Minerals& Conflict

A T O O L K I T F O R I N T E R V E N T I O N

Key Issues

Lessons Learned

Program Options

Survey Instrument

Resources

US Agency for International Development (USAID)Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation

onflict can be an inherent and legitimate part of social and political life, but inmany places the costs and consequences of conflict, crisis, and state failure havebecome unacceptably high. Violent conflict dramatically disrupts traditional develop-ment and it can spill over borders and reduce growth and prosperity across entireregions. Although development and humanitarian assistance programs are increas-ingly implemented in situations of open or latent violence, unfortunately most still donot explicitly incorporate a sensitivity to conflict in their design or execution.

The Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM) in theBureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA) of the UnitedStates Agency for International Development (USAID) was established to providetechnical leadership on conflict to USAID Missions and our Washington-basedregional and pillar bureaus. The vast majority of our field missions and staff arecurrently working in areas that are either in conflict, coming out of conflict, or are athigh-risk for violence. A central objective of the office is to integrate or “mainstream”best practices in conflict management and mitigation into more traditional develop-ment sectors such as agriculture, economic growth, democracy, education, andhealth. Where appropriate, CMM will be an advocate for stable change.

As Director of CMM, I am pleased to introduce this document on minerals andconflict. I hope that readers will find the information contained herein thoughtful,innovative, and useful. CMM will release additional toolkits in the near future and Itrust that each one will bring its own unique value to discussions about developmentand conflict. We consider these toolkits to be “living documents” and would welcomeyour comments and observations to help us improve future iterations.

Elisabeth KvitashviliDirectorOffice of Conflict Management and MitigationBureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian AssistanceU.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)

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U S A I D O F F I C E O F C O N F L I C T M A N A G E M E N T A N D M I T I G A T I O N

This toolkit is part of a series that explores how development assistance canaddress key risk factors associated with conflict. One area that is receiving increas-ing attention is the relationship between natural resources and violence. In manyrecent conflicts, valuable or scarce resources - land, water, timber, or minerals -have played a central role in both causing and sustaining violence. In particular,valuable minerals took center stage after ‘conflict diamonds’ or ‘blood diamonds’,became a prominent feature of Sierra Leone’s civil war. Unfortunately, competitionover coltan in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has followed a similarly brutalcourse.

This toolkit: 1) examines the relationship between valuable minerals, such asdiamonds or coltan, and violence; 2) discusses lessons learned in developingprograms to deal with ‘conflict commodities’; 3) presents a range of programoptions; 4) provides a survey instrument that identifies key questions related tominerals and conflict; and 5) identifies relevant USAID mechanisms and imple-menting partners. Monitoring and evaluation tools are being developed. Together,the elements of this toolkit are designed to help raise awareness about thelinkages among valuable minerals, development assistance, and conflict; and toassist officers integrate a conflict perspective into their development programming.

The toolkits in this series explore individual risk factors in depth. They do notidentify all relevant factors linked to violence. As such, they are designed to serveas companion pieces to conflict assessments. Conflict assessments provide abroad overview of destabilizing patterns and trends in a society. They sift throughthe many potential causes of conflict that exist and zero in on those that are mostlikely to lead to violence (or renewed violence) in a particular context. While theyprovide recommendations about how to make development and humanitarianassistance more responsive to conflict dynamics, they do not provide detailedguidance on how to design specific activities. The toolkits in this series areintended to fill that gap by moving from a diagnosis of the problem to a moredetailed discussion of potential interventions. Together, the assessment frameworkand toolkits are designed to help Missions gain a deeper understanding of theforces driving violence and to develop more strategic and focused interventions.

This toolkit was initially authored by a team of researchers, including AlexanderCarius (Adelphi Research); Geoffrey Dabelko (Woodrow Wilson InternationalCenter for Scholars); Doris Capistrano (CIFOR); Moira Feil (Adelphi Research);and Jason Switzer (International Institute for Sustainable Development). It wassubsequently revised with substantial input from officers in USAID Missions, otherbilateral and multilateral donor agencies, academic experts, and members of theNGO community. Comments, questions, and requests for additional informationshould be directed to the Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation.

Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM)

Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance

United States Agency for International Development

KEY ISSUES 2

LESSONS LEARNED 8

PROGRAM OPTIONS 12

SURVEY INSTRUMENT 16

RESOURCES 18

Minerals & Conflict:A Toolkit for Programming

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Throughout history, valuable mineralshave frequently been associated withconflict or used to finance it. Wars,banditry, murder, and violence havegone hand-in-hand with humankind’sneed—or greed—for the control ofvaluable minerals. Nevertheless, theseminerals play an essential role in ourdaily lives. Along with the beauty and

luxury they provide, industrial productsand processes depend on them. Whenmanaged well, valuable minerals play animportant and positive role in enhancingeconomic growth and stability, such asin Botswana, Namibia, Chile, Brunei,and Gabon.

Unfortunately, the physical and marketcharacteristics of valuable minerals also

The presence of valuablemineral resources can

exacerbate power strugglesand zero-sum competitionover economic resources

that are common in conflict situations.

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Key Issues

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hat is the relationship among jewelry, cell phones, AlQaeda, and child soldiers? They are all linked to valuableminerals, and in many places, valuable minerals have beenlinked to violence. Diamonds in West Africa, Colombo-Tantalite(coltan)in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, andgold in Indonesia have all been linked to violence and civilconflict. Similarly, traffic in valuable minerals is believed tohave helped finance Al Qaeda’s terrorist operations.

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The Nature of Mineral Conflicts

Valuable minerals can affect thegeographic focus, duration, andintensity of violent conflict:

Geographic focus: Even if con-trolling mineral resources is notthe original cause of conflict, it canbecome the focus of fighting. Thepresence of minerals in remoteregions can also reinforce seces-sionist tendencies. Conflict overresources within those remoteregions often stays under theradar of international attention,allowing the conflict to fester.

Duration: Mineral wealth canfinance continued fighting,strengthen incentives to defectfrom peace processes, andundermine discipline in militaryforces, thus lengthening conflict.Struggles over ownership andaccess to the minerals can alsocontribute to the complexity andduration of conflicts.

Intensity: Mineral wealth canfinance arms purchases, raisingthe level of military and civiliancasualties. It can also become afurther point of antagonism fuelingthe conflict. On the other hand,the presence of resources candiminish conflict intensity, if, forexample, local commanderscooperate to permit mining forpersonal gain or the managementof the minerals provides a channelfor cooperation and confidencebuilding.

Sources: Ballentine & Sherman(2003); Le Billon (2003); Ross(2002).

create the potential for negative impactson peace and security. Though people,not minerals, engage in conflict, thepresence of valuable mineral resourcescan exacerbate the zero-sum economiccompetition that is common in conflictsituations. Choosing to work withstrategic mineral resources in high-risksettings can be extremely difficult.However, where feasible, such interven-tions have the potential to reap multifoldbenefits.

From Luxury Goods toIndustrial Processes andProductsExtraction of valuable minerals, such asdiamonds and gemstones, gold, coltan,cobalt, silver, copper, manganese, andphosphates, occurs in two basic ways.Large-scale, industrial mining typicallyexploits minerals hidden in deeper veinswith the help of specialist know-how andheavy-duty equipment. Artisanal andsmall-scale miners (ASM) exploit moreaccessible surface deposits using basic,often self-made tools.

Minerals linked to conflict share one ormore of the following physical character-istics:

Lootable— easily extracted orplundered

Valuable but small—easy totransport

Extraction and sales are difficult tomonitor and regulate

Minerals that combine these first twotraits (i.e., they are lootable, small andvaluable) are easily transported andconcealed, and are most commonlylinked to crime and conflict, asevidenced by the "conflict diamond"trade in West Africa.

Certain mineral markets are volatile andhighly sensitive to external economicforces and political decisions, thoughmineral prices have generally declinedover the long term. Market value per unitweight differs considerably dependingon the mineral. The price for gold, forexample, is currently in the range of~$400 an ounce, up from about $280per ounce in 2000. Coltan currentlytrades at about $40 a pound, after

peaking in early 2001 at $300 perpound.

Even minerals with generally low marketprices are central to the economies ofmany developing countries. Forexample, phosphate mining remainedthe most significant industrial activity inTogo in 2002 (5% of GDP, 26-28% ofexports), despite consistently low globalprices and reduced exploitation (WorldBank 2002a).

Certain kinds of mineral exploitation ortrade are clearly illegal under interna-tional law (e.g., UN sanctions againsttrade from particular countries). Otherminerals are legal in nature, but areillicitly harvested or traded acrossborders (e.g., without licenses, permits,royalties, or border customs duties). Theboundaries between legal and illegalmining activities are often blurred. Boththe “legal” exploitation of minerals and“illegal” and unregulated, poverty-drivensubsistence mining can generateunstable conditions and be linked toconflict.

How Valuable MineralsLink to Violent ConflictValuable minerals become conflictminerals when their control, exploitation,trade, taxation, or protection contributesto, or benefits from, armed conflict.Valuable minerals are linked to violentconflict in three primary ways:

Minerals can finance violent conflict.

Mining can lead to lower-scaleconflicts.

Mineral wealth can increase vulner-ability and corruption, which weaken states and their ability toeffectively govern and maintainsecurity, thereby opening the door toviolent conflict.

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Chart 1: World Bank Metals andMinerals Price Index, 1960-2001

(Sampat 2003; Worldwatch)

Using Minerals to Finance ViolenceSustaining a fighting force requires asteady flow of money. Diamonds directlyfinanced the UNITA rebels in Angola inthe 1990s, while in Liberia, Charles Taylorfirst used timber, then diamonds, as alucrative source of funds (Ross 2002).Likewise, governments and other groups(including militaries) have used mineralsto sustain wars against secessionistgroups and rebels. An expert panelreported to the UN Security Council in2002 that the DRC conflict had become awar for access, control, and trade of fivekey mineral resources. In the DRC andelsewhere, governments and/or insur-gents have sold mineral rights to privateinterests to generate funds for buyingarms and hiring mercenaries.

At times, the discovery of valuableminerals has led to attempts tooverthrow the government to capture ashare of future revenues. Moreover,armed rebel groups, military units, orgovernments often seek revenue, whichcan be used to fuel conflict, by miningand selling valuable minerals orrequiring taxes and royalty paymentsfrom legitimate operators. Others extort“protection” funds and some simply stealthe minerals after they have been mined.

For example, Russian crime groupsillegally extract and sell 300 metric tonsof amber worth an estimated $1 billioneach year. Criminal syndicates operatingin South Africa stole 20 metric tons ofgold and diamonds valued at $350million in 1996. In Southeast Asia,smuggling of precious gems was amajor source of revenue for the KhmerRouge insurgency in Cambodia andremains a secondary source of incomefor drug-trafficking insurgent armiesbased in Burma. (Federation ofAmerican Scientists)

Mining and Lower-scale Violent ConflictsMining offers many potential benefits interms of employment, wealth creation,state revenues, and infrastructureinvestment. Yet, disputes can easilyarise from both industrial mining andartisanal and small-scale mining (ASM)

activities. Issues surrounding land rightsand resource access; distribution ofwealth and benefits; entry, construction,and exit issues; and social and environ-mental impacts all have the potential toincrease local vulnerability and generateconflict.

Land rights and resource accessWhen mining begins, conflict can ariseover land claims and access toresources. Sometimes, communities arerelocated so that companies can reachthe valuable minerals beneath the soil.Disputes can intensify when local peopleare offered insufficient compensation,are excluded from decision-making, andfind their livelihoods threatened. At theexploration stage, governments oftenprovide access to the proposed site forseismic testing and exploratory drillingwithout informing or consulting localcommunities, particularly indigenouspeoples, whose rights to the land maybe unrecognized by national law. In suchcases, conflicts can arise between com-munities and the companies, as well aswith the government.

Industrial mining is a large-footprintoperation. Local communities, artisanalminers, and industrial mining companiesfrequently contest the right to control anarea and to exploit the resources beneathit. The military is often called upon toexpel artisanal competition and localfarmers or foresters by force. Typically,industrial mining sites are heavilyguarded by security forces to protectstaff, extracted minerals, and machinery.For example, in West Papua, the miningcompany Freeport-McMoRan providedtransportation, accommodation, andfunding to the Indonesian governmenttroops that protected the company’sassets and engaged in human rights vio-lations. Private and public security forceshave reportedly used excessive force onlocal communities and orchestrated oroverlooked incidents of expulsion, intimi-dation, and human rights violations(Renner 2002). Evicting artisanal minerscan eliminate a significant source ofincome for the community, fosteringresentment. In the worst case, it can leadto a spiral of violence among thecommunity, artisanal miners, and themining company.

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Diamonds directlyfinanced the UNITA rebels

in Angola in the 1990s,while in Liberia, CharlesTaylor first used timber,

then diamonds, as alucrative source of funds.

Likewise, governmentsand national militarieshave used minerals to

sustain wars againstsecessionist groups

and rebels.

Distribution of mining wealth and benefitsCentral government officials often appro-priate tax and royalty revenues frommining companies without fairly consult-ing and compensating communities, andconcomitant secrecy feeds corrupt andillegitimate regimes. This mismatch isclosely tied to the absence of democrat-ic or participatory decision-makingprocesses. Unclear property rights;restricted communication; and lack ofrepresentation, consideration, and pro-tection for traditional resource users,such as artisanal miners, farmers, orfishermen, can also lead to conflict.

Once a mining enterprise is established,local communities' expectations ofmining revenues can be high, occasion-ally prompting attempts to take a shareby force. The risk of violence increasessubstantially if local communities believethat a new mining operation has notemployed enough local people orchanneled sufficient benefits to themthrough direct compensation, communitydevelopment funds, and broader socialinvestments.

While staff members of multinationalcompanies present lucrative kidnappingtargets, artisanal miners are easier to extort. In areas of instability andexisting conflicts, bandits, rebels, and

mercenaries—sometimes funded bygovernments—use their dominance tocontrol access to markets, collect duesand safety payments, or steal theminers’ livelihoods.

Entry, construction, and exitDuring a mining project, the risk of low-level, local conflict is highest at the timeof entry, construction, and exit. Thedecision to develop a site leads tosevere and irreversible impacts on localcommunities, particularly when the com-munities rely on intact ecosystems fortheir livelihoods (e.g., through subsis-tence farming, fishing and hunting) orhave had little contact with industrializedsocieties. Both industrial and artisanalmining frequently bring a large influx ofpeople from different ethnic, cultural,and religious backgrounds, often over-whelming existing communities.

Because construction is usually out-sourced to contractors with littleincentive to develop friendly relationswith local communities, development ofa large-scale mine can generate conflictwhen local customs and traditions areviolated and public health is underminedby the spread of disease. The Pangunamining project in Papua New Guinea, forexample, employed 4,300 workers, mostof whom were not from the localcommunity (Ross 2001a). This may

The risk of violenceincreases substantially iflocal communities believethat a new miningoperation has notemployed enough localpeople or channeled sufficient benefits to them through direct compensation, communitydevelopment funds, andbroader social investments.

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have exacerbated secessionist tensionson the island, which led to a long-termconflict with the national government.

Social and environmental drivers and impacts of miningMuch of the world's mining activity ispoverty-driven. Poor communitiesincreasingly turn to mining in times ofcrises in order to sustain themselves. Indeveloping countries, some 80 to 100million people depend on ASM activities(UNECA 2002), even though unregulat-ed and uncontrolled mineral harvestingis environmentally and socially unsus-tainable. Many countries explicitly outlawinformal and small-scale mining, whileothers simply ignore it. Nevertheless,illegal and unregulated ASM activity cancontribute to grievances, undergroundeconomies, and, when sales are con-trolled by conflict parties, the financingof violent conflict, as in the DRC, SierraLeone, Angola, Sudan, and Liberia.

Mining can also destabilize a communityor region by degrading the environment.Long-lasting or irreversible damage towater, arable land, forests, wildlife, andhunting or fishing grounds can immedi-ately reduce the quality of life (Renner2002). Conflicts can also arise overlong-term waste storage and environ-mentally-related economic losses,

including unemployment. While miningbenefits some factions (often elite)through employment, it negativelyaffects those who rely on agriculture orfishing, often forcing them to fight tomaintain their traditional livelihood.

Mineral Wealth, Vulnerability,and CorruptionThe question of whether a country'smineral wealth brings prosperity andsocial development or leads to adownward spiral of corruption, violence,and counter-violence depends largely onissues of economic policy and gover-nance.

Socioeconomic vulnerabilityStudies have shown that macroeconom-ic dependence on mineral wealthincreases a country's socioeconomicvulnerability and weakens its govern-ment (Collier 2003).

Countries that are economicallydependent on a few resources such asminerals, oil, and natural gas often sufferfrom "Dutch Disease" - pursuing policiesof over-reliance on a single commoditywhile shifting resources and labor awayfrom traditional or diversified exports. Alarge income stream from a singlecommodity can increase a country'seconomic vulnerability to global price

Much of the world's miningactivity is poverty-driven.

Poor communities increasingly turn to mining

in times of crises in orderto sustain themselves.

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fluctuations or to the decisions of foreigninvestors. Most states lack social safetynets to buffer people from these macro-economic shocks. In 1998, for example,the Asian financial crisis led to a 40percent decline in sales of Zambiancopper, the country's primary export.This nearly doubled Zambia's inflationand sharply constrained public spending(Parris 1999). Macroeconomic swingsand commodity price collapses appar-ently initiated or intensified violence inRwanda, Central America andIndonesia. (Griffith-Jones and Kimmis2002).

Dependence on mineral wealthempowers corrupt elites andobstructs social development

Revenue flows from mineral sales andforeign mining companies are easilyhidden, reducing incentives for govern-ments to distribute economic benefitsequitably. When the flows are used toreinforce military capacity and pay offthe opposition, key collaborators, andfriendly leaders, social order and devel-opment suffer. The diverted benefits ofmineral wealth enrich elite groups andincrease the power of the ruling clique,simultaneously undermining nascentdemocratic, legal or non-violent disputeresolution structures, and increasingtensions and the potential for conflict.The weakening of governments may noteven be an accidental by-product butrather an intended goal of those whowish to take advantage of a weakenedstate.

The IMF, for example, reported that in2000, less than two percent of govern-ment expenditure in the DRC was"executed through normal procedures"(Smillie 2003). Most of these expendi-tures were from diverted revenue,through direct orders from the centralbank without prior knowledge of thetreasury. Corruption and bad gover-nance are major reasons that countriesthat rely heavily on minerals tend toscore very poorly on human develop-ment indicators, including child mortalityrates, life expectancy, child education,and overall economic equality (Ross2001b).

International companies often contribute

financial support and confer legitimacyto governance failures. Even if acompany does not actively engage incorruption and bribery, compliance withillegitimate and oppressive governmentsor rebel groups enables oppression andescalates violence (Ross 2002). Thepopulation does not generally realize thescale of corruption payments to the gov-ernment, which are often secret. Further,the military and political powergenerated by the revenue robs people ofthe power to mobilize for democraticchange.

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Characteristics of “Elite” Networks Involved in Illegal Natural ResourceExploitation in the DRC

1. The networks consist of a smallcore of political and military elites,businesspersons, and, in occupiedareas, selected rebel leaders andadministrators. Some membersoccupy key positions in the govern-ment or rebel groups.

2. Members of these networkscooperate to generate revenue and,in the case of Rwanda, institutionalfinancial gain.3. The elite networks ensure theviability of their economic activities byusing the military and other securityforces under their control to intimi-date, threaten, or carry out acts ofviolence.4. The networks monopolize produc-tion, commercial, and fiscal functions.5. The elite networks maintain thefaçade of rebel administrations inoccupied areas to generate publicrevenues, which they divert, therebydepleting the public treasury.6. The elite networks gain moneyfrom criminal activities such as theft,embezzlement, undervaluing goodsand assets, smuggling, falseinvoicing, evading taxes, kickbacks topublic officials, and bribery.7. The elite networks form businesscompanies or joint ventures as frontsfor illegal commercial activities.8. The elite networks are supportedby transnational organized crimegroups, which provide “services,”such as air transport, illegal armsdealing, and natural resourcemarketing.Sources: Stabrawa (2003); UnitedNations (2002)

Despite the complexity of the links between minerals andconflict, many development initiatives by USAID, other aidagencies, NGOs and the private sector are having a positiveimpact. These range from direct interventions to policydialogues, and many have achieved positive results for socialstability and offered important lessons for future action.

Empower LocalCommunities throughInformation Access

True and timely information is essentialfor holding decision-makers account-able, but the sheer distance and lack ofadequate transport and telecommunica-tions infrastructure between the centerof decision-making and a mining sitecan hinder information access for localsand limit channels for their voices to be

heard. Development actors can play animportant role in fostering the flow ofdata by supporting watchdog groups andinformation activities.

Increase Participation,Dialogue, andPartnership

Beyond sharing information, local com-munities and miners should actively par-ticipate in decisions that affect their

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For participatory decision-making to foster agreement

and dialogue rather thanexacerbate existing

differences, all stakeholdergroups must be involved,

with gender and ethnicgroups represented propor-

tionally.

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lives. Participation and involvementdiminish grievances and the potential forconflict in two important ways:

Locals can voice concerns thatmight be unknown or ignored bydecision-makers located elsewhere;and

Consensus-based decisions meetneeds of all stakeholders and distrib-ute responsibility.

For participatory decision-making to fosteragreement and dialogue rather than exacerbate existing differences, all stakeholder groups must be involved, withgender and ethnic groups representedproportionally. Participation is a key characteristic of democracy, and evensmall-scale efforts to encourage dialoguecan foster stability.

Incorporating the local community into keydecision-making processes also isessential to ensuring that localknowledge, customs, and aspirations areadequately taken into account. When thisapproach is followed, the communityaffected is much more likely to accept,and to work to support, an activity.

Create SustainableLivelihoods for Artisanaland Small-scale Miners

Recognizing that banning or ignoringunsustainable ASM is counterproductive,the World Bank and the United Nationshave begun to tackle its root cause:poverty and lack of sustainable liveli-hoods. ASM has been largely viewed asnegative, with unregulated ASM linked tosevere environmental degradation, highcrime rates, poor social and health con-ditions, increased STDs and HIV/AIDS,prostitution, and child labor.

In the past five years, international organi-zations have launched initiatives thatexplore ASM, poverty, and subsistence.There is an emerging consensus that ASMplays a vital role in local life, providesemployment, and supports developmentgoals – when it is officially recognized,regulated, and supported. The relative lackof knowledge and analytical tools in thearea of ASM underscores the need toincrease its visibility, facilitate moreeffective ASM policy design and imple-

mentation, and monitor assistance effortsto help prevent poverty traps and conflictsassociated with small-scale mining activi-ties.

The United Nations Department ofEconomic and Social Affairs (UNDESA),United Nations Development Programme(UNDP), and the World Bank researchactivities are working to convince govern-ments to recognize ASM and manage it sothat miners can work legally, access basicsocial services, and increase theirearnings.

Development agencies can set anexample for national governments byexplicitly recognizing ASM in their ownwork. For example, the 2002 Poverty andHuman Development Report of Tanzaniamakes several references to mining andASM and calls for new policies to makethese sectors truly pro-poor (UNDESA2003).

Upgrading the sector requires a holisticapproach that includes micro-creditloans, training, professional organiza-tions, formal land tenure, and a specialappreciation of women’s and children’srole in ASM (UNDESA 2003).

Reduce MacroeconomicDependence andVulnerability

Vulnerability caused by overdependenceon mineral exports can be addressedby:

Macroeconomic policies that smoothout the economic impacts of swingsin mineral prices. Such mechanismslink aid to state revenues, making itconditional on government commit-ments to limit public expenditureswhen prices are high and toestablish regulations to hinder fraudand corruption, as in the case ofChile's Copper Stabilization Fund(World Bank 2002b).

Microeconomic policies that supporteconomic diversification. Theseinclude providing micro-credit toentrepreneurs and small businessesand reducing bureaucratic barriersto establishing a business andentering the formal economy.

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There is an emergingconsensus that artisanaland small-scale miningactivities (ASM) play a vitalrole in local life, provideemployment, and supportdevelopment goals – when they are officially recognized, regulated, and supported.

Address Gaps inNational Governance ofHost Countries

Corruption and patronage can be exac-erbated by mineral wealth (Ross 2001b).Making aid contingent on implementinganti-corruption strategies, democraticconstitutional provisions, and local-levelempowerment activities can help.

Some mining companies and govern-ment officials exploit communities,abuse human rights, and instigateviolence with impunity. Donors that havesupported and publicized local and inter-national accountability mechanismshave helped communities make theirvoices heard.

Such mechanisms include national legis-lation and human rights protection,regional ombudsmen, the World BankInspection Panel, and the NationalContact Points established under theOrganization for Economic Cooperationand Development (OECD) Guidelinesfor Multinational Enterprises (OECD2001).

Raising awareness among governmentofficials and leaders of civil society organi-zations about the existence of and meansof access to international regulatorymechanisms, like the Kimberley Processas well as other emerging systems whichcan help countries properly regulate theirnatural resources, provides anothermeans to help countries address nationalpolicy gaps.

Promote ResponsibleBehavior by Large andSmall Companies

Promoting responsible private sectorinvestment in regions prone to mineral-related conflict is an important elementof development and peace building.Development agencies can support theadoption of voluntary internationalstandards by companies.

The US–UK Voluntary Principles onSecurity and Human Rights are a goodexample. International Alert has also beenworking closely with OECD DAC in itsBusiness and Conflict program to promoteconflict-sensitive and conflict-preventionapproaches to corporate investment andconduct.

These OECD DAC guidelinesrecommend that governments:

Promote the use of peace and conflictimpact assessment by businesses;

Support processes to resolve project-related claims by indigenous commu-nities;

Improve codes of conduct on specificissues and risk insurance;

Explore tri-sectoral development part-nerships and create fora for multi-stakeholder dialogue; and

Identify ways to involve the privatesector in the peace-building process.

If voluntary commitments are broken orinsufficiently monitored, regulatoryprocesses would be needed to backthese commitments.

Another channel for intervention onminerals and mining is promotingadherence by the private sector to inter-national conventions on bribery and cor-ruption, including the OECD Conventionon Combating Bribery of Foreign PublicOfficials in International BusinessTransactions.

StrengthenGovernance of theInternational MineralTrade

Minerals obtained and controlledthrough criminal means can be legallytraded in the international market. Thus,efforts to hinder conflict trade mustaddress the full commodity chain:miners (both artisanal and industrial);traders and intermediaries; processors;and consumers.

The Kimberley Diamond CertificationProcess and complementary effortsrepresent an important step in thisdirection. Donors can fund certificationprocesses, make compliance a conditionfor aid, and support civil societyadvocates. Follow-on activities shouldinclude on-the-ground training for ASM,local NGOs, government officials andindustry representatives to ensure com-pliance with certification regimes.

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Create a Safe Space for Reform

The political dynamics before, duringand after conflict will determine what ispossible in terms of reforming themineral sector. The windows of opportu-nity must be carefully gauged to gainaccess to governments from a policyperspective as well as to communitiesfor implementing an action agenda.There are significant political andsecurity risks inherent to working in aconflict context, making it essential tohave buy-in from local stakeholders andsupport from outside stakeholders suchas private sector corporations,Ambassadors to the host country, UNpeacekeepers, and others.

Monitor and AssessDevelopment

Managers of development agencieshave greater capacity to react to violentsituations related to mineral dependencewhen they are aware of the risk factors.Conflict assessments at both countryand program levels should include therole of potential conflict commodities.

By supporting independent and grass-roots research and monitoring efforts,development agencies can enhanceinternal and public awareness andunderstanding of the mineral-conflictrelationship.

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Want to know more?Ian Bannon and Paul Collier, the editors of Natural Resources and Violent Conflict:Options and Actions (2003), have collected previously unpublished articles by leadingauthors in the field, such as Michael Ross and Philippe Le Billon. The book examinesthe economics of the natural resources/violent conflict nexus, including the role of macro-economic policy, the financial and business sectors, and the development community.

In The Anatomy of Resource Wars (2002), Michael Renner explains the relationshipbetween natural resources and violent conflict, illustrating how natural resources eitherfinance or trigger violent conflicts, by providing descriptions of specific cases andanalyzing their dynamics.

Michael Ross’s report, Extractive Sectors and the Poor (2001), gives a brief butthorough overview of the links between minerals (including oil) and conflict, highlightinglivelihood and governance issues. http://www.polisci.ucla.edu/faculty/ross/oxfam.pdf.

The final report of the Extractives Industries Review (EIR), Striking a Better Balance(2003), presents the cumulative results of the EIR process, which was launched by theWorld Bank Group to provide an independent review of its role in the extractive indus-tries. The report contains a collection of recommendations to guide the World Bank’sinvolvement in the oil, gas, and mining sectors, many of which are generally applicableto policy and decision-makers. http://www.eireview.org.

The Mining Minerals and Sustainable Development (MMSD) project report, Breaking New Ground (2002), combines a wealth of information on all aspects ofmining, including economic, social, and environmental concerns about industrial andartisanal mining, as well as responses and recommendations. It reviews miningdynamics and best practices for particularly controversial aspects of the industry.http://www.iied.org/mmsd/finalreport/index.html.

The Kimberley Process is ajoint government, diamondindustry and civil societyinitiative to stem the flow ofconflict diamonds throughan innovative, voluntarycertification schemerequiring participants toattest that shipments ofrough diamonds are freefrom conflict stones.

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StrengtheningGovernance ofInternational Trade in MineralCommodities The Kimberley Certification Process

brings together governments, thediamond industry, and NGOs tonegotiate commodity tracking to

preserve the legitimate diamond tradewhile excluding conflict diamonds frominternational markets. Participants agreenot to trade in rough diamonds with anynon-participant and to require certifica-tion for both exports and imports, withinternal controls to eliminate conflictdiamonds. Data collection and mainte-nance on production, imports, andexports is key, as is cooperation and

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Program Options

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The following programs are examples of innovative attempts thataddress the role of minerals in causing and sustaining violence. Whiletools are still being developed to measure the impact of these programs,many have shown promise in empowering local communities, promotingresponsible behavior by the private sector, and addressing gaps in gov-ernment policy. Given the highly context-specific nature of minerals andconflict dynamics, readers should view successful interventions fromother countries as a starting point, but should adapt programs to fit theirown country context.

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sharing information with other partici-pants. The Kimberley Process has 43participants who are involved in the pro-duction, export, and import of roughdiamonds and accounts for approxi-mately 98% of the world trade. Yet,voluntary compliance to the agreementleaves many NGOs concerned about thesystem’s credibility and effectiveness. www.kimberleyprocess.com

In Sierra Leone, the Peace DiamondAlliance (PDA) complements theKimberley Process by formalizing thediamond trade while strengthening thestate’s capacity to govern it effectively.Following previous successful diamondcertification efforts in Sierra Leone, PDAworks collaboratively with local andinternational members to formulate anintegrated approach to diamond man-agement—developing competitivebuying schemes, training miners aboutthe value of their production, trackingdiamonds, providing credit to miners,reclaiming mining land for agriculture,engaging youth, and socializing soldiers.The project’s strength lies in membercommitment to undertake specificactions and share responsibility.www.peacediamonds.org

In Sierra Leone, technical assistanceto the government for new diamondpolicies and development activities hasincluded dialogue among government,representatives of diamond-producingcommunities, human rights activists, tra-ditional leaders, Parliament, rebels, andinternational diamond leaders andexporters. Long-term developmentproblems, such as poverty and exploita-tive systems of production andmarketing, were addressed with short-term issues related to the war and rebeluse of diamonds. Partners included theprivate sector, NGO advocacy groups,and other U.S. government entities.

Promoting ResponsibleBehavior by Large and Small CompaniesThe US–UK Voluntary Principles on

Security and Human Rights seeks toimprove security by ensuring humanrights in the mining industry throughregular consultation with host govern-

ments, local communities, civil society,and companies. Policies are communi-cated openly, and security forces andhost governments are encouraged torespect human rights. Training,education, and screening out individualsimplicated in human rights abuses helpsavoid inappropriate and excessive usesof force and ensures appropriate medicalcare. However, methods for ensuringcompliance are weak. www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/2931.htm

The Extractive IndustriesTransparency Initiative (EITI) addressescorporate responsibility for governmentcorruption and aims to increase thetransparency of mining companypayments to host governments. Statesthat host mining projects or miningcompanies agree to disclose companypayments and government revenues toa trusted third party. Azerbaijan, EastTimor, Ghana, Indonesia, Nigeria, SierraLeone, and Trinidad and Tobago havecommitted to the initiative, along withlarge mining companies. Governmenttransparency and cooperation is alsosought. www.dfid.gov.uk/

Since 1999, a business and conflictprogram at International Alert haspromoted peace-building practices, prin-ciples, and policies of extractive transna-tional corporations and local businessesin partnership with multilateral agencies,governments, and civil society, includingfostering conflict-sensitive investmentand engagement policies. www.international-alert.org/

Monitoring andAssessingDevelopmentsNGOs have encouraged transparen-

cy in the mineral trade and garneredpublic attention for the problem ofconflict diamonds in West Africa andcontributed to the launch of theKimberley Process. Developmentagencies can support independent moni-toring and advocacy by NGOs that carryout rigorous, verifiable research insupport of human security. http://www.globalwitness.org/http://www.pacweb.org

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Under the ExtractiveIndustries TransparencyInitiative (EITI) encouragescorporate responsibility byhaving states that hostmining projects or miningcompanies agree todisclose companypayments and governmentrevenues to a trusted third party.

Fighting Poverty andCreating Sustainable LivelihoodsThe multi-stakeholder Mining Policy

Research Initiative, created in 1998,addresses mining issues in SouthAmerica. Its wide variety of programmat-ic areas includes sustainable artisan andsmall-scale mining, multi-stakeholderdialogue and engagement, partnershipsfor local development, mine closure andreclamation, and mining and indigenouspeoples. http://www.iipm-mpri.org/

The Communities and Small-ScaleMining (CASM) secretariat seeks to“reduce poverty by supporting integratedsustainable development of communitiesaffected by or involved in artisanal andsmall-scale mining in developingcountries.” It hosts a knowledge center,regular meetings, and workshops toidentify best practices in mining andgovernance policies and initiated aresearch program to improve profiling ofartisanal and small-scale mining activi-ties in Africa and to implement baselinesurveys. It aims to gain a better under-standing of ASM, including how itinteracts with other sectors and stake-holders and its social, economic,political, and environmental dimensions. http://www.casmsite.org/

In Tanzania, national dialogue onmining’s contribution to povertyreduction seeks to better assess needs,vulnerability, capacity, and developmentalternatives; identify policies to improveASM-sector performance; and build linkswith other income-generating sectors. http://www.casmsite.org

IncreasingParticipation, Dialogue,and PartnershipThe Las Cristinas tri-sector partner-

ship in Venezuela successfully resolvedconflicts among local communities,artisanal miners and a large-scalemining group. The project constructed acommunal health service center, whichimproved both public health and relation-ships among the groups. The partner-

ship model combined participatorydecision-making with benefit-sharing toresolve conflicts among the localcommunity and industrial and artisanalmining. An independent evaluatorconcluded that there are no longer anymining-related conflicts in Las Cristinas,unlike other areas of Venezuela. www.bpd-naturalresources.org

For several years, BHP-Billiton hassuccessfully engaged in an ongoing con-sultative process with key communitystakeholders in the Tintaya mine in Peruto resolve differences and manageconflict. The joint effort between, OxfamAmerica, Oxfam Australia - CommunityAid Abroad, several Peruvian organiza-tions, BHP-Billiton and affected commu-nities has provided a channel for sub-stantive engagement between theaffected communities and the mineowners. The facilitated dialogue processis known as the Mesa de Diàlogo(Dialogue Roundtable). The highlyeffective Dialogue has provided a senseof legitimacy, a forum for transparentand inclusive communication, and ameans for addressing old, recent andemerging grievances.

Empowering LocalCommunities through Information Access

An independent hydrological impactassessment and community referendum inTambogrande, Peru, gave voice to themarginalized local population when aproposed mine threatened environmentalpollution, diversion of the nearby PiuraRiver, and forced relocation of about 9,000townspeople and fruit growers.Strengthened stakeholder participation inthe decision-making process helped keeplocal citizens informed and provided aplatform for communication with decision-makers.www.oxfamamerica.org/

Addressing Gaps inPolicy and GovernanceA project to help Peru’s Ministry of

Energy and Mines improve public sectorpractices for mine safety, environmentalmanagement, and poverty reduction,

The Las Cristinas tri-sectorpartnership in Venezuela

successfully resolvedconflicts among local com-

munities, artisanal minersand a large-scale mininggroup. The project con-

structed a communalhealth service center,which improved both

public health and relation-ships among the groups.

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focuses on medium-sized undergroundoperations, which have the highestincidence of fatalities and environmentaldegradation. The project trainsengineers, regulators, operators, andworkers on treatment and control ofenvironmental impacts, such as acidmine drainage and mine site reclama-tion. Peru’s mines have improved theircompliance with environmentalstandards, and the ministry is preparinga new environmental code for transport-ing and handling concentrates. www.percan.ca

In Bolivia, regulatory reforms tominimize the environmental impact ofmining operations and attract newinvestment provides technical assistancefor rehabilitating mine sites, administer-ing mining codes, managing geologicalinformation, and improving health andsafety conditions. More than 80 percent

of the area is highly contaminated,affecting 300,000 people, many of whomdepend on the mining sector for survival.A planned extension project will buildadministrative capacity for controllingpollution, improving health and safety,and consulting the public. www.acdi-cida.gc.ca

Workshops and seminars for miningcompanies in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Perupromote corporate social responsibilityand sustainable development andencourage regional and bilateraldialogue on the sector’s sustainabledevelopment. Workshops on mining andthe environment and on mining andcommunities have resulted in acommunity consultation process inEcuador to develop and adopt a newmining law grounded in sustainabledevelopment principles.

http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca

Workshops and seminarsfor mining companies inBolivia, Ecuador, and Perupromote corporate socialresponsibility and sustain-able development andencourage regional andbilateral dialogue on thesector’s sustainable development

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Are minerals being used tofinance violence or oppres-sion? If not, what factorssuggest that minerals may doso in the future?

Are valuable and/or highly lootableminerals present, and are theseresources located in remote, politicallyand economically marginalized areaswith secessionist tendencies or ahistory of violence?

Do other forms of trade that supportcriminality and violence exist in theseareas (e.g., narcotics, timber, smallarms traffic, etc.)?

If you compare minerals export data(where such statistics are available),does it indicate that minerals produc-tion has gone “underground” anddeveloped illegal trade markets?

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Survey Instrument

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his section identifies key questions that evaluate the risk ofconflict linked to valuable minerals. These questions shouldhelp development agencies effectively integrate valuableminerals management and conflict prevention/mitigation intotheir programs and projects. Not all questions will be relevantin all regions because of historical and cultural differences.

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Are the social and environ-mental impacts of mining andinequitable distribution ofbenefits fueling grievances orcontributing to violence?

Do large proportions of the populationdepend on ASM for income, and is ASMillegal-without clearly defined rights andobligations or mechanisms for regulationand support?

Are there mechanisms to assess envi-ronmental and social impacts, developmitigation and compensation plans,monitor and enforce compliance, and dis-seminate relevant information to affectedcommunities?

Have groups (including local communityand indigenous groups) with legitimateinterests, facing serious impacts, orholding formal and informal access rightsto the resource area, been appropriatelyconsulted and compensated? If thesegroups oppose the decision and refusecompensation, do they have access tolegal representation in an independentjudicial system?

Are there processes to mitigatedynamic flashpoints produced duringminerals exploitation: initial exploration,the influx of other communities (‘honeypot effect’) and construction workers, andthe impact of mine closure?

Is securing the mining site with militaryor private security forces likely to con-tribute to human rights abuses? Areartisanal and small-scale miners intimidat-ed into cooperating with rent-seekingforces using violence?

Do institutions equitably mediatecompeting claims from communities,artisanal and small-scale miners,companies, and officials, for access tonatural resources, social and environmen-tal impacts, and benefit-sharing?

Do underlying domestic andinternational governancefailures contribute to thepotential for violence?

Is the country’s economy highlydependent on valuable minerals? Arethere mechanisms to mitigate mineral-related economic shocks, and to support diversification?

Do government and security institutions(military/police) participate in the lootableminerals trade?

Are efforts underway to combat corrup-tion, enhance revenue transparency, andhold officials accountable for mineral-related activities?

Are there international mechanisms toenhance governance of the minerals inquestion, and can these mechanisms beused to screen out “conflict commodities”and manage revenues? Do the state andits neighboring countries participate inthese initiatives, and have they imple-mented domestic regulation and enforce-ment?

Are foreign mineral extractioncompanies contributing to or legitimizingoppressive capacity of the state, thefinancial support of insurgent groups, orthe violation of local human rights, and canthese companies be encouraged to adoptvoluntary standards?

Consider how managementand development of mineralresources might work well,and determine the essentialprerequisites for a positivetrajectory that does not sparkconflict. Within that framework,where are the relevant gaps?Governance Gaps:

Are there important institutional gapsor weaknesses?

Are there critical legal and/or policyneeds?

Operational/Capacity Gaps:Are there informational barriers (e.g.,

issues of transparency, evidence,common definitions/constructs, etc.)?

What are the human capacities onissues related to valuable minerals?

Special Considerations:How do issues sort across time:

immediate, near, medium and long-term?

Are mineral-related revenues financingcriminal or insurgency activities?

What are the political flash points(actual and latent)?

What are USAID’s comparative/strategic advantages and limitations (e.g.,legitimacy, know-how, resources)?

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Are there mechanisms to assess environmentaland social impacts,develop mitigation andcompensation plans,monitor and enforce compliance, and dissemi-nate relevant information to affected communities?

IQCs for Anti-Corruption(DCHA/DG)Aimed at curbing governmental corruptionin political and bureaucratic offices, thisactivity focuses on unilateral abuses bygovernmental officials such as embezzle-ment and nepotism, and abuses linkingpublic and private actors. It includes bothadministrative corruption and statecapture. Governmental integrity supportactivities under this contract couldencompass increasing government andmining company transparency through ini-tiatives, such as the EITI, and civil societyadvocacy on behalf of transparency andanti-corruption reforms in the naturalresources extraction and governancesectors.(http://inside.usaid.gov/G/DG/mechs/iqcs/gov5_1203.pdf)

Prime Recipients: ARD, Inc.; Casals &Associates, Inc.; DPK Consulting;Management Systems International;

PADCOContact: Jerry O'Brien(jo'brien@usaid.gov)

U.S. Department of theInterior, InternationalTechnical AssistanceProgram (EGAT/NRM)This activity allows Missions to access theDepartment of Interior's extensive staffexpertise in such areas as minerals man-agement and minerals-related issuesthrough personnel from the U.S.Geological Survey, Bureau of LandManagement, Bureau of Reclamation,Minerals Management Service, and Officeof Surface Mining. Staff typically engagesin longer-term (3 years +) initiatives tobuild partnerships but is also available forshort-term assignments. This mechanismis particularly useful in getting a betterunderstanding of the technical issuesrelated to minerals in developing conflict

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Resources

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USAID Contracting Mechanisms for

Minerals andConflict

Programming

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programs. (www.doi.gov/intl/itap)

Prime recipient: U.S. Department of theInterior, Office of International Affairs,International Technical Assistance Program.Contact: Roberta Hilbruner(rhilbruner@usaid.gov)

GreenCOM:Communication andEducation forSustainable Development(EGAT/NRM)Missions may access this mechanism toundertake rapid initial assessments todevelop context-specific, programmaticinterventions related to minerals manage-ment as well as minerals and conflict suchas those outlined in the SurveyInstrument. For example, Missions may

access this mechanism to assist in devel-oping activities that target effective com-munication strategies to combat corrup-tion and illegal resource capture related tominerals extraction as well as disseminateinformation to communities on their legalrights in accordance with existing landand natural resource laws. In addition,GreenCOM may be used to develop par-ticipatory processes and local capacity forcommunities dependent on minerals andother natural resources to be moreinvolved in addressing issues related tominerals management and conflict resolu-tion. (http://www.greencom.org/)

Prime recipient: AEDSubcontractor: Chemonics InternationalIncContact: Roberta Hilbruner(rhilbruner@usaid.gov)

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US Government and Donor ContactsThe following section provides a partiallist of US Government agencies anddonor contacts with expertise relevant tominerals and violent conflict. For information on NGOs who implementthese types of activities and individualexperts, please contact Jaidev Singh(USAID/CMM) at jasingh@usaid.gov.

U.S. Agency for International Development Dr. Jay SinghOffice of Conflict Management andMitigation1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NWWashington, D.C. 20523

Phone: 202-712-4206Email: jasingh@usaid.gov

U.S. Agency for International DevelopmentDan RundeGlobal Development Alliance1300 Pennsylvania Ave, NWWashington, D.C. 20523

Phone: 202-712-0438Email: drunde@usaid.gov

U.S. Agency for International DevelopmentScott BodeBureau for Economic Growth,Agriculture, and Trade1300 Pennsylvania Ave, NWWashington, D.C. 20523

Email: sbode@usaid.govPhone: 202-712-5079Fax: 202-216-3173

US Department of StateRobert Jackson, DirectorUS-UK Voluntary Principles onSecurity and Human RightsOffice of Human Rights and DemocracyBureau of Democracy, Human Rights,and Labor

Phone: 202-647-1716Website: www.state.gov/g/drl/

Department of Foreign Affairs and International TradeTim Martin, ChairmanKimberley ProcessPeacebuilding and Human SecurityDivision125 Sussex DriveOttawa, Ontario K1A 0G2Canada

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Ballentine, Karen and Jennifer Sherman(Eds.) 2003: The Political Economy ofArmed Conflict - Beyond Greed andGrievance. International PeaceAcademy.

Bannon, Ian and Paul Collier (Eds.)2003: Natural resources and violentconflict: options and actions. WorldBank.

BHP Billiton: 2003 Annual Health,Safety, Environment and CommunityReport. Avalilable at: http://www.bhpbilli-ton.com/hsecReport/2003/home/home.html.

Business for Social Responsibility andFirst Peoples Worldwide 2003:Resource/Extractive Companies andIndigenous Peoples Engagement:Recipe for Dialogue Guidebook.

Collier, Paul ed. 2003: Breaking theConflict Trap. Oxford University Press

Extractive Industries Review (EIR) 2003:Striking a better balance: The finalreport. World Bank. Available athttp://www.eireview.org.

Griffith-Jones, Stephany and JennyKimmis 2002: International financialvolatility and human security.Commission on Human Security.

Le Billon, Philippe 2003: “Getting itdone: Instruments of enforcement,” inBannon, Ian and Paul Collier (Eds.).Natural resources and violent conflict:options and actions. World Bank.

Mining Minerals and SustainableDevelopment (MMSD) 2002: Breakingnew ground. London: EarthscanPublications. Available athttp://www.iied.org/mmsd/finalreport/index.html.

Organization for Economic Co-operationand Development (OECD) 2000:Progress in the fight against corruptionin Asia and the Pacific. Manila:OECD/Asia Development Bank.

OECD 2001: OECD guidelines for multi-national enterprises. Available athttp://www.oecd.org/daf/investment/guidelines/

Parris, Brett 1999: Trade for develop-ment: Making the WTO work for theworld’s poor. World Vision International.

Renner, Michael 2002: The anatomy ofresource wars (Worldwatch Paper 162).Washington, DC: Worldwatch.

References:

Phone: +613-944-0900E-mail:kimberley.process@dfaitmaeci.gc.caWebsite: www.kimberleyprocess.com

Department for International DevelopmentPenny McMillin or Simon RayExtractive Industries TransparencyInitiative1 Palace StreetLondon SW1E 5HEUnited Kingdom

Phone: +44-20-7023-1211Phone: +44-20-7023-1696

Email: p-mcmillin@dfid.gov.ukEmail: s-ray@dfid.gov.ukWebsite: www.dfid.gov.uk/

World Bank GroupGotthard Walser or Jeffrey DavidsonCommunity and Small-Scale MiningSecretariatMining Department2121 Pennsylvania Avenue NWWashington DC, 20433

Email: Gwalser@casmsite.orgEmail: Jdavidson@casmsite.orgPhone: 202-473 4234 / 458 8388Website: www.casmsite.org/

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Ross, Michael 2001a: Natural resourcesand civil conflict: Evidence from casestudies. Draft cited with permission.World Bank/UC Irvine workshop on “CivilWars and Post-Conflict Transitions,” May18-20, 2001, Irvine, CA. Available athttp://hypatia.ss.uci.edu/gpacs/newpages/Ross1.pdf.

Ross, Michael 2001b: Extractive sectorsand the poor: An Oxfam America report.Boston and Washington, DC: OxfamAmerica. Available athttp://www.polisci.ucla.edu/faculty/ross/oxfam.pdf.

Ross, Michael 2002: Natural resourcesand civil war: An overview with somepolicy options. Draft report prepared forconference on “The Governance ofNatural Resources Revenues,”sponsored by the World Bank and theAgence Française de Dévelopement,Paris, December 9-10, 2002.

Sampat, Payal 2003: “Scrapping mineraldependence,” in State of the World2003. Washington, DC: WorldwatchInstitute, page 114, fig. 6-2.

Small Arms Survey 2003: Small ArmsSurvey Yearbook 2003. Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press. Available athttp://www.smallarmssurvey.org/publica-tions/yb_2003.htm

Smillie, Ian 2002: The Kimberly Process:The case for proper monitoring(Occasional Paper 5). Ottawa:Partnership Africa Canada. Available athttp://www.diamonds.net/kp/KP%20Monitoring%20article%20Oct%202002.pdf

Smillie, Ian 2003: Motherhood, apple pieand false teeth: Corporate social respon-sibility in the diamond industry(Occasional Paper 10). Ottawa:Partnership Africa Canada. Available athttp://www.globalpolicy.org/security/natres/diamonds/2003/0603-pac.pdf

Stabrawa, Anna 2003: Environmentalendowment and conflict: The case ofdiamonds in the Democratic Republic ofCongo (DRC). UNEP Division of EarlyWarning and Assessment & WatsonInstitute for International Studies, BrownUniversity. Available athttp://www.uvm.edu/~shali/drc.pdf

United Nations 2002: Final report of thepanel of experts on the illegal exploita-tion of natural resources and other formsof wealth of the Democratic Republic ofthe Congo. United Nations, UN Doc:S/2002/1146, 16 October 2002.Available at http://www.natural-resources.org/minerals/CD/docs/other/N0262179.pdf

United Nations Department of Economicand Social Affairs (UNDESA) 2003:Poverty eradication & sustainable liveli-hoods: Focusing on artisanal miningcommunities. (SPPD ProjectRAF/99/023 Final Report). Available athttp://www.casmsite.org/Documents/RAF99023_UN_ASM_Final_Report.pdf.

United Nations Economic Commissionfor Africa (UNECA) 2002: Compendiumon best practices in small-scale miningin Africa. Addis Ababa. Available athttp://www.casmsite.org/Documents/ASM_Best_practices.pdf

United States Agency for InternationalDevelopment (USAID) no date: SierraLeone transition strategy phase 2FY2004-2006. Available athttp://www.usaid.gov/gn/sierraleone/background/programstrategy04_06.htm.

United States Agency for InternationalDevelopment (USAID) Office ofTransition Initiatives (OTI) no date:Sierra Leone.

World Bank 2002a: World Bank groupcountries: Togo. Available at:http://www.worldbank.org/afr/tg2.htm.

World Bank 2002b: Chile country brief.Available at:http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/external/lac/lac.nsf/Countries/Chile/71BC8229DD493B2A85256C5A005D9093?OpenDocument

U.S.Agency for International Development (USAID)1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Suite 6.09

Washington, DC 20523E-mail: conflict@usaid.gov

Tel: 202-661-5810Fax: 202-216-3453www.usaid.gov

USAIDFROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE