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Military Review VOLUME LlX MARCH 1979 NO 3

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CONTENTS AIR SUPERIORITY AT THE TREETOPS

by Lieutenant Colonel Retsae H. Miller, US Army

WHAT ABOUT MULTINATIONAL CORPS IN NAT07 by Colonel Wolfgang Gerhardt, FRG Army

WINTER WARFARE BY ANY OTHER NAME by Lieutenant Colonel Richard A Dixon, US Army

COUNTERINSURGENCY IN RHODESIA by Captain James K. Bruton Jr .. US Army Reserve

AN OLD SOLDIER SPEAKS by General Walter T Kerwin Jr, US Army, Relired

CHANGING DIMENSIONS OF MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM by Lieutenant Colonel Sam C Sarkes!an, US Army, Retired

SOVIET CiVil DEFENSE SOME MYTHS IN THE WEStERN DEBATE by Fred M Kaplan

YOU MUST BELIEVE by MalOI Dennis Carlin, US Army

A METHOD FOR DEVELOPING DOCTRINE by Major John W Taylor, US Army

REVIEWS from reports and loumals 79 STUDIES 80 LETTERS 83 NEWS 88 BOOKS contemporary reading for the profess,!:nal

MILITARY REVIEW IS published monthly on English and Spanish and quarterly 10 Portuguese Use of funds for prmtmg thiS publication approved bv Headquarters. Department of U1e Army, 30 May 1978 Controlled CIrculatIOn postage paid at Leavenworth. KS 66048 and Topeka. KS 66608 SubscnpliOn $1200 per year US and APO/FPO. $1400 foreign Son91e copies $1 50 US and APO/FPO. $17(; foreign Address all mall to Military Re,new. USACGSC. Fort Leavenworth. KS 66027 Telephone (913) 6845642 or AUTOVON 5525642 Unless otherWise stated. the views herem are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of Defense or any element thereof BaSIS of offiCial distribution IS ann pm general officer and one pm five flold grode officers

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Salute to NATO 1979 ~arks the 30th anniversary of the :-.iorth Atlantic Treaty Organization, an alhance so famlhar to us that Its acronym, NATO, no longer needs to be defined in our lIterature. Thl' well-organlled defemive system, created by the allies and Joined by signature In April of 1949, has provided a basis of stability and confidence fiom which we have been able to guarantee our collective security for three decades.

We often forget that the post-World War II era of NATO's beginmng was different from the world as we now know It. The' threat \\a, clearly v ISIble.! he former allies of the \\ar, diSillusioned by the SOViets' unwilhngness to live In peace and harmony WIth all nations. and fearful of possible further Sonet expansion westward. were compelled to onCe again seek alliance for their common defense. A dangerous clImate of In'tabillty prevaIled.

Since then. things ba\e changed Through ;'o;ATO. a stable military and pohtical balance ha, been created bet\\een Ea,t and West NegotIatIons for pOSSIble mutual and balanced reductiOn> of mIlitary forces and other measures aimed at easing ten'lom were begun and are continuing In the meantime, we 'have also beeome \\I,er. We arc a\\arc of our shortcoming, In the area of standardl7ed forces. We kno\\ that the 1 hreat continue, to Impro\e It> military posture and strengths. Two NA I 0 member; havc wIthdra\\n theH forces from the command. Many incon-'I,tcncle' In thc ceonOl1l1e fIeld remain. and common development of equipment and wcapon '~'tcm, i, lar trom Ideal. H,mever. \\e mu,t not be misled into thinking Lh,1l the deflclcncles di'played by :-':A TO mean a weak organi7atlon. It IS not Much ha' been accomplIshed In three decades. Continuing Improvement m unctc"tandm/!. rcdeplclyment. compatIblht~ and pohtlcal will all add up to a mighty alliance.

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Air Superiority at th~ __ Treetops

Lieutenant Colonel Retsae H. Miller, US Army

The United Slates emerged from the Vietnam conflict as the undisputed expert in tactical employment of helicopters. /{owever, the Soviets appreciated the role of helicopters in future warfare and are rapidly expanding their use of attack helicopters and airmobile forces. In an oversimplified way, our doctrine calls for the Army to win the ground battle and the Air Force to win the air battle. But there is a gray area: the 100 feet abpve the battlefield. There is where the helicopters u'ill be flying. What happens if the Soviets use their attack helicopters in an air-to-air role against our attack helicopters waiting to pounce on their massed ar-mored and mechanized units? In the event of a Soviet airmobile. assault, do our" helicupters attack the Soviet helicopters, or do they continue to fight the battle to our front? If we are to win the land battle, we must have air-superiority at the treetops. Within present dollar con-straints, what can we do? One answer is to equip our advanced scout helicopters (ASHs) with air-to-air weapons. In this way, the ASH can provide our attack helicopters security against Soviet attack helicopters, become a potent weapon against Soviet airmobile forces and continue its role as scout. A larger question remains unresolved: Do we have the time and funds to 'go through a long and expensivf research and development cycle, or wlfwld an off-the-shelf commercial helicopter be just as effective once it has been

mil~tarized? " " .

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WORLD War I introduced three very lethal weapons. They were the machinegun, the tank and the airplane. German military planners were quick to realize the impact of these systems. Between World Wars I and II, the German army refined its concept of warfare and built its ground forces around the mass employment of mechanized forces. One only has to look to the successes of Rommel and Guderian to realize the extent to which the German High Command had adopted the use of these new tactics ,and weapons. In contrast, only a few farsighted individuals in the US Army such as George S. Patton Jr. had fully realized the impact that armor was to have on future warfare.

In South Vietnam, the US Army quickly embraced the concept of air-mobile warfare. Tactical necessity and the obvious advantages to be gained by using the helicopter to provide both firepower and mobility in a war that was classified asr-t'tow intensity" overcame previous prejudices toward helicopter vulnerabilities. The United States emerged out of Vietnam as the world's leader in helicopter warfare. However, as the emphR.sis shifted from the rice paddies of Vietnam to the complex problems associated with fighting in Europe, the US Army began again to question the sur vivability of helicopters in combat.

Forgotten were the previously favorable findings of the Howze Board and 11 th Air Assault tests of the early 1960s that examined the use of helicopter-borne forces in mid-intensity conflict even though these findings were verified in actual combat. In conditions approximating mid-intensity warfare, as experienced in Lam Son 719 and An Loc, we lellrned

AIR SUPERIORITY

that helicopters could survive if flown in the "nap of the earth" and equipped with aircraft survivability equipment. These findings were further substan-tiated by tests conduded at Fort Hood, Texas, by Project MASSTER.

The "nap of the earth" envelope limited helicopters to a relatively small layer of maneuver area determined to be that air space that begins just a few feet above the ground and extends upward to approximately .100 feet. Because of the lethality of air defense systems, it is ~ow a foregone con-cl usion that all helicopters, friendly and enemy, will have to operate in this portion of the atmosphere.

As the German High Command realized the importance of armor before World War II, NATO's potential

,-adversary, the Soviet Union, has realized the importance of the role of the helicopter in future warfare. The. Soviets' use of both attack helicopters and airmobile force'S is expanding at an alarming rate. This implies that NATO's use of the air space at or near the treetops could be hotly contested by Warsaw Pact helicopter forces if hostilities were to erupt.

It must. be realized now by US planners and our NATO allies that the helicopter will have a significant impact on winning or losing the land battle. This means that our helicopter systems, doctrine, force structure and training must concentrate on winning the helicopter battle in order to ensure success on the ground. In order to accomplish this, we must gain and maintain air superiority" at the treetops.

To what extent does the Soviet Union appreciate the advantages gained by the helicopter and air-mobility? The recent Ogaden War in

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Ethiopia supplies the answer. Soviet Mi6 helicopters supported tbe Cuban-Soviet attack against Somali forces by' flying troops, supplies and equipment across the Ahmar Mountains. Some observers reported the transportation of PT76 tanks by these helicopters.

The entire operation was a coor-dinated combined arms attack using armor, macserl artillery, tactical air and helicoptE'rs to envelop the Somali strongpoint in the vicinity of Jit'iga. JVelL'swc('k

' quoted an Arab mil' ary

attache' a~ saying "it was over al ost before it start

force commander. Notification of at-tacking enemy columns and their lengths, direction and speed has been passed to the covering force com mander who launches his two attack helicopter companies. The companie~' mission is to engagp a motorizeJ rille rpgiment that is now approach-ing thp kill zonp that was established on the most dangerous avenue of approach. . The two.... attack helicopter com-

pani~s arp v~ctorpd to attack positions by SOT AS (Standoff Target Ac-quisition System)' and att.ack upon notification that the regiment is in the zone. Attack ships firing 2.75-inch multipurpose rockets' begin the attack by saturating the enemy column in order to degrade or destroy the enemy's air defense umbrella. As the last sup-pression rockets explode, TOW firing helicopters press their attack from their positions around the kill zone. The attack is completed in lpss than 80 minutes, and tbe helicopters withdraw to rearm, refuel and prepare for further commitment,

What if} Soviet attack helicopters were employed to the fronL and Ilanks of this column as a security element? Or what if Hinds were employed in overwatch positions as the column moved toward and through the kill zone? It is unlikely that a surprise attack by our helicopters would be feasible.

Or what if our attacking helicopters were counterattacked by Soviet attack helicopters during tbe engagement? The resulting US helicopter losses probably would be unacceptable. In other words, the attacking enemy motorized rille regiment would close at full strengtb with our covering force element.

AIR SUPERIORITY

Scenario Two

Enemy. forces have forced the withdrawal' of the covering force and are now attempting to conduct a breakthrough of our main battle area. The US 'division commander has iden-tified the area in which the enemy will attempt his breakthrougb. He- is attempting to meet this threat with a 3 to1 combat ratio and is shifting forces laterally to achieve this objective.

In order to gain time to accomplish his realignment of forces, he now

e~ploys his two attack helicopter com-panies on tbe Ilanks of the massing enemy echelons. Unopposed by other

. aerial systems, the attack belicopters engage the enemy along with the in tegratpd fires of artillery, tanks, ground guided missile systems and A /0 close support aircraft. It is probable that the US ground com mander could reposition his maneuver elements during this time and prepare to prevent the breakthrough.

Tbis situation could be changed drastically by the entrance of enemy attack helicopters. Our attacking helicopters could be totally neutralized if tbey were attacked wnile attempting to destroy the enemy's massing armor. In addition, the enemy helicopters would be free to roam in our rear areas and could destroy targets of oppor-tunity at will.

Scenario Three

During the enemy's buildup and eventual massed armor and mechanized attack, he launched large

MILITARY REVIEW

numbe'rs of Hip troop-carrying helicopters accompanied by Mz-6 heavy lift helicopters carrying BMPs and PT76 tanks internal and escorted by Hind attack helicopters. Even though hp sustained aO-percen t losses, the enemy inserted a force equiv~lent to a motorizt'd 1'I)le division behind the main battle arpa.

The US division commander is now in the position that French forces oef!'nding the Maginot line found

thems!'lve~ at the beginning of World War II-that of fighting in two direc-tions simultaneously while oriented to fight only in one direction. By adhL;nng to the principles of mass, mobilIty :.md surprise. the enemy used vertical pnvplopment by motorized forct's to rpducp the combat power of our force,.; in the main battle area. Without the means to counter such foret's, the outcome of this situation should be obvious.

How Should We Proceed?

Rp(,pnt simulator studies imply that the most effiCIent countersystem to an attack helicopter is another attack helicopter. If air superiority at the treetops is vital to winning and the most effective countersystem to the helicopter is another helicopter, air-to-air engagements between helicopters are' inevitable on any future European battlefield involving NATO and Warsaw Pact armies.

Rased on preliminary in-vestigations, it also can be expected' that helicopter air-to-air engagements

~t the treetop level will be fleeting, violent, intense and of short duration. This means that detection, speed and

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maneuverability plul;! accurate, long-range destructive weapons systems will be key factors toward winning victories in the air space just above the treetops.

What must we do? We could in-crease our buy of the incoming AH64 advanced attack helicopter with its basic weapons system, Hellfire, or we could increase the purchase of ad-ditional AHIS TOW Cobras. Both of these helicopters could prove to be effective helicopter killers.

Will present dollar constraints support either course of action? The question really should be: "Can we not afford to field adequate Qelicopter countermeasures?" By the mid to late 19R08, the US Army should have in its inventory the total quantities of AH64 and A HIS a ttac k helicopters programed for purchase to meet force structure requirements. Attack helicopters and air cavalry units have been programed to offset superior numbers of armor and motorized rifle

elem~nts' of the Warsaw Pact. Given the additional requirement of providing' a defensive capability against Soviet attack helicopters, will there be adequate US helicopters to engage enemy armor while employing a If'0rtion of these attack helicopters in an overwatch security role?

The threat will demand that helicopter security fQrces be employed to protect those helicopters that are engaging armor targets. Adaitionally, large numbers of attack helicopters will be re~uired to meet enemy air-mobile forces to destroy these forces before they reach their objectives. All of these factors imply that an'increase in the numbers of attack helicopters is not only justified but is a necessary 'element of s'urvival.

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AIR SUPERIORITY

a Aero ~ Aero Scout lift ~AeTO ~Rifle 20 ASH' 8 UH60s (10 per platoon)

4 TOWs 4 Dragons 8 Motorc.ycles 8 Ground lightweight

laser Designators

"Each aircraft equipped with 10 to 12 air-to-air missiles

Figure 1

How can this be accomplished in a climate of severe funding constraints? In addition to the ongoing purchases of AH64 and AHIS attack helicopters, could we not increase the numbers of

. attack aircraft by arming future scout aircraft? '

In the spring of 1978, a consensus was reached by the attendees at the Aviation Employment Conference that a definite requirement exists for an advanced scout helicopter (ASH). Agreement could not be reached as to

. whether it should be armed or un-a~med. All agreed that it should be equipped with the ta,rget ac-quisition/ detection system (T ADS) and with the pilot night vision system

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(PNVS). These two. systems plus sur-vivability equipment increased weight requirements to 7,000, pounds. (This approximates th size of the UHIH.) Development of the ASH also implies large expenditures of research and development dollars and years of waiting before ASH becomes a reality.

Balancing dollar constraints against the urgent need of increasing our attack helicopter fleet, where can we make tradeoffs? Should we not rethink the ASH's mission and design requirement-s? Could the ASH provide the increase in attack capability while still performing its traditional role as a scout? How survivable must the ASH be? If the decision were to arm the

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A~H Overwatch ASH Overwatch ,

KILL 275 SuppreSSiOn tHlnq helicopters

'ASH Overwatch

ZONE

TOW Cobras or HellfIre equipped AH64 attack helicopters

ASH Overwatch

Figure 2

ASII, whilt armament would hp the Ill"~t l'ff," tive,'! Do we really nt't'(j to undc'l'gn ('xhaustivp rt'~f'Hrch and dt'vPlopnwnt, or "ould an off-th" shelf h"lll'opter snU"r" our need'! It is un-d,'rstood that many alternatives nll1ginh from off thl' shl'lf thnlUgh new dl,\t'lopnH'nt currently are bemg

~ludil,d b~ tIll' Department of the Army.

It IS impl'rative that we forego n'sl'

ASH so equipped would be the nucleus around which we could reorg;mize air cavalry units. The air cavalry troop could be reorganized as shown in Figure 1.

The air cavalry's mission would remain reconI'laissance and security, with increased emphasis on security. The security mission would require the employment of ASH, armed with air-to-air missiles', in overwatch positions when attack helicopters (AHIS or AH64s) were conducting their attacks on armor targets. This would prevent surprise attack b,y enemy helicopters. In vignette one, we described the sur-prise attack on an enemy armored column forward of the covering force. Now let's add ASH employed in its security role. Helicopters could be positioned aA depicted in Figure 2.

This attack could be enhanced further by adding AIO close support ships to ensure armor kills and perhaps increase protection from other

1 The OgJden Ol'bilcle Newsw!'ek 20 Mdlch 1978 2 Durong JAWS A,r Forcl' AIDs Arm~ lOW Cob/os aOl delpn,>"

arhllp.y armo' and arl,lIpf\l Wl'rp mdneuvPred e warhead~ ot a nt'"" lam,!y 01 2 7':J ,n(/1 roCkets thai dTe PdT! of the new Droduct Imprnved 2 75 Inch sySTem For more deldlls see Colonel James L Tow < 2 75 Upd,)IP WbaTever HnDDeT1ed ~o The Egg on ttle Wall> Un,/ed 5ldre~ Army A~'dtlon O.qe5t May 1978

Lieutenant Colonel Retsae H. MIller IS WIth the Department o( TactICS. USACGSC. He rccelt'ed a B A. (rom the Unwerslty o( M,am, and an M.A (rom Webster College and is a graduate o( the USACGSC. He has

c~mmanded au cavalry and assault h /tcoptCT unrts and served wIth alT assault lantry. AsslRnments mclude serVlce with t e 1st Cavalry and IOIst Airborne DWlslOns in' V,etnam and wzth the Army SectIOn. US MILItary Group, Honduras.

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Colonel Wolfgang Gerhardt, Federal'Republic of Germany Army

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MULTINATIONAL CORPS

NATO Corps LANDJUT is unique within the NATO command structure. Located in Rendsburg, Germany, Head-quarters, Allied Land Forces, Schleswig-Holstein .and Jutland, was created in 1962 to protect the critical area of the land approaches to the Baltic approaches and exits. Manned in peacetime by a West German armored infantry dil'ision and a Danish division plus a West German territorial forces brigade, the corps would expand in war to im'lude forces from the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom. Major exercises such as Bold Guard test the corps' readiness. Interoperability is a key factor in the corps' success. Perhaps based on the experience gained with Corps LANDJUT, we can look forward to more mul-tinational corps in NA TO.

RECENTLY in Br~ssels, at one of the variou~ staff meetings at Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe, one of the participants, when I introduced myself and ~aid I was from Corps LANDJUT, asked: "Corps what?" This was not surprising to me. Even within the NATO command structure, this unique corps head quarters is not wellknown.

Generally, all army corps are national corps, 'and, as far as the German forces in NATO are con cerned, they also are the highest national field command level. This multinational corps headquarters with the long title of Headquarters, Allied Land Forces, Schleswig Holstein and Jutland (LANDJUT), was created in 1962 for the critical area of the land approaches to the Baltic approaches and exits. The headquarters is located in Rendsburg, Germany, and its position in the allied chain of command can be seen on Figure 1. The' corps commands in pellcetime the 6th Federal Republic of Germany (GE) Armored Infantry Division with head

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quarters in Neumiinster and the Danish Jutland Division with head quarters in Fredericia, Denmark.

Corps combat support and service troops are earmarked to the corps 'from both nations. A unique major for mation also is assigned to the com mander, Allied Land Forces, Schleswig Holstein and Jutland (COM LANDJUT). The German Defense Group l:l i~ a territorial brigadesize formation located a1 Eutin, Germany. This formation is an exception since territorial formations normally are assigned to the local territorial com mander for rear area security missions. Because of the peculiar situation in the area and the existing threat on the Warsaw Pact side, this brigade has a defense mission in the forward defense area alongside the.tw~ divisions.

The headquart~as a reduced peacetime strength of around 1'00, in c1uding officers and noncommissioned officers from Germany, Denmark, the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States. These. nations have certain contingency forces earmarked

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"\ XXX Commander.

Allied land Forceo;;. Schlesw'ig.

Holstem and ...Jutland Acnc!sl,...,q

Neumuostcr frederic,,,

Figure

for the area, ;]nd it is deslrahle to have expertise pre:-;ent in the headquarters. As to the manning, only the com mander and chief of staff rotate in a thr~eyear cycle bl'tween Denmark and Germany-at the present time, the commander is Lieutenant General P. O. W. Th

Atlantic, the Warsaw Pact has. to get out of the confining waters of the Baltic and return for repair and supply since a high percentage of its support facilities are located in eastern harbors. The sensitivity of the waters is demonstrated by the permanent Warsaw Pact presence of a number of electronic warfare 1 ships at various points around the three exits.

Our left flank neighbor is the Allied Land Forces, Zealand; in peacetime a Danish national corps command at Copenhagen. LANDJUT maintains dose liaison with them as well as with our neighbor to the right, the I German Corps just south of the Elbe River. Due

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MULTINATIONAL CORPS

to its peculiar situation, LANDJUT has a number of liaison tasks that are not normal for this type of command.

For instance, there are links to the local Lunder governments in Kiel and Hamburg as well as to the Federal German Border Police and the flag officer, Germany, with his naval air arm who is, in turn, responsible for the waters outside Schleswig-Holstein. The two senior national commanders in the area, the German admiral in Kiel and the Danish general in Arhus, Northern Jutland, detach liaison teams to LANDJUT to present the views of their respective commands. This is a vital aspect in planning since the

Platoon leader of Home Defense Group 13 training for combat in bUlltup areas

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BALTIC APPROACHES

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EAST GERMANY

Figure 2

introduction of external n'inforcements from thl' United Kingdom or United States into the area brings a number of host nation support problems that only "national commands can solve.

In the field of standardization, some significant steps have been made. During the last few years, a number of

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major items in weapon systems, such as the Leopard tank, the MI09 howitzer, the M 113 armored personnel carrier and the Redeye air defense missile, have been introduced in both the Danish and German divisions, making logistics and mutual support a great deal easier.

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The mission of COMLANDJUT tells him to defend the area as far

f~rward as possible and as flexible as possible in order to deny an attack into the heart of Schleswig-Holstein. To fulfill this mission, COMLANDJUT has a number of major formations and units assigned. The missions and tasks that these formations have to execute are laid down in a general defense plan which is written and modified by the' COMLANDJUT staff.

One of the problem areas is the . availability of forces. Whereas the German forces are readily available and near their wartime positions, the

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MULTINATIONAL CORPS

Danish Jutiand Division must be par-tially mobilized and has to travel 100 to 200 kilometers to its wartime positions. An early availability of these forces is necessary which means that a political decision has to be made in order to send them forward.

Another aspect is that because of its geographic situation and the Warsaw Pact doctrine, the LANDJUT operations plan has to include the possibilities of tactical air landing deep in the defense sector and/or amphibious operations anywhere along its long. left flank. This necessitates close liaison requirements.

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To enhance the capability to react to any of the Warsaw Pact options, a constant ~nd permanent exercise program is being conducted at all levels throughout the year. This is not confined to German soil, but takes plaee on Danish territory as well. While other- commands still question the word "interoperability," we in the LANDJUT area have practiced it for years ahd not only in the head-quarters, but all the way down to the brigade and sometimes right down to the' company. Recent training com petitions in the fields of artillery, engineer and military geography prove this point well when the multinational teams start taking home the prizes from national competitio~s.

Every four years, a major live ex-ercise is being conducted under the name of Bold Guard. This year, the exercise will see on the' Blue side possible forces that COMLANDJUT can count on in a crisis situation. Not only will the three major land for-mations and strong territorial units participate, but a US Marine Corps amphibious brigade- with its own air component and logistic support is be-ing shipped from the United States along with a British 'forml;ltion called the 6th Field Force. The field force has a strong antiarmor capability and a

parachute battalion for high reaction mobility. Naval and air force units of the nations concerned arso will be in-volved. - It will be the biggest exercise ever

conducted in the area, and it should demonstrate that the NATO area of Schleswig-Holstein, Jutland-Hamburg will not give in readily to the Warsaw

P~ct, but will be defended by a joint and combined effort of at least four nations. That this can be done under the command of a multinational corps headquarters is one of the aims of the exercise. Interoperability should not remain a "new fangled device," but should convince others that this is one of the answers to our defense problems.

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The saying in the German army when Schleswig-Holstein problems are being presented "Alles ist anders in Schleswi{

Northern operations, arctic warfare, cold weather operations just do not excite many readers. However, be it Alaslla, Korea or Central Europe, winter warfare is a fact of life which most choose to ignore and refuse to plan for. An American unit trained to fight in the snow suddenly becomes a "special purpose" force. Have we forgotten the Ardennes Campaign in World War II or the Chasin Reservoir in Korea? The Soviets train for winter warfare and not just because they have more

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I N 196:5, the US Army published a field manual entitled .vorth.ern OprJ'atlO/lS, and defimd its operation.al arena as' gf.'hl'rally north of the Arctic Circll'. Northern opl'mtions is syn-. onymous with arctic operptions. Sprinklp in a [pw, exotic terms like auroral l'nvironment and 50 degrees isothenn. ,;nd instant obscurity is assurpd. .

The Vl'ry term "arctic' warfare" . paints a fanciful ml'ntal picture of armies maneuv('ring against each otlwr across thl' frozen wastelands of th .. f[H north. Thl' probability of that kind of military action warrants littll' attention whl'n compared with the

-realIties of our most likely .future hatt ll'fil'lds. The atmosphere crea,ted by this geographically limited frame of rpfl'rence has seriously hamper{'d cold weathl'r com hat devl'lopments and has resultl'd in our reference to any unit trairil'd primarily to fight in the snoW as a "spl'cial purpose" force.

A replacement field manual is to be , titled OperatlOlls ~n Cold Weather. and

that is a little closer to the mark in establishing a reality-oriented rl,ferencl' with real-world impact. But it IS gomg to take more than changing the' title of a field manual to draw attention to the need to upgrade our wintl'r capability.

In point of fact, a preoccupation with geographic frames of reference obscures the main difference between a winter battlefield and any other kind: the presence of cold and snow. Call it by any other name, winter warfare .simply means that the way we fight is influenced by the presence of cold or

. snow or both on the battlefield . regardless of where in the world that, hattlefield is. Call it by any other name, and' the need to prepare for it

18

becomes less ,obvious: Cold begins to influence operations

whenever people ani:! materiel begin to lose efficiency because of 'it; Cold affects people as a function of wind speed a'nd humidity, as well as of temperature. These effects. can' seriously hamper operations at t{'mperatures well above zero degrees Fahrenheit. Most of our hardware is designed to operate' efficiently in temperatures do'wn to minus 25 degrees Fahrenheit, and that is acceptable. for operations almost anywhere in the Northern H.emisphere, including about 90 percent of the time in the coldest regions of the north.

Some problems begin to appear at about plus 20 'degrees Fahrenheit, but prevention of serious equipment problems is relatively simple until the temperature falls - below about zero degrees Fahrenheit. Wherever man-. fachinB interface is required, the' effect of cold depends on whether the' machine is designed to protect the operator from the environ]llent. For example, at 30 degrees Fahrenheit, a driver in the heated cab of a truck is perfectly effective. Total effectiveness of the system may be seriously hampered when the driver has to perform operator maintenance wnile exposed to the elements.

Snow acts as an obstacle of varying lJ1agnitude depending upon its depth and consistency. The farther north. we go, the more likely it is that snow will be so hard crusted so as to provide avenues of approach rather than serve as obstacles. Farther south, snow is, likely to' be present in softer, deeper' quantities, providing obstacles of karying magnitude more or less directly proportional to its depth.

There is no magically derived depth

Area of northern operations from Field Manual 3171 perspective focuses on north polar regIon obscuring inclusion of hIgh potentia~ ba,ttle areas

of snow for deflmtlvl' military con siueration. Most of our tactical whcelpd vehicles haw' udTiculty nCh'otiatinh' any depth of snow when travelmg off road. Most of our tr,t('k('d vchidl's do vpry well In up to approximately :Hl inche" of ,;now as Ilmg as ,I solid ba~l' eXIsts und('r tlll' ~now. Most of the timp, snow would prPSl'nt no grl'at obstack to llll'chanil.l'd lllf,llltry It the infantry l'ould always fight from within thpir "I'hid!'s and if thosl' units Wl'n' not h('avtl~' dplH'nd!'nt on whl'plPd v('hicks for r('supply. As long ,IS in fantry is r('quirl'd to IlIllVI' Oil foot across any p

MILITARY REVIEW

Land areas between 40 north latitude and ,he Arctic Circle include highly probable battle areas subject to winter warfare conditions .

,

jected to winter ~arfare conditions. Many historic ancl highly probable futurp battlegrounds lie between the 40th parallel and the Af(~tic Circle to include most of Europe and more than half. of Asia. Campaigns in the Ardennes during World War II and the Chosin Reservoir in Korea serve as dynamic examples of the effects of cold and snow well south of so-called cold regions of the world.

We should expect to fjght the first 'battle of the next war during winter because that is what our greatest potential adversary does best. Given

20

the Soviet Union's proven propensity for success in winter combat, we can reasonably anticipate an attack when snow and cold can be used to' best advantage. I

The next war has been advertised as a "como:: as you are" war, and ~ are to be expected to win outmanned and outgunned. If decisive battles of that war are fought during winter, we can expect opposing force equipment to function very well no matter how cold it gets. We can expect our own equipment to work very well within the norm'al temperature ranges of the

. .

probable battle areas. If the battleground is covered by deep snow, both sides will face the same mobility problems. Prime targets for air inter-di'ction will be the ;oad nets that both friendly and enemy forces are attempting to use for movement of vehicles either forward or to the rear.

A wintl'r environment tends to be an equalizer of combat power by placing the burden of fighting onto the dismounted infantry soldier. The Soviet army learned from bitter ex-perience . in Finland that when the snow is deep, maximum combat power forward often consist" mainly of in-fantry units trained to maneuver effec tively on foot. If German experiences in Russia during World War II are any indicator, the Soviets learned their le,;son well. .

Understanding that the weather itself is neutral-that is, its effects are felt equally by both Rides and that the advantage reRts with whichever side can best use the environment-when winter weather, particularly deep

snow, endangers the momentum of a Soviet advance, we can expect units to dismount and continue the attack on foot. We can expect the Soviets to use snowstorms, fog and darkness to in-filtrate regiments into a defender's rear to cut lines of communication, destroy command and control facilities and to attack front-line posltions from unex-pected directionR.

The Soviet Union apparently has standardized an extreme cold re-quirement for most of its war machinery. Tanb. sel1'propelll'd ar-tillery and other weapons and trc1l1sport Ipavl' assl'mhl.v lim's preparf'd for opl'rations in temperatures wl'll IH'low minus :,!;-, degrees Fahn'nhl'it. Thi" appears to hl'

21

WINTER WARFARE

a defense-oriented measure because while extreme cold temperatures can be expected within the Soviet interior, temperatures of bordering countries rarely drop to minus 2f) degreE'S Fahrenheit. That means our equipment will generally functj'~n as well as theirs on any battlef.ie~d where we are likely to meet.

Major Soviet advantages for winter. warfare exist in attitude and in training. Extensive winter training of ci a majority of Soviet forces appears to be more than a function of geographic location. It is a logical extension of an attitude that because the hostile winter environment has servea so well as an ally in the past, it should be used whenever posRible to gain and maintain advantage over any less-well : prepared enemy.

A common op1l1ion that people who art' born llnd live ('ut their liVE'S in a cold clitnate are better suited physically for cold weather warfare is a mvth. The human body does not accli~atize to cold in' the same way it do~s to heat. For example, the only measurable advantages an Eskimo posseSRes over an Arab for cold weather exposure are based on lifelong psychological conditioning and training. An effective winter Roldier dol'S not fear the cold, he respects it. He has learne,d to accommodate his way of living and fighting to it.

Cold can be an insidious enemy, wounding on contact and forcing the soldiE'r to take positive action merely to ['nsure hls own Rurvival. Snow can be an all'encompassing obstacle forcing f'xhausting energy expenditure for the simpll'st maneuvers. With proper con-ditioning, soldiers can be taught to use till' winter environment to great ad-vantagl'. Conversely, if winter is

MILITARY REVIEW

treated like another enemy. then we are forced to fight on two: fronts.

Training starts with attitude. All too often. US soldiers entering the winter environlTIent for the first time, regardless of civilian experience with winter. display fear symptom5 out of proportion to actual dangers. When queried as. to what portion of cold weather orientation they remember best. they often recall grizzly

photographs of the physical effects of frostbite on the human body. This is evidence that their training has had the same psychological impact as would. for example. orienting on physkal results of skiing accidents have on beginner ski instruction. The resulting induced fear inhibits effective learning.

Cautionary training certainly is necessary, but its positive value must

, always be placed in proper perspective. Effective eold weather training focuses on how we can make the environment work for us rather than on what it will

'; I 1/ 22

If

do to us if we i are careless. Once the need fQr more universal

winter training has neen recognized as a requirement in response to a real threat. several facts of life on the winter battlefield present themselves as worthy of consideration. Paramount among them are: The environment affects the way we move in a much more dramatic way than it affects the way we shoot ot communicate; the best

way to move about the winter battlefield is to fly over it; and light infantry is best suited for combat if\: deep snow.

Effects of cold and snow on materiel are well-established' and a5e reasonably predictable.' We know, ftr example, that dry cell battery power diminishes rapidly in the cold,. propellant charges burn more slowly, metal becomes brittle and bursting radii are diminished by snow. We know that a rifle brought into a warm tent will sweat and likely freeze up when reintroduced to the cold. Procedures

WINTER WARFARE

If ' .

23 .1

MILITARY REVIEW

and 5pe:::ial equipment where needed are standardized 'and elicit little con jecture or controversy.

Ground trafficability, on the other hand, is subi\ct to so many variables that its accurate prediction is often impossihle. Snow depth arid con-sistpnc'Y, ambient temperature, cloud cOWl', vpgetation, condition and type of pnrth bpneath the snow are a few of the variables.

Thpse variubles may all change several times in any given 24-hour ppriod. For example, tanks may find themselves hopelessly bogged down in 3 feet of snow, after easily plowing thl"llugh it for several hours, simply hpcausp a tempel'aturp rise of a few degl'pes has made the snow heavier and stickier. When that happens, fOI"\\ ard momentum of heavy units may be lost if they are not prepared to continue operations as light infantry.

InfantrY cannot man'euver effec-tively in deep snow unlpss it has been trained to use snowshoes or skis or both. Proficiency in the use of snowshoes requires very little training and practice. It is possible to issue snowshoes on the battlefield and pxppct an untrained unit tel be able to move short distances effectively. A relatively short period of training will allow it to fight and move longer distances with confidence.

Units on snowshoes cannot be ex-pected to maneuver successfully on the groui1d against ski troops. Skis are fasLer and 'less tiring to well-trained troops than are snowshoes. On the other hand, skiing skill is much more difficult to learn than is snowshoeing.

Reasonable proficiency on skis, even using the most modern equipment and teaching techniques, requires a minimum of two weeks' intensive

..

rt

:1 .

~ ... l'--J

24

training, followed by continued habitual use of skis for all field

_, training activities during Forces stationed in areas

winter. without

,ready access to snow-covered terrain i for at least four months each year , cannot expect to gain and maintain a : viable skiing capability. Attempts to

prepare units for winter exercises by conducting "crash" courses in skiing have proven themselves largely a wa;;te of time. These units are better off settling for the mobility limitations of snowshoes.

Mobility disadvantages of forces on snowshoe;; oppo;;ing ski troops can be partially overcome with an air assault capability. Theoretically, the best way to maneuver in deep snow is to fly over it. Air assault exercises conducted in Alaska during the past six years have proven that the helicopter provides very effective winter troop transport even in extreme cold. Air assault troops on snowshoes are at least as effective as ski troops so long as helicopters are able to fly and can place troops fairly close to objectives.

The primary disadvantage of relying on the helicopter for battlefield mobility is weather. During early winter months in Alm;ka, for example, flyable weather occurs during ap-

WINTER WARF'ARE

proximat~ly 65 percent of the time. Even a'ccou'nting for increased flying risk factors durin-g combat, vulnerability to ski-b'orne attack may be present during a significant period' of time. For that reason, Alaskan in-fantry units have not abandoned ski proficiency despite a strong air assault capab;lity.

If we accept the realities cif the most probable areas for future conflict, the capabilities of potential enemies and the kind of war we can expect to have to fight, we also should accept the fact that major battles may well be fought during the winter in an environment whi(ch will have a tendency to neutralize our mechanized mobility capability. We cannot expect to ignore that environment and "muddle through somehow" as' we have managed to do in past wars,

We need to train our units for winter warfare. Training needs to be more comprehensive than periodic exposure to large-scale ~ercises allows. Large exercises provide a high-level ap-preciation for winter difficulties, but allow very little opportunity for small units to develop solutions to those problems. The first battle of the -'come as you are war" had better find us prepared to fight it hip d'e.ep in snow. ""k

LlI'UtCllClllt LRlone! Rlchard A DIxon lb com mand,'r of th .. US Army Combat Developments ActIVit' (Alaska), Fort RIchardson, Alaska Oth('r ~s:;I#llmcnts held Within the actwlly have been m, dllef of matCrll'l d('[t'iopmt'llt and as chief of doctrme and or!:amzatum. He has par-tiCIpated In many tramUlI: exerCIse!! in Alaska and Canada and m a NATO l'Xl'rClSC in Nortlll'rn Nort('ay. He 'received a B S. {r..om the llnll'I'nlt" of Wl1 ... hl11,l!ton and an M .:1-1.A.S. from till' (l811('(;8C.

25

I .

J

Counteril)surgency t

In Rhodesia

Captain James K. Bfu,t~n Jr., US Army Reserve

The Rhodesian army h seen called the world's finest counterinsurgency force. Th ruthor had occasion to visit Rhodesia and study its mili ~y structure, training and tactics. His opinion is that hodesia has the necessary manpower to counter the insur ncy, but a shortage of funds limits the expansion of the training base and other programs. This article was witten in the fall of 1978~ Portions of the article may hav been overtaken by events suah as the change in 'gol'ern ,nts on,3i December 1978, but, on the whole, this pieee rep

THE Rhodesian army has, been called the world's finest counterin-surgency force. Although branded as an outlaw nation and constricted by United Nationsimposed trade sanc-tions. the Rhodesians have responded to the threat of a Marxist-directed terrorist war with determined resiliency and astounding ingenuity.

This nation's eclectic applications of the principles of war are embedded in the training system and reflected in tactical operatIOns. Rhodesia's im-provisations include the use of a hors~ mounted infantry unit, the deployment of austere bush wise, longrange tracking teams, insertions of quick-reaction forces in operational jumps, protected movement afforded by hideous looking, mine protected ar-mored vehicle::; and an assortment of locally manufactured weapons.

Rhodesia's counterinsurgency doc trine has' been influenced specifIcally by the army's experience as part of the British I Commonwealth forces in Malaya and, in general, by the study of revolutionary movements in Africa. This doctrine can be hroken down into six points:

Popular support or fighting a war for people, not for terrain. This i's sought through the maintenance of government services administered hy the Internal Affairs branch.

Protection of the populace from terrorist harassment through the es-

: tablishment of protected villages guarded by special guard troops.

Predominant reliance on local police intelligence and operations as the means of maintaining civil order.

Coordination of combined operations between civilian alld

. military services at district and

27

RHODESIA

provincial-level Joint. Operations' Centers (JOCs).

Continuous small unit tactical operations using observation posts, patrolling, ambushes and tracking con-ducted by highly mobile forces who spend extended periods in the bush .

Surprise cross border raids on terrorist. training camps within their ,;anctuary areas of Zambia and Mozambique.

Most significant in instilling the' tactical applications deriv\,d from the doctrine is the Rhodesian training system. This system generates a steady flow of officers, noncom-missioned officers (NCOs) and soldiers into the force structure while con-tinually advancing. their profes&ional development. A proficient leadership cadre is seen as an essential re-quirement in any counterinsurgency effort.

Critics who see the Rhodesian war as a racial struggle are often surprised upon discovering that three-quarters of the Security Forces are African, with blacks and whites fighting side by. side, and that most businesses, restaurants, hotels, discotheques and the national university are multiracial as well.' .

The majority of Rhodesia's African population of six to seven million are farmers and craftsmen living in the Tribal Trust Lands. The towns and cItIes support a growing. African middle class.

This group and the 265,000 Eu-ropeans, who have held key positions in the government, in the military and police units and in the commercial sector, have the capability of providing the social and political leadership needed to administer the country .

MIlITARY REViEW'

Soldiers seeking informatIOn from tribes-men In the Tribal Trust Lands

In March 1978, Prime Mini~ter Ian Smith, rppresenting the strongest par-ty of the European population" the Rhodesian Front Party, concluded a settlement with three of the moderate African nationaliRt leaders. These are Bishop Abel T. Muzorewa, the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole and Senator Chief Jeremiah Chirau who, 'With Prime Minister Smitn, form the provisional Executive Council. An in-terim government filled by both. African and European officials is preparing for nations,l elections scheduled in December. On 31 December 1978, power will be' transferred to a black parliamentary majority government. Rhodesia then will officially become Zimbabwe (5he traditional African name),

Opposed to the evolvement of such - moderate leadership with concomitant 'support of the wHites, the Marxist-directed Patriotic Front (PF), under'the doctrines of revolutionary warfare, has

28

......

been .conducting a campaign of terrorism and s\lbversion to gain

~cendancy within Rhodesia. Recent' targets of the terrorists have been the moderate blaek party leaders and their supporters.2

The importance of Rhodesia to the West is both moral and strategic. Morally, the realization of a mul tiracial government based on British parliamentary procedure and English common law, and committed to a liheral capitalist society, can serve as a needed model of stability and growth on a continent suffering from a shortage of democracies and an'excess of repressive one-party states ad-ministering stagnant economies:'

Strategically, Rhodesia is a minerally rich area contiguous to an even richer area, It is a leading

'supplier of asbestos, beryllium, chromium, copper, lithium, magnesium

. and nickel. It is a dagger pointed at the Republic of South Africa,. with its

,'"

strategic geographic sigmfieanel" as well as its resources of platinum, chrome ore, gold, diamonds. uranium and copper. Furthermore. both coun-triet, have vast food potential.

Rhodl'sia has become the prime target within the Soviet Union'~ strateg.v of "liberating" Southern Africa through the use of surrogate forces-namely, jndigenom; terrorist organizations such as the Patnotic Front and the SouthWest Africa Peoplr's Organization, trained und supported by advisers und technicians from Sovirt bloc nations and Culm.' Intelhgl'nce r

MILITARY REVIEW

biill'O Operations' Heaoquarter~ in S'ahshury descnbed the situation:

From UJ70 ()lllcards ZAPU played '11" part III tllfJ terronst Icar. They u"r(' III a state of' dl,array fol/o(('illg llzeir dI'Clsil'" ddeats It'itlllll Rhodesia, and thl'Y fool! Ihl' opportulllty ()( COil sohdatlll" Ih"lr poSltWII hy s(,lldillR thl'lr t.:rronsts. O(ltSU/C thi' (,Olllltry, Oil l'.ttl'lIdl'd "ours,'s to RUSSia. {uha. alld North Korl'a. TII/s sltuatwlI as n'"ards ZAP(l culltillul'd ulltll 1976. ZANU took tlillC out to 1'1" tIll 11 I< Ihe tacllcal

I miles of border: that with South /\frica, remained' that could be called friendly toward Rhodesia.

The ZANU, under the titular leadership of Robert Mugabe, a declared M",rxist, allied itself in 1976 with the ZAPU faction under Joshua Nkomo to form the Patriotic Front.

-" Chinese ad"isory and logistical ;;upport appears to have been withdrawn from Mozambique camps, if

"'\ not from Tanzania . .soviet, Cuban and,

30

"reportedly. East .German support r'e~'lins. ZANU camps are based in Mo ambique, while the ZAPU con-tinu(',' to operate out of Zambia and ,somettmeH Botswana. l !

The Patnotrc Front IS a marriage of conveniencl'. Thp Z/\PU derives most of its support from the Matabele tribal groups 111 the west, the ZANU frum the Mashona groups 111 the east. Both factions ,are wracked with internecinE' p.';..'er struggles.

At the time of this writing, the. Z/\ PC iH trying to expand its influence to tbe east'. and thp ZANU is pushing to thp west. /\rmed clashes between the two organi7ations have been reported. 1-'

Both terrorist leaders thus far have declined invitfltion to participate in the Decem ber elections. Nkomo and Mugabe are not interested in -power-sharing nor in black majority nile in and 'of itHl'If. \put, rather, in 10tal power with which to 'affect the revolutionary transformatIOn of society under their aegis. In free elections, many doubt whether Nk'omo and Mugabe together could win 15 percent of the vote, hence the resort to gunbarrel politics. -

Should international pressures cause the current governmental' structure of white and moderate black admimstration to collapse and the

Patriotic Front to assume power, the underlying tribal animosities could easily trigger the bloodiest con-flagration in Africa since the Nigerian Civil War.

The PF strategy is to undermine government control over the pop-ulation in three ways. First is dis-ruption of internal administration and governmpntal services. In the vast Tribal Trust Lands and African townships, health clinics, medical stations, local council offices, cattle dips and schools, as well as mis-sionaries, have been prime targets. I I Governmpnt spokesmpn acknowledge that while no part of Rhodesia has been given up, there are areas where the government has difficulty main taining its prespnce.

The second part of PF strategy is complete intimidation of thp populace through thp use of murder, mayhem and savagp barbarism. The terrorists seek to hide among the prople to recruit support and to r:esupply themselves. They attempt to neutralize government intelligence and anti-PF sentiment. The terrorist strikes, therefore, focus on "soft" civilian targets. One objective is to break down the traditional tribal authority, with its implied replacement, ultimately by some new form of social organization. The other objective is to demonstrate government inability to provide security.

While insurgent attacks on white civilian establishments, including In-ternational Red Cross teams, mis siqnaries and commercial airliners, receive most of the attention in the world press, around 90 percent of the terrorist victims are black.

Reports document mass killings of African workers, abduction of school

31

RHODESIA

children, incidents of enforced can-nibalism, the public torture and ex-ecution of village headmen and others randomly selected as "sellouts to the Smith regime," mining of civilian road traffic and urban terrorism. While an overwhelming majority of ,Africans resent tprrorist intrusions, many remain cowed by the terrorist threat.

The third part of PF strategy is to render the entire counterinsurgency effort of government cost-ineffective. Attaeks on farmers have caused ap-proximately 10 percent to abandon their farms.

Distribution serVices, affecting the sales volume of many manufacturlnR lIldustries, hal'e been severely curtailed as a re~ult of guerrilla activity .... DISfrlhu.(;/On MIS collapsed eompletely in much of the former sales area, causin;< a sel'ere cutback in turnouer and profit margins."

The decline in farming and com-mercial activity has reduced the government tax base, while the cost of fueling the military machine is in-creasing. The war effort, along with the economic sanctions, is costing Rhodesia over one million dollars a day.

The war against soft civilian targets has mobilized Rhodesia into an armed camp. Security alarm fences guafd farmhouses, police convoys protect vehicular movement in the countryside, women become adept at handling pistols and Uzi sub-machineguns and many camouflage-u.niformed soldiers remain armed while ih the otherwise normal-looking cities of Salisbury, Bulawayo and Umtali. Most men of the European 'population from 18 to 50 are subject to varying lengths. of military or police com-mitmenfs.

MllIT~RY REVIEW

RAR soldiers on patrol.

The SeeurIty Forces l'onducting the counterinsnrgency Inl'ludp roughly 40,000 persons in the air force, the poliee and the army, whose total strength apprOXllnate~ that of a full division. Thp army is composed of regulnr units and Territorial Army units.

The backbonf' of the counterin-surgpncy effort is represented by bat-talions . from two regulflr infantry regiments: the Rhodesian Light In-fantry (RLI) and the Rhodesian African Rlf1es (RAR). The entire RLI and most of the RAR are airborne qualified. Most European regulars-volunteers with cqntracts of three years "'or .more-are assigned to the RLl. Most African regulars are posted' to the RAR, Rhodesia's senio'r regiment.

32

The 1st Battalion, Rhodesian Light Infantry, is organized along com-mando lines. It consists of three company-size units called "Comman-dos" and a support group with mortar, reconnaissance and tracking detach-ments. Trairied to operate either as small teams, as separate comman-dos or as an integral battalion, the RLI has the general mission of following up suspected terrorist presence or of backing up other troops in contact.

Volunteers for the;'.RLI receiveJ,heir 16 weeks of recruit training wi~ilt the regiment and undergo continuous unit training within their respective Com-mando. Normally, RLf units spend a month to six weeks in the bush and 20 I days in their 'camp south of Salisb~ry . , for ret and retraining.

By lmj! standard, the Rhodesian

African Rifles is an elite unit. As there are on a weekly basis far more African volunteers than positions to fill, the RAR recruits are hand-picked. Six months of basic training- at the depot RAR in Balla Hana cover both conven tional and counterinsurg-ency'tactics intensively and extensively. The newly trained soldiers are assig-ned to sub-units witr.in the reg-iment.

A rigid selection system in the RAR produces candidates for junior and sl'nior NCO training- courses. Officer candidates are likewise selected from among the N'cOs. RAR units are farmed out to 'the operational com-mands for security missions, for seek-anddestroy operations or for areawide reaction force contingencies.

The Territorial Army corresponds to the' US' National Guard ot Army Reserves. It is filled by national servo icemen who, as opposed to regulars, enter the army with an ISmonth ini-tial commitment, followed by periodic callups thereafter.

Following four and a half months of basic training at Llewellin 'Barracks, the majority of these men are assigned to one of the battalions of the Rhodesian Regiment (RR) or to ~ndependent companies where they serve their mitial tour. Some are selected to servl' in a specialist unit or a Service Corps unit. COll\pleting their ISmonth requirement, the territorials are then assigned to a reserve RR battalion at a center near their homes where they train and serve during their callups.

The constant retraining and the maintenance of unit integrity results in a high experience level for the Territorial Army. The RR battalions now assume as active a combat role as do the regular battalions.

Specialist units, those with unique

33

RHODESIA

,

combat specialties, include the Rhodesian Armored Corps (RAC), the Artillery Regiment, the Grey's Scouts, the Selous Scouts and the Special Air Service (SAS). Formerly known as the Rhodesian Armored Car Regiment, the RAC fulfills an armored cavalry mission. It possesses. antitank capability and usually functions with its suhelements assigned to operational commands for task organization. The corps represents a unit approximately regimental size along with an armored car trammg center. Armored car operational techniques are influenced hy llS, British, German and South African doctrine and experience.

Officers, NCOs and soldiers of the RAC all have had infantry training, followed by armored car training in the

'corps depot. Drivers, gunners and vehicle commanders are cross-trained in others' skills and m vehicle maintenance as well.

.Particulars ahout most of the ar 'mored vehicles are classified. Generally, their design protects the occupants from mine blasts which damage little more than the tire.

As with the armored troops, the gunners of the 1st Field Regiment Rhodesian ArtillPry are trained first as infantry. Using SSmm gun howitzers and heavier pieces (which are classified), the batteries are oriented to both the conventional and counterin-surgency requirements.

The Grey's Scouts are a mounted infantry unit about battalion -size that specializes in tracking and pur~uit.l' Then' are few places in Rho~sia's highvcld and lowveld _ that horses cannot go, and horses are more silent than army lorries 'or land rovers.

1;he Grey's are deployed in the operational areas by squadron. A

MILITARY REVIEW

Selous Scouts tracking

squadron (roughly equivalent to a company) is made up of three troops (roughly equivalent to platoons), each with four eight-man sections. The Grey's Scouts consist of three "saber" (c;ombat) squadrons and a support squadron containing a. 60mm and 81mm mortar section, a recon-naissance troop and.a tracking dog troop using mostly English foxhounds.

With b~tter visibility and {aster mobility, an eight-man section can cover the same ground as a foot-bound infantry battalion. This section, working in two teams of four, can advance on a 550-meter front.

'Sometimes when closing in on fleeing terrorists, the Grey's radio for heliborne reinforcement of a "fire

34

force" for mopping up operations. Most soldiers in Grey's Scouts are

selected from recruits who undergo basic training with the RLI. They then receive 16 additional weeks oftraining, including . horsemanship, with the Grey's at Inkomo Barracks, north of Salisbury.

The Selous Scouts hf),ve become legendary during their short ex-iistence.'K They basically area 300-man tracking unit, about half African, half European, who can travel and survive in the bush for extended periods on limited rations. The Selous generally work from friendly lines forward. In pursuit of terrorists, they also radio for reinforcement, if required.

Their selection course is rough.

.f

Every eight .~onths, up to 400 trained soldiers may he screened to select about 100 candidates for the arduous truining course. Of these, only one-sixth will complete a four-week en-durance and survival course, with con-stant deprivation of food and sleep. Once in the unit. the men are prepared literally to follow terrorist spoor for -weeks on end in all types of Rhodesian terrain while living off the land.

The mission of the Special Air ~ervice is longMrange reconnaissance', generally far in front of and working hack toward friendly positions. Tht' SAS has an additional role as a quick-reaction forct' and the capahility for dirpct-action missions such as cross-border operations,

Modt'ipd upon the British SAS, the men of this unit t'xperience the most di',prsified trainiRg of men in any of tht' unit",. Initially, this includes static-line parachutIng. Ijght and heavy weapon trmning, hushcraft. first aid. communications, watermanship (handling canoes and boats) and minor SAS tactics_ Succpssful compll'tion of thp above just gt'ts the voluntper into the unit!

I

MILITARY REVIEW

Thn'" 01 tIll' mHJor JOCs eHc'h con troIs a quickrl'adion forl'l' enllNj a "fin' fonp." ])pscrillld by om' offic!'r as "OUI' l",,;t killing machinl'," thl' fin'

. forc,' ll'olllpnSIng n'glllm' ill' Territorial A rIll \. Ilmts I I" ,urdl'opPl'd and or air-I.lnd"d h.v 11l'1}('t'pll'r to i'einf!ll'cl' fon,ard units In "ontact and to pursue, hlol'!, ;Inri "10';,, WIth L"ITori"t forces.

TIlt' gtl\l'rnlll"nt h.}. ... count('rl'd the gLll'l'rilb pn'"l'lll''' hy till' ""tahhshn1l'nt tit prtlll,t"d \ lllagd.. wlthm tlll' If 1"('Il'd .lrl',IM. TIlt' vlllagtr,., rl'main in th,s, I,n,"dm cOlllpll'x,'''' undl'r a du,.,kttldawn "Ul'i'!'W TIll' vdlag"c an' jll't,,ttd h~' .1 (;uard Fort''' ullit and ,Idllllm"t,nd h~' InLPrnal Aff'lirs ad

Vl~l'rs \\'hl'l(, tl'l'l"Ilrt:-..t pn.':--l'IH'l' Ill' i.\Vl'IlUl';-;

til'

peded to train up to 3,000 students in 1978.

National servicemen undergo four and a half months of basic training at Llewellin Barracks. Those selected by a board the first week can go directly. into officer cadet or NCO cadet training. African regular recruits receive six, months of basic pt the Depot RAR, Balla Balla, where junior leader courses also are taught for privates and corporals to advance.

Rhodesian military training places emphasis in four areas: cJose-~rder drill, physical and mental con-ditioning, marksmanship and immediateaction techniques in con-ventional and counterinsurgency situations.

Grey"s Scouts

37

RHODESIA

In the British tradition, the Rhodesians see "square-bashing," or drill, as the foundation for discipline, esprit and leadership. The results from the parade field can be seen in the sharp appearance and impeccable military etiquette reflected throughout the army. .

The training for recruits and for officer and NCO cadets is rigorolls physically and mentally. A number of foreign. volunteers in the Rhodesian army, inc! uding sOIJle American Vietnam veterans, have failed to com-plete their initial training course successfully or have eventually "taken the gap" (deserted). Night-long land navigation. exercises, 15 to 20-kilometer forced marches over difficult terrain in

,

:! MdllTARY REVIEW

full l'omhat kit and negotiation of an a~~ault ('our~e of 12 or so obstacles, wlwre live fire, ~moke and sil'I\ulators add verisimilitude, servp to toughen ant! to in~till l'onfidpncp.

On the ritk range, each recruit fires 1'1 III to 1,IlOIl rounds to perfect his

mal'k~man~hip. The FN ~elfloading "Inl' i~ th" ~tandard infantryman's Wl'aIH>l1.

Sl'C'lI1g clasHica1. conventional war as tlll'ir longtl'rm threat, the, WlO(jpsians Hpl'nd 7() perl'ent of thplr trHlI1l11g timp on l'unventional tactics. Thirt~ pprc('nt goes to counlPrin-"urgc'IH',Y tactic's Counterinsurgency trall1l11g lIlc!uch'", study of terrorist 1,!('li,'s, patrolling, ambush, vehicular 1l1I)Vl'111l'nt in Hn operational nrea. org:ll1ll.:ltion oj' patl'lll hases, cordon :Inc! sparch opc'ratHlns, attack on t(,IT,)\'I,,1 ","I1P';, and muunted and dis Ill,,"nll'c! ('"unteramhush' techniques. FIPlc! I rai I1Ing ('x('rci~l's and "tactical ,'x,'n'ls;'" Without twops" rehear~e both ('on\ ,'nllon,d and counterinsurgency l!'('hni''1ul''' within a realistic Hcpnario.

Hlw

RHODESIA

NOTES \.

1 In Rhodesian parlance l/1e term Atncan refers to the indigenous black popuiallon The term European reters to the wtllle!> regardles!> 01 natlollal ongln 01 length of family duration ,n the country

') The terms 'terronst gueHllla and Insurgent arp u~ed Interchangeabl'!' In the RhodeSian context t;1lven the brutal attacks on cl\llhan~ to break down law and order the term terrOrist IS not misapplied

3 Some ,Of the Atncan state!> most VOCIferouS In their call lor one man aile vote black maJor I!,!, rule for RhodeSia are tho!>e ruled b,!, their armies and tho'i' w'lh pres, dents lor hie

4 The border alea betwpen Argola and South West Africa Which IS admmrstered bv the RepubliC at Snuth Africa IS the scene of another rnsurgen,,!, South AfTican forces and South West AtTIca People s Organization (SWAPOI terronsts baSed III AngOla are lOcked In conflrct over contrOl of the OvambO tflbal area See AI J Venter"

South Afnca vs SWAPO Terronsts So/(1Ier at Fortune November 1978

5 COunt Hans Hu,!,n RhodeSIa and Southern Africa DeCISion tor the Future of the Free World Jou!naf of ImeTnallona' RelatIons Volume III Spnng 1918 p 63

6 Among these was a farmer named Ian Smith who flew on the Rh9des,an Squadron of Ihe Ro,!,al A" r orce dunng World War 11 On on~ occaSion hiS Sp,t/lfe was Shot down behind German hnes In Ital'!' He lived for a time ""ltIl Italran parhSans then evaded through German POSitIons to the Amellcan Iones

7 I=or an account of the event'i leading up to the UOilateral Declaration of Independel'lce Irom the 8rrtlsh ~rewpOlnl see Robert 81ake A H,s/oIY of RI10desia Alfred A Knopf Inc N'f 1978

8 The sanct,nns had the reverse e"etl of compelling the Rhodec"ans to develop local mdus,y 10 manufacture what had been Imported From 1968 to 1976 the economrC InfrastflJcture 'itlengthened minerals. and food were e~ported and the economy c.ontlnued to e>

An Olfl Soldier

A YEAR AGO, when I accepted General Thurman's kind invitation to address , your graduating cljlss, I did not realize that it was ,to be my last major presentation before retiring from active duty. But, since it is, there are several things I want to pass on to you .

. Now, I know that I entered West Point as a cadet in 1935 before most of you were born, and I graduated from LeaveiIworth in 1948 about the time you were in kindergarten. You may well wonder what I could possibly have that could be of value to you. If you do have such thoughts, you would be one with the majority of Americans who are convinced that anything in ,the past is ancient history with no relevance to the present or to the future.

This article IS adapted from an address made by General Kerwin on 9 June 1978 at the USACGSC graduation ceremony

40

,-,.

AN OLD SOLDIER SPEAKS

Prior to his retirement after almost 40 years of military service, Army Vice Chief of Staff General Walter T. Kerwin Jr. shared some of his insights with the 1978 US Army Command and General Staff College class last June. In his graduation address, General Ker!pin discussed the value of developing perspective and prop'ortion in dealing with con-temporary problems. The valu'; of perspective allows us to see that many of our problems are not new and gives us insights on how to deal with them. Proportion allows us to view one' element or segment in relation to the other ele-ments or segments which make up the whole. The balance of these elements is very important, and the emphasis shifts rapidly to meet changing situations. The tools of perspective and proportion are invaluable in dealing with the problems of this complex world-now and in the futllre.

As a people, we tend to be future-oriented. While this does make for a dynamic and creative society. it also costs us valuable ,tools with which to deal with contemporary problems. These tools are perspective and pro-portion, and these are what I want to P&J3S on to you today.

This is a good time for you to receive these tools. You are arriving at that time in life where perspective and proportion become increasingly im-portant. Some have called the period you are entering the "mid-life crisis." Your life is beginning to take on a certain shape. Most of you have growing families. Your careers are becoming somewhat more fixed. For example, your graduation here today marks a midpoint in your professional military development.

Recently, I have had an opportunity to put perspective to good use. When talking to the new brigadier generals of our Reserve forces, I gave them a copy of an article on "The New Na-tional Guard." Although the article was written in 1892, it had a clearer,

41

more cogent rationale for today's Total Army than articles written five years ago.

Again, when talking to the new active duty brigadier generals, I gave. them an article about the "new" vol-unteer Army. It told of recruits from the disadvantaged sectors of our so-ciety who resented authority and were difficult to train and discipline. The interesting thing about this article is that it was talking about the Army in 1948 rather than 1978.

The value of perspective is that it allows us to see that many of our problems are not new. It gives us insights on how to deal with these problems and warnings of the probable consequences of failure to face and resolve problems as they occur. The article on the "new" volunteer Army of 1948 told what happened when these untrained, undisciplined troops were committed to combat in 1950-a clear warning to us today.

It is too early for you to put Leaven-worth in' perspective, but, from npr perspective of 30 years, I know that

MIlITARY REVIEW

Leavenworth is the most important school you will attend during your military careers. It is the most im-portant bec~use it has given you a set of proportions, the second tool I want to discuss with you today.

Until your arrival at Leavenworth, most of you had been too busy le'arning and practicing basic skills of your particular branch to concern yourself with larger issues. The Army revolved around the infantry, the ordnance corps or whatever was your primary specialty. In your assignments and your basic and advanced schools,. you were isolated from the rest of the Army.

During the past year, you have met and studied witn men and women from other branches, from other services and from other nations. You have seen your particular branch in proportion to the whole of our Armed Forces.

You have had an opportunity to see the Army~oportion to the other services and to the nation. You have gained an appreciation of the legit-imate role of the military in a free society. In your management studies and in your studies' of the budget process, you have seen the realities of civilian control of the military.

Leavenworth is unique among the Army's schools since it combines both

education and training. You will put the training you received here to imme-diate use. The education will continue to guide you throughout your careers. The proportion of the curriculum de-voted to education and to training has changed to fit the Army's needs time and again since the' turn of the cen.tury. It will continue to change in the future. This dynamism is what 'makes Leavenworth what it' is. As graduates, it will be your responsibility

I i 42

to 'ensure that Leavenworth continues to meet the ne~ds of the Army.

'Ailied with finding the prop,er pro-portions between education and training is the need to find the balance between military art and military science. In 1935, when he was chief of staff, General Douglas MacArthur wrote' a paper to the officers of the Army pointing out the need for both military art and science. He defined art as the strategies and tactics that had evolved over the centuries; science he defined as the' application of these strategies and tactics to new tech-nology. As Americans we are more comfortable with military science than with military art, but we ignore the lessons of history at our peril.

The very name of th.is institution gives us another set of proportions-the proportion between command and staff. Until you came here, many of you spent most of your careers with troops. After you leave here, the ma- . jority of your time will be with staff. Leavenworth should have given you an understanding of the fact that while the Army exists to fight, before it can fight it must first exist. If we do not have the staff to gain the funds, the equipment and the soldiers, we cannot have an Army in the field.

And, as Leavenworth has taugl.lt you, the Army in the field must find the balance between operations and logistics. They are interlinked and interdependent, and the -absence of either can spell disaster on the battle-

I field. ' The final set of propoitions I want

to leave with you is' the proportion between management and leadership." In today's complex Army, effective management is an absolute essential. We have borrowed many techniques

from civilian industry to improve 'our performance. We have made extensive use of computers. We can take great pride in the effectiveness of our re-source management. We must take care, however, that we do not get a false transfer of values.

Techniques that work well for the management of things may prove dis-astrous in the management of people. We must be constantly aware that the factors for which soldiers are willing to sacrifice their lives-morale, esprit, loyalty,' team spirit-cannot be quan-tified. Personal leadership is as nec-essary to today's battlefield as in any-time in history. While wars can be lost through lack of management, they can only be won through leadership.

As I said earlier, Americans tend to lack perspective. We also are uncom-fortable with proportions. We like cer-tainty. When confronted with alterna-tives, we want to concentrate on either one or the other.

But we do not have this .luxury. When you examine the proportions I discussed earlier-your particular branch versus the Army, the Army versus the other services, the Army versus society, education versus training, military art versus military science, command versus staff, opera-tions versus logistics and manage-ment versus leadership-you can see that the rear challenge is in finding the

AN OLD SOLDIER SPEAKS

balance between these alternatives. This balance if! constantly changing and shifting to meet new and different situations. It will take all of your skills to keep them in concert. :

In the 30 years since I graduated from Leavenworth, I have had the opportunity to use the tools of !per-spective and proportion many times. They have been most useful in dealing with the problems of this complex world.

Take these tools with you. As I look at the many challenges the Army faces today and the threats that our nation faces in this troubled world, I am sure you will find a use for them. As an old soldier, let me give you one other thing to take with you. If'you get nothing else from this college and what I have said to you, remember these four words: "Never forget the soldier. Never forget the soldier." Good luck and God-speed. "i..

General Walter T. Kerwm Jr., US Army. Retired. was u,ce chIef of staff of the Army from October l,974 untIL his. retirement in June 1978. He IS a graduate of the USMA. the USACGSC, the Armed FQrces Staff Col/ege, the Army War Col/ege and the NatIOnal War Col/ege. H,s actwe duty assIgnments mcluded serumg as commandmg general of the 3d Armored DlUlSlOn In Germany; Ithe II Field Force, VIetnam; and the US Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia.

India Chooses Ja~ircraft. The IndIan government has chosen the Bntlshmade Jaguar fIghter aircraft to replace Its aging fleet of Canberras and Hunters. Two hundred Jaguars have been. oraered from Great Bntaln. but It IS expected that a large portton of th~m will be bUIlt In India under 'lIcense, Jaguars won the chOIce in comp~tltton with the French Mlfage and the SwedIsh Viggen,

43

Changing '.Dimensions of Military Professionalism:

Education and Enlightened

Advocacy

Lieutenant Colonel Sam C. Sarkesian, US Army, Retired

STEEPED in the classic concepts of "Duty, Honor, Country," military professionals perceive the nature of professionalism as selfevident. Civilian scholars, on the other hand, differ in their interpretations and analyst!s. These varying nnd at times conflicting perspectives and assessments have been reflected in the literature, Yet few of these studies provide candid assessments of politics and professionalism. Those that do are influenced considerably by Samuel Huntington" The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politrcs of Civil Mihtary Relations, and the Garrison State thesis.'

Many political scientists, as well as civilian and military scholars of other disciplines, seem to presume that the military institution is separate from the political system except in an abstract sense. The military is said to be isolated from the mainstream of politics and political life, This view is reinforced by the idea, particularly among the civilian liberal oriented, that the military institution is fundamentally antithetical t.o democ~acy,

The frequent outcry that military men have no business publicly commenting on policy or becoming involved in "politics" is a further reflection bf this point of view. In no small measure, these views have influenced the scope of research on military professionalism-limiting it to internal military matters or tq broad dimensions of policy and civil-military relations, to the neglect of political attitudes, political roles and the politics of military professionalism.

I ThIS artIcle IS an abridged verslOni of the original paper presented at the Tactics/IUS Symposium at ,the Command and

: General Statt College >n March 1978

CopYright ,~, 1979 by lIeutenant Colonel Sam C Sarkeslan, US Army, RetIred

44 !.

PROFESSIONALISM

Those within the military view the military as a profession. l'et feu' studies pr,ol'ide candid assessments of politics and professionalism. The po/iticai dimension of the external environment in which the military must operate almost presupposes that the military be aware of and l'ersed in the \ political perspectiL'e surrounding them. The changed inter- \ national scene and the new technological age haue forced changes on the military establishment. Since World War II, for better or worse, the military has become a major political actor. The military ,professional becomes increasingly familiar with political and social intricacies as he moves to positions of greater responsibility. Higher education for the military professional ;n both Civilian institutions and service schools is probably the best way to develop the intellectual sensitil'ity and analytical insights he will need. The end result of this synthesizing should be a military professional who is able to understand and contribute more to the decision making process. While this enlightened advocacy may not prol'ide closer linkage betw.een military and civilian structures, if may help achieve an intellectual empathy and understanding within military and civilian circles. The military professional' should not "play politics" but must be fully l'ersed in and appreciaie the politieal system in which he operates.

This is a curious oversight. The importance of the political dimension seems clear in the light of the extetnal environment in which the military must operate, the nature and politics of the domestic political system, and organizational behavior and politics. The purpose of this article is to ex amine these matters and explore them with respect to their ramifications on military professionalIsm.

In this context, this article is based on two premises regarding the military profession. First, regardless' of the debate centering .around the status of the mIlitary as a profession, it is presumed that the military is indeed a profession. This presumes that it has the attributes generally associated with civilian professions. Additionally, the uniqueness of the military

45

profession is perceived to be based on three important characteristics: the coneept of ultimate liability, the state professi\>n relationship (that is, the state as'the sole client) and the concept of honor. Many of these matters have been discussed ir. detail elsewhere in the literature."

Second, military professional refers primarily to the officer corps. Regardless of the importance of the enlisted structure (to include quantity and quality): it is the relationship between the officers corps and the state that is fundamental to the nature of civil-military relationships. Indeed, it is the officers corps that sets the "pace," provides professional stand-ardsand creates the professional im-age. : Brore we explore the matters

MILITARY REVIEW

associated with the purpose of this article in greater detail, it is necessary briefly to examine prevailing political' perspectives and their consequences' regarding the military profession.

PREVAILING POLITICAL 'PERSPECTIVES AND THE MILITARY

The existing political and social environment in the Unitcd States has created an ambiguous context and contradictory' directions within the military. On the one hand, a liberal traditional alliance has articulated a narrow professional dimension while, on the other hand, thc political and \ocial demands require a more flexible and intellectually broadened military professionalism. The military professional, imbued with the idea of a traditional and narrow professional focus, is thus placed in an environment that demands much more than professionalization can provide. As a result, there has developed an am biguity of professional purpose and an increasingly indistinct professional identity. '

The liberal-Traditional Alliance

A narrowly defined military professionalism confined to purely. military matters serves a particular ' purpose. Fo'r the liberal political heritage, it ensures (presumes) civilian control and a nonpolitical military. For the traditional military orientation, it ~nsures (presumes) a total focus on specific military skills and training as the proper career orientation. The con-

46

sequences of the liberal-traditional alliance -constrain' the military professional from developing a broad intellectual awareness of the political-social environment in which he must operate while insisting that be in-tensely and solely i concern hImself with immediate pr~blems of a clear military content.a I

Our argument rejects these perspec-tives. The' politics of the military, politics of war and the issues of democraQY and the military require a , heightened intellectual and political

perspec~ive and an expanded dimensi~n to military profes-sionalism." These distinct, yet interre-Jated elements of professionalism not only affect: military posture, but are necessities' ~f strategic requirements of the 1980s. ,I

I Military and Politics

The post-World War II period, a vastly dhanged international en-vironment 'combined with the new technological