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Ethnic and Racial Studies

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Mirrored boundaries: how ongoinghomeland–hostland contexts shape Bangladeshiimmigrant collective identity formation

Tahseen Shams

To cite this article: Tahseen Shams (2017) Mirrored boundaries: how ongoing homeland–hostlandcontexts shape Bangladeshi immigrant collective identity formation, Ethnic and Racial Studies,40:4, 713-731, DOI: 10.1080/01419870.2016.1181773

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2016.1181773

Published online: 13 May 2016.

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Mirrored boundaries: how ongoinghomeland–hostland contexts shape Bangladeshiimmigrant collective identity formationTahseen Shams

Department of Sociology, University of California Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA, USA

ABSTRACTLargely overlooked in the international migration literature, migration from theMuslim world can reveal how the combination of globalization and ongoinghomeland tensions shapes immigrants’ collective identity formation in thehostland. Using the case of Bangladeshi Muslims in Los Angeles, this articleethnographically traces how ongoing and historic homeland, hostland, andglobal political–religious contexts shape immigrants’ everyday struggles overidentity categories through two distinct but overlapping processes: (1) theimmigrants’ exposure to a more expanded, diverse range of people in thehostland; (2) their import of homeland cleavages to the receiving society. Itargues that through international migration, migrants both produce andexperience globalization, consequently both reiterating and reconstructingtheir identity categories in the hostland. It also shows how the immigrants’cross-border ties to not only their homeland and hostland but also to nation-states beyond shape their identity-work, thus revealing conceptual ambiguitiesabout transnationalism and diaspora.

ARTICLE HISTORY Received 23 May 2015; Accepted 18 April 2016

KEYWORDS Transnationalism; globalization; international migration; immigrant identity; MuslimAmerican; Bangladeshi

Introduction

The transnational perspective expanded the focus of immigration scholarshipbeyond the hostland, underscoring the persistence of immigrants’ homelandties. However, the foundational studies (Glick-Schiller, Basch, and Blanc-Szanton 1992, 1995; Portes, Guarnizo, and Landolt 1999; Levitt 2001)focused on population movements in the Americas, which experiencevarying levels of political strife, but not intense ethno-religious violence. Con-sequently, while the literature correctly emphasizes the widespread, ongoingnature of immigrants’ homeland ties, it largely overlooks the contexts of

© 2016 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group

CONTACT Tahseen Shams tshams@ucla.edu

ETHNIC AND RACIAL STUDIES, 2017VOL. 40, NO. 4, 713–731http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2016.1181773

emigration when ethno-religious conflicts at the point of origin leave thenature of the homeland fundamentally contested.

This gap is particularly consequential regarding migration from the Muslimworld. These migrants stem from multiethnic and/or multi-religious countrieswhere the relationship between ethnicity and/or religion on one hand, andthe state on the other is the fulcrum of conflict. To what extent the state rep-resents a single ethnic/religious group or the diverse population within itsboundaries informs deep, ongoing cleavages even as migrants settle through-out the developed world. Moreover, immigration often exposes Muslims to adiverse, frequently global, Muslim population, thus engendering a furthertension between Muslims’ local ethnic/national identities and their member-ship to an abstract but global panethnic Islamic community, the Ummah.Largely overlooked in the international migration literature, migration fromthe Muslim world can reveal how globalization and ongoing homeland ten-sions simultaneously shape immigrant identity in the hostland.

I address these gaps by using the case of Bangladeshi Muslims in theUnited States to ethnographically trace how ongoing as well as historic home-land, hostland, and global contexts shape immigrants’ everyday strugglesover recognition as members of an identity category. Although not entirelyrepresentative of the extremely heterogeneous Muslim migrant experience,this population is well-suited to this study’s intellectual objective because Ban-gladesh is predominantly (but not exclusively) Muslim, and religion historicallyunderlies the intense political tensions ongoing both betweenmembers of thereligious majority and minority as well as within the religious majority.

The case of Bangladeshi Muslims tells the story of how two distinct butoverlapping processes interact in shaping immigrant identity categories.First, it shows how immigrants in the hostland, through internationalmigration, both produce and experience the effects of globalization. Immi-grants bring with them the cultural beliefs, practices, and values of the home-land to the receiving society where they encounter both native and non-native groups from diverse ethnic backgrounds. As this wide range of individ-uals mesh with each other within the host society, they produce contact andinteraction between various cultures and societies. This would have beenimpossible had immigrants remained in their respective countries of origin.Consequently, national identities that had been previously latent amongthe hostland’s native-born population when the migrants lived in foreignlands get triggered, producing nativist reactions against the newcomersfrom abroad. Thus, it is after international migration and in the hostlandthat immigrants experience the interconnectedness of diverse societiesfrom across the globe. Through these encounters, immigrants also apprehendthe similarities and differences between and within categories of people. Sim-ultaneously, both the immigrants and natives attribute meanings to thesedifferences and similarities, doing so in ways influenced by the ongoing

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hostland socio-political environment. While some dimensions of their identitycategories are made salient through these interactions, others lose relevance.Still other dimensions get reconstructed as immigrants, responding to theirpost-migration experiences, reevaluate their location not only within theirnewly adopted country but also according to their expanded worldview.

As will be shown, the Bangladeshi Muslim immigrants’ membership inIslam gains salience in the multi-religious United States society and is givenpolitically charged meanings post-9/11. Encounters with native host popu-lations highlight differences between ‘Muslim’ and ‘non-Muslim’ identity cat-egories that activate other forms of identities. It is also after migration to themultiethnic United States that Bangladeshi Muslims actually encounter andinteract with the Ummah. The infusion of multiethnic co-religionists allowscontact between Muslims of diverse national backgrounds, which wouldhave been impossible in the largely ethnically homogenous Bangladeshisociety. These interactions lead the Bangladeshi Muslim immigrants torealize that their religious practices have been infused with local culturalelements. Furthermore, interactions with co-religionists from differentcountries reflect gaping inequalities within the Muslim world at the globallevel. A key finding of this study is that, according to Bangladeshis, there isa hierarchy of Muslim groups with Arab Muslims at the top and BangladeshiMuslims towards the bottom. Despite subscribing to the same religion, immi-grants thus do not always view each other as having equal levels of religiousauthority or understanding based on national background. Thus, it is afterinternational migration that these immigrants also become ‘nationals’ asthey realize their location as an ethnic/national Muslim group according totheir new globalized worldview. As will be discussed, this finding has impli-cations pertaining to the concept of diaspora.

Second, the Bangladeshi Muslim case shows how immigrants bring withthem to the hostland their deeply embedded ethno-religious conflicts, inher-ited from colonial regimes in the homeland. As such, there can also be clea-vages within the same national immigrant group based on religious–political divisions imported from the homeland. The historical and ongoingconflicts ingrained in Bangladeshi society and national consciousnessprevail among the immigrants even as they settle in the hostland. BangladeshiMuslims’ homeland-oriented social divisions, networks, and loyalties do notdisappear once they enter the host country. Instead, telecommunication tech-nologies reinforce the homeland divisions by relaying and diffusing infor-mation of ongoing homeland conflicts. The immigrants use this flow ofinformation as raw materials to replenish dialogue with each other, and reiter-ate the boundaries within the community. Thus, the collective identitystruggles of the Bangladeshi Muslim immigrant community mirror the reli-gious–political divisions ongoing in the homeland. However, although the sal-ience of these homeland divisions does not diminish in the immigrants’

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identity-making processes, the meanings attributed to them are recon-structed as immigrants reevaluate their collective position in light of theirexposure to diverse populations and identity categories in the hostland.

Through these inter-related processes, the Bangladeshi Muslim immigrantsmaintain sometimes competing (but not mutually exclusive) identity cat-egories – Bangladeshi, Bangali, Muslim, and Bangladeshi Muslim – usinglanguage, space, symbols, organizations, and individual interactions on aneveryday basis. These identity categories are given meaning in relation tothe socio-political dynamics of both the homeland and hostland. To betterunderstand the specificity of these identity categories, a brief overview ofthe historic and ongoing religious–political tensions underlying Bangladeshisociety and national consciousness is as follows.

Historical overview of ongoing religious–political homelandtensions

Religion is a defining factor in Bangladeshi national identity, politics, social life,and everyday moral order (Devine and White 2013; Siddiqi 2006). Divisionsalong religious–political lines run deep in Bangladeshi national consciousness.The identities of Bangali and Bangladeshi, Muslim and Bangladeshi Muslim areextremely contentious, as they speak to which political party one belongs to –Awami League (AL) or Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP)/Jamaat-i-Islam –and the corresponding identity of Secularist or Muslim. The identities of‘Bangali’ and ‘Bangladeshi’ are layered with meanings that reflect internal div-isions. In the Bangladeshi public consciousness, ‘Bangali’ suggests support forAL and ideals of secular nationalism based on a common Bangla languageand culture that is negatively associated with the neighboring nation-state,India. Relationally, ‘Bangladeshi’ implies support for BNP/Jamaat and aBangali Muslim identity, which is negatively associated with Rajakars or Pakis-tani sympathizers. These identity categories, in turn, signify whether one is a‘true Bangladeshi’ or a ‘traitor’.

The foundation of the religion- and politics-laden identity categories inBangladeshi society today arguably goes back to British colonial policies inthe Indian sub-continent. During their colonization of India for two centuries,British administrators categorized their subjects based on religious affiliation,differing from pre-colonial classifications (Uddin 2006). They viewed Muslimsand Hindus as ‘two separate communities with distinct political interests’ andstrategically developed different education, electorate, and civil service pol-icies for each group (Uddin 2006, 48). As a consequence of Britain’s Divideand Rule policies, religious difference between Hindus and Muslims gainedpolitical salience. Religion became a fundamental factor in constructingtheir nationalist ideas even as the entire sub-continent fought for indepen-dence from the British. Hindu–Muslim tensions rose, imploding in the 1947

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Partition of Bengal along religious lines as carved by the withdrawing Britishforces. On one hand, India was predominantly Hindu. On the other, West Paki-stan and East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) comprised one Muslim state butwere geographically separated being located on either side of India. The par-tition pitted these states against each other, instigating large-scale massacresand forced migrations of both Hindus and Muslims across the borders asHindus fled from Pakistan to India, and Muslims from India to Pakistan. Mem-ories of these atrocities fuelled by religion remain in Indian, Pakistani, and Ban-gladeshi national consciousness to this day.

Despite common religious affiliation, however, East and West Pakistan con-sidered themselves culturally, economically, politically, and ethnically differ-ent from one another. Culturally, East Pakistan aligned more with theneighboring India than with West Pakistan located over 2000 kilometresaway. The balance of power between East and West Pakistan was in favourof the latter, leading East Pakistan to claim economic and political emancipa-tion. War ensued where ironically West Pakistan justified the genocide of EastPakistanis on religious grounds as they claimed to save the country’s Islamicideals from the neighboring Indian/Hindu influence (Riaz 2010).

Greatly shaken by the use of religion as a tool for violence in both par-titions, Bangladesh became independent in 1971 based on ideals of secular-ism, Bangali nationalism (nation-building based on the common use of Banglalanguage), socialism, and democracy. But only two decades since its indepen-dence, state politics transitioned from vehement exclusion of Islam from stateaffairs to embracing Islamist groups, such as Jamaat-i-Islami Bangladesh, asmajor power players in national politics (Ahmad 2008; Uddin 2006). Thisbipolar transition was possible because Islam is central to the overwhelmingmajority of the Bangladeshi population. Of the country’s total population,almost 90 per cent are Muslims while Hindus comprise around a dwindling9 per cent (Pew Research Religion and Public Life Project 2012). Religion isembedded in public sentiment and is exploited by the two rival politicalparties – AL and BNP.

AL claims to be a secular political party, advancing Bangali nationalism,which emphasizes unity of all Bangalis, Muslims and Hindus. AL spearheadedthe independence movement and stepped into power after the war, banningIslamic parties from entering state politics. However, BNP took power after theAL Prime Minister was assassinated. BNP withdrew the ban on religion in gov-ernment and replaced Bangali nationalism with Bangladeshi nationalism, thatis, a Bangali Muslim national identity that separated Bangladesh from India orthe ‘other’ Hindu Bangalis in Indian Bengal.

Eventually, Islam became the state religion and Jamaat partnered with BNPbecame the ruling coalition in 2001. Jamaat seeks to advance revivalist Islamthrough the establishment of an Islamic state with the Shariah as state law.Many of its leaders were Pakistani allies in the independence war. Advancing

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Islamic solidarity with other Muslim states, including Pakistan, Jamaat’s imageis largely that of a ‘Rajakar’ or traitor. Supporters of Jamaat as well as its his-torical ally BNP are branded as Rajakars. On the other hand, supporters ofAL are associated with a Bangali identity, which, for many, renders themtoo close to India for comfort. Although India was Bangladesh’s ally againstPakistan in 1971, the religious divide between Hindu India and Muslim Bangla-desh, and the contested India–Bangladesh border created hostility towardsIndia in Bangladeshi public consciousness. AL supporters and/or those identi-fying as Bangali are often suspected to be India sympathizers.

In 2008, AL took back power and began the 1971 war tribunals. In 2012, anumber of key Jamaat leaders were sentenced to death and/or imprisonmentfor their activities against Bangladeshis and freedom fighters during the war.These sentences sparked controversy in the Bangladeshi public, both indefence of the country’s Muslim leaders (Jamaat) and in support of the sen-tences or harsher punishments. Exploited by AL, BNP, and Jamaat, religiousand national divides have amplified. Strikes, violent public conflicts, and kill-ings led by student political leaders done in the name of religion becameregular occurrences. Those in defense of Islam are publicly branded as Raja-kars while those in support of secularism are branded as atheists.

Methodology

I conducted participant observation (including semi-structured, conversa-tional interviews at fieldsites) for nine months during 2012–2013 (withseveral follow-ups) in Los Angeles, which hosts a Bangladeshi enclave andone of the largest Bangladeshi immigrant populations in the United States.I accessed the community using a Bangladeshi restaurant/grocery-storeinside the enclave and a biweekly Bangla language school located inanother part of Los Angeles. This enabled me to locate Bangladeshis livingthroughout Los Angeles. As a young Bangladeshi woman proficient inBangla, I had an insider’s access to their community and family lives.

On weekends, men from the enclave gathered at the restaurant to shareconversations over food, some staying long after they had eaten to catchthe news from the store’s television. I visited here twice a week as a customer,usually sitting at the back where I had a complete floor-view. I observed every-one’s interactions, sometimes participating in ongoing conversations. Thestoreowner usually introduced me to the customers as a doctoral student.This status cast me in a favourable light, paving the way for conversationsabout family, career-choices, and education. A couple of the men introducedme to their wives who saw me as a young girl away from family for pursuinghigher education, and invited me to their homes.

At the Bangla school I volunteered as a language teacher, a position thatallowed me to become familiar to the families and interact with them

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during class and community-lunches. Eventually, in addition to my regularfield-visits, I branched out to other locations and gatherings through peopleI met during fieldwork. I was invited to people’s homes for private dinnersand community get-togethers, organizational events, cultural festivals, aswell as casual hang-outs at restaurants, museums, shopping-malls, andfarmers-markets. I analyse my findings below.

Immigrants producing and experiencing globalization

Globalization refers to the interconnectedness of various societies fromacross the globe through large-scale population and informational flowsleading to a more integrated world (Scholte 2005). Through internationalmigration, immigrants create contact between diverse societies, identitycategories, cultures, social beliefs, and practices in the hostland. Immi-grants are categorized into identity labels in the hostland regardless oftheir own narratives based on ongoing socio-political contexts. Throughthese interactions immigrants also experience the effects of globalizationas they begin to see themselves and their multiple identities differently –they reevaluate their collective position not only within their adoptedcountry, but also in the more expansive and interconnected society thanbefore migration. The immigrants in this new context either establishnew identity categories or give new meanings to pre-existing categoriesfor themselves.

In focusing on the contrast between natives and foreigners, immigrantsbecome aware of the differences between identity categories as theybecome exposed to the new hostland social and religious environment, par-ticularly the views and expectations of the majority group. Immigrants fromthe Muslim world arriving in a non-Muslim (predominantly Christian)country like the United States discover what it means to be a member ofboth a foreign nationality and a minority religion. For example, upon arrival,Bangladeshi Muslims are exposed to an Islamophobic narrative that conflatesextremists and moderates within one ‘Muslim’ identity category viewing themall as national security threats and holding all Muslims accountable for theviolent actions of a select few in both domestic and foreign conflicts(Cainkar 2009; Maira 2009). For instance, during an informal Bangladeshi gath-ering the week after the Boston Marathon bombings, guests exchanged newsof how their Bangladeshi friends and family in Boston were doing. One of thefamilies had a female friend in Boston who wears a hijab. She was shoved frombehind in the streets and was called derogatory names for being Muslim. ‘But,it was nothing much – she didn’t get injured,’ we were told. Such encounterswith the native population inform Bangladeshi immigrants of their ‘Other-ness’ in the host society. More specifically, they become conscious of a politi-cally charged ‘Muslim’ identity category imposed on them by the natives, an

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awareness that had not occurred in their homeland where they were the reli-gious majority.

Thus, the Bangladeshi Muslim immigrants interpret various encounterswith the native host population in relation to the overarching post-9/11socio-political environment and homeland-oriented identities. Based onthese interpretations the Bangladeshi Muslim immigrants attach racially/eth-nically and religiously charged meanings to their national identity category.These immigrants position themselves and their homeland-oriented organiz-ations in response to Islamophobic hostland encounters. For example, RELIEFis a charity organization run by middle-class Bangladeshi professionals thatfunds development projects in Bangladeshi rural areas. The organization rig-orously screens potential projects to first and foremost ensure they have‘absolutely no connection’ to any religious cause. This organization empha-sizes secularism not because they view religion as a divisive line back in Ban-gladesh, but because the United States identifies the Bangladeshi immigrantcommunity as Muslim. Where the money goes and how it will be spent, thus,depend on the identity category imposed on the immigrant group by the hoststate in relation to its socio-political context. At an invitation-only charitydinner, the board members gave a presentation on the organization’shistory and objectives. The first point the board members talked about is asthat ‘we Bangladeshis’ have to remember that this is a ‘post 9/11 world andthat we are Muslims’ and that Bangladesh is an Islamic country. The boardmembers explained that they have to be extremely careful about wheretheir money goes because they are under surveillance as Muslims. Bangla-desh, in fact, had been one of the twenty-six Muslim-majority sendingcountries in the United States government’s ‘special registration’ programmefor ensuring national security after 9/11. The Bangladeshi immigrant organiz-ation’s transnational secular identity is a reaction to Islamophobic encountersin post 9/11 America.

Thus, the Bangladeshis undergo an experience of foreignness common tomost immigrants – albeit in this case, a double foreignness compounded bynationality and religion that highlights the differences between identity cat-egories. However, as populations of myriad ethnic and national origins inthe Muslim world all converge in the United States, hostland encountersalso highlight differences within identity categories, which, in the BangladeshiMuslim case made them aware of the differences separating them from otherMuslim nationals. These differences between groups within the Muslim iden-tity category are interpreted in ways that reflect the inequalities and historictensions that percolate among countries at the global level. Due to exposureto multiethnic coreligionists in the hostland these differences become salientin the Bangladeshi Muslim immigrants’ globalized worldview.

Generally, Bangladesh is a country largely invisible in the American imagin-ary. In research, Bangladeshis are usually lumped together as South Asians

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and Muslims, overlooking the internal group dynamics. Paradoxically,however, simultaneous to Bangladeshis’ obscurity as an immigrant group,their homeland Bangladesh is infamous for its floods, poverty, and politicalinstability. Thus when Bangladesh does come up in the American mediaand discussions, it is almost always because of its natural calamities,poverty, and political corruption (Kibria 2011).1 In stark contrast to Bangla-desh, Saudi Arabia is one of the wealthiest countries in the world as well asa key player in global politics. Most importantly to Muslims, Saudi Arabia isthe birthplace of Islam and the Prophet, and hosts the Ka’aba, the placemost sacred to Muslims worldwide. Saudi Arabia is generally perceived tobe the custodians of Islam as exemplified by its regulating the nationalquota on who gets to perform pilgrimage or Hajj each year.

I found that although Bangladeshi generally implies Muslim, the categoryof Bangladeshi Muslim implies having less religious knowledge and authoritythan Muslims from Saudi Arabia. Through international migration, this globalimbalance of power within the Muslim world trickles down, gains salience,and shapes how Muslim immigrants from different nationalities view eachother as they physically interact within a multiethnic hostland, such as theUnited States. Throughout my fieldwork, interactions with BangladeshiMuslims revealed this underlying sense of national hierarchy within the‘Muslim’ category wherein the Bangladeshis placed Arab Muslims at ahigher rank. For example, I had asked Nazma, a woman actively involved inthe Bangladeshi community for almost three decades why most Bangladeshistend to celebrate Islamic occasions mostly amongst themselves. She replied,‘Because they [Bangladeshi men] can’t boss around in the Muslim community!There are Muslims from Arab countries – really learned Muslims. Who amongthem would listen to a Bangladeshi Bhai?’ In this context, Bhai, meaningbrother in Bangla, carries belittling connotations. Although Nazma’s spon-taneous response may appear to be flippant, it in fact reveals a gapingdivide among Muslim nations at the global level. I analyze this internaldynamics based on an underlying hierarchy in depth in the following ethno-graphic observation:

I was waiting for my order at the Bangladeshi restaurant when a family of sevenentered. The family looked religious. The father had a long beard and woreclothes traditional for Muslim men. The mother wore a burkha. Even thoughthe restaurant was almost empty and had several booths unoccupied, themother went all the way to the end of the store and sat at the last boothwith her back to the entrance, completely hidden from view. The three sonsand two daughters sat with her. The father sat on the next booth all byhimself. Although there was plenty of room for people to sit in his booth, oneof the sons borrowed an extra chair from another table to join the mother.The older daughter sat with her, facing the back wall, and the youngest daugh-ter sat at the corner with only her head showing. Both daughters wore burkha.The three sons were wearing the same kind of clothes as the father who had an

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air of authority – he was clearly the head of the family. He placed orders for thewhole family and had to pass by me several times to get napkins and ketchup. Inoticed he never looked at me directly. When he did look at me to exchangepleasantries, he looked at my right arm.I had to go check on my food and by the time I came back, I saw that the fatherwas having a lively conversation in English with a young man who was havinglunch by himself on the other side of the restaurant. I understood from their con-versation that the young man was from Saudi Arabia. He spoke with a heavyaccent. He has been in the America for four months and attends a universityin California. After complimenting the young man’s English, the father toldhim that his oldest son is now a Quran Hafiz (one who has memorized theQuran). He then turned towards his son telling him to go sit next to theyoung man. “He is from Medina! Allah has truly graced us,” said the father inBangla to his son. The son did as he was told. I inferred from their excitedexpression that this encounter was indeed viewed as a treat. The father toldthe young Arab to ask his son to recite his favorite verses from the Quran.The Arab asked the boy to recite anything. The boy started to recite theQuranic verses loudly. Everyone in the restaurant stopped talking and turnedto listen. They were all smiling. After the boy was done, the Arab turned tolook at the father and said ‘MashaAllah’. One of the customers in the restaurantexclaimed ‘Thank you!’ The Bangladeshi boy smiled widely and even wider whenthe young Arab man told him that he could go to a famous Medina school forhigher Islamic studies. The boy had heard about this school and wants to gothere to study.

Here, the Bangladeshi Muslims not only interacted with a foreign nationalbut with one who is also a foreign co-religionist. The Bangladeshi and Arabimmigrants in this instance actualized the abstract notion of the Ummah byphysically connecting multiethnic Muslims and their societies with eachother. The father could very likely not have met an Arab Muslim man fromMedina had he remained in Bangladesh. It is after migrating to the receivingcountry that immigrants such as the father are exposed to an expansive anddiverse range of encounters with people and societies from across the globe.

By exposing Bangladeshis to coreligionists of foreign nationalities notpresent within their homeland boundaries, globalization via migrationforces them to confront their status within the hierarchy of Muslim-originpeoples. The father did not ask, for example, whether the young man was reli-gious, but instead upon hearing that the young man was from Medina thefather assumed the man was an Arab Muslim whom he and his family were‘graced’ by Allah to have met. Again, despite the Eid dates in Bangladeshand America being different from Saudi Arab, many of the Bangladeshi immi-grants celebrated Eid on the day the Saudis observed it. Eid is the main reli-gious festival for Muslims scheduled based on new moon sightingssupervised by religious authorities in each country. However, these Banglade-shi Muslim immigrants viewed the Saudi lunar calendar to be the most‘authentic’.

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The immigrants’ encounters across Muslim cultures reinforce the sense ofhierarchy as immigrants question the correctness of their own religious prac-tices. For example, Tipu, a young man I met at a social event, has learnt afterencountering Arab Muslims in America that some of the religious festivals thatBangladeshis observe do not have roots in Islamic scriptures and are notobserved elsewhere. ‘Islam’ he said, ‘is more like a culture than religion’ in Ban-gladesh where religious leaders are politically motivated and little educated.Indeed, for many Bangladeshi Muslim immigrants Bangladesh is not only apoor developing country but also one that is geographically and culturallyproximate to the largely Hindu India, as a consequence of which Islam in Ban-gladesh includes local elements that are not part of ‘real Islam’. The view thatHindu culture is the antipode of Islamic beliefs, so much so that any culturaldiffusion between the two because of proximity adulterates Islam, is rooted inhistoric national–religious conflicts still ongoing in Bangladesh, as overviewedtowards the beginning of this article.

Religion indeed remains a potent source of cleavage within the Banglade-shi national category as Hindus and Muslims tend to organize separately fromeach other even in the hostland. Even within the ‘Muslim’ identity categorywhere all members mainly adhere to Islam or within the ‘BangladeshiMuslim’ identity category in which the members ascribe to both the same reli-gion and nationality, historic and ongoing homeland political dynamics play apersisting role. The next section shows how, through encounters in the host-land that highlight the differences between and within religious/national cat-egories, the cleavages dividing the immigrant community mirror thoseongoing in the homeland.

Homeland-oriented cleavages within the national group

While immigrants are foreigners in the hostland, they also encounter co-nationals from different segments of the homeland society as they engagein different ethnic organizations and build ethnic communities. The co-national immigrants find common reference-points based on nationalhistory, language, culture, and ethnicity amongst each other. For example,the historical and political divides between Pakistan and Bangladesh arestill salient in the collective national memories of the Bangladeshi immigrantsobserved in this study. Despite sharing Islam as a common religion with Paki-stan, association with Pakistanis is still stigmatizing within the Bangladeshicommunity as exemplified in the following conversation I had with a groupof woman I met in the Bangladeshi enclave.

One of the women brought up the recent wedding of the daughter ofanother woman present in our group. I learnt that the daughter married aPakistani man. The mother immediately corrected the other woman bysaying that the groom’s ‘parents are from Pakistan’. ‘You mean Pakistani?’

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I asked. She immediately responded, ‘his parents happen to be from Pakistan –not him. He was raised in America’. Another woman in the group commentedthat she had gone to another wedding where the groom was also from Paki-stan. The mother, I observed, was uncomfortable during the conversation asshe fidgeted with her fingers and was eager to change the topic.

That a wedding between a Bangladeshi and Pakistani is a topic of gossip inthe Bangladeshi community as well as the mother’s reluctance and discomfortin her daughter marrying someone with Pakistani heritage suggest thatassociation with Pakistanis is not considered a norm among the Bangladeshiimmigrants. This reflects an existing cleavage between Bangladesh and Paki-stan in the Bangladeshi immigrants’ collective consciousness produced fromtheir common history of national struggle.

Conversely, interactions with co-nationals in the hostland can reveal thedifferences within the national group as individuals have opposing viewpointsand interpretations of Bangladesh’s history and ongoing political events.Despite identifying within a ‘Bangladeshi’ national identity category, manyimmigrants in this study also subscribed to other homeland-oriented identi-ties, such as ‘Bangali’ based on political allegiances informed by Bangladesh’sturbulent history of state-formation and subsequent ongoing political–reli-gious tensions. These homeland conflicts are embedded in the immigrants.As such, they struggle to create boundaries within the same national groupbased on ongoing political tensions entrenched in Bangladesh’s history,society, and national consciousness overtime that immigrants import to theUnited States.

The salience of religion as a dividing line within the Bangladeshi immigrantcommunity separating Muslims and Hindus exemplifies this point. There islittle Hindu presence in the Bangladeshi immigrant community even in cul-tural events open to all Bangladeshis. In the language school, only two ofthe fourteen attending families were Hindu. Nazma explained why the Ban-gladeshi community is Los Angeles is largely Muslim: ‘Religion is definitely adividing line in the community. No one likes to admit it and no one does itwith intention. It just happens.’ She said that Hindu Bangladeshis do not‘mix’ with Muslim Bangladeshis after arriving in America. ‘They mix morewith Hindu Bangalis from Kolkata [a city in India with a large Bangali speakingpopulation along the western borders of Bangladesh].’ Nazma further saidthat the ‘Hindu culture’ in the Bangali community resonates more withHindu Bangladeshis than the culture in the Bangladeshi community, whichis ‘unintentionally Muslim’ making Hindu Bangladeshis feel ‘left out’. Bangla-deshi Muslims used to attend Bangali events in other organizations run byBangalis from Kolkata. However, these events usually opened with Hindurituals (such as puja, coconut breaking). ‘So Muslim Bangalis don’t go therebecause it’s not them,’ Nazma said. Similarly, even though Eid parties to

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celebrate the Islamic festival in the Bangali community are open to all Banga-lis, Hindu Bangalis do not attend.

Although situated in the Bangladeshi enclave, the restaurant fieldsite struc-turally catered to Muslim Bangladeshis. Thus, the store has a big sign on thewall saying “Halal Meat” in English, with a smaller sign in Bangla informingthat the store takes orders for meat shares for Eid celebrations. The customersand staff are co-ethnics – Bangladeshi Muslim. Usually women who come infor grocery shopping or dining with their families wear a hijab, a burkha, ora shawl covering their hair, indicating their Islamic belief. I only once saw aHindu couple – identifiable as Hindu from the vermillion on the wife’s hair– enter the store. The couple did not dine, but left after purchasing their gro-ceries. By contrast, it was easy to tell when customers in the dining area wereMuslim (as in most cases) because of the frequent references to Islam in theirconversations with one another. For example, customers and the storeownerusually exchanged salaam upon entering the store. Even casual day-to-dayinteractions had Islamic connotations. For example, when the storeownerasked his helper to carry a hot tray to the kitchen he jokingly said, ‘If youare a true Muslim, you have no fear! You will not burn!’ implying that Allahwill protect him.

Whereas Nazma’s comment, above, attributes the distance between Ban-gladeshi Muslims and Hindu immigrants to cultural differences, considerationof ongoing homeland contexts points to deeper roots. A religious minority,the Hindu presence in Bangladesh is a source of intense political tensionsbecause Islamic fundamentalist groups want to eliminate them from thecountry despite the fact that they are Bangladeshi citizens. In fact, Bangladeshhas been named an ‘egregious violator’ of human rights because of violentoutbreaks against Hindu citizens, and illegal confiscation of their property(Hindu American Foundation 2012).

Whether and how to include Hindu presence in immigrant communityspaces is a conscious decision in Bangladeshi cultural organizations. Forexample, in the case of the language school, which is comprised of mostlyBangladeshi Muslim families, members stressed that it was a place for ‘notnecessarily Bangladeshis, but Bangalis. Anyone who wants to learn theBangla language is welcome here. It was a meeting place for the Bangali com-munity’. When I asked some of the parents who attended American graduateschools if they had other Bangladeshis in their departments, I was told thatalthough they did not know other ‘Bangladeshis’, they knew some ‘Bangalis’.‘Which is what matters,’ Nazma, who attends the school, quickly added. Shesaid, ‘We are all Bangalis. We have the same culture, same language. We Ban-galis are all one.’

Nazma is an influential person both in the school and in the larger Bangla-deshi immigrant community. She tries to create spaces to unite Bangalisthrough participation in South Asian organizations, arranging events that

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are deliberately inclusive of both Muslim and Hindu cultures. One way sheinstitutionally enforces a secular Bangali identity is through use of languagein community events under her supervision. For example, the events at thelanguage school always began with both Islamic and Hindu greetings(‘Salaam and Nomoshkar’) or the secular Bangla word for welcome (‘Shago-tom’). Despite the low turn-out of Bangladeshi Hindus and Kolkata Bangalis,this deliberate use of language within the school symbolically includes all Ban-galis, regardless of religion and nationality. In order to create a Bangali com-munity, any symbol that may show bias towards a particular religion (forexample, Islam over Hinduism) is consciously omitted.

Despite these attempts, the immigrants from Bangladesh are nonethelessdivided by a religious line between Bangalis (Hindu) and Bangladeshis(Muslims). In some contexts (as described above), this division translatesinto different communities with people organizing and participating separ-ately based on their homeland political dispositions and whether they empha-size their national identities as ‘Bangladeshis’, linguistic identities as ‘Bangalis’or their religious identities as ‘Muslims’ in the hostland. In some other con-texts, these communities overlap within a common space. For example,Jamila has a son whom she brings to the ‘Bangali community’ in the languageschool for Bangla lessons and also to be around other ‘Bangladeshi children’.When I asked her why she used the term Bangladeshi instead Bangali, she said,‘Of course wemix with Bangalis as well. We [Bangalis] have the same languagebut there is also the religion thing. From Bangladeshis, my son can get theMuslim aspect of the Bangladeshi culture as well.’ Some of the othermothers I spoke with reflected similar motivations as Jamila’s.

While Nazma and others like her want the language school to be a secularBangali space, there are others who want the school to be more conducive toIslamic norms. This tension became explicit during a conversation among themothers who were mostly in charge of the language school. A mother of twodaughters, Rahima is well known in the community. She wants the school tobe gender-segregated. She and her eldest daughter wear a hijab. In keepingwith a conservative interpretation of Islamic rules, Rahima does not want hertwo daughters attending the school to come in front of men outside thefamily. If the school does not enforce these Islamic traditions, Rahima wouldnot want her daughters attending the school. Rahima’s example of wantingto create a Muslim environment shows that the language school, despiteexplicitly promoting a secular identity, is a contested space where actors doboundary-work based on religious and national lines rooted in Bangladesh.

The Bangladeshi immigrants also imported explicitly political divisions andthe identity categories produced from them, which characterize the ongoingsocio-political landscape in Bangladesh. The salience of these imported politi-cal identities is visible in the collective boundary-work within the Bangladeshiimmigrant community. For example, every year, the Bangladesh Day Parade

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takes place in the LA Bangladeshi enclave for all Bangladeshis to commemor-ate Bangladesh’s independence from Pakistan. The LA Bangladeshi organiz-ations pay the city to block the streets for the parade to march through theneighborhood. At one such parade, people were wearing traditional clothesin red and green – the colours of the Bangladesh flag. Bangladeshi patrioticsongs were blaring from the front of the parade. As participants carried organ-izational banners, tiny Bangladeshi flags, and even a few American flags, thewhole neighborhood became transformed into a space for celebrating Ban-gladeshi-ness. I was surprised, however, that women from a Muslim organiz-ation wearing hijabs and burkhas comprised the largest group in the parade.Also, although I saw a banner for the BNP, I did not see one for AL, or a Ban-gladeshi Hindu organization. I realized that this parade was comprised of andcatered to only Bangladeshi Muslims. An elderly woman in a sari watching theparade from the sidewalk who was apparently well known in the communitytold me that she used to live in this neighborhood for many years beforemoving. I asked her about her thoughts on the parade. She replied that it isusually three times bigger. As Jamaat was believed to have funded theparade, many people and organizations (especially those who are againstJamaat and/or support AL) did not participate, expecting it to become politicalin light of the contentious 1971 war tribunals ongoing in Bangladesh thatyear. The woman also informed me that there was a rumor of another, BNPmarch later that day protesting AL supporters’ boycott of the parade. My con-versation with the woman was interrupted then as a young man broke fromthe parade shouting, ‘Are we Rajakars? We are all Bangladeshis. We are here asBangladeshis. Why would they not come?!’ I later heard from two participantsthat a fight had broken out in the festival following the parade. A singer whoflew in from Bangladesh played ‘secular’ songs, which in the political contextof that time meant he was spreading not just anti-Jamaat or anti-BNP propa-ganda, but anti-Islamic ones. His songs triggered outrage in some people fromthe audience, instigating the fight.

These observations suggest that some imported identity categories arereproduced in the hostland. The salience of these homeland-oriented identitycategories does not diminish and remain unaltered in their meanings becauseBangladeshis continue to encounter and interact with co-nationals in LosAngeles. Furthermore, the Bangladeshi immigrants’ homeland connectionsbolstered by technological advancements provide ways to cultivate theseBangladesh-oriented identities. Social media, blogs, phone calls, Bangladeshinews channels, and regular visits back home provide information of theongoing day-to-day political scenario in Bangladesh as well as provide chan-nels to engage in homeland politics. Bangladeshi bloggers and Facebookusers living abroad were a key force in shaping the ongoing movement toprosecute conspirators of Bangladesh’s liberation war. Although immigrantsare not directly affected by Bangladeshi politics because of being physically

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outside of the home state’s reach, their loved ones left behind are. Thisemotional attachment serves as a motivation for immigrants to closelyfollow the political situation back home. Whenever there is an instance ofincreased violence, they call their families to make sure that they are safe.The immigrants’ interest and knowledge of ongoing developments in home-land politics are reflected in the group conversations in social gatheringswhere Bangladeshi politics is the main topic of discussion and heateddebates. The television in the Bangladeshi restaurant usually plays Banglade-shi news channels for the customers. Many families with school-going chil-dren also visit Bangladesh at least once every two to three years. Someimmigrants involved in Bangladeshi development organizations also go toBangladesh to oversee sponsored projects. When they come back, theyhave insider updates for others in the immigrant community. Telecommuni-cation advancements, thus, not only reinforce homeland identities but alsoenlarge the diffusion of homeland conflicts to the diaspora. Such flows ofinformation from the homeland to the hostland serve as raw materials toreplenish discussions and debates among immigrants within the samenational group. These interactions conversely also reinforce the importedhomeland political identity categories within the immigrant community.

Conclusion

This article shows how homeland political–religious tensions spill over andcombine with existing hostland and global contexts to shape immigrants’ col-lective identity categories on the ground. In their struggle to reconcileimported homeland cleavages with an expanded, post-migration worldview,immigrants reevaluate, reiterate, and/or reconstruct previously taken forgranted meanings attached to their identities.

Overall, the article reflects a contrast between political transnationalism ofmigrations within the Americas and those from elsewhere in the developingworld where multiethnic/multi-religious states have risen from colonialistempires. In the former, reflecting the stability of territorial boundaries, politicaltransnationalism has been often aimed towards regime change, as amongCubans (Eckstein 2009), or has sought to attain extra-territorial participationin homeland democratic political processes (Smith 2003; Smith and Bakker2008). In the latter, the political transnationalism of immigrants from develop-ing countries elsewhere (particularly from the Muslim world, such as Bangla-desh), long-distance, cross-border loyalties reflect the instability of the nationitself that is still under construction along the cleavages left by colonialistregimes. As shown, these past and ongoing homeland contexts shape immi-grant identity-work in relation to hostland dynamics as the globalization ofdiverse populations via immigration reveals contrasts and similarities bothbetween and within categories of people.

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Furthermore, this article raises questions regarding the adequacy of trans-nationalism and, by extension, diaspora as concepts for analyzing thephenomena to which they refer. The concept of transnationalism refers tothe social connections between homeland and hostland (Waldinger 2015)or ‘the processes by which immigrants build social fields that link togethertheir country of origin and country of settlement’ (Glick-Schiller, Basch,and Blanc-Szanton 1992, 1). However, the case of Bangladeshi Muslims high-lights another form of cross-border tie, one that extends across not only theborders of receiving and sending states, but, as in the case of the Ummah,across numerous different states, nations, and ethnicities. The Bangladeshiimmigrants’ connections to Saudi Arabia, generally considered as the heart-land of the Muslim world by believers, shaped their identity formation inaddition to those with Bangladesh and the United States. This shows thatnation-states other than the immigrants’ homeland and hostland, such asthose important to their religious identity, can also shape their identity for-mation processes. As Levitt (2007) has noted, scholars of transnationalismneed to adopt a globally interconnected lens for a more comprehensiveunderstanding of the role of cross-border ties on immigrants. In focusingon the case of Bangladeshi Muslims, this article has sought to implementjust such an understanding, and thereby extend the existing homeland–hostland framework.

In terms of diaspora, which studies migrants’ connections between an ima-gined or real ethno-national centre or ‘referent origin’ and multiple receivingstates (Dufoix 2008), this article makes the theoretical point that a diasporagroup can have multiple centres—both ethno-national as well as religiousthat simultaneously shape collective identity formation. Members of an immi-grant group can subscribe to multiple identity categories, each of which isassociated with a referent origin. For example, the center for the ‘Bangladeshi’diaspora is Bangladesh, whereas, for the ‘Muslim’ diaspora it is arguably SaudiArabia. However, Bangladeshi Muslims identify differently with both these dia-sporic groups – based on national origin with the former, and religion with thelatter. As shown, their ties to both the ethno-national and religious centersshape their collective identity-work in the hostland. In order to move thisresearch agenda forward, international migration researchers shouldexplore how immigrants connect to multiple diasporic centers based on asense of group-ness and consequently do identity-work in relation toongoing political–religious dynamics in the homeland, hostland, and else-where beyond.

Note

1. Kibria (2011) analyzes Bangladesh’s ‘global national image’ as an obscure devel-oping country and how it affects its migrants in the world market economy.

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Although studying the same national group, this article, in contrast, theorizeshow globalization via immigration, and homeland–hostland contexts shapeinternal identity struggles within the ‘Bangladeshi’ and ‘Muslim’ categories.

Acknowledgments

I am grateful to Dr Roger Waldinger and Dr Rubén Hernández-León for their construc-tive comments.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Funding

This work was supported by the National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fel-lowship [DGE-1144087].

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