milstein criminal justice policy forum: countering today's terrorism-searching for a more subtle...

8/9/2019 Milstein Criminal Justice Policy Forum: Countering Today's Terrorism-Searching For A More Subtle Approach

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Remarks by Sir Richard DearloveIntroduction by Richard Aborn

April 17, 2007

COUNTERING TODAYSTERRORISM:

SEARCHING FOR A

MORE SUBTLEAPPROACH

MILSTE

INC

RIMIN

ALJU

STICE

POL

ICY

FORUM

Citizens Crime CommissionOF NEW YORK CITY, INC.


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THE MILSTEIN

CRIMINAL JUSTICE

POLICY FORUM

Since 2002, the Cit izens

Crime Commission of New

York Ci ty has presented

a series of Criminal Justice

Policy lectures sponsored by

Edward L. and Howard P.

Milstein through the Milstein

Brothers Foundation. Each

event features a nationally,

or internationally, prominent speaker who addresses the

Commission on such issues as crime, criminal justice or

terrorism. The formal remarks are followed by a question-

and-answer period. Each meeting is open to the media.

Attendance is l imited to 150 invited guests drawn

from the top ranks of the New York City business and

law enforcement communities. Each lecture is printed

and distributed to top business, civic and law enforce-

ment leaders.

The Cit izens Crime Commission of New York City

is an independent, non-profit organization working to

reduce crime and improve the criminal justice system

in New York City. The Commission is supported by the

business community; its board of directors is drawn from

top corporate executives and members of major law

firms. The Commission was established in 1978.

Howard and Edward Milstein are prominent New York

bankers and real estate owners. They have a long record

of working with the New York City criminal justice system

to create and support innovative programs. They are also

active in national crime prevention issues.

HOWARD P. MILSTEIN


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Introduction by

Richard Aborn

A

s you know, our speaker is SirRichard Dearlove, the former chiefof MI6. The formal name, the Secret

Intelligence Service, or as more commonlycalled, MI6, provides the British governmentwith a global covert capability to promoteand defend the national security and economicwell-being of the United Kingdom. MI6 was

founded at the turn of the 20th century, in1909. It was the first time that Britain hadformalized its intelligence capability. And itwas formed, in part, because of the growingperceived threat, and actually real threat, of

German military and naval expansion priorto the First World War. The bureau wassubsequently divided into a home section,MI5, and a foreign section, MI6.

Sir Richard served as chief of MI6 from

August of 1999 until retiring in July of 2004.During those years, and as I understand, itcontinues, MI6 priorities continued to expand,and now encompass counter-terrorism,counter-proliferation and international crime

fighting. And, needless to say, Sir Richardhad to take on the task of also focusing onIslamic terrorism.

His work at MI6 provides him with aunique vantage point to which to observe

the global war on terrorist networks, aswell as a build up to a war in Iraq andother related issues. Sir Richard beganworking at MI6 in 1966 following hisgraduation from Cambridge. His postings

have included Nairobi, Prague, Paris,Geneva and Washington. Since 2004, sinceleaving MI6, Sir Richard has served asmaster of Pembroke College at CambridgeUniversity.

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As Master, Sir Richard plays an importantrole in the life and progress of Pembroke,

the third oldest college in Cambridge. Itwas founded in 1347. It is my pleasure towelcome Sir Richard Dearlove.

Remarks bySir Richard Dearlove

R

ichard, thank you for that extremelyaccurate introduction. Youre clearly

a lawyer who does his homework.The first thing I want to say is, as Deputy ViceChancellor at Cambridge because Im alsoa Deputy Vice Chancellor of the university I want to express my condolences for the

deaths at Virginia Tech. I find that eventparticularly shocking. That it should takeplace, within a sanctuary of learning. Onefeels very strongly about such an issue.

Im very conscious that there is a high

degree of expertise in this audience. And Ithink maybe much of what I want to saywill be known to many of you already. ButI hope I present it from a slightly differentperspective. And I think on these occasions,

anyway, the questions very often get downto the meat of what we want to discuss.And Im very happy to answer any questionsthat you want around this very complexand wide ranging subject. Our time is

limited.So I am going to present in shorthand

some of the issues that Ill speak about.Obviously, here in New York City, the pointat which we start, is 9/11. It is definitely a

defining event.

It is on one of those lines in history,contemporary history, or even in the longerterm. Itll be seen as a barrier of which

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theres a before and an after. And theresno question that it brought a large number

of issues into very sharp focus.

They were defined on that day. And itcaused the U.S. and other western govern-ments to radically revise their foreign

policy, and domestic security priorities.And, interestingly, I think its true, if wetravel backwards from 9/11, many of theelements that came together on that dreadfulday were actually known about.

Particularly by the intelligence andsecurity communities of what I will looselyrefer to as the west. Though they were, atthat stage, still, I think, poorly understood.And not seen really as a set of cohesive

issues profoundly affecting overall nationalsecurity policy. Yes, they were consideredimportant. But they were not considered tohave overwhelming importance. Similarly,if we travel forward from 9/11, the issue

of confronting and fighting terrorism,which, to the international community,seemed such a logical and straightforwardnecessity in the immediate aftermath, has,I think, been obscured now and confused

partly because of the consequences of thepolicy decisions engendered by our responsesto 9/11.

But, also, of course, because of thecomplexities of the politics of the MiddleEast. In short, I believe that in fighting orcountering terrorism, we have lost clarity ofpurpose and execution.

9/11 has also inspired a massive out-

pouring of academic, journalistic andpolitical writing and speculation about thephenomenon of terrorism, and the terrorisminspired by fundamentalist Islam inparticular and also, about the Middle East

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and the nature of Islam. Time was, if youwalked into a book shop, it was hard to

find any books on terrorism or on Islam atall. Now theyre prominently placed. Andthere are hundreds of them. And I hopethis wont cause offense. Time was, if youwere a Londoner, it seemed that Americans

were not particularly stirred or interested by terrorism, per se, when it had an Irishlabel on it.

But times have changed indeed. Andthe aim of my talk today is, I hope, to castsome light on the issues of how oursocieties might best deal with the continuingterrorism from both a practical andcommonsensical standpoint. And I think,also, to try to see through some of this

excessive amount of often ill informed andover complex commentary that we find onthe phenomenon.

My credentials for giving this talk you

heard about, I was an operational intelligenceofficer for a large chunk of my career, beforeI became a senior manager. And, in thatcapacity, I was involved both in dealingwith the Irish problem, but also, of course,

with the appearance and development ofwhat we now refer to, by the shorthand, ofal Qaeda. I might just add I was the 13thChief of SIS, as you said, founded in 1909.Im the 53rd Master of Pembroke CollegeCambridge, founded in 1347. Both jobs havea certain amount of continuity and stabilityabout them. All my predecessors as Chiefdied in their beds. One of my predecessorsas Master of Pembroke, was actually burnedat the stake. I leave you to decide which is

the riskier position.

Now, some basic contextual points aboutthe phenomenon that we refer to as al Qaeda.It is one of the extreme emanations of

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of alien influences. And today we are clearlyin the throes of another such series of events,

of which 9/11 was one, albeit of particularsymbolic importance, both for the perpetratorsand those attacked.

However, it is essential to realize how,

with the benefit of hindsight, that al Qaeda,if we look at the circumstances surroundingits emergence, is not, or should not beregarded, in my view, as a particularlysurprising phenomenon. However much itsactivities may shock us and threaten us.And it is the depth of its roots in the politicaland religious history of the Middle East thatmakes it, now, so formidably difficult todeal with.

So let us narrow the focus to al Qaedaitself. As modern terrorist movements go,and there are many of course, it is essentiallyreligious and ideological in character. Mostother terrorist movements I can think of are

active to achieve very specific political, andusually territorial, objectives. Palestinians,Irish, Armenians, and so on. If al Qaedahad specific political objectives, and I thinkit may have done at its inception, the

destruction of the house of Saud being one,and the removal of western forces from theMiddle East being another. These, I believe,have now been completely superseded.Superseded by quasi-mystical objectivesthat are essentially religious in character.Such as the creation, which is quite impractical,of course, of a new caliphate.

Actually, this does make al Qaeda, in myview, qualitatively different from every

other terrorist movement we have experi-ence of dealing with. It doesnt really havepolitical handles. And what I mean by thatis even if you wanted to negotiate with alQaeda, Im not sure that at the moment,

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would be possible. Another characteristicit acquires from its religious inspiration I

think is a lack of restraint. And what I meanby that is that if you think of a movementlike PIRA in comparison, the ProvisionalIRA, there are certain terrorist incidents andoutrages that PIRA would never have even

considered committing.

Now it is this lack of tangible politicalsubstance, and its primary espousal of reli-gious values that makes al Qaeda such aformidable ideological influence as well.And gives to it the character of a movementrather than the rigidities, weaknesses andformal structures of an organization.

I think thats a very important distinc-

tion. Al Qaeda, in its early active stages, wasmuch more organized than it is now. Whenit moved from Sudan to Afghanistan, givensanctuary by the Taliban, it was almost amini-state within a state. Providing the

Taliban with its best shock troops. It waslocated in well organized camps. It ran itsown hotels which had signing in books.You may be surprised by that. It createddocumentation. It researched in laboratories.

And, you know, it trained jihadis and terrorists.At that stage, al Qaeda had a distinctive

military aspect. And it was during this periodthat the attacks on the U.S. embassies in eastAfrica were elaborately planned. Similarly,

the attack on the USS Cole.

And all of these events were highlyorganized conspiracies. Large amounts oftime, significant numbers of people, were

involved. The organization which plannedand carried out those attacks was not reallyunder much pressure from, as it were,opposing forces. And it does point to the factthat our intelligence coverage ofal Qaeda

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at that time, and our insights, were franklynot very good at all. In June 2001 I dont

know whether this is in George Tenets bookor not, but Im going to tell you nonetheless,George Tenet and I had an intelligencesummit on Bermuda.

We actually planted two trees in thegovernors garden, because its a traditionon Bermuda to plant trees for such meetings.I hope theyre thriving. We spent the firsttwo hours talking about something terroristand big being planned. We didnt know

when, we didnt know where.

Of course the rest is history. And Imgoing to move on now. I mention that

because I think people overlook the fact, now,

following the report of the 9/11 commission,the depths of concern and the focus in theintelligence community during that summit,and the latter part of that summer. After theinvasion of Afghanistan, and I think thatwas a brave and correct decision by the Bushadministration, al Qaeda was at its mostvulnerable. And, in the two to three yearsfollowing the invasion, the U.S. led war onterror, and thats a phrase which I personallydont think adds to our understanding of the

problem, but I use it nonetheless, the war onterror had significant success.

Much of al Qaedas infrastructure wasdismantled and its leadership detained.However, this success, though significantwith great beneficial short term results, wasnot sufficient to excise the cancer.

It became evident that one of al Qaedasmost essential strategic qualities has been

its ability to mutate in response to oursuccess against it. I think this has somethingto do with its, what I would describe as itsgenetic make up. And, by that, I mean it ismore of a movement than an organization.

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But it does show compelling evidence ofa direct connection back to al Qaeda in

Pakistan. And, in fact, the experts now talkabout al Qaeda reconstituting and reassertingits leadership. Some experts go as far as tosay that al Qaeda is very much on themarch again. Alive and well on the Pakistani

Afghan border, particularly in Waziristan,largely beyond the effective reach of thePakistani government. Witness the failureof the local tribal leaders to respect therecent agreement conducted with the

Pakistani military to control foreigners inthis sensitive area.

So I think we may be facing a situationwhere al Qaeda has almost gone full circle.And is back again in the northern part ofPakistan and southern Afghanistan. Not,of course, with the same infrastructurethat it had before. But with a very effective,and protected, base area. This, to me, is asignificant development, and I think asurprise. Because I had always thoughtthat we would look into Saudi Arabia foral Qaedas, lets say, ideological engine.But the Saudis have been surprisinglyeffective in suppressing the phenomenon.

They havent done much to solve theproblem but the Saudi security service has

been much more efficient and has reachedfurther into the problem than any of usanticipated.

And I think thats also maybe one of thereasons why you now have this Pakistanifocus. One of the consequences of thisPakistani focus is that it does put the U.K.

in the front line in terms of the risk of amajor terrorist attack, given the evidenceof the links which exist between radicalfundamentalist Muslim leaders in Pakistanand the youth susceptible to radicalization

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in the U.K. The statistics on visits toPakistan by young Pakistani males from the

Pakistani community in the U.K. are quitestaggering. And many of those visits exceeda month in length. And it is clear that wedo have a major problem of radicalization.The numbers are not necessarily very great.

But they dont have to be very great tocause a significant problem.

And the U.K. based plot dismantled bythe arrests of August 2006 to blow up ten

U.S. airliners simultaneously over theAtlantic using liquids explosives is, I think,symptomatic of these relationships. Theserious security problem that the U.K. isnow facing is very serious.

As I said earlier, the war on terror hashad significant success. A number of majorattacks have been prevented. And it has

been, in my view, a real achievement to stopanother major attack on the U.S. mainland.However, I would say that this has been alargely tactical success.

When it comes to striking at the causesof terrorism, the eventual removal of the

risk itself, rather than its symptoms, weactually, in my view, have made littleprogress. The complexities of the problemwe face probably accounts for this.

The fact that it is as much a Muslim onMuslim problem, a struggle for the soul ofIslam, as it is a confrontation betweenMuslim values and western values. Afterall, it took the west many years to climb

onto the moral and political high groundin the Cold War. Despite the fact that thiswas a much more straightforward and lessnuanced confrontation of opposing ideologiesand political systems.

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But maybe it is still too early in thiscrisis for us to expect to have made strategic

progress. Now, unquestionably 9/11 hashad a massive impact on U.S. governmentin all its aspects. Judicial, legislative andexecutive. It has also profoundly influencedpolicy. That this should have happened is

thoroughly understandable.

That it is as desirable in the way that ithas happened, I think, is questionable. Thewar on terror was not a bad idea at itsinception. I would in fact argue that it wasprobably a necessary response which metthe implicit wishes of the vast majority ofthe American people. It was also, initially,successful. But where I part company withthe policy is its failure to adapt in response

to the threat. The policy has, in practice,lacked subtlety.

You do not carry out brain surgery witha blunt knife. We did start out attempting

to amputate, in rather basic fashion, bits offfrom the main body. But were now intosomething much more subtle, sophisticated,delicate.

Yet there is still too much emphasis onwhat I would describe as the use of bluntinstruments. From time to time, they may bestill required, they are not and they shouldnot be at the core of our counter-terroristefforts. Terrorism is no more or less than adesperate act of political communication,a resort to extreme violence when otherpolitical means of attracting attention to orconsideration of the cause it supports, is notgoing to work. The terrorist aims to force

himself upon our consciousness, to obligeus to take account of him.

Now if one accepts this premise, one ofthe basic principles of counter-terrorist

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policy should be, over time, to avoidamplification of the terrorist message.

Much counter-terrorist policy in the U.S.I strongly support. But where the U.S. differsfrom the U.K. is that I fear the balance hastipped in the U.S. towards giving terrorismtoo much attention. And, thus, amplifying

rather than minimizing the terrorist message.Now perhaps the complex checks and

balances within the political system makethis inevitable.

But the polarization of the U.S. politicalscene has created a situation where counter-terrorist actions and policies have becomeintensely partisan issues. And you could saythat Bin Laden has succeeded in insertingthe al Qaeda virus into Americas political

bloodstream.

The U.K. has been more successful,despite the currently greater al Qaedainternal threat, at not allowing itself to be

affected to the same degree. Or I should sayinfected to the same degree. Perhaps yearsof bipartisan solidarity on countering Irishterrorism has made it easier. Maintaining asense of proportion about terrorism, and by

that I mean not investing the terrorist threatwith excessive importance, is difficult. But itis very important even following an eventlike 9/11. We have yet to cross a thresholdwhere that sense of proportion should orcould be justifiably abandoned. And what Imean by that is we havent yet faced anincident where it would be, as it were, logicalto abandon a sense of proportion.

And Im thinking in terms of a CBRN

incident. Which I think would change ourperceptions. One of the most undesirablelonger term effects of 9/11 has been thedistortions it has created governmentally.In the legislative process, in the use of

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executive power. In the influence of the9/11 Commission, and Rob Silverman on

the reorganization of the U.S. intelligencecommunity. Time is limited this evening.So I will restrict my comments to theone area which I do know somethingabout, which is the reorganization of the

U.S. intelligence and security community.The something-must-be-done; reaction inCongress, and in the Senate, which followed9/11 and Iraq, has, in my view, achievedpoor results. And I hope Im not causing

offense but I thought if I was going to givea lecture to this group, I should state myviews clearly.

Judge Richard Posner has writtenexcellently and sensibly about this in his bookUncertain Shield. But at the very momentwhen the U.S. requires a strengthened andmore highly focused and secured community,it has achieved no more than compoundedan already over-complex bureaucracy. Thedepartmental leviathan which is homelandsecurity still, in my view, lacks its essentialnew element. Which is a proper domesticsecurity service. And the position of DNIhas been created with two fundamental

flaws: No overall control of intelligencebudgets, and, two, overriding but conflictingresponsibilities. One being managementand coordination of the whole intelligencecommunity without the control of the budget.

And at the same time ultimate responsibilityfor giving analytical advice to the president.To do both jobs effectively for the worldsremaining superpower is certainly, in myview, beyond the competence of a single

individual, however well served and staffedhe might be.

Which brings me, finally, to the natureof the current terrorist threat, and our

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response to it. I see little evidence that Islamicextremism and militancy is in decline. Read

todays article on page 61 of the currentEconomist which touches on many of thethings that I have been talking about.

Potential recruits to Islamic fundamentalist

terrorist movements are not in short supply.And there appears to be no significant changein the base conditions in the Middle East.And in the Muslim diaspora beyond theMiddle East, especially Europe, where thepreconditions exist that dispose mainlyyoung males between the ages of 18 and32 to become terrorists. The threat, therefore,remains serious and unlikely to decline.

And despite our success in disrupting it,

I am sure that al Qaeda is still pressing hardto attack its main targets. And a successfulattack on the U.S. mainland, or against theU.S. infrastructure elsewhere, must remainits primary objective. What I believe is also

worrying is the likelihood that eventuallyterrorists will tire of using conventional blasttechnology and attempt to use unconventionalweapons against us.

This could be chemical, biological, radio-logical or nuclear. For the moment, I believe,this risk is still low probability with apossible exception of a contamination device.That is the use of a radiological dispersaldevice in an urban area. Not necessarily

designed to kill great numbers, but quiteliterally to terrorize and to disrupt life forpossibly thousands by causing the evacuationof a significant part of a western major city.

Now the longer our successes against theal Qaeda phenomenon is merely tactical, andwe make little strategic progress against theproblem as a whole, the greater the risk ofmore catastrophic terrorist attacks become.

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If the threat and the success of terroristsremain more or less on the same level as

they are now, we can probably continueto manage the problem without it escapingour ability to retain the sense of proportionthat I spoke about in dealing with it.However, we cannot be complacent of the

threat on account of the possibility that itcould mutate through the abuse of thetechnologies to which I have referred.Which presents us with far, far more seriousconsiderations. The means that we now use

to counter this problem, and in the longerterm, are of huge importance. And, as I havehinted in this talk, well actually I haventhinted, Ive said it rather bluntly, I thinkthat the U.S. has placed itself, albeit inad-vertently, at a disadvantage.

Effective and sustained counter-terroristpolicy requires a subtle balance of differentmeans and instruments of which the mostimportant is probably intelligence capability.

And the least relevant, large scale militarycapability. Time is short to get this balanceright. And it is certainly not so at themoment. And time is short, generally,for moderate Islam and us, the allies of

moderate Islam to get to grips with thefundamental causes of the problem rather thanexhausting our precious resources by being

bound to chase after every tactical threatthat we learn about. Thank you very much.

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Questions & Answers

Sir Richard DearloveRICHARD ABORN: Well, that was certainlya sobering, somber, and provocative conver-sation, and I greatly appreciate it. As is our

custom, Sir Richard has agreed to take somequestions from all of us. So, I will look tothe first volunteer. Theyre always very shyat first.

Q. Some of us had the privilege of havingdinner some time ago with Bernard Lewis,and he suggested to our group that what we

were dealing with was another crusade that

has nothing to do with Israel or oil. And we

talked about that today. What do you thinkis a solution to this problem if in fact that is

what were dealing with?

A.I dont know if I really agree. What

were dealing with is a crisis withinIslam between Muslims, and if you acceptthat premise rather than the Lewis premiseof a clash between Christianity and Islam,I think a certain logic would stem from this

analysis. I mean I do spend quite a lot oftime in the Middle East, and my contactswith Middle Eastern leaders and influencemakers inclines me to think that their positionon this issue is hardly different from mine

or yours, and that they are just as worriedand as threatened by it. And the difficultyI think for moderate Islam is intimidation,and the difficulty of speaking out and takinga strong position.

But I think that the longer term solutionslie in empowering our moderate Muslimallies without compromising them in theeyes of fellow Muslims. Now that is notstraightforward. Its a complex and difficult

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task. But I have encountered two small, but I think significant initiatives recently

which I think may show the way forward.

I was recently in Singapore where theyhave a very in typical Singaporeanfashion a very highly developed program

for rehabilitating or reconverting radicalyouth who had been led astray intoextremism. And they take it very seriouslyindeed.

Interestingly, last time I was there the

head of the Saudi program doing the samething was visiting Singapore to compare notes.And I understand that the Saudi programis beginning to show some positive resultsand influence.

This has been practiced also for aconsiderable amount of time in Egypt, andin Algeria as well. These may only be verysmall green shoots. But I think it does give

you an indication of having a strategicapproach to the problem rather than atactical approach.

You know, the implementation of thestrategy is not for intelligence and thesecurity organizations. Its for governments.Were talking about large scale movements.But I dont agree with Bernard Lewiss rathermessy and depressing idea of a majorconfrontation.

I much prefer the theories of Olivier Roy,the French intellectual who writes aboutIslam. And he characterizes the problem asIslam having come to terms with secular

government. Thats a great simplification ofhis thesis. And in a religion where there isno separation between church and state,what is the fate of that religion as a matterof private conscience only.

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And I think that were seeing this crisis.And we are dragged into this crisis. And it

will take some time to resolve. And it may be that the Muslim diasporas in Europewhich are having to find their place withinsecular states and live successfully withinthose states. There may be found seeds of

an important solution.

Q. A lot of people began to point the fingerat the firewall that had been directed to the

United States between law enforcement

operations on the one hand and intelligenceoperations on the other. They pointed to

specific incidents in which law enforcement

was in session and information which might

have prevented the al Qaeda attacks who

were unable to share this intelligence andvice versa.

Now we see the pendulum heading back

in the other direction as some journalists are

concerned about letters that had been issued

to retrieve telephone data about Americans

ostensibly for the purpose of fighting terror-

ism when in fact it was for other purposes.

Do you have the sense that America has

struck the right balance in raising or lowering

the firewalls or where we should go?

A. Well, I think as I indicated, I dontthink it has yet come up with the right

solution. And Im, you know surprised bysome of the things that have happened.I dont want to go into technicalities. Butlet me just make a general point about theU.S. security structures. It is intended ascompliment.

I think for someone brought up inEuropean security traditions, this is a reallyimportant point. The United States greatachievement domestically is to create

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Americans, which it does very successfully.It creates, in a way that no other country is

able to do.

It has never, except for one or two odd-ball incidents like Sacco and Venzetti, neverhad a tradition of spying on its immigrant

communities. And this is a remarkableachievement. I think one of the worst aspectsof 9/11 is that it threatens that concept ofAmerican identity. In Europe, let us takeFrance for example. France has a furiouslyefficient security service, the DST. And italso has another rather bizarre policeservice called the Renseignement General.And the degree of intelligence, within ademocracy collected on their own citizens,is significant. Its a tradition that goes way

back in time.

And frankly, 9/11 could never havehappened in France because a conspiracyof that nature, would have been detected

by either the R.G. or by the DST. Andsimilarly, even in the U.K., although wevenow had to revise our ideas about the scopeand breadth of what needs to be done.

And I think that there is a completelydifferent tradition and mental attitude. TheU.S. should be very pleased in many respectsthat it doesnt have it. It doesnt have it forobvious reasons. But then the question is ifyou have this dreadful terrorist problem,how do you create an infrastructure to dealwith it domestically?

Actually, I dont think that the domesticthreat within the U.S. is very great. Its much

more likely to be an imported virus herethan it is, lets say, in the U.K. Im not sayingit doesnt exist, but I mean Ive dealt withyour question sort of tangentially, but Ithink you can see what Im driving at.

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Q. I have to disagree with you in yourappraisal of France. And I wouldnt say this

on the street because the media being what

it is today, it could be very troublesome.

We Americans, in a way, need to be thankful

that our illegal immigrant question has to

do primarily with people who are coming

here to seek jobs. And we have to deal withthat issue, but theyre primarily coming

here to seek jobs and integrate into the

country. They are not doing that in France.

The reason they dont attack France is

because they can get what they desirewithout attacking France.

The question Id like to ask you is how

is it a good outcome when we allow a group

of Imams to go on an airline and then createa false case to entrap Americans?

How is it a good outcome when at will

the government of Iran can kidnap anyone

and we consider the freeing of these captives

without any punishment for the governmentof Iran to be a positive outcome? How is it

a positive outcome when in Britain your

educators will not teach the Holocaust to

their students for fear of angering Muslims

who have been taught Holocaust denial inthe home? We can go across Europe, and

across America, across anywhere we want,

unless you have one degree of civility, were

not winning this, were losing this.

A. Well, effectively, I dont really disagreewith what youre saying. And I mean allIm saying about France is that it has avery efficient security service. And youknow, whatever else you say about it, thatis true.

And its very, very active internallywithin France. But I dont argue with the

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points you make at all about, as it were,the consequences of, lets say, intimidation,in the way that people may behave. Youknow, lets not get into discussion of theIranian issue. Im sure a lot of peoplewould love to punish Iran, and it is beingpunished by the international community.

Its not just being punished in terms of thespecific incident. But I havent answeredthat very well.

Q. A quick question about the finances ofal Qaeda. Whats your point about how itsbeing financed?

A.I dont think its being financed by

foreign governments. Al Qaeda doesnt needmuch money. And, you know, this isnt anorganization with a massive infrastructure.Initially, theres no question that some of themoney came from the production of opium

in Afghanistan.

I think the Taliban originally had sourcesof money in the Gulf, some of which mayhave links back to influential families.

But I think the main source of funding, tothe extent that al Qaeda needs largesums of money, has been through Wahhabicharitable organizations in Saudi Arabia,and similar organizations in other Muslim

countries. And there hasnt been, hitherto,significant control by governments likeSaudi Arabia on the and distribution ofthese funds. But that is changing. I dontsee the starvation of cash to al Qaeda as

being a way to solve the problembecauseit will always have a sufficient trickle offunds still to be extremely lethal.

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Q. My question is to the issue that povertyis considered to be a breeding ground forterrorism. If you look at those involved in the

terrorist plots in the United Kingdom, they

were solidly middle class, second generation

British citizens. And Im wondering, in terms

of the war of ideas whether in fact the UnitedStates greatest ally, Britain, has ceded its

ideas of sovereignty to embracing a multi-

culturalism which actually encourages this

type of terrorism because we dont do a very

good job of saying why our ideas are betterthan their ideas.

A. Theyre certainly concerned aboutthat in the U.K., and about the way thatthe government has not asserted nationalidentity. But I think the link betweenpoverty, deprivation, and terrorism is atenuous one. Obviously its easier perhaps to

find foot soldiers in deprived communities.But in essence, I think the problem is

much more about cultural identity and thedifficulties of second and third generationimmigrants. The characteristic shape, in the

U.K. and Europe, is that the parents arriveand want very little to do with where theycame from. They want to be seen to be aslocal as possible. But at the same they neveractually lose touch with the original home

country.

And in the second and the third genera-tion, they have adopted the identity of thenew country in terms of language and

day-to-day cultural influence. But theyrestill not part of it, particularly when theresa failure to be absorbed in a thorough wayinto their new society.

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And at that point to, as it were, re-identifyyourself, one of the ways to do it is to go

back to your parents former origins and,re-emphasize your identity by excessivereligiosity. And this is certainly one of thephenomena I think which explains whatshappened both in France and in the U.K.

because of the failure of both countriespolicies. I think you will find it has cer-tainly been the theme in the Frenchelections. Its certainly been a theme withGordon Brown, that there is going to be a

much more aggressive and confident set ofpolicies about asserting British, Frenchidentity, to attempt to counter this failure,really, to absorb the immigrant particularlyafter two or more generations.

And, of course, the program in the U.K.to confront the problem of radicalization, isnot a security and intelligence program.Thats just finding out about the problem.Its about education, its about local govern-

ment, its about integration, its about thecomposition of our societies.

And one shouldnt neglect the fact thatin certain areas theres a lot of success in

these fields. So, one is certainly not withouthope. The problem is you only have to havea handful of failures and a handful ofperpetrators of terrorist events for thesituation to look very different indeed. I

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