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Mining, Corporate Social Responsibility and the "Community": The Case of Rio Tinto,Richards Bay Minerals and the MbonambiAuthor(s): Paul KapelusSource: Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 39, No. 3, Resource Extraction Industries in theDeveloping World (Sep., 2002), pp. 275-296Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25074842 .

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Mining, Corporate Social

Responsibility and the

"Community": The Case of

Rio Tinto, Richards Bay Minerals and the Mbonambi Paul Kapelus

ABSTRACT. Mining companies have long had a

questionable reputation for social responsibility, espe

cially in developing countries. In recent years, mining

companies operating in developing countries have

come under increased pressure as opponents have

placed them under greater public scrutiny. Mining

companies have responded by developing global cor

porate social responsibility strategies as part of their

larger global business strategies. In these strategies, a

prominent place is given to their relationship with

local communities. For business ethics, one basic issue

is whether such an approach

to corporate responsi

bility is likely to effectively address the development concerns of local communities in developing coun

tries. This paper addresses this question by investi

gating how the corporate social responsibility agenda

Paul Kapelus is a co-founder of the African Institute of

Corporate Citizenship (The views presented in this

paper are personal). Paul has been working in the field

of social responsibility for the past ten years. Initial

research began in the migrant workers hostels of

Johannesburg and continued whilst working on platinum mine in Organisational Development. Consultancy in

the field of social and environmental impact assessment

allowed Paul to work in a number of African countries on projects ranging from greenfields exploration through to privatisation. Paul undertook a BA (HONS) in social

anthropology at the University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa, and a Masters in the Anthropology of

Development at Sussex University, UK. On his return

from the UK he co-founded the African Institute of

Corporate Citizenship, a consultancy and advocacy

organisation. His work has focussed on corporate citi

zenship strategy, social management plan development, tri-sector partnerships and socially responsible investment.

of a major minor company has been implemented by one of its subsidiaries in South Africa.

KEY WOPJDS: corporate social responsibility, mining ethics, Rio Tinto

At the Rio Tinto head quarters in St

James Square, London, an anthropology

professor and his research assistant advise

the Rio Tinto mining operations around

the world on community affairs. They comment on the company's relations

with "the community", scrutinise five

year community development plans and

provide direction for engaging with the

community on sensitive cultural issues and

advice on resettlement. On their desks sit

various reference books including James

Ferguson's "The Anti-Politics Machine", "Civil Society" by Hann & Dunn and

literature dealing with mine ? aboriginal

relations in Australia, as well as internet

web site printouts from the British

Institute for Development Studies library.

They maintain files for storing articles

from the media about the operations at

different mine sites and actively "surf the

web" examining sites that campaign

against Rio Tinto.

On the northern KwaZulu Natal coast in

South Africa, Richards Bay Minerals

(RBM), a Rio Tinto subsidiary, is busy

preparing to relocate a number of house

holds situated within the demarcated

100 m mining zone. The team of com

-^g- Journal of Business Ethics 39: 275-296, 2002.

r" ? 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.



276 Paul Kapelus

munity development workers goes out

each day to support community develop ment projects in the adjacent Mbonambi

community. The projects are displayed to

the world in the Rio Tinto corporate

reports and magazines, on the RJBM web

site and on billboard signs next to the

development projects.

Enlightened corporations, including those in the

mining industry, have long been aware that it

may be in their interests to address issues of

concern to the local communities in which they

operate. The pragmatic logic involved in this

notion is quite simple. Local communities are

often in a position to impose costs on corpora

tions, with their ability to do so being a function

of the resources they command and their ability to organize themselves. What this has meant his

torically is that corporations have tended to pay more attention to those communities which have

more resources. More specifically, corporations have paid more attention to the concerns of

communities in developed countries in which

they operate than to those in developing coun

tries.

With recent processes of economic globalisa tion this simple truth has become more compli cated. For one thing, as corporations increasingly shift their production to developing countries,

they are finding that they are not the only ones

who are going global. Civil society, and more

specifically, environmental and corporate watch

dog groups, are also globalising and collaborating with civil society groups in developing countries.

As a result, corporations are facing increased

surveillance and criticism of their activities in

developing countries, as well as increased pressure to operate in a socially responsible fashion. For

their part, corporations are responding. As

the vignettes above indicate, large transnational

mining companies are changing as a result of bad

press, production delays and campaigns instigated

by civil society groups. By way of response, these

corporations are developing global corporate social responsibility (CSR) strategies

? which

employ the vocabularies of business ethics, human rights and development

- as part of their

larger global business strategies.

For business ethics, one basic issue that arises

in this context is whether such an approach by

corporations to this situation is likely to effec

tively address the development concerns that the

local communities in developing countries have.

It is this question that this paper investigates. I

examine this issue by way of a case study.

Specifically, I look at the global CSR agenda set

out by the mining giant Rio Tinto and how it

has been implemented by its subsidiary Richards

Bay Minerals (RJiM) in the Mbonambi Tribal

Authority of South Africa. The case study

analysis is based in part upon a series of inter

views with key figures in Rio Tinto, BJBM and the local communities in and around Richards

Bay conducted in 1999.1

In adopting a case study analysis in this paper,

my goal is primarily heuristic, that is, to explore the tensions that appear in the process and

the concerns that arise (rather than providing a

definitive evaluation of the effectiveness of the

particular policies and their implementation and

concrete steps to be taken to address shortcom

ings). Key aspects of the analysis involve the

investigation of how the company conceptualizes and employs the notion of "community" and

how its approach to these tasks is contested by stakeholder groups.

I. Context - transnational mining

corporations and their critics

The transnationalization of (the mining) industry

Over the last couple of decades transnational

corporations (TNCs) have experienced unprece dented growth. While in 1970 there were

approximately 7000 TNCs, by 1994 the count

had risen to some 39 000 parent TNCs and

20 000 affiliate TNCs (Nelson, 1998). Various

technical, organizational and political factors have

provided the opportunities for the increased

financial investment across the globe. These

include privatisation policies, liberalised invest

ment policies, the reregulation of mining activ

ities, new technology for global operations, traditional concerns about spreading financial

risks and more effective production processes.



Mining, Corporate Social Responsibility and the 'Community' 277

Like TNCs generally, mining TNCs have

also been growing in recent years. As Reed doc

uments in his paper in this issue, the transna

tionalization of the mining industry is not

new. Commercial mining has been expanding

throughout the globe for more than 150 years, a

process that has largely been linked to the dom

ination of colonial powers. In recent years,

however, mining companies have stepped up their operations in developing countries. The

primary reasons for this are the liberalizing ten

dencies in the new global economy, noted above, as well as depletion of resources in developed countries.

The transnationalization of opposition

The mining industry has always provoked reaction to its operations, especially from local

communities. While this is true in both devel

oped countries and developing countries, oppo sition groups in developing countries have

typically enjoyed advantages in making their

demands heard due to greater resources, better

organization and more effective political repre sentation. The organizational advantages in

developed countries have included more active

and better resourced social movements and

NGOs (operating around such concerns as

human rights, the environment, the rights of

indigenous people, corporate responsibility,

etc.).

As mining TNCs are increasingly becoming

global corporations, so has opposition to them

become increasingly global. While many estab

lished NGOs in the developed world have long been international in perspective, they have been

taking a greater interest in issues related to

mining. As well, many new NGOs have been

established over the last couple of decades,

including a variety with a specific focus on

mining concerns. Both newer and more estab

lished NGOs have shown a strong propensity to

collaborate, not only amongst themselves, but

with organizations and local communities in the

developing world. The result has been the estab

lishment of networks of opposition to mining firms.

Particularly significant among the opposition to mining TNCs in developing countries has

been the emergence of increased activism by

indigenous communities, who are frequently

among the groups most directly and adversely affected by mining activities. Large numbers of

indigenous peoples are entering into conflict

with mining companies (Fabig and Boele, 1999;

Burger, 1987). Indigenous communities are chal

lenging mining companies on a wide range of

issues including profit-flows, headquarters' decision making procedures, representation on

the company board, rights to extract minerals,

compensation measures, reporting procedures and long-term strategies. Almost every aspect of

a business is scrutinised from a social responsi

bility perspective. These indigenous communities have benefited

greatly from the globalisation of opposition to

mining TNCs. In recent years a global network

of indigenous peoples organisations has emerged as a result of this larger opposition movement.

Members of the larger movement provide impor tant services, such as reporting on negotiations between mining firms and local (indigenous) communities. Such negotiations are often

relevant for other indigenous groups, even if they are being held on another continent, as deals

struck between one group and a mining

company can be used as reference points or

benchmarks for other groups (Broad, 1997).

Reports on such negotiations help to ensure

indigenous communities the best possible price

(in both financial terms and other considerations) for their granting of mining rights (Crowson,

1998). The efforts of indigenous peoples to organize

have been paying off in other ways, as well.

Indigenous peoples are starting to have more of

their land claims officially recognized, as in

the 1992 "Mabo ruling in Australia" (which

provided for native title of land if historical and

continuous links with the land could be demon

strated). Indigenous people are also having their

rights recognized in other fora. In 1989 the

International Labour Organisation (ILO) adopted Convention 169, "Concerning Indigenous

Peoples and Tribes in Independent Countries."

For its part, the United Nations Human Rights



278 Paul Kapelus

Commission has formed a Working Group on

Indigenous Populations and developed a draft

Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. The UN has also been active specifically with

respect to indigenous peoples' relations with the

mining industry, promoting the concepts of free

and informed consent, participation in the

benefits of development, compensation, and mit

igation of adverse impacts.

II. Corporate social responsibility

(mining) and the community

CSR as a programmatic response to critics

While corporations have always been involved

with CSR programs to some degree in one form

or another, the last couple of decades have seen

an explosion in terms of the effort and resources

that corporations have been expending on CSR.

Mining and other resource sectors have been in

the forefront of this new surge of interest. There

are a couple of overlapping reasons for this new

emphasis on CSR. Perhaps, the major factor, as

discussed above, is the fact that NGOs, social

movement and indigenous peoples have increased

their organizational capacity and cooperation

tremendously over the last twenty years or so.

This has allowed them to exert much greater

pressure on corporations, both directly (through actions against their production facilities and

campaigns directed at shareholders and con

sumers) as well as indirectly (through the polit ical system).

In addition the pressure from civil society

organizations and indigenous peoples, TNCs are

also encouraged to become more responsible and

take up CSR programs by pro-business organi

zations, such as the World Business Council for

Sustainable Development (WBCSD), the Prince

of Wales Business Leadership Forum (PWBLF), the Centre for International Private Enterprise

(CIPE), etc. A recent initiative by the WBCSD,

for example, is directed specifically at the mining

industry and represents an effort to confront the

poor ethical reputation of the mining industry and the resultant pressure placed on the industry

to transform. Entitled "Mining Minerals and

Sustainable Development" (MMSD), this global

programme is being administered by the

International Association of Environment and

Development (IIED). The stated intention of the

project is "to identify how mining and minerals

can best contribute to the global transition to

sustainable development" (IIED, 2000). The

WBCSD hopes that the project will help to

publicize the serious attempts of the mining

industry to construct an agenda for CSR and

encourage all members of the industry to live

up to the highest standards. Major research

themes of the project include human rights issues

(conflict, abusive practices, corruption), concerns

of indigenous peoples, access to markets, world

trade and globalisation and finally designing a

sustainable future. The findings of MMSD will

be presented to the Rio +10 World Summit on

Sustainable Development (WSSD) in 2002 in South Africa.

In addition to civil society pressures, there are

numerous international treaties and agreements that attempt to promote more responsible activity

by TNCs with respect to their social and envi

ronmental impact.2 Environmental awareness in

particular has intensified in recent years, espe

cially after the convening of the 1992 Earth

Summit in Rio. One key issue that has emerged with respect to international regulation is how

TNCs might be encouraged to apply their home

standards abroad, when they move to locations

with lower labour costs and less stringent envi

ronmental regulations. Mining companies, in

particular have been an object of concern, as they have not only not fulfilled their promises of being

engines of local economic growth, but frequently adverse social and environmental impacts of their

activities have far outweighed the economic

benefits that have accrued (Anderson, 1996, cited

in Carter, 1997). A final source of pressure has to do with the

pragmatic interests that firms have with respect to operating with a minimum of government

regulation. The problem is that as TNCs have

shifted their investment more to the developing world in recent years, they have opened them

selves up to criticism for not maintaining

adequate minimum standards. Underlying this




charge is the notion that either existing standards

are not adequate or that they are not effectively enforced. Such charges potentially pave the way for more stringent regulation of TNCs (either at the national level or internationally). CSR pro

grammes represent one possible method for

TNCs to dampen any pressure for increased reg ulation that may arise as the result of such

charges.

In taking up CSR programmes and responding to concerns about sustainable development,

mining companies readily acknowledged that

they are responding to social pressure and that

such a response is no longer optional. Marc

Gonsalves, the Corporate Affairs manager of the

Billiton mining group, for example, states that

in the future, "undertaking corporate social

responsibility programmes will be the same as

having to print annual corporate reports. It is

what business is about" (Gonsalves, 1999).

Similarly, the Canadian mining company, Placer

Dome has come to accept that "its ability to

work within the sustainability framework will be

the key to getting good projects and developing successful mines in many parts of the frontier

zones of the world" (Wilson, 1999, p. 48).

Forging a CSR agenda

TNCs have taken up the CSR agenda in a major

way recently. One aspect of the CSR agenda involves TNCs publicly proclaiming their values.

This may be done through any or several of a

number of types of documents produced by the

firm (e.g., mission statements, code of ethics, code of conduct, etc.). Increasingly, TNCs have

also been signing on to statements produced by other groups, including: business organizations,

e.g., WBCSD, PWBLF; multilateral bodies, e.g., the OECD (principles of corporate governance), the UN (Global Compact) and; human rights organizations and NGOs, e.g., Transparency International. There has been a proliferation of

such codes and statements over the past decade, much of it embracing the language of "sustain

able development." A second related aspect of

CSR involves TNCS establishing appropriate standards to operationalise their values in their

business activities. This may involve such areas

as labour standards, environmental standards, etc.

A third key aspect, and the one probably most

closely associated with CSR, involves designing and implementing social-economic development

programs and services.

In undertaking CSR initiatives, TNCs have

engaged a variety of non-business experts to help

develop their initiatives, including explicating their values and principles developing standards, and designing programs. These include anthro

pologists, ethicists, health professionals, develop ment workers, etc. They have not forgotten,

however, to also hire a range of business profes

sionals, especially in the media and publishing world. Their function is to ensure that the world

knows what the values and commitments of the

firm are and how these are expressed through their CSR projects. Indeed, the intensity of the

agenda and the number of policies and pro

grammes in place has contributed to the CSR

global agenda becoming a business in its own

right. Consultancy groups, public-relations com

panies, management and accounting firms are

employed in generating a virtual flood of paper work in the form of conference material, brochures and reports and, as Fabig and Kapelus

(2000) argue, are beginning to set the agenda and

define the discourse of CSR.

The prominence of the "community" in CSR

As corporations have taken up CSR programs, one theme has tended to dominate. That is the

commitment of the firm to the local communi

ties in which they operate. The corporate liter

ature on CSR is permeated with references to

how corporations perceive themselves to be part of the community. Such commitments are typi

cally fleshed out both in terms of principles that

define the basis of the relationship and guidelines that provide more practical instructions for

managers on how to establish good relations with

"the community."3

It is not only the corporations themselves that

provide the community a place of prominence in

the CSR agenda. International financial organi zations also highlight the importance of rela



280 Paul Kapelus

tionships with local communities. The World

Bank, for instances, hosted two conferences in

1998 entitled "Mining and the Community," the

first in April in Quito, Ecuador and the second

in July in Madang, Papua New Guinea. The

Bank is concerned that as a result of the rapid

globalisation of the mining industry and increased

investment in developing countries conflicts

between indigenous communities and the mining

industry are likely to increase. In line with this

situation, the Bank joined with the mining

industry in expressing the belief that "proper

management of relations with communities is

going to be the biggest challenge in the next

ten to twenty years" (McMahon, 1998, p. 10). Discussions at the conference highlighted the fact

that the rights of indigenous people and local

communities are increasingly being recognised around the globe. It was urged that consultation

by communities be recognized as a right and that

traditional values and customs of the community be taken seriously in the decision-making

processes.

That the "community" has emerged as the

distinctive narrative in the strategy of the mining sector for promoting CSR should not be sur

prising. An emphasis on community in the devel

opment literature extends back to the British

colonial office, whose approach reflects an

organic conception of the state - widely held in

the nineteenth century - as being composed of

social parts (Strathern, 1992). As noted above, communities have always been important to the

mining sector to some degree. In the mining

industry, the narrative of community has

commonly been associated with the category of

"culture." Usually, this category had a negative connotation for the industry as traditional

cultures were seen as an impediment to devel

opment generally and a potential constraint on

mining activities, as it could lead to opposition to mining by the community and raise concerns

(by others) about the impact of mining on the

local community.4 Typically, to get around the

situation, the industry would undertake "cultural

appraisals" to ensure that projects could proceed without adversely impacting the culture and the

community. In recent times, the role of the "community"

has become even more prominent. From a prag matic perspective, the reason for this would seem

to be quite obvious. The operations of mining firms almost inevitably adversely affect (some

members of) the local communities (e.g., by

degrading the environment, diminishing liveli

hood prospects, displacing people form their

homes, etc.) in ways that are likely to evoke

opposition. While adverse effects and opposition are not necessarily limited to the local commu

nity, especially in our current global context (e.g.,

regional, national and foreign politicians, NGOs,

social movements, shareholders etc., may all raise

concerns about firms' activities), it is the local

community that is most directly affected and it

is their claims that have the most credibility. If,

for their part, companies can convincingly make

the claim that the local community is benefiting from their operations (e.g., though community

development programs), then it provides them

with a cloak of legitimacy that serves to protect them from charges by other groups (e.g., envi

ronmentalists, labour organizations) and enables

them to continue on with their activities (with a minimum of disruption and cost).

Defining the community ? a complex and

controversial task

Increasingly firms want to be able to claim that

local communities are benefiting from their

presence (and that where there are negative

impacts on communities these are under control). The logical first step in making such a claim is

to "identify" the community in question. As

noted above, the understanding of this need to

identify a community is not new. One way or

another mining firms have been identifying the

community ever since they first began to spread

through the "frontier" zones. Typically, the key

step in identifying the community involved

requesting permission to mine from "the chief"

or other traditional authority, an act that implic

itly set the boundaries of the community along the lines of the (de facto) authority of the chief.

More recently, the process of identifying the

community has become much more explicit in

nature, being designated a key task of CSR. It




has also become much more sophisticated,

involving the entire machinery of CSR,

composed of community affairs, public relations,

social impact assessments, and public involvement

programmes.

Identifying a community, however, is a

complex and contested task, especially in con

temporary societies. There are several reasons

why this is so. For one, communities can be

identified on the basis of any number of shared

traits such as geographic territory, religion,

culture, history, kinship, etc. For another, people can have multiple, overlapping identities and

these identities can change overtime.5 This means

that any definition of a community is always a

construct, an imposing of order that does not

necessarily fit the lived experience of the people in question. For this reason, it is also the case that

definitions of community are necessarily open to contestation, both in terms of the limits and

the structure of the community.6 With respect to the limits, different definitions based upon dif

ferent criteria include and exclude different

people. As the choice of criteria is largely a

subjective matter, any one choice is inevitably

going to be challenged, especially when excluded

individuals feel they should be included. With

respect to the structure, the key question is

who (if anyone) can represent the community.

Historically, it was generally assumed that tradi

tional leaders could represent the community, both de facto and in terms of having some degree of (moral) legitimacy. It is much more problem atic to make these assumptions today, as tradi

tional authorities have frequently lost much of

their decision-making power (to democratically elected representatives), while their moral legit

imacy is also increasingly under attack.

CSR, ethics and the community

CSR programs can have either of two functions

and, correspondingly, may be undertaken for

either of two forms of motivation. From the per

spective of business ethics, CSR programs can

help corporations to discern and fulfil their oblig ations to stakeholder groups. From the perspec tive of business strategy, however, CSR programs

may be viewed as a method for minimizing costs.

With respect to motivation, TNCs can under

take CSR programs either because they have a

strong moral commitment or because they have

pragmatic interests in doing so (as indicated

above). These two forms of motivation are, of

course, logical extremes. In actual practice, due

to the wide variety of people and issues involved,

both forms of motivation are likely to come into

play.7 Generally, however, it is possible to talk

about corporations as operating closer to one

pole than the other.

The function of CSR and the motivation of

firms would not be an issue (at one level)8 if it

were universally true that being socially respon sible is good for business. Under these circum

stances, TNCs would always be socially

responsible (except when they make errors in

strategy), as this would help them to maximize

profits (and shareholder value). It seems na?ve,

however, to assume that this condition always holds.9 This is only likely to be the case to the

degree that stakeholders can effectively impose costs on the firm.

The function and motivation underlying CSR

programs have practical implications with respect to communities. If firms tend to be more morally

motivated, then they will employ CSR as a tool

of moral discernment. Under these circum

stances, firms will be willing to live up to their

obligations to stakeholders, even when it involves

costs in terms of shareholder value. If, on the

other hand, firms are primarily guided by

pragmatic interests (i.e., profits), then CSR can

become exclusively a business tool rather than an

approach to discerning moral responsibility. Under these circumstances firms will be inter

ested more in the appearance of social responsi

bility than actually being socially responsible. In

this scenario CSR programs are ultimately con

cerned with minimizing disruption to the firm's

(processing, transportation, marketing, etc.) activ

ities and, thereby, minimizing costs. This has two

basic implications with respect to the definition

of communities.

The first implication of firms adopting a prag matic approach to CSR relates to how they are

likely to understand the structure of the com

munity. For purposes of maximizing profits, it is



282 Paul Kapelus

in the interest of firms to be able to present the

community as having an uncontested, legitimate

authority. When such a legitimate authority

exists, and is in agreement with the firm, then

the firm's plans can proceed in a smoother

manner (and responses to any objections that may arise by dissenters can be more effectively devel

oped and implemented). The need for agreement

by authorities, in turn, can lead to a tendency to designate local (economic and traditional) elites as the legitimate authorities or the com

munity. Typically, it would not be in the inter

ests of firms to raise the question of the criteria

by which such authorities could be considered

legitimate. Nor is it generally in their interests to

note any disagreements within the community

(unless the dissenters can impose significant

costs), as this may undermine the legitimacy of

the leaders of the community and the firm's claim

to be socially responsible. Similarly, firms might not want to investigate the distribution of

benefits deriving from their activities among local

communities.

Second, to the extent that the firm is inter

ested in limiting costs, it will want to limit the

size of the community as this will limit the claims

that can be made upon it. What restricting the

size of the community means practically can be

understood with reference to the concept of an

"ecological footprint" (Wackernagel and Rees,

1996). The ecological footprint, a device which

ecologists commonly employ to investigate the

range of effects of the firms' operations, is impor tant in pointing out that many of the (adverse) effects of firms are diffuse, wide-ranging and fre

quently not immediately evident. When firms

use the community as their basic unit of analysis, then the more they restrict the notion of com

munity, the more they restrict their vision of

their "ecological footprint." More specifically,

they limit the number of people who they will

see as affected by their operations and the fail to

acknowledge the different ways in which people

might be (adversely) affected. Such a restriction

on their vision will function to limit their

responsibilities and costs.

The CSR agenda -

global and local

In the contemporary economy, TNCs in the

mining sector are inevitably both global and local

in their organization. As multinational, their

operations around the globe are becoming

increasingly integrated (e.g., in terms of strategy,

marketing, etc.) and subjected to centralized

control. As mining operations, however, their

operations are inevitably local. They must extract

resources from specific sites with specific char

acteristic in specific contexts that generate

specific problems. This global-local dynamic is

also at play with respect to the CSR agendas of

mining TNCs. At the level of the global head

quarters, CSR agendas get worked out in terms

of abstract principles and general guidelines, which are to apply to the firm's operations worldwide. At the level of individual projects and

sites run by subsidiaries, however, the CSR

agenda of mining TNCs becomes much more

concrete. Here, actual projects must be developed and implemented in accordance with the guide lines. Similarly, the notion of community at the

level of the global agenda can remain rather

abstract, which at the local level actual commu

nities need to be defined in concrete ways. As was noted above, there may be a strong

tension between firms maximising profit and

being socially responsible. This potential tension

can be reflected in different ways and to different

extents at the global and local levels. At the

global level, it may be more possible to pave over

the tension. Here it is easy for firms to make the

assumption of a harmony of interests between

the company and local communities.10 At this

level of the global CSR agenda, where firms

embrace general principles (e.g., participation, human rights, etc.) and guidelines for CSR activ

ities (e.g., community economic development

programs) and do not identify specific commu

nities, they do not have to make concrete oblig ations or calculate the costs of being socially

responsible in individual locations. Moreover,

they can easily portray (past and current)

problems primarily in terms of misunderstand

ings and organizational problems at local levels.

From this perspective, the challenge of CSR is

primarily to translate global commitments into




the specific contexts of individual communities.

Nelson (1998, p. 11) refers to this as "the art of

being local world-wide," a process whereby "the

community" becomes an all-important focus of

attention which verifies the global firm's status as

a good local corporate citizen.

At the local level, firms do have to make

specific obligations with specific communities

and confront specific claims about their behav

iour. It is here where CSR principles and guide lines are implemented that the potential costs of

being socially responsible can be measured against the potential profits of operations. In situations

where the costs of being socially responsible do not help keep total costs down, then local

managers will have to confront the tension

between being socially responsible and increasing shareholder value. Here it is not as easy to facilely state that, "good ethics is good business." From

a pragmatic perspective, local managers will want

to find some way to (at least appear to) ease this

tension. Probably the most effective method they have for doing this is to shape the definition of

the community in ways that restrict the number

of claims upon them. As noted above, this may

help firms to limit costs and proceed in a more

expeditious manner - if they are not effectively

challenged.11 Such assumptions about the community,

however, can be challenged (both by members of

the community and their allies). In what follows, we will examine how a company like Rio Tinto

develops its CSR agenda around the notion of

community - both at the global level and at the

local level through its subsidiary Richards Bay Minerals

- and how its account of CSR and the

community is contested.

III. Rio Tinto's global CSR agenda

We did not just give help as we thought fit but consulted with the community who

decided what the priorities were. The

community also worked to achieve our

joint objective. We are now members of

the community - for mutual benefit.

- Leader of Ecuador exploration

team

(Rio Tinto, 1999, p. 6).

Rio Tinto's story

Rio Tinto was originally founded in 1873 to

mine copper in Spain. Over the years it has been

restructured several times through mergers and

acquisitions. In 1954, two thirds of the Spanish

operations were sold, with the remaining one

third being divested later. In 1962, the Rio

Tinto-Zinc Corporation (RTZ) was formed

through the merger of two British firms, the Rio

Tinto Company and the Consolidated Zinc

Corporation. At the same time an Australian

firm, Conzinc Rio Tinto of Australia (CRA) was formed through the merger of Australian

interests of the Rio Tinto Company and the

Consolidated Zinc Corporation. In 1995 RTZ

and CRA were unified through a dual listed

companies structure. In 1997, RTZ became Rio

Tinto pic and CBJV became Rio Tinto Limited.

The dual listed company is based in the UK and

in Australia, with control being exercised by the

parent company in London.

Over the course of its history, Rio Tinto has

not only grown substantially, but has also diver

sified. In the period immediately after the 1962

merger, its diversification was limited to the

mining sector, as it opened up new operations in uranium, tin and borax. Between 1968 and

1985, however it moved beyond mining into

such areas as cement, oil and gas, chemicals and

even manufacturing parts for the automotive

and construction industries. Following a review

of the companies operations in 1987-1988,

however, the decision was made to refocus the

firm's efforts on mining and related industries.

This led not only to the divestment of its non

mining operation, but a whole new series of

acquisitions within the mining sector. As a result, Rio Tinto is now one of the world's largest

private mining company with assets of over ?1 billion.

Throughout its history, but in particular in

recent decades, Rio Tinto has been the subject of criticism with respect to a range of environ

mental, social and labour issues. In response to

the accusations and activities of its critics, Rio

Tinto has undertaken steps to become (critics would say "appear") more socially responsible.

It has developed, in effect, a global corporate



284 Paul Kapelus

responsibility strategy. This strategy has two basic

components: a declaration of its values and the

elaboration of policy guidelines for the imple mentation of these values. These values and

guidelines are set forth in policy documents that

were produced by the company, and its anthro

pology advisor, at the head office in London.

They are intended to provide each of the

parent firm's operating companies, subsidiaries

and contractors with a programme for becoming

socially responsible enterprises. The company

emphasises that because it operates in diverse

cultural and social environments, each location is

required to design a unique social responsibility

programme.

Conceptually, the first part of Rio Tinto 's

strategy is to clearly state the company's values

and principles. The primary place where this

happens is in a document entitled "The Way We

Work" (1998). Rio Tinto affirms a commitment

to widely accepted norms such as human rights. It looks to the United National Universal

Declaration of Human Rights as well as the

human rights provisions of the countries in

which they operate to guide them in their

responsibilities. It also identifies other values to

which it is committed. Most notable in this

regard are three principles that it proclaims will

provide the basis for its relationships with local

communities, viz., mutual respect, active part

nership, and long-term commitment. Mutual

respect, it is argued, is essential if relationships are to be lasting, beneficial and interactive.

Mutual respect entails "continuing and effective

two way communication and realistic expecta tions on both sides" (1998, p. 8). Active part

nership defines the way Rio Tinto hopes to work

with local communities, regional and national

governments and other affected parties. The aim

of such partnership is to seek "mutual commit

ment and reciprocity based on trust and openness so as to reach agreed objectives and shared

involvement" (1999, p. 8). Finally, long-term commitment is "sought so that social and

economic well being is safeguarded and, where

possible, enhanced throughout the mine's life and

beyond" (1999, p. 8). The second aspect of Rio Tinto s strategy is

to develop practical guidelines that can facilitate

the implementation of its values. This task it

primarily takes up in an internal corporate document entitled "Community Policy Guide

lines" (1997). The goals of these guidelines are

to help the firm to build long-term relationships of mutual benefit between the operations and

their host communities, to enhance access to

existing and new opportunities and to avoid

costly disputes, higher project financing and

insurance costs. The reason for having company

wide-guidelines is not only to ensure that stan

dards are maintained throughout the company, but also to facilitate that lessons learned can be

shared and the company can build on the suc

cesses of its individual components. In line with the discussion in the previous

section, several points need to be highlighted. First, Rio Tinto clearly defines its CSR com

mitment in terms of its relationships to local

communities. This emphasis not only runs

throughout its documents, but is the organizing

principle of many key documents such as the

"Community Policy Guidelines".

Second, Rio Tinto seems to allow for a broad

understanding of community and a diversity of

forms of community. The former characteristic

is indicated in its definition of "community" as

"anyone who is impacted in any way, socially,

economically and environmentally by the oper ations of the mine" (Pettifer, 1998, p. 3). The

latter trait is reflected in its recognition of a wide

variety of possible bases for communities,

including "the nature of attachment to a terri

tory; self identification by others as members of

a distinct group; the culture or common beliefs, attitudes and work interests of the group; a

language or dialect, which may be different from

the national language; the presence of unique

religious, political or cultural beliefs" (Rio Tinto,

1997, p. 8). In principle this broad, flexible

approach to defining community would seem to

allow for wide ranging responsibilities on the

part of the corporation and might be taken to

imply that the firm views CSR more in terms

of moral commitment than as a pragmatic business strategy.

In other places, however, the documents

suggest a narrower understanding of community and more limited responsibilities. Thus, for




example, when the company proclaims its com

mitment to protecting the dignity, well-being and

rights of people with whom they are "directly"

involved, it identifies these people as employees and their families and people in "neighbouring" communities. Such passages reflect a more prag

matic approach to CSR, as do passages empha

sizing the firm's aims of enhancing access to

existing and new opportunities and avoiding

costly disputes, higher project financing and

insurance costs. Such pragmatism is also

expressed by the non-business experts Rio

Tinto hires. Professor Glynn Cochrane, the com

munities and anthropology advisor to Rio

Tinto, for example, states that the relationship between the company and the community has to

be business-like (rather than philanthropic). The

situation is one in which, "Rio Tinto is under

a microscope and if we screw up we cannot

access goods. The time taken to license, insure, secure and finally start production has increased

by 300 per cent. Good relations can cut down

on lead time, disputes and delays" (Cochrane,

1999). The ambiguity over community in the docu

ments makes it unclear whether the firm views

CSR primarily in terms of moral responsibility or business strategy. The fact that there might be a tension between these two approaches is

never addressed. Rather the firm seems to assume

a harmony between its moral responsibilities and

its business interests. This assumption is stated

quite clearly in passages where the firm asserts its

conviction that its "competitiveness and future

success depend not only on our employees and

the quality and diversity of our assets but also

on our record as good neighbours and partners around the world" (Rio Tinto, 1998, p. 1). This

assumption of harmony also gets expressed less directly, such as in the strong emphasis that

Rio Tinto places on the "value" of mutual

benefit.

The counter-narrative: international trade unions

Rio Tinto has come under criticism over a

wide variety of issues (e.g., human rights, the

environment, labour relations, treatment of

local communities, etc.) from a range of

groups including environmentalists (e.g., The

Earth Times), corporate watchdogs (e.g.,

Corporate Watch), mining activists (e.g., Project

Underground), human rights groups (e.g., Asia

Pacific Human Rights Network) and labour

organizations.12 Here I focus on the criticisms

about Rio Tinto 's CSR agenda. I will limit my

investigations to criticisms made by labour orga

nizations, in particular the Belgium based

International Federation of Chemical, Energy, Mine and General Workers' Unions (ICEM) and

the International Confederation of Free Trade

Unions (ICFTU), as these are representative of

the nature of the claims brought against Rio

Tinto.

As labour organizations, ICEM and ICFTU

are obviously concerned about Rio Tinto's

approach to industrial relations. The ICEM has

targeted Rio Tinto as a special object of concern

due to "the extreme actions of the company in

seeking to de-unionise its operations and to

restrict the bargaining rights of its workers"

(ICEM, 1998a, p. i). In response to this situation, ICEM affiliates met in South Africa in February 1998 to form the Rio Tinto network of trade

unions with the aim of pressuring Rio Tinto to

improve its standards with respect to human

rights, workers' rights and environmental pro tection. Part of the ICEM's concerns, however, relate directly to the CSR agenda of Rio Tinto,

which it tends to see as a somewhat cynical

attempt by the firm to gain legitimacy by

claiming to represent the interests of local com

munities. This skepticism about Rio Tinto's

intentions and concern about their practices is

clearly expressed in the titles of two documents

that the ICEM has released on the firm, viz., "Rio Tinto - Tainted Titan" (1998a) and "Rio

Tinto - Behind the Fa?ade" (1998b).13 The unions have two basic criticisms of Rio

Tinto's global CSR Agenda. First, with respect to its principles and guidelines, the ICEM

believes that Rio Tinto does not go far enough. More specifically, "The Way We Work" is

criticised as being too weak to be able to effec

tively bind the company to responsible behav

iour. Apart from making reference to the

UN Declaration on Human Rights, the ICFTU



286 Paul Kapelus

(1998) argues, "The Way We Work" does

not refer to the two most authoritative interna

tionally agreed definitions of responsible behav

iour. These are the International Labour

Organisations' (ILO) Tripartite Declaration of

Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprise and Social Policy, and the OECD Guidelines for

multinational enterprises. ICEM suggests that the

omission of the international treaties and guide lines from "The Way We Work" discredits Rio

Tinto s claim that "their processes aim to provide the required level of control, transparency and

accountability in line with worldwide best

practice" (1998b, p. 9). The second basic criticism that the labour

organizations put forth is that Rio Tinto is not

adequately accountable for the implementation of its principles and guidelines. The ICEM

argues, for example, that there are no clear lines

of responsibility between London and the local

operating companies with respect to the over

sight of the guidelines, a situation that leads to

inconsistencies in the implementation of Rio

Tinto's global CSR agenda. The ICEM (1998b, p. 8) states that "Rio Tinto itself knows that

implementation may most certainly not be uni

versal," the implication being that Rio Tinto

either does not care about or actually prefers this

state of affairs. ICEM's position is that, while

some of its subsidiaries may live up to the

global CSR agenda, this is not sufficient. Until

all of its operations (including both wholly and partially owned subsidiaries) are managed in a socially and environmentally responsible

way, Rio Tinto is a valid target of criticism

and can rightfully be judged to be socially

irresponsible.

IV. Richard Bay Mine's local CSR agenda

Just as the end products which come from

the minerals extracted from the sand

enhance the lives of millions of people

throughout the world, so the fruits of

mining are enhancing the lives of the

people who walk that ground. -

Managing Director, RBM 1999.

Context - CSR and the political

economy of South Africa

CSR in South Africa has in the past been

restricted to the domain of paternalistic gift

giving, making charitable donations to various

organisations, and securing patronage from

traditional chiefs (with the metaphorical bottle

of whisky). This situation began to change with

the crumbling of "apartheid" in the late 1980s

and early 1990s. Many analysts consider the

speech made by former President De Klerk on

February 2 1990 to be the watershed for

more responsible business in South Africa.14 The

country was pushed into a new environment in

which the old rules and norms no longer applied.

Initially, without any set of rules or norm to

conform to, business was a bit lost. It had to

design a new strategy for engaging with the new

social order and shift from a "racial capitalism"

(policies based on racial ideology) to a "social

capitalism" (policies based on development

ideology). Business had to rethink how it was to

behave responsibly. A shift from corporate giving to a total

social and political strategy was engaged, with

business starting social upliftment programmes and poverty alleviation and supporting the polit ical negotiation process. Since the 1994 elections,

legislation has forced business to start working

differently on many fronts. New labour relations, environmental management, affirmative action, black empowerment and corporate governance have become the accepted standards rather

than exceptional practices that go beyond "the

call of duty." International standards and decla

rations have also become integrated, especially by

leading business sectors, a process that has served

to help integrate South African business into the

global economy (Innes, 1992; Botha, 1994). Within the mining sector, the CSR initiatives

have been impressive in some quarters (although it could still be argued that they are insufficient

compared to the profits generated, especially in

the most profitable sectors such as platinum and

titanium). One of the more impressive examples is the Anglo American and De Beers Chairman's

Fund, which has an annual budget of R50

million (?5 million). The Fund has adopted an




"interactive partnership approach," where "own

ership" and "choice" are the two fundamental

principles driving all initiatives (Keaton, 1997b,

p. 17). The Fund operates across the spectrum of CSR - from being a charity and donor

through to acting as an implementing agency. The Billiton Development Trust, established

by the Billiton company (now BHP Billiton), provides another example of a substantial devel

opment programme. The Trust understands itself

as a development catalyst or facilitator rather than

an implementing agent of development. The

Trust provides funds to NGOs so that they may, for example, "go and promote women's issues

under the Billiton banner" (Sepeei, 1999). While social intervention has always been

a practice of mining companies in South

Africa and elsewhere, such assistance largely remained within the confines of the immediate

"mining community," namely employees and

their families. In South Africa, such a practice has been fraught with racist policies underlined

by the laws of the apartheid government, which

regulated among other things social infrastruc

ture, housing, transport, separate amenities and

education. For a number of years before the new

democratic government came to power in 1994, various mining companies began to acknowledge their role in the socio-economic hardships expe rienced by both urban and rural communities.

Recognising that the labour sending areas in the

homelands suffered through migrant labour

policies, companies such as Anglo American,

Johannesburg Consolidated Investments (JCI) and

Gencor (now known as BHP Billiton) instigated social investment programmes. Subsequently, the events leading up to the first democratic

elections, the election victory of the African

National Congress (ANC) and the instatement

of Nelson Mandela as President of South Africa

would lay the foundation for a more concerted

CSR drive on the part of mining companies. After the elections, the new Reconstruction

and Development Programme (RDP), the

platform from which the government launched

their poverty alleviation drive, quickly became

seen as important programme for business to

support, in part due to the government's active

encouragement of private sector participation. In

1994, Godsell wrote in an article in the South

African Labour Bulletin "[bjusiness is ready to

participate in the reconstruction and develop ment of South Africa," suggesting that social

investment could contribute to the growth of

South Africa which "ultimately is the engine of

poverty relief" (1994, p. 7). But working with

the new government required shifts in attitude

with respect to managing development programs - a shift from a heavy-handed, controlling

approach to engaging with multiple stakeholders

with different interests. In 1997 the mining

industry presented their official commitment to

community development to the South African

Parliament in Cape Town. In an effort to high

light the shifts that mining companies have gone

through with regard to environmental and devel

opment challenges Margie Keeton of Anglo American stated:

Mines and their communities are confronting

together, in a spirit of common purpose and

resolve, many of the country's critical development

challenges. Their efforts are making a real contri

bution to the search for effective interventions

bringing new hope and opportunity to those mar

ginalised from the mainstream of growth and

advancement (1997, p. 6).

Mining companies recognize that there is some

legitimacy to be gained in South Africa today from being involved in social and economic

reconstruction. This is due in large part to the

government's plea for assistance from the private

sector,15 including a greater emphasis on public

private partnerships. Yet, understanding how

to engage in such co-operation is not always easy for an industry that historically has not set

participation with diverse actors with different

ideologies as a top priority. Mining companies have generally wielded the power to implement

community development policies (within limits

set by government) that allowed them to get on

with their core business, namely the extraction

of minerals. Now, having to undertake more

participatory, democratic approaches to develop ment, which demand a more professional and

consultative approach, companies are adopting different models. Some mining companies have

handed over their CSR to non-profit organisa



288 Paul Kapelus

tions to manage, others have established an inde

pendent trust, while others retain the initiative

within the company structures. The basis for

these individual decisions in not entirely clear.

Nor, given the complexity of factors involved in

determining CSR performance, is it yet certain

that any one model is to be preferred over the

other.

RBM's story

Richards Bay Minerals (RBM) is a leading producer of titania slag, high purity pig iron,

rutile and zircon. Jointly owned by Rio Tinto

pic. and BHP Billiton pic, FJ3M is situated on

the coast of the Indian Ocean in northern

KwaZulu Natal province, approximately 20 kilo

meters from the town of Richards Bay. The town

is host to at least five major industries, including fertilizer manufacturing, aluminum smelting and

paper and pulp manufacturing. The immediate

area in which BJBM is situated, the Mbonambi

Tribal Authority (MTA), is considered a rural

area. Mining, commercial forestry, subsistence

farming and basic retail activities dominate the

economic landscape (URC, 1999). The larger

region surrounding Richards Bay, including the dunes in Mozambique to the north and

Madagascar to the east, is rich in mineral

resources and host to a number of exploration

companies assessing the feasibility of opening new mines.16

For its part, RBM has also been seeking to

expand its operations. In particular, RBM hoped to establish a new mine at St. Lucia, just north

of Mbonambi. This plan was halted however, as

the South African government -

after months of

negotiations, studies and consultations -

decided

to exploit the eco-tourism potential rather than

the heavy mineral sands. This decision by the

South African government may have been related

to the tremendous amount of attention that the

proposal for mining drew from environmental

lobby groups, NGOs and activists (Solomon,

1997). This attention placed not only the

South African government under the spotlight,

however, but also RBM and forced RBM to

realign its CSR strategy.

FJ3M first became involved with community issues shortly after the mine was established in

1976. This initial engagement came about as a

result of the introduction of the Sullivan

Principles (the forerunner of the Sullivan Code).

Developed by the Rev. Leon Sullivan - an

African-American Baptist minister, a civil rights leader and a member of the Board of Directors

of General Motors -

these principles were

designed to ensure that American companies

improved the conditions of their black workers

(and their families) both at work and in the home

environment (O'Brien, 1998, p. 110). RBM's

involvement with community affairs at this time,

however, can be best described as limited and ad

hoc in nature.

It was only during events around the St. Lucia

proposal that RBM came to pay more system atic attention to CSR. The reaction surrounding the St. Lucia proposal demonstrated to the

company that undertaking community social

investment was good for business and reputation

management. The St. Lucia episode highlighted the need for PJBM to professionalise and market

its CSR initiatives. O'Brien states:

[T]he company tried to convince its detractors of

the fact that RJ3M would invest in the underpriv

ileged St Lucia communities ... as it had done in

the Richards Bay area . . . [an] advertising and pub

licity campaign launched [but] it was too late. The

tide of public opinion had swung firmly against RBM and ultimately the battle for St Lucia was

lost by RBM (1998, p. 190).

It is hoped that successful marketing of the CSR

projects will help to encourage the government to revisit the issue of allowing mining operation in St. Lucia and to ensure RBM is well placed to take advantage. Investing in "the community"

through CSR programs is viewed as investing in

the financial future of the company. A key step that RBM took in the wake of the

unsuccessful St. Lucia proposal was to work more

closely with the local community through the

Community Development Council (CDC). The

stated goals here were to help ensure not only an effective co-ordination of development ini

tiatives in the MTA but more local participation. RBM now organizes their efforts around a five




year plan, which claims to embed the notion of

"partnership" in its approach to consultation and

to stress a "bottom-up" approach to develop ment. These principles are supposed to enable

the community to dictate the pace of efforts and

promote community ownership and long-term

self-sufficiency of projects. For its part, the

eleven-member RBM community development team engages with the surrounding community on a constant basis about development projects and negotiations over resettlement of homesteads

and graves and expropriation of grazing and

farming land. RBM now prides itself on the

partnerships that it has established with the local

community through its community affairs oper ation and sees itself as exemplifying the global

policies of Rio Tinto on CSR.

RJiM's pride is not without foundation. RJBM

supports a variety of CSR projects in such areas

as education (e.g., assisting local schools, pro

moting, technical education, teacher training,

promoting life skills), health care (e.g., rural

clinics, a 24 hour clinic for employees, an

HIV/AIDS program) and community develop ment (e.g., gardening and cooking clubs, support for small businesses, support for a Rural

Development Centre). In 1999 it funded its com

munity projects to the tune of RIO million (?1

million), a sum that dwarfs the funding that the

government has been able to provide. As a result, FJ3M is the primary agent of development in the

MTA.

RJ3M has not been shy about publicizing its efforts locally. The Mbonambi community

projects are easily recognisable by large signs indi

cating that RJ3M either sponsors or assists the

project, whether it be a school, cr?che or clinic.

FJ3M also has a share of local supporters who

praise its efforts. Prominent among these is Inkosi

(Chief) Mthiyane of Mbonambi, who has fre

quently expressed his strong appreciation of the

efforts of RJ3M, whom he sees not only "as a

neighbour, but also as a friend" (Titania, 7 May

1999).17

The counter-narrative - dissenters and the larger

community

While RBM undoubtedly contributes to local

community development through its CSR

projects, it is not without its detractors, both

within and beyond the Mbonambi "community." While within the Mbonambi community oppo

sition is probably muted to a significant extent

by the relatively generous levels of spending that

the company provides, there are still concerns.

The major concerns can perhaps be best under

stood in terms of how the company operates its

CSR programs. While institutions like the World

Bank, picking up on the vocabulary or recent

development thinking, advocate a "partnership" model for CSR (e.g., the "Business Partners for

Development" programme), developing partner

ships requires trust, learning and an ability to

hand over control in a flexible manner. This

approach typically goes against the normal

problem solving approach employed in mining firms like RBM, e.g., establishing what the

problem is and solving it in a technocratic, linear

manner. As a result, local communities like the

Mbonambi can feel alienated, even when they are enjoying relatively generous benefits.

Outside of the Mbonambi community, RBM

also has its detractors. As noted above, RJ?M is

located in the Mbonambi Tribal Authority. The

MTA, however, is but a small part of the Imfolozi

sub-district, which comprises sixteen tribal

authorities (see Figure 1). The Imfolozi sub

district, in turn, is but a fraction of the larger

Uthungulu district, which comprises a total of

sixty-nine tribal authorities (Uthungulu Regional

Development Plan, 1998). While each tribal

authority is the legal authority in its own local

area, it is the Uthungulu Regional Council

(URC) that is responsible for development

planning in the Uthungulu district.

With regards to regional development

planning and activities, its relationship with

RBM has placed the MTA in a unique, and

somewhat tense, position vis-?-vis its neighbours. In effect, its relationship to RBM, which serves

as the de facto development agency for the MTA, has made the Mbonambi community an "island

of development" in a URC sea of underdevel



290 Paul Kapelus

opment. It is an island in two senses. On the one

hand, it is much better funded, as is evident

when one compares the RBM budget of RIO

million (?1 million) for community projects in the MTA with the budget of the URC (approx imately ?4.6 million), which has to be spread out over 69 tribal districts. On the other hand, the MTA has few external linkages and networks.

Most significantly, perhaps, is the fact that

FJ3M does not share its community development

plan with the URC. As RBM states, they "have nothing to do with the URC unless it is

requested" (O'Brien, 1999). For its part, the URC feels somewhat frus

trated with (and a bit resentful of) the MTA and RBM. As they do not have the community

development plan from PJBM, they cannot inte

grate the MTA into its regional development

plan (For its part, RBM has not seen the URC

regional development plan.) The council officials

interviewed suggest that the council "takes a

hands off approach to Mbonambi" (Marais,

1999). Accordingly, the URC, which commonly refers to the Mbonambi as the "PJBM commu

nity," does not take the MTA into account when

it comes to the allocation of funds. There is a

strong feeling that greater integration of RBM

and the MTA into the URC would make for

more effective regional development policy. The

URC, however, has no way to force such par

ticipation, nor does such participation seem to

be of interest to the RJ3M or the leadership of

the MBA (which is provided with a great deal

of local autonomy and political influence by its

relationship with RBM).

V. Conclusion - two tales of CSR

Rio Tinto and its subsidiaries such as PJ3M

have committed themselves in recent years

through their CSR agendas to being more

socially responsible. They have expressed this

commitment primarily in the language of rela

tionships with and responsibilities to local com

munities. Rio Tinto, however, is not without its

detractors. Such critics differ with the firm at a

number of different levels, viz., basic assump

tions, the understanding of community, local

development practices and the approach to public

policy and development strategy. Their differ

ences around these various points, discussed

below, constitute two different tales of CSR.

Basic assumptions. It is commonly held that

business has an obligation to maximize share

holder value. To the extent that business

has obligations to stakeholder groups (e.g., local communities) as well, a tension may arise

between it meeting these two forms of obliga tion. There are two basic dimensions to this

tension. At a moral theoretical level, the basic

tension is one of competing moral claims (e.g., between shareholders and stakeholders), which

must be resolved on the basis of moral arguments and analysis. At a practical level (when stake

holder claims are deemed to take precedence), the tension involves the ability of the firm's board

and management to exercise their moral will to

take decisions that go against their own interests

(and those of shareholders). For their part, Rio Tinto and FJ?M seem to

make assumptions that deny the existence of any tension. At the moral theoretical level, as we have

seen, they tend to assume a harmony between

good ethics and good business. At the practical level, they also seem to assume that the company is committed to the values that it expresses and

that their managers can act upon them.

These assumptions contrast with those of

their detractors. Such opponents argue that Rio

Tinto 's efforts to maximize shareholder value do

impinge on its obligations to stakeholders. They also raise the question of whether Rio Tinto has

the moral will to implement decisions that are

not in the interests of its shareholders. Rio

Tinto 's failure to effectively implement its global CSR agenda across its subsidiaries, for example, could be interpreted as such a failure of will.

The understanding of community. As was noted

above, defining the notion of community is a

complex and controversial task. It is also the case

that different definitions of community can serve

different interests. We have seen that at the level

of its global corporate agenda, Rio Tinto does

allow for some flexibility in defining communi

ties which could, in principle, allow for a wide




range of stakeholder obligations. In the case of

RBM, however, we have seen how a Rio Tinto

subsidiary adopts a notion of community that

tends to restrict the firm's obligations. In terms

of boundaries, as we have noted, BJ?M defines

the community as the MTA rather that the larger sub-district or district in which it operates. In

terms of structure, BJBM tends to make simpli

fying assumptions about the community (e.g., that the local authority is legitimate, that there

are no significant conflicts of interests, etc.). These assumptions about the nature of the com

munity serve to reduce BJBM's costs (by allowing them to streamline decision-making, not take

into account certain issues and claims, etc.). In contrast to Rio Tinto's definition, it is

possible to understand community more broadly

(e.g., as the Uthungulu community). It is also

possible to acknowledge that the community is

at times divided by different interests, values and

strategies. This is the approach that is taken by the various opponents of Rio Tinto. Doing so,

however, is likely to increase the demands on

PJ3M and Rio Tinto and, thereby, increase their

costs (and decrease profits).

Local community development. As noted above, cor

porations can engage in CSR programs (and local

community development projects) either out of

moral or pragmatic motivation. These two moti

vations, however, are not necessarily compatible and do not necessarily lead to the same results.

To the extent that corporation are primarily motivated by pragmatic considerations, they are

seeking to reduce costs (related to disruptions,

protests, shareholder action, etc.). To reduce costs

they need to target different audiences. One is

the local community, which may be both a direct

source of costs (by initiating lawsuits, demon

strating, etc.) and an indirect source of costs

(when portrayed by others as being adversely affected by the firm's operations). Another

audience is comprised of potential financiers

(e.g., shareholders, banks, multilateral lending

agencies, etc.), which may be reluctant to invest

for either moral or pragmatic reasons (which

might involve issues of costs, fiduciary responsi

bilities, etc.). Another possible audience that may need to be placated is made up of NGOs and

social movements. In order to promote their

ultimate goal of profit maximization, firms will

have to take into account the costs and benefits

of addressing the concerns of each of these

groups, in the process ignoring the interests and

claims of some (e.g., small NGOs) and paying close attention to those of others (e.g., multilat

eral financial institutions). As we noted above, Rio Tinto and RJ3M tend

to make the simplifying assumption that being a

"good neighbour" is good for business. In doing so, they do not have to address the issue of whose

interests they need to address and what the costs

of doing so are. Similarly, by supposing a limited

and undifferentiated concept of community and

the legitimacy of local elites, they can claim that

their projects are promoting the form of devel

opment that the local community wants and

that they are fulfilling their responsibilities. If

NGOs or other groups disagree with them, then

Rio Tinto can always point to its support from

the local community (as Rio Tinto/FJ3M has

defined it). Rio Tinto's detractors, on the other hand,

have a different story to tell. They argue that to

the degree that companies like Rio Tinto are

operating on the basis of pragmatic motivation

(i.e., profits), they are basically engaging in a

public relations program. As such, they will

generally want to finance high profile projects

(which will put them in good stead with poten tial financiers and local elites) and to maintain

significant control over the nature of the projects

(so as to be able to choose and promote them

effectively). However, firms like Rio Tinto are

constrained (for PR reasons) by their "commit

ment" to good development practices (including such values as participation) and their need to

get cooperation from local elites and passive

acceptance by the local population. Under these

circumstances, the most logical options for a firm

are to: 1) try and restrict the number of its

projects and the area over which it operates, so

as to make its impact appear more impressive (on a per capita basis); 2) to try and retain control

over the projects selected (to make certain that

they are high profile and provide good PR value

for the money spent); 3) to limit participation to symbolic participation (so as not to impose



292 Paul Kapelus

excessive costs) and; 4) to ensure that the inter

ests of the local elites (in terms of selection of

projects, public acknowledgment, etc.) are met.

This, critics will argue, is what Rio Tinto has

done. This is not to claim that Rio Tinto's -

and in particular RBM's - efforts have not had

any positive development impact, as they clearly have. Rather, it is to claim that Rio Tinto has

not fully lived up to its responsibilities (i.e., it

should be providing more resources to more

people, it should be respecting labour standards) and that it has not effectively promoted devel

opment (i.e., the resources that it has used could

have been allocated more efficiently, albeit in

ways that probably would have had less PR value

for the firm).

Public policy and development strategy. Rio Tinto's

and RBM's CSR agendas operate in a larger

political economy context. This is constituted by different programs of economic liberalization

(e.g., trade, financial markets, etc.) as well as a

reduction in the various roles of the state (e.g., as economic agents, as providers of health, social

and educational programs, etc.) in countries

around the globe. In addition to being sceptical about the wisdom of this liberalisation for the

promotion of economic development generally,

many critics of economic liberalization have a

more specific concern that relates directly to

CSR. The concern is that the CSR agendas of

TNCs do not only serve to help local commu

nities (and reduce TNC costs), but also function

to justify liberalization policies. By taking over

functions that have traditionally been seen as the

role of the state, CSR programs may operate to

legitimate government cutbacks and the privati sation of social programs. This in turn, it is

feared, is resulting in decreased social spending,

inappropriate priorities and the creation of

"islands of development" (centered around cor

porate sites) in a larger sea of underdevelopment

(as it could be argued is the case of the MTA and

the Uthungulu district). While there is little reason to doubt that CSR

can function to legitimate liberalization and the

privatisation of government functions (Crooke and Manor, 1998), it could be argued that this

is not necessarily the case. While Rio Tinto does

not address this claim directly, others have devel

oped conceptualisations and languages that allow

for alternative explanations of the role of TNCs

in providing services vis-?-vis the state. Ferguson

(1998), for example, believes that the position stated above involves a conceptualisation of

TNCs as typically operating "below" the state,

but at times (and more and more) entering the

state's domain. He suggests that an alternative

would be to view TNCs as an "integral part of

a new transnational apparatus of governmen

tality" (1998, p. 21). In this new apparatus, the

lines between business and government may become more blurred, but it does not necessarily

mean a withdrawal by the state. Rather, if

business takes on a larger responsibility than

it previously had, this would allow the govern ment to target it's development programs more

effectively. These two stories of CSR (and the concep

tions of community that underlie them) are

clearly contradictory. The story that Rio Tinto

tells, is obviously the one that works to its advan

tage. This is not to say, however, that it could not

also be the one that works to the best advantage of local communities. Rio Tinto s case remains

shaky, however, weakened by its own failure to

effectively and consistently implement its own

global CSR agenda. While some of its operations like FJ3M have served as "showpieces," others

continue to lag much further behind (not only with respect to local development projects, but

also in terms of human rights, environmental

issues and labour relations). More consistent (and

timely) implementation would go a long way in

making Rio Tinto's story more convincing. Whether this would result in a practical refuta

tion of the alternative story is unclear, however.

These narratives collide in the context of the

larger disputation about processes of economic

globalization. Yet, while it may not be possible to envisage any resolution between the com

peting sides in this debate, companies like Rio

Tinto can (and should) continue to take steps that

at least make their stories more consistent inter

nally.




VI. Epilogue

Since the research for this paper was done (in

1999), there have been some developments. Most

significantly, perhaps, RJ3M has taken some steps to try and work more closely with regional

planning authorities. I have not yet been able to

try and evaluate the reaction by local communi

ties to these recent efforts, nor do I know of

other attempts to do so. For its part, Rio Tinto

continues to refine its global CSR Agenda. This

has included the publication of "Human Rights Guidance: Guidance for managers on imple

menting the human rights policy in 'The Way We Work'

" (2001), efforts to ensure that its non

managed companies also comply with appro

priate CSR principle and practices, expanding

partnerships (e.g., with Earthwatch), as well as

signing on to the United Nations' "Global

Compact." To this extent, it is attempting to

make its own story more consistent.

Despite its on-going efforts, Rio Tinto con

tinues to come under criticism. In 2000, for

example it was sued in a US court by residents

of Bougainville, Papua New Guinea (who allege that the firm is responsible for environmental dis

asters, toxin exposure, and the murder or resi

dents committed in complicity with the local

defence force). Rio Tinto 's operations in Brazil

have also come under attack for human rights, environmental and health and safety violations.

Similar complaints continued to be launched

regarding Rio Tinto 's PT Kelian Mine in

Indonesia (Drillbits and Tailings, 2000). Such

practices, critics claim, are not only unacceptable, but constitute violations of the commitments

that Rio Tinto made when signing on to the

UN's Global Compact (Kennedy, 2001). Nor is

it only stakeholders who are concerned. Senior

management has also come under criticism

by (some) shareholders, who are upset, among other things that management did not support shareholder resolutions at the March 2000

Annual General Meeting, which called for Rio

Tinto: 1) to become more accountable to share

holders through the appointment of an inde

pendent Deputy Chairman, and; 2) to implement a code of labour standards "based on the inter

nationally agreed core human rights conventions

of the United Nations' International Labour

Organisation" (Asia-Pacific Human Rights

Network, 2001). Both resolutions were easily defeated. Thus, while Rio Tinto's story may be

becoming internally more consistent, it would

seem that it is still far from convincing its critics

that this is the proper story to be told.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to acknowledge the

support and assistance offered by Richards Bay

Minerals, Uthungulu Regional Council and res

idents of Mbonambi, which made the research

for this paper possible. He would also like to

express his appreciation for the support provided

by the Mining and Energy Research Network

(MERN), University of Warwick and Dr. Ralph Brillo at Sussex University.

Notes

1 These interviews and this paper are based on

an MA Dissertation at the University of Sussex

(Kapelus, P., 1999. Mining and the Community: An

Ethnography of Transnational Corporations and

"Corporate Social Responsibility"), written with

support from MERN. 2

Among these are the Universal Declaration of

Human Rights, International Labour Organisation (ILO) conventions and Tripartite Declarations of

Principles concerning Multinational Enterprise and Social Policy, the International Covenant on Civil and

Political rights, and the Organisation for Economic

Co-operation and Development (OECD) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprise. Various environmental

guidelines such as Agenda 21, International Standards

Organisation, certification standards and environ

mental and social impact assessments have emerged out of international conferences and environmental

agreements. 3

Despite all the time and resources put into building

community relations, it would appear that the mining

industry is still struggling in its efforts. A vice presi dent of Orvana Minerals put the situation this way, "The point of contact and potential conflict between

communities and mining interests over social, socio

economic and environmental issues has been drawn

forward from the mining phase into the exploration



294 Paul Kapelus

phase . . . the industry collectively is ill equipped to

handle this reality" (Thomson, 1997, p. 1). 4

For a discussion on culture as a constraint to devel

opment, see Grillo (1997) and Crewe and Harrison

(1998). 5

Societies charcacterised by refugee movements may be particularly susceptible to having their traditional

identities questioned and having to take on multiple identities. 6

For their part, corporate leaders are certainly not

unaware of the contested nature of "the community.

Marc Gonsalves (1999) of Billiton pic (one of the co

owners of Richards Bay Minerals) states the situation

this way, "the community is like a wheelbarrow

pushed around by different political forces." 7

This is a complex question as firms are themselves

complex organizations and operate within a larger business system. In such a system, business firms have

to operate within the constraints of profitability. As a

result, CSR projects and budgets also have to operate under constraints. Insofar as firms have obligations to

shareholders and other stakeholders (e.g., consumers,

employees) as well as stakeholders commonly associ

ated with CSR programs (e.g., local communities), then discussion about the constraints that have to be

placed upon CSR programs do not necessarily indicate only a pragmatic motivation (although they

may), but may also have a strong moral component. 8

It would, of course, be an important issues for

deontologists, virtue theorists and others who place a strong emphasis

on motivation in moral analysis. 9 Cragg et al. (1995) have argued that if firms only

operate out of pragmatic motivation, they are not

likely to act in a responsible fashion. 10

Not only firms, but pro-business groups like the

PWBLF also readily make this assumption. The

PWBLF, for example, declares that being responsible to communities and cultures will "add value" to both

shareholders and society (Nelson, 1998). 11

Another argument that may help to ease this

tension, relates to the notion of "dependency."

Companies and their CSR experts may express moral

concerns that in undertaking CSR there is some risk

of creating dependency on the company and local

authorities. This could relate to situations in which

firms are fulfilling legally required or voluntary oblig ations (e.g., ensuring workers have adequate

access

to health and education services, community devel

opment projects, etc.). Such dependency, it could be

argued is not good for the "beneficiaries" of these

services in the long run. As well, from the perspec tive of the pragmatic interests of firms, such depen

dency may also be undesirable as they may increase

long term liabilities and undermine shareholder

value. 12

Among the areas in the developing world where

Rio Tinto has come under harsh criticism are Papua New Guinea, Indonesia and Namibia. In Papua New

Guinea, Rio Tinto's Bougainville mine has become

synonymous with environmental damage and associate

problems. In Indonesia, the company's operations

(e.g., the Kelian mine) during the time of the Suharto

dictatorship were not only charged with extensive

environmental and labour abuses, but also with major human rights abuses, including

numerous murders

involving paramilitary organizations. During the

apartheid era in South Africa, Pdo Tinto was violating basic international standards by illegally mining uranium in Namibia. In direct violation of UN

resolutions, the company extracted uranium,

according to the United Nations Council for

Namibia, "by virtual slave labour under brutal con

ditions" (Asia-Pacific Human Rights Network, 2001). 13

It is interesting to note that the layout, type face,

pictures, paper quality and cover images of these

documents reveal the same attention to aesthetic

considerations as the Rio Tinto corporate documents,

brochures and magazines. 14 This speech indicated that there would be a

handover of power through democratic elections and

that Nelson Mandela would be released from prison after 27 years of incarceration. 15

Such appeals have been made by various members

of government as well as during the Truth and

Reconciliation Commission (TRC), where Bishop Tutu called upon business to recognise it's role in

apartheid and participate in the development of South

Africa. 16

These include Kenmare (Irish), Billiton (South

African), Southern Mining (South African) and QIT

(Canadian), among others. 17

It is interesting to note that some PJBM officials

clearly express their commitment in moral terms.

Mr. Jabu Khubeka (General Manager, Public &

Community Affairs), for example, states that the

various CSR projects are being undertaken because

"what we believe in is human rights" and "we cannot

sleep if our neighbour is dying of hunger, we have

got to look in our cupboard" (interview, Mr. J. Khubeka, 23/06/99).

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