstothedetentionfacilitiesandhealthchecks.

As diplomatic representation cannot be guaranteedeverywhere, the Consular Assistance Programme,established in 2007, has served to broaden thenetworkofconsularcontactpointsacross47countriesdedicated to providing assistance and services toKoreansoverseas.Tofurtherexpandaccesstoconsularassistance, theMinistry’s Crisis Response System alsoincludesaConsularCallCentrewhichprovides24-hourconsultation services to Koreans in need of consularassistance.In2011alone,theCentrehandledmorethan240incomingcalls.

1 Lee Young-ho is Deputy Director General of the Bureau ofOverseasKoreansandConsularAffairs,MinistryofForeignAffairsandTradeintheRepublicofKorea.

Insomecases,financialaidcanhelpresolvesomeofthepredicamentsthatKoreannationalsfindthemselvesinwhileabroad–theRapidOverseasRemittanceSystemprovides assistance to Korean travellers who are inurgentneedofmoneyduetorobbery,lossofpossessionsorotherunforeseencircumstances.In2011,therewere536 users, and about USD 700,000 was transferred.Emergency Financial Assistance is also available formoredramaticcircumstances,includingforemergencysuppliesincasesofnaturaldisasters,forbringinghomeKorean nationals who require special attention or forassistanceinthefuneralservicesfornationalswithoutfamily.

For more serious crises, the Ministry established theRapidDeploymentTeamsin2005,consistingoftrainedexperts who are able to deploy within 24 hours of alarge-scale incident abroad that has affected Koreannationals. Teammembersare selected froma reservepoolofForeignMinistrystaffintheRepublicofKoreaaswellasstaffatKoreandiplomaticmissions.In2011,forexample,RapidDeploymentTeamsweredispatchedonfourseparateoccasions:inarescuemissionforKoreansailors on board an abducted ship; to assist Koreannationals in the aftermath of the earthquake in NewZealand; to support the evacuation of Koreans fromLibya;andinthewakeoftheearthquakeandtsunamiinJapan.

Inadditiontotheresponsemechanismsdetailedabove,theMinistryhasalso implementedarangeofservicesaimed at preventing certain incidents andminimizingrisks for Koreans travelling or residing abroad. TheseincludeaTravelAdvisorySystem,SafeTravelCampaign,travellerregistrationsystemanddisseminationofsafetyinformationviatextmessages.

Lessons learned from the evacuation of Koreans during the Libya Crisis

The2011LibyacrisistestedtheKoreansystemforcrisismanagement on behalf of Korean nationals abroad.PriortotheoutbreakofthefightinginLibya,therewere1,460Koreannationalsresidingandworkingthere,yetonly nine Ministry staff, including four diplomats. Asthe crisis intensified, theGovernment of the Republicof Korea started a response operation to support theevacuation of Koreans in Libya who were in need ofprotection. However, the small number of officials

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availabletoassistKoreannationalsandtoorganizeanevacuationprovedaseriouschallenge.

Inordertomaketheevacuationpossible,twocharteredplanes, awarship anda largenumberof vehicles andcommercial ships were deployed, with contributionsfrom private companies.With support from IOM, theKorean Embassy dealt with administrative proceduresatharboursandairports,while theRapidDeploymentTeamdispatchedbytheForeignMinistryinSeoultookchargeofissuingpassportsortravelcertificates,andofdistributingemergencysupplies.

TheexperienceinLibyageneratedanumberofimportantlessonsregardingtherealityofacrisissituationandtheKorean response mechanisms. It also prompted theMinistry to reflecton thechallenges thatmayarise infutureresponseoperationsincrises:

• Whatifadiplomaticmissionhadnotexisted?• Whatifsimilarincidentsoccurincountrieswithout

aKoreanmission?• Howcanadministrativeproceduresbesimplified

intimesofemergency?

Memorandum of Understanding with IOM

Aware of a growing mismatch between the numberof Korean nationals travelling and living abroadand the extent of Korean diplomatic and consularrepresentation, the Government of the Republic ofKorea sought international cooperation to facilitateemergency evacuation of overseas Koreans and toproviderelatedservices in locationswherethere isnoKoreanrepresentation.

The Korean Government took note of IOM’s vastnetworkoffieldoffices–450offices,ascomparedtotheRepublicofKorea’s158diplomaticmissions–itsskilledstaff,anditsexpertiseinprovidingservicestomigrants.ThecountryfeltithadmuchtolearnfromIOM’slong-standingexperienceandprovenexpertiseinmigrationaffairs.

Consideringthesestrongpoints,theKoreanGovernmentdecidedtoconcludeaMemorandumofUnderstanding(MOU)withIOM.TheMOUwassignedon8June2012in Seoul between Korean Foreign Minister Kim Sung-Hwan and IOM Director General William Lacy Swing.It “provides a framework between [the Republic of]Korea and IOM for cooperation and facilitationof theemergency evacuation [of] and related services [for]Koreannationals,including,butnotlimitedto,locationswhere no Korean Foreign Ministry’s representationexists.” With this MOU, IOM provides cooperativeservices to Korean nationals upon the request of theKoreanGovernment,suchas:

• arrangement of in-country transportation to theairportofdeparture;

• organizedinternationalevacuationtransportationbyair,landorsea;

• facilitationoftraveldocumentsanddocumentationfortransitcountries;

• fitness-to-travelmedicalchecks;• assistancetoevacueeswithdepartureformalities,

andthelike. The MOU foresees that the Foreign Ministry willreimburse IOM for all direct operational costs, and aservicefeewillbechargedtoeachservicerequest.TheMinistry will then charge each national who receivedassistance.

Conclusion

International cooperation is critical in enhancing crisisresponse capacity and creating more cooperativemigrationpolicy.Inthepast,theRepublicofKoreacouldonly communicate with the country concerned on abilateralbasis,butthiscommunicationcanbeseriouslyhampered if the country is engulfed in crisis. Thanksto theMOUwith IOM, solutions can be sought on amultilateralscale.

The MOU between the Republic of Korea and IOMopens the possibility for shared emergency responseandmore practical and efficient cooperation. It couldbecomeausefulreferenceforstrengthenedcooperativemechanisms in migration policy, led by IOM andsupported by itsMember States and other interestedparties.

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Les enseignements à tirer de la gestion de la crise libyenne par la République du Tchad Moussa Mahamat Dago1

LeTchadpartageaveclaLibyeplusde1000kmdefrontièrecommuneetentretientaveccepaysdesrelationstrèsanciennes,nourriespardeséchanges

humainsetcommerciauxeuxaussitrèsanciens,entoutcasantérieursà lapénétrationcolonialedanslesdeuxpays. Les vastes espaces désertiques et montagneuxn’ontjamaisconstituéunobstacleàceséchanges.

Ainsi, tout ce qui se passe dans un des pays affecteplusoumoins intensémentl’autre. Ilenestainsidelaconquêtecolonialeitalienneau19èmesiècle,quiapoussédescentainesdeLibyensàfuirleurpayspours’installerauNordet auNord-OuestduTchad. Tout commecesmilliersdeTchadiensquisesontinstallésenLibyepourdesraisonséconomiquesouàcausedel’insécuritéquirégnaitdanslesrégionsduNorddupays.

Entoutcas,ceséchangessesontintensifiésàpartirdesannées70,enparticulierdanslesensTchad-Libye.LesTchadiens se sontmassivement rendus en Libye pourdifférentesraisons,notamment:

• Lasécheresse,quiaséviavecbeaucoupdevigueurdans lesrégionsNord,CentreetEstduTchadetquis’ajoutaitàlapauvretéetauchômage;

• L’insécurité, entretenue par les groupes rebellesqui opéraient dans ces régions et alimentée enpartieparlerégimelibyendel’époque(c’était lapériodedel’occupationdelabanded’AouzouparlaLibye);

• LaprospéritédelaLibye,quinécessitaitunemaind’œuvredeplusenplusabondante.

L’undansl’autre, lapopulationtchadienneémigréeenLibyevarieaujourd’huientre200et500000personnes.Ilestdifficilededonnerunchiffreexact,carlesenfantsdeceuxquisesontinstallésenLibyedepuis20,30ou40 ansne se sontpas enregistrés auprèsdes servicesconsulairesdel’Ambassade.

Ils n’ontpaseu lanationalité libyenne (ledroit du soln’existe pas dans ce pays) et ne peuvent donc pasbénéficierdesavantagesquiysontliés;ilsnesontpasenrèglenonplusaveclepaysd’originedeleursparents.

1 MoussaMahamatDagoestSecrétairegénéralduMinistèredesAffairesEtrangèresetdel’IntégrationAfricainedelaRépubliqueduTchad.

En réalité, la stabilité dont jouissait ce pays depuisdes décennies, la prospérité induite par l’importanteproductionpétrolièreetunecertaineaffinitéculturelle(laplupartdesTchadienssontd’originearabeouparlentl’arabe)ontfaitquecesderniersn’ontjamaissongéàquittercepaysunjour(surtoutdanscesconditions)etencoremoinsàpréparerleurretour.

Contrairement aux autres ressortissants des paysafricainsquivontenLibyepourytravailleretrapatrierargent et biens, les Tchadiens étaient installés. Parconséquent, ils étaient les plus affectés par la criselibyenne.

Ainsi, dès le déclenchement de cette crise, leGouvernement amis en place un Comité présidé parle Premier ministre, avec comme Vice-Président leMinistredesAffairesétrangères.

CeComitéestappuyéparunComitétechniqueprésidépar le Secrétaire général du Ministère des AffairesEtrangères et comprenant tous les départementsconcernésd’unemanièreoud’uneautreparleretourdesTchadiens :Défense,Sécuritépublique,AdministrationduTerritoire,Santé,Affairessociales,etc.CeComitéapourmission:

• d’étudier et de proposer au Gouvernement desmesuresenvuedesécuriserlesfrontières;

• d’identifierlessitesdevantaccueillirlesrapatriés;• demobiliserlesmoyensenvuedefairefaceaux

urgenceshumanitaires.

Ainsi, des dispositions ont été prises très rapidementpour gérer les premières arrivées. Des sites d’accueilprovisoiresontétéidentifiésetaménagésàN’Djamenaet à Faya. LeGouvernementaaffrété deuxvolspourrapatrier les personnels diplomatiques et leur familleainsi que les étudiants. Il a loué des camions pourtransporterceuxdesTchadiensvivantauSuddelaLibyeetquinepeuventêtreévacuésqueparvoieterrestre,àcausedel’embargodécidéparlesNationsUnies.

Faceauxcoûtsélevésquenécessitentcesévacuations,le Gouvernement a demandé à l’OIM de prendre lerelais.

Ainsi, les ressortissants tchadiens en Libye, munis depièces d’identité, de laissez-passer ou quelquefoissans aucun document, sont accueillis aux frontières

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tunisiennes (Ras Jider ou djerba) et égyptiennes(Salloumou LeCaire)paruneéquipede l’OIMetdesagentsdel’AmbassadeduTchadàTripolietauCaire.Ilssont identifiés et enregistrés avant d’être embarquéspourleTchad.

L’aéroport de N’Djamena accueillait quotidiennementjusqu’à quatre vols en provenance de ces pays. AN’Djamena,leséquipesdel’OIMreçoiventlesrapatriésetlesacheminentverslescentresdetransitaménagésàceteffet.

Aprèsquelquesheuresouquelquesjours,l’OIMaffrètedes moyens de transport pour les convoyer jusquedans leur régionou villaged’origine, et pays d’originepour lesétrangers.Lapriseenchargedupointdevuealimentaire, sanitaire et psychosocial dans les centresde transit est faite conjointement par les agents duMinistèredesaffairessocialesetlepersonneldel’OIM.

S’agissantmaintenantdesconséquencesetdesleçonsàtirerde toute l’opérationquiaunedizainedemois,nousavonsrelevé:

D’abordauniveaudesrapatriés:

• Traumatismes causés par la violence de la crise,la perte des personnes connues et des biens:maisons, argent, mobilier, emplois, etc., et unavenircompromis;

• Pressionexercéesur les communautésd’accueil,elles-mêmes aux prises avec l’insécuritéalimentaire, les problèmes d’infrastructuresd’accueiletdesanté;

• Choc culturel : la grande majorité des rapatriéstrouveunmodedeviedifférent,unpaysetuneadministrationdetraditionfrancophone;

• Chômagedes rapatriésdu faitd’uneabsencedepossibilitésd’emplois;

• Familles privées des fonds transférés par lesmigrants.

Audébutdecetteannée,àlademandeduGouvernement,l’OIM a effectué une mission d’évaluation des esoinsdes rapatriés, en vue d’élaborer des programmes deréinsertion mais également concernant l’impact desretoursmassifssurlescommunautésd’accueil.

Sur ce dernier point, il ressort que les rapatriés ontrencontrédegrossesdifficultésdansleurscommunautésd’accueil,tantcelles-cimanquentdetout:eaupotable,santé,école,etc.,àtelleenseignequenombreuxsontceuxquisontrepartisenLibye.

S’agissant de la coordination des activités liées à lagestion des migrants, elle a été déterminante dansle succès des opérations menées pendant dix mois.Les différents services de l’Administration tchadienneont collaboré étroitement avec l’OIM et les autres

intervenants à N’Djamena et en province comme auniveaudesambassades,dansl’accueil,l’installationetlapriseenchargedesrapatriés ; cequiapermisauxopérations de rapatriement de se dérouler dans debonnesconditionsjusqu’àlafin.

Lesservicesdesécurité,deladouane,etdemanutentionde l’aéroport de N’Djamena ont fait preuve d’undévouementetd’unedisponibilitéexemplaires.

Les gouverneurs des régions, les préfets, lesresponsablesmilitairesdeszonesd’accueiletdetransitontmis à disposition leurmoyens de transport et decommunicationpour aider des rapatriés égarés ou endétresse.

Les servicesde l’aviation civile sollicitésà touteheureet pendant les jours non ouvrables accordent dansl’heurequisuit(parfoispartéléphone)lesautorisationsde survol et d’atterrissage aux avions transportant lesTchadiens.

Les services de sécurité, des douanes, les entreprisesprivées de manutention de l’aéroport de N’Djamenaontfaitpreuved’undévouementetd’unedisponibilitéexemplaires.

En tout cas, chacun avait conscience qu’il contribuaità une action humanitaire, qui plus est en faveur decompatriotesquionttoutperdu.

La bonne collaboration avec les agences des NationsUniesounongouvernementalesacontribuéégalementausuccèsdesopérationsderapatriement.

Le Gouvernement s’est d’abord adressé à l’OIM, euregardàsonmandat.Mais,cheminfaisant,ilnousavaitsemblépercevoirdesfrictionsetconflitsdecompétenceentre l’OIM et certaines organisations, en particulierle HCR. Nous avions été amenés à demander, parfoisfermement, aux uns et aux autres de dépasser leursquerellespours’occuperdel’essentiel.

C’est ainsi que le Coordonnateur humanitaire desNationsUnisauTchadamisenplaceune“TaskForce“,unesortedecoordinationdesdifférentesorganisationsintervenant dans la gestion et la prise en charge desmigrantsquiseréunitchaquesemaineenprésenced’unreprésentantduMinistèredesAffairessociales.

Ilaétépréciséqu’ils’agitbiend’unecrisemigratoireetnonde réfugiés. Le rôlede chefdefilede l’OIMdansla gestion de cette crise a été réaffirmé, et chacun aété invitéàapportersonconcours,danssondomainedecompétence,auxdifférentesphasesdesopérations.C’est ainsi qu’a été confiée au HCR la mission des’occuperdesmigrantsétrangerstransitantparleTchadpourunelonguedurée,notammentlesSomaliensetlesErythréens.

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L’autreremarquequenousavonsfaite,c’estlaréticencede l’OIM à collaborer avec l’armée. Nous l’avionssenti lorsqu’il s’agissait d’avoir recours à un avion del’Armée tchadienne pour aller chercher des rapatriés(essentiellement des femmes et des enfants) piégésà l’extrême nord du pays, suite à une panne de leurvéhicule.

Nouscomprenonsqu’ils’agit làdurespectduprincipede neutralité cher à l’OIM et à tous les organismes àcaractèrehumanitaire.Mais,faceàcertainessituationsd’urgence, cette rigidité ne peut se justifier. D’autantque dans le cas d’espèce, il ne s’agit pas d’un conflitopposantdeuxEtats.

Le principal enseignement que nous pouvons tirer,c’est que l’appui d’organisations telles que l’OIM aété déterminant dans l’évacuation des ressortissantstchadiens. Près de 250 rotations d’avion, environ 200camionsaffrétéspourévacuercesderniers;l’assistance

apportée aux migrants de retour dans les différentscentresdetransitdisséminésdansunterritoirevastedeplusd’unmilliondeKm2.Assurément,leTrésorpublictchadien n’aurait pas pu supporter une telle chargefinancière.

Ilrestequelesquestionssoulevéesparl’après-crisen’ontpasencoreeuderéponse.Prèsde100.000personnescherchent à s’insérer dans le tissu socioéconomiquede leur pays. Avec toutes les difficultés d’adaptationque cela comporte pour une population de migrantssouvent jeunes, plongés dans un environnement quileurestétranger.

Il y a la grandemajorité de Tchadiens qui sont restésen Libye, accrochés à leur biens, qui n’ont aucuneperspective au Tchad et qui continuent d’endurerl’hostilité ambiante en Libye. Là également, lesorganisationsinternationalesetnongouvernementalesontunrôleàjouer.

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Atención y reparación integral a las víctimas del desplazamiento forzado en ColombiaPaula Gaviria Betancur1

Uno de los mayores impactos marcados por elconflictoarmadoquesehaextendidoporvariasdécadas en Colombia es el desplazamiento

forzado de millones de personas. Por lo general,acompañan al desplazamiento forzado otras gravesviolaciones a los derechos humanos, comomasacres,torturas, violencia sexual, reclutamiento forzado ydespojodetierras.Todoestohaocasionadodañosdetipo individual, como la pérdida de vidas humanas,secuelas emocionales y fisiológicas, interrupciónde laactividadproductiva,ydañosdetipocolectivo,comolapérdidaderedescomunitariasydeprácticasculturales.

ElEstadocolombianoharecorridounlargocaminoenlabúsquedaderespuestasintegralesqueseanefectivasy reconozcan esta compleja situación. Desde 1997 seinstituyeronmedidaspara laatenciónyasistenciaa lapoblaciónensituacióndedesplazamientoconelobjetivodemitigartemporalmentesusefectos.Lasmedidasdeatención seextendíanaaquellaspersonasenquienespersistían las condicionesdevulnerabilidad relativasala subsistencia mínima y asociadas al desplazamientoforzado.Sinembargo,enel2004laCorteConstitucionalencontrófallasestructuralesenelsistemadeatencióna lapoblacióndesplazadaydeterminóqueexistíaunaviolacióngeneralizadaalosderechosdelapoblaciónensituacióndedesplazamiento.Hacia2008tuvieronlugarotrasnormasquepretendíanproporcionarmedidasdereparaciónalasvíctimas,perosualcanceerameramenteeconómicoybasadoenunactodesolidaridadporpartedelEstadoynodesuresponsabilidadydeberespecialdeprotecciónporlasgravesviolacionesalosderechoshumanoscometidas.

Conel impulsodeorganizacionesde las víctimasydela sociedad civil, en el gobierno del Presidente JuanManuel Santos Calderón se decidió destinar mayoresesfuerzospararestablecerlosderechosdelasvíctimasdelconflictoarmadoydarunpasomásalládelmodelode atención a la población desplazada para construirunapolíticapúblicabasadaenel reconocimientoyenelderechoalareparaciónintegral.Estegirosignificativose concreta en la expedición de la Ley 1448de 2011,mejor conocidacomo la LeydeVíctimasyRestituciónde Tierras. Esta Ley, aprobada con un alto respaldo

1 PaulaGaviriaBetancuresDirectoraGeneraldelaUnidadparalaAtenciónyReparaciónIntegralalasVíctimas.

políticoysocial,reflejaelconsensonacionalenquelaconstrucción de una paz duradera, la superación delconflicto y la recuperación de los lazos de confianzaentre el Estado y sus ciudadanos requiere que lasvíctimasocupenelcentrodelaacciónestatal.

No son pocos los retos que existen al momentode implementar una política pública que buscatransformaciones tanprofundasparaunpaísenteroysobretodoparaquieneshansufridodeformadirectaloshorroresdelaguerrayqueseencuentranenextremapobrezaymarginalidad.Sinlugaradudaselmayorretopara la implementación exitosa de este nuevomarcolegalradicaenlapermanenciadelconflictointernoylacapacidaddelosactoresarmadosdecausardañosenlapoblacióncivil.

Actualmente se encuentran inscritas en el RegistroÚnicodeVíctimas5’832.9342 personas, de las cuales4’613.796 personas son víctimas del desplazamientoforzadoyrepresentanmásde900mil900.000hogares.Deltotaldepersonas,cercadel28%sonniñosyniñasmenoresde14añosmientrasqueel5%sonpersonasmayores de 60 años, el 12% pertenece a un grupoétnico, el 51% sonmujeres, de las cuales el 22% soncabeza de hogar. La continuación de las accionesarmadasdejanclaroqueestascifraspuedenaumentarcada día y que quienes ya fueron victimizados tienentemoroencuentranenormesobstáculosparaaccederalaspolíticasdeatenciónyreparación.

La implementaciónde laLeydeVíctimasyRestituciónde Tierras parte de importantes aprendizajes. Acontinuación se exponen algunas de las apuestasestratégicasylasherramientasparadesarrollarlas.

Reparación para la reconciliación

UnodelosavancesmásvaliososquecontienelaLeydeVíctimasyRestitucióndeTierrasesel reconocimientode la complejidad de las violaciones de derechoshumanossinimportarelactorarmadoquelaperpetró.Así,ademásdeldesplazamientoforzado,sereconocenotras graves violaciones a los derechos humanos y alderecho internacional humanitario asociadas a estecrimen. También se reconoce la dimensión individual

2 CifrasdelaUnidadparalasVíctimas,Juniode2012.

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y colectivade la violación.Porejemplo,enel casodeniñosyniñassonincluidoscomovíctimasdirectasynocomobeneficiariosdesuspadres,comosuelesucederenexperienciassimilares,ytambiénpuedensersujetosde reparación colectividades como grupos sociales,organizaciones políticas y sindicales y comunidadesétnicas.

La apuesta del gobierno nacional es proporcionaruna reparación que sea significativa para las víctimas.A través de los programas de atención y reparaciónse busca que las víctimas se sientan reparadas, porlo que la medida de reparación debe responder demanera adecuada a la condición particular de cadavíctima.Sibien lamasividaddel casocolombianoy laheterogeneidad de intereses dentro de las mismasvíctimas representan un desafío en este sentido, seestátrabajandoenfórmulasquepermitanalcanzaresteobjetivo. Hacen parte de la estrategia implementadadesdelaUnidadparalaAtenciónyReparaciónIntegrala las Víctimas la habilitación de rutas de acceso a losprogramas que distingan las condiciones de género,edad, origen étnico y discapacidad, el entrenamientoespecializado para funcionarios públicos, la atenciónpsicosocial, la utilización de lineamientos para unaintervenciónquenorevictimiceniexacerbelosdañosylapuestaenmarchademecanismosdeparticipaciónparaquelasperspectivasdelasvíctimastenganimpactoen el diseño, implementación y evaluación de lasmedidasyprogramas. Las víctimas se encuentran en regiones apartadas yenfrentan enormes dificultades para acceder a losprogramas, por lo que la implementación de la Leyde Víctimas y Restitución de Tierras gira en torno aun esquema descentralizado y desconcentrado en elque losgobiernos locales jueganun roldeterminante.La implementación de la Ley se ha acompañado deuna estrategia de fortalecimiento de las entidadesterritoriales así como de un sistema que asegure latransferencia de recursos técnicos y financieros a lasentidades territoriales. El gobierno nacional destinó3,4 mil millones de dólares EE.UU. para financiar laimplementacióndelaLeydeVíctimasyRestitucióndeTierrasdurantelos10añosdesuvigencia.

Articulación y coordinación para la atención y reparación

Una respuesta efectiva a las víctimas presupone elfuncionamiento articulado y eficaz de las entidadespúblicas.Bajoelderroterodelacentralidaddelasvíctimasen la acción estatal, la mayor parte de las entidadesoficialescompartenalgúntipoderesponsabilidadenlaatenciónyreparaciónalasvíctimas.ComoinstanciadeplaneaciónycoordinaciónsecreóunSistemaNacionalde Atención y Reparación Integral a las Víctimasconstituidopor37entidadespúblicasdelnivelnacionaly mesas de participación de víctimas encargadas de

formular o ejecutar los planes, programas, proyectosy acciones específicas, que tiendan a la atención yreparación integral de las víctimas. La Unidad para laAtenciónyReparaciónIntegralalasVíctimasgestionaycoordinaesteSistemaNacional.

Las entidades estatales y gubernamentales seencuentran trabajandoen la adopcióndeun lenguajecomúnparaquesin importar lapuertaquetoqueunavíctimaencuentreunarespuestaefectiva.ActualmenteseconstruyeunSistemadeInformaciónIntegradoparafacilitar el proceso de formulación, implementación yseguimientodelosprogramasdeatenciónyreparación.UnapiezaimportantededichoSistemadeInformaciónloconstituyeelRegistroÚnicodeVíctimas,herramientatécnica que facilita la identificación de la poblaciónvíctima,y laRedNacionalde Información,que facilitael intercambioe interoperaciónde la informacióny lageneración de insumos para que todas las entidadesencargadasdelaatenciónyreparaciónpuedancumplirdeformaadecuadasustareas.

Como resultado de una construcción colectiva yparticipativa se expidió el Plan Nacional para laAtención y Reparación, el cual sirve de carta denavegación para todas las entidades encargadas de laatenciónyreparaciónalasvíctimas.EstePlanNacionalcontiene el plan de financiamiento de los programas,los lineamientos generales vinculantes para todas lasentidades, las metas e indicadores estratégicos y losmecanismosdeseguimientoalcumplimiento.

Integralidad de la acción estatal: un modelo que conecta la atención humanitaria con la reparación integral

La integralidad en la atención a las víctimas consisteenproporcionaratenciónhumanitariaalmomentodelaocurrenciadelhechoyconectara lavíctimaenunarutadereparaciónquelaempodereparaemprenderlareconstruccióndesuproyectodevida.Atravésdeunarutadereparaciónindividualsebrindaacompañamientoyorientaciónpermanentealasvíctimasatravésdeunfuncionarioquesirvedeenlaceparahacerseguimientoasucasoparticularyasegurequeelplandereparaciónqueconstruyandeformaconjuntasematerialicedentrodelaofertaestatal.

De esta manera, el suministro de ayuda humanitariaa las víctimas del desplazamiento forzado que puedeconsistir en asistencia en salud, educación, asistenciafuneraria, identificación, alimentación, reunificaciónfamiliar y orientación ocupacional, se desarrolla demaneracoordinadaconeldesarrollodelasmedidasdereparaciónalasquehayalugar.

AtravésdeunProgramadeAcompañamientoalquelasvíctimasingresandeformavoluntaria,sehabilitanvariasmodalidades para que las víctimas inviertan la suma

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dedineroqueselesentregaatítulodeindemnizaciónadministrativa. El programa contiene incentivos paraquelasvíctimasusenlosrecursosquerecibenenplanesdeeducación,creacióno fortalecimientodeempresasproductivasyproyectosqueincorporentecnologíasdelainformaciónycomunicación.Enelcasodelasvíctimasdedesplazamientoforzado,sebrinda laalternativadeadquisiciónomejoramientodeviviendanuevaousadao la adquisición de inmuebles rurales a través de laofertaestatal.

Enelcasodelapoblaciónensituacióndedesplazamientoforzado, el gobierno nacional fijó como estrategiapriorizarlaimplementaciónconjuntadelosprogramasde restitución de tierras, reparación colectiva,rehabilitación del tejido social, retornos, reubicacióne inclusión social. De esta manera, la concentraciónde varias medidas proporciona un impacto mayor yaseguran la sostenibilidad del proceso de reparación,especialmenteenelcasodezonasygruposafectadosporeldesplazamientoforzado.

Paraconectarenlaprácticalaatenciónhumanitariaconlasmedidasde reparaciónsehadispuesto lacreaciónde Centros Regionales de Atención y Reparación quereúnen la oferta institucional. Además, se cuenta conUnidades Móviles de Atención que se desplazan aaquellaszonasapartadasendondenosecuentaconlainfraestructuradeatención.Tambiénseencuentranenoperaciónuncentrotelefónicodecontactoyorientaciónquebrindainformaciónpermanente.Atravésdeestasestrategiassóloentrejuniode2011yjuniode2012sehanatendidoa2’808.946 solicitudes yproporcionadoatención humanitaria en los primeros seis meses deesteañoa364.288hogares.Lametaparaelaño2012consiste en reparar 110.380 víctimas, de las cuales el34%yahansidoreparadasal30dejuniode2012. Ni una víctima más

Elgobiernonacionalesconscientedequeelprogramadereparaciónseráefectivoenlamedidaenqueserompaelciclodevictimizaciónysetransformenlascondicionesque permitieron la violación masiva y sistemáticade derechos. En ese sentido el Sistema Nacional deAtención y Reparación trabaja en coordinación y demanera complementaria con el Sistema Nacional deDerechos Humanos en el componente de Prevenciónde Violaciones de Derechos Humanos a través devarios mecanismos de identificación de riesgos y decoordinación interinstitucional para la prevenciónen escenarios tales como la Comisión Intersectorialde Alertas Tempranas, el Comité de Evaluación yRecomendacióndeMedidasylaComisiónIntersectorialdePrevencióndelReclutamientoyUtilizacióndeNiños,NiñasyAdolescentes. Adicionalmente, a través de los espaciosinterinstitucionales creados por la Ley de Víctimas y

Restitución de Tierras, como el mencionado SistemaNacional deAtención y Reparación y de herramientascomolaRedNacionaldeInformación,laUnidadparalaAtenciónyReparaciónIntegraltrabajaconlosgobiernoslocalesenlacreacióndeplaneslocalesdecontingenciayoperaunsistemademonitoreoderiesgosquefacilitala identificación y análisis de las causas de gravesviolaciones y permite la focalización de las accionesdirigidasareducirelriesgodevictimización.LaUnidadtambién realiza misiones de prevención de riesgosdirectamente en el terreno en las cuales verifica lascondicionesdelcontextoydelriesgodevictimizaciónycontribuyealaimplementacióndelasrecomendacionesimpartidasporotrosorganismos.

Seguimiento y evaluación: goce efectivo de derechos

UnadelasdificultadesquesebuscasuperarconlaLeydeVíctimasyRestitucióndeTierraseslanecesidaddeestablecer los criterios bajo los cuales se determinacuándo un hogar desplazado supera la situación dedesplazamientoyalcanzaunasituacióndeconsolidacióny estabilización socioeconómica. Dichos criterios sonnecesarios para establecer el alcance de la obligacióndel Estado de garantizar los derechos de la poblacióndesplazadamediantepolíticasespecíficasqueatiendanasuvulnerabilidadcomovíctimasdelconflicto,facilitaelseguimientoyevaluacióndelapolíticadeatenciónalapoblacióndesplazadaysobretodo,ayudaamedirelimpactodelapolíticadedesplazamientosobreelgoceefectivodelosderechosdelapoblacióndesplazada.

Es importante notar que la figura de la cesaciónde la condición de vulnerabilidad que se aplicaríaprincipalmente a las víctimas del desplazamientoforzadoyqueconstituyelamayorpartedelasvíctimasen Colombia, no las despoja de su derecho a lareparaciónysuaccesoalarestitucióndetierras,sinoquepermitediferenciaraaquellapoblaciónensituacióndedesplazamientoporsuvulnerabilidadrequieredeayudahumanitariayaquellaquenolanecesita.Actualmenteel gobierno nacional se encuentra elaborando lametodología de evaluación de la restitución de goceefectivo de derechos para lo cual tiene en cuenta losestándares trazados por el derecho internacional y laCorte Constitucional colombiana. Esta metodologíase aplicaría una vez cada dos años y se aplicaría porprimeravezhaciael2014.

* * *

La Ley de Víctimas y Restitución de Tierras es unaherramienta con gran potencial de impulsar cambiosdehondocaladoenlasituacióndemillonesdevíctimasdeldesplazamientoforzadoenColombia.Lasleccionesy metodologías que de esta experiencia se deriventienen el potencial de marcar un hito en la maneraen que otros Estados que enfrentan desplazamientosmasivosrespondenalascrisishumanitarias.Elgobierno

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colombiano se encuentra comprometido con elreconocimientoylareparacióndelasvíctimas,porquecadacolombianoycolombianaesunapiezaclaveenlaconstruccióndelapazylareconciliación.

Sobre la Unidad para la Atención y Reparación Integral a las Víctimas

La Unidad fue creada por la Ley de Víctimas yRestitución de Tierras como la entidad encargadade diseñar, coordinar e implementar las políticaspúblicas de atención y reparación dirigidas alas víctimas del conflicto armado. La Unidad esuna entidad del gobierno colombiano que tienepor objetivo acercar el Estado a las víctimasmediante la coordinación eficiente y accionestransformadoras que promuevan la participaciónefectiva de las víctimas en su proceso dereparación.Parainformaciónadicionalvisite:www.atencionyreparacion.gov.co.

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Dealing with the consequences of article 1F of the Refugee Convention in the Netherlands: A crisis for migration policymakers and excluded asylum claimants Joke Reijven and Joris van Wijk1

The drafters of the 1951 Refugee Conventionbelieved war criminals and other perpetratorsof serious crimes are undeserving of refugee

protection. Article 1F of the Convention thereforestipulates that when there are serious reasons forconsidering thatpersonscommittedsuchcrimes, theyare to be excluded from refugee protection. Thoughdetermining whether this exclusion clause applies ischallenging in itself,developinganadequatepolicyonhowtodealwithexcludedpersonsinthepost-exclusionphaseprovesevenmorecomplicated.Thisisespeciallythecaseifexcludedpersonscannotberefouled totheircountriesoforiginbecauseofhumanitarian concerns.They continue to live in limbo; not having access torefugee protection while simultaneously not beingdeportable.

Inthisarticle,wedescribethepost-exclusionchallengesfaced intheNetherlands,acountrywhichhasappliedthe exclusion clause rather actively over the pastdecade. For years the question on what to do withexcluded persons who find themselves in limbo hasbeenatopicofdebate innationalparliament,andforyears the Government of the Netherlands has beenstruggling todevelopacoherentpost-exclusionpolicy.Inthemeantime,theexcludedpersonshavetogetbylivingasundocumentedmigrants.Basedonananalysisof policy documents and interviews with excludedpersonsthemselvesandexpertsonthetopic,thisarticlediscusses the consequences of a fundamental systemerrorininternationallaw.

The no safe haven policy in the Netherlands

In the European context, the Netherlands is at theforefront with regard to the application of article 1F,which is based on the idea that the country shouldnot be a safe haven for alleged criminals applying forasylum.Between1997and2011,810asylumclaimantshave been excluded. Since 2001, every official of theDutch Immigration and Naturalization Service (IND)is expected to automatically refer cases to the “1Funit”when,duringthe initial interviews intheasylumprocedure, indicationsarisethat theremaybeserious

1 Both authors work at the Department of Criminal Law andCriminologyatVUUniversityAmsterdam.

reasons for considering that someonewas involved inwarcrimes,crimesagainsthumanity,actsofterrorismor other serious crimes abroad. Such indications canbestatementsof theasylumapplicants themselvesorother sources that reveal that their activities, claimedprofessions or positions in a group could mean theirinvolvement in human rights violations. Currently, themajorityoftheexcludedindividualsintheNetherlandsareofAfghannationalityandapproximately190ofthemarestillresidinginthecountry.2TheirexclusionisoftenbasedonareportoftheMinistryofForeignAffairsontheactivitiesoftheKhAD/WADduringthecommunistregime between 1978 and 1992. It concludes that allsub-officersoftheKhAD/WADrotatedbetweenvariousdepartments and were therefore personally involvedin the arrest, questioning, torturing and occasionalexecution of suspects. The report forms the basis forthe categorical exclusion of former sub-officers ofKhAD/WAD. Theuseof the specialist report hasbeenhighly criticized, among others by UNHCR. Uniqueto the Netherlands 1F policy is the fact that from2006 onward, alleged 1F offenders are automaticallydeclaredundesirablealiens,orpersonanongrata.Thisis motivated by the presumption that their presencein theNetherlandsendangerspublicorderand/or theinterestofinternationalrelations.BeingpresentintheNetherlandswhilehavingsuchastatusispunishablebylaw.

Post-exclusion measures

Consistentwithinternationalobligations,thepossibilitiesofcriminalproceedingsareexaminedfirstafterarticle1F has been applied. Preferably, the excluded personwouldbeprosecutedinhiscountryoforiginorathirdcountry requesting his extradition. However, barrierssuch as the absence of a bilateral extradition treatyand concernswith regard to the human rights recordofthecountryoforiginfrequentlyimpedeextradition.Further, it does not occur often that requests forextraditionof 1F excludedpersons aremade. For thisreason,transferstoaninternationalcriminalcourtsuchas the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal for theformer Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal

2 Minister and State Secretary of Justice, Notitie betreffende de toepassing van artikel 1F Vluchtelingenverdrag (The Hague,2008),p.32.

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for Rwanda or the permanent International CriminalCourt in TheHague (ICC) also rarely occur.Moreover,accordingtotheso-called“complementarityprinciple”ofthesecourts,intheabsenceofanindictmentbyaninternationalcourt,theNetherlands,ashostStateoftheallegedperpetrator,shouldassessifitcandomesticallyprosecute an excluded individual. This, however, isfar from easy. The “serious reasons for considering”evidentiary standard in the administrative exclusionproceduresismuchlowerthanthe“beyondreasonabledoubt” standard in criminal procedure. In addition,complex,time-consumingandexpensiveinvestigationsinthecountryoforiginareoftenindispensabletogatherfurther evidence to prove that the excluded personhas committed the alleged crimes. Therefore, despitethe availability of universal jurisdiction and the closecollaborationbetweentheimmigrationauthoritiesandaspecialistwarcrimesteamofthepublicprosecutionoffice, the post-exclusion measure of prosecution islargelyunsuccessful.

Theauthorities’preferredalternativeistoconvincetheindividual andhis family to voluntarily depart to theircountry of origin or a third country that is willing toacceptthem.However,voluntaryreturntothecountryoforiginisoftennotseriouslyconsideredasanoptionbytheexcludedpersons.Indeed,whyvoluntarilyreturntothecountryonehas–oftenbymeansofpayinghighfeestotravelagents–justfled?Anadditionalreasonforalleged1FoffenderstonotconsidervoluntaryreturnisthattheyarenoteligibleforfinancialsupportfromtheInternationalOrganizationforMigration(IOM).Whereasotherrejectedasylumclaimantsmaybeprovidedwithreintegration support schemes which can add up toseveral thousand euros, such support is not availableforexcludedindividuals.VoluntarilydepartingtoathirdcountrywithintheEuropeanUnionisoftennotanoptioneither. The Dublin Regulation, signed by 26 Europeancountries,includingtheNetherlands,regulatesthatthefirst country inwhichan individualapplied forasylumwill be responsible for acceptinghis claim.A claimantthathasbeenexcludedintheNetherlandswillthusbehandedovertotheNetherlandswhenheorsheappliesfor asylum in any of the 25 other Dublin RegulationMember States. Travelling to countries outside theEuropean Union is also complicated since alleged 1Foffenders often lack identity documents. Moreover,theymaynothavethefinancialmeanstoobtainavisatoenternon-EUcountries.

ThelastoptionavailabletotheNetherlandsGovernmentin dealing with the excluded persons is forcibledeportation.This,however,islessstraightforwardthanit may seem. Lack of cooperation from the excludedperson or grave medical concerns can, for example,complicatethisprocess.Aparticularlydifficultbarriertoexpulsion for alleged 1F offenders to overcome stemsfrom human rights obligations under article 3 of theEuropeanConventionfortheProtectionofHumanRights

(ECHR)andarticle3oftheConventionAgainstTorturewhichprohibitrefoulementofindividualstotorture,orinhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. TheNetherlandsGovernmentisboundbyarticle3ofECHR,which not only prevents forcible deportation to thecountryoforiginbutalsotonon-MemberStatesoftheCouncil of Europe,where the excluded applicantswillnolongerbeprotectedagainstrefoulementbyarticle3ofECHR.

Living in limbo

WhenthepublicprosecutionofficeoftheNetherlandshas not found sufficient starting points for a criminalinvestigation of an alleged 1F offender, this does notlead to a reassessment of the applicability of article1F to his asylum claim.Norwill a failure to extradite,transfer to an international court or deport. Theexcludednon-prosecutableandnon-deportableasylumapplicantsremainingintheNetherlandsarenotentitledto education above the age of 18,medical insurance,work, financial support and housing. Because theyare generally also being declared undesirable aliens,they constantly risk being arrested and imprisoned.Prospectsofanendtothislimboaregrim.Currently,aminimumof240excludedasylumclaimantsstillremainintheNetherlands,atleast45percentofwhomcannotcurrentlybedeportedduetoarticle3ofECHR.3 The sections below present some of the practicalconsequences that excluded persons in limbo face.The data is based on in-depth interviews with 24excluded individualsandeightexperts that tookplacefrom2011to2012.Theexpertsareprofessionalswho,through their work with former asylum claimants,becameknowledgeableonthetopicofexclusion.Withthe exception of one, all the interviewed alleged 1Foffendersaremale.NineteenofthemareAfghan,fiveIraqiandthreeAfrican.Onaverage,Afghanindividualshad remained 14 years in the Netherlands and non-Afghans7.Mosthadthereforeformedrelativelystrongties toNetherlandssociety,especiallywhenthey livedwiththeirchildren.TheAfghanrespondentsaremostlyintheir50sor60sandlivewiththeirfamilies,whilenon-Afghanrespondentsaregenerally in their30sand lefttheirfamilybehindintheircountryoforigin.

Awaiting decisions on ongoing procedures, thepossibility of being arrestedanddetainedat anytimeand the infinity of the duration of exclusion lead togreat uncertainty. As one respondent mentioned,

3 This number, however, is fluid, since the principle of non-refoulement canbe acknowledgedand rejectedovertime. Kst.19637nr. 1547,Het bericht dat Afghanistan wil dat Nederland onderzoek gaat doen naar oorlogsmisdadigers (1 June 2012);Ah-tk-2011 2012 nr. 1607, Antwoord van Minister Leers op kamervragen van Gesthuizen en Karabulut (20February2012).

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the consequences of the application of article 1Fare perceived as administratively sanctioned prisonsentences:“Inmycountry,someonewillbeincarcerated72hoursbeforebeingconvicted,but…hereittakes12years!Justbecauseofasuspicion.”

Another respondent stated: “If someone in theNetherlandskillsfivepeople,hegetsmaybea20-yearprisonsentence.Ihavebeenimprisonedhereforalmost9yearsandIneverdidanythingwrong!”

The uncertainty impacts all areas of life: finances,housing, health and social life. Financially, therespondentsclaimedtohavenolawfulmeansavailabletoearnmoney.Theylargelydependonassistancefromnon-governmental organizations (NGOs), friends orfamily members. The financial dependency on familymembers changes traditional roles – when whenwife and children are taking care of themostly malealleged1Foffenders,thisoftenleadstofrustrationandpressurewithinthefamily.AssistancefromNGOsisnotguaranteed either, even when the main objective oftheseorganizationsistoassistrefugeeclaimants.SomeNGOs are unwilling to help alleged 1F offenders wholack prospects of a positive outcome of their asylumclaimsor theyprioritizethe interestsofotherasylum-seekersoverthoseofallegedlycriminalapplicants.Analleged1Foffender’ssonremembered:

The first hit came from [a Dutch NGO]. They called my father when they received a letter from IND regarding his 1F status. They told my father: “You are a 1F offender, we don’t deal with that type of case.” … We also asked IOM whether we could go to a third country with the entire family, but they said no.

IntheNetherlands,secondaryhealthcareisnotforfreewithoutmedical insurance.Medicalexpensescanthusincreasefinancialworries.Medicalexpertsinterviewedclaimthatalleged1Foffendersfacemanypsychologicalproblems. Being stigmatized as supposed dangerouscriminals weighs heavily on the excluded. Theirpsychological complaintsarecausedprimarilyby theirexclusionratherthanbyearliertraumas,whichinhibitseffectivetreatmentofthelatter.Moreover,respondentsseemtopostponeseekingmedicalaid.Theyprioritizesolving problems related to work, legal proceduresand social environment and only resort to medicaltreatmentwhenanyhopeforchangehasdisappeared.Thefollowingstatementisfromamanwhohadfallenillduringhisdetention:

My doctor sent me to the hospital… I was handcuffed and they put a stick in my trousers so I couldn’t bend my legs. I had to walk through the crowd with police officers left and right of me… The eye drops burned in my eyes. I asked the police: “Can you loosen the cuffs, so I can rub my

eyes?” But… they wouldn’t. I became aggressive. I started to scream to the people in the corridor: “Look at me, I am a criminal, a terrorist!”

Beingdeclaredpersonanongrataaggravatesthestigma.Contrary to other undesirable aliens, the respondentshave never been convicted for an offence or crime intheNetherlandsandidentifythemselvesasregularlaw-abidingcitizens.Oneintervieweesaid:“Thelabel…usedto be for people killing, dealing drugs and I have thesamesticker.”

Respondents cope with the social isolation, stigmaand shame by either keeping their 1F status secretor by disclosing it strategically to themedia or a fewconfidants in Netherlands society who, they believe,canoffersupport.Thepresenceof familymembers inthe Netherlands can provide assistance but can alsobe a source of tension, shame and guilt. The alleged1F offender often feels or is held responsible for thedeprivationofhisspouseandchildren.ThisisbecauseintheNetherlands, relativesofanalleged1Foffenderare,onprinciple,notentitled to refugeeor subsidiaryprotectioniftheylackindependentgroundsforasylum.Since 30 November 2008, however, dependants can,undercertainconditions,apply fora residencepermitafteralong-termstayintheNetherlands.4Nonetheless,the feeling of guilt originating from causing the long-term exposure of spouse and children to financial,educational, medical and social problems, and theconstant threat of the excluded familymember beingdetained or deported is experienced strongly. As onefemalerespondentstated:

The IND tries to destroy the family… “Because of you I am 1F, our kids have 1F.” My children say: “Mum, why have you said you were in the military, why didn’t you lie?” Because of the war I lost my brothers, parents and family. But because of the injustice here I lost my husband, kids and life.

Thepersonalaccountsofalleged1Foffendersindicatethat their long-termdire situation alsohas a negativeimpactonNetherlandssocietyasawhole.Notintheleastbecausetheir1Fstatus,poorhealthandageinginhibitthemfromworkingandcontributing,throughtaxestothe economy. In addition, the continuous litigationsinitiatedbybothexcludedasylumapplicantsandINDarecostlygovernmentexpenditures.Respondentsperceivethe1Fpolicyas incoherentand its implementationasinconsistent.AformermemberofAlgeria’sDepartmentofIntelligenceandSecuritysaid:

4 Decision of the State Secretary of Justice, Wijziging van de Vreemdelingencirculaire 2000,nr2008/29(18November2008).Available online at https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/stcrt-2008-1080.html.

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If IND here suspects an Algerian asylum-seeker of having terrorist ties, what do you think they will do? They will go to AIVD [Netherlands secret services], which searches for data and asks my former colleagues to give information so this person can get 1F… it is Kafka-esque.

Government representatives frequently appear not toknowhowtodealwithalleged1Foffenderswhocannotbedeported,resultinginmixedmessages.Arespondentwhose refugee status was withdrawn and who wassubsequentlyinvitedforanotherINDinterviewgavethefollowingexample:

[The IND representative] said: “According to us you have a refugee status, there’s no problem. Go talk to the one who withdrew it.” [In the asylum centre after being excluded,] he [Central Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seekers employee] said: “What are you doing here? In our computer it says you have a house and refugee status.”

Tosumup,thesituationofexcludedpersonsinlimboisextremelytroublesomefortheindividualsinvolved.Thesocial,psychologicalandfinancialconsequencesoftheirexclusionaresevere.Forthisreason,NGOs,academicsand politicians have over the past years criticized the1Fpolicyandactivelylobbiedtocometoasolutionforexcludedpersonswho live in limbo.Butwhatoptionsdoes the government have? On the one hand theRefugeeConventionobliges immigrationauthoritiestostrictlyapplyarticle1F,whilearticle3ofECHRon theother hand prohibits refoulement. Third countries arenotwillingtoofferawayoutbyopeningtheirbordersforalleged1Foffenders.Asitstands,internationallawandpoliticsdonotyethaveananswertothisfundamentalsystemerrorininternationallaw.

Ad hoc solutions to the policy crisis

Netherlands authorities in the meantime use adhoc tools to deal with this crisis. The minister forImmigration, IntegrationandAsylum,forexample,hasthe option to use his discretionary authority in orderto terminate the unlawfulness of the residence of anindividual who has not been granted refugee status.Thisdiscretionarypowercanalsobeusedinrelationto1F excluded persons. The condition required to applythiscompetenceisaparticularlyharrowingsituationintheNetherlandsfortheindividualconcerned.AlthoughitwasrecentlyusedforanAfghanmanwhoseexpulsionwould leave his children behind in the Netherlandswithoutparents,ministershavesofarrarelymadeuseofthiscompetence.

Asecondalternativetoendtheindefinitelimbosituationofanalleged1Foffender in theNetherlands isa typeof post-exclusion balancing test which is specificallydesignedtodealwithexcludedpersonswhocannotbe

deported.Itiscalledthe“durabilityandproportionalitytest” and was developed in the jurisprudence of theAdministrative Jurisdiction Department of the CouncilofState.ItallowstheStatetodisapplyarticle1Fwhenthe gravity of the crime allegedly committed by theasylum-seeker is outweighed by the humanitarianconcernsregardingtheindividualthathavearisenafterhis exclusion from refugee protection. An excludedindividual is eligible for a temporary residencepermitintheNetherlandswhenhecomplieswiththefollowingcumulativerequirements:5

1. Thepersoncoulddemonstrablynotbeexpelleddueto human rights concerns during many years6 and cannotberemoved.

2. Thereisnoprospectofchangeinhissituationwithinareasonableterm.7

3. Departure to a third country has been impossibledespitetheindividual’sbestefforts.

4. He finds himself in an exceptional situation in theNetherlands.

BasedonarecommendationbytheAdvisoryCommitteeforAlienAffairs,“manyyears”isinterpretedasatleast10years.8The“exceptionalsituation”referstoamedicalorotherhumanitarianemergencyandasituationinwhichhisfamilylifeiswellestablishedintheNetherlands.Inpractice, the post-exclusion balancing, implementedsince June 2004, has been rarely applied andwhen ithasbeen,itgenerallyconcernedterminalillness.Inthepasttwoyears,itresultedinthegrantingofaresidencepermit to fewer than five excluded persons.9 It thusprovesdifficult tomeet thedemandsof thedurabilityandproportionalitytest.

The durability and proportionality test causes muchconfusionandparadoxicalresults.Excludedindividualsare told to leave the Netherlands directly after beingexcluded,butanexceptionalsituationcanonlyleadtoaresidencepermitiftheycandemonstratethattheyhave“durably”remainedonNetherlandsterritoryforatleast10years.Itisapolicythatisnoteasytodigestforsomerespondents:“OntheonehandIamundesirable,ontheotherhandINDsaysIshouldstay10yearsafterwhichtheywillreviewmyprocedure.Ican’tgobackandIhavetowaitfor10years…butnodocuments?”

5 CouncilofState,LJN:BB1436(18July2007).6 CouncilofState,LJN:AP2043(2June2004).7 CouncilofState,LJN:BB1057(18July2007).8 Bahtiyar, Z., Exclusion of ex-KhAD/WAD members in the

Netherlands.In:Fervet Opus Liber Amicorum Anton van Kalmthout (M.S.Groenhuijsenetal.,eds).(Maklu,Apeldoorn,2009),p.27.

9 Ah-tk-2011 2012 nr. 1607. Antwoord van Minister Leers opkamervragenvanGesthuizenenKarabulut(20February2012).

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More problems on the horizon?

The situation described above does not constitute acrisis innumbers.Yet itdoesrepresentacrisis for theindividualsaffected.Theyliveinthemarginsofsociety.Despite the fact that the drafters of the Conventionclearly stipulated that the application of article 1F isnot intended to have a penal function, the de factoconsequencesarefeltassuchbythepersonsconcerned.Post-exclusion measures to address this system errorarethereforeindispensable.

However,thepolicymeasurescurrentlyavailabletoendthislimboprovidenoadequateandcoherentsolution.Excludedpersonsareonlyeligibleforthedurabilityandproportionalitytestiftheycansurviveasundocumentedimmigrants for aminimum period of 10 years. In themeantime, they have to get by without any support,rightstoeducation,workorsecondarymedicalcare.

Meanwhile,newlimbocasesappearonthehorizon.TheNetherlands, in particular, is likely to be faced shortlywithaverydelicateandproblematicissueinrelationto1FduetothelocationofICConDutchterritory.Recently,the Court of Amsterdam decided that three detainedCongolesedefensewitnesseswereentitledtoapplyforasylum in the Netherlands. Considering their allegedinvolvement in crimes categorized under article 1F oftheConvention,itislikelythatarticle1Fwillbeappliedtotheirasylumcase.10Article3ofECHRmightpreventtheirrefoulement toaprisonintheDemocraticRepublicof Congo.Will these and future allegedly criminal ICCwitnessesseekingasylumintheNetherlandsendupinthelimbosituationdescribedabove?

10 Van Wijk, J., Possible Scenarios following Asylum Applicationsby Four DefenseWitnesses. The Trial of Germain Katanga andMathieu Ngudjolo Chui (28 August 2012). Available online atwww.katangatrial.org/2012/08/possible-scenarios-following-asylum-applications-by-four-defense-witnesses/.

Next, there is a tendency of more countries settingup structures in refugee determination procedures toimplementamoreactivenosafehavenpolicy.UNHCRis currently in the process of updating its exclusionguidelines. In theprospectofmass influxesof asylumapplicants fleeing the instabilities in theMiddle East,governmentsandUNHCRwillhavetoseparatelegitimaterefugees from those there are serious reasons forconsideringtheyhavebeenimplicatedinactsoftorture,suchasformermembersoftheSyrianorLibyansecretservices.Butmerelyexcludingsuchpersonsmaycreatenewproblemsifnocoherentpost-exclusionpolicyisinplacetodealwithpersonswhocannotberefouled.

A consistent and more uniform approach to theapplication of article 1F of the Convention and post-exclusion measures is needed. This article discussedsome of the dilemmas faced and policies used in theNetherlands, but post-exclusion policies by othercountries, when they exist, are often not publiclydisclosed.Afirststeptocometoamorecoherentpolicycouldbetoexaminethedifferencesbetweennationalapproachestopost-exclusionandidentifytheirsuccessesandfailures.Inaddition,consideringitsguidanceontheapplicationofarticle1F,UNHCRcouldtakeaproactiverole in developing post-exclusionmeasures. The needforsharing informationonthematter isevident,sincethe crisis for migration policymakers and excludedasylumclaimantsisfarfromresolved.