1

MindMisreadingShannonSpaulding

InvitedcontributiontoPhilosophicalIssues,annualsupplementtoNous

Abstract:Mostpeoplethinkofthemselvesasprettygoodatunderstandingothers’beliefs,desires,emotions,andintentions.Accuratemindreadingisanimpressivecognitivefeat,andforthisreasonthephilosophicalliteratureonmindreadinghasfocusedexclusivelyonexplainingsuchsuccesses.However,asitturnsout,weregularlymakemindreadingmistakes.Understandingwhenandhowmindmisreadingoccursiscrucialforacompleteaccountofmindreading.Inthispaper,Iexaminetheconditionsunderwhichmindmisreadingoccurs.Iarguethatthesepatternsofmindmisreadingshedlightonthelimitsofmindreading,revealnewperspectivesonhowmindreadingworks,andhaveimplicationsforsocialepistemology.1.Introduction

Incommonparlance,mindreadingisthetelepathicabilitytoseeintoanother

person’smindanddiscernwhattheyarethinking.Telepathicmindreadingisexotic

andintriguing–atleastjudgingbythenumberofmovies,TVshows,andnovels

aboutit–andnotreal.Inphilosophyandthecognitivesciences,thereisanother

senseofmindreadingthatislessexoticbutjustasinteresting.Thiskindof

mindreadingistheabilitytoattributementalstatestoagentsinordertointerpret

theirbehaviorandanticipatewhattheywilldonext.Itisacentral,ubiquitous

featureofoursociallives.Whenwearedrivingonabusyfreeway,takingcareofour

children,teaching,fieldingquestionsatatalk,weattributebeliefs,desires,emotions,

andothermentalstatestopeopleinordertomakesenseoftheirbehaviorand

interactsuccessfullywiththem.

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Thesocialworldisincrediblycomplex.Ouruniqueexperiences,physiological,

behavioral,andpsychologicalfactorsinfluenceourmentalstates.Moreover,our

mentalstatesaredynamicallyrelatedtoothers’mentalstates.Whatwethink,feel,

andintenddependsonwhatothersarethinking,feeling,orintending.Figuringout

whyanotherpersonbehavedasshedidandanticipatingwhatshewilldonext

involvesgrasping,atsomelevel,howallofthesefactorsinfluencehermentalstates.

Thedynamicsofreal-worldsocialinteractionsaresocomplexthatitis

amazingthatweaccuratelymindreadatall.Mindreadingseemstocomeveryeasily

tomostofus.Weoftenhavelittledifficultyunderstandingothers’mentalstates.We

generallycantellwhatotherdriversaretryingtodoandwhy,whatourchildwants

andwhy,whenourstudentsareboredorinterested,andwhethertheaudience

memberunderstandsouranswers.Givenhowimpressivethisfeatis,itisnaturalto

framethestudyofmindreadingaroundthecognitiveprocessesthatmake

successfulmindreadingpossible.Indeed,thishasbeenfocusofthemindreading

literaturesinceitsinceptioninthelate1970s.

Myfocushere,however,willbeonmindreadingfailures,i.e.,mind

misreading.Mostpeoplethinkofthemselvesasprettygoodatunderstandingothers’

beliefs,desires,emotions,andintentions.However,socialpsychologistshave

discoveredthatwearesignificantlyworseatmindreadingthanwethinkweare

(Ames&Kammrath,2004;Epley,2008;Hall,Andrzejewski,&Yopchick,2009;Realo

etal.,2003).Weconsistentlyandsubstantiallyoverrateourabilitytoaccurately

judgeothers’mentalstatesandinterpretsocialinteractions.Thismaybeduetoa

lackofinterestincorrectingourmindreadingmistakes,alackoffeedbackonerrors,

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oranextremeinstanceoftheDunning-Krugereffect.1Whateverthecause,the

consensusfromtheempiricalliteratureisthatmindmisreadingisverycommon.

Thephilosophicalliteratureonmindreadingdoesnotstudymindmisreading

inanysystematicway.2Thisisunfortunatebecausethereisahightheoreticalpayoff

forexaminingourmindreadingerrors.Specifically,patternsofmindmisreading

shedlightonourvariousmindreadingstrategiesandtheconditionsunderwhichwe

use(andmisuse)thesestrategies.Inthisway,theinvestigationofmindmisreading

revealsthelimitsofourmindreadingabilities,whicharenotapparentwhenone

focusessolelyonsuccessfulmindreading.Inaddition,theexaminationofmind

misreadingsuggestsnovelhypothesesabouthowweunderstandothersthatarenot

evidentsimplyfromstudyingmindreadingsuccesses.

Inthispaper,Iexplorethisdivergencebetweenoursubjectivesenseofour

mindreadingabilitiesandtheobjectiveevaluationofourmindreadingabilities.In

thenextSection,Ibrieflyreviewthetwomainaccountsofmindreading.InSection3,

Idiscusstheempiricalliteratureonthevarietiesofmindmisreading.Iconsiderthe

distinctiveerrorsthatariseforaccuracy-orientedmindreadingandefficiency-

orientedmindreading.InSection4,Idiscusstheimplicationsofmindmisreading.I

arguethatthesepatternsofmindmisreadingindicatespecificlimitsonour

1TheDunning-Krugereffectisacognitivebiaswhereinpoorperformersinsocialandintellectualdomainsareunawareoftheirignorance(Kruger&Dunning,1999).Theirdeficiencyisinvisibletothemperhapsbecauserecognizingtheirdeficiencyrequirestheverycompetencytheylack.2Thisliteratureextensivelydiscussesmindreadingfailuresinchimpanzeesandchildreninthecontextofestablishingaphylogeneticandontogenetictimelineformaturemindreading.Italsoexaminesthemindreadingfailuresofindividualswithautism.However,thereisnosystematicdiscussionofneurotypicaladults’mindreadingerrors,whichiswhatIfocusonhere.

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mindreadingabilities.Furthermore,Iarguethatthesepatternsofmindmisreading

suggestthatself-reflectionplaysanimportantfactorinmindreadingaccuracy.In

Section5,Idiscusstheimplicationsforsocialepistemology.

2.TheoriesofMindreading

Twocompetingaccountshavedominatedthemindreadingliterature:theTheory

Theory(TT)andtheSimulationTheory(ST).TheTTholdsthatweexplainand

predictbehaviorbyemployingatacitfolkpsychologicaltheoryabouthowmental

statesinformbehavior.Withourfolkpsychologicaltheory,weinferfromatarget’s

behaviorwhathisorhermentalstatesprobablyare.Fromtheseinferences,plusthe

psychologicalprinciplesinthetheoryconnectingmentalstatestobehavior,we

predictthetarget’sbehavior.

Onthisview,interpretingaperson’sbehaviorandanticipatingwhattheywill

donextfundamentallyisthesameasexplainingandpredictingthepositionofthe

electronsinacloudchamber.Inbothcases,werelyonarichbodyofdomain-

specificinformationaboutthetarget,whichweusetoinfercausalstates,andonthe

basisofthiswemakepredictionsaboutthebehaviorofthetarget.Ourtheoryof

mindistacitandlessformalizedthanourscientifictheories,but,itisargued,the

abilitytounderstandothersisbestunderstoodastheapplicationofatheory.

TheST,incontrast,holdsthatweexplainandpredictatarget’sbehaviorby

usingourownmindsasasimulationoftheotherperson’smind.Toexplaina

target’sbehavior,weputourselvesinanother’sshoes,sotospeak,andimagine

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whatourmentalstateswouldbeandhowwewouldbehaveifwewerethatagentin

thatparticularsituation.Topredictatarget’sbehavior,wetaketheattributed

mentalstatesasinputandsimulatethetarget’sdecisionaboutwhattodonext.

Simulationtheoristsrejecttheideathatmindreadingconsistsintheorizing.

AccordingtoST,wedonotrequirealargebodyoffolkpsychologicalinformation

abouthowmentalstatesinformbehaviorinordertomindread.Onthisview,allwe

needistheabilitytoimagineoneselfinadifferentsituation,figureoutwhatone

wouldthink,feel,anddointhatsituation,andattributethoseimaginedmental

statestoanotherperson.Thissimplyrequiresustouseourordinarycognitive

mechanismsinanofflinewayforthepurposeofmindreading.Thus,theSTis

regardedasaninformation-poortheory,whereastheTTisregardedasan

information-richtheory.

InadditiontowhatwemightcallpureTTandpureSTarehybridaccounts

thatincorporateelementsofTTandST.Thesehybridaccountsaimtocapturethe

theoreticaladvantagesofSTandTTwhileavoidingtheproblemswithboththeories.

ShaunNicholsandStephenStich(2003)havedevelopedaTT-centrichybrid

account,andAlvinGoldman(2006)hasdevelopedaST-centrichybridaccount.

Thesetwoinnovativeaccountshaveservedaspillarsforthemindreadingliterature.

3.MindMisreading

Studyingbothsuccessfulandunsuccessfulprocessesisacommonmethodologyin

philosophyandthecognitivesciences.Consider,forexample,thestudyofvision,

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memory,andself-knowledge.Ineachofthesecases,researchersstudyhowthe

capacityworksandhowitbreaksdown.Tolearnhowvisionworks,westudy

veridicalperceptionbutalsomisperception,visualhallucinations,andvisual

illusions.Memoryresearchersstudyhowandwhenwehaveaccuratememories,but

thisispairedwithinvestigationoffalsememories,misremembering,andamnesia.

Similarly,researchonself-knowledgecoverssuccessfulintrospection,confabulation,

andself-deception.Thesethreecasesarerepresentativeofthestudyofcognitionin

general.Theunderlyingrationaleisthattounderstandaprocess,youmust

understandwhenandhowitfails.

ThedebatebetweentheTT,theST,andvarioushybridaccountsprimarily

focusesonexplainingsuccessfulmindreading.Thoughitisimportanttostudy

successfulmindreading,forseveralreasonsthisdiscussionshouldbepairedwithan

examinationofmindmisreading.First,asnotedintheintroduction,wearenot

nearlyasgoodatmindreadingaswethinkweare.Focusingpurelyonsuccessful

mindreadingpresentsamisleadingpictureofouractualabilities.Second,patterns

ofmindmisreadingrevealthelimitsofourmindreadingabilitiesthatarenot

apparentwhenfocusingsolelyonsuccessfulmindreading.Third,anexaminationof

mindmisreadingsuggestsanovelperspectiveonwhatittakestomindread

successfully.

InthisSection,Ishallexamineseveralprevalentbutunderexplorederrors

thatarisefortwotypesofmindreading.Inthephilosophicalliteratureon

mindreading,manytheoriestacitlyassumethattheprimaryaimofmindreadingis

accuracy.Thatis,whenweattributementalstatestoothersinordertointerpret

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andanticipatetheirbehavior,themostimportantgoalistoattributethecorrect

mentalstates.Althoughthiscertainlyistrueinsomecases,accuracyisnotalways

theprimaryconcerninmindreading.Sometimeswearenotmotivatedtoorsimply

cannotengageinathoroughdeliberationaboutatarget’smentalstates,andinthese

casesefficiencytrumpsaccuracy.Whenefficiencyistheprimarygoalin

mindreading,weusevariousmindreadingheuristics,whicharecognitivelyless

demandingandreliablewhenusedappropriately.

Indiscussingthevarietiesofmindmisreading,Ishalldistinguishbetween

theerrorsthatariseforaccuracy-orientedmindreadingandtheerrorsthatarisefor

efficiency-orientedmindreading.Thisisnotahardandfastdistinction.Some

processeswillnotfitcleanlyintotheaccuracy-seekingorefficiency-seeking

categories.Someefficientstrategiesmayplayaroleindeliberativemindreading,

anddeliberativeprocessesmayinfluenceefficientstrategies.Despitethese

complications,thedistinctionbetweenefficiency-orientedandaccuracy-oriented

mindreadingishelpfulinthiscontext,andIwilluseittoillustratethetypesofmind

misreading.3

3.1MindMisreading:AimingforAccuracy

3Idistinguishbetweendeliberativeandefficientmindreadingprocesses,butIremainneutralonthekindofcognitivesystemthatunderliestheseprocesses.Itcouldbethattherearetwoseparatesystems–system1andsystem2–thatrealizeeachtypeofprocess.Alternatively,theremaybeonesystemthatrealizesallmindreadingprocessesbutismodulatedbyexecutivefunctionorsomeotherfactor.Theremaybeotheroptions,aswell.Myargumentsareneutralwithrespecttothesedifferenthypotheses.

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Insomesocialinteractions,ourprimaryaimisaccuratemindreading.Thisusually

occurswhensomethingimportantdependsongettingitright,whenitmatterstous

personally,whenwewillbeheldresponsibleforourinterpretationofthe

interaction,orwhenthesituationisunusualorunexpected(Fiske&Neuberg,1990;

Kelley,1973;Tetlock,1992).Whenourprimaryaimisaccuracy,wetendtosearch

forrelevantinformationinacontrolledanddeliberativefashion.Consider,for

example,whatitisliketogoonafirstdate.Youaretryingtofigureoutwhetherthe

personisinterestedinyouromantically,sharesyourbeliefsandvalues,hasagood

personality,willnotcheat,wantstobeinalong-termrelationship,etc.Thestakes

arerelativelyhighforyou;youdonotwanttoinvesttime,energy,andemotionin

someonewhowillturnouttobeapoormatchforyou.Thus,youwillwantto

consideralltherelevantevidenceandmakesureyourjudgmentsarenotbasedon

merelysuperficialcues.

Whenweaimforaccuratemindreading,errorscanoccurunderthree

conditions:whenweareundercognitiveloadandthuscannotengageinathorough

searchforinformation;whenweapplyaninappropriatemodeltothesituation;

whenourinformationsearchisskewedbyothermotivations.

Table1:Typesofmindreadingerrorsforaccuracy-orientedmindreading.

Accuracy-oriented

Mindreading

TypesofMindMisreading

Deliberation Cognitiveloadinterfereswith

informationsearch

Applythewrongmodel

Self-interestbiasesinformationsearch

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Thefirstsortoferrorthatarisesfordeliberativemindreadingoccurswhen

onelacksthecognitiveresourcestoengageinathorough,objectiveinformation

search.Deliberativemindreadingiseffortfulandcognitivelytaxing,anditisdifficult

ifoneisundercognitiveloadornotwellpracticedinthiskindofreflective

reasoning(Gilbert,Krull,&Pelham,1988).Insuchcases,theresultisthatoursocial

inferencesarebiasedtowardthemostreadilyaccessibleinformation,whichmay

leadtoerror.

Consideragainthefirstdateexample.Supposethattheeveningyougoonthe

date,youaretired,stressedaboutwork,anddistractedduringthedate.Athorough,

objectivedeliberationaboutyourdateisdoublydifficultforyou:Notonlymustyou

trytomakeagoodimpressiononyourdatebybeingpersonableandwitty,youalso

mustlistentoandinterpretwhatyourdateistellingyou,figureoutwhatfood

choice,clothes,questionsandanswerstellyouaboutyourdate’smindset,andyou

mustdoallthiswhilephysiologicallyandcognitivelytaxed.Acareful,deliberative

informationsearchrequiresgoingbeyondjustthesalientcues.However,youare

toocognitivelytaxedtodothiswithmuchcare,andasaresultyourdeliberationis

guidedbysuperficialbutpotentiallymisleadingcues.

So,whatarethesalientcuesinsocialinteractions?Forallofus,themost

salientfeaturesofapersontendtobetheirage,race,andgender(Ito,Thompson,&

Cacioppo,2004;Liu,Harris,&Kanwisher,2002).Werapidlysortpeoplebyage,race,

andgenderandothersocialcategories,dependingonthecontent.Onthebasisof

thiscategorization,wespontaneouslyattributepersonalitytraitssuchas

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trustworthiness,competence,aggressiveness,anddominance(Olivola&Todorov,

2010;Rule,Ambady,&AdamsJr,2009).Althoughthespeedofspontaneoustrait

inferencesisamatterofdispute,itoccursveryrapidly:between100milliseconds

and1400to1600milliseconds,evenwhenweareundercognitiveload(Malle&

Holbrook,2012;Todorov&Uleman,2003).

Inaddition,wespontaneouslyandimplicitlyassociatethesesocialcategories

withspecificcharacteristics.Forexample,weassociateoldandincompetent,female

andwarm,baby-faceandunthreatening.Theseassociationsarethesortofthing

testedbytheImplicitAssociationTask,whichmeasurethestrengthofaperson’s

implicitassociations(Greenwald,McGhee,&Schwartz,1998;Greenwald,Poehlman,

Uhlmann,&Banaji,2009).

Puttingallofthistogether,inordinarysocialinteractionsthemostaccessible

informationaboutanotherpersontendstobeanindividual’ssocialcategory,

spontaneouslyinferredpersonalitytraits,andimplicitassociations.Itispossiblein

deliberationtooverridetheimplicitassociationsandspontaneouslyinferredtraits

ifoneismotivatedandhasthecognitiveresourcestodoso.However,ifoneisbusy,

stressed,andtired,overridingtheseinferencesandassociationsisextremely

difficult,andtheymaybiasone’sdeliberation.Thus,itisdifficultforyouonyour

hypotheticalfirstdatetodeliberateobjectivelyaboutwhetheryourdateis

committedtobeinginaseriousrelationship,sharesyourvalues,isloyal,etc.Your

deliberationisinfluencedbyimplicitassociationsandtraitinferences,whichunder

idealcircumstancesyouwouldreflectonandpossiblyreject.However,becauseyou

areundercognitiveloadyoulacktheabilitytooverridethesesalientfeaturesin

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favoroflesssalientbutpotentiallymoreaccuratefeatures.Thus,errorsarisefor

deliberativemindreadingwhenwearecognitivelytaxedandcannotdeliberate

carefully.

Thesecondkindoferrorthatmayoccurwhenweareaimingforaccurate

mindreadingconcernstheframeworkweemploytomakesenseofasocial

interaction.Eveningooddeliberativemindreading,wedonotconsiderallofthe

availableinformation.Thatwouldbeimpossiblebecausethereisfartoomuch

informationforhumanbeingstoprocess.Instead,wesearchforthemostrelevant

informationandbasemindreadingjudgmentsonthatinformation.4Thesituational

contextandone’spastexperiencesdeterminewhatistakentoberelevant

information.Theyshapeexpectationsinsocialinteractions,andtheymakecertain

interpretationsmoreaccessibletous,i.e.,ourattentionisprimedforthese

interpretations(Wittenbrink,Judd,&Park,2001).

Considerthefollowingsimpleexample.Havingspentmuchofmylifeon

universitycampuses,IgenerallyknowwhattoexpectwhenIvisitauniversity

campus,evenonethatisunfamiliartome.Iunderstandthegeneralinstitutional

structure,socialroles,andtypicalbehaviorofadministrators,faculty,andstudents.I

haveamodelthatguidesmyinterpretationandexpectationsofwhathappenson

campuses.Someonewhohasneverattendedauniversityandhasnoexperience

withlifeonauniversitycampusmaynothavethesameinterpretationsand

expectationsasIdo.Theywilluseadifferent,lessappropriateframeworkto4Someerrorsoccurbecausetheinformationweattendtoincludesstatisticaloutliersorourinformationsampleissmalland/orbiased.Thesestatisticalerrorsarecommontoeverytypeofreasoning,soIwillnotdevotespecialattentiontothemindiscussingmindmisreading.

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understandandanticipatebehaviortheyencounteronauniversitycampusandthus

arelikelytomisunderstandsomeoftheidiosyncraticbehaviorsonuniversity

campuses.

Thetheory-ladennessofsocialobservationiskeytothesecondtypeoferror

indeliberativemindreading.Wearelikelytoattendtoirrelevantormisleading

informationwhentheframeworkthatguidesourinformationsearchisfaultyin

somerespect.If,forexample,theframeworkdoesnotapplytothesituation,orifthe

frameworkitselfinaccurate,thenwearelikelytomisinterpretothers’behavior.

Consideragainmymodelforuniversitycampuses.Itisusefulandappropriatefor

mostAmericanandEuropeanuniversities,butdespitesomesuperficialsimilarities

itisnotappropriateforcontemporarytechnologycampuseslikeGoogleplexor

MicrosoftCampus.IfIapplymyuniversitymodeltoGoogleplex,Iamlikelyto

misunderstandtheinstitutionalandsocialdynamics,andIamlikelyto

misunderstandthebehaviorandmotivationsofpeopleinthisenvironment.

Ingeneral,applyinganinappropriateorfaultymodeltoasituationcanlead

ustomisinterpretsocialinteractions,whichpavesthewayformindmisreading.

Thisisespeciallylikelytohappenwhenweareundercognitiveloadbecausewe

mayfailtonoticethatourmodeldoesnotfitthesituation.Thiskindoferroralsois

likelytooccurwhenweareoverlyconfidentinoursocialinterpretation,whichis

commonwhenasituationseemsveryfamiliartous.Insuchcases,becauseweare

confidentweunderstandthesocialdynamics,wedonotreflectonour

interpretationorconsiderthepossibilitythatweareemployinganinappropriateor

faultymodelofthesocialinteraction.

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Athirdsortoferrorinaccuracy-orientedmindreadingariseswhenthe

mindreadingprocessisskewedbyself-interest.Inmanysocialinteractions,our

socialinterpretationsareshapedbytheneedforanxietyreduction,self-esteem

preservation,andconfirmationofone’sworldview.Inthesecases,ourmindreading

inferences,inonewayoranother,serveself-interestedpurposes(Dunning,1999;

Kunda,1990).Thesemotivationsleadtoseveralspecificmindreadingerrors.

ConsiderfirsttheSelf-ServingAttributionalBias,whichdescribesour

tendencytotakecreditforsuccessanddenyresponsibilityforfailure.(Miller&Ross,

1975).Weoftenattributeoursuccessestosomeinternalfactor,e.g.,diligenceor

talent,andattributeourfailurestoexternalmitigatingfactors,e.g.,badluckorbias.

Inthisway,wecometofeelgoodaboutoursuccessesandbrushoffourfailures.

Thispatternisfoundforjudgingin-groupandout-groupbehaviors,aswell.

ThisiscalledtheGroup-ServingAttributionalBias(Brewer&Brown,1998;

Pettigrew,1979).Onetendstojudgethesuccessofanout-grouptobetheresultof

external,mitigatingsituationalfactorsandthefailureofanout-groupastheresult

ofinternalfactors,whereasonejudgesthesuccessofone’sin-grouptobetheresult

ofinternalfactorsandthefailureofone’sin-grouptobetheresultofsituational

factors.Oneseesthispatternofreasoningveryclearlyinsportsfans.Whenthe

Badgerswinitisbecausetheyaretalentedandhardworking,butwhentheBadgers

loseitisbecausetheywereofftheirgamethatday,theotherteamgotluckyafew

times,andtherefereeswerebiasedagainsttheBadgers.

TheSelf-andGroup-ServingAttributionalBiasestendtooccurinacontextof

threatorcompetition.Insuchcontexts,weemploydifferenttypesofexplanations

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dependingonwhosebehaviorweareexplaining.Whetherwecitesituationalfactors

ormentalstatesdependsonourperceivedsimilaritytothetarget,notwhether

situationalfactorsormentalstatesactuallycausedthebehavior.Thus,thesebiases

distortourjudgmentsaboutourownandothers’behavior.

NaïveRealismisanothersortofmindmisreadinggeneratedbyself-interest.

Itdescribesthetendencytoregardothersasmoresusceptibletobiasand

misperceptionthanoneself(Pronin,Lin,&Ross,2002).Wethinkthatwesimplysee

thingsastheyarebutotherssufferfrombias.Thistendencyisprevalentin

interactionsinwhichpeopledisagree.Forexample,oneregardsthoseofadifferent

politicalpartyasmisguidedandbiasedbytheirpersonalmotivations,whereasone

regardsoneself(andtosomeextentothermembersofone’spoliticalparty)simply

ascorrect.Weassumethatwesimplyseethingsastheyreallyare.NaïveRealism

influencesthementalstatesweattributetoourselvesandtoothers.Thisbiasis

entrenchedinourreasoning,butitisespeciallycommonwhenweareoverly

confident.Inthosecases,wefailtoconsiderseriouslytheideathatwearetheones

whoarebiasedandmisperceiving.

Finally,confirmationbiasdescribesageneraltendencytoseekonly

informationthatconfirmsone’spreconceivedideasandinterpretambiguous

informationinlightofthesepreconceivedideas.Withrespecttosocialcognition,we

havepreconceivedideasaboutotherindividualsandgroups,andwetendto

interpretsocialinteractionsintermsofthosepreconceivedideas.Forexample,

racistsnoticewhenindividualsbehaveinwaysthatconfirmtheirracistbeliefsbut

theyoftendonotattendtothemanycaseswhereindividualsactinwaysthat

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disconfirmtheirracistbeliefs.Confirmationbiasoccursregardlessofhowthe

preconceivedideaoriginated,howlikelyitistobetrue,andwhetheraccuracyis

incentivized(Skov&Sherman,1986;Slowiaczek,Klayman,Sherman,&Skov,1992;

Snyder,Campbell,&Preston,1982).

3.2MindMisreading:AimingforEfficiency

Section3.1explainsthreewaysinwhichthoughtfuldeliberationaboutothers’

mentalstatescangoawry.ThisSectionexplainsthetypesoferrorsinefficient

mindreading.Althoughsometimesourprimaryaimisaccuratemindreading,thisis

notalwaysthecase.Oftenthereareconstraintsonourmotivation,time,and

attentionthatprohibitevenattemptingtoengageinathoroughsearchfor

information.Insuchcases,accuracyisasecondaryaimandefficiencyistheprimary

aim.Whenthesocialinteractionseemsordinaryandfamiliar,whennotmuchhangs

onit,orwhenweareotherwisecognitivelytaxed,weusecognitiveshortcuts.

Whenourprimarygoalisefficientmindreading,severalstrategiesare

available.Thestrategiesweusedependonwhetherornottheindividualweare

mindreadingispartofourin-group.Weidentifypeopleaspartofourin-groupor

partofanout-grouponthebasisofperceivedsimilarity(Ames,2004a,2004b;Ames,

Weber,&Zou,2012).Thatis,thosewhoweperceivetobelikeusarecategorizedas

partofinourin-group,andthosewhoweperceivetobeunlikeusarecategorizedas

partofanout-group.Onetendstoidentifypeoplewhoshareone’sage,race,gender,

religion,ornationalityaspartofone’sin-group.However,becausepeoplehave

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multiple,overlappingidentities,andperceivedsimilarityisrelativetoacontext,

socialcategorizationextendsbeyondthesebasicclassifications.Thus,Imay

considersomeoneaspartofmyin-groupinonecontextbutnotinanother.5

Firstconsidertheheuristicsweusewhenweperceiveanindividualtobe

similartoourselvesinsomesalientrespect.Inthesecases,weoftensimplyproject

ourownmentalstatestothatindividual(Ames,2004a,2004b;Amesetal.,2012).

Thisisanefficientstrategybecausewedonothavetodeliberateaboutthetarget’s

situationandlikelymentalstates.Rather,wesimplyinferthatthetargetbelieves,

desires,orfeelsaboutsomeeventthewaywedo.Forexample,inmanycontextsI

considerphilosophersasmyin-group.Ihavelearnedthatphilosopherstendtohave

similarsocialandpoliticalviews.IfIlearnthatSallyisaphilosopher,Iassumethat

shesharesmanycharacteristicsincommonwithme,includingpoliticalopinions.In

suchacase,Isimplyprojectmyownpoliticaljudgmentsonherwithoutany

deliberation.

Sometimeswealsouseourmentalstatesasananchorandadjustthe

interpretationbasedonhowsimilartheindividualistous.Forexample,ifIlearn

thatSallyspecializesinsocialandpoliticalphilosophy,Imaythinkthatsheprobably

hasmorenuancedviewsonpoliticsthanIdoandadjustmyattributionsaccordingly.

Projectionandanchoring-plus-adjustmentareegocentricheuristics.Ifour

perceptionsofsimilarityarecorrect,andifweaccuratelyintrospectourownmental

states,theseegocentricheuristicsareusefulandaccurate.Errorsoccurwhenthese

twoconditionsarenotsatisfied.5Importantly,perceivedsimilarityisasubjectiveandsometimesidiosyncraticjudgment,notanobjectivemeasureofactualsimilarity(Amesetal.,2012).

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Errorsarisewhenweoverestimatethesimilaritybetweenourselvesandthe

otherperson(s)andthusengageinmoreprojectionthaniswarranted.Theresulting

errorsarecalledtheFalseConsensusEffectandtheCurseofKnowledge(Clement&

Krueger,2002;Epley&Waytz,2010,p.512).TheFalseConsensusEffectoccurs

whenwefalselyassumethatagroupofpeoplesharesourperspectiveonsomeissue.

TheCurseofKnowledgeisarelatedphenomenoninwhichwefalselyassumethat

anotherindividualknowswhatweknow.Forbothkindsofmindmisreading,we

inappropriatelyprojectourownmentalstatesontoothersbecauseweassumethat

wearemoresimilarthanweinfactare.Thespecificdetailsonhowthishappens

willdifferfromcasetocase.Ingeneral,inappropriateprojectionoccurswhenwe

attendtosuperficialsimilaritiesbetweenothersandourselvesandfailtonoticeor

appreciatedissimilarities,e.g.,intermsofsituationalcontext,personalbackground,

knowledge,attitudes,andemotions.

Asecondkindoferrorforegocentricheuristicsoccurswhenwecorrectly

diagnosethesimilaritybetweenthemindreadingtargetandourselvesbut

inaccuratelyintrospectourownmentalstates.Insuchacase,projectingourown

mentalstatesontoatargetiswarrantedbecausewearesimilartothetargetinthe

relevantrespect,butwefailtounderstandourownbeliefs,desires,motivations,and

feelingsandthusattributethewrongmentalstates.Consider,forexample,aself-

unawareracistwhothinksofhimselfas“colorblind”butinfactharborsmanyracist

attitudes.Inmindreadingasimilarperson,themindreadercorrectlyjudgesthatthe

otherpersonissimilarandthusprojectshisownattitudestothatperson.Inthis

case,heattributestotheotherpersonthebeliefthatallracesareequal.However,he

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makesamindreadingerrorbecauseneitherhenorthesimilarotheractuallyhave

racialegalitarianattitudes.Ifhehadintrospectedcorrectly,hewouldhave

recognizedhisWhiteSupremacistattitudesandprojectedthosetothesimilarother

person.Thiskindoferrorislikelytooccurwhenwearelessself-reflectiveandthus

donotunderstandourownmentalstates.

Thepreviouskindsofefficiency-orientedmindreadingarebasedon

egocentricheuristics,whichweemploywhenweperceiveanindividualtobe

similartous.Whenweperceiveanindividualtobedifferentfromus,weuse

alternativeefficientstrategies,namely,stereotypesabouttheindividual’ssalientin-

group(Ames,2004a;Amesetal.,2012;Krueger,1998;Vorauer,Hunter,Main,&Roy,

2000).Stereotypesmaybepositive,negative,orneutralbeliefsaboutsomegroup.

Table2:Typesmindreadingerrorsforefficiency-orientedmindreading.

Efficiency-oriented

Mindreading

TypesofMindMisreading

Projection Overestimatesimilarity;

inappropriatelyprojectone’smentalstates

Overestimatesimilarity;insufficiently

adjustprojection

Correctlyjudgesimilarity;incorrectlyintrospectone’s

mentalstates

Stereotyping Underestimatesimilarity;

baselesslyapplystereotype

Employfalsestereotype

Employmisleading,unrepresentative

stereotype

Stereotypesarereliableheuristicsforunderstandingothers’behaviorwhen

theyareappliedappropriatelyandthestereotypesareaccurateandrepresentative.

Wemaymakemistakeswheneitherofthesetwoconditionsisnotsatisfied.When

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weunderestimatethesimilaritybetweenourselvesandtheotherperson,we

baselesslyapplystereotypeswhereprojectionordeliberativemindreadingwould

bemoreappropriate.

Contrarytowhatonemightexpect,wearelikelytomakethistypeoferror

whenweareinfamiliarsituations.Whenweareinunusualorunfamiliarsituations,

wetendtodeliberateabouttheinteractionmorethanwedoinnormalandfamiliar

cases.Asparticularsituationsbecomefamiliartous,certaininterpretationsofthose

situationswillbecomemoreaccessible,moreroutinized,andincreasinglydifficult

tooverride(Higgins,King,&Mavin,1982).Thus,inveryfamiliarsituationswemay

failtonoticeorappreciatestereotype-inconsistentbehaviorandthus

inappropriatelyapplystereotypes.

Asecondtypeoferrorforstereotype-basedmindreadingoccurswhenwe

correctlydiagnosethedissimilaritybetweenourselvesandtheotherpersonbutthe

stereotypesweemployarefalseorunrepresentativeoftheout-group.Thispattern

isevidentinracistindividuals’mindreadingpractices.TheWhiteSupremacist,for

example,isinclinedtouseraciststereotypestoinferthemotivationsand

perspectivesofmembersofdifferentracialcategories.Falseorunrepresentative

stereotypeshavemanysources,includingexplicitandimplicitbias,idiosyncratic

experienceswithagroup,poorstatisticalreasoning,andsimplyfalsebeliefsabout

thegroup.Howevertheyarise,employingfalseormisleadingstereotypesislikelyto

generatemistakesininterpretingothers’mentalstatesandbehavior.

Insummary,sometimeswehavethemotivationandabilitytoexhaustively

reviewtheavailablesocialinformationandattributementalstatestoothersinthat

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way,whereasothertimeswetakeshortcutsbecausewelackthemotivationor

abilitytodoanexhaustivesearch.Intheformercase,mindmisreadingoccurswhen

cognitiveloadinterfereswiththeinformationsearch,weapplythewrong

frameworktothesituation,orwhenself-interestskewsourdeliberation.Inthe

lattercase,mindmisreadingariseswhenwemisdiagnosethesimilarityor

dissimilaritybetweenourselvesandthetarget,failtounderstandourownmental

states,orapplyfalseorinappropriatestereotypes.

4.TheLimitsofMindreading

Thephilosophicalliteratureonmindreadingprimarilyfocusesonsuccessful

mindreading.Althoughexplaininghowwemanagethecomplextaskofaccurately

attributingmentalstatestoothersisinterestingandimportantforunderstanding

socialcognition,focusingexclusivelyonsuccessfulmindreadingobscuresthelimits

ofourmindreadingabilities.Withthedistinctionbetweenaccuracy-orientedand

efficiency-orientedmindreading,wecanseethatconditionsforsuccessdifferfor

eachtypeofmindreading.Deliberativeandefficientmindreadinggoawryin

distinctiveways.SeeTable3below.

Table3:Typesofmindreadingerrorsforaccuracy-orientedandefficiency-orientedmindreading.MindreadingAim TypesofMindMisreading

Accuracy Cognitiveload

interfereswithinformationsearch

Applythewrongmodel

Self-interestbiasesinformationsearch

Efficiency Misdiagnose Correctlydiagnose Employbaseless,

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similaritybetweenoneselfandother

similarity,butincorrectly

introspectone’smentalstates

false,orunrepresentative

stereotype

Errorsinmindreadingrevealthelimitsofmindreadingabilitiesinawaythat

isnotpossiblewhenwefocussolelyonsuccessfulmindreading.Toillustrate,

comparewhatthedatahereindicatewithrespecttotheprocessespositedbyTT

andST.Theevidencesuggeststhatwesuccessfullyusethedeliberativeprocesses

positedbyTTandSTonlywhenwehavethemotivation,time,andcognitive

capacitytoengageinathorough,deliberativesearchforinformation.Whenwe

attempttoengageinsuchsearcheswhenwelackthecognitivecapacityorhaveself-

interestedbiasesthatskewourinformationsearch,wearelikelytomakemistakes.

Theseerrors,whicharediscussedin3.1,arenotpredictedbyTTorST.

TheSTpredictstheuseofegocentricheuristics,namely,projectionand

anchoringandadjustment.Theseefficientstrategiesareemployedsuccessfullyonly

whenwecorrectlydiagnosetherelevantsimilaritybetweenthetargetand

ourselvesandweunderstandourownmentalstates.Wearelikelytoerrwhen

theseconditionsdonothold.Theotherefficientstrategy–stereotyping–isnot

predictedbyeitherTTorST,thoughitiscompatiblewiththeTTifthestereotypes

arepartofthetheory.Thisefficientstrategyissuccessfulonlywhenwecorrectly

diagnosetherelevantdissimilaritybetweenthetargetandourselvesandthe

stereotypeemployedisaccurateandrepresentativeofthetarget’srelevantin-group.

Stereotypingisinaccuratewhenitfailstomeettheseconditions.

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Typically,mindmisreadingismorelikelytooccurwhenthesituationis

ambiguous,whichsocialinteractionsoftenareespeciallywhentheyinvolvepeople

outsideone’sclosecircleoffamilyandfriends.Inaddition,severalgeneral

psychologicalfactorsmayleadtomindmisreading,e.g.,memoryfailure,

psychosocialdisorder,orlowintelligence.TheerrorsIdiscussabovearise

specificallywhen(1)wearetoocognitivelytaxedtoengageinthoroughinformation

search,(2)wepayattentiontosuperficialcues,(3)wearebiasedbyself-interest,

(4)wefailtounderstandourownmentalstates,(5)andweinappropriatelydeploy

stereotypes.

Investigatingtheselimitsofourmindreadingabilitiespavesthewayfor

differentperspectivesonmindreading.Aninterestingupshotofthisdiscussionis

thatwearelikelytomakemindreadingerrorswhenwearenotself-awareorself-

reflective.Self-awarenessisapsychologicalstateinwhichonetakesoneselfasthe

subject,specifically,one’straits,mentalstates,feelings,andbehavior.Beingself-

awareinvolvesreflectingonmental,physical,behavioral,andrelationalfactsabout

oneself.Onemighthavethoughtthatthelimitationsonmindreadingwouldhaveto

dowithothers’behaviorandmentalstates,i.e.,thatwewouldbeunabletomake

senseofsomebehaviorsinsomecontexts.Thoughthatcertainlyhappens,this

investigationsuggeststhatthemoreimmediatelimitationsonmindreadingare

internaltothemindreader.

Theideasuggestedbyexaminationofthelimitsofmindreadingisthatself-

awarenesspredictsmindreadingsuccess.Ceterisparibus,anindividualwhoisless

self-awarewillmakemoremindreadingmistakesthananindividualwhoismore

23

self-aware.6Incircumstanceswhereindividualsarelessself-aware,theyaremore

likelytomakemindreadingerrors.Fordeliberative,accuracy-orientedmindreading,

individualswhoarelessself-awarearelesslikelytonoticethattheyareunder

cognitiveload,thattheyarebeingoverlyconfident,thatdespitetryingtodeliberate

carefullytheyarepayingattentiontomerelysuperficialcues,andtheylikelywillnot

noticehowtheirownmotivationsskewtheinformationsearch.Individualswhoare

lessself-awarearelikelytomakemistakesinefficientmindreading,aswell.They

arelesslikelytoconsiderhowmuchorlittletheyresembleanotherperson,

appropriatelyadjusttheirprojectionsoftheirownmentalstates,correctly

introspecttheirownmentalstates,andexaminetheirstereotypes.

Thecentrallessonhereisthatexaminingmindmisreadingshedslightonthe

limitsofourmindreadingabilitiesandsuggestsnewperspectivesonhow

mindreadingworks.Studyingthewaysinwhichweerrinmindreadingwillgiveusa

betterpictureofhowweunderstand–andsometimesmisunderstand–other

people.Iproposedahypothesisabouttheroleofself-awarenessinmindreading.

Thishypothesisisnotendofthedebate.Infact,itisjustthestart.Investigating

mindmisreadingopensupahostofnewdebates,whichpromisetoadvanceour

understandingofmindreading.

6Self-awarenessdoesnotuniquelypredictmindreadingsuccess.Executivefunctionwillplayanextremelyimportantroleinself-awarenessinsofarasitregulatesattention,inhibitorycontrol,andworkingmemory.Moreover,higherintelligenceandhealthypsychologicalfunctioning(e.g.,conscientiousness,tolerance,openness)arepositivelyrelatedtoaccuratemindreading(Halletal.,2009).Andcertainlyone’srelationtothetargetandmotivationtounderstandthetarget’smentalstatesplayacrucialroleintheaccuracyofone’smindreadingjudgments.

24

5.ImplicationsofMindMisreading

Thediscussionsofarclearlyisrelevanttothefieldofsocialcognition,butitalsohas

implicationsforsocialepistemology.Inparticular,mindmisreadingbearsonhow

wejudgewhetherothersareourepistemicpeers.YouandIareepistemicpeers

withrespecttosometopictotheextentthatwearecomparablyknowledgeableand

competenttoreasonaboutthattopic.Thatis,wepossessthesameevidenceaboutX

andareequallyintelligent,freefrombias,competentatperceiving,reasoning,etc.

(Kelly,2010).

Thenotionofepistemicpeerarisesintheepistemologyofpeerdisagreement

debate.Proponentsoftheconciliationviewarguethatwhenyoudisagreewith

someoneyoutaketobeanepistemicpeeryoushouldreduceyourconfidencein

yourjudgment(Christensen,2007),whereasproponentsofthesteadfastviewargue

thatinsuchacaseyoushouldremainsteadfastinyourview(Kelly,2010).The

notionofepistemicpeercomesupinthediscussionofepistemicinjustice,aswell.

Epistemicinjustice,inparticulartestimonialepistemicinjustice,occurswhena

hearer’sprejudicesresultindowngradingaspeaker’scredibility(Fricker,2007).

Thatis,invirtueofepistemicallyirrelevantfactsaboutthespeakerthehearer

downgradesthespeaker’sepistemicstatus.Centraltobothphilosophicaldebatesis

theissueofhowwejudgeothers’knowledge,intelligence,reasoningabilities,bias,

etc.Ourdiscussionofmindmisreadingshedslightonthisissue.

Inexplainingthewaysmindreadingfails,Idescribedseveralverycommon

self-enhancingbiases:theSelf-ServingandGroup-ServingAttributionalBias,which

25

resultinoverestimatingourowncompetenceandunderestimatingthecompetence

ofothers(especiallyout-groupmembers);theDunning-KruegerEffect,wherein

individualswhoarenotknowledgeableorcompetentwithrespecttosomeissue

egregiouslyoverestimatetheirownknowledgeandcompetenceandfailto

recognizeothers’equalorsuperiorknowledgeandcompetence;andNaïveRealism,

whichdescribesthetendencytoregardothersasmoresusceptibletobiasand

misperceptionthanoneselfespeciallyinthecontextofdisagreement.Thesethree

self-enhancingbiasesinfluencehowwejudgeourownknowledgeandcompetence

inrelationtoothers.

Inadditiontotheself-enhancingbiases,Ialsodiscussedseveralbiasesin

assessingothers’knowledgeandcompetence.Socialcategorizationandimplicit

associationswithsocialcategoriesinfluencehowwedecidewhoisanepistemic

peer.Simplyinvirtueofbeingpartofparticularsocialcategorywemayupgradeor

downgradeaperson’sknowledgeorcompetence.Forexample,wetendtoassociate

spontaneouslyandimplicitlyelderlywomenwithwarmthandincompetence.We

habituallydowngradetheepistemicstatusofanelderlywomanjustinvirtueofher

socialcategory.Ofcourse,wecanoverrideimplicitassociations,butdoingso

requiresawarenessoftheassociationsandtheireffectonone’sbehavior,attention,

andcognitiveeffort.Forthisreasonimplicitassociationsaredifficulttoexcisefrom

one’sjudgments.

Furthermore,in-group/out-groupstatussignificantlyaffectsourjudgments

ofotherpeople’sepistemicstatus.Weusuallyhavemorefavorableattitudestoward

andempathizemorewithin-groupmembers,especiallypeoplewhoshareour

26

gender,race,age,religion,ornationalitythantowardpeopledonotsharethese

features.Thedatasuggestthatwearelesslikelytoregardout-groupmembersas

epistemicpeers,i.e.,asbeingequallyknowledgeableandcompetent.Wetendto

simplifyandcaricaturethementalstatesofthosewhoweperceivetobeunlikeus.

Althoughwesometimeshavepositivestereotypesaboutout-groups–e.g.,an

AmericanstereotypeaboutAsiansisthattheyarehardworkingandsmart–mostly

weupgradethestatusofourin-groupanddowngradethestatusofout-groups.This

tendencyisespeciallystronginacontextofthreat,e.g.,whenpeopledisagreeabout

someimportantissue.

Combiningself-enhancingbiaseswithdataonother-downgradingbiases

yieldsableakpictureofhowwejudgeothers’knowledgeandcompetence.Itseems

thatwearemostlikelytoregardanotherpersonasanepistemicpeerwheninfact

sheisanepistemicsuperiorandsheispartofourrelevantin-group.Inmostother

conditions,otherthingsbeingequal,wearelikelytoregardanepistemicpeeras

inferior,andwearelikelytoregardmoderatelyepistemicallysuperiorout-group

membersasinferior.

Thesedatasuggestthatoftenwearenotreliablejudgesofourepistemic

peers.Inparticular,wetendtooverestimateourownknowledgeandcompetence

andunderestimateothers’,especiallyotherswhoarepartofanout-group.This

discussionofmindmisreadinghasimplicationsfortheepistemologyofpeer

disagreement.Inlightofthesefacts,whenwetakeourselvestobeinadisagreement

withanepistemicpeerweoughttoconciliate.Thatis,weoughttodecrease

confidenceinourownjudgmentswhenwedisagreewithsomeoneweregardasan

27

epistemicpeerbecauseitislikelythatthatpersoninfactisanepistemicsuperior.7

Indeed,whenwetakeourselvestobedisagreeingwithanout-groupmemberwhom

weregardasmoderatelyepistemicallyinferior,weshouldconciliatethenaswell

becauseourjudgmentsabouttheout-groupmemberarelikelytobeevenmore

skewedinthatcase.

Thediscussionofmindmisreadinginjudgingepistemicpeersisrelevantto

epistemicinjustice,aswell.Thedowngradingofepistemicpeersandout-group

epistemicsuperiorsjustdescribedisaninstanceofepistemicinjustice,i.e.,ofa

hearer’sprejudicesdiscountingaspeaker’scredibility.AboveIdiscussedthe

conditionsforsuccessfulmindreadingandthevariouswaysinwhichwefailto

understandotherswhentheseconditionsarenotmet.Thesedatarevealwhenand

howepistemicinjusticeislikelytoarise.Socialcategorization,implicitbias,andin-

grouping/out-groupingbehaviorsareparticularlyimportantforunderstanding

whenarelikelytobebiasedinassessingothers’epistemicstatus.Understanding

whenandhowepistemicinjusticearisesisanimportantstepinmitigatingitseffects.

Mindmisreadingsofarhasbeenanunder-exploredtopicinphilosophy,

whichisunfortunatebecauseitisaninterestingandimportanttopic.Mind

misreadingiscrucialtothestudyofsocialcognition,andithasimplicationsbeyond

philosophyofmindandcognitivescience.Inparticular,itisrelevanttothe

epistemologyofpeerdisagreementdebateandepistemicinjustice.Ihopethispaper7Thecaseofdisagreeingexpertsmaybemorenuancedthanthecaseofdisagreeingnon-experts.Ifoneisanexpertinsomedomain,onemaybebetteratidentifyingfactorsthatdistortone’sownjudgmentsinthatdomain,haveamorerealisticassessmentofone’sknowledgeandcompetenceinthatdomain,andbebetterabletoidentifyothers’expertise.EvenexpertsarenotimmunetomanyofthecognitivebiasesdiscussedinSection3,buttheymaybebetterabletomitigatetheireffects.

28

showsjusthowmuchthereistobegainedinphilosophyofmindandepistemology

fromasystematicevaluationofthewaysinwhichweunderstandandoftenfailto

understandotherpeople.8

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