military review september 1961

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, iIi t a r y ~f MI Ni ~ ~ e v i e wi ~ S Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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. Mission-Type Orders The Red Army s Role Management or Command

Septembe f61


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UNITED STATES ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COL EGE

FORT LEAVENWORTH KANSAS

COMMANDANTMaj Gen Harold K. Johnson

ASSISTANT COMMANDANTBrig Gen Harry J. Lemley Jr.

DEPUTY ASSISTANT COMMANDANTCol Edward Chalgren Jr.

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JlILITAltY BEVIEW-l'ubliohed _nth y by U. S, A...,. Command o,nd General Stall, C Ioge, "l) Ill~ w o r t ; h j . Kansas. in EnJ&h. Spanish, and f o r t . u l ' U ~ Second-c1ass- .posta#e patd ,tTi)"CLl t ~

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EDITOR IN CHIEFCol Kenneth E. Lay

ASSISTANT EDITORLt Col Jerry G. Wallace

FEATURES EDITORLt Col Cleo S. Freed

SPANISHAMERICANEDITORt Col C. BetancesRamirez

ASSOCIATE E I T ~ RLt Col Daniel E. HalpinU. S. Army War College)

PRODUCTION OFFICERLt Col Louis Ruiz

STAFF ARTISTCharles A. Moore

The Military Review, aublication of the UNITEDTATES ARMY provides a.rum for the expression ofilitary thought and a meium for the dissenIinationArmy doctrine of the di. ion and higher levels.The VIEWS expressed ini magazine ARE THEUTHORS and not neces

i y those of the Army ore United States Army Comand and General Staff Col-

SEPTEMBER 96 NUMBER

ONTENTSMission-Type Orders 2Gen B) uce C. Clarke, USAA New Dimension inSpecial Operations . 4Anthony HarriganThe Red Army s Role inBuilding Communism 10Walter Darnell JacobsThe Armed Forces of Japan 20

Maj Edgar O Ballance, Te) ritorialArmy Great BritainMcmagement or Command? 31Lt Col David M. Ramsey, Jr., USATeaching Military Science 40Capt James E. Smith Jr., USAWar Rockets-FromAncient to Operational 45

Peter-Christoph StormSwedish Total Defense . . 53Col Sam Myhrman, Swedish ArmyGuerrillas Without Morale-The White Russian Partisans 64Col William A. Burke USARommel at Theda 72Col Herman W. W. Lange, USAAir Defense and theArmy National Guard 85Maj Warren K. Wells, USANGCivilian Role in AntiguerrillaWarfare 91Maj John B. Bellinger, Jr., USAAfrica, Proposed Military

Alliances 95Military Notes 99Military Books 108


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I US eGse EXTENSION COURSEi The U. S. Army Command and General Staff College Exiiten ion Course, with two options, combat or logistical, is based

~ U t the resident Associate Course presented during the curhen school year. There are 22 subcourses ommon to each oph i O l with three additional subcourses dealing with advancedleon lat operations in the combat option, and three sub courses

~ ' e ,ing lal'ge-scale a d m i ~ i s t r a t i : e sUPPOlit in the logis.tical oP-.lt1 1 A student who satIsfactonly completes one optIOn maylihc study the other.

ELIGIBILITY: Commissioned officers of all components'of i:\C Army who have completed the advanced or associate adivan,ocd course of their branch school, the advanced branch'icouJ'se of a USAR school, the 50-series or advanced extensionlcol1!'se of their branch school; commissioned officers of any comjpO!wnt of othel' services if deemed qualified by their particular!sen"ice; or civilians employed by Department of Defense i f

f itheit' duties require knowledge of material taught in this 'course.ENROLLMENT: Applicants should submit DA Form 145,

rArmy Extension Course Enrollment Application" throughfltheir commanding officers and appropl'iate branch schools to" USA CGSC, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.ij

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Mission-Type OrdersGeneral Bruce C. Clarke. United States rmy

N World War II. those who served in armored divisions and probably inother units as well learned that mission-type orders were a requirement if themost was to be obtained from a command. Since then. we have had to considerthe control of operations in the fluidity and unpredictability of nuclear battle.As battle becomes more complex and unpredictable. responsibilities must bemore and more dcentralized. Thus mission-type orders often will be used atall echelons of command and probably will be the rule at the division and higherlevels. This will require all commanders to exercise initiative. resourcefulness,and imagination---operating with relative freedom of action.

In our tactical forces we have u i l t ~ i n organizational flexibility. We mustrecognize this and capitalize on it in our orders. To get maximum combat power.we must have plans flexible enough to meet rapidly changing situations. butcareful planning is not enough. This must be coupled with the readiness tochange and adapt to situations as th y a ~ e not as they were expected to be

To train commanders and staff officers for operations in war. where missiontype orders will be widely used. it is necessary that tactical courses in ourschools teach the use of such orders. and that we widely employ mission-typeorders in our peacetime operations.

Basically. a missiontype order needs to cover only three important things: t should clearly state wbat the commander issuing the order wants to

have accomplished. t should point out the limiting or control factors that must be observed

for coordinating purposes. t should delineate the resources made available to the subordinate com

mander and the support which he can expect or count on from sources outsideof his command.

There is a strong reluctance at every headquarters to relinquish the autl}ority to direct the details of an operation. This reluctance is clearly seen in theembellishments added to an order as iF threads its way down to company level.Careful judgment must be used at every echelon of command in stating thelimitinlf and control factors in a mission-type order. Confidence must be placed

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the Judgment and ability of the subordmate commander. Too often, whatstarts out as a broad mission-type order at a high echelon ends up with voluminous, minute, detailed, and restricting instructions specifying how to get thejob done when it finally gets down to company level.

Many officers hearing this may think they would like to have a commandfunctioning under such a system. Others who may say they would like to workunder such a system really are disturbed by the thoughts of it. There are someofficers who require something in writing before they will take significantaction

A mission-type order requires the subordinate commander and his staff tomake basic gecisions and plans based upon a careful analysis of the situation.f the basic decisions or plans are not successful, there is no paper foxhole intowhich they can crawl. Mission-type orders require initiative, promptness, andresourcefulness which are not always forthcoming. Problems in service schools,based upon such orders, bring forth a variety of solutions which are difficult forthe faculty to grade. This sometimes looms as a very important problem.

I have said many times that a commander has two channels within which tooperate. He has the channel of command and the channel of suggestion. Ibelieve that a good commander who has subordinates who are trained and havethe confidence to use mission-type orders can operate almost exclusively usingthe channel of suggestion, reserving the channel of command for use onlywhen he wants to give special emphasis to an order, to relieve someone, to takedisciplinary action, or like cases.

I went to Leavenworth over 20 years ago, so it is difficult for me to rememberall the things which I must have learned then at the Command and General StaffSchool The one thing that I have never forgotten and which has stood me in goodstead was the teaching of General McNair, then Commandant, when he stated:

When you ,eeeive an order or a direetit e from your ne.,t higher commander,o eVr1ything you can and in the best way you can to further the mission which

. he ,cants to accompz.ish.An officer who follows this advice will find that he can act promptly and aggressively with confidence. He will have no problem in operating in an environ

ment of mission-type orders.General Bruce C Clarke is Commander in Chief, United States

Army Europe. He has commanded the United States Continental ArmyCommand and the 7th United States Army Europe. This article is an.,cerpt from a talk delivered at the U S. Army Command and GeneralStaff College in June 1961.

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IINEW DIMENSION INSPECI L OPER TIONS

Anthony Harrigan

The pieR s expressed in this ar-ticle aI e the author s and not nec-essarily those of the Department ofthe Army 01 the Un; te StatesA,.,l1Y Command and General StaffCollege.--Editor.

WIT special operations destined to play an increasingly important part in the Nation's defensepreparations, the time has come toconsider the potential role of nuclearsubmarines in support of such operations.Defense planners recognize that nuclear-powered submarines equippedwith ballistic missiles are a majordeterrent to Soviet nuclear aggression. It also is known that nuclearsubs are a highly effective counterweapon against an attacking submarine force. But the relation of nuclearsubs to Special o r c e s-unconventional warfare units-has been generally overlooked.

This oversight is remarkable, forit is evident that raiders operatingfrom nuclear submarines could playan itnJlortant role in conflicts of the

future. The unconventional warfarecapability of the Army could be enhanced by subs available for lightningraids and other duties.

Through use of nuclear submarinesfor transporting antiguerrilla forcesit would be pOssible to achieve themaximum in secrecy, surprise, selfsufficiency, mobility, and ease of penetration into an enemy s coastal areas

President Kennedy has c Iear I ystated that Special Forces are to playa larger part in possible conflict situations in the years ahead. Whether thesituation is an undeclared conflict between Free World forces and Redvolunteers on the coast of Africa, aconventional World War II-type struggle in Southeast Asia, an all-out nu

clear attack, or another Korea, SpecialForces will have a big job to do.Among miSSIOns that they might beideally suited to perform are destruction of submarine pens that are im

mune to air attack, capture of communication facilities, rescue of anti-Communist leader from enemy territory,landing of guerrilla and psychologicalwarfare teams, seizure of mine con-

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irol units at harbor mouths, secretemplacement of nuclear devices andsmall missile launchers on remotecoasts and islands from the tropics tothe polar regions, and landing of unitslor infiltration of the enemy s rearareasFrom the American Revolution to

the Civil War and down to WorldWar I I and Korea, guerrilla operat Ons have been of real significance.llany of these guerrilla strikes alsohave involved amphibious opel ations.n the last war, Army rangers proceeded to their destinations aboard,urlaee ships. But World War II-typerangel operationB re no longer fea-ible n many parts of the world be Ulise of effective radar warning netsand other detection systems. The neressity of recovering raiding. p rtiesafter a strike, plus the need for secrecy, renders airdrops unsatisfactorymsome f ltuations. Ail tr nsports c n-not venture 0 vel enemy territorywithont revealing the existence of anoffensive mission, thereby attractingthe attention f the enemy.Speed and SecrecySlow speed and limited carryingcapacity of conventional diesel-powered submarines disqualify such craftfrom widespread use for raiding parhes of Special Forces in the future..The nuclear submarine could be theanswer to some of the needs of SpecialForces. With high underwater speed

and sustained performance withoutthe need to surface, a nuclear Rubma-Anthony Harrigan is DiI ector, For-ign P a l i y Research Institute ofSoulh Carolina. Educated at KenyonCol/elle and the University of Vil -

gillia, he salt sen ice in World VUI'fl He IS a frequent contributor toiIi t a I y iournals both here andabroad . I ISeptember 1961

rine can proceed to a target area asfast as the newest destroyer in anyfleet. Moreover, it can accomplish itsj 0 u r n e y in complete secrecy-notshowing so much as a radar mast. fintereepted on the surface after putting a party of raiders ashore, it candive and outrun the fastest trackingvessels. Of major importance in thisera is the fact that it is not susceptible to nuclear retaliation, being ableto take its contingent of raiders farbelow contaminated regions to an areafree of lethal radioactivity.

In considering the value of nuclearRubmarines as transports for raiders,it should be borne in mind that guerrilla forces operating in remote areasrequire support if their effectivenessis to ,Continue over a long period. Nuclear submarines are superb vehiclesfor supply and reinforcement in oceanic and coastal areas. For example,they could shift guerrillas from pointto point in a coastal area. Anotherconsideration is that guerrilla forcesare most effective when they are adequately controlled by the over-all command. f such forces could maintaincontact with the area command via asubmarine moving swiftly along acoast, the effectiveness of com b tunits would be greatly increased.uture Conflict SituationsConflict situations in wars of the

future in the so-called underdevelopedareas 01 the world are apt to be extremely fluid. Well-defined com b tzones may not exist. The struggle isike y to be sporadic and involvewidely separated control points 01 in,

stallations of strategic importance. Iffor instance, an enemy were to construct concrete submarine pens nearthe mouth of the Congo River on theAfrican coast, a full-scale invasion ofthat territory in all likelihood would

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NUCLE R SUBS

not be attempted simply to llchievetheir destruction.

Indeed. it might be undesirable toemploy nuclear weapons against thepens because of unwillingness to bringthis class of weapon into the conflict.or because of a desire to avoid resent-ment on the part of the populationof the area.

Under these circumstances, destruction of installations might have to be

attempted by a raiding party. f thehigh command were to avoid sacrificing the raiders, it would be necessaryto provide them with complete concealment in approach and a way ofwithdrawing f t e r accomplishingtheir mission, The only satisfactorytransport for a raiding party in this

case would be araiders, and therebytected.ntiguerrilla Operations

and South America,parts of the Fl eerecognized. After an

nuclearthat could wait offshore after

The possibility that the enemywill employ submarine-bornealong the exposed shoreline ofas wellWorld,attack the

ing party could return to their m thelcraft, move off, and mount an ss ulon another target.

In tracking down sucb groups, thlbest counterforce would be an ntiguerrilla force operating from a nuclear submarine. Use of paratrooper,against such an invasion force woull

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U NanThe nuclear powered submarine USS eorge Washington underway in Long lslancSound. A nuelear submarine can proceed to a target area with underwater speed af st s the newest destroyer in any fleet.

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e less effective because they wouldbe pinned to land while seaborne raid-ers can leave and strike other points.

he use of nuclear submarines insupport of an Army special warfaremission also might include seizure ofislands for weather stations (in theIndian Ocean, for example) or landing of demolition parties to blow updams and locks. But the most impor

ventional surface ships and conventional land forces.ubmarines in the rcticBut the nuclear submarine can bethe means of breaking into this privileged domain. Thousands of miles ofSoviet arctic territory now can bepenetrate i with ease by nuclear sub

marines operating beneath the once

US avyThe V argo surfaced through the ice at the North Pole. Nuclear submarines couldbe the means of breaking into th o n e ~ p r i v i l e g e d domain of Soviet arctic territorytant area of operations might be alongthe Soviet Union's arctic coast.

The arctic is the most vulnerablearea of the Soviet Empire. Of the40 000 kilometers of Soviet coastline,24.000 are in the arctic. This is thezone that the Soviets long have considered secure against land or navalattack because the frozen area cannotbe penetrated conveniently by con-September 96

protective shield of ice. Polar airbases.radar warning stations, and the industrial and power com pIe x s ofnorthern and Siberian Russia are exposed to attack by raiders.

Protected by ice overhead, nuclearsubmarines can move into these vitalregions. By firing a small charge, asubmarine could shatter the ice ceiling. The noise of the explosion, heard


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NUCLE R SUBSby the Soviets, undoubtedly w.ould beconsidered the hreakup of an icebergor strip of an icefield. The resultantpip on a radar scope could well beinterpreted as a pressure ridge shattering the ice and forcing it high intothe air. In other words, identificationa f sue h submarine breakthroughswould be almost impossible becauseof the frequency of natural phenomena that have the same characteristicsas a submarine surfacing.

From these nuclear submarinescould emerge Special Forces. Thesecould be equipped for sabotage, eitherfor military or industrial effect or fordemoralization of the civilian population. They could abduct enemy offi-cials, or act as espionage g e n t s,guerrillas or underground resistanceliaison teams. Equipped with conventional weapons n d nuclear-armedmissiles, these Special Forces couldopen up another war front-a.hit-andrun campaign from submarines. Reconnaissance missiles also could beused for obtaining information on industrial facilities deep in Siberia andAsiatic Russia.Arctic WarfareSpecial Forces aboard submarinescould explqit the Soviets great fe r -that of a revolution of the restless,resentful peoples in Siberian territories. The result of the use of suchSpecial Forces would be a maximumwar advantage at minimum cost inmen and materiel.

That this kind of war could befought on the top of the world isclear. Sweden, for instance. is basingmuch of her land defense effort on theso-called jagars men trained to defend regions of that country abovethe Arctic Circle. The jagars continually hold maneuvers in the frozenwastelands even sleeping in the snow.

,.Perhaps the most important feature

of arctic operations by submarine.based Special Forces would be that itwould carry war to the enemy s Ownterrain-something the enemy mostwants to avoid.

Submarines were used for a largenumber of unconventional missions

pivicrinphoofb rGe.piO

during World War II. They made;many evacuation runs removing keymilitary personnel and bullion frombesieged Corregidor and Bataan. Theyalso delivered medical supplies, food.and ammunition to the defenders. Thesubmarine ea W I t for instance.transported 37 tons of .50-caliber ammunition and brought out 25 UnitedStates aviators along with submarinespare parts and other equipment atManila. The submarine Trout carriedout two tons of gold, 18 tons of silver.and five tons of negotiable securities.

During the Solomons campaign, thesubmarine Amberjack delivered aviation gasoline to Tulagi and engagedin photographic reconnaissance ofbeac hes marked for amphibious landings.

Throughout the war in the Pacific.submarines formed the so-called Life

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guard League, rescuing 504 airmen 'tmshot down at sea. The Harder went atlinto shoal waters of Woleai Sualdn .ar'and brought out a pilot by means of pIcrewmen in an inflatable rubber boat. IVa conoIling organ is unique to the busiellS community. Peter F. Drucker inis book, The Practice o anage-

il ent states that management is thearu pecific organ of the business enterve rise. t differs from all other govm rning organs of all other institus ions even such other organs as seem

or ot unlike the management of a busior oss enterprise. In other words, manter gement per se is the management Qfal business enterprise. The aim of cidian business is economic perform

nee and . management must always,n every decision and action, place I onomic performance first.m Military command on th otherd and is concerned primarily with na

ed ional security; economic considerael ions are of secondary importance tohe t. Economic aspects of military deisions' may have a modifying effectl those decisions ut they should- ever be the basis for them. Consid

01 rations of national security aloneust be the basis for military dec iions, and any other basis representsbetrayal of the Nation's trust. Conly, if management is concernedily with economic results, itbe an appropriate activity ofi1itary command in discharging itsesponsibilities for national security.ertoncommercial nstitutionsle Can the administration of any greatoncommercial institution---e h u r c h,

d overnment, or army-be rooted in aof esire to economize, or in economical erformance? Certainly not. Unlike0 hese institutions, the business enter

rise exists for the sole purpose ofd roducing economic goods and serv ' ces. Prop.erly, it alone is managed.ll eltember 96

Peter F. Drucker also makes thepoint that the business manager hasan entrepreneurial function whichcorresponds to the function of devising s t r a t e g y ~ ' in the military or topolitical decision making in government. These functions are very different, and this fact makes a profounddifference between command and management.

Performance in all organizations ismeasured against results. This is another way of saying that evaluationis made in terms of accomplishmentof objective. That the objectives ofbusiness, government, and the military differ widely from each other isself-evident. Therefore, the results desired in one of these enterprises arequite logically unlike those desired inthe other two. Performance and itsresults together determine what shouldbe done, and even-to a large extent-how it should be done.Here, then, in their vital nonadministrative roles, command and management part company. Methodologies andtechniques useful to one are not necessarily appropriate to the other. tcould hardly be otherwise, when thepurpose of one is economic performance, and of the other, success in war.rmy ManagementThe creation of the military comp

troller function and of the Army Command Management System (ACMS)was justified by th i r proponentslargely on the basis that administering an army is in many respects similar to the management of a civilianbusiness. In terms of resources used,the Army is admittedly very muchlike the biggest of big business. Thusthe rationale for application of business methods and techniques to military organizations is established. Andthis doctrine is reasonable, so long as

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MANAGEMENT OR COMMAND?

these methods and techniques are applied to the business end of militaryactivity-budgeting' and accountingfor men, money, and materials.However, the concept has grown farbeyond its original meaning. Now, in-stead of effective command, dynamicmanagement has become--for manytheorists-the panac.ea for all militaryills. f Drucker is right-and there isgood evidence that he is- the militaryis being forced to pay increasing at

tention to economic performance, asecondary consideration, at the ex-pense of national security, its primary and overriding concern.

f business management were iden-tical with military command or withthe administration of church or gov-ernment, it could be inferred that theknowledge and skills of one are transferable to the others. However, bylogic and the record, such interchange-ability is unlikely. Administrativeskills may be transferable, but theyare secondary elements in achievingthe objectives of the noncommercialinstitution.

ommanders Not ManagersWe have had many governmentleaders and military commanders whow r poor Hmanagers, but ,,,hoseplaces in history are rightly determined by the wisdom of their politicaland military decisions, not by theirmanagerial abilities. History recordsnumerous instances of top-drawer menin one field who failed miserably inanother. Is this so surprising, con-sidering the wide gulfs between po-litical, military, church, and businessobjectives?

Perhaps the most significant difference between command and management occurs with respect to theauthority that each possesses. Com-mand. presupposes authority, with its

disciplinary prerogative. Managemendoes not possess such power-a facthat must not be forgotten when busl'ness management practices are considered for military adoption.Business management's authority ilrestricted to that necessary to dis.charge its ~ c o n o m i c responsibility. texercises authority over individuals

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aonly in their roles as members of the slbusiness organization. While m a n a g ~ coment da res not ignore its responsibil.ities to society, it has no authorityover the individual except in conneetion with performance on the job.Moreover, such social authority asmanagement may have over individuals must be shared with other groups.

The authority of command, however, goes far beyond any suchstriction. t transcends control of performance on the job. t is a full timeauthority encompassing every facet 1a soldier s existence-his ability, tentiality, professional knowledge, personal life, and, in time of war, hiphysical survival. t is a total author.ity, reaching to a depth far beyondthat of any other secular power. o r ~over, most significantly, all of this authority is solidly founded upon lawand tradition-law and t r a d i t i onwhich do not apply to business management.The Question of Leadership

t is sometimes argued that military command, based as it is on au-thority, is no Ion g e r adequate todirect military affairs in their present (day complexities. This argumentsupposes that reliance on authority.with its related concepts of subordination, obedience, and discipline, nolonger satisfies the requirements 1mod rn society, particularly whenthese are viewed in light of OUf present knowledge of human motivation

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M o l t i V ~ L t i ( m is to a great extent theconfronting leadership, irreof kind of organization. Yeta vital difference between

li lcODllnallU and management in this areaOne can never lose sight of thethat the military is subject toand strains which are not enin any other institution.

command is charged with theresponsibility of subjectpossible death in war. Nocom.pal,able responsibility is t h r u s t

Business management and militarycommand are both copcerned with theelement of time---present and future.But here again there is an importantdifference, although it is perhaps buta difference in degree or emphasis.Management continuously plans forthe future while k e e p in g a handon current performance. Long-rangeplanning is indispensable, yet currentoperations must provide satisfactory

economic results-or else there maynot even be an organization to managein the future.

Men cannot bethe f ce of enemy

must be commanded.nol a n a ~ r e n l e r l t is surely appropriate ~

O I . ' ~ u , u U J , e S l t u a t l O n ~ , but it is conspicuand ineffective on thes Mttlefiel :I There, greater responsibilrequires greater authority.

ime and the ilitaryMilitary command is also concerned

with both present and future butrarely with both at the same time.Today, the military is engaged in heing prepared for war should it come.There is really no other basis on whichto justify a military force in peace

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MANAGEMENT OR COMMANDtime. In effect, in peacetime there isno present justification for the military; there is only a preparation forthe future-for war itself:In war itself there is only the shQrt-est of a short-range future. Victoryin the briefest possible time is thecompelling objective. In war, then, itis the present time with which themilitary is 'concerned, and not the future. Success (victory) in the presentis the only foundation for a future.

In reflecting upon the validity ofthe term manaoement in its applica-tion to nonbusiness organizations, onemight consider the case of civil gov-ernment operations. Seldom, if ever,is the administration of a governmentagency referred to as management.Invariably, the term used is public ad-ministration. One good reason for thisis that management pertains to a business enterprise, not to a political body.Does it not follow, then, that manage-ment is an equally inappropriate termto apply to the military, which is asubsidiary of government? In this con-text milit ry administ1 alion is surelya far-more accurate term to use thanmiNtary management.Logic dictates the exclusion of theword command from civilian industryeven though many military principleshave been applied to business enterprises-such as the generally acceptedline and staff concept. Similarly, itwould be reasonable to exclude thebusiness-enterprise t e r m s manage-ment and manager. f r o m militaryterminology.Military dministration

There is no intention here of imply-ing that military command is a pecul-iar institution set wholly apart frombusiness i n s t i t u t i o n ~ On the contrary.the administrative similarities of business and military organizations are

probably more noteworthy than thedissimilarities.

Yet the differences, although admittedly few, "make all the difference.Differences in roles and purposes, Iderivation and degree of authority. Iresponsibilities, and in time p e r s p ~tive have been mentioned here in ordel' to establish and emphasizil tiefact that military command and business management are not identicalspite their many similarities.

It is time that the term "militalfcommand" be restored to its forme;traditional position of honor. Tradl'tion itself, incidentally. provides'powerful reason for so doing. Tradl'tlon does not consist in blind adherence to the past, but in retention 01those practices, customs. or institutions which have time and time agaltinspired contemporary man to greaterheights of achievement.

The traditional military command.with its few renowned and countieSunsung heroes serving as omm nder has led American fighting men to til'umphs pnder pressures of responsibIl-ities unequaled in any other walk 01life. Can the same be said for management and managers? Does a powerful tradition of management ex.;at all?The Tradition of CommandWhy, then. do we deprecate the concept of military command? Why drwe seem to have such a sense of lliliin espousing this traditional idea'Why has the word management infiltra ed to the point where We now spealof "military managers." "mili ar,management." "command m n g ~ment." and the like in lieu of the previously respected commander and hI>command?

Without question. civilian indus "and . its management process haveMilitarlRevill6


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much to offer the military, particularlyin the personnel and logistics fields.Moreover, it must be acknowledgedthat teqhnical service installationssuch as arsenals, where manufacturin is a major activity, come veryclose to being business ente rprises inevery sense of that term. In thesecases the application of proved management techniques to the military activity makes good sense. Nevertheless,even in these limited instances, man.gement is not and can never be anequivalent of or a substitute for authoritative command.The real danger, n the currenttrend of imitating business methods

in the military, lies in the temptationto apply them to tactics and strategy,for which tbey were never intendedand where they have little or no chanceof working. t is easy to criticize present military performance on an economic basis, since military forces areessentially nonproductive segments ofnational life. t is far more difficultto foresee the requirements of thebattlefield of the future, and the prep'aration necessary to meet those requirements.he Present DangerCan there be any assurance thatpresent emphasis on military management. in preference to military command, will contribute to a more adequate national defense? Or is there ahidden danger that we will become sopreoccupied wi t h efficient management, business style, that we will losesight of the critical objective-preparation for successful waging of war?There isn't even any assurance thatefficient business management ndproper combat readiness are necessar

ily compatible. The management experts would have us believe that theeptember 96

military has been shamefuny inefficient and wasteful in the past for lackof attention to sound managerial practices. Yet with nonmanagerial practices we have been successful in war.t is, after' all, the payoff that counts.One must keep in mind that waris wasteful and destructive, and that

military forces are ecohomically unproductive. Consequently, undue preoccupation with economic efficiencywould seem to provide doubtful readiness for uneconomic war. That oneadversary may have the best managed military force structure in theworld is little consolation if the otheris victorious in war. Superior strategy, tactics, strength, and leadership,developed in arduous combat-orientedtraining over the years, will continueto win wars, irrespective of the economic efficiency of the forces involved.Combat eadershipEffective combat leadFrship is fundamental to the succeSsful prosecution of war. Such leadership in theArmy requires insPiratjonal directionof men on the battIefie d. The leaderfocuses on the m i l i t ~ y objectivewhich may be a piece of terrain, abody of enemy troops, or the destruction of materiel. Quite properly, thecombat leader is not concerned withthe management of resources, business style. except perhaps in the areasof personnel and supply. Even thenhis concern for economy is directedto maXimizing his capability to ac, complish the military mission, and notto realizing economic efficiency andmonetary savings from more effectivemanagement.

There must be a proper balance between time spent on the developmentof combat leaders and time spent onthe development of efficient militarymanagers. Dollars and cents are the

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,ANAGEMEHT OR COMMAND?wrong criteria for evaluating combat leadership performance. Yet thereseems to be considerable evidence thatleadership training is being undulydiverted from its primary objectiveto an economic orientation. I f thistrend continues, a weakening of leadership potential for the future battIefield is inevitable.

Over-all military programing mustbe based on the requirements of national security. An acceptable program results from the considered judg- 'ment of civilian and military leaders,as to forces required in the face of theevaluated threat. Acceptability on thebasis of dollars is obviously an improper condition. Absolute need, irrespective of cos t, determines theproper criterion. Any lesser consideration would represent colossal blundering on the part of national leadership.xcessive Management

Recent controversies in this areasuggest that there may have been ex

e s ~ i v e concern or economic consider-ations during the past deca


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III

aged, but th r e would be seriousdoubt as to its ,ability to wage successful war.'Administration of military affairsmust be put into proper perspective.When management ceases to contribute to combat readiness, or actuallydetracts from it, it loses its usefulness. Civilian and military leaders ofour Defense Establishment ought totake a long, hard look at this problem.Tbey should make certain that ourmilitary strength doe s not witheraway, under pressure of the very emphasis on management which is currently supposed to improve it.Suggested RemedyUnfortunately, the tendency to consider command and management identical, and to use the terms interchangeably, continues, to the detriment ofboth. What is needed is a bold strokeof pen and tongue by our eivil andmilitary leaders. A suggested startingpoint is the elimination of such termsas 'military manager and militarymanagement in every in.tance whereth terms commander and com-mand are, in fact, the correct appeJlations under law and regulations.A second step might well be substitution of the word administration for

management to reflect more accuratelythe i f f e r e n ~ e between public institutions and business enterprises.

These modest proposals will not affect in any way the application ofproved business-management principles to military administration. Whereappropriate, this certainly should becontinued and, perhaps, v n expanded. However, these proposals ifadopted would help to discourage theuse of business management preceptsfor the solution of all military administrative problems. They might evenreverse the current drift toward management-for-management's-sake.

Most important of all, such changeswould help to restore military command to its rightful position of honor,and cause it to be more sought afterby the young men who, with or without command experience, will one daybe the Nation's military leaders. Theseyoung men should have the opportunity to become experienced leadersmilitary commanders (not managers)-proud to uphold the great traditionsof military command, In short, themilitary should officially recognize andheed an inescapable axiom: Commandand management are not one and thesame thing.

Simply stated, the purpose of American military strength is to preventwar, to halt the expansion of tyranny, to help restr in ny belligerence pos-ing a serious threat to world order, and to achieve a qU ck and decisive victory in any conflict in which we might become involved.

The fact that the principal peacetime purpose of maintaining ArmedForces is to prevent war, coupled with the nature of the current worldwidethreat and the great military power maintained by others, makes it absolutely essential that our Armed Forces offer a credible deterrent to all formsof War by being clearly able and ready to fight successfully any kind of war,anywhere, at any time.SeC1 etary of the rmy Elvis J. Stahr Jr.

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NEEDED a new attitude or

TEACHING MILITARYSCIENCECaptain James E. Smith, Jr nited State rmy

T Res e r v e Officers TrainingCorps (ROTC) needs a philosophy ofteaching, so that it may fulfill itsfunction on the college campus of today. t is not enough for us to relyupon our proved training techniques,adhering strictly to the Army Training Program and to the subject schedules supporting that program. t isnot enough to present a mechanicallyperfect class, a superbly trained drillteam, or an excellent parade. We mustadd mind to the bone and muscle supporting the ROTC. The pro g r amr e qu i r e s a continuity of thoughtthroughout all the courses.

We have been under attack for a.variety of reasons for some years,often by the very colleges that offerthe program as a part of their curricula. One of the reasons cited is thatthe caliber of instruction is low.This criticism usually provokes an indignant reaction from Army personnel, who spend a great deal of theirtime training troops in proved techniques. These techniques were developed, often in conjunction with collegeeducators during World War II, to

train large numbers of troops in ashort time, and hilVe been improvedover the years to meet changing needs,They are being used to train troops,in condensed programs, to handle themost complex equipment in fast-moving situations that simulate combatof the futUre.

So it is not unnatural for Armyofficers to feel that the criticisms arefar from justified. These officers areprofessionals in the field o training,For the most part, they are possessorsof college degrees, sometirnes from thevery school that they are serving. Theyare well-traveled, well-read, and curioous about the world in which theylive. They are responsible people whocare about the status of the Nationi t s approach to leadership, its moralstandards, and its outlook for the future. They usually are a conservativegroup.

t would seem that such personswould be excellent instructors at college level-but something is report'edly lacking. It is s o m ~ t i m s said thatROTC programs are not college levelCOUI ses, or that the level of teaching

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t its best does not approach that ofollege instruction. i Having listenedboth to college instructors and to serv00 instructors, I find this hard to

Some of the poorest ins ructhat I have experienced was colJege instruction. Some of the est -the m 0 s t challenging-was Armyinstruction. I am sure that there areboth superior and inferior instructorsn both fields. From observation, it appears that the real problem springsfrom a difference in approach.The Army trains people. The col

Jeges educate people. What is the difference? The dictionary says that totrain is to make proficient by instruction and practice, as in some art, profession, or work (as to train soldiers)also to give the discipline and instruc.tion, drill, and practice designed to impart proficiency or efficiency. To educate is defined as to bring up, train,educate; also to develop the facultiesand powers of by teaching, instruction, or schooling; qualify by instruchon or training for a particular caIlmg practice. . . . When a man is.trained, he becomes proficient in acertain field. When a man is educated,

.he is taught to use his intellect in anyfield-to seek the facts and to use themas required by a given situation.Education or TrainingOur curriculum is designed to playa part in educating a man, if it iscorrectly understood and applied bythe instructor. But if the instructor

Captain James E. Smith h . is As-8 Stant Professor of Military Scienceat Wheaton College in Illinois. Hegraduatecl from t he United State qilitary Acaclemy in 1947. CaptainSmith 8 e r v e cI in Japan and Koreafrom 1948 to 1951 ancl with UnitedStates Army Europe from 1954 to1957. .September 1961

i Idoes not search beneath the surfaceof the Army Training Program andthe appropriate subject schedules, heis going to train rather than educate,An opportunity to i n c r ~ s e man'sability to understand and;solve problems will thus be lost.

What then is missing? What shouldan instructor do before he steps tothe platform? I believe that he mustdevelop a philosophy of teaching atthe college level, by studyi/lg the principles of teaching and of his field-military science. Philosophy may bedefined as the love or pu1'uit of wisdom. Wisdom, in turn, is defined asthe power of judging rightly and following the soundest course of action,based on knowledge, experience, un

derstanding; good judgmbnt, discretion sagacity.

This requirement for wisdom cannotbe restricted to the needs of militaryscience-it reaches beyond the limitsof ol1r profession into' many otherfields: The instructor must become astudent, studying constantly and keeping himself inforlned. This will includepicl


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MILIT RY SCIENCEchange of pace, a new atmosphere.that he will experience. His new situation will be vastly different from thatof the field unit, the headquarters, orthe service school. His family wiU haveto adjust to the life of the average civilian community.

An instructor can profitably readand digest a large amount of material-history, political science, philosophy,economics, military science, psychology, the natural sciences. The ArmyContemporary Reading List is a goodplace to start. This list deals primarilywith discussions of military policypolitical, economic, military-that theinstructor should understand in orderto teach in several courses.

He will wish to acquire a deep understanding of the military ethic, asso ably presented by Dr. Samuel P.Huntingdon in his book, The oldierand the State oldiers and cholarsby Lyon and Masland is a prerequisitefor an understanding of certain educator attitudes toward the militaryservices. Nowhere else does the professional soldier have an opportunityto peruse so many books of substanceas he does on a campus where there isa fine library.

The military department, moreover,that does not build a respectable departmental library is failing to provide the specialized knowledge required for research. Budgets generallyare small for such purposes; this callsfor emphasis on quality, and on titlesthat are not to be found in the collegelibrary. A knowledge of current affairs and new developments in themilitary field is also required. Newspapers, news magazines, military periodicals, other periodicals with philosophical content, TV, and radio-allthese are necessary for maintaining

contact with fast-changing situationsin the world.With this background, the Officer

instructor can preJ,lare himself in themost important area of all: his under.standing of the student and his back.ground. No two colleges are alike andthe instructor should proceed witlrcare in establishing the instructor.student relationship. I t first must erememhered that the student is a ci.vilian and not subject to the UniformCode of Military Justice.Almost all the students. are prepar.ing themselves for fields other thanthe military. Quite often, there is someresentment of the time required forRotsee. There is some feeling thatmilitary s e I v i e will come soonenough, and that military educationin college is an imposition. The wearing of the uniform- conforming makes a student part of the mass. Hefears losing his individuality in acommunity of individuals. all seekingdifferent goals.The College ackgroundWhat conditions of discipline andobedience does the college impose upon \him? What intellectual standards are 'set by the college? What moral or reoIigious convictions are involved? Whatis the basic philosophy of the collegepertaining to the student as an individual? What social pressures areexerted upon the student? What systern of values is applied by the collegeto its charges? What background dothe students share?These questions are important withregard to placing the military department in its proper niche within a college. Each college is different; nocommon answer may be applied. t isclear, however, that the instructorcan undertake considerable researchincluding much discussion with tbe

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theerckIRdn

or

student himself. This is simply toapply the old axiom, Know yourmen.Yet we try to bring students into

the military structure without reallyopening the door them. They area different breed from ourselves inmany respects. In background, sense1 discipline, sense of duty, and sense

inspire the student and make himsee that military education is impor-tant not in the military field alonebut in other fields of endeavor as well.He hopes to impress upon him the no-tion that even highly individualistictypes must conform to a norm to acertain extent so that the group mayexist in some semblance of harmony.

be of humor they differ from the man The instructor can provide superior

eptnreSogedoIht)j.

iorbIe

m_track ROTC drill team. Understanding the individual stndent-his needs, desiresand values-is the all-important factor to the military instructor.who has served the public in uniformfor 10 to 20 years. Often, this gap isnot easily bridged.The instructor will wish to observethe student, converse with him, andachieve a rapport with him. There

shOUld be understanding on the partof both the instructor and his students The instructor ought to makestandards of the military service,as reinforced by his own convictions,crystal clear to the student. He mustleptember 1961

leadership that will stimulate the student's desire to join in the work ofthose who have gone before him. Re-spect between instructor and studentwill grow on the basis of clear under-standing of standards and motives.Once this relationship is established,and only when it is estabIisbed, theofficer is able to challenge the studentto become the leader, to assume theresponsibility of authority and to actas a member of the team.

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MILIT RY SCIENCEA third area important to the phi-logophy of the instructor is the relationship of the military department to

other departments and to the faculty.We must never forget that our effortis only a fraction of the total expendedin educating the student. The studentwho is seeking a commission receivesapproximately 10 percent of his education from -the military department.and the student participating in onlythe basic course receives less than fourpercent. The point is that we mustmaintain our perspective in relationto demands upon his time and energyin meeting the requirements of ourcourses. This is no argument for turn-ing soft. but rather for seeking theproper balance of study with outsidework. and for realizing that we cannot preempt vital time needed for hismajor area of study.Instructor and Faculty

t is necessary to blend ou rselveswith the faculty. to receive the benefitof their experience in the field of education. Their knowledge of the studentand his problems. and of the pitfallsof classroom teaching. can contributegreatly to our estimates of the situa-tion. The officer instructor can inquireinto the views of the instructors ofother departments and. at the sametime. he can express the philosophyof the Army. He can demonstrate thevalidity of our claim to being able tostimulate learning. and thus to educate the student. We have to proveourselves. just as do any faculty members who join this professional group.

Many of our subjects overlap thoseof other departments. especially ofthe history and science departments:Here. there is the chance to reinforcethe student s education by complementary instruction. This calls for akind- of coordination achieved only by

friendly cooperation with the otherdepartments. Quite often there w llbe an honest difference of opinion inthe interpretation of some event orproblem. All the better. for this w lloffer the student a well-defined argument. allowing him to make a judgment and to see that it is possible tomake more than one interpretation ofa given set of facts.aculty Participation

The participation of other facultymembers in specialized areas is val-uable. either on the platform or Inadvising the officer instructor in hispreparation for the platform. Thisparticipation will not be achieved bya standoffish attitude that refuses tosee the application of the other areasof learning to the military. A militarydepartment accepted by the facultyas a part of the college family willreceive strong support. The facultycan become the strongest and best re-cruiter for the ROTC outside the de-partment itself. A professor of his-tory. for instance. who is sympathetictoward the goals of the ROTC. mayhave a tremendous effect upon the stu-dent in his decision to enter upon theadvanced course. The antipathetic professor may have an opposite effect

t must be clear that understandingthe individual student is all importanthis needs. desires. and values. With-

out this understanding there is nochance of developing the group-theCor p s of Cadets. Inevitably. theremust be compromise; the needs of theindividual must be measured againstthe needs of the group. These can bemet with a sense of judgment anacknowledgment of the problems in-volved -in teaching at t ~ college leveland the desire to participate in graduating a superior student and citizen

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W R ROCKETS.,.

ited to the utmost in all,sectors, in any manner and in -allpases in which the Swedish defensestrategy has prepared WilY for it. Today s Swedish armed f o r ~ e s train fora tactical-offensIve employment, forwhich the Swedish land ;features, theSwedish granite, and the Swedish w llto defend goods and ch3ltlels providethe prerequisite stability.

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1

GUERRILLAS WITHOUT MORALEThe White Russian PartisansColonel William A. Burke, United tatea rmy

PARTISAN or guerrilla warfare,unless it is motivated by patriotismand animated by political and moralideals, may be,. subject to the samefailures and defeats as any other typeof modern warfare. The Belorussian(White Russian) partisans of WorldWar II are' widely reputed to havebeen among the most effective nonregular forces to fight against theGerman Army. This view, establishedin large part by the USSR as usefulpropaganda, is only partially true. Asa matter of fact, Belorussian guerrillas fought both for and against theGermans, as well as against Russiaand among themselves. The record ofBelorussian partisan activity--eventhough i t is imperfectly known toWestern historians-provides an illuminating instance of confused and incoherent guerrilla activity.

The h i s t o r y of Belorussia, nowknown as the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic (BSSR), one of the15 Soviet "republics." is a long recordof disaster and catastrophe. Situatedon the western edge of Greater Russia, Belorussia has bee n repeatedlyoverrun by the armies of France, Germany, and Russia during the pastcenturies. Although its population ofeight million makes it the third largest ethnic group in the USSR, it hasbeen little known as a national or ethnic unit outside the Slavic world. Themajority of Belorussians have in the

past seemed apathetic to political 'Bquestions, and relatively backward inpolitical, social, and cultural e v e l o ~ >ment.

v,Iv

'r

' L;p

-..-TExcept for a few days during the i,Ctwo World Wars, there has been nn tindependent Belorussian state to which II

the more nationalist-minded citizencould point as an ideal to be regainecl;Even the wartime "independent statewas merely permitted to exist by QC Jcupying powers who were busy e l s ~where.

Belorussian resistance groups:'however, have been organized and ern .ployed by both the Germans and theRussians. Dominance over the mem'bers of such groups appears to h vebeen the chief aim of the organizers,Manipulation by stronger powers fortheir own ends has characterized thehistory of Belorussia, as the regionhas changed hands successively amongits neighbors,

Ever since the 17th century, eachsuccessive controlling or occupyingpower has striven by all means knownto man to assimilate the Belorussianpopulation to its own culture, and tosuppress every manifestation of Belorussian nationalism.To ensure the success of this ruthless program, all noteworthy aspectsof a distinctively Belorussian culturewere stamped out repeatedly. Nationalist-minded intelligentsia and forward-thinking students were purged

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j

years. Even the languageer the~ d

~ e r s'Union inn

banned on occasion, or its use reAs the Belorussian massesmostly illiterate, and culturallytoward either Russia or Pois easy to understand' theirence in this systematic deuction of everything "Belorussian."As a result of this subjugation, Hitonslaught against the Soviet1941 was accepted by the. Belorussians with understandable reief. Having cowered under the tyran, . ieal rule of their stronger neighbors

~ o r as long as any living Belorussiane J,could remeniber, they thought that, their future could not but improve., 1Instead of an improvement, however,1 'the war brought a new, but familiar,'!totalitarian rule in the form of Ger;man and, ultimately, Re1 Army oc;cupatlOn.Nationalist MotivationUnder such conditions, few, if any,countries had ever possessed the historical motivation of Belorussia torise with new-found vigor and violently combat these new aggressors inan effort to gain the independence soruthlessly denied them during the past"everal hundred years. The field Was

: set, it remained only to see who were: the stronger players-the native gueri rilla defenders, or the invading ag,gressors.: Colonel William A. Burke is Com-;manding Officer of Combat Command: C 2d Armored Division, Fort Hood,Texas. During World War II he served


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WHITE RDSSIAN PARTISANSerman SupportBelorussian leaders began to assume

certain responsibilities of organization and administration, tacitly supported by the German command. Belorussian military units were organizedto resist the diversions of the Communist partisans and to protect strategiclines of communications.

Although painfully slow and weakin the beginning, this movement provided the needed impetus for the Belorussians' first steps toward normalcommunity, cultural, and educationallife. In the ar


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heGerman etreatDuring the latter part of 1943 theGerman Army began its retreat before the adVancing Communists whohad already occupied the Ukraine andwere preparing for the onslaughtagainst Belorussia. This increased thetempo of Belorussian demands andforced the German authorities to takecognizance of the adverse conditionswhie h confronted the occupationforces themselves.

The Belorussians therefore wereallowed to create a Central AssemblyII hie h mobilized a Belorussian national defense of some 36 000 soldiersIII March 1ll44. To regulate its na-tional representation of Belorussia-the assembly called the Second Ali

I Belorussian Congress in Min s k i n; June 1944, This was attended by 1 039- delegates from all parts ~ f the country, representing all classes of people.; The Congress with patriotic fervorreaffirmed, among other things proclamations of a similar IndependenceCongress of 1918 for the Belorussian t i o n l Republic. t annulled all in ternational treaties which called foreither the division and the annexa lion or both of Belorussia. It reestab-Jished a national representlltion ofBelorussia and the Belorussian people

III the form of the Belorussian Central Assembly. o ~ significantly itexpressed determination to break with-Communist Russia in all respects.The Soviet Army however had already crossed the b 0 r d e r and waspressing the Germans all along theEastern Front. As a resu It the as

-sembly was compelled to withdrawfrom the country before the violentassault of the Soviet forces. t wentinto exile in Germany to continue thestruggle for liberation from SovietRussia. Pl\rt of the newly establishedSlptlmber 96

Belorussian national defense f 0,1' C ewas sent to the front against the Soviet armies and was later reorgan-ized into the First Belorussian Division. Groups also were parachuted intothe rear areas of the Soviet forcesbut their meager successes were farfrom noteworthy.Nazi ErrorsIn antagonizing the passive massesthe Nazi forces had spelled their owndoom. In this connection two acts ofthe Germans are worthy of mention.The first was the recall. of the freedPrisoners of War to prisoner of warcamps; and second the drafting ofnative labor for use in Germany.To escape these policies thousandsof Belorussians lied to the woods.Soon their numbers were doubled byrefugees from cities and towns wherethe labor draft for Germany had begun. The total number of this swampand forest population is unknown butit might be estimated at several tensof thousands by the end of 1942. Having no unity of purpose except sur-vival and vengeance. they lacked theleadership and support necessary tomake them a formidable threat to theGerman rear.

The story of the guerrj]]a warfarethat developed a g a i n s t this background has undoubtedly ee n obscured and distorted by the Sovietpress. Insofar as it is possible tojudge on the basis of ~ o m e w h t morethan a cursory study. lit appears thatthe movement only gradually and re-luctantly fitted into the Soyiet pattern.The claim that the Soviet agents hadthemselves created i t seems unwar-ranted. In fact the credit shOUld begiven to the Germans themselves.Evidence indicates tllat the firstguerrilla forces in Belorussia werenonpolitical groups each merely fight

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its own physkal survival;iherwise they remained conspicuouslynactive. Such groups preyed upon theoeal peasantry long before they turnedheir arms against the Germans. Iniially, the peasants willingly suppliedbern with food and clothing. Later,

g for

eir numbers grew, they began tothe villages for their needs, whichfor th m the nickname ofdemons." For protection from"patriotic" forces the peasantryto the Germans, but to no avail.ors versus uerrillasLittle evidence can be found to in

IdieRte the existence of Belorussian na'ilionalist guerrillas. A certain number'of Belorussian nationalists collabo-rated with the Germans. They treated;all guerrillas as anti-Belorussians.Mention is made in some Belorus:sian literature of the existence ofsizable groups. allegedly fighting both

the Germans and the Soviets for aJ r e e and independent. Belorussia.,Neither concrete evidence of this, noreVidence that "Belorussian ideology"was the motivating factor for thesenationalist guerrillas. has heen madepublic. Little mention is made anywhere of Belorussian emblems, flags.or insignia being used by the guerrillas; the aims of most were their own

1 survival. and a determination to be, "neither German, Soviet. nor Polish.", Nor could all of them be called "guer. rillas in the proper sense of the word.. N. P. Vakal'. a leading authority onthe matter, has described the guer; rillas as follows:, These gl'oups 1< el e most p evalentin the Belol'1wsian fm'ests at the endvf 1943. They could neither articulate'W pl Omote any pl'ogram, and ap-parently all they wanted was to. beleft alolle. Soviet guerrillas avoidedfighting I{/em so as not f push themeptember 96

into the German camp. They calledthemselves guerrillas but cave menof modern t imes they used arms onlywhen attacked in their dugouts. Therewere also 'wild' units fighting the So-viets, the Germans, and one anotherat the same time.Mr. Vakar has quoted the personalreminiscence of a Belorussian national:People of military age, deprived ofthe 'chance to live and work in peace,felt lost and betrayed. They were anti-Stalin, and wanted to join hands withthose who were fighting him. Theyenrolled in antiguerrilla units but.realizing that they had to fight forthe Germans and against their ownpeople. deserted and joined the anti-German guerrillas. Thus many youngpeople changed sides several times.The Soviets eturn

The Soviets set out lures for thelarger guerrilla groups: sup p l i s trained leadership. and pardon for political sins. Soviet instructors had thetask of coordinating and directinganti-German operations, and of convincing the popUlation that throughSoviet efforts their country was beingrid of the hated German occupation.Both leaflets and radio broadcastswere used toward this end; rumormongering was initiated, and coveredall subjects from promises to abolishcollective farming to promises of religious freedom. These activities, combined with the fact that the Germanrout had begun on all fronts, promptedmany to join the guerrillas in orderto be on the safe side. The Soviets. began raiding villages in a forced recruiting campaign; those who refusedto join the guerrillas were shot asGerman agents. Needless to say, theguerrilla units swelled with new recruits.

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WHITE RUSSI N P RTIS NS

The reconstituted units were headedby a uniformed Soviet commanderand a political commissar. Memberswere forced to take' an oath of loyaltyto Moscow; criticism of the SovietUnion became a punishable crime. Soviet field presses were established toprint literature appealing to Belorussian patriotism, emphasizing theblood kin s h i.p of the Belorussian,Ukrainian, and Russian peoples, anddenouncing nationalists who collaborated with the Germans as, traitorsto 'the Belorussi'}n people. ,Soviet PropagandaEven before the end of World WarII, the Soviets began to tell the FreeWorld about the presumably great ef-fectiveness of the White RussianPartisans in combating fascism. Suchreports, of COllrse, make up a typicalsort of Soviet pr6paganda.Since the war, on the other hand,it has become fashionable to believethat this patriotic effectiveness stillexists as a latent nationalistic spiritwhich if roused might even throw offthe yoke of Moscow. Although suchrevolt might b ; possible in other areaspresently under control of the SovietUnion, it is not, in fact, likely tooccur in Belorussia.

In assessing the actual ineffectiveness of the White Russian partisans,one must not overlook the fact thatthey were not motivated by an extreme nationalistic belief. The major-ity were not nationalist-minded volunteers from the local population, butpersonnel from German-encircled RedArmy units. deserters from severaldifferent armies, and dedicated Belorussian Communists. Physical sur-vival. rather than a political or nationalistic objective, appears to haveprovided the motive of these bands.

One must concede that a degree of

nationalistic spirit has been fannclinto effectiveness each time Belorus.sian territory has been liberated fromtotalitarian control and occupied ya Western European power. The Belorussians, for example, welcomed thearrival of both the forces of Napoleonand those of Hitler. However, the po\].cies of these occupation forces eventuaIly embittered the natives to thepoint where their initial allegianceagain swerved.ack of National Spirit

One must realize, moreover, thatnot since World War has Belorussian nationalism, or any other motivation for that matter, assumed the initiative and displayed itself as it hasin Yugoslavia, Poland, Hungary, andEast Germany. The spirit of nationalism (that identity of t people withthe common idea of nationhood) halways plagued the Soviet Empire,and doubtless will continue to be aserious source of trouble. But totalSoviet power now 0 b t a ins in th,BSSR, and prospects for substantiallyaltering these conditions do not appeal' to be bright.After the reoccupation of Belorussia in July 1944, Soviet Russia reestablished the BSSR in its pre-WorldWar likeness. The one thing nO'has been the admission of the BSSRto the United Nations as an independent state and a founding member. Th,BSSR, like 0 th r union republics.nominally has a defense and foreignaffairs ministry. On the basis of thispretension to Belorussian independence, Soviet Russia has hoped to usethe Republic both in the United Nations and in other international dealings.

In reality. everything in the Republic remained fundamentally with

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out change after World War II, andtbere continued to be a complete enslavement and subjugation of the peoples by imperial Moscow. The Communists practiced a bloody suppressionof the Belorussian people. Anythingoi distinctively national characterwas considered a m'lnifestation ofBelorussian b o u r g e o i ~ nationalism,and destroyed. e l o r ~ s s i a n nationaland cultural leaders were deported toSoviet labor camps; artists, teachers.officials. priests. and even members oftheWorkers Union were hanged. Peas-ants who had left the collective farmsystem for individual agriculture wereparticularly vulnerable to S 0 v ie twrath. Farm collectivization was reintroduced throughout Belorussia. Themajority of the male population weretaken into the Soviet Army withouttraining, and sent to the front wheretheir chances of survival were nil.ommunist uppressionThe Soviet's postwar discriminatorypolIcies were applied with particularrIgor in Belorussian cultural fields.The country's history was rewrittento stress more emphatically the unityof the east Slavic world. within whichthe leading role of the Russians wasglorified. Stalin was put forward asthe sole creator of the BelorussianRepublic. Belorussian literature wasstereotyped into that pattern estab-hshed for the entire Soviet Union.and is barely distinguishable f ro mother modern Slavic writings.The language itself is being brought

closer to the Russian, with the Rus-sian language being used in institu-tions of higher learning, and commonly in the civil service; Soviettextbooks predominate in Belorussianschools. The Russians have been par-ticularly on their guard to criticizeBelorussian writers and ~ c h o l a r s forlapsing into forms of b ~ u r g e q i s nationalism:The Soviet HierarchyIn conformity with Soviet practicein all non-Russian o v i e ~ Republics:a small percentage of the ,political administration is comprised of Belorussian nationals. Even though the manin office may be a Belorussian. his direction r e c h e s him from above,through the double hierarchy of stateand party bureaucracy which is subordinate to the government f the USSR.Indications h a ve appeared whichlead one to believe that Belorussiannationalism has been developing intwo opposite directions since the war:at home, toward complete dissolutionin the Soviet sea; abroad in the nigrcgroups. toward further crystallizationof a nationalist doctrine. The politicallaboratories of the exiles may precipitate a true national sentiment at sometime in the future. Evidence for sucha hope is either meager or abundant.depending upon which migr s onereads or talks with. What little activenationalism does still exist. appearsto exist in exile. Belorussia today. asin the past, is only a nation in themaking.

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RommelTTH L

O THE morning of 23 February1943 a handful of United States andBritish troops at Thala, Tunisia,awaited the renewal of a devastatingattack by General Rommel's forces.A fateful and bloody battle was cer-tain since Rommel had advanced forthe last five days, at great cost to theAllies in men and materiel. Rommel'sexact objective was not clear, but itwas obvious he intended to disruptthe Allied threat to Axis control ofTunisia. Beyond that he might haveplanned to cut across the Allied linesof communication from Algeria andjeopardize the entire Allied NorthAfrican operation.Although the Battle of Thala islittle known, it marked a decisive turn-ing point in the war comparable inits way to stopping the Axis pel' etra-tion into Egypt. or the defense ofBastogne. Marshal Alexander recallsthat Rommel's success:

Could have upset the whole{mnt and would have led to a withdrall al i not to disaster the situation w s xtr m ly serious nd w sonly stabilized, after periods of v rygrave danger.General Juin stated. "1 felt strategic fear, for if Rommel broke through.all of North Africa was doomed.Why did Rommel fail? His tankwaves maneuvered on the ridgelinejust short of Thala and Stukas divebombed the exhausted defenders. Hisfarthest advance. on the night of 21-22February had been a penetration intothe British defense position. The remnant force of three infantry platoons.12 tanks, and some artillery seemedto have little chance to halt his spearhead, reported by Allied intelligencpto be a composite force of the AxisAfrika Korps, the 10th and 21st Panzer Divisions.The Thala defense commander,

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Nicholson, committed hisrigadiertanks in a desperate countercharge ontbe morning of 22 February; noneback. But survivors from thecrews reported 70 German tanks andrr.any armored personnel carriers justbeyond the ridgeline.

Three United States artillery battalions had arrived to reinforce thesmall Thala force. They fired at a1 furious rate that morning. One bat: tery "C" of the 84th, charged intoaction on the defense crest and, exe-cuting the old movement of right; front. into line," dropped trail to fire. at pointblank range-an action sel-. dom recorded in 20th century militaryi annals. The Germans were halted.; Failure of rganization

II Basically, Rommel failed becausethe principles of good organizationwere neglected. The ineffective com-, mand structure offset Rommel's keen,taelical ability and combat aggres, siveness. C Battery's guns providedthe dramatic turning point on the fieldof battle but Rommel was defeated, elsewhere. The Axis lacked unity ofcommand and a clearly defined strategic goal.Some historians claim that too fewunits were available for such an offen-, sive. It seems, however, that Rommel, had planned well and he felt that hismeans were sufficient. One militaryhistorian notes that Rommel's suc-cesseR were achieved with minimumforces. But in these cases Rommel at.Colonel Herman W W Lange isvitk the ffice o the United StatesArmy Attache in Palis. Prior to this,

he was a student at the French ArmyAdt anced War College Ecole Supe-rieure de GuelTe). Colonel Lange wasS of the 84th Field Artillery Bat-talion during the action described inthis aIticle,September 96

least had full control of the meansand could jockey them at the last mo-ment, depending on his "fee " of thesituation. But for Thala he never received what was promised.Some claim that faulty logistiCSbogged the offensive. There was nosurplus available for resupply, but agreat I e a del ' does not need lavishsupply.

Some students believe that pressurefrom the British 8th Army played apart in limiting Rommel's offensive.Study of the nature of Montgomery'spressure, however, shows that thiswas not an essential faetor. f Rom-mel's plan had been exeouted and histiming respected, the southern frontwould have had no e f f e c ~

Nor did the air situation paralyzeRommel. The balance of ilirpower wasnot overwhelmingly favorable to theAllies and air tactics at this date couldnot effectively stop a ground offensive.As, for intelligence, this appears tohave 'been a standoff. Rommel's excel-lent intelligence staff was no moreable to show Rommel how close he wasto success, than was the Allied G2Buccessful in clearly estimating Rom-mel's capabilities. IAxis operations in Tunisia sufferedfrom many problems, eaah a handicapbrought on by violation. of the principles of good organization.taff WeaknessesThere were conflicts of interest be-tween Italy and Germany, the diffi-culties which one finds in an international staff, the problems of aninformal organization (that is, directrelationships between individuals onvarious staffs) that did Inot coincide

with the official organization chart.and the handicap of too many com-mand echelons. Despite 'the distancebetween Italy and Tunisja there was

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ROMMEL T TH L

a failure to delegate authority as thetheater grew in size and importance.

Gerlllany did not want to fight inAfrica. but gradually was forced todo so by Italian failure to handle theBritish vigorously. The GermanAfrika Korps was at first an armoreddetachment intended to train the Italians and bolster their morale. Africawas Italian territory. so the Germans left the operations up to theItalians. Sensitive to any loss to the

tinental viewpoint and was not awareo the inherent difficulties an overseas theater generated. Hitler and theOKW refused to the very end to establish a precise theater objective.

The chain of command to Rommelran through the Theater SupremeCommand in Italy (Figure 1) WhereGerman advisors and supportingforce commanders had an official relationship that should have left control to the Italians. But the problems

COMM ND ORG NIZ TION

OF ICIAlUNOFFICIAL OR INIORM L

FIGURE 1

Italian Empire. Mussolini had theTheater Supreme Command stronglyreproach Rommel whenever he gaveup territory-even when the tacticalsituation favored such action.Tao Little Too Late

Absence of a clear-cut G e r m nstrategy for Africa was another handicap. When Hitler finally decided in1942 to make a greater effort in Africa, the requirements of the EasternFront no longer left hilll the l;\eans.Neither Hitler nor the OKW (ATmedForces High Command) gave Africaa high priority. The OKW had a con-

common O many staffs produced informal relationships. and. in effectan informal organization functioningoutside channels depicted on the o -cial chart. The resulting difficulties.uneconomical in any situation. can bedisastrous in war.Parallel hannels

While the Italian headquarters wasin command of the African forces. theOKW and Hitler personally. lookedover its shoulder. The German Gen-eral von Rintelen (nominally MilitaryAttache and OKW liaison officer) andMarshal Kesselring (German Air

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orce Commander and Southern The-ter Commander of the Germanorees) were regarded by Berlin asdirect channel parallel to the officialone with Commando Supremo. Berlin

also passed and received official matfrom Africa through Kesselring.relationships.were complicated byntacts that the African com-s had with Berlin.The official organization chart

s shows both Rommel and Von Arnimcommander of the 5th Panzer Armyin Tunisia) as responsible directly toI ommando Supremo. Two independ-[ ent commands might have worked wellenough when the fr ika Korp8 was inLibya and the 5th Army in the northeast corner of Tunisia, but they: brought only difficulties as strategicdevelopments brought the tactical andlogistical aspects of the commands to-: gether. To make matters worse, eachlof these two commanders had, andIused, informal channels that bypassed

; the command echelon responsible forthe theater.Resort to Higher Echelons; The lack of delegation of authority\ forced key commanders repeatedly to; travel to higher echelons for confer-

- 1ences. Rommel felt obliged to visitommando Supremo and Hitler, todefend his concepts and to emphasize

his needs.Kesselring likewise had to makefrequent trips to Berlin. His mostcritical absence was that of 17 February. While he was at Hitler s head-quarters his chief of staff (nearRome) telephoned to report that Rom-mel insisted on Ziegler (command-ing a prong of the operation) con-tinuing the attack although Von Arnim had told him to halt. Kesselringtold his chief of staff to get Com-mando S'I premo to issue an order forSeptember 1961

the operation to continue, and thatRommel should be in command. Butthe chief of staff lacked the authorityand nothing was done until Kesselringreturned to Rome on 19 February.

Seniority in Africa, or relative pri-ority between the fr ika Korps andthe 5th Panzer Army, was never clari-fied. Rommel had landed in Tripoli inMarch 1941; Von, Arnim became ac-tive in Tunisia in December 1942.The fr ika Korps therefore, hadmuch experience, was larger than the5th Army, and Rommel (who also out-ranked Von Arnim) had gained suc-cess and fame. This led Rommel tofeel that he was an echelon higherthan Von Arnim; there were manyindications that this was a fact butCommando Supremo never announcerlit openly-until too late.Kesselring s Position

Commando Supremo was too dis-tant for effective coordination or tomilke competent decisions. t acted asif Kesselring were its representativefor visits to the combat zone, and attimes it seemed to be looking to himfor command decisions. However, thiswas never clear, and if Kesselringsometimes talked like a commanderhe never made the decisions. t isinteresting to note that while Kessel-ring was an air force general he wasapparently accepted as a tactical ad-visor on ground matters by Rommeland Von Arnim; probably because hewas German and also because Com-mando Supremo never provided anyother personal contact.Rommel Named Chief

Thus, despite many echelons makingdecisions on Africa, the Germans stilllacked a clearly defined commandechelon in Africa. A chief was neededto command the operation. t seems

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, ROMMEL AT THALAthat this was understood for there f/uence on ,Hitler which almost pre-was talk of making Rommel an army cluded personal ju gment and o jec-group. commander. But the delays of tivity on the situation. I was in no w yan international chain of command Rommel s superior since he was undejand personality conflicts prevented Commando Supremo; besides, Romthis desirable step until 23 February mel felt responsible to the OKW with1943, when Rommel finally was named which he had close relationships.commander of the African Army Rommel s BackgroundGroup. Renowned as a heroic leader ofIt is surpri.sing that Rommel re- mountain troops itt World War I. andceived the command because Hitler as the author of infantry tactics texts

US rmvField Marshal J rwin Rommel and stair in Tunisiaconsidered him worn out. Rommel wasin ll health and had insisted, officiallyas well as personally, to Hitler thathe did not believe the Tunisian bridge-head could be held, and that Germanmanpower should be conserved bywithdrawal while there was still time.Rommel had direct personal accessto Hitler. In Kesselring s words:Rom lel had a sort of hypnotic in-

before World War II, Rommel hadcommanded Hitler s headquarters,and thereupon sought and receivedcommand of a Panzer division. Hisoutstanding leadership was proved byclever tactics that enabled his th(Ghost) Division to push through theFrench line in 1940. Even other Ger-man generals had not believed thisspearhead operation possible.

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Hitler's interest in military mattersfirst brought Rommel to his attention.Their respect for each other probablywas heightened by Hitler's distrustof the German General Staff and Rommel's only slightly higher regard forthem. The feeling was mutual, however. One German General Staff officer expressed a commonly held viewwhen he said: Rommel neverbothered to figure out where resourcesmight come from, he managed to makeonly a mess. For their part, manygenerals of the General Staff considered Rommel an unprincipled tactician.

The parallel command structure, beset by international command andstaff weaknesses, therefore was fur-ther i m ~ i r e d by personality conflicts.

Of course, Rommel and Von Arnimhad mJch in common. Both, soughtvictory 'for Germany. Both were sus-picious of Hitler's vague strategicconcepts, which often seemed only tosacrifice the German fighting power.Both considered their relations withtheir Ruperiors as a w r g inst therear. But the gulf between the twowas deep enough to lead Von Arnimto withhold reinforcements for Rommel's thrust through Kasserine Passto Thala. A German author says:

The 5th A,.,,,y lived o its c,l'pcri(nces in Russia and nourished a particular pride. Its attitude towaI'd Rommel tcas neither fair nor indueive tothe accomplishment of the mission.Rommel s Plans

The assault on Thala was to be theclimax of Operation Stu mflut, thepenetration phase following the ini-tial parallel assaults, OperationsFriihlingslVind and Mo genluft. Rommel had planned and directed theselatter two coordinated attacks, employing ,units taken from both his andSeptember 1961

Von Arnim's armies. Kesselring hadtold him that if it came to launchingthe penetration, he, Rommel, wouldget the command; but it should havebeen obvious that the breakthroughcould not be delayed more than a fewhours once the parallel attacks provedsuccessful and also that others besidesRommel would, in some official man-ner, have to know about the pl:innedcommand structure. Kesselring observed:

The command structure did notmeet the needs of the theater of operations. This is what allowed the 5thA rrny to continue under its own maneuver concept at a time when, fromall evidence, it should have adapteditself to the envelopment as directed.Rommel felt restrained from takingthe drastic steps that the situationequired and which were s entirelytypical of his temperament.oordination Not noughRommel and Von Arnim, so Kessel

ring found, were both strong-willedmen. t was impossiole to reconciletheir differences by simple cOOl'dination. Rommel had a spirit of initiative,a grand will-to-win, and was accustomed to expressing Himself forciblyand to making rapid and independentdecisions. His tactical dispositionsfrequently were disapproved by Commando Supremo, but then, after theprescribed operation had progressedfor a time, the Commando wouldchange its mind and allow him to dowhat he had wanted in the first place,Rommel said of Kesselring:

Despite his undeniable qualities henever undej'gtood the tactical and operational peculiarities of the AfricanTheater. He saw v ~ y t h i n g throughose-colored glasses.Rommel was known for his talentsof improvisation, the speed of his ma-


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neuver, and his ability t modify orders at the last minute in the midstof combat. He often exasperated his.officers by such changes. But he didnot kllow how to delegate authority;he not only wanted to do everythinghimself but he wanted to be everywhere. Often absent from his headquarters, he always appeilred at the

US A'Ymll2d Battalion, 6th Infantry Regiment,march through asserine Passopportune moment at the vital pointto give the action a decisive impulse.he Operations

Early in February Rommel saw achance t6 relieve the Allied pressureon his lines of communication by anoperation in central Tunisia whichmight inflict serious damage on theAllied forces (Figure 2).On 4 February he proposed use ofhis own mobile forces and othersavailable in the theater to drive theAllies back, by Operation Fruhlings-wind through the Faid Pass to Sbeitla,and Morgenlurt from Gafsa towardFeriana. Fu rther progress in a penetration (Operation Sturmfiut ateither Sl ejUa, Kasserine. or Feriana-

Thelepte would depend on the degreeof initial success. He calculated thebalance of forces and saw that heneeded, besides his own mobile forcesof the Afrika Korp8, the 10th PanzerDivision, the 21st Panzer Division(both then under Von Arnim's jurisdiction), and the new Tiger tanks(actually a weak battalion also operating under Von Arnim). The plan didnot specify where success would besought and Rommel was somewhatvague in expressing his objectives.But he wanted freedom to drive onTebessa and destroy this major Alliedbase for the central Tunisian area.onfused ommandRommel's proposals were never explicitly approved but, Commando Su-premo directed a coordinated drive,

the forces for Friihlingswind beingunder General Ziegler, Von Arnim'sdeputy, and those for Morgenluft under General Liebenstein of the AfrikaKorps. A preliminary conference washeld on 9 February and at a meetingwith Kesselring at Faid on 3 February the commanders conferred andagreed on the assault for 4 February.Von- Arnim speaks of having beenadvised to turn over to Rommel'sforces the 10th and 21st Panzer Divisions on 7 February. At the 9February conference, the plan examined indicated that success of Friih-lingswind would mean a major olfensive to folJow immediately, with thesetwo divisions under Rommel's orders.The term "advised"

military review september 1961

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